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The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups

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The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups

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... Such a normative approach is also applied by Mancur Olson (1971) in his book 'The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups'. In that book he reviews the origin of every single organization from the point of view of providing the common good for every single one of its participants. ...
... These groups do not assume ideological membership primarily based on the expected utility for every participant and its variation depending on the total count of people preferring the given alternative. This claim corresponds with Olson's (1971) thesis about the value of the decision of every single participant and the benefit of the larger part of the group which seeks the same social good. ...
... In the first case, as also pointed out by Mancur Olson (1971) the smaller number of participants leads to more optimal decisions and easier distribution of the profits of the taken decision. ...
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Exploring the reasons behind the difference in the outcomes of three mining projects in Bulgarian municipalities. The focus is put on the economic development, media coverage and institutional framework. The results suggest that lack of regulation in line with the responsibilities of the stakeholders is the main reason behind the volatility of the expected outcomes.
... The theory of access [25] and the theory of collective action [26] were applied to understand the mechanisms of access and management strategies of agricultural machinery by farmers and food processors. ...
... All these mechanisms are interdependent and can operate sequentially, simultaneously, or in opposition to each other [25], [33]. The existence of informal access rules and norms can determine who can access agricultural machinery as well as the processes by which the machinery is accessed [26]. Moreover, the mechanisms of access to agricultural machinery by farmers and processors may vary according to the type of equipment [27], [28], the user, the rainy season, or the circumstances [35]. ...
... To analyse how collective action influences access to agricultural machinery, the theory of collective action has been considered [26]. This theory posits that at the basis of a group, there is an interest, and until this interest is materialised through action, the group does not exist. ...
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Agriculture in Benin represents a strategic asset for the country's socio-economic progress, however, there is low productivity and competitiveness within the sector. This is owing to the difficulties in accessing new technologies such as agricultural machinery. This study investigated the mechanisms of access and management of agricultural machinery in Benin. The study was conducted in 13 villages across the seven Agricultural Development Poles (PDA). It used a mixed-method approach involving semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Respondents were selected using a multi-stage sampling technique. A sample size of 129 farmers and 66 food processors were interviewed in the entire study area. Moreover, 26 focus group discussions were conducted; two discussions with men and women in each village. Content analysis method was adopted to analyse the data obtained from the focus group discussions while the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23 was used to analyse the primary data collected through semi-structured interviews espousing descriptive statistics, Kendall W test, and Chi-square test. The findings indicate that the access strategies to agricultural machinery were based on social integration, farm management, and social loyalty whereas the enabling perceived factors for accessing agricultural machinery includes the donation of agricultural machinery to farmers’ organisations, the subsidisation of agricultural machinery, and the promotional offer of equipment. However, the respondents preferred the provision of services by farmers’ organisations and individual ownership as the main management mechanisms. Therefore, the study recommends the government motivate farmers through the provision of incentives, subsidies in hiring agricultural machinery, promote service centres to facilitate access to repair and maintenance of machine parts, and support extension programs to educate farmers on the benefit of using agricultural machinery in their farming activities.
... But even if the impact of an individual isn't marginal, early economic work on this topic (see e.g. P. A. Samuelson 1947;Olson 1971;Hardin 1982) suggests that individuals do not have an incentive to contributing towards collective goods, even though having a marginal positive impact. ...
... Such behaviour is called free-riding. At first glance, free-riding is the optimal strategy from an individual's perspective for goods that are non-excludable and in some form indivisible (Olson 1971;Brubaker 1975;Hardin 1982;Sandler 1992), which we summarize as collective goods in this thesis. Collective goods are by definition non-excludable, which means, that it is impossible or "prohibitively costly" (Taylor 1987, p. 6) to exclude an individual from consumption, as in the example of a walk through a forest. ...
... While early economic literature suggests (see e.g. A. Smith 1776) that actions of selfinterested individuals always improve the collective well-being as well, starting with P. A. Samuelson (1947, p. 203-252) many authors have argued the opposite for the case of collective goods (see e.g. P. A. Samuelson 1954;Downs 1957;Olson 1971;Brubaker 1975;Sandler 1992). One of the most important works in this field is the book The logic of collective action by Olson (1971). ...
Thesis
Fridays for future, students for future, scientists for future… Environmental activism increased drastically in the last years resulting in a growing number of activists. While some of these activists live with a sustainable ecological footprint, others do not and pollute the environment in an unsustainable manner e.g. by flying frequently. One strand of economic literature interprets this (at first glance contradictory) behavior as an attitude-behavior-gap: Having a high preference should result in a high willingness to pay and therefore in an adaption of one’s own behavior, which is not the case for these activists. Not changing one’s behavior can easily be explained by the free rider problem caused by the marginality of one’s impact though. However, this in turn raises the question, why some people live sustainable, abstain from environment polluting goods hence have a willingness to pay for the environment. We argue that both kinds of behavior can be explained by separating the willingness to pay for public goods. Since collective action is hard to sustain reciprocally and without the intervention of a (public) entity, especially for large public goods, two willingness to pay for a public good have to be considered instead – one for the private and one for the public provision of the public good. Assuming that both types of environmental activists understand, that their own contribution is marginally small, this dissertation argues – first in a theoretical model and then in an empirical application – that the willingness to pay for public goods in the private case is actually only dependent on the preference for other (mainly social) incentives – e.g. to silence one’s conscience or for reputational reasons. The unsustainable type of environmental activist just has a lower willingness to pay for social incentives compared to the sustainable typ. Only if the state interferes, the preference for the public good will be considered in the decision-making process of individuals. Consequently, it proposes a different form of measuring the willingness to pay for public goods – the so-called Quasi-Monarch. As a Quasi-Monarch, one individual can hypothetically dictate the contribution of all individuals including herself. In this scenario, no one would have an incentive to not state their “real” willingness to pay for the respective good.
... In some contexts, most written communications were long, intricate, and aimed largely at small, literate audiences (readers) of fellow elites [36] . In other contexts, texts were short, specific, embedded in representational images [38,72] , and, perhaps, not directed mainly toward a narrow status cohort. In this regard, it is also necessary to restate that modes of computational communication, including writing, are not the sole means to convey information to large groupings and that oral communications and public rituals, sometimes in concert, can convey and bidirectionally transfer messages [10] . ...
... Oral story and myth telling have a long human history, and such events can underpin social cohesion and cooperation [79] . More specifically, beyond the pan-Mesoamerican representations of speech [72] , the Mayan word for king, lord, or ruler (ajaw) and the Nahuatl (Aztec) word for ruler (tlatoani) both have their roots in words for speaking. Significantly, the Mayan word, ajaw, which literally means "person who shouts or cries out" [80] , stems back to the Formative period [81,82] when Maya political organization was less autocratic than it was in the Classic period [83] . ...
