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Historicizing Internet Regulation in China: A Meta-Analysis of Chinese Internet Policies (1994-2017)

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Despite growing scholarly attention, few studies have systematically investigated the historical evolution and patterns of Chinese Internet policies. We created the first comprehensive database of Chinese Internet laws and policies between 1994 and 2017 and conducted a meta-analysis of 358 policy documents using content analysis and social network analysis. We found: 1) among the 71 government agencies involved in Chinese Internet regulation, there are central-peripheral dynamics as well as complex networks of collaboration; 2) although more than 40% regulations concern information services, the overall regulatory emphasis has evolved from Internet infrastructure to online content to digital economy; 3) Chinese Internet policies historically follow the principle of “rule by directives” instead of “rule of law,” dominated by low-level policies, leading to both arbitrariness and adaptability. Overall, our study contributes to debates on three core issues in Internet governance from a Chinese perspective: Who (should) regulate the Internet? What issues (should) fall under regulatory oversight? And how to regulate the Internet via what mechanisms?
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Historicizing Internet Regulation in China:
A Meta-Analysis of Chinese Internet Policies (1994–2017)
WEISHAN MIAO
1
Institute of Journalism and Communication, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China
MIN JIANG
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA
YUNXIA PANG
Central University of Finance and Economics, China
Despite growing scholarly attention, few studies have systematically investigated the
historical evolution and patterns of Chinese Internet policies. We created the first
comprehensive database of national-level Chinese Internet laws and policies between
1994 and 2017 and conducted a meta-analysis of 358 policy documents using content
analysis and social network analysis. We found that (1) among the 71 government
agencies involved in Chinese Internet regulation, there are central-peripheral dynamics
as well as complex networks of collaboration; (2) although more than 40% of
regulations concern information services, the overall regulatory emphasis has evolved
from Internet infrastructure to online content to digital economy; and (3) while Chinese
Internet policies historically follow the principle of “rule by directives” instead of “rule of
law,” dominated by low-level policies, leading to both arbitrariness and adaptability,
recent state efforts aim to streamline policymaking. Overall, our study contributes to
debates on three core issues in Internet governance from a Chinese perspective: Who
(should) regulate the Internet? What issues (should) fall under regulatory oversight?
And how should the Internet be regulated via what mechanisms?
Keywords: China, Internet, policy, law, governance, regulation, content analysis, social
network analysis
Internet growth and adoption present a multitude of challenges to governments around the
world, ranging from security to economy. Though Internet governance encompasses many domains, three
Weishan Miao: WeishanMiao@gmail.com
Min Jiang: Min.Jiang@uncc.edu
Yunxia Pang: yxpang@126.com
Date submitted: 2020-07-02
1
The study was supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China (20BXW037).
2004 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
questions are central: Who (should) regulate the Internet? What issues (should) fall under regulatory
oversight? And how should the Internet be regulated via what mechanisms? Different answers to these
questions have formed the basis of various models and practices of Internet governance, including the
contentious debates surrounding state and commercial regulation and influence of the Internet (DeNardis,
2014). Despite the phenomenal growth of the Internet in many non-Western developing countries, the
fact that knowledge of Internet governance has largely been modeled after and produced from Western
societies has prompted scholars to advocate for the inclusion of the “Global South” into Internet
policymaking and knowledge production (Bhuiyan, 2014). China, the only country to have built an Internet
ecosystem that can rival Silicon Valley’s, and which is now exporting digital products globally and striving
to become a strong cyber power, is crucial in this respect.
Systematic research of Chinese Internet policies becomes all the more imperative as the Chinese
government now aspires to promote its regulatory model abroad to reshape global Internet governance.
For example, overseas expansion of Chinese Internet companies including Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and
ByteDance has gone hand in hand with Beijing’s promotion of its Internet sovereignty governance model
(Jiang, 2010) to challenge traditional U.S. dominance.
In recent years, research of Chinese Internet policies has been increasingly integrated into global
Internet governance discussions. Some study China’s participation in global Internet governance (e.g.,
Shen, 2016). Others focus on specific policiesfor instance, China’s real name registration policies (Jiang,
2015); and more recently China’s new cybersecurity laws and data policies (e.g., Triolo, Sacks, Webster,
& Creemers, 2017). However, few studies have systematically reviewed the long-term evolution of
Chinese Internet policies or the complex internal dynamics between regulators empirically (Negro, 2017;
F. Yang & Mueller, 2014). When it does, this research has several limitations. First, the anthologies of
relevant Internet laws and policies lack rigorous systematic analysis (Zhang & Guo, 2012). Second, most
studies cover a short time span (L. Hu, 2008). Third, research tends to rely on relatively small samples (F.
Yang & Mueller, 2014).
To this end, we propose a meta review of China’s Internet policies between 1994 and 2017 to
historicize analysis of regulatory agencies, issues and mechanisms. Policies are valuable lens to examine
the goals, principles and procedures of Chinese Internet regulation, which informs and drives regulatory
practices. Our meta-analysis study fills several research gaps. First, our work uses longitudinal dataa
corpus of 358 national-level Chinese Internet policy documents published between 1994 and 2017, the
most comprehensive to our knowledgeto historicize the analysis. It serves as a comprehensive baseline
for assessing sweeping policy changes epitomized by the passing of China’s Cybersecurity Law in 2017.
Second, we use both content analysis and network analysis to unveil the complex and dynamic relations
between agencies and policies. Third, aided by empirical data, we contribute to theoretical debates
surrounding several key regulatory issues. First, who regulates the Internet in China? Our analysis shifts
the perspective from treating “the state” as a monolithic entity to viewing it as composed of distinct state
agencies. By identifying their key roles and complex power relations, we demystify “the state” and with
new data gain insight into Chinese bureaucratic politics in Internet governance (F. Yang & Mueller, 2014).
Second, what issues fall under regulatory oversight? We identify specific Chinese Internet policy areas and
analyze their respective trajectories. By historicizing and contextualizing such macro trends, this study
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2005
yields new insight into China’s Internet governance and moves research beyond a singular focus on
censorship (Dong, 2012) to include diverse topics such as industrial policies and business regulations.
Third, how should the Internet be regulated via what mechanisms? We highlight the hierarchy of Internet
regulations and China’s ad hoc approach of “rule by directive” rather than “rule of law” (Zhu, 2012, p. 26).
In the following, we first review the literature on Chinese Internet regulatory agencies, Internet
policies passed, and their characteristics. We then detail our data and methodologies. Using content
analysis, we coded Chinese Internet policy documents based on issuing time, agencies, regulatory areas,
and policy types. Social network analysis then outlined the relationships between regulatory agencies,
reference patterns between various Internet policies, and regulatory responsibilities of different agencies.
Coupled with brief case studies, this article depicts the historical trajectory and logic of Chinese Internet
policies, and in doing so, we discuss their impact, associated problems, and areas for future research.
Literature Review
Literature Review Regulatory Agencies: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen?
Different from the United States’ generally laissez-faire approach toward Internet regulation and
the EU’s more interventionist approach (e.g., EU’s General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR]), Chinese
Internet policies are historically inseparable from various state regulators competing to assert control
(Mueller & Tan, 1997; F. Yang & Mueller, 2014). China’s state-centric model prioritizes the central
government’s role in Internet regulation from infrastructure to content, while commercial entities,
nongovernmental, civic organizations are subsumed to play complementary roles (Negro, 2017). Within
state bureaucracy, interagency conflicts often reflect what Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) called
fragmented authoritarianism in China’s policymaking, which views the Chinese government not as a
unified entity but as a complex system of powers and controls, with cracked space for autonomy and
loopholes for bargaining.
