No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment
... He argues that unlike cognitive judgments (which are based on concepts), aesthetic judgments are based on subjective feelings of pleasure or displeasure. He introduces the concept of "free play" suggesting that in aesthetic judgment, we appreciate beauty for its own sake, without any personal interest [1,11]. The cognitive process of letting one's imagination conform to their understanding without any deliberations or constraints would meet a state of transcendence. ...
... Freedom is achieved under free play as one may use their creativity and interest boundlessly; their understanding and attention will meet their fantasies instinctively in perfect harmony. Makkreel states that free play would be an activity of conceptual freedom without any empirical evidences to back up or to examine the legitimacy [11]; Ginsborg defended that judgement of beauty is subjective for its own sake referring to Kant's "autonomy of taste", highlighting the independence of our judgement of taste no matter whether the aesthetic normativity, or universal validity, exists or not [12,13]. Interestingly, on ...
... Kant's judgment of fine art, he recounts that artists should create works following fine art's rule and set the objectivity; yet, he believes "nature gives rule to art" as these gifted genius make "sensible rational ideas of invisible beings" [1,14]. Anthropologist Gehlen would argue human nature is known for not having any specialized instinct [11][12][13]. He seeks to reconcile the realms of nature and freedom, arguing that while nature operates according to deterministic laws, human beings possess moral freedom. ...
This work is evolved around a question whether there is a freedom of expression in the 19th- 20thC art world when the art creation is impacted by political turmoils or is subjected to monetary constraint? Artistic expression is a gifted talent and should be let out freely as a continuation of naturalistic principle. Instead of setting an anatagonistic stance between art and social movements, this research article finds art that pertains political and commercial elements as a modern form of aesthetic transcendentalism, since it has successfully merged historical movements, modern day political and social ideologies, as well as commercialized market phenomenon into the format of artistic illustration. This holistic inllustration gives a unique point of view based on artists life path; it communicates and transforms peoples perception through visual language. Whether a work from Muhammed Sami, a portait of post-WWI German veteran, or a consumer packaged good in Andy Warhols paint, these artworks manifest their artistic value for theyve recounted the artists uniquely analytical and personal point of view. The comparative studies of artworks post-WWI in Germany and post-modernist countercultural movement in the U.S. and Western Europe gives detailed analysis.
... U trećoj Kritici pokazuje da se i na području estetike radi o apriornim sudovima, sudovima zasnovanim na umu, a ne na iskustvu. Apriorne tvrdnje su formalne po prirodi (Makkreel, 1990). 3 Moć suđenja je za Kanta sposobnost razaznavanja da li nešto treba da se podvede pod pravilo, odnosno sposobnost mišljenja posebnog kao sadržanog u opštem (Schischkoff, 1991). ...
... Estetska imaginacija je produktivna i autonomna, smatra Kant. Time je učinio slobodnijom od imaginacije koja je ograničena određenim objektivnim saznanjem i njegovim zakonima u Kritici čistog uma (Makkreel 1990). Međutim, kako jedino razum uspostavlja zakone, uobrazilja se, kao produktivna i autonomna, saglašava sa razumom pri svom djelovanju. ...
... Ako dalje pratimo konsekvence po saglasnost imaginacije i razuma u slobodnoj igri duševnih moći, imaginacija je slobodna jer se može igrati sa mogućim formama, ali pri primjeni na lijepu stvar, veže se za određenu formu. Imaginacija, u svojoj slobodi, ne narušava zakone razuma, ali može ukazivati na mogućnosti koje su u tom okviru ostale otvorene (Makkreel, 1990). Forma objekta je ishod predstave subjekta i onoga što ta predstava u subjektu proizvodi, u saglasju sa drugim subjektima koji sude. ...
U ovom radu je akcenat na čistom estetskom sudu koji Immanuel Kant naziva sudom ukusa. Cilj rada je sagledati slobodu suda ukusa s obzirom na komunikativnu dimenziju koju mu Kant pripisuje. U prvom dijelu rada je prezentirano Kantovo razumijevanje suda ukusa iz Kritike moći suđenja, tačnije, poglavlja “Analitika lijepog”. U drugom dijelu rada u fokusu je Kantovo razumijevanje slobode suda ukusa. U nastavku rada je obrazložena komunikativna dimenzija suda ukusa tj. učešće u reflektivnom horizontu zajedničkog smisla prosuditelja. Razmatranje suda ukusa u kontekstu transcendentalne društvenosti uvodi nas u posljednje poglavlje u kojem je pokazano da saznanje komunicirano u zajednici, u njegovoj univerzalnoj a ne konkretnoj formi, uslovljava slobodu suda ukusa.
... Nesse caso, de modo semelhante àquelas propostas que pensam o esquematismo como uma "tradução" para a linguagem da imaginação (cf. Biemel [1959], Makkreel [1990] e Ferrarin [1995]), La Rocca também pensará o procedimento esquemático na reflexão estética. Em primeiro lugar, o intérprete propõe a seguinte interpretação do esquematismo como apresentado na 1ª Crítica: ...