... Texts are brief, and glyphs generally are presented as elements of (embedded in) larger representational murals that were painted on the walls of domestic contexts, and so access was not narrowly restricted. Teotihuacan glyphs do not have linguistic meaning, rather they represent or are associated with numbers, names of buildings, place names, or political offices/positions [38,41,72,89,90] . Glyphs, whether integrated into murals or not, such as those recovered on the floor of the La Ventiila plaza [45] and a recent carved stone glyph recovered at the Plaza of the Columns (Fig. 10), were both stand alone and relatively large. ...
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Writing has often been put forth as one indicator of civilization. This correspondence dovetails with the even broader cross-species expectation that the degrees of social complexity and levels of computational communication should closely correlate. Although in a general sense across human cooperative arrangements, a basic relationship between these variables undoubtedly exists, more detailed and fine-grained analyses indicate important axes of variability. Here, our focus is on prehispanic Mesoamerica and the means of computation and communication employed over more than three millennia (ca. 1500 BCE–1520 CE). We take a multiscalar and diachronic analytical frame, in which we look at 30 central places, six macroregions, and Mesoamerica as whole. By unraveling elements of “social complexity”, and decoupling computation from communication, we illustrate that institutional differences in governance had a marked effect on the specific modes and technologies through which prehispanic Mesoamerican peoples communicated across time and space. Demographic and spatial scale, though relevant, do not alone determine time/space diversity in media of computational communication. This article is part of the theme issue “Evolution of Collective Computational Abilities of (Pre)Historic Societies”.
... However, no individual has the incentive to change their strategy to cooperate given the predicted choices of others to defect. Such social dilemmas are commonly understood as public good or collective action problems (Olson, 1965). They have been modelled as prisoner dilemmas (Dawes, 1975) and as problems of shirking (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), free-riding (Grossman and Hart, 1980) and moral hazard (Holmstrom 1982). ...
... In the presence of collective action problems, classic theory implies that individuals will be trapped in an inevitable cycle of destruction but for the coordination of external agencies who can enforce cooperation (Olson, 1965;Hardin, 1968). This might explain why SCAs are often overlooked in favour of market or government-based solutions. ...
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A majority of people in developing countries lack access to formal finance, and rely on community-organised groups. These savings and credit associations (SCAs) face challenges in overcoming well-known collective action problems. SCA financial products can be understood as a common pool resource. We investigate the conditions under which SCAs can achieve sustainability, drawing on Ostrom's (1990) design principles for self-governing local institutions. Using a qualitative methodology, data were collected by examining administrative records and interviewing stakeholders from three SCAs in the Philippines. Our results indicate that adherence to the design principles is positively associated with SCA sustainability. We find that pre-existing social connections are not a necessary condition for initial adherence to the design principles but appear to be necessary for sustainability overall. These findings contribute to our understanding of how governance design can boost the sustainability of informal groups and enhance financial inclusion amongst the poor. Acknowledgements: This research would not have been possible without the partnership and generosity of colleagues at the Centre for Community Transformation (CCT) and HOPE International. We are very grateful to the savings group members for inviting us to understand their experiences. The article has benefitted from the feedback of two anonymous reviewers; our thanks also go to Justin Fisher and Paolo Morini for their helpful suggestions.
... One explanation is that the risks of coordination losses are generally thought to be higher, the larger the group (Kerr, 1989). As a consequence, these findings have lend support to the theoretical reasoning (Olson, 1965) that group size is negatively related to the provision of public goods. ...
... The group size hypothesis, as pronounced by Olson (1965), stipulates that public good provision is decreasing in group size, a paradox to 'the more the better'. This relationship has been explained by diminishing marginal influence and coordination losses (Kerr, 1989) among others. ...
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This paper presents novel collective agri-environmental scheme (cAES) data from a biodiversity protection measure that has been put in place in Alsace, France to preserve the local European hamster population. A collectively conditional subsidy mechanism recompenses farm-ers' collective effort if they provide sufficient favorable farmland habitat to meet an exogenous contribution threshold. Using cross sectional Mills' ratios in panel estimation, we analyze the coordination of contribution efforts within groups of farmers. Both the degree of territorial influence a farm has over the protection perimeter and group size seem to positively influence participation under the cAES, with larger groups producing slightly more contractors. Territorial influence is identified as the main driver for the the size of a farm's surface contributions to the collective contract. Based on individual contribution patterns within collective zones, a typology for contributions to collective contracts with conditional incentives is proposed.
... The commons school derives its moral foundations and theoretical roots from concerns about how to understand and resolve "collective action" dilemmas (Olson 1965) in which, owing to absent or weak governance institutions, individuals make "rational" decisions to engage in behaviours that produce suboptimal outcomes (Ostrom 1990, 3). In the classic "prisoner's dilemma" metaphorical example, a thief interrogated in a different cell and unable to coordinate and create compliance mechanisms with an accomplice will make the utility chasing "rational" choice to confess (Nash 1953) because this avoids the risk of an expected higher prison term from remaining silent if the accomplice confessed-even though the thief is aware that that collective silence would have produced lower aggregate prison terms. ...
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Contrary to calls for increased relevance, the discipline of political science has had lasting impacts in shaping environmental policy analysis. The ideas and approach advocated by former APSA president Elinor Ostrom, most comprehensively articulated in Governing the Commons , have diffused to shape or reinforce generations of sustainability scholarship. We identify four “ideal type” problem conceptions that are distinguished based on their consistency or inconsistency with Ostrom’s inductive approach to problem structure and economic welfare emphasis, and four corresponding schools that reinforce each: commons (Type 1), economic optimization (Type 2), compromise (Type 3), and prioritization (Type 4). Whereas the prioritization school seeks to understand and identify lessons for minimizing the impact of human activity on the natural environment, the diffusion of the commons’ metaphor has led political scientists to champion frameworks that bias Type 3, 2, and 1 orientations. The latter all rest on moral underpinnings that promote human material interests as their goal, rather than recognizing them as also a primary cause of environmental degradation. A fundamental conceptual reorientation is required if social scientists in general, and political scientists in particular, are to generate an understanding of and identify tools for ameliorating rather than exacerbating today’s Type 4 climate change and species extinction crises.