Because of the multitude of governing bureaucracies and their complex relationships, Chinese
Internet governance has been compared to “nine dragons bringing no rain” (Zhan, 2013, p. 93), or “too
many cooks in the kitchen,” where disputes between multiple agencies often lead to confusion. The many
Internet laws and regulations thus can be viewed as a product of such a tangled web of control:
Horizontally, ministries and agencies vie for power; vertically, superior and subsidiary bodies also clash to
maximize control over resources (Sohmen, 2001). Even Chinese president Xi Jinping admits China’s
Internet regulation is deeply fragmented and decentralized (People’s Net, 2013), justifying the
reconsolidation of regulatory power.
Despite fragmentation, however, Internet convergence has not only challenged China’s regulatory
agencies to cooperate and gradually shaped their organizational structure (F. Yang & Mueller, 2014), it
has also led to industry convergence. While scholars argued “China’s regulation of the Internet has
evolved into a highly coordinated and balanced structure parallel to the institutional convergence” earlier
(Tan, 1999, p. 261), we view this process to be one full of conflicts and contradictions despite intentions
to bring more institutional coordination. In the 1990s, management of the Internet was dominated by an
2006 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
emphasis on industry and technology, making the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) the prominent
regulator. Since 2000, as the Internet started to play a critical role in online communication and public
opinion, ideologically driven agencies such as the Ministry of Culture (MOC) and the State Administration
of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) became more prominent. Most recently,
Internet regulation has been elevated to the level of national strategy under the framework of “no cyber
security, no national security” (Xinhua Net, 2015, para. 2). On February 27, 2014, the Cyberspace
Administration of China (CAC), answerable to President Xi Jinping himself, was established.
Though the Chinese central government dominates Internet regulation in China, few studies
analyze the interactions, conflicts, and cooperation between regulatory agencies. For instance, with the
evolution of the Internet, what state agencies participated in regulation? What do they regulate? How do
they compete or cooperate? We pose the following questions:
RQ1: Between 1994 and 2017, which Chinese state government agencies have issued Internet
policies?
RQ2: What are the regulatory responsibilities of these various state government agencies?
RQ3: What are the networks of relations between government agencies based on policies and
regulations jointly issued?
Regulatory Policies: Supremacy of Ideology?
Internet policies are expressions of government desires and positions, designed to address
pressing problems of the time. From the start, Chinese Internet research challenged popular discourses
that viewed the Internet primarily as a space and instrument for free expression and association. Instead,
work has shown that not only can the Internet be used by governments, especially in authoritarian
countries, to filter content, it can also disseminate dominant ideologies and propaganda to reproduce
existing social relations and strengthen the ruling class (Jiang & Okamoto, 2014). While scholarly work
outside China has focused on censorship (Dong, 2012), mainland China research tends to emphasize
regulation, business and information management (Herold & Seta, 2015). Moving beyond a
“democratization” agenda (Meng, 2010), Chinese Internet research has expanded to include Internet
industrial policies, business development, political economy and globalization (Hong, 2017; Shen 2016).
Further, Chinese Internet policymaking shows distinct features at different stages, heavily
influenced by the political thinking and outlook of the leadership at the time as well as China’s social,
economic, and political conditions. In the late 1970s, reforms reset China’s development path and
connected China to the global market and transnational capital during Deng Xiaoping’s presidency (1981
89). Under the sway of the Third Wave and information superhighway, “informatization” became part of
China’s social imaginings and national policies associated with modernization and progress (Wu & Yun,
2018). During Jiang Zemin’s presidency (19932003), China started to build Internet infrastructures.
Several policies on network security were issued during this period. After joining the WTO in 2001, China
became more embedded in the global economy. Commercial Internet grew rapidly, evidenced by the
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2007
founding of three Chinese Internet giantsBaidu, Alibaba, and Tencentall around 2000. Under President
Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao (20032013), while the state continues to maintain ideological work,
Internet activism and contention moved to the foreground in public opinion formation and expression,
triggering tighter state control (G. Yang, 2009). Between 2000 and 2014, official discourse of Internet
governance evolved from one dominated by moral and security concerns to one obsessed with the
Internet’s potential to bring instability and contention (Cui & Wu, 2016).
Unlike previous presidencies under Deng, Jiang, and Hu, the administration coming into power in
2012 under Xi Jinping elevated the management of public opinion to unpreceded levels with a focus on
centralizing regulatory power that significantly weakened the autonomy and spontaneity of the Chinese
netizenry. President Xi’s reemphasis of government thought work prompted scholars to suggest Chinese
Internet governance is witnessing a Maoist “return of ideology” (G. Yang, 2014, p. 109). Meanwhile, the
central government supported the “Internet Plus Plan,” aimed at enhancing economic productivity and
China’s transition from the world’s factory to a new digital economy (Hong, 2017). Further, the Chinese
state grew interested in exporting China’s Internet governance model to reshape global Internet
governance, an aspiration likely to exert greater influence and pose challenges to global affairs. Based on
the regulatory regime’s changing emphases, we pose the following research questions:
RQ4: How has the number of Chinese Internet policies changed each year from 1994 to 2017?
RQ5: How has the focus of Chinese Internet policies evolved in the past 20 years?
Regulatory Approach: “Rule of Law” or “Rule by Directive”?
Over the past two decades, hundreds of laws and regulations have been issued in China to tame
the Web and minimize its political ramifications (F. Yang & Mueller, 2014). As part of the Chinese legal
system, Chinese Internet policies comprise legal regulations at various levels. According to the Legislation
Law of the PRC, Chinese laws and regulations include laws, judicial interpretations, administrative
regulations, local decrees, autonomous decrees, special decrees, and rules. All laws and regulations are
subsumed under the Constitution with laws forming the main body of legal documents, whereas
administrative regulations and local decrees constitute the supporting components (State Council
Information Office, 2011).
Despite large numbers of regulations targeting the Internet, very few have high legal status.
Among them, only four were passed by the National People’s Congress between 1994 and 2017 as laws.
The rest take the form of “regulation,” “decision,” “decree,” “administrative measure,” and even “opinion”
and “notice.” Given the relative absence of high-level Internet-related legislation, agencies have published
many ad hoc regulations to solve problems. Invariably, such policies are designed to maximize the power
of respective regulatory agencies, reflecting what Tian (2008) identifies as the prime characteristics of
Chinese legislation: agency-based power, interest-driven agency, and law-sanctioned interest.
More importantly, although all Chinese legislation is expected to observe the Constitution, large
numbers of regulations targeting the Internet directly contradict the supreme law. As Y. Hu (2010)
2008 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
pointed out, while Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution stipulates Chinese citizens enjoy the freedoms of
speech, the press, assembly, association and of demonstration, Interim Provisions on the Administration
of Internet Publishing (2002) required permits for Internet publishing. The contradictory reality has led Y.
Hu (2015) to quip that in China, “The Constitution is inferior to common law, common law is inferior to
administrative statute, administrative statue is inferior to bureaucratic provision, and bureaucratic
provision is inferior to a leader’s opinion” (p. 55). Given such ironies, how to best investigate the hierarchy
in China’s Internet legislation? Which legal documents are more important than others? We base our
analysis on legal citations (i.e., Chinese Internet legislation often cites other legal documents published
prior as sources of authority). Based on the above literature, we pose the following questions:
RQ6: Which types of legislation such as laws, judicial interpretations, administrative regulations,
departmental rules and regulatory documents dominate China’s Internet regulation?
RQ7: In Chinese Internet legislation, which are the most frequently cited policies?