Resumo: Tencionamos apresentar uma explicação do que seja o esquematismo sem conceitos, a fim de solucionar algumas supostas contradições com relação ao que Kant apresenta no capítulo Do esquematismo dos conceitos puros do entendimento, na Crítica da Razão Pura. O problema sobre o qual discorremos pode ser assim formulado: o que devemos entender por esquematismo sem conceitos e em que deve consistir o esquematismo enquanto uma atividade geral da imaginação? Vamos defender a tese de que o esquematismo sem conceitos consiste em um procedimento de sensificação da unidade do juízo de gosto. Palavras-chave: Esquematismo cognitivo; Esquematismo estético; Juízos lógicos; Juízos estéticos.
Abstract: We intend to present an explanation of what schematism without concepts is, in order to resolve some supposed contradictions in relation to what Kant presents in the chapter On schematism of the pure concepts of understanding, in the Critique of Pure Reason. The problem we are discussing can be formulated as follows: what should we understand by schematism without concepts and what should schematism consist of as a general activity of the imagination? We will defend the thesis that schematism without concepts consists of a procedure for sensitizing the unity of the judgment of taste.
... 33. Makkreel (1990) introduced the concept of 'orientation' in interpreting the CPJ. Allison (2001) emphasizes CPJ 5: 267, on the potential moral educativeness of the sublime, while Clewis (2009) and Guyer (1996) write of the feeling of freedom. ...
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is a towering figure of Western philosophy, someone whose work continues to exert an influence across all areas of the discipline. His work is characterized by both breadth and unity: he writes powerfully about mind, epistemology, metaphysics, logic, mathematics, natural science, ethics, politics, religion, history, aesthetics, education, and more. And across those areas, he is concerned to work out and defend a view of human beings and their place in nature according to which our own reason enables us to discover and uphold the laws of nature and freedom—that is, to think for ourselves. The newly commissioned essays which make up this Handbook collectively present a picture of where the study of Kant’s philosophy finds itself, at this point in the twenty-first century. They are organized around the four questions which Kant said unite all interest of our reason: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope? and (4) What is the human being? Their aim is to help students and scholars of Kant’s philosophy think for themselves about the topics about which he wrote with such insight.
... It must also be noted that Kant, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, stretches imagination's power beyond its synthetizing function by arguing that imagination takes on a role in interpretation. For an astute reading of this added powers of imagination, see Rudolf A. Makkreel (1990). ...
... 629-658). Por el contrario, un intento sugerente de rehabilitar a Kant para el pensamiento hermenéutico -independientemente del trazado por Wieland y Vigo-es el de Makkreel (1990). ...
In this article, I examine core aspects of Kant's political philosophy and law from the point of view of the power of judgment. In line with Wolfgang Wieland and Alejandro Vigo, I discuss aspects of this branch of Kantian philosophy in which different rules and criteria demand a particular application. In particular, I deal with aspects related to the critical exercise of citizenship, the implementation of republicanism and the making of law, and the application of law in the case of instances of legal punishment. Based on these analyses, I point out the relevance of interpreting Kant's legal philosophy as a criteriological one, where the reflection of the agent is fundamental in the application of general norms and principles.
... Tellingly, Garfinkel himself qualifies his reading of these authors as a "mis-reading" directed at "discovering the phenomena of embodied practices that compose as its production and analyzability the miraculous familiarity of the ordinary society" (Garfinkel, 2022: 76). 8 For a more extended analysis of the following, see especially Meerbote, 1981, Makkreel, 1984, Makkreel, 1990, and Kneller, 2009 Kant is basically working out the grounds that allow us to attribute possibility (and not sheer reality) to a concept. When can we consider a concept to be possible? ...
This paper discusses the phenomenological method’s reliance on imaginative procedures in view of ethnomethodological research. While ethnomethodology has often been seen in continuity with Alfred Schütz’ phenomenological sociology, it mainly parts ways with phenomenology by stressing that the decisive details structuring mutual understanding (gestures, bodily expressions, or the myriad trifles that regulate casual conversation) are „not imaginable, but can only be found out”. This paper reflects from a phenomenological perspective on what such a claim entails by first delineating this line of criticism from other objections raised against the use of imaginative procedures in phenomenology and by showing how this line of questioning departs from the core philosophical debates concerning imaginabilitiy and unimaginability in the Kantian tradition. Further on, the paper offers an in-depth interpretation of the aforementioned ethnomethodological claim in order not only to outline its methodological implications for phenomenology, but also to show that it involves possible key insights for understanding interaction, which phenomenology needs to take into account despite its eidetic scope.
... Esta falta es evidente por la casi inexistente bibliografía sobre la cuestión del genio y de la originalidad kantianas en el pensamiento de Hannah Arendt.8 Sobre el tema de la imaginación en Kant véase:Thompson, 2013;Makkreel, 1995. 9 Sobre el tema del genio véase:Martínez, 2015;Molina Flores 2001;Escudero, 1995. ...
Necesitamos de la figura del “genio” para comprender, por analogía, cómo es que el actor arendtiano puede excluir la posibilidad de la mentira y de la destrucción de la esfera de los asuntos humanos sin menoscabo de la capacidad de acción y la realización de la libertad política, así como el genio kantiano no puede excluir la posibililidad de producir repugnancia (Ekel) en los espectadores sin menoscabo de la capacidad de producir obras de arte que puedan ser juzgadas como bellas por los mismos. A partir de la exposición de la aporía de la imaginación productiva, mostraré las razones por las cuales Hannah Arendt concibió la necesidad de un pensamiento político que, a través de juicios ejemplares, ilustre al actor sobre la vulnerabilidad inherente a la acción política. El actor debería imitar en esto al genio, es decir, exponerse al gusto de los espectadores para regular la obra de esos “excesos” o “vicios” que repugnan y que, en una de sus transposiciones políticas, llamamos “mentira”.
... According to some philosophers, reflecting judgment is what enables us to progress towards more perfect conventions, constructing new institutions and rules to replace inadequate ones (Makkreel, 1994;Nuzzo, 2005;O'Neill, 1996O'Neill, , 1998O'Neill, , 2007. In this section, I argue that although reflecting judgment is key, it is not enough; we also require practical synthesis. ...
One aim of moral education is to help society progress from morally imperfect conventions towards more perfect ones. According to a popular view, reflecting judgment is the vehicle of this progress. In this paper, I argue that although reflection is important, it is not enough; moral development also requires practical synthesis. Moral development takes place by securing new connections—conceptual, affective, volitional and behavioural—that bring thoughts, feelings, motivations and actions into alignment with higher reason, to instantiate respect for all who are ends in themselves. Constructing parallels from Kant's theoretical philosophy, I identify three kinds of synthesis that are central to moral practice. If I am right, then a key task for moral education is to support the development of these capacities of practical synthesis.
... 3 Vgl. Brachtendorf, (2002); Dieringer (2009); Makkreel (1990), 141 ff. 4 Vgl. Schulte (1991); Cavallar (1993); Geyer (1982). ...
For the sake of completeness, Kant’s teleological thinking should cover not only what is purposive, but also what is contrapurposive. Kant fulfils this systematic requirement by means of the concept of theodicy, which is typical of his general critical parting from traditional Metaphysics. Within the transcendental framework of the teleological reflection upon world and nature, theodicy could no longer proceed theoretically and speculatively, but had to gain a new foundation on practical grounds. And insofar as, within this framework, the standpoint of God is made dependent on the human cognitive faculties, theodicy could no longer count as a theo-, but should instead become an anthropodicy. To show this, I rely on the conceptual pair “doctrinal – authentic” and I argue that the former is not a description of traditional theodicies (as is held in the relevant literature), but plays a constitutive role in Kant’s own account of theodicy.
... (Anth AA 7:174f.) Für eine detaillierteA nalyse der Einbildungskraft und ihrerE nt-stehungsgeschichteimDenken Kants siehe : Mörchen 1970;Makkreel 1990;Kneller 2007;Wunsch 2007;H orstmann 2018. "Wenn also gleich die Einbildungskraft eine noch so große Künstlerin, ja Zauberin ist,soist sie doch nicht schöpferisch, sondern muß den Stoff zu ihrenBildungen vonden Sinnen hernehmen." ...
This Element introduces Kant's ideas of reason, focussing on the ideas of theoretical reason in the study of nature. It offers a novel interpretation that shows how such ideas as the soul, the world-whole, and God provide a regulative orientation for coping with human perspectival situatedness in the world. This perspectivalist interpretation reconciles two interpretive tendencies: a realist reading, according to which ideas refer to real things independent of the human mind, and a fictionalist reading, according to which ideas are heuristic fictions without reference to anything real. The perspectivalist interpretation recognizes two functions of ideas: first, ideas outline domains of possible objects, thus presenting the human mind with contexts of intelligibility in which the cognition of objects can be meaningful at all. Second, ideas project an ultimate reality as a focus imaginarius, which serves as a normative ideal for evaluating the success of human inquiries into nature.
The present analyzes Kant's subjectivist understanding of the concept of the event in the way aesthetic judgments are issued under the aesthetic experience. Heidegger returns to the original position of Ereignis or event in the way of finding the question about understanding the inner foundations of language. An event is a situation in which language reveals itself through speech and speaks about itself, and in this way, other beings also enter the field of presence. But in Kant, the subjectivist view of the event is revealed in the free play between imagination and understanding. Kant does not directly use the concept of event in explaining the beautiful thing. However, the examination of his view on the validity of aesthetic judgments indicates the cognitive interaction between understanding and imagination, which beyond epistemological rules and foundations is revealed in a general, necessary, and universal way in the situation of the event. From Kant's point of view, because the understanding is faced with difficulties in how to issue reflective judgments, and the understanding lacks prior categories that can formulate the sensory impressions contained in the imagination, therefore, the issuing of judgments outside of the cognitive rules is manifested in an event-like way. The subject goes beyond their subjectivity in relation to the object to beyond the object at the moment of encounter, they interact through the event of the game. It is the first interaction of the subject with the world and then the free play between imagination and understanding.