... The term "group" looks back on a long career in different disciplines like social anthropology (see Fuhse, 2006), sociology (Cooley, 1929;Bales, 1951;Freeman, 1992;Homans, 2010, etc.), group dynamics (Lewin, 1947;Forsyth, 2014, etc.), economics (most notably Olson, 1965), social psychology (Tajfel, 1974(Tajfel, , 1982aTurner, 1982Turner, , 1988Hogg and Abrams, 1998;Sherif, 2015, etc.), communication studies (Hirokawa and Gouran, 1989;Putnam and Stohl, 1996;Harwood et al., 2005;Giles and Giles, 2012;Poole, 2013, etc.), sociometrics (Moreno, 1934(Moreno, , 1937, and cooperative game theory (e.g., Branzei et al., 2005). It would be a hopeless endeavor to find a common conceptual denominator that all research directions could agree on. ...
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This article presents a novel conception of groups and social processes within and among groups from a communication-ecological perspective that integrates approaches as different as Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, Heideggerian praxeology, and Luhmann’s systems theory into an innovative social-theoretical framework. A group is understood as a social entity capable of collective action that is an object to itself and insofar possesses an identity. The elementary operations of groups consist in social processes with communicative, pre-communicative, and non-communicative episodes. Groups operate in a number of environments that are conceived of as both correlates of their own processes and providing groups with the raw materials for the fabrication of their constituents. These environments include but are not limited to spatial, discursive, emotional, institutional, semiotic-medial, psychic-personal, technical, and groupal environments. The article paves the way to combine studies on intergroup and intragroup communication in one comprehensive theoretical framework situated on such an abstract level that it can be concretized in view of utterly different cultural contexts and the emic perspectives of actors therein. Accordingly, the framework provides researchers with the conceptual devices to balance the comparability of different lifeworlds with the faithfulness to actors’ inside views. The methodological implications laid out in this article prioritize qualitative, especially ethnographic methods as a starting point for research on group communication.
... If that is the case, the effect of leftist ideology I argue for could be driven by negotiation complexity rather than ideology. Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that cooperation efforts decline with a larger number of parties (seeOlson, 1965;Koremenos, 2005;Axelrod, 2011). I return to this issue in Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. ...
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Does the political ideology of negotiating parties influence the design of international environmental agreements? This article distinguishes between leftist and rightist executives in democracies to develop a twofold argument. First, left-leaning democratic governments tend to be generally more environmental-friendly, which implies that they should favor designs that are more conducive to effective institutions. Second, leftist democratic executives are commonly less concerned about sovereignty costs. Both mechanisms suggest that environmental treaties likely comprise “legalized,” i.e., hard-law elements when left-wing democracies negotiate their design. The empirical implication of the theory is tested with quantitative data on international environmental agreements since 1975. The findings report an association between leftist ideology in democracies and agreement legalization, although this is driven by aspects of sovereignty delegation. This article contributes to the literatures on environmental institutions, international cooperation more generally, as well as party politics.
... However, whereas social movements typically aim to change the system or their group's position relative to other groups, CEIs have the goal to change their own community (e.g., Sloot et al., 2017). CEIs can be seen as initiatives for providing impure collective goods (see Olson, 1965) which potentially generate both private, individual benefits, and collective benefits for CEI members, the whole community and society at large (e.g., Bauwens, 2017). This suggests that next to personal pro-environmental motivations, community factors could play a unique role in explaining initiative involvement. ...
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Community energy initiatives are set up by volunteers in local communities to promote sustainable energy behaviors and help to facilitate a sustainable energy transition. A key question is what motivates people to be involved in such initiatives. We propose that next to a stronger personal motivation for sustainable energy, people’s perception that their community is motivated to engage in sustainable energy and their involvement in the community (i.e., community identification and interpersonal contact) may affect their initiative involvement. We tested this proposition with a questionnaire study among inhabitants of seven local communities ( N = 439). Results suggested that community factors are uniquely related to initiative involvement (willingness to actively participate and attendance of an initiative meeting) next to personal sustainable energy motivations. In particular, stronger community identification and more interpersonal contact with other community members increased the likelihood that people become involved in a community initiative, but the perception of the sustainable energy motivation of one’s community was not uniquely related to initiative involvement. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings.
... Most of these challenges may take their roots in a very wellknown issue in social sciences: free riding (Kilbane and Beck, 1990;Tenn et al., 2006;Héritier and Eckert, 2008;Forster, 2012;Bowen, 2019). Free riding is a situation where it is possible in a group or in a collective initiative to individually benefit from a shared resource while avoiding bearing the cost for accessing it (Olson, 1965;Gunningham and Rees, 1997). Within MFAs, free riding may materialize into two forms. ...
Thesis
Microfinance has substantially evolved since its early days. Still, a dual aim has always been at the heart of most microfinance institutions (MFIs): providing financial services to the poor and doing so via a financially sustainable model. 20 years ago, some mentioned a promise, or even a revolution. Yet, the sector has faced significant criticisms related to high interest rates, discrimination, aggressive commercial practices, crises, and over-indebtedness. Overall, the abundant impact studies carried out in microfinance did not reveal the expected positive impact. These failures emphasize a critical but still challenged stake for MFIs: combining financial and social aims and avoiding mission drift. With a view to support this double-bottom-line mission, this thesis adopts an industry-level approach and studies three forces affecting MFIs’ behaviors: regulation, competition, and collective action through professional associations. To do so, the thesis is structured around four chapters and offers an original combination of multiple fields and quantitative and qualitative research methods. Chapter 1 assesses the effects of a strengthening of microfinance regulation that occurred in 2012-2014 in Benin, using graphical analyses, hypothesis testing, and an event study. Chapter 2 investigates the effects of interest rate restrictions and possible interactions with market conditions in microfinance, using panel data estimations, a moderation analysis, and different measurements of competition. Chapter 3 details a qualitative study carried out in Cambodia to investigate how MFIs reacted to the imposition of an interest rate cap and suggests a theoretical framework helping regulators integrate market conditions into regulatory decisions. Finally, Chapter 4 suggests a qualitative study based on a fieldwork carried out in Tanzania to explore the root causes of free riding within professional microfinance associations. Overall, the thesis adopts a systemic approach where regulation, competition, and collective action are seen as interacting sector-level forces.
... Furthermore, in collective action problems, political decentralization leads to reduced free riding as costs and benefits of the public service fall on the same group of people (see e.g. Olson 1971). ...
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Decentralization of the electricity sector has mainly been studied in relation to its infrastructural aspect, particularly location and size of the generation units, and only recently more attention has been paid to the governance aspects. This article examines power sector (de)centralization operationalized along three functional dimensions: political, administrative and economic. We apply this framework to empirically assess the changes in California's electricity market, which saw the emergence of institutional innovation in the form of community choice aggregation (CCA). Unpacking the Californian case illustrates how decision-making has moved from central state government and regulators to the municipal level in uneven ways and without decentralized generation keeping pace. We also explore the impacts this multidimensional and diversified decentralization has on the ultimate goals of energy transition: decarbonization and energy security. Our framework and empirical findings challenge the conventional view on decentralization and problematize the widespread assumptions of its positive influence on climate mitigation and grid stability.