Data Collection and Analysis
Data Collection
This study covers Chinese Internet policies between 1994 and 2017, drawn from 44 sources in
eight categories (see Table 1 in Miao & Jiang, 2021). Our data, built on systematic triangulation of
different sources, creates the first comprehensive database of 358 policy documents for national-level
Chinese Internet laws and policies (see dataset in Miao & Jiang, 2021). Taking cues from F. Yang and
Mueller’s (2014) study that collected 63 policies for content analysis, we expanded our data gathering to
include (1) authoritative academic legal databases; (2) leading commercial legal databases; (3) law
sections of 15 Internet regulators’ websites; (4) Chinese search queries in Baidu and Google
2
; (5) legal
anthologies maintained by top official Chinese media; (6) top Chinese legal journals; (7) books and
reports on Chinese Internet laws and regulations culled through extensive literature review
3
; and (8)
think-tank and research institute reports. For search queries in legal databases or websites, we used
(Internet or Network) in Chinese as keywords.
In the end, we collected 358 national-level Chinese Internet policies. Our national focus led us to
include laws and regulations passed by central government agencies but not local decrees, self-disciplinary
provisions, or those partly relevant. This collection vastly expands the scope of data compared with F.
Yang and Mueller’s (2014) seminal work. It also accounts for changes after Xi Jinping took power in 2012:
an ambitious Internet governance approach adopted by the state, consolidated Internet policymaking
2
We queried each year from 1994 to 2017 in Baidu and Google: China AND (Internet or Network) AND
(policy or regulation or law or decree) AND (year). Relevant results were collected from the first 20 pages
(10 results per page).
3
We searched for relevant books and reports in the library databases of Peking University and Tsinghua
University, two of China’s top research institutions, using the query “(Internet or Network) AND (policy or
regulation or law or decree).” The most relevant ones were selected.
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2009
power, and greater numbers of Internet policies issued. The study, however, does not assign weight to
specific agency (e.g., CAC) or policy (e.g., Cybersecurity Law), but complements the quantitative
approach with qualitative assessments.
Content Analysis
To code the data, we first analyzed the codebooks developed by previous research (F. Yang &
Mueller, 2014) and coded several variables including time, issuing agency, policy type, and policy area
based on our research questions. Two PhD student coders randomly selected 40 of 358 legislative
documents to code and further refined the codebook. The final codebook (see Table 2 in Miao & Jiang,
2021) details five Internet policy types (law, judicial interpretation, administrative regulation,
administrative rule, and regulatory documents) and four policy areas (resources and infrastructure,
cybersecurity, Internet economy, and information services). The two coders then coded all 358 policy
documents. Intercoder reliability in Cronbach’s alpha are: time (alpha = 0.99), issuing agency (alpha =
0.99), type (alpha = 0.95), and area (alpha = 0.92; Neuendorf, 2002).
Our four policy areas differ from F. Yang and Mueller’s (2014) typology to adapt to recent policy-
making development. We preserved “cybersecurity”; combined “Internet resources” and “development”
into “Internet resources and infrastructure,” emphasizing Internet access and infrastructure; replaced
“intellectual property” with “Internet economy” to account for the growth of policies related to digital
economy far beyond IP laws; and replaced “content regulation” with “information services,” as more
policies focus on algorithms, data, and privacy.
Social Network Analysis
We used the UCINET 6 software (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) to analyze two types of
relational networks: (1) joint policy network indicating degrees of cooperation between government
agencies; (2) two-mode networks between policy areas and government agencies.
First, when two agencies jointly issue a policy, they are considered to cooperate once as part of a
joint legislature network. If eight agencies issue a legislation, each pair is considered to have cooperated
once. Such cooperation is undirected. The more times two agencies cooperate, the greater the “degree” of
their cooperation, and the larger the “node” in the network.
Second, the two-mode network includes policy areas and government agencies. One dimension
involves the four policy areas. The other dimension corresponds to related government agency. The
resulting two-mode network is a matrix of 4 × 71.
2010 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
Results
Regulatory Agencies
We report below our findings in three areas: core Chinese Internet regulatory agencies, their
respective regulatory areas, and the patterns of cooperation between them.
Core Chinese Internet Regulatory Agencies
We grouped regulatory bodies into three tiers based on their formal legislative power. In the
Chinese legal system, National People’s Congress (NPC) is nominally the highest-level authority to issue
Internet laws (see Table 3 in Miao & Jiang, 2021). Between 1994 and 2017, the NPC passed four Internet
laws focused on electronic signature, information protection, and cybersecurity. Under the NPC are the
second tier government bodies including the Supreme Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the
State Council. Most of the policies passed by the Supreme Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate
are legal interpretations. The State Council issued many midlevel administrative rules such as the
Regulation on Internet Information Services of the PRC (2000). Among all regulators, the State Council
plays a crucial role: Besides supervising various ministries, it directs several departments and bureaus
with legislative power. Internet news, for instance, was previously under the purview of the State Council
News Office, later supervised by the State Council Information Office (SCIO). In 2011, SCIO was folded
into State Internet Information Office (SIIO). In 2014, SIIO became the Cyberspace Administration of
China (CAC), an administrative unit to carry out the decisions made by the Party’s Central Cybersecurity
and Informatization Leading Group (CCILG), headed by President Xi. At the third tier are various
ministries, commissions, bureaus, and departments directed by the State Council.
Table 3 (see Miao & Jiang, 2021) shows that 71 government agencies have been involved in
Internet policymaking. Some are more central than others. First, Ministry of Industrial and Information
Technology (MIIT), which participated in issuing 98 regulations, is a key player. Since 1996, MIIT has
passed Internet regulations almost every year, solidifying its status as a major regulator. Second, Ministry
of Public Security (MPS), State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT),
Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), and State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC)
issued 56, 51, 47 and 40 regulations, respectively, making them important policy players. Specifically,
MPS has independently issued 12 regulations in areas such as cybersecurity and has co-issued 44 rules
with other agencies, making it an authority issuing the second largest number of Internet provisions.
Third, Ministry of Culture (MOC), National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), People’s Bank of
China (PBC), and China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) make up the “third tier of Internet
regulators, having each issued more than 15 statutes.
In particular, Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) is composed by Chinese leaders at the
highest level, including the president, vice president, and related members of the Standing Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party Politburo, State Council, and other agencies. This new high-level regulatory
agency issued 47 policies in merely four years (as opposed to 98 policies issued by MIIT over 24 years).
Although CAC was initially tasked to review and filter information and issued 24 related policies in four
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2011
years, its regulatory reach has extended to two other areas: cybersecurity (nine policies) and Internet
economy (14 policies).
Regulatory Agencies and Their Respective Regulatory Areas
To display the regulatory areas corresponding to regulatory agencies, we used network
analysis tool UCINET 6 to draw a two-mode network (see Figure 1). The two modes are (1) regulatory
areas, including resources and infrastructure, cybersecurity, Internet economy, and information
services; and (2) regulatory agencies.
Figure 1. Two-mode network of regulatory agencies and areas (out-degree centrality).
First, the in-degree centrality of the two-mode network displays which regulatory area involves
more agencies. The more complex the area, the more agencies are involved and, in network visualization,
the denser are the dots surrounding a given area. Our analysis shows large numbers of agencies
participated in Internet policies ranging from information services, Internet economy to cybersecurity,
resources, and infrastructure. Particularly, “information services” (targeting online content) involves more
regulators, whereas “resources and infrastructure,” given its technicality, mainly involves MIIT and CNNIC.
