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When religious differences are present within an ethnic group, how do they affect the scope of its nationalist mobilization? The Kurds of Iran presents an ideal case to address this question given their religious diversity and varying levels of involvement in Kurdish nationalist movements. Building on an institutional approach to ethnic identity, this article argues that the dynamics of Kurdish ethnic mobilization in Iran reflect the nature of political exclusion in the Islamic Republic that is primarily based on sectarian affiliation. The article, based on original datasets compiled using several languages, including Persian and Kurdish, shows that recruitment into the Kurdish insurgency in Iran is significantly stronger in the Sunni Kurdish areas than the Shiite ones. While religious identity limits the appeal of ethno-nationalism among the Shiite Kurds, it doubles the sense of marginalization among the Sunni Kurds and makes them more receptive to violent insurgent mobilization.
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... Tezcür and Asadzadep propose that lower levels of political representation for Sunni Kurdish people in the Islamic Republic of Iran are reflected in higher rates of recruitment for Kurdish insurgencies in Sunni than in Shiite Kurdish districts of Iran. That is to say, the blending of Iranian and Shiite national identities makes the Shiite Kurds more politically loyal to the Iranian state [13] (p. 17). ...
... With the "total vision of the world" that they offered to their constituents, these ideological organizations were able to draw members by utilizing a variety of intricate bonds of allegiance, such as those derived from markets, families, and spatial networks that brought together horizontal and vertical linkages and enabled the creation of a new political community model [62] (pp. [12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21]. ...
... Al-Fawzān adds that this tenet forbids collaboration with non-Muslims in the workplace (unless Muslims hold superior positions) or in wars; this principle should forbid a Muslim from adopting a non-Muslim name, praising non-Muslims, exalting their civilization and culture, marveling at their morals and abilities, rejecting their beliefs and religion, taking part in their festivals, wishing them well or attending their celebrations, adhering to their calendars, particularly those that record their rites and celebrations like the Gregorian calendar, awarding them positions in government, hiring them, using them as confidants and advisors, supporting them, protecting them from Muslims, entertaining them, remaining in non-Muslim lands rather than emigrating to a Muslim country, and attempting to behave in a manner that is similar to them in terms of appearance, language, and behavior [79] (pp. [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]. ...
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Up until recently, research on loyalty and Islam—here considered as the discourses and practices of Muslims in regard to the Muslim tradition—had ignored the topic of loyalty. Interest in loyalty in Islam has just lately grown sufficiently and extensively. This entry is both bibliographical and thematic. It seeks to identify the principal themes that have dominated Muslim loyalty studies for the past thirty years or so. Additionally, it provides a thorough synopsis of over 100 studies on loyalty that were published during the same time span in Arabic and European languages. Allegiance in Muslim political ethics always had more than one connotation and the religious component of loyalty, while not strictly defined, allowed and even justified the overlap of multiple loyalties. A person’s or a family’s, ruler’s, or dynasty’s power to govern an area or defend religious institutions and symbols was intimately linked to the loyalty they could claim. Most studies agree on the diversity of political allegiance in modern Islam with regard to perceptions of religion, ethnicity, self-interest, etc.; it is also co-relative in the sense that it is mixed with other allegiances, such as those of family, tribe, leadership, or country.
... However, it is essential to note that the emergence of new perceptions of Muslims and Islam, associating them with insecurity and radicalism, was influenced by a combination of conflicts, including the major Arab Israeli wars, the Iraq-Iran war, and civil wars in Lebanon, Sudan, and Somalia (Amour, 2018). The involvement of different militant groups in conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war and subsequent wars in the region did contribute to the spread of radical ideologies (Tezcür & Asadzade, 2018). For example, Kurdish militant groups engaged in guerrilla warfare during the Iran Iraq War (Tezcür & Asadzade, 2018). ...
... The involvement of different militant groups in conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war and subsequent wars in the region did contribute to the spread of radical ideologies (Tezcür & Asadzade, 2018). For example, Kurdish militant groups engaged in guerrilla warfare during the Iran Iraq War (Tezcür & Asadzade, 2018). Additionally, the support provided by various countries to combat militant threats, like Saudi Arabia aiding Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, showcases the complex dynamics of regional alliances and their impact on militant activities (Oztig, 2021). ...
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Islamism in the modern world is clearly portrayed as a notion of religious extremism. Bangladesh on the other hand as a young developing nation finds its root into two different branches of ideology: Bengali cultural and Muslim ideology. The militant groups in Bangladesh have been found active recently specially after 2015 when international media spotted Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State’s (IS) presence in the country. This study, however, aims at understanding the Islamic radicalisation in Bangladesh through the analysis of Islamist political and non-political groups’ functions and propaganda. In this article the ideas of Islamic radicalisation, mutations and role and function of Islamist militant as well as political group have been discussed. The role of Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing in the radicalisation have been discussed. The disputed relationship of Jamaat and the radical extremists as well as ban on their politics have created a complex scenario in Bangladesh. The political polarisation and politicising of counter terrorism effort have weakened the government’s effort to tackle radical organisation. Honest and tolerant political intervention by welcoming different views regarding the solution of the radicalisation problem can help address it effectively.
... Келесі топтағы зерттеулер иран күрдтерінің ұлттық бірегейлігі мен ұлттық қозғалыстың жұмылдыру идеологиясына бағытталады. М. Тезкюр мен П. Асадзаде иран күрдтерінің 5 ғасырдан астам уақыт Ирандағы тарихи империялардың ықпалында болғанына қарамастан, олардың діни әртүрлілік жағдайына қарамастан, этникалық бірегейлік жағдайын сақтап келеді (Tezcür, G. M., Asadzade, P., 2019). Ислам Республикасындағы діни бірегейлік мемлекет біртұтастығын сақтап қалуда базалық идеология болып табылатын болса, этникалық бірегейліктің параллельді түрде өмір сүруі орталық үкімет пен этникалық топтың бірегейлік қақтығысын кез-келген уақытта тудыруына алып келеді. ...
... 2011 жылғы ПЖАК-ты жоюға қатысты Иран қауіпсіздік қызметінің арнайы операциясы мен 2007-2016 жылдар аралығындағы күрд қоғамдық белсенділерін өлім жазасына кесу әрекеттерін дәлел ретінде келтіруге болады. Ирандағы 2018 жылғы өлім жазасына кесілген тұтқындардың 45 пайызы күрд өкілдері болды (Tezcür, G. M., Asadzade, P., 2019). ...
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Иран билігі мен күрдтер арасындағы шиеленіскен қақтығыстар соңғы бір ғасыр бойы жалғасып келеді. Иран күрдтерінің жергілікті билікпен қарым-қатынасы әр режим тұсында әр түрлі дамып келді. Ирандағы күрдттердің мәселелерін қамтитын зерттеулер көлемі жағынан Түркия, Иран, Сирия күрдтері туралы зерттеулер санынан салыстырмалы түрде азырақ. Оның себебі, Ирандағы мемлекеттік саясат жекелеген ғалымдарға зерттеу жүргізуге қажетті дереккөздерге қолжетімділігін шектеуге бағытталғандығымен түсіндіріледі. Ирандағы күрдтердің мәселесі осы күнге дейін тек, ұлттық қозғалыс пен бірегейлік мәселелері шеңберінде жүргізіліп келгендігін ескерсек, жергілікті күрдтер мен Тегеран билігінің өкілдерімен қақтығыстық қарым-қатынасқа белгілі бір тұжырымдық концепция тұрғысынан түсіндіру әрекеттері жетіспейтіндігін айтуға болады. Бұл зерттеу жұмысы Иран билігі мен күрдтер қақтығысын Э. Азардың ұзақ мерзімді әлеуметтік қақтығыс тұжырымы тұрғысынан қарастырады. Талдау критерийлері ретінде, топтардың қоғамдық құрылымы, адами негізгі қажеттіліктерінің қамтамасыз етілмеуі, басқару және мемлекеттің, халықаралық байланыс элементтері алынды. Зерттеу қорытындысына бойынша, біріншіден, Ирандағы күрдтер ғасырлар бойы өз бірегейлігін жоғалтпаған, ассимиляцияға төтеп бере алатын және жұмылдыру деңгейі жоғары ұлттық топ екендігін көрсете алды. Екіншіден, Иран үкіметі күрдттердің экономикалық, саяси, әлеуметтік, мәдени қажеттіліктерін қамтамасыз етуде шектеулер қою саясатын ұстанып келді. Үшіншіден, Иран үкіметі тарихи әр кезеңде күрдтерге қатысты ассимиляциялық және репрессиялық саясатты ұстанып келді. Бұл әсіресе, исламдық республика шеңберінде айқын байқалады. Себебі, Иранның ұлттық интеграциялық идеологиясы жекелеген ұлттар бірге өмір сүретін федерациялық формаға емес, керісінше, «мұсылмандық умма» деп этникалық шеңберден шығатын универсалды идеяға негізделді. Төртіншіден, ирандық күрдтер әрқашан да шетелдегі күрд диаспоралармен тығыз байланыста екендігі мәлім болды. Бұл оларға өз мәселелерін халықаралық деңгейде көтеріп, әрқашан қолдау ала алатындықтарын білдіреді. Демек, Э. Азардың тұжырымы Иран билігі мен күрдтер арасындағы қақтығыстың ұзақ мерзімді болуының себептерін түсіндіруге келеді. Түйін сөздер: иранның ұлттық саясаты, күрдтер қозғалысы, ұзақ мерзімді әлеуметтік қақтығыс, ассимиляция, ұлттық саясат