... Leaders try to strengthen group-based identities to create intergroup solidarity which, in turn, makes it more likely that members will contribute to collective group goals (Minkoff 1997, Salisbury 1969. For groups that pursue public goods, and thus experience the free-rider problem, this type of identity-based solidarity is probably especially important (Olson 1965). Campbell (2005) shows how the leaders of elderly advocacy groups attempted to foster a distinct political identity among older Americans and that this identity helped spur individual contributions to the achievement of group goals. ...
Article
Compared to other Western democracies, in the U.S. fewer people subjectively identify as working class historically and many working class individuals think of themselves as middle class. This likely has important political implications. We argue, however, that union membership can strengthen identification with the working class, through communications from leaders and interactions among members. Using General Social Survey data from five decades, we develop an original multi- indicator IRT-based measure of objective class status and find that union membership makes it more likely that individuals identify as working class, across all objective class groups. Panel data analysis shows that union membership predicts future working class identification but that the opposite is not true, suggesting that these associations are causal. Finally, we show that identifying with the working rather than middle or upper class is associated with more support for redistribution and the welfare state.
... The central concern of these frameworks is the challenge of designing institutions to support collective action. As much online as offline, building a successful community requires managing finite, costly resources whose provisioning and distribution raise classic social dilemmas such as the tragedy of the commons [22,52] and the dilemmas of peer production: attracting volunteer contributions, reducing the cost of free riders, and managing vandalism [39,50]. ...
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Building a successful community means governing active populations and limited resources. This challenge often requires communities to design formal governance systems from scratch. But the characteristics of successful institutional designs are unclear. Communities that are more mature and established may have more elaborate formal policy systems. Alternatively, they may require less formalization precisely because of their maturity. Indeed, scholars often downplay the role that formal rules relative to unwritten rules, norms, and values. But in a community with formal rules, decisions are more consistent, transparent, and legitimate. To understand the relationship of formal institutions to community maturity and governance style, we conduct a large-scale quantitative analysis applying institutional analysis frameworks of self-governance scholar Elinor Ostrom to 80,000 communities across 3 platforms: the sandbox game Minecraft, the MMO game World of Warcraft, and Reddit. We classify communities' written rules to test predictors of institutional formalization. From this analysis we extract two major findings. First, institutional formalization, the size and complexity of an online community's governance system, is generally positively associated with maturity, as measured by age, population size, or degree of user engagement. Second, we find that online communities employ similar governance styles across platforms, strongly favoring "weak" norms to "strong" requirements. These findings suggest that designers and founders of online communities converge on styles of governance practice that are correlated with successful self-governance. With deeper insights into the patterns of successful self-governance, we can help more communities overcome the challenges of self-governance and create for their members powerful experiences of shared meaning and collective empowerment.
... Por su parte, Olson (2002), cuestionó a la capacidad que tienen grupos de individuos para emprender acciones colectivas en busca de objetivos comunes. Al respeto señaló: ...
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Explica desde los postulados de acción colectiva, la administración del agua en un espacio rural indígena. Javier Rivera Márquez
... Inspirándonos en un argumento clásico de la sociología de la acción colectiva, el cultivo del símbolo de la familia podría interpretarse como una modalidad de incitación selectiva (Olson, 1965) de carácter ambivalente, tanto positivo como negativo. Se trataría de una incitación selectiva positiva en el sentido en que, involucrándose intensamente en la PAH, las activistas pueden esperar forjar lazos amicales intensos y satisfactorios. ...
... The emergence of effective coordination and collective action within groups is, however, challenging and can often be undermined by individuals acting in their own self interest. Such individuals-commonly termed 'freeriders' or 'defectors'-may act selfishly and reap the benefits of a group's collective efforts without providing their own contributions [40,41]. Theory and evidence suggest that groups tackle free riding and reduce the costs of coordination when certain individuals have disproportionate social influence (i.e. ...
Article
Across species, social hierarchies are often governed by dominance relations. In humans, where there are multiple culturally valued axes of distinction, social hierarchies can take a variety of forms and need not rest on dominance relations. Consequently, humans navigate multiple domains of status, i.e. relative standing. Importantly, while these hierarchies may be constructed from dyadic interactions, they are often more fundamentally guided by subjective peer evaluations and group perceptions. Researchers have typically focused on the distinct elements that shape individuals' relative standing, with some emphasizing individual-level attributes and others outlining emergent macro-level structural outcomes. Here, we synthesize work across the social sciences to suggest that the dynamic interplay between individual-level and meso-level properties of the social networks in which individuals are embedded are crucial for understanding the diverse processes of status differentiation across groups. More specifically, we observe that humans not only navigate multiple social hierarchies at any given time but also simultaneously operate within multiple, overlapping social networks. There are important dynamic feedbacks between social hierarchies and the characteristics of social networks, as the types of social relationships, their structural properties, and the relative position of individuals within them both influence and are influenced by status differentiation. This article is part of the theme issue 'The centennial of the pecking order: current state and future prospects for the study of dominance hierarchies'.
... Whether insiders benefit from the existence of outsiders or are threatened by them may be related to the institutional configuration. The theory behind this rationale goes back to Mancur Olson, who suggested that on a societal level, collective interests may be harmful if they are significant but not encompassing (Olson, 1971). This can be linked to the insider-outsider model: the share of insiders needs to be large in order to have relevant bargaining power with macroeconomic e↵ects. ...
... As a first rigorous test, we deploy Democratic AI to address a question that has defined the major axes of political agreement and division in modern times: when people act collectively to generate wealth, how should the proceeds be distributed? [16][17][18][19][20][21] . We asked a large group of humans to play an incentive-compatible online investment game that involved repeated decisions about whether to keep a monetary endowment or to share it with other players for potential collective benefit. ...
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Building artificial intelligence (AI) that aligns with human values is an unsolved problem. Here, we developed a human-in-the-loop research pipeline called Democratic AI, in which reinforcement learning is used to design a social mechanism that humans prefer by majority. A large group of humans played an online investment game that involved deciding whether to keep a monetary endowment or to share it with others for collective benefit. Shared revenue was returned to players under two different redistribution mechanisms, one designed by the AI and the other by humans. The AI discovered a mechanism that redressed initial wealth imbalance, sanctioned free riders, and successfully won the majority vote. By optimizing for human preferences, Democratic AI may be a promising method for value-aligned policy innovation.