Second, how agencies jointly issue legislation across regulatory areas is an indication of a
regulator’s degree of specialization. The size of nodes in the graph indicates out-degree centrality of a
regulatory agency. The bigger the node, the more regulatory areas an agency covers. Hence, in the
graph, the nodes have four sizes signaling regulatory areas range from one to four. Figure 1 shows MIIT,
Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), the State Council (SC), Ministry of
Education (MOE), National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and Ministry of Personnel
2012 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
(MOP) have issued legislation across all four regulatory areas. For instance, although MOE has issued only
15 legal documents, it is central to the regulatory area network due to the interdisciplinary nature of its
functions.
Third, thickness of the tie in the graph implies the dominance of an agency in a given regulatory
area. The more policies an agency issues, the stronger the tie. In “resources and infrastructure,” MIIT
reigns. In “cybersecurity,” MIIT, MPS, and CAC dominate. In “Internet economy,” SAIC, State Council
(SC), and MPS, MIIT, NDRC, and CAC are most central. In “information services,” SAPPRFT, MOC, CAC,
MPS, MIIT, and SC are major players.
Cross-Agency Cooperation
Though various ministries and departments issued policies in their respective areas, the
complexity of the Internet also compelled agencies to coordinate (F. Yang & Mueller, 2014). We analyzed
which agencies collaborated the most often with others, central to the network of cooperation. Among the
358 policy documents, 256 are issued by individual agencies. One hundred and two are jointly issued by
more than two agencies. These 102 policies involve 68 of 71 agencies identified in our study, reflecting
the complexity of coordination. Three agenciesMinistry of Railway, State Intellectual Property Office, and
National Copyright Administrationdid not collaborate with others, issuing highly specialized policies that
didn’t require collaboration.
Figure 2 displays the cooperative relations between state agencies. The size of the nodes
indicates the degree of connectedness, where the more an agency cooperates with others, the higher the
degree centrality. Figure 2 shows the most central in the network are Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIIT), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(SAIC). The second tier includes the State Council (SC), Cyber Administration of China (CAC), People’s
Bank of China (PBC), Ministry of Finance (MOF), National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),
and State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT).
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2013
Figure 2. Cooperation between agencies to jointly issue policies (degree centrality).
Figure 3 uses betweenness centrality to depict which agencies (as nodes in the network) act as
the most important bridges between agencies across different types of Internet policies. It shows MIIT and
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) appear to have the highest betweenness centrality, indicating they are
the most important players in legislation of different kinds.
2014 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
Figure 3. Cooperation between agencies to jointly issue policies (betweenness centrality).
Regulatory Policies
Between 1994 and 2017, the number of Chinese Internet policies issued each year has been on
the rise (see Figure 4), reflecting a general evolution of regulatory emphasis from Internet infrastructure
to online content to digital economy. The majority of policies concentrate in “information services” (40%)
and “Internet economy” (32%). In comparison, “cybersecurity” and “resources and infrastructure” policies
are at 14% and 13%, respectively. “Information services” targets content control, whereas “Internet
economy” focuses on economic planning and guidance, reflecting the state’s dual concern in economic
development and political control.
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2015
Figure 4. Internet penetration rate and number of Chinese Internet policies issued (1994
2017).
4
Table 4 shows the evolution of policy types and trends. “Information services” policies, for
instance, experienced a peak between 2000 and 2010, whereas “Internet economy” policies quickly grew
while “resources and infrastructure” policies declined. This reflects the focus in Chinese Internet
policymaking shifted from infrastructure to content to digital economy.
Table 4. Percentages of Four Internet Policy Areas (19942017).
199499
200010
201117
(n = 24)
(n = l 54)
(n = l 80)
c2
Information services
8.33% (2)
51.30% (79)
35.56% (64)
19.58***
Internet economy
4.17% (1)
22.73% (35)
43.89% (79)
26.27***
Internet security
45.83% (11)
9.74% (15)
13.89% (25)
22.18***
Resources and
Infrastructure
41.67% (10)
16.23% (25)
6.67% (12)
25.03***
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10.
First, in the early stage of Internet development in China, authorities’ preoccupation with Internet
infrastructure and security manifests itself in policymaking. Between 1994 and 1999, among the 24
Internet policies issued, 10 (or 42%) concern “resources and infrastructure” and 11 (or 46%)
“cybersecurity.” Internet access, connection, and domain name allocation were important infrastructural
4
Internet penetration data comes largely from CNNIC annual reports. Note: (1) CNNIC annual reports
started in 1997 when Chinese Internet survey data became available; (2) between 1997 and 2001, CNNIC
annual reports only provided estimates of Chinese Internet populations. We calculated penetration rates
based on figures from China’s National Bureau of Statistics; (3) between 2002 and 2018, CNNIC reports
provided Internet penetration rates.
2016 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
work. During this time, MIIT (issuing four policies) and the State Council (issuing four policies) played
critical roles in connecting the Chinese Internet to the global network and managing domain names.
Cybersecurity concerns not only the State Council but also specialized agencies such as Public Security,
People’s Bank of China, and Ministry of Railway.
Second, between 2000 and 2010, policy-making focus shifted to regulating Internet applications
and content. For example, as major Chinese portals such as Sina, Sohu, and Netease experienced rapid
growth since 2000, State Council issued Regulation on Internet Information Services (2000) to target
website registration, content publishing, and foreign investment. When blogs and Web 2.0 applications
became popular in 2004, the state issued more stringent Internet regulations that required personal
websites, blogs, and other not-for-profit websites to register with authorities. Policies directed at content
regulation reached a peak between 2009 and 2010. Among the 49 policies issued during this period, 32
target content regulation.
Between 2011 and 2017, during China’s economic slowdown, digital economy became a hotbed
for entrepreneurship and investment. The Chinese state issued numerous policies to position the Internet
as a new driver of China’s economic restructuring. In 2015, the “Internet Plus Plan” was unveiled to
integrate the Internet with traditional industries to fuel economic growth (Hong, 2017). The State Council
accordingly issued the Guiding Opinions of the State Council to Actively Promote the “Internet Plus Plan”
(2015), elevating the Internet to be a national economic engine. Prompted by such policies, many
agencies released related directives in their own regulatory fields such as plans to develop modern
agriculture, smart energy, and artificial intelligence. Between 2016 and 2017, “Internet economy” policies
totaled 55, close to the number of “Internet economy” policies (n = 60) issued between 1994 and 2015.
Regulatory Approach: “Rule by Directives”
Our research finds overall Chinese Internet policies are dominated by lower level regulations
such as regulatory documents (63.13%) and departmental rules (26.54%), whereas few enjoy high
legal status such as laws (1.12%), judicial interpretations (5.87%), or administrative regulations
(3.35%; see Figure 5).
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2017
Figure 5. Pyramid of Chinese Internet policies by legislative type.
Hierarchy of Chinese Internet Policies
Given the regulatory hurdles the passing of a law involves and the changing nature of Internet
technologies, the state has opted to issue powerful lower level policies such as departmental rules and
regulatory documents. The structure of Chinese Internet policies takes the shape of a pyramid (see Figure
5), where lower level rules and regulations ironically matter more in terms of both numbers and
importance. This paradox reflects several problems in the Internet policy framework in China historically
(though this situation has changed significantly with Cybersecurity Law of the PRC): (1) it lacks systematic
design, driven mostly by ad hoc problem solving; (2) its enforcement is based largely on lower level policy
documents that lack legal authority; and (3) coordination between policies at different levels is poor.
Among the 358 policies, four were passed as “laws,” approved by the National People’s Congress:
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Preserving Computer Network
Security (2000), Electronic Signature Law of the PRC (2004), Decision of the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress on Strengthening Information Protection on Networks (2012), and
Cybersecurity Law (2017). Among them, the first three target specific issues such as network security and
electronic signature. After two decades, the absence of top-level Internet law changed with Cybersecurity
Law. Anchored in security concerns, the new law marks a milestone of Chinese digital policymaking with
broad ramifications (Triolo et al., 2017).
On the other hand, judicial interpretations are supplemental, meant to provide objective
interpretations. Although China’s Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate have
issued 21 judicial interpretations such as those involving network security, online defamation, and online
auction, such interpretations do not provide a robust enough legal framework for Internet regulation in
China.
2018 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
Thus, large numbers of departmental rules and regulatory documents form the main body of
China’s Internet policies. While policies are often perceived to be systematic, normative and stable, in the
Chinese context, they tend to be temporary fixes to existing sociolegal problems, which strictly speaking
are only “paralegal.” High-level laws are expected only to provide broad frameworks, whereas lower level
rules and decisions are to address specific issues. For instance, various agencies including Ministry of
Transportation, State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), and General Administration of
Quality Supervision issued six policies in 2016 alone to regulate problems emerging from Uber-like
ridesharing apps.
Core Internet Policies
Among the many Internet policies, which are most central? Policy documents often reference
prior rules for imposing punishment or legal justification. This study focuses on the legal precedents cited
by an Internet policy document in its introduction. The policy cited is commonly considered upper law.
Table 5 shows the most cited.
Table 5. The Most Cited Chinese Internet Policies (19942017).
Policy name
Number
of times
cited
1
Regulation on Internet Information Services (2000)
27
2
Telecommunication Regulation (2000)
16
3
Cybersecurity Law (2017)
15
4
Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Healthy Development of Internet Finance (2015)
12
5
Guiding Opinions of the State Council to Actively Promote the “Internet Plus Plan” (2015)
10
6
Notice of the State Council on Charging the Cyberspace Administration of China with the
Content Management of Information on the Internet (2014)
10
7
Measures for the Administration of Internet Domain Names (2004)
10
8
Regulation on Protecting the Safety of Computer Information System (1994)
10
9
Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet Culture (2003)
9
10
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Strengthening
Information Protection on Networks (2012)
9
Regulation on Internet Information Services (2000), issued by the State Council, is the most
cited Chinese Internet policy. Offering a broad framework to oversee network information transmitted in
China, it regulates commercial Internet service providers (ISPs) through licensing and noncommercial
entities through filing and registration to ensure their online content meets state requirement. Article 18
of the regulation requires publishing, education, health, commerce, public security, state security and
other relevant authorities to supervise and manage Internet content in their respective area according to
law. Such a clause gives various state agencies the legitimacy to legislate related Internet services. The
“licensing + filing” model has also been cited in other policies such as Management Provisions on
Electronic Bulletin Services in Internet (2000). However, such policies created significant challenges for
ISPs which must obtain relevant licenses for their services in multiple areas.
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2019
Cybersecurity Law, effective in 2017, has been cited 15 times in our dataset to regulate issues
covering various areas such as “cybersecurity” (eight times), “information services” (six times), and
resources and infrastructure(once). This law is designed to pose stricter control over information use by
individuals, commercial and noncommercial entities. For instance, while this law covers privacy issues, it
also includes clauses such as data localization, causing concerns among foreign businesses over trade
secrets and intellectual property (Triolo et al., 2017). In addition, frequent citations of Internet policies
such as Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Healthy Development of Internet Finance (2015; cited 12
times) and Guiding Opinions of the State Council to Actively Promote the “Internet Plus Plan” (2015; cited
10 times) in a mere two years indicate the growing importance of the Internet to the overall Chinese
economy.
Discussion
This meta-analysis employed content analysis and social network analysis to examine 358
national-level Chinese Internet policies issued between 1994 and 2017, focusing on regulatory agencies,
policies, and approaches. Building on previous research (e.g., F. Yang & Mueller, 2014), our study
expanded data collection, conducted new analysis, and generated new insight.
Regulatory Agencies
First, in terms of regulatory agencies, this study empirically studied 71 state agencies involved in
regulating the Chinese Internet for the first time. Compared with F. Yang and Mueller’s (2014) study that
identified 15 core agencies, we mapped out with greater detail many more state agencies and their
changing influence, especially after Xi’s ascendance to power. Our data show historically the State Council
and various ministries were the major Internet regulators. While the State Council issues broad policies,
ministries target specific issues. We find within various ministries there are “central-peripheral” dynamics:
Ministry of Industrial and Information Technology (MIIT) issued the largest number of Internet regulations
in the last 20 years, mostly in the areas of “resources and infrastructure” and “cybersecurity.” Ministry of
Public Security (MPS) issued the second largest number of regulations, often collaborating with other
agencies as a key enforcer of state power over the Internet. SAPPRFT, CAC, and SAIC were also main
players, reflecting state concerns over ideology and digital economy.
Second, social network analysis, employed for the first time to empirically analyze interagency
relations in Chinese Internet regulation over 25 years, shows although as many as 71 state agencies are
involved in Internet regulation in China, a division of labor exists among different agencies with clusters
and centers of power in different regulatory areas (see Figure 1). MIIT is the dominant player in
“resources and infrastructure.” In the field of “cybersecurity,” MIIT, MPS, and CAC share regulatory power
where MIIT focuses on technology, MPS on management, and CAC on strategy. In “Internet economy,”
SAIC, NDRC, and SC remain predominant. In regulating “information services,” ideologically oriented
agencies such as SAPPRFT, Ministry of Culture, and CAC are major architects.
Third, despite specialization, various regulators collaborate, increasingly driven by digital
convergence. Social network analysis (see Figure 2) finds that MIIT and MPS cooperate the most with
2020 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
other agencies, acting as the most important bridges between agencies across different policy types with
the highest betweenness centrality.
Fourth, it is worthwhile to critically assess the newly established CAC, a “super” Internet
regulatory agency, and its impact. Cybersecurity Law of the PRC (2017) has explicitly tasked the CAC to
coordinate the planning of cybersecurity work and supervise relevant agencies. Miao, Zhu, and Chen
(2018) showed CAC has also assumed the crucial task of informatization, i.e., coordinating policies on
industrial upgrades and modernization such as the “Internet Plus Plan,” a task that used to fall under the
purview of MIIT and NDRC (p. 6). Overall, CAC has also grown more powerful to regulate online content
and public opinion.
While President Xi has consolidated Internet regulatory power at the highest level via the CAC
(Miao & Lei, 2016), decentralization (F. Yang & Mueller, 2014) and fragmented authoritarianism
(Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988) will remain useful explanatory frameworks as conflicts between regulators
persist. Given the existence of influential agencies such as MIIT, CAC is unlikely to monopolize Internet
regulatory power. Rather, CAC serves as a strategic conductor to set the tone and direction of regulation
and facilitate collaborations between factional interests. The ongoing tensions surrounding regulators and
their regulatory power may be best characterized as multicentered power sharing that incorporates
elements of both centralization and decentralization. Overall, while China’s Internet policymaking is
dominated by the central government, coordinated via the CAC lately, various regulators manage their
respective areas, compete against and collaborate with others, which creates both competition conducive
to industry growth and dysfunctional rivalry at times. Centralization and decentralization are thus part of
the conflicting regulatory process in China.
Last but not least, certain regulatory agencies, most notably the Central Publicity Department
(CPD, formerly the Central Propaganda Department), can exert considerable impact on Chinese Internet
content from behind the scenes. It does so not through overt legislation but daily administration of
media content. The CPD, which oversees the press, radio, film and television, views the Internet as an
extension of traditional media and regulates it through its elaborate system of propaganda units at
central, provincial and local levels. Although CPD issued only seven Internet policies with other agencies
and hence is not prominently featured in our network analysis graphs, its critical role in content
regulation should not be overlooked.