... Although, the editors openly acknowledge this weakness (xxix), it skews the balance of the book. Albeit not comparable in quantity to the other Kurdish regions, interesting research is being done on Kurds in Iran (Tezcür and Asadzade, 2018), building upon existing works (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, 2010;Yildiz and Tayşi, 2007;Vali, 2014). While this limited focus on Kurds in Iran is common in the field (see Baser et al., 2018), it seems that their marginalisation here is a further opportunity lost. ...
... Although, the editors openly acknowledge this weakness (xxix), it skews the balance of the book. Albeit not comparable in quantity to the other Kurdish regions, interesting research is being done on Kurds in Iran (Tezcür and Asadzade, 2018), building upon existing works (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, 2010;Yildiz and Tayşi, 2007;Vali, 2014). While this limited focus on Kurds in Iran is common in the field (see Baser et al., 2018), it seems that their marginalisation here is a further opportunity lost. ...
... Although, the editors openly acknowledge this weakness (xxix), it skews the balance of the book. Albeit not comparable in quantity to the other Kurdish regions, interesting research is being done on Kurds in Iran (Tezcür and Asadzade, 2018), building upon existing works (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, 2010;Yildiz and Tayşi, 2007;Vali, 2014). While this limited focus on Kurds in Iran is common in the field (see Baser et al., 2018), it seems that their marginalisation here is a further opportunity lost. ...
... Although, the editors openly acknowledge this weakness (xxix), it skews the balance of the book. Albeit not comparable in quantity to the other Kurdish regions, interesting research is being done on Kurds in Iran (Tezcür and Asadzade, 2018), building upon existing works (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, 2010;Yildiz and Tayşi, 2007;Vali, 2014). While this limited focus on Kurds in Iran is common in the field (see Baser et al., 2018), it seems that their marginalisation here is a further opportunity lost. ...
... By contrast, elites from more favored religious segments should prefer a closer relationship with the central state government, especially if their denomination aligns with the one of the ethnic group in power. Indeed, for instance, in Iran, state-favored Shiite Kurds exhibit lower levels of recruitment into Kurdish self-determination groups than Sunni Kurds (Tezcür and Asadzade, 2019). All else equal, such intra-group variation in state treatment is more likely, the more religiously divided an ethnic/ethno-regional group is: ...
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Ethnic movements continue to challenge state governments globally, with many ethnic conflicts revolving around the status of groups’ territories. Yet, politically mobilized ethnic groups vary considerably in their territorial demands: some press for increased autonomy or even outright secession, while others do not make such demands at all and prefer integration in the existing state. What explains this divergence in ethnic group demands with respect to the group's territorial status? We argue that the expected benefits of ethno-regional autonomy or secession compared to integration in a centralized state differ across distinct segments within the group as a function of three structural factors: heterogeneity in the group's income sources, cultural divisions, and territorial fragmentation, leading to disagreement over self-determination demands between different political organizations representing the same ethnic group. We test our argument using an expanded version of the Ethnic Power Relations–Organizations (EPR-O) dataset. Our pre-registered study finds support for one of our hypotheses: heterogeneity in groups’ income sources increases disagreement over self-determination demands. This finding sheds new light on the structural sources of internal divisions within ethno-political movements.
... While a considerable number of Kurds in the southern Iranian-Kurdish areas are Shia, those in the north are mostly Sunni. Great insight into this effect is provided by the study of Tezcür and Asadzade (2019). They created a dataset of all Iranian Kurds who joined the ranks of the PJAK and found out that coming from a majority Sunni area has a significant influence on joining the armed fight against the Iranian state (Tezcür and Asadzade 2019, 666). ...
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The IJCV provides a forum for scientific exchange and public dissemination of up-to-date scientific knowledge on conflict and violence. The IJCV is independent, peer reviewed, open access, and included in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) as well as other relevant databases (e.g., SCOPUS, EBSCO, ProQuest, DNB). The topics on which we concentrate-conflict and violence-have always been central to various disciplines. Consequently, the journal encompasses contributions from a wide range of disciplines, including criminology, economics, education, ethnology, history , political science, psychology, social anthropology, sociology, the study of religions , and urban studies. All articles are gathered in yearly volumes, identified by a DOI with article-wise pagi-nation. For more information please visit www.ijcv.or g Suggested Citation: APA: Jasim, D. (2022). Civic culture and support for democracy amongst Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.
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Nationalism is widely perceived to be one of the leading threats to order in the contemporary world. Many lives have been ruined or lost in its name and, as a consequence, nationalism swirls in perpetual controversy. Part of the problem is that it seems to be an uncannily protean phenomenon. Nationalist political demands differ from place to place and time to time: sometimes they are linguistic, sometimes religious, and sometimes cultural in a more diffuse sense. Strong nationalist movements often emerge in a given territory, subside, and then suddenly reemerge years later to nearly universal surprise. Whereas the literature on nationalism is voluminous and growing at an increasing pace, there still remains a lack of conceptual agreement among scholars of the subject.
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Why does ethnicity become politically salient and the basis of mobilization for some members of a disadvantaged group but not for others? This article suggests that members of a disadvantaged ethnic group are unlikely to support ethnic mobilization as long as they perceive the channels of personal mobility in the political system open. It builds upon an original dataset of biographical information of 2,952 governors, ministers, and judges in Turkey. The results show that support for Kurdish ethno-mobilization and recruitment into the Kurdish insurgency remain low in Kurdish localities with greater representation in the echelons of political power. This finding supports institutional approach to the study of ethnicity and demonstrates the importance of state recruitment patterns in shaping the political saliency of ethnic identity.
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This article aims to shed light on the modern history of the Kurds in Iran, with particular reference made to the main Kurdish political and social movements of the 20th century following World War I and the establishment of an Iranian nation-state. The modernization and centralization of the new state deprived the non-Persian ethnic groups, including the Kurds, of democratically expressing their national aspirations. The consequences of this policy and the struggle of the Kurds against it throughout the remainder of the century and up to the present are the main issues discussed in this article.
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In 1938, the Turkish state massacred thousands of people in Dersim, and forced thousands to move out of the city. Unacknowledged within official Turkish history, the event has a paradoxical existence in Dersim. Absent in the form of a collective memory, 1938 was simultaneously being referred to in life stories as well as within social gatherings and political discussions. In this paper I look into different relationships between past, present, and future in the shaping of subjectivity, identity, and movements in the absence of a collective memory. Combining oral history, life narrative interviews, and ethnography, this research reveals that temporality is experienced, thought of, imagined, and transferred by subjects in multiple and complex forms. Fragmented stories and life narratives break the silences, and they attain meanings within a consciousness of history, a sense of history and time, an implicit understanding of past, present, and future, which shapes identity and subjectivity.
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Iranian nationalities have played an integral part in the country’s century-long anti-authoritarian, anti-imperialist, and pro-democracy movements. The Kurds of Iran have certainly been an integral part of this struggle, and they have largely framed their demands for recognition of their sociopolitical and cultural rights within the broader context of a democratic and decentralized Iran. The purpose of this chapter is to examine factors that have inhibited the realization of Kurdish demands since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. In particular, the chapter seeks to analyze the role played by the securitization of the Kurdish demands in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and how the nexus between securitization and coercion redounds to the detriment of the broader democratization in the country. In other words, Kurdish demands for greater cultural and sociopolitical space will have a spillover effect into the larger Iranian society and will help the country establish a transparent and democratic political system that is responsive to the needs of all of its constituent elements.