... This means that there is a social dilemma because of the temptation to free-ride and enjoy the benefits without expressing the behaviors underpinning their production. 39 In the following discussion we categorize prosocial behaviors based upon whether they are closer to private exchange or public goods/common-pool resources on the excludability scale. ...
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To resolve the major controversy about why prosocial behaviors persist in large-scale human societies, we propose that two questions need to be answered. First, how do social interactions in small-scale and large-scale societies differ? By reviewing the exchange and collective-action dilemmas in both small-scale and large-scale societies, we show they are not different. Second, are individual decision-making mechanisms driven by self-interest? We extract from the literature three types of individual decision-making mechanism, which differ in their social influence and sensitivity to self-interest, to conclude that humans interacting with non-relatives are largely driven by self-interest. We then ask: what was the key mechanism that allowed prosocial behaviors to continue as societies grew? We show the key role played by new social interaction mechanisms—change in the rules of exchange and collective-action dilemmas—devised by the interacting individuals, which allow for self-interested individuals to remain prosocial as societies grow.
... Crises present a variety of collective action and decision-making problems, involving high risk and low information. In crises two factors are key in collective action problems: one is group size and the other is group cohesion (Olson, 1965). ICTs help alleviate both of these problems, because they can broadcast to a very large audience with little difference in cost (Lupia & Sin, 2003). ...
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The study discussed in this paper focuses on ICT use during disasters in Samoa and is a replicate of a study carried out in 2015. The study used a survey to explore how Samoan citizens use technology, act on different types of information, and how the information source or media affects decisions to act during a disaster. Findings revealed that traditional broadcasting were still the most prominent, most important, and still predominate in early warning and disaster response. However, there were now increasing usage of mobile and social media in disaster communications. Findings also revealed that people trust official reporters the most as source of information in times of crisis. The intent is that findings from this study can contribute to a people-centred approach to early warning and disaster providing empowerment to affected individuals to act in a timely and appropriate manner to ensure survival in times of disaster.
... In assuming that the mere existence of individual protections is sufficient, this justification ignores the public goods problem facing shareholders (Olson, 1965). Even if they were to agree on the appropriate course of action, individual shareholders have little incentive to bear the costs of legal action because the benefits of successful litigation are shared. ...
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The fear that business corporations have claimed unwarranted constitutional protections which have entrenched corporate power has produced a broad social movement demanding that constitutional rights be restricted to human beings and corporate personhood be abolished. We develop a critique of these proposals organized around the three salient rationales we identify in the accompanying narrative, which we argue reflect a narrow focus on large business corporations, a misunderstanding of the legal concept of personhood, and a failure to distinguish different kinds of constitutional rights and the reasons for assigning them. Corporate personhood and corporate constitutional rights are not problematic per se once these notions are decoupled from biological, metaphysical, or moral considerations. The real challenge is that we need a principled way of thinking about the priority of human over corporate persons which does not reduce the efficacy of corporate institutions or harm liberal democracies.
... The successful implementation of any large-scale reform hinges on strong political support. This is often hard to achieve, as government officials and frontline service delivery workers who have benefited under the status quo have little incentive to ensure that reforms are successfully implemented -even when these reforms improve welfare outcomes for society as a whole (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2008;Olson, 1965). Fortunately, AP's smartcard program had strong political support among senior state government officials. ...
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This chapter presents the Open Data Kit (ODK) project’s design, challenges, development, and evolution of configurable software frameworks and their international development impacts. The ODK project created a suite of mobile data collection tools designed to help organizations working in resource-constrained contexts collect, aggregate, and analyze data. ODK mobile tools are designed to maintain their functionality in locations with limited, intermittent, or no Internet connectivity. While the first set of ODK tools has experienced wide adoption with millions of users collecting data, its primary use case of unidirectional data flowing from the field to a central repository could not be adapted to certain use cases. To broaden the scope of potential applications, a second generation of tools was developed that added support for bidirectional data management applications. This chapter discusses the iterative research and development process of the ODK project.
... On the other hand, a presumption such as the existence of direct causality between collective identities and collective action can sometimes be misleading. For instance, Olson (1965) showed up in his striking work which challenged and unsettled the two wide pre-acceptances of his day such as "everyone sharing the common interests will not act collectively to reach/obtain them." He started from the point that the basis of collective action is production or access to collective goods. ...
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Identity is a matter that social sciences have been working on for over a hundred years. The literature, which emerged with the interaction between psychology and sociology to a large extent and has aimed to shed light on the mutual interactions between individuals, groups, and social structures, has now reached a remarkable volume. Besides, identity has taken a key place in the research and analysis of different disciplines of social sciences. However, the extent to which this expanding literature contributes to a deeper understanding and explanation of identity is a matter independent of quantity. This paper theoretically discusses how far identity theory has advanced and which aspects of the concept have become better understood today, compared to the beginning of the studies, by reviewing the studies that we can call the cornerstones of the literature. In connection with this, it addresses the references of the individual, social and collective dimensions of the identity term. In addition, it critically evaluates the recent debates on whether identity is a useful concept for social analysis today and attempts to briefly expound why it is still relevant and significant for social sciences.
... 19,20 For example, in the case of repeated interactions between two individuals such as the iterated prisoners' dilemma, tit-for-tat direct reciprocity, i.e. doing as one's partner did in the previous round, is highly successful in sustaining cooperation. 7,21 In another version of the iterated prisoners' dilemmas where partnerships change each round, a pay-it-forward strategy of indirect reciprocity allows cooperation to persist when (1) players can view their partner's previous decisions and when (2) reputation accumulates over time. 8,21 In public goods scenarios where individuals interact as a group, reciprocity takes a more general form of "conditional cooperation" where one gives the same as the rest of the group does on average. ...
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Evolutionary scientists argue that cooperation is central to human ecological success. Theoretical models, and behavioral experiments have found that human cooperation is conditional and context dependent, that individuals vary in their propensity to cooperate, and that cooperation can be stabilized by reciprocity within a group. However, outside of behavioral experiments, these findings have been difficult to validate with observations of cooperation in natural settings, especially in industrial societies, cash economies and structured organizational contexts. Here, we report in situ observations of behavioral cooperation and reciprocity from organizations embedded in a cash economy. We study small consumer food cooperatives or ‘food clubs’, in which members share bulk food purchases, and are considered to be heavily dependent on cooperation. We take advantage of a high-resolution purchasing dataset of all economic interactions for 1,528 individuals across 35 clubs, including 10,261 bulk purchases over a combined total of 107 years of club purchasing data. We develop a network method to detect economic reciprocity, categorize economic behavior as directly reciprocal, indirectly reciprocal, or non-reciprocal, and statistically classify individual behavioral types (reciprocator, helper, and beneficiary). Observed patterns of reciprocity confirm the central findings of theoretical and experimental studies. Reciprocity is highly abundant in most clubs, with direct reciprocity far more common (72%) than indirect reciprocity (11%). Reciprocators are the most common (69%) and the most stable behavioral type, but clubs vary significantly. Our results provide some of the first observational evidence of economic reciprocity and cooperation generally. They imply that cooperation may be a more important force in industrial societies, organizational contexts, and cash economies than currently understood. These results solidify the findings of the behavioral study of cooperation and open the door for greater study and application of cooperation in organizational management and economic policy.