El objetivo de este libro es contextualizar el problema del arte en el pensamiento de Martin Heidegger y analizar el lugar que ocupa el ensayo “El origen de la obra de arte” en su itinerario intelectual.
Para Heidegger, la obra de arte pone en obra la verdad, abre un mundo, funda
historia. El arte, o más bien, el “gran arte”, transforma cómo interpretamos la
realidad, cómo le damos sentido a lo que nos rodea y a nuestra propia vida. En la historia solo se dan raros momentos en los que ciertas obras de arte transforman el mundo.
Ubicado en una instancia de transición, “El origen de la obra de arte” es un
oasis, un lugar fértil, que le permite a Heidegger superar un proyecto que comienza a desertificarse, Ser y tiempo, para tomar los impulsos necesarios para revivificar su pensamiento, la filosofía del Ereignis.
Bu makalede, Kant’ın sanat anlayışının temeli sayılabilecek deha kavramı ele alınmıştır. Düşünüre göre sanat deyince akla güzel sanat gelmelidir. Güzel sanat ise ancak bir dehanın eseri olan, eşsiz, mükemmel ve özgün bir eserdir. Kant’a göre yüksek sanatı ancak deha üretebilir. Kant dehayı sanata kural koyan yetenek olarak tanımlar. Deha, doğuştan gelen bir yetidir ve herhangi bir eğitimle geliştirilemez. Bu üstün yetenek güzel sanatların uyması gereken kuralları oluşturmada vazgeçilmez bir role sahiptir. Kant, güzel sanatta dehanın önemini belirten argümanlar öne sürer. Buna ilk argüman tüm güzel sanatların sanatsal olarak kabul edilmesini sağlayan kuralları varsaydığı ve belirleyici zemini bir kavram olan bir kuraldan türetilemeyeceğidir. Dolayısıyla güzel sanatın ürününü meydana getireceği bir kuralı kendisi düşünemez. Bununla birlikte, ürünün sanat olarak kabul edilebilmesi için ondan önce gelen bir kural olması gerektiğinden, bu kuralın atandığı araç öznenin gücü dahilinde olmalı ve özellikle de öznenin doğuştan gelen deha yetisinin bir yaratımı olmalıdır. Bu doğuştan gelen bir yetenek olmalıdır, çünkü eğer öğretilen bir beceri olsaydı, sanatın kural ve kavramlarının ilk olarak kendileri tarafından oluşturulduğu gücün aksine, öğrenilen kural ve kavramların bir ürünü olarak var olurdu. Kant deha yetisi teorisini, deha kavramının Kant’ın genel estetik yargı teorisiyle nasıl bağlantılı olduğunu ve bu teoriyi nasıl genişlettiğini göstermeye hizmet edecek dört özelliğini tanımlayarak detaylandırır. Kant’ın tanımladığı dehanın ilk özelliği, bir kurala uygun olarak öğrenilebilen şeylere yönelik bir beceri yatkınlığının aksine belirli bir kuralın verilemeyeceği şeyleri üretme yeteneği olmasıdır. Bunun sonucu olarak özgünlük onun birincil özelliği olmalıdır. Dehanın ikinci özelliği, her ne kadar orijinal olması gerekse de aynı zamanda örnek teşkil etmesi, taklit edilmeye değer olması ve bir standart ya da yargılama kuralı olarak var olmasıdır. Üçüncü olarak, deha gücünün eserlerini nasıl ürettiğini bilimsel olarak tanımlamanın veya göstermenin bir yolu olamaz ve bu nedenle sanatçı güzel sanatı var etmeyi isteyemez veya planlayamaz. Dördüncü olarak Kant, dehanın yalnızca güzel sanata kural koyan bir yeti olduğunu ve bilime kural koymada herhangi bir rol oynamadığını açıklığa kavuşturur. Abstract In this article, the concept of genius, which can be considered as the basis of Kant's understanding of art, will be discussed. According to the thinker, when we think of art, beautiful art should come to mind. Fine art, on the other hand, is a unique, perfect and original work of genius. According to Kant, only genius can produce high art. Kant defines genius as the ability to rule art. Genius is an innate ability and cannot be developed through any education. This superior talent has an indispensable role in establishing the rules that fine arts should follow. Kant puts forward arguments indicating the importance of genius in fine art. The first argument is that all fine arts assume rules that enable them to be recognised as artistic and cannot be derived from a rule whose determining ground is a concept. Therefore, fine art cannot itself think of a rule from which its product is to be derived. However, since there must be a rule that precedes the product in order for it to be recognised as art, the instrument to which this rule is assigned must be within the power of the subject and, in particular, must be a creation of the subject's innate genius. It must be an innate faculty, because if it were a taught skill, it would exist as a product of learnt rules and concepts, as opposed to the power by which the rules and concepts of art were first created. Kant elaborates his theory of the faculty of genius by identifying four characteristics of genius that will serve to show how it relates to and extends Kant’s general theory of aesthetic judgement. The first characteristic of genius as Kant defines it is ‘the ability to produce things for which no particular rule can be given, as opposed to a predisposition of skill towards things that can be learnt in accordance with a rule. Consequently, originality must be its primary characteristic. The second characteristic of genius is that, although it must be original, it must also be exemplary, worthy of imitation, and exist as a standard or rule of judgement. Thirdly, there can be no way of scientifically describing or demonstrating how genius produces its works, and therefore the artist cannot will or plan to bring fine art into existence. Finally, Kant clarifies that genius is only a faculty that prescribes rules for fine art and plays no role in prescribing rules for science.