Regulatory Policies
Chinese Internet policies have focused on a combination of issues including security, content
regulation and digital economy. Although content regulation (censorship) will remain central, Internet
governance in China has expanded to include new topics and areas. New data from this study shows while
cybersecurity was of paramount concern early on (heightened in the post-Snowden era) and content
regulation remains a dominant regulatory issue, Internet economy and consumer protection have started
to occupy public conversation and policymaking lately.
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2021
In terms of cybersecurity, between 1994 and 2017, National People’s Congress passed four laws,
three of which concern security. Over time, the notion of security in Chinese cyber policymaking evolved
from network security to information security to more broadly cybersecurity today. The evolution
culminated in the Cybersecurity Law (2017). By then, cybersecurity has become a multi-faceted concept,
emphasizing a more holistic and systematic approach toward security issues including personal data
protection, consumer protection, cybercrime, public order, and cyberdefense (Jiang, 2020).
The Chinese state’s deep-seated insecurity over regime stability has manifested itself in
numerous Internet regulations. Between 1994 and 2017, 40% of Chinese Internet policies in our dataset
target “information services.” This control-based regulatory model, opposite a rights-based model to limit
power abuse and protect user rights, is designed to minimize political risk, maintain social stability and
spur economic development. China’s overly broad and vague policies provide flexibility for the state to
regulate online content (Han 2016), while limiting individual expressions, public discourse, and collective
actions (G. Yang, 2009).
Moreover, the combination of cybersecurity, economic growth, and depoliticization is increasingly
achieved in China through a complicated alignment between the state and the market. Although
censorship is commonly seen as antithetical to the growth and innovation of the Chinese Internet, Hong
(2017) argues that the Chinese government and indigenous Internet firms can form a mutually beneficial
politicaleconomic alliance. First, state preoccupation in cybersecurity has provided a more protected
environment for indigenous Internet businesses to function. While security considerations have led to the
construction of the Great Firewall to filter information, they have also effectively blocked foreign
competitors like Google, Twitter, and Facebook, giving domestic companies like Baidu, Alibaba, and
Tencent the opportunity to prosper. Second, both the state and Internet firms have a shared interest in
developing China’s digital economy into an economic driver: the former benefiting from increased political
legitimacy for improving China’s economy; the latter from stable profits. Our analysis shows state policies
restrict political content but endorse apolitical content such as entertainment and e-commerce with an
increasing focus on personal data protection, consumer protection, privacy and AI in response to GDPR
and growing SinoU.S. rivalry (Jiang, 2020).
Unlike its U.S. and European counterparts where the market drives economic development,
China’s Internet and digital economy are much more closely watched, supervised, and promoted by the
state. Not only did the Chinese government set strict boundaries for political discourse, it has also
invested heavily in network infrastructure, owns the country’s telecom networks, and actively promotes
industry growth. Seen in this light, state Internet policies are expected to serve long-term national
strategic goals, which in recent years have focused on economic restructuring and digitization.
Particularly, the “Internet Plus Plan” and “Made in China 2025 Plan” have put information, data, and AI at
the heart of China’s economic transition to a digital economy (Hong, 2017). Guided by this macro policy
framework, 2016 alone saw the passage of the largest number of Internet policies in a single year
between 1994 and 2017, totaling 78, where various ministries and bureaus issued detailed plans. This
top-down, whole-of-government approach has achieved considerable success. China’s digital economy
reached 31.3 trillion RMB (or US$4.43 trillion) in 2018, counting for 34.85% of the nation’s GDP (Xinhua
Net, 2019).
2022 Weishan Miao, Min Jiang, and Yunxia Pang International Journal of Communication 15(2021)
Regulatory Approach
In terms of regulatory approach, our data provide systematic, empirical evidence lacking in previous
research. The Chinese legal system and its Internet policymaking embody the ethos of “rule by directives”
instead of “rule of law.” Between 1994 and 2017, Nearly 90% of the 358 Internet policies are issued as
“departmental rules” or “regulatory documents,” whereas only four are “laws” passed by the NPC. Most
policies targeting specific issues were issued by lower ranking regulators requiring much less legislative
coordination. They lack systematic, overarching legal frameworks and often impose arbitrary rules.
The “rule by directive” ethos in Chinese Internet policymaking reflects the state’s ad hoc approach
toward Internet regulation historically, following a “develop first, regulate later” pattern (Wang, 2016, para.
8). Liu and Jayakar (2012) also argue: “China’s telecommunications decision-making is significantly affected
by the macro level political rearrangement and is more likely to be non-incremental” (p. 13). In essence,
“rule by directive” conjures instinctive regulatory responses to a fast-changing environment, providing
businesses and public opinion a space to thrive sometimes and less room for maneuvering at other times.
Notably, the “rule by directives” ethos observed in TV content regulation (Zhu, 2012) previously is
also undergoing considerable changes in Xi’s Internet governance regime. Our data show that since Xi took
power in 2012, the corpus of Internet policies has grown both in number and scope. Reversing decades of ad
hoc regulatory approach that often lacks systematic design, Xi’s administration has embarked on an
ambitious Internet regulatory redesign, exemplified by the passage of Cybersecurity Law in 2017. This high-
level national law now serves as the overarching framework for a burgeoning set of new policies (Triolo et
al., 2017).
Despite the central government’s restructuring of Internet policymaking bodies and processes by
concentrating power in the newly established CAC, the “rule by directive” principle continues to reign. Lower
level administrative regulations and departmental rules are regularly issued, coordinated via the CAC, to
circumvent the more arduous process through the NPC. This arrangement not only allows China’s top
leadership to exert considerable power over policy directions but also speeds up decision-making process in a
fast-changing economic, political and international environment, a bureaucratically systematic process some
scholars bemoan the U.S. government lacks in its cybersecurity policymaking (Trautman, 2015).
Conclusion
As an emerging cyber superpower, China’s ever more complex legal edifice of Internet regulation
will gain importance in both domestic and international Internet governance. Overall, this work historicizes
the development of Chinese Internet policies from a macro, longitudinal, and network perspective, based
on the assumption that legal documents can reflect state approaches toward Internet governance. Here,
we briefly discuss the implications and limitations of the study and offer suggestions for future research.
That China has developed the only Internet ecosystem that can compete with the United States
while maintaining the one-party state is not lost on keen observers. Our brief historical survey of Chinese
Internet policymaking reveals a complex picture of interdepartmental bureaucratic competition,
International Journal of Communication 15(2021) Historicizing Internet Regulation in China 2023
collaboration, and central-peripheral relations that a monolithic view of the state often fails to capture
(Miao et al., 2018). Moreover, China has adopted a state-centric, interventionist approach of Internet
governance, relying on an extensive censorship apparatus that is sanctioned by Chinese laws, coordinated
by central propaganda organs, and facilitated by Internet companies (Dong, 2012). While government
intervention in the economy is anathema to Western market-centric models of Internet development,
China’s insistence on technological self-reliance has charted a different path, placing the state at the
center for research funding, infrastructure investment, industrial development, and market regulation
(Hong, 2017). Last but not least, the tendency in the Chinese legal system to “rule by directive” instead of
following the “rule of law” will continue to frustrate practitioners and scholars who look for clarity to avoid
confusion and conflicts over policies (Han, 2016).
Finally, we acknowledge several limitations of this study and point to areas for future research.