... The successful implementation of any large-scale reform hinges on strong political support. This is often hard to achieve, as government officials and frontline service delivery workers who have benefited under the status quo have little incentive to ensure that reforms are successfully implemented -even when these reforms improve welfare outcomes for society as a whole (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2008;Olson, 1965). Fortunately, AP's smartcard program had strong political support among senior state government officials. ...
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In any problem-solving endeavor, identifying the right problem and asking the right questions is at least half the challenge. A well-posed problem can suggest an obvious, effective solution, while a poorly chosen problem can lead to dead-end non-solutions that leave no one better off. In this chapter, we consider important questions that should be asked with respect to potential beneficiaries or collaborators, the larger context of a problem, the type of impact, approaches to scale, and ethical considerations.
... Information transmission along one-to-many channels becomes more efficient and less error prone with such encodings. Exchanges of materials likewise become more efficient through the development of a symbolic system capable of precisely specifying a unit † We follow Bondarenko [6] in adopting Turner's [7] definition of institutions as complexes of "positions, roles, norms, and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of … activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures…". of value (automatically allowing it to also specify relations of value) and a political authority guaranteeing that value [12] ; this symbolic system is instantiated in money. ...
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Collective computation is the process by which groups store and share information to arrive at decisions for collective behavior. How societies engage in effective collective computation depends partly on their scale. Social arrangements and technologies that work for small- and mid-scale societies are inadequate for dealing effectively with the much larger communication loads that societies face during the growth in scale that is a hallmark of the Holocene. An important bottleneck for growth may be the development of systems for persistent recording of information (writing), and perhaps also the abstraction of money for generalizing exchange mechanisms. Building on Shin et al., we identify a Scale Threshold to be crossed before societies can develop such systems, and an Information Threshold which, once crossed, allows more or less unlimited growth in scale. We introduce several additional articles in this special issue that elaborate or evaluate this Thresholds Model for particular types of societies or times and places in the world.
... Understanding what motivates political actors, especially in legislative bodies, to cooperate-particularly with colleagues from alternative partisan and demographic backgrounds-can provide insights into how to more effectively solve collective issues in a democracy. Whereas the biological and social sciences have produced an extensive literature on the evolution of cooperation over the past 60 years (e.g., Alexander, 1987;Boyd & Richerson, 1985;Hamilton, 1964;Nowak, 2006;Olson, 1965;Ostrom, 1990;Richerson et al., 2003;Smith, 1985Smith, , 2003Trivers, 1971;West et al., 2007), prevalent theory in political science continues to emphasize the power of constituencies, policy objectives, and individual policymakers in determining legislative behavior. Attention has only recently moved toward understanding processes of building and maintaining social relationships in these political spheres, providing a fruitful avenue for research examining legislative behavior (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2017;Fowler, 2006;Heaney & McClurg, 2009;Lazer, 2011;Micozzi, 2014). ...
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Social network analysis has become an increasingly important tool among political scientists for understanding legislative cooperation in modern, democratic nation-states. Recent research has demonstrated the influence that group affinity (homophily) and mutual exchanges (reciprocity) have in structuring political relationships. However, this literature has typically focused on political cooperation where costs are low, relationships are not exclusive, and/or partisan competition is high. Patterns of legislative behavior in alternative contexts are less clear and remain largely unexamined. Here, we compare theoretical expectations of cooperation in these contexts from the political and biosocial sciences and implement the first assessment of political alliance formation in a novel legislative environment where costs to cooperation are high and party salience low. We implement a stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) to examine bill floor sponsorship, a process in which a “floor sponsor” becomes the exclusive advocate for a colleague’s piece of legislation, in the Utah state legislature from 2005 to 2008—a context in which gender (male) and political party (Republican) supermajorities exist. We find that (1) party and gender homophily predict who legislators recruit as floor sponsors, whereas seniority does not, and (2) legislators frequently engage in reciprocal exchanges of floor sponsorship. In addition, whereas gender homophily increases the likelihood of reciprocity, party homophily decreases it. Our findings suggest that when the cost of cooperation is high, political actors use in-group characteristics for initiating alliances, but once a cooperative relationship is established with an out-group political member, it is reinforced through repeated exchanges. These findings may be useful for understanding the rise of political polarization and gridlock in democracies internationally.
... The enormous impact of social media on the civil movement motivates us to revisit Mancur Olson"s notion of collective action. In his conceptualisation of how common interests drive the goals of groups of individuals, he argues that the smaller the size of the group, the more effective it would be in organising itself and in pursuing its purpose (Olson, 1965). The Occupy Nigeria example destabilises Olson"s proposition. ...
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In this paper, we use audience interpretation of images and their accompanying comments relating to the Occupy Nigeria protest and retrieved from Facebook to examine the beginning of how activist circulation and interaction around images on social media materialise into real-life protest in Nigeria. The Occupy movement triggered by the government"s removal of fuel subsidy on 1 January 2012 was then the largest in Nigeria. More recently, the #EndSARS protest which outweighed Occupy Nigeria broke out in October 2020 in agitation against police brutality and more broadly, the failure of the government to bring socio-political and economic transformation. As grandiose civil movement enacted in the geographical space but driven by online visuality has taken root in Nigeria, it is crucial to reflect on the inception of this culture. We analyse the visual dimension of Occupy Nigeria to explore how it established a pattern of online-offline mobilisation propelled by internet-based dialogic visual practices that would mark subsequent social movements. Online images, from symbols to cartoons, photographs and videos are used to conscientise citizens about perceived injustice. When the virtual mobilisation sets off the spatial protest, images keep feeding back on the demonstrations, sustaining and intensifying them. The visuality of Occupy Nigeria has been previously explored in literature, but due attention has not been paid to how the images in themselves constitute a space of interaction among the networked public, both prior to and during the street protest. We draw on the work around civil discourse of photography that sees the image as a site of conversation.