Kant makes a puzzling claim in the Critique of the Power of Judgment concerning the connection between the feeling of pleasure occasioned by the appreciation of an object as beautiful and the universal communicability of this aesthetic feeling: on the one hand, he claims that this feeling is due to the free play of the faculties of imagination and understanding, and on the other hand, that it has its ground in the very communicability of this pleasure. The central argument of the present study is that it is possible to clarify the relation between the feeling of pleasure occasioned by the reflective judging of an object and the universal communicability Kant attributes to such a judging by grasping the demand for a ‘universality without concept’ claimed by a pure judgment of taste in terms of what appears to be a problematic relationship of grounding between the shareability of pure aesthetic feeling and the reflective activity of the mind. I will claim that this relationship can be rendered clearer by an explication of the ‘share’ of disinterestedness, purposiveness, and subjective universal validity claims in pure judgments of taste and brought together in the notion of a common sense (sensus communis). What thereby comes into view is an original orientation in the world that is presupposed by explicitly theoretical and practical judgments.
Organized around eight themes central to aesthetic theory today, this book examines the sources and development of Kant's aesthetics by mining his publications, correspondence, handwritten notes, and university lectures. Each chapter explores one of eight themes: aesthetic judgment and normativity, formal beauty, partly conceptual beauty, artistic creativity or genius, the fine arts, the sublime, ugliness and disgust, and humor. Robert R. Clewis considers how Kant's thought was shaped by authors such as Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, Georg Meier, Moses Mendelssohn, Johann Sulzer, Johann Herder, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Edmund Burke, Henry Home, Charles Batteux, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Voltaire. His resulting study uncovers and illuminates the complex development of Kant's aesthetic theory and will be useful to advanced students and scholars in fields across the humanities and studies of the arts.
Este artigo se propõe a investigar uma perspectiva hermenêutica, afinada com teorias estéticas contemporâneas, nas seções posteriores, §§ 49-60 da Crítica da faculdade de juízo estética, KU e EE. Tratando de qualificar adicionalmente a mera-reflexão e o juízo estético no contraponto da reflexão e função da imaginação que produz os esquemas e conceitos empíricos. Mas ainda, em especificar a reflexão estética como uma interpretação reflexiva, pressuposta e modelada pela estrutura complexa e polissêmica das ideais estéticas nos §§ 49, 51, 58, 59. Interpelando as formulações de Kant, com o argumento de Allison, Longuenesse e Makkreel, para explorar os pontos de interlocução com as estéticas-semânticas de Danto e Rancière.
Kant's Critique of Judgment seems not to be an obviously unified work. Unlike other attempts to comprehend it as a unity, which treat it as serving either practical or theoretical interests, Kristi Sweet's book posits it as examining a genuinely independent sphere of human life. In her in-depth account of Kant's Critical philosophical system, Sweet argues that the Critique addresses the question: for what may I hope? The answer is given in Kant's account of 'territory,' a region of experience that both underlies and mediates between freedom and nature. Territory forms the context in which purposiveness without a purpose, the Ideal of Beauty, the sensus communis, genius and aesthetic ideas, and Kant's conception of life and proof of God are best interpreted. Encounters in this sphere are shown to refer us to a larger, more cosmic sense of a whole to which both freedom and nature belong.
O objetivo deste trabalho é expor aquilo que se pode chamar de «a parte estética» do juízo determinante, ou seja, do juízo em sua tarefa cognitiva. Quer se desenvolver aqui a ideia de que a Estética Transcendental só se apresenta como uma doutrina justamente pela presença do fenômeno a ser conhecido, que põee a funcionar todo aparato cognitivo típico da imaginação. Certamente, deixando aqui de lado a Analítica dos Princípios, a síntese tripla é, neste sentido, a «construtora» prévia desta doutrina estética, sobretudo se tomarmos como ponto de partida as afirmações de Kant, segundo as quais o espaço e o tempo são produtos da imaginação.
In this book, Lara Ostaric argues that Kant's seminal Critique of Judgment is properly understood as completing his Critical system. The two seemingly disparate halves of the text are unified under this larger project insofar as both aesthetic and teleological judgment indirectly exhibit the final end of reason, the Ideas of the highest good and the postulates, as if obtaining in nature. She relates Kant's discussion of aesthetic and teleological judgment to important yet under-explored concepts in his philosophy, and helps the reader to recognize the relevance of his aesthetics and teleology for our understanding of fine arts and genius, the possibility of pure judgments of ugliness, Kant's philosophy of history, his philosophy of religion, and his conception of autonomy. Ostaric's novel and thoroughly integrative presentation of Kant's system will be of interest not only to Kant scholars but also to those working in religious studies, art history, political theory, and intellectual history.
