An ontology of psychedelic entity experiences in evolutionary psychology and neurophenomenology

Abstract

Background and aims
Psychedelic entity experiences are examined from perspectives of evolutionary psychology and neurophenomenology. Their similarities with other entity experiences illustrate the need for a general biological explanation of entity experiences. Mechanisms are proposed to involve innate modules, operators, and intelligences that underlie ordinary cognitive inferences and provide the basis for supernatural thought.

Methods
Comparisons of ayahuasca and dimethyltryptamine (DMT) entity experiences with other types of entity experiences show their fundamental similarities to conceptions of spirit guides, mythological beings, divinities, extraterrestrials, angels, celestial beings, demons, gnomes, dwarfs, elves, and others. Entities exemplify the properties of anthropomorphism, exhibiting qualities of humans. Comparative methods are proposed to identify common features and differences in psychedelic and other entity experiences.

Results
Features of psychedelic entities reflect the functions of principal innate operators and modules (i.e., animacy detection, social role inferences, and mind reading) that have central roles in the explanation of the genesis of spirit experiences and beliefs. Humans’ innate psychology includes diverse forms of self and alien self-phenomena, providing mechanisms for explaining psychedelic entity experiences. Neurophenomenological approaches illustrate that the physiological effects of psychedelics can account for release of innate modules and mental organs. The concept of the phantasy mode of consciousness provides a mechanism through which our unconscious causal and explanatory mechanisms produce accounts of encounters with non-human beings. The extensive interaction of DMT with the receptorome explains why these experiences give such a powerful sense of ontological certainty.

Conclusion
Psychedelic entity experiences share central features with a robust innate human tendency to attribute agency, intentionality, causality, and personhood and to create accounts involving human-like qualities and entities.

Full text

An ontology of psychedelic entity experiences in evolutionary
psychology and neurophenomenology*
MICHAEL JAMES WINKELMAN**
Retired, School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
(Received: November 14, 2017; accepted: January 18, 2018)
Background and aims: Psychedelic entity experiences are examined from perspectives of evolutionary psychology
and neurophenomenology. Their similarities with other entity experiences illustrate the need for a general biological
explanation of entity experiences. Mechanisms are proposed to involve innate modules, operators, and intelligences
that underlie ordinary cognitive inferences and provide the basis for supernatural thought. Methods: Comparisons of
ayahuasca and dimethyltryptamine (DMT) entity experiences with other types of entity experiences show their
fundamental similarities to conceptions of spirit guides, mythological beings, divinities, extraterrestrials, angels,
celestial beings, demons, gnomes, dwarfs, elves, and others. Entities exemplify the properties of anthropomorphism,
exhibiting qualities of humans. Comparative methods are proposed to identify common features and differences in
psychedelic and other entity experiences. Results: Features of psychedelic entities reflect the functions of principal
innate operators and modules (i.e., animacy detection, social role inferences, and mind reading) that have central
roles in the explanation of the genesis of spirit experiences and beliefs. Humans’innate psychology includes diverse
forms of self and alien self-phenomena, providing mechanisms for explaining psychedelic entity experiences.
Neurophenomenological approaches illustrate that the physiological effects of psychedelics can account for release of
innate modules and mental organs. The concept of the phantasy mode of consciousness provides a mechanism
through which our unconscious causal and explanatory mechanisms produce accounts of encounters with non-human
beings. The extensive interaction of DMT with the receptorome explains why these experiences give such a powerful
sense of ontological certainty. Conclusion: Psychedelic entity experiences share central features with a robust innate
human tendency to attribute agency, intentionality, causality, and personhood and to create accounts involving
human-like qualities and entities.
Keywords: psychedelic entities, ontology, evolutionary psychology, innate modules
INTRODUCTION
What are we to make of reports of psychedelic entities,
experiences of autonomous beings often experienced
on psychedelics? Many reports of psychedelic entity
experiences allege that they are not a hallucination nor
merely some phenomena of experience, but rather a
manifestation of some transcendent real noumenon in-
volving communicative contact with another sentient
being (e.g., see Luke, 2011;Meyer, 1994,2010;St John,
2015). What is the reality of these experiences? How do
we understand the ontology and origin of entity experi-
ences, if we do not accept that they are reflections of a
transcendent reality?
If we dismiss these experiences as irrelevant halluci-
nations without substance or meaning, we exclude sig-
nificant information regarding the nature of the human
mind. Yet, if we simply accept the phenomenological
experiences of entities as transcendent realities, we
commit an error of epistemological naivety. The Kantian
distinction between phenomena and noumena is useful
here. Do these psychedelic entities represent noumena,
manifestations of a real transcendent reality, or are they
merely phenomena produced by our complex brains, but
ultimately nothing more than dream-like hallucinatory
experiences?
The experience of an entity does not mean that what we
see is an actual reality. The tendency for the mind to play
tricks is easily illustrated in visual illusions and with dis-
torted figures that use irregular line orientations to force the
eye into a perception of movement. Various visual illusions
(Figure 1) do not move as we perceive them to, but rather are
distortions produced by our brain and visual system.
Nonetheless, the distinction of phenomena justifies an
acceptance of the reality of the experiences for the person.
Accepting the phenomenal contents of experience as data for
scientific exploration of the phenomena of the human mind
*The ideas for this paper were stimulated by an invitation from
Anton Binton and David Luke to participate in the Tyringham
Initiative in May 2017.
** Corresponding address: Michael James Winkelman; Caixa Postal
62, Pirenopolis, Goias, 72980-000 Brazil; Phone: +1 623 239 1662;
+55 62 99 647 4169; E-mail: michaeljwinkelman@gmail.com
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium for non-commercial purposes, provided the original author and
source are credited, a link to the CC License is provided, and changes –if any –are indicated.
© 2018 The Author(s)
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018)
DOI: 10.1556/2054.2018.002
First published online March 22, 2018