... The successful implementation of any large-scale reform hinges on strong political support. This is often hard to achieve, as government officials and frontline service delivery workers who have benefited under the status quo have little incentive to ensure that reforms are successfully implemented -even when these reforms improve welfare outcomes for society as a whole (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2008;Olson, 1965). Fortunately, AP's smartcard program had strong political support among senior state government officials. ...
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South Africa has one of the highest rates of youth unemployment and under-employment around the world, despite having a relatively large formal sector. This is driven, in part, by frictions in labor markets, including lack of information about job applicants’ skills, limited access to job training, and employers’ reliance on referrals through professional networks for hiring. This case study explores whether the online platform LinkedIn can be used to improve the employment outcomes of disadvantaged youth in South Africa. Researchers worked with an NGO, the Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator, to develop a training for young workseekers in the use of LinkedIn for job search, applications, and networking for referrals. This intervention was randomized across 30 cohorts of youth, with more than 1600 students enrolled in the study. The research team worked with LinkedIn engineers to access data generated by the platform. The evaluation finds that participants exposed to the LinkedIn training (the “treated” participants) were 10% more likely than the control group to find immediate employment, an effect that persisted for at least a year after job readiness training.
... Coordination challenges arise when the potential benefits of mobilization are non-excludable but individual participation entails significant risks of government repression or sanctions. Since any benefits realized through dissent are public but the costs of mobilization are private, individuals have incentives to free ride on others and not themselves participate in protest (e.g., Olson, 1965;Tullock, 1971). ...
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It is often assumed that nondemocratic regimes will control mass media and suppress independent information, but in many autocracies the media are partially free and imperfectly controlled. We argue that partial media freedom can increase the prospects for mass nonviolent dissent. We develop a theory emphasizing how even less than perfectly free media outlets can increase the ability of individuals to coordinate and mobilize, and provide an informational endowment that can help non-state actors overcome collective mobilization barriers. We further argue that this informational endowment amplifies the effect of other influences spurring mass protests in autocracies, in particular protest contagion and elections. We find empirical support for our argument in an analysis of all autocracies between 1955 and 2013. A case study of the Georgian Rose revolution provides further support for the postulated mechanisms.
... The combination of these rights that an actor holds for a property are determined by the interplay between actors, policy-makers, legislation, and governance mechanisms (Bromley 2012;Hicks and Cinner 2014). In a sense, these rights combined with how an ecosystem service benefit is obtained define the degree to which an ecosystem service is excludable and/or rival, thus determining whether the ecosystem service in question is a public or private good, or some combination of the two, such as a toll good or common pool resource (Olson 1971;Ostrom 2010). Furthermore, this framework provides a starting point for examining how ecosystem service flow and property rights interact to enable, or restrict, actors from obtaining ecosystem services directly. ...
... Group size increases the transaction costs of and resource mobilization for monitoring and enforcement, but larger groups can mobilize resources (e.g., hiring an official monitor) for rule enforcement (Yang et al. 2013). Hence, it is hard to expect a linear effect of group size on successful self-governance (e.g., Olson 1965, Agrawal and Goyal 2001, Esteban and Ray 2001, Boyd et al. 2010, Tucker 2010. The effect of the resource area is also ambiguous because it is mediated by other attributes of the community such as group size and socioeconomic heterogeneity of farmers (Wade 1989, Ostrom et al. 1994. ...
Article
Institutional structures can fundamentally shape opportunities for adaptive governance of water resources at multiple ecological and societal scales. The properties of adaptive governance have been widely examined in the literature. However, there has been limited focus on how institutions can promote or hinder the emergence of adaptive governance. Elinor Ostrom's institutional theory stresses the importance of formal and informal norms and rules in effective governance of natural resources. Specifically, Ostrom's "design principles" (DPs) are considered important because they increase the capacity for adaptive decision making and facilitate the emergence of self-organization at smaller scales. Self-organizing agents can frequently modify rules-in-use, procedures, and technical methods to tackle changing ecological conditions and address significant management issues left by more traditional governments. In this study, we examine institutional arrangements for successful water governance by analyzing (1) the co-occurrence of DPs in irrigation systems, and (2) the combination(s) of DPs leading to social and ecological success. We collaborated with a local non-profit organization to review institutional records and conduct interviews in 50 irrigation communities in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka in South India. Using qualitative comparative analysis, we found that the effectiveness of design principles is contingent on biophysical properties, such as the size of the watershed being governed, and attributes of the community, such as population size. We also discuss the methodological and data-related challenges involved in collecting primary data for conducting a context-specific institutional analysis. Our study offers a much-needed example of empirical research that investigates the role of operational level rules in adaptive water governance.
... The successful implementation of any large-scale reform hinges on strong political support. This is often hard to achieve, as government officials and frontline service delivery workers who have benefited under the status quo have little incentive to ensure that reforms are successfully implemented -even when these reforms improve welfare outcomes for society as a whole (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2008;Olson, 1965). Fortunately, AP's smartcard program had strong political support among senior state government officials. ...
Chapter
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This case study tells the story behind a research project on the economics of rural electrification in Western Kenya. The chapter covers (1) aspects of the policy and technology environment that initially guided the course of the work; (2) how the project pivoted away from solar microgrids and focused instead on the expansion of the national electricity grid; (3) unexpected challenges encountered while implementing a randomized evaluation of electricity infrastructure; (4) how we interpreted the study findings in light of consequential, concurrent changes to Kenya’s electrification policies; and (5) possible directions for further research, motivated by our project experience.
... Moreover, public choice economics argues that some regulators are selfinterested (e.g., Buchanan & Tullock, 1962;Frye & Shleifer, 1997;Olson, 1965) and succumb to lobbying and other rent-seeking activities (e.g., Kreuger, 1974;Tullock, 1967) because they do not face market competition. If regulators like the SEC are captured by the regulated (e.g., Mahoney, 2001;O'Connor, 2004;Partnoy, 1999;Smith, 1776;Stigler, 1971), then regulation is unlikely to be effective. ...
Article
Ramanna (Unreliable accounts: How regulators fabricate conceptual narratives to diffuse criticism. Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium , this issue) argues that the FASB’s new Conceptual Framework deemphasizes reliability, and especially verifiability, in favor of representational faithfulness to facilitate the FASB’s promotion of an “asset-liability” approach measured at fair values. More importantly, he argues that this change is likely to generate costly unintended consequences by undermining reporting quality. We agree and consider more broadly whether FASB creates social value through better accounting knowledge, and whether it is time to sunset the FASB monopoly in establishing accounting standards.