Este artículo se interroga acerca de cuál es la importancia de la Crítica del juicio en relación a la imaginación política. Hablar del “gusto” como un sentimiento universalmente comunicable, es significativo en tanto que dirige la atención hacia las formas y los acontecimientos que se juzgan relevantes, en el espacio público, sin que medie necesariamente una determinación conceptual. Rechazar al Schwärmer, al que desvaría, permite a Kant identificar las formas de la experiencia posible con la sensibilidad estética de sujetos “políticamente razonables”. Nos proponemos explorar si la exclusión de aquellos cuyas sensibilidades y experiencias no son señaladas como universalmente comunicables, constituye la única lectura posible del proyecto crítico kantiano.
Abstrac t_ Stelios Gadris | Philosophizing With Children. What Does It Mean to Think About Abstract Concepts? Philosophy for/with children continues to face the suspicion that children-especially of relatively young ages-cannot philosophize because they are unable to think in abstract terms. In what follows we will try to establish that thinking abstractly should not be confused with thinking in general terms: All the concepts and ideas that pertain to philosophy and are abstract in nature, namely, beauty, friendship, justice, fairness etc. are, first of all, contestable and ambivalent; second, they endure throughout history, constantly resur-facing occupying a locus of interest-common to both, adults and children-and, finally, they seem to be already operative, embodied within children's lives. Thus, the question that we need to pose refers to the meaning of the term 'abstract'. We will try to establish that to think about abstract concepts it suffices to be able to acknowledge the ambivalent character of the aforementioned ideas: and being ambivalent means that there is no consensus regarding their meaning; thus, to think about abstract concepts might mean to be able to acknowledge and think from different standpoints; something akin to Kant's sensus communis. Εισαγωγικά Η φιλοσοφία για παιδιά ή με παιδιά 1 αποτελεί μία μεθοδολογική προσέγγιση για την εισαγωγή του φιλοσοφικού στοχασμού στα σχολεία. Με αυτήν την έννοια δεν συνιστά διδασκαλία της ιστορίας της φιλοσοφίας, ούτε και ερμηνεία των κειμένων του κανόνα της δυτικής-κυρίως-φιλοσοφικής παράδοσης, αλλά αποτελεί, μάλ-λον, δραστηριότητα που έχει ως στόχο τη διερεύνηση εννοιών που αναγνωρίζουμε-διαχρονικά-ως φιλοσοφικές και οι οποίες είναι αμφιλεγόμενες, έννοιες για τις οποίες ερίζουν θεοί και άνθρωποι. Όπως αναφέρει ο Σωκράτης στον Ευθύφρονα: Σκέψου μήπως αυτά <ενν. τα αντικείμενα της διαφωνίας> είναι το δίκαιο και το άδικο, το ωραίο και το άσχημο, το καλό και το κακό. Αυτά δεν είναι τα πράγματα για τα οποία, όταν διαφωνούμε και δεν μπορούμε να καταλήξουμε σε 1 Ο Matthew Lipman περιγράφει ως "φιλοσοφία για παιδιά" την προσέγγιση που χρησιμο-ποιεί τα δικά του μυθιστορήματα ως αφορμές φιλοσοφικών ερευνών, μυθιστορήματα που συν-οδεύονται από διδακτικά εγχειρίδια με προτάσεις θεμάτων συζήτησης ή ασκήσεων, και ως "φι-λοσοφία με παιδιά" προσεγγίσεις που ακολουθούν τη μεθοδολογία του αλλά χρησιμοποιούν διαφορετικό υλικό ως αφορμές/ερεθίσματα για φιλοσοφικό διάλογο με τα παιδιά. Περισσότερα για την παραπάνω διάκριση: Sutcliffe 2017. Για μια σύντομη ιστορική εισαγωγή στο πρόγραμμα της φιλοσοφίας για παιδιά βλ. σχ. Lipman 2017.-163-Αριαδνη/A
We argue that the relationship between Kant’s theory of imagination and his moral philosophy has not been well understood. Missing is an adequate connection between his idea of sensus communis and the power of imagination to exceed the senses. This connection is close and important, and it has serious implications for how we are to apply and further theorize moral relations among human beings. Especially important in this regard is the ability among humans, in their social setting, to imagine other persons. We do this pre-cognitively, at the level of feeling. The effects of imagining other persons prior to all knowledge of them (as, for instance, rational agents), grounds the autonomy of other persons in a relationship that is far broader than knowledge.
This book develops an original theory of performative beauty. Philosophical aesthetics has largely neglected one’s own actions as a potential experience of the beautiful. Throughout the book, the author uses own experiences of Argentine tango as a case study; one important incentive for social dancing is to have pleasurable and beautiful experiences.