provides an empirical foundation for characterizing the nature
of these experiences. Analysis of these descriptions can
provide data to determine if there is an objective (intersub-
jective) reality to these experiences; examine their nature as
conceptual entities; and identify the mechanisms producing
these experiences in terms of known effects of psychedelics
on brain function, potentially explaining the processes pro-
ducing these often convincing manifestations.
The ontological realities of psychedelic entities
Psychedelic entities are obviously experiences that occur.
How are we to conceptualize this data with respect to
ontology concerned with the nature of reality and the
similarities and differences among basic categories of being
that may exist (Encyclopedia of Philosophy)? The Merriam-
Webster Dictionary’s(2017)definitions of entities help to
clarify at least three types of psychedelic entities: transcen-
dent entities (noumenon, “1a: being, existence; especially:
independent, separate, or self-contained existence”); and
objective (intersubjective phenomenon) and conceptual en-
tities (“2: something that has separate and distinct existence
and objective or conceptual reality”).
The meaning of definition 1 –“independent, separate, or
self-contained existence”–implies an empirical entity with
transcendent status. True believers who allege that psyche-
delic entity experiences are real represent the notion of a
separate and independent existence, apart from our imagina-
tion –a transcendent entity that implies a noumenon. In my
view, such claims have not been substantiated with rigorous
methodologies (i.e., parapsychological research). I shall leave
the evaluation of this transcendent reality of psychedelic
beings for others and instead address the concepts of an
objective entity (intersubjectively validated experience) and
conceptual entity (an explanation for such experiences).
The concepts of an objective psychedelic entity can be
derived from similarities in individual experiences that
point to a shared intersubjective reality underlying the
experiences –are there repeatedly encountered features/
qualia in psychedelic entity encounters? The question of
an objective psychedelic entity is concerned with whether
across observers there are common features. Can we agree
objectively –interpersonally and intersubjectively, and
ultimately scientifically –about whether there are regular
features exhibited in these experiences?
If encounters with psychedelic entities produce a repeat-
able pattern of experiences across people, those patterns
establish an objective psychedelic entity, as well as a
phenomenon to be explained as a conceptual entity. Just
as we explain the experience of rainbows as your physical
perspective on the sunlight reflecting off of water droplets in
the air, we can seek naturalistic explanations of the nature of
psychedelic entity experiences that do not require evoking
the notion of a transcendent noumenon. There is not really a
rainbow where you perceive one, but we can explain this
repeatable intersubjectively validated observation through a
conceptual explanation involving an understanding of the
physics of light and perception.
I believe that the evidence available allows us to provide
a similar materialist explanation of psychedelic entity
experiences within the known frameworks of psychedelic
effects on the brain. But the development of a rational and
empirical discourse on psychedelic entities faces challenges
due to the lack of formalized attempts at rigorous compara-
tive examination. As Gallimore and Luke (2016) and Luke
(2011) noted, we need an academic study of entity encoun-
ters that offers a thorough examination of the similarities in
independent reports by identifying the recurrent character-
istics common to these experiences.
This paper proposes a cross-cultural and interdisciplinary
study of the features of entities and uses case materials and
previous profiles of psychedelic entity experiences to offer
hypotheses regarding what might be revealed by such system-
atic evidence. This paper outlines a methodology for
Figure 1. Illusionary pulsation
6|Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018)
Winkelman