First, our macro approach cannot yield detailed analysis of policy-making process. In-depth case studies
can supplement to reveal the varied perspectives, behaviors and negotiations between government
agencies and other actors. Second, this study uses frequency (e.g., the number of times an agency issues
policies or how often a policy is cited) rather than other metrics to measure policy influence. Alternative
measurements can yield different insight. Third, we focused on state-level policies, thus unable to analyze
policies at provincial or local levels, which may differ from state regulations. Fourth, policies only reflect
the intent of state agencies, not their actual implementation or effects. Different agencies and interest
groups may interpret and execute Internet policies differently and produce unintended consequences. We
hope future work can leverage the historical, empirical data of our study to further explore Chinese
Internet regulators, policies, and approaches from diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives.
Such work to understand China’s complex bureaucratic structures and dynamics may also serve as a
useful baseline for comparison with other countries or regions (e.g., United States, EU, Russia, India,
Brazil). Given the increasing importance of China in the global digital economy and the Chinese state’s
desire to influence global Internet policies, we believe a more historicized, critical, systematic, and
empirical understanding of Chinese Internet policies and policymaking that informs global Internet
governance research is warranted.
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... A forma com que a lei é redigida no caso chinês possui ligação intrínseca com a maneira com que a internet é regulada no país. Diferentemente da abordagem mais livre dos Estados Unidos ou da regulação intervencionista geral da União Europeia, as políticas chinesas para a internet são forte e historicamente inseparáveis do controle estatal (Miao;Jiang;Pang, 2021;Tan, 1996;Yang;Mueller, 2014). ...
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A presente pesquisa tem por objetivo investigar a prática de doxing e identificar os conflitos e ilicitudes daí oriundas sob o contexto do tratamento de dados pessoais, considerando demais direitos fundamentais, pilares democráticos, que permeiam a atividade de doxing, bem como analisar a regulação vigente desta matéria a nivel nacional e global. Para tanto, partimos dos seguintes problemas de pesquisa: poderia o doxing ser uma ferramenta para prática de ilícitos no contexto digital, de quais formas e como as principais legislações globais legislam acerca deste fenômeno? Como hipótese preliminar temos que o doxing pode ser utilizado como ferramenta ou meio para a perpetração de diversos crimes cibernéticos, desde crimes como extorsão, perseguição, assédio e ameaças, até crimes que resultam em danos físicos reais, como ataques, linchamentos e ciberterrorismo, bem como diversos outros propósitos maliciosos. Ainda, preliminarmente entende-se que o doxing não é necessariamente criminalizado como uma prática única, mas várias ações envolvidas em sua execução podem ser alvo de sanções legais que necessariamente estão profundamente ligadas ao contexto social em que essas leis são aplicadas. Os objetivos específicos são dois, quais sejam: a) analisar de quais maneiras o doxing pode ser utilizado para prática de ilícitos; e, b) compreender de qual forma as principais legislações globais tem enfrentado essa temática. Termina confirmando a hipótese preliminar elencada. Metodologia: hipotético-dedutiva, com método de abordagem qualitativo e abordagem bibliográfica.
... As in other sectors, China's cyber governance was state-centered. In this model, the central government held the greatest power in regulating cyberspace, from infrastructure to content (Miao et al., 2021(Miao et al., , p. 2005. Commercial, non-governmental, and civil society entities played complementary roles (Miao et al., 2021(Miao et al., , p. 2005. ...
... In this model, the central government held the greatest power in regulating cyberspace, from infrastructure to content (Miao et al., 2021(Miao et al., , p. 2005. Commercial, non-governmental, and civil society entities played complementary roles (Miao et al., 2021(Miao et al., , p. 2005. However, in the government bureaucracy, competition between institutions had resulted in what was called fragmented authoritarianism, where the government did not act as a single entity but rather consisted of a complex system of power and control, and bureaucratic institutions competed for influence and autonomy (Miao et al., 2021(Miao et al., , p. 2005). ...
... Commercial, non-governmental, and civil society entities played complementary roles (Miao et al., 2021(Miao et al., , p. 2005. However, in the government bureaucracy, competition between institutions had resulted in what was called fragmented authoritarianism, where the government did not act as a single entity but rather consisted of a complex system of power and control, and bureaucratic institutions competed for influence and autonomy (Miao et al., 2021(Miao et al., , p. 2005). ...
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Cyberspace has become a new method of interaction for humans in the digital industrial era. One of the countries that play an important role in global cyberspace is China, which has the largest number of internet users, reaching 989 million. This has prompted Chinese Government to formulate a complex cybersecurity governance strategy to maintain national stability and security. Therefore, this study aims to explore China's approach to cybersecurity at domestic and foreign levels. Domestic level explores the governance in the country by examining strategic documents, policies, as well as legal and institutional frameworks, while foreign level discusses cybersecurity as part of foreign and security policy. The primary focus of this study is the series of Chinese diplomatic initiatives aimed at shaping governance norms across various international forums.
... Such confrontations are not incidental but a predictable consequence of the disruptive potential that these connective protests hold within Chinese society. In their efforts to maintain control, social harmony, and national security, central and local governments often view the unfettered flow of information and online collective action as threats that need to be mitigated (Miao et al., 2021). This leads to the implementation of various censorship mechanisms aimed at monitoring, controlling, and blocking digital activities associated with bottom-up populist movements. ...
... China has developed a complex mechanism of internet censorship and internet governance (Han, 2015;King et al., 2013;Schneider, 2023). According to Miao et al. (2021), China has issued 129 internet policies from 1994 to 2008. This number increased to 229 from 2009 to 2017. ...
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This article explores the complex, multi-layered mechanisms of internet censorship in China, emphasizing its role as both a tool of control over public engagement and a mechanism for elites to disconnect themselves from spaces of public scrutiny, and avoid potential threats such as doxxing by bottom-up populist online movements. Through in-depth interviews with social media users, this study investigates how individuals perceive, assess, and navigate the boundaries of internet censorship, focusing on their awareness of censorship practices, the assessment of sensitive content, and the tactics they employ to circumvent restrictions. We further examine how a sophisticated censorship mechanism-comprising self-censorship, platform censorship, and physical enforcement-works to disconnect netizens from grassroots collective actions. The findings reveal that internet censorship in China not only regulates online populist activism but also serves as a protective shield for elites, allowing them to curate a controlled digital space that suppresses critical discourse. By highlighting the ways in which both ordinary users and elites navigate the challenges of digital engagement in this heavily regulated environment, this study provides theoretical insights into the practice of disconnectivity as an elite privilege. It enhances our understanding of the interplay between connectivity, censorship, and disconnectivity in shaping the digital landscape and its implications for social change and political engagement in China and beyond.
... Such confrontations are not incidental but a predictable consequence of the disruptive potential that these connective protests hold within Chinese society. In their efforts to maintain control, social harmony, and national security, central and local governments often view the unfettered flow of information and online collective action as threats that need to be mitigated (Miao et al., 2021). This leads to the implementation of various censorship mechanisms aimed at monitoring, controlling, and blocking digital activities associated with bottom-up populist movements. ...
... China has developed a complex mechanism of internet censorship and internet governance (Han, 2015;King et al., 2013;Schneider, 2023). According to Miao et al. (2021), China has issued 129 internet policies from 1994 to 2008. This number increased to 229 from 2009 to 2017. ...