This book begins by investigating the methodological causes for why beauty in modernity has been seen to result only from contemplating external objects. It then builds a theory of performative beauty that incorporates findings from new phenomenology, neuroaesthetics, enactivism, and somaesthetics and that reassesses existing inquiries of beauty. The result is an account that identifies kinaesthetic awareness as the point of emergence of both theory and practice, of creation (poiesis) and perception (aisthesis), and of moving (agency) and being moved (reception). Performative beauty is the pleasure of being moved by the dance where the dancer feels both as a creative improvisor and as an integrated part of the activity itself.
A Somaesthetics of Performative Beauty – Tangoing Desire and Nostalgia will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in aesthetics, dance studies, performance studies and related fields of artistic research
The 1929 encounter between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger in Davos, Switzerland is considered one of the most important intellectual debates of the twentieth century and a founding moment of continental philosophy. At the same time, many commentators have questioned the philosophical profundity and coherence of the actual debate. In this book, the first comprehensive philosophical analysis of the Davos debate, Simon Truwant challenges these critiques. He argues that Cassirer and Heidegger's disagreement about the meaning of Kant's philosophy is motivated by their different views about the human condition, which in turn are motivated by their opposing conceptions of what the task of philosophy ultimately should be. Truwant shows that Cassirer and Heidegger share a grand philosophical concern: to comprehend and aid the human being's capacity to orient itself in and towards the world.
This study aims to point out the journey of the term Einbildungskraft throughout the Turkish dictionar-ies of philosophy and fields of use the term in Kant’s critical philosophy. Thus, some of the dictionaries of philosophy that hold together the concepts considered as the building blocks of philosophy and their meanings to sustain an intellectual tradition, are the subject of this study. It focuses on the transmission of cultural memory, which is formed by the concepts of philosophy, and the importance of the task of term revivification. With this study, the importance of mastering in the terminology of philosophy from past to present, in reconstructing the concepts of Kant's critical philosophy in Turkish is pointed out. Thus, through the term Einbildungskraft, the meanings given to the term by Kant and the chosen words while translating it into Turkish are emphasized. The value of the rectification activity in the language and the importance of the attachment to the tradition of thought are emphasized. In this sense, Kant's terminology, and conceptual choices that he made in his own works are discussed. The allusions on concept construction that Kant made in his critical philosophy are included. On the other hand, the importance of choosing the term that best meets the semantic load of a philosophical concept is emphasized. The Turkish equivalents of Einbildungskraft appropriate to Kant’s usage and the adequacy of these words as the translation of the concept are pointed out. In order to distinguish the semantic nuances of the concept, its use in the precritical period and critical period has been emphasized.
Empathy and Mental Health: An Integral Model for Developing Therapeutic Skills in Counseling and Psychotherapy. The text features a multiple perspective conception of empathy in the context of facilitating a wide-range of stage and strategic skills in diverse treatment practices.
In this paper, I discuss Kant’s concept-less schematism ( KU , 5: 287) in the third Critique ¹ and make three claims: 1) concept-less schematism is entirely consistent with the schematism in the first Critique ; 2) concept-less schematism is schematism with no empirical concept as an outcome; and 3) in accordance with 1) and 2), the imagination is free to synthesize the given manifold and leads to judgements of taste without this meaning either that the categories play no role at all or that these judgements are full-fledged cognitive determining judgements. While most commentators read the freedom of the imagination as its independence from the understanding, I argue that the freedom of the imagination is based on a non-determining employment of the pure concepts of the understanding. The freedom of the aesthetic imagination consists in the temporal schematization of the categories without any complementary determination of the empirical concept.
This chapter explores what Kant means by “life”, the “feeling of life”, the “feeling of the promotion (or inhibition) of life”, and related notions, such as the idea of a “vital power”, through the contrast between Kant’s account of the beautiful and his account of the sublime. We argue that it is significant that Kant characterizes the feeling of the beautiful as a feeling of the promotion of life but the feeling of the sublime in terms of vital powers. We account for this difference by showing that in experiences of beauty, we are aware of ourselves as rational but embodied human beings, as part of nature. In the feeling of the sublime, by contrast, we are aware of ourselves as pure rational beings. This entails that in the beautiful, we experience nature as deeply life-promoting, while in the sublime, we experience the independence of our supersensible vocation from nature.
The harmonious free play of the imagination and understanding is at the heart of Kant’s account of beauty in the Critique of the Power of Judgement , but interpreters have long struggled to determine what Kant means when he claims the faculties are in a state of free play. In this article, I develop an interpretation of the free play of the faculties in terms of the freedom of attention. By appealing to the different way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, we can explain how the faculties are free, even when the subject already possesses a concept of the object and is bound to the determinate form of the object in perception.
The article explores Kant’s notion of the human being as the ultimate end of nature, presenting an ethical interpretation of this notion. The author of this article believes that the analysis of Kant’s assumptions will allow a deeper understanding of our own hermeneutical situation, in which ecological problems force us to rethink our relationship with nature and the meaning of human existence. Analyzing Kant’s early texts on Lisbon earthquake and his reflection on the sublime in the Critique of Judgement, the author asks how the experience of an uncontrolled natural element complements Kant’s ethical vision of nature’s teleology. Emphasizing the importance of insight into human vulnerability for the implementation of moral purpose in nature, the article outlines guidelines for interpretation that allow the relevance of Kant’s position in the context of contemporary environmental ethics.
This updated edition offers a comprehensive, penetrating, and informative guide to what is regarded as the classical period of German philosophy. Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling are all discussed in detail, along with contemporaries such as Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schopenhauer, whose influence was considerable but whose work is less well known in the English-speaking world. Leading scholars trace and explore the unifying themes of German Idealism and discuss its relationship to Romanticism, the Enlightenment, and the culture of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. This second edition offers an updated bibliography and includes three entirely new chapters, which address aesthetic reflection and human nature, the chemical revolution after Kant, and organism and system in German Idealism. The result is an illuminating overview of a rich and complex philosophical movement, and will appeal to a wide range of interested readers in philosophy, literature, theology, German studies, and the history of ideas.
Kant admits the existence of a universally communicable feeling, which is significant in that it directs attention to the forms and events that are considered relevant in the public space, without a conceptual determination. Rejecting the Schwärmer and the extravagant, allows Kant to identify the forms of possible experience with the aesthetic sensibility of politically reasonable subjects. The question of universal communicability seems to be resolved by Kant if we recognize in the subjects the same reason that can be carefully delimited. In this article we explore the political implications of this search for the unity of Kantian reason and a possible reading that, on the contrary, highlights its fragmentation and finitude and contributes to a problematization of the unity of experience and its communicability.
This essay explores the relation between worldly orientation and rational comprehension in Kant. Both require subjective grounds of differentiation that were eventually developed into a contextualizing principle for reflective judgement. This kind of judgement can proceed either inductively to find new universals or by analogy to symbolically link different objective spheres. I will argue that the basic orientational function of reflective judgement is to modally differentiate the formal horizonal contexts of field, territory, domain and habitat laid out in the Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgement . Assessing which context takes priority will be important in making aesthetic judgements and for applying practical reason to comprehend human affairs.
According to Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement , in the end all estimation of magnitude is sensible, or ‘aesthetic’, and the absolutely great in aesthetic estimation is called ‘the mathematical sublime’. This article identifies the relevant sensible element with an inner sensation of a temporal tension: in aesthetic comprehension, the imagination encounters an inevitable tension between the successive reproduction of a magnitude’s individual parts and the simultaneous unification of these parts. The sensation of this tension varies in degree and facilitates aesthetic estimation in general. But in the special case where it comes to involve a sense of exceeding our imagination’s limit, we judge a magnitude to be mathematically sublime. Pace Kant, I argue that this limit is private and contingent rather than transcendental, such that the judgement of the mathematical sublime is neither universal a priori nor necessary.
This paper argues that Kant presents two different accounts of beauty, one that applies properly to art and one that applies properly to nature. The judgment of beauty that applies properly to nature can be free and thus judged without concepts. The work of art, however, is judged beautiful when it expresses aesthetic ideas. This distinction then enables me to explain several problematic passages in Kant's text: those that serve to distinguish these two conceptions of beauty from one another as well as those passages in which Kant views them as overlapping. With respect to the latter, I argue that Kant lays especial significance on cases where we apply the conception of artistic beauty to natural objects, as in doing so we view nature as expressing ideas that step beyond nature.
In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Ego-splitting. My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking.
У статті досліджується кантівська концепція вільної гри пізнавальних спроможностей – виображення і розсуду – в ракурсі проблеми трансцендентальної універсальності. Відзначається універсалізуючий потенціал третьої «Критики», одним із визначальних сюжетів якої є проблема вільної гри, щодо Кантової філософської системи в цілому. Викладаються базові параметри авторської тематизації трансцендентального універсалізму як такого, що ґрунтується на принципах відношення і відмінності і є пов’язаним із конституюванням порядку гіпер-універсальності. Оприявнено й проаналізовано параметри універсальності, імпліковані концепцією вільної гри. Показано, яким чином вихідна універсальність трансцендентального виображення виявляється в рамках вільної гри водночас підваженою і гіперболізованою. Досліджено амбівалентну позицію вільної гри у відношені до пізнання; з метою схоплення універсалістичних імплікацій релевантного вільній грі модусу пізнання – «пізнання взагалі» – введено концепт «пізнання als ob». Встановлено певну асиметрію в рамках вільної гри між статусами виображення і розсуду, а саме – пріоритетність останнього. Проаналізовано специфіку властивої вільній грі суб’єктивної універсальності, виявлено її інтерсуб’єктивні та квазі-об’єктивні засновки; застосовано поняття «als ob-об’єктивності», що характеризує певну тенденцію до універсалізації самої універсальності, позначаючи універсальний вимір на межі суб’єктивного й об’єктивного.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.