empirically addressing the question of qualities of objective
psychedelic entities and proposes a series of hypotheses
regarding the qualities of these experiences based on principles
of evolutionary psychology and the neurophenomenology of
psychedelic experiences. These perspectives derived from
evolutionary psychology provide hypotheses regarding the
qualities of objective psychedelic entities, and explanations of
their qualities through a conceptual definition of psychedelic
entities by reference to brain processes involving innate mod-
ular structures and their functions. I propose explanations as to
why objective psychedelic entities should reflect the modular
structures of the brain and present a series of hypotheses
derived from evolutionary psychology regarding the basic
features of objective psychedelic entity experiences.
The possible qualities of objective psychedelic entities
are suggested by case comparisons of reports of these
experiences; this also reveals a wide diversity across various
psychedelic entity experiences, including those from indi-
viduals using the same drug. Such comparisons call into
doubt the assumption of a single unambiguous objective
concept of a psychedelic entity experience, with a common
set of features manifested across all experiences. But only
through a systematic and comparative analysis of entity
experiences can we determine, if psychedelic-induced entity
experiences constitute a singular objective entity, a clear
class of experiences that are uniquely and reliably associated
with psychedelic experiences, or whether they are but
another example of a widely distributed experience of
various forms of an encounter with an alien other.
Nonetheless, in either case, the existence of a naturalistic
basis for psychedelic entity experiences is suggested by reports
of psychedelic entities that resemble other kinds of supernatu-
ral entities, such as elves, spirits, and extraterrestrials.
These similarities indicate a need for a broader explana-
tion of psychedelic entities within the context of other kinds
of mythological, spiritual, religious, and supernatural enti-
ties, an explanation found in their common basis in human
biology. The apparent similarities in psychedelic entities
and various other types of entity experiences found across
cultures, time, and diverse conditions for altering conscious-
ness suggest that an explanation be sought within innate
functions of the human brain.
These cross-cultural similarities are examined within the
context of humans’innate operators and innate intelligences
(see Gardner, 2000), ancient human adaptations that provide
basic aspects of our unconscious functional processing
modules. These involve innate functions for specific opera-
tions, such as detecting an agent, recognizing animal spe-
cies, perceiving the thoughts of social others, imitative
interpretation of others (mirror neuron inference), and other
adaptive automatic information processing capacities ac-
quired in the course of human evolution.
These features of psychedelic entities involving innate
intelligences have been evoked as explanations for the
universality of spiritual beliefs. These reflect the operation
of innate intelligences, modules, and operators for uncon-
scious processing of the most significant features of the
environment –animals and other humans (see Gardner,
2000). Our innate evolved psychology involves a number
of predispositions and interpretative structures provided by
biology to detect features of human-like entities. This
tendency is a consequence of millions of years of adapta-
tions for the most important factors affecting human
survival –other human-like entities. These innate structures
cultivated a disposition toward interpreting the external
world in terms of the presence of others and their desires,
intentions, temperament, etc. These tendencies reflect the
necessity for adaptation to a social world in which the ability
to understand the internal dispositions of other members of
our species –their perceptions, thoughts, intentions, roles,
personalities, evaluations, and emotions –played a crucial
role in adaptation and survival.
The inevitably of projecting human-like qualities in our
perception of the world requires that we assess experience of
psychedelic entities with reference to our evolved predispo-
sition to project human-like entities with certain features. The
paper proposes testable hypotheses derived from evolutionary
psychology that link features of psychedelic entity experi-
ences to functions of innate modular structures of the brain.
Psychedelic entopic imagery as innate modules
Ajustification for evaluating the structure of psychedelic
entity experiences in relation to innate brain structures is
found in the phenomena of entoptics, i.e., the visual phenom-
ena produced by innate functions of the brain. Recognition
that psychedelic substances stimulate innate representational
systems goes back almost a century (see Carr, 1995). In his
studies of the subjective effects of mescaline, Kluver (1928)
found his subjects reported recurring geometric patterns. He
used this subjective data to provide characterization of the
recurrent features of these entoptic images, which he labeled
“form constants.”The principal types he recognized included
basic geometric forms; a lattice structure manifested as
grating, honeycombs, and cobwebs; and openings such as
tunnels, funnels, and cones.
The widespread manifestation of these innate forms
includes their natural manifestations in non-drug experi-
ences and in medical conditions (i.e., epilepsy, insulin
hypoglycemia, delirium from fever or infections, and psy-
chotic episodes); during near-death experiences and hypna-
gogic states; and under conditions of flickering lights,
sensory deprivation, and rhythmic drumming (Siegel,
1977). The elemental forms of the entoptic images are also
integrated into larger geometric patterns that typify the
complex imagery of psychedelic experiences.
The central explanatory framework proposed for account-
ing for the features of psychedelic entities involves similar
psychedelic effects stimulating (or releasing) innate aspects of
neurotransmission, brain function, and the innate modular
functions of the brain. These neurophenomenological explana-
tions have the potential to highlight how psychedelic entity
experiences can result in the compelling appearance of an
objective reality, filled with an experiential force that results in
a perceived epistemological and ontological significance.
METHODS: A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION
OF ENTITY EXPERIENCES
Do we know what are the essential and necessary features of
a psychedelic entity experience –beyond that a psychedelic
Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018) |7
Ontology of psychedelic entities