... One of the alternative mechanisms for the provision of public goods is their private provision. Olson (1965) describes basic principles of group behavior, and the influence of a group size on people's behavioral changes. He concludes that economic incentives like money, are not the only important incentive, but people are also affected by the desire to gain prestige, respect, friendship. ...
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In the paper, we discuss the possibilities of alternative provision of public goods using the individual voluntary contributions. We use the data from the behavioral public goods game based on the model of voluntary contribution mechanism. We examine how people’s decisions about voluntary contributions to public goods change when the environment changes. The participants of the game were divided into small (5 persons) and large (10 persons) groups. During the game participants were asked to invest experimental money to different types of accounts, i.e. private account, Group account 1 and Group account 2. Using the game, we also examine the impact of a provision point on voluntary contributions. Based on the analysis of the data from this behavioral game, we found that the provision point is effective only if the participants are members of a small group. When the participants were members of both a small group and of a large group the provision point was not effective. When the income of participants was considered, we found that participants with higher experimental income were less willing to voluntarily contribute to financing of a public good.
... Banfield (1958) noted that amoral familism was the problematic culture in Montegrano and was characterized by a focus on personal/private interest and by a lack of public spiritedness, which, in turn, prevented any form of association and collective action. This type of culture, Banfield (1958) observed, was the reason why it was problematic to get organized and to solve what Olson (1965) called the "collective action problem", there were high levels of corruption (real or perceived), and there was a substantial lack of trust. But in his exploration of the factors that had been responsible for the emergence for such a culture, Banfield (1958) suggested that it was a function of material forces such as a high death rate, certain land tenure conditions, and the absence of the institution of the extended family. ...
Article
Pakistan’s political volatility is well known and oft cited as a cause for concern both regionally and internationally. The state is accused of adopting duplicitous tactics and fostering violent paramilitary organizations in its efforts to undermine Indian hegemony and internal opposition. From the outside, the persistent functioning of the state can sometimes appear to be a mystery. Managing chronic conflicting adversarial relations over a sustained period of time demands particular social and political tools that must be resilient while ensuring robust reproduction of particular types of shared interests. Such social and political tools are diverse and operate to generate both stability and instability in state political institutions. The political networks of individuals and groups that actively seek to control and manipulate state institutions are formed through different types of relationship, but one of the most publicly visible is marriage. Marriage networks offer opportunities for indirect alliances through children, siblings and other kin members in ways that need not threaten ideologically rooted affiliations, such as those created through shared political party membership. In this working paper, we focus on the communicative potential of such marriage networks through comparing village networks of landowners and the families who engage actively in electoral politics in Punjab, Pakistan. Although these findings are based on more than two decades of research carried out in rural and urban Pakistan, they remain partial, because Pakistani politics is anything but tidy or simply. Nevertheless, any attempt to analyze Pakistani politics that neglects the impact of the complex personal relationship networks is unlikely to satisfactorily explain or even describe the current political situation of the country.
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Russia and Slovenia are in many aspects very dissimilar countries. The process of systemic change in the post-communist period was also usually assessed differently. Slovenia is an example of successful transformation that resulted in consolidated democracy and effective market economy, while Russia is an example of flawed democratisation, resulting in authoritarian reversal and an oligarchic economy with a combination of state interference and domination of ‘olygarchs’. However, the global crisis revealed some severe structural weaknesses of the Slovenian model of transition that led to the development of a rather dysfunctional democracy and ‘crony-capitalism’ characterised by entanglement of political and business elite that is—at least in some aspects—rather similar to the situation in Russia. We claim that these similarities between the two countries are predominantly determined by the type of elite formation and configuration, i.e. a high level of elite reproduction and ideological hegemony of one political faction that led to development of institutional setting with a number of ‘extractive’ characteristics.
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Cette recherche s’intéresse aux stratégies déployées par les méta-organisations pour influencer les décisions publiques dans un secteur régulé. À travers 18 entretiens semi-directifs avec des dirigeants du secteur de l’enseignement supérieur privé français et experts en lobbying , et une analyse de la communication numérique des acteurs du secteur (7 759 tweets analysés), l’article met en évidence le rôle des méta-organisations dans les stratégies politiques et étudie leurs modalités d’action. Les résultats suggèrent également un raffinement de l’arbre de décision des stratégies politiques de Hillman et Hitt (1999).
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Civic duty is a critical feature of explanations of political participation, but why do individuals differ in their propensity to adopt particular civic duty norms? We argue that norms are likely to be adopted when congruent with underlying values and support this contention using evidence from the European Social Survey. We show that individuals who prioritize self-transcendence values (which capture altruistic goals) place much greater emphasis on norms positively related to participation while individuals who prioritize conservation values (which capture goals related to social stability) place much less emphasis on these norms. The substantive influence of personal values in explaining norm adoption is greater than that of education, age, and interpersonal trust. Our results thus provide new insights into how citizens form their normative conceptions of citizenship and also highlight the substantive role played by value orientations in conformity to social norms more generally.
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This study examines the link between ethno-religious voting pattern in the 2015 presidential elections and governance in the post-election era in Nigeria. Relying on the Rational Choice theory and data generated from documentary sources as well as content analysis, this study argues that the electoral choices of voters during the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria were based on ethnic and religious considerations. As such, the ethno-religious voting pattern played vital role in determining the pace of governance and how the spoils of office were distributed among the competing ethnic nationalities in the post-election era. Unfair distribution of political appointments and infrastructural projects has deepened and sustained ethno-regional agitations across different geopolitical zones in southern Nigeria. This study concludes on the need for electorates to embrace party ideology and competence as against candidate's ethno-religious affiliation.
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Recent studies suggest that a lack of judicial independence increases the risk of violent action, diminishing the incentives to solve disputes peacefully. However, violent action is not the only option when judiciaries are under the control of the executive. I argue that individuals become refugees in countries with non-independent judiciaries, losing their hope that violations of rules by the executive or privileged groups will be tried fairly. Using data from 181 countries over the 1976–2015 period, I find evidence that the lack of judicial independence leads countries to produce more refugees than others.
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This article empirically examines the effects of foreign aid on economic freedom while considering the mediating role of political institutions. We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we provide an empirical analysis of how different types of foreign aid affect the economic freedom of the receiving country. Second, we provide evidence regarding how political institutions mediate the foreign aid/economic freedom relationship. We use IV and GMM techniques to test a model using data from 40 developing countries covering the time period 1985 to 2016. Our analysis yields three main findings. First, democratic and politically stable countries enjoy more economic freedom. Second, foreign aid's net effect is to reduce economic freedom, whether we consider official development assistance (ODA) or net official assistance (NOA). Finally, economic freedom increases with both types of foreign aid if the receiving country's political institutions are more democratic and/or durable.
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