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p align="justify">This paper examines the complex, multi-layered mechanisms of internet censorship in China, highlighting censorship’s role as a tool for elites to disconnect from public scrutiny and potential threats like doxxing amid populist digital movements. We focus on how censorship serves both as a shield for elites and a method of control over citizens that compels them to disengage and demobilize from collective actions. Our study utilizes in-depth interviews with social media users, exploring their perceptions and reactions to censorship. We investigate how sophisticated censorship mechanisms, including information, digital, and body surveillance, alongside self-censorship, platform controls, and physical enforcement, collectively disconnect netizens from grassroots digital activism in China. Censorship mechanisms not only affect netizens’ abilities to participate in bottom-up populist activities, they also allow elites to maintain their status by suppressing digital discourse that could expose them to public criticism. By shedding light on how individuals and elites navigate the challenges of digital engagement within these constraints, this study enhances understanding of the strategies used by elite-group to maintain control online. This study provides theoretical insights into the practice of disconnectivity as a privileged strategy engaged with by elites, thereby contributing to the broader understanding of online populist movements and social polarization in China and beyond. By delineating the intricate dynamics of connectivity, censorship, and disconnectivity, it offers a nuanced perspective on the digital landscape and its implications for social change and political engagement.</p
... Zhou (2022, p. 9) suggests that the coexistence of arbitrary power by central authority and the bureaucratic power based on administrative positions, rules, and procedures is fundamental to the formation of an institutional logic of governance in China. In regards to platform governance, the central government and Cyberspace Administration of China holds arbitrary power in determining internet regulation (Miao and Lei, 2016), but secondary multifacet regulatory agencies often act with conflicting interests (Shen, 2016;Miao et al. 2021). Meanwhile, platform companies are granted autonomy and rights to develop informal practices and patronage ties to implement state policies or tame undesirable behaviors of users. ...
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While digital platforms have reconfigured the institutions and practices of cultural production around the globe, current research is dominated by studies that take as their reference point the Anglo-American world--and, to a lesser extent--China (Cunningham & Craig 2019; Kaye et al. 2021; Poell et al. 2021; Zhao 2019). Aside from totalizing theories of platform imperialism (Jin, 2013), the “rest of the world” has thus received relatively scant attention. Consequently, central concepts in the study of platform-based cultural production bear a strong imprint of Western institutions, infrastructures, industries, discourses, and cultural practices. US-based research, in particular, has informed how we understand and subsequently theorize notions of precarity, labor, governance, authenticity, gender, creativity, diversity, and autonomy in a platform environment. We can’t simply apply these concepts to local cultures of production in other parts of the world. There is bound to be friction, as this panel will demonstrate, between how labor, precarity, and governance are understood in the Anglo-American world and the lived experiences of platform-dependent cultural labor in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Concerns about Western-dominated research and theory are, of course, by no means novel. Post-colonial and decolonial theorists have long criticized the dominance and universalism of Western theory, pointing to the continuation of colonial knowledge-power relations (Chakrabarty 2009; Chen 2010; Escobar 2018; Mignolo 2012). Moreover, there have been numerous calls to decolonize (Glück 2018; Willems & Mano 2016) and de-westernize (Curran & Park 2000; Khiabany 2003) media studies and, more recently, production and platform studies (Bouquillion 2023; Bulut 2022; Zhang & Chen 2022). That being said, in practice, the US and Western Europe continue to function as the primary and often sole frame of reference in research on platforms and cultural production. In the light of these concerns, this panel aims to contribute to efforts to: 1) challenge universalism, 2) “provincialize” the US, and 3) multiply our frames of reference in the study of platforms and cultural production. Such a conceptual undertaking is especially vital as the cultural industries are at the heart of societal processes of meaning making (Hesmondhalgh 2018) and market activity. Let us unpack how the papers in this panel pursue this objective. The first paper develops a conceptual framework to expand our frames of reference for studying platforms and cultural production. Departing from epistemological universalism, it argues that “platforms”, “cultural production”, and the “local” need to be studied as dynamic configurations, characterized by crucial variations and correspondences across the globe. That is, in contemporary instances of creating cultural content, transnational platform markets, infrastructures, governance frameworks, and cultural practices become entangled with local political economies and cultural practices. Examining how such configurations take shape around the world, the next four papers in this panel focus on specific regions and modes of production, interrogating how local and transnational political economic relations and practices articulate each other. In this discussion, we pay specific attention to the notions of precarity, governance, and imaginaries. The second paper reframes influencer precarity in a semi-peripheral context in the Balkans and emphasizes the relational basis of influencer agency, as influencers rely on family members and oft-mocked “Instagram husbands” to alleviate precarity. It thus offers insights into the local characteristics of algorithmic encounters with platforms by proposing the concept of platform lethargy. This concept speaks to an emotional response and deliberate refusal on the part of influencers to adapt to platform mandates. This refusal is rooted in algorithmic knowledge from the semi-periphery, where creators are cognizant of their position in a devalued platform market. The third paper critically examines the intricate dynamics of creator culture, challenging the assumption of globally detached markets. Focusing on Latin American content creators in the United States, it explores how their aspirations intersect with the construction of the "Latin American" content creator dream. The study also scrutinizes the role of Content Service Organizations (CSOs) executives in shaping creator culture. Despite global portrayals, tensions emerge, revealing national market characteristics rooted in socio-cultural, linguistic, and regional norms. The fourth paper examines how drama creatives, who work for streaming platforms, are globally connected and yet remain nationally restrained in terms of how they imagine work. Through the notion of platform ambiguity, the paper shows how streaming platforms negotiate with cultural producers by both enabling and restraining their work. Thus, it thus de-westernizes scholarship on platforms and cultural production by highlighting how drama makers are not only creative but also geopolitical subjects dependent on the state. The last paper offers an alternative epistemological and ontological perspective on the state-platform-user configuration, where each actor works in alignment with others under the logic of governance. It uses a Chinese social media platform, Douyin, as a case to reveal how platforms rely on anthropomorphization to communicate with cultural producers and develop playful governance of China’s political and cultural environment.
... Due to the fact that internet laws and regulations issued by central authority and the multifaceted regulatory agencies are often arbitrary and sometimes feature conflicting interests (Shen, 2016;Miao et al., 2021), platforms need to react with flexibility in their regulatory operations, mediating formal policies and rules into cultural and social norms to effectively govern users. This brings us to the second layer of the state-platform-user configuration, which is the relationship between the platform and the user. ...
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To mediate the tensions between state regulation and content-creator incentives, Chinese social media platforms have developed an interesting practice of using platform official accounts to communicate their rules to the creator community. These accounts anthropomorphize platforms, enabling platforms to represent their regulatory bodies using fictional human characters or animated figures. The phenomenon of platform anthropomorphization in the Chinese context stems from a different ontological understanding of platform governance. The first part of this article discusses the logic of platform governance in China, and highlights a different state–platform relationship in comparison to the US and European countries. In the second part, the article turns to focus on Douyin as a case study to further investigate how Chinese social media platforms establish rules and govern content creators. By analysing Douyin's public-facing policy documents and its platform official account, Douyin Safety Centre, we reveal a mechanism of playful governance.
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Digital sovereignty unfolds differently and unevenly across geographies. The paper describes and theorizes three models of state digital sovereignty from the Global South—China, India and South Africa—three BRICS member countries that are home to over 1/3 of the world's population. Their digital policies and practices form an interesting and diverging array of efforts to pursue digital sovereignty in contrast to the U.S. and EU approaches, ranging from a digital powerhouse like China, a middle power country like India, and a regional power like South Africa. The paper argues for the need to reconceptualize “digital sovereignty”: not only in such normative terms as territorial integrity, legal equality, and noninterference, but also in terms of digital capacity, self‐sufficiency and autonomy that emphasize the constitutive power of digital technologies in structuring social, economic and political relations. In addition, state‐centric analysis of digital sovereignty practices and policies can coincide and overlap with other analytical perspectives (such as postcolonialism in this analysis) to render the phenomenon and understanding of digital sovereignty complex and multidimensional. This paper highlights the choices and constraints of the three Global South countries' digital nation‐state building efforts while also raising concerns over state instrumental use of digital sovereignty for censorship and surveillance in authoritarian and democratic countries alike.
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