and an entity are involved? Is there a specific profile to
psychedelic entity experiences, a common set of features to
these entity experiences that regularly occur under psyche-
delic influences? Yet, there is no systematic evidence
establishing such a singular experience of an objective
psychedelic entity and its qualities; on the contrary, case
examples show that psychedelic entity experiences take a
considerable variety of forms. This paper uses case materials
and others’profiles of various psychedelic entity and other
entity experiences to identify the possible qualities of
objective psychedelic entities and as a basis for hypotheses
regarding what might be revealed by a formal cross-cultural
and interdisciplinary study of such systematic evidence.
Case evidence regarding objective psychedelic
entity experiences
The paintings of Pablo Amaringo (see Luna & Amaringo,
1999) represent a person’s psychedelic entity experiences.
Amaringo’s work highlights elements that suggest more
than a single profile for such entities. Nonetheless, they
generally appear as humanoids, but these reflect a variety
of cultural and religious themes, including Amerindian,
Spiritist, Asian, and Christian. Amaringo’s depictions cover
the range of themes reported by Shanon (2010) in his
analysis of a wide range of supernatural beings experienced
under the influence of ayahuasca. Shanon specified these
different types as involving mythological beings; divinities
and semi-divinities; half-human and half-animal shape-
shifting hybrids; extraterrestrials –angels and celestial
beings; and demons and other entities of death.
These predominantly anthropomorphic figures are mir-
rored in Luke’s(2011) summary of various studies on
dimethyltryptamine (DMT) entity experiences that reported
entities characterized as gnomes, dwarfs, elves, imps, goblins
and other forms of “little people,”as well as angels, spirits,
and gods. But even this humanoid form is exceeded in the
characterizations of DMT entity experiences in modern
clinical settings; Strassman’s(2000) participants experienced
various types of “beings,”including “entities,”“guides,”and
“aliens,”but appearing similar to insects, bees, cacti, clowns,
mantises, reptiles, spiders, and stick figures.
These admittedly unsystematic assessments of psyche-
delic entities suggest that there is no single profile for a
psychedelic entity, but a diversity of appearances mani-
fested in these experiences. Whether they nonetheless share
functional properties or features in their manifestations in
human experience has not been determined through system-
atic study of accounts. Do psychedelic entities appearing as
bees, reptiles, and spiders do the same things as those
appearing as elves, angels, and ETs?
Case data show that what is reported about psychedelic
entities is also found in many experiences and cultural tradi-
tions, which are often evoked in describing the nature of
psychedelic entity experiences. Casual comparisons show
overall similarities of psychedelic entity experiences with
entity experiences in other contexts, such as religious and
spiritual visions, shamanism, experiences of possession, spirit
allies, guardians, and animal transformation; out-of-body
experiences and a range of other anomalous body phenomena;
experiences of haunting, ghosts, and apparitions; encounters
with various entities conceptualized in folklore and mythology
traditions as dwarfs, elves, “little people,”demons, etc.;
experiences of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) encounters;
the phenomenological content of dream experiences; and the
phenomenology and neurophysiology of many psychiatric
conditions, including hallucinations and properly speaking.
Whatever their unique properties may be, there are
nonetheless notable parallels of many psychedelic entity
experiences with other experiences of encounters with
entities. For example, the experiences that result from
extensive meditative practices may include encounters with
entities that parallel the reports for psychedelic-induced
experiences. Meditative traditions have numerous reports
of experiences of entities that are encountered during pro-
found meditative experiences, or even in everyday life!
Hancock (2000) noted substantial similarities of DMT
entity experiences with experiences of fairies, UFO contact,
and shamanic practices. Such similarities have profound
implications for questions regarding the possible nature of
objective psychedelic entities.
We need to verify if any types of entity experiences are
unique to psychedelics. Are there consistent features of
psychedelic entity experiences that are found only with
psychedelics, or do the psychedelic entity experiences reflect
the same basic properties found in entities experienced in
other contexts? If there is not one type of psychedelic entity
experience but a variety of subtypes, then we have several
objective phenomena to be explained. If major features of
psychedelic entity experiences mirror those of other kinds of
entity experiences, then our questions are more broadly
concerned with the explanation of entity experiences in
general, as well as why psychedelics are so powerful in
inducing these experiences that also occur in other contexts.
Entitiology
I propose that to determine whether there are consistent and
unique features of psychedelic entity experiences, we need a
cross-cultural and interdisciplinary assessment of phenom-
enological reports of diverse types of experiences of entities
(i.e., see Winkelman, 1992). Formal quantitative compar-
isons of the reported characteristics of diverse entity experi-
ences are necessary to discover any commonalities to
psychedelic entity experiences and their uniqueness with
respect to other types of entity experiences. We need a new
field of scientific inquiry, entitiology, i.e., the study of
entities, to address the questions of the nature of psyche-
delic, and other types of entity experiences. This field of
entitiology might be viewed as partially subsumed within the
field of philosophy called ontology [The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (2017) characterized ontology as concerned with
the study of beings and their nature. Ontology is characterized
as concerned first with the nature of being and reality, what it
is that exists and is what it is made of, what are the general
features of these things; ontology includes a concern with
identifying the basic categories of being, determining evi-
dence regarding what entities may exist, and how such
entities may be related within a hierarchy, and subdivided
according to similarities and differences (summarized from
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology;alsosee
Kenny, 2012)].
8|Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018)
Winkelman

To determine the significant features of the experience of
entities, psychedelic and otherwise, we need to be able to
code variables from detailed accounts of these personal
experiences and subject the empirical data to systematic
analysis to determine the patterns of characteristics. This
assessment of the significant features of entity experiences
requires first, a structured solicitation and coding of descrip-
tions of these experiences; second, an analysis of the
similarities and differences among entity experiences, by
procedures such as cluster analysis which define similar
groups; and finally a comparison of those empirically derived
groups and their common features with other data, including
the a priori labels for the experiences; the known effects of
psychedelics on brain and perception; and the functions of
innate modules hypothesized to account for their features.
This inquiry into psychedelic entity experiences must
include entity experiences beyond those directly linked to
psychedelics (as important as a clear delineation of the
category “entities”might be, I do not think that it is necessary
to have an a priori definition. We need to include all possible
types of experiences and reports in our pool of entity data. We
should be dissuaded by a priori determination or definition of
entities, allowing the characterization to be empirically driv-
en, derived from the data rