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Britain's Prime and Britain's Decline: The British Economy, 1870-1914.
... Only eleven years later the relative position of British technology at the Exhibition of 1862 suggested impending encroachment. This image was reinforced with high-profile coverage of the Exhibitions of 1867 and 1870 (Pollard 1989;Sanderson 1995;Sanderson 1999 Several scholars argue that concerns over decline emerge as early as the 1850s, well before the economic downturn of the 1870s, or the threats of contending great powers in the 1880s and 1890s (Briggs 1987;Newsome 1961;Pollard 1989;Rubinstein 1990;Sanderson 1995;1999;Silver 1983). The idea of decline proved to be very powerful and was reinforced every time some weakness was perceived. ...
... Only eleven years later the relative position of British technology at the Exhibition of 1862 suggested impending encroachment. This image was reinforced with high-profile coverage of the Exhibitions of 1867 and 1870 (Pollard 1989;Sanderson 1995;Sanderson 1999 Several scholars argue that concerns over decline emerge as early as the 1850s, well before the economic downturn of the 1870s, or the threats of contending great powers in the 1880s and 1890s (Briggs 1987;Newsome 1961;Pollard 1989;Rubinstein 1990;Sanderson 1995;1999;Silver 1983). The idea of decline proved to be very powerful and was reinforced every time some weakness was perceived. ...
... On the other side of the equation, social groups of all ideological stripes lamented the lack of educational opportunities in modern subjects. The industrial products and processes of the pervious century required little in the way of formal learning, and this instilled the unfortunate idea that such training was therefore unnecessary (Pollard 1989). But the leading sectors of the period after 1830 (electro-magnetism and organic chemistry) required more systematic education and research (Hobsbawm 1968). ...
Why do hegemonic powers appear to have so few viable policy levers with which to cope with their fears of decline, and often adopt policies that are least well-suited, if not antithetical to the task? In this work I suggest that status threat generates a set of typical and quite maladaptive responses at both the individual/organizational level, and in the context of popular political culture, that exacerbate decline. This phenomenon, “pre-emptive decline,” is evident in both elite-driven policy and mass political responses and is reviewed here in maladaptive courses of action adopted in 19th century Britain, and in the contemporary United States.
... Perante estes indicadores, adensava-se junto da opinião pública o espectro da perda de hegemonia económica, que se traduzia no receio de ver os mercados da Grã-Bretanha inundados por produtos de qualidade superior de origem estrangeira, receio esse que encontrava voz em 1896 num bestseller de E. E. 115 S. Pollard, 1989: 263. 116 D. Reynolds: 1991: 12. 117 P. Mathias, 1983: 383. ...
... 116 D. Reynolds: 1991: 12. 117 P. Mathias, 1983: 383. 118 S. Pollard, 1989: 27. 119 S. Lee, 1994 It is not difficult to see why the thesis that there was a downturn in the British econonmy somewhere near the end of the nineteenth century, and that the relative decline has continued ever since, should have enjoyed such popularity in recent years, at least among British authors. ...
... That there was a change at that time is undisputed: this was the change-over from solitary pre-eminence in industrial and mining production to being one of several industrialized countries, each of which had access to similar capital resources, technical equipment and scientific knowhow. It was a traumatic experience for many British citizens, and one which they had scarcely fully absorbed... 132 128 S. Pollard, 1989: 8, 52. 129 Idem: 51. 130 R. S. Sayers, 1967: 93-100. ...
... 2 The extent to which Britain experienced economic decline relative to its competitors is subject to considerable debate and variation in interpretation. See, for example, Kindleberger 1964, Saul 1976, Pollard 1989, Feinstein & Prest 1972. The novelty of this late nineteenthcentury situation may be compared with British imperial decline after the Second World War, and the consequent problematizations of masculinity (Tolson 1977). ...
Self-Hypnosis: The Complete Manual for Health and Self-Change, 2nd ed offers a step-by step guide to using hypnosis to better well-being and stronger self-control. For over two decades renowned therapist and author Brian Alman showed thousands of individuals how to use self-inductive techniques for relief from pain, stress, and discomfort. Self-hypnosis assists in meditation and fosters positive self-regard. The exercises in Self-Hypnosis are clear, concise and easily attainable. As an effective therapy in alleviating the pain of childbirth, medical and dental surgery, burns, and accidental injuries, hypnosis is practiced widely. Hypnosis in pain relief is a noninvasive and natural healing process. Self-Hypnosis makes this healing technique available to the lay reader.
... 9 Fakat bu yenilikler, nitelik bakımından İlk Sanayi Devrimi sırasında buhar makinaları ve iplik eğirme alanındaki keşiflerle 8 Toplu bir değerlendirme için bkz. Pollard (1989). 9 Freeman ve Soete (2003) ve Landes (1969). ...
... Robert Lucas sharing such a perspective. Skeptics about whether finance is the major driver of growth might relish the lag of NYSE equities behind GDP growth in 1902-24 ( (Hobson 1905, Kennedy 1987, Pollard 1989), pre-figuring some modern literature on financialization and off-shoring (Krippner 2005). Such critics have in turn attracted refutation: pre-1914 British investors are defended as sensibly pioneering rationally diversified return maximisation strategies (Lenin 1928, Edelstein 1982, Goetzmann and Ukhov 2006, Chabot and Kurz 2010. ...
La Porta et al. see common law as most favorable to corporate development and economic growth, but Japanese legislators explicitly based their system on German civil law. However, Japan’s commercial code of 1899 omitted the GmbH (private company) form, which Guinnane et al. see as the jewel in the crown of Germany’s organizational menu. Neither apparent “mistake” retarded Japan’s adoption of the corporate form, because its commercial code offered flexible governance and liability options, implemented liberally. It was this liberal flexibility, not choice of legal family or hybrid corporate forms emphasized by previous writers, that drove corporatization forward in Japan and more widely. Surprisingly (given that Germany’s superficially fuller organizational menu predated Japan’s by many decades and the country was wealthier), by the 1930s Japan already had not only more corporations than Germany, but also more
commandite
partnerships (with some corporate characteristics). After the introduction of the
yugen kaisha
(private company) in 1940, corporate forms became nearly as widely used in Japan as in the United States, United Kingdom, or Switzerland.
... This research was supported by a Northwestern University Graduate Research Grant and a Pew Younger Scholars Program Fellowship. 1 It should be noted that not all agree that British education failed. For a dissenting view for example, see Pollard [1989]. ...
For more than a hundred years before the turn of the nineteenth century, Britain was the world's dominant economy. In explaining Britain's eclipse, economic historians have traditionally placed great weight on its underinvestment in human capital. However, in the past it has been impossible to empirically test the conjecture that Britain's schools performed poorly. This study employs new data on males linked between the English censuses of 1851 and 1881 to provide such a test. The panel nature of the data allows the effect of school attendance on adult earnings to be measured. Reduced form and structural models indicate that schooling positively influenced earnings, but the small magnitude of the effect supports pessimistic views that schools in Britain failed to select and promote talent and likely impeded growth.
We explore which business forms were predominant in the later Victorian economy and why some forms were more effective among large British manufacturing firms during this period. With a dataset of 483 manufacturing firms in 1881 that either employed at least 1000 or had done so a decade earlier, we find that the great majority were partnerships. Public corporations attained higher capital–labour ratios and stronger employment growth than other business forms. The separation of ownership from control was most effective where it was most thoroughly practised, as by public, in contrast to private, corporations. Engineers were frequently encountered in all business forms and associated with expanding employment. But the large public manufacturing corporations employed almost twice the proportion of engineers and professionals in top management as other enterprises. Family firms, proxied by heirs, were present in management of three‐quarters of partnerships but in only one‐third of public corporations. Heirs reduced the employment growth of the firm, whereas engineers boosted it. Lords, mayors, and landed wealth in management were also associated with faster employment growth of enterprises.
By 1900, local authorities had succeeded companies and voluntary organisations as the major providers of utilities, schools and hospitals. This article examines why the role of companies and voluntary organisations diminished. It does this by comparing the financial results of companies, voluntary organisations and local authorities to identify the differing objectives they pursued. The results show that the priority for companies was short term dividend payments, while voluntary organisations put their charitable objectives first. In contrast, local authorities invested heavily to promote long term growth. Councils also pursued this objective by taking over a significant number of utility companies and voluntary schools.
Recent research relating to productivity growth during the British industrial revolution is reviewed. This confirms that there was a gradual acceleration rather than a ‘take‐off’. The explanation for the speeding‐up of technological progress remains controversial but the evidence base has improved considerably. In the face of a surge in population growth, slow growth of real wages during the industrial revolution may be seen as a good outcome which was underpinned by improved growth potential. Slow total factor productivity growth from the 1870s suggests that British technological capabilities at the end of the industrial revolution were still quite limited.
The principal aim of this thesis is to investigate the origins of the research university in Britain, focussing in particular on University College London in the period 1890-1914. This account demonstrates that this period witnessed a series of pioneering attempts to establish research schools in various departments of the College, and the emergence of an institutional commitment to both teaching and research. It is argued that - contrary to the assumptions implicit within much of the existing literature on this subject - government money and initiatives were of secondary importance, and the role of the state was merely to consolidate the effects of various developments that were taking place within the College. This thesis therefore highlights the significance of the role played by a handful of pioneering professors in certain key departments of the College - notably Karl Pearson (Applied Mathematics and Statistics), Sir William Ramsay (Chemistry) and A.F. Pollard (History). These remarkable individuals managed to pursue successful research careers and pioneered the development of research training for students. Moreover, through their efforts to secure the necessary financial support for their work (principally from private sources) and involvement in the campaign to reform the University of London, the College Council and University authorities were slowly forced to accept an expanded conception of the role and function of the College in this period, and in 1905 UCL was formally reconstituted as 'a place of teaching and research'. In the absence of a satisfactory secondary literature on Britain's universities and the rise of research, it is hoped that this thesis will act as a pilot study, suggesting a possible strategy for investigating the origins of the research university in this country based on local studies of individual universities, colleges and departments.
In a business-dominated society entrepreneurship supposedly ensures that the elite is forever changing, ‘recruited from below’ (Schumpeter 1961; 156). Society consists of a great many more players than business though. Politicians, bureaucrats, professionals, rentiers, workers, all promote or discourage social mobility and growth. Greater social mobility was possible because of the stronger demand for the services of British professionals, outside the civil service and the Churches, according to Perkin (1990 Table 3.1 80). The present paper adjudicates between these opposed views of social mobility (‘Schumpeter’ versus ‘Perkin’ in shorthand) into the British elite in the later Victorian and Edwardian periods. In so doing it uncovers some of the sources and constraints upon social success for those not born into the upper echelons of society.
The later 19th century saw the formation of two distinct visions of serious criminality. Previous studies of the weak-willed,
‘degenerate’ offender, have neglected the simultaneous appearance of the modern professional criminal. This essay reveals
that the rise of the security industry in the Victorian era served to reshape notions of criminal professionalism, imbuing
them with a new emphasis on the technical proficiency of thieves. This image of the criminal provided an outlet for ambivalent
reflections on social and technological change, much as similar, high-security visions of the criminal have ever since. Hence,
this essay both traces the origins of a neglected aspect of modern criminological thought and reconstructs the historical
role of security provision in shaping visions of the criminal.
This paper investigates a neglected aspect of the transitions literature: the destabilisation of existing regimes and industries. It presents an analytical perspective that integrates four existing views on destabilisation and conceptualizes the process as a multi-dimensional and enacted phenomenon involving technical, economic, political, and cultural processes. This perspective is illustrated with two historical cases of the British coal industry (1913–1967, 1967–1997). These cases are also used to articulate five lessons regarding the overall destabilisation process and five lessons regarding the economic and socio-political environments of industries. The conclusion section translates the historical lessons into insights with relevance for the contemporary challenge of climate change and transitions to low-carbon energy systems.
Abstract Industrial Revolution arose in Europe as a consequence of very specific conditions for its realisation, which were ,created in the ,course ,of the ,historical development. ,One of these ,characteristic European traits, which differed from those in other high cultures, was the comparatively strong position of women in society. There arises the question, wether this factcaused repercussions for the Industrial Revolution. Already in the Middle Ages the close cooperation in production within the frame of monogamic,matrimony
A distinctive feature of the British approach until the 1960s was that vocational education and training (VET) should be provided by employers. This is conventionally contrasted with the much more formal state coordinated approach of Germany. The question posed is whether the British style was the ‘spontaneous order’ that results because markets use information efficiently about the supply of and demand for skills. Alternatively, was it ‘spontaneous disorder’ in which the absence of standards and coordination led to underinvestment in VET and economic decline relative to those countries with strong leadership in education and training? There is considerable evidence in the twentieth century that Britain suffered from shortcomings in the availability of highly trained labour. The most credible explanation is the organisation and operation of the VET system; the perceived self-interests of undereducated employers and restrictive unions during booms and slumps provided inadequate conditions for efficient employer-led education and training.
During the second half of the twentieth century the international economy expanded in size and complexity. The integration of goods and capital markets culminated in the 1980s and 1990s, described as an era of ‘globalization’ comparable to the late nineteenth century. As this process unfolded, there was a steady reduction in Britain's prominence as a world economic power both in quantitative terms and in terms of influence in global policy-making. This had as much to do with the evolution of the international economy as with Britain's own economic strength. The rapid expansion in global trade and investment and the increase in the number of countries involved compared to the nineteenth century inevitably left the British economy in a less prominent position. This trend also reflected a more fundamental shift of economic strength and influence toward the US economy that had begun before the First World War and was enhanced by America's war experience.The era began with Britain exercising its still considerable influence in global policy-making. Indeed, the entire framework of the post-war international economic system was born out of wartime relations between the United States and the UK. Through the post-war years, despite heavy domestic economic burdens, Britain managed an international currency that ranked second only to the US dollar and was the unit of account for half of the ... log in or subscribe to read full text
In 2001-2002 numerous scandals have occurred in developed countries in connection with financial reports' distortions and breaches of good corporate governance principles. As a result, regulatory bodies began to study the role of boards of directors in preventing such cases, putting an emphasis on the duties and powers of non-executive directors. Serious steps have been taken in United Kingdom, where the first corporate governance standards were established in the beginning of the 1990s. The article analyses the document published in January 2003 - the review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors prepared by D. Higgs team. The author considers the peculiarities of the British corporate governance system and examines most important provisions of the Higgs report.
In this article I provide a micro-level analysis of primary schooling in Victorian England. Using a new dataset of school-age males linked between the 1851 and 1881 population censuses, I examine the determinants of childhood school attendance and the impact of attendance on adult labor market outcomes. I find that schooling had a positive effect on adult occupational class and that the associated wage gains were likely to have outweighed the cost of schooling. However, this effect was small relative to father s class, and the effect of education on earnings appears to have been small relative to modern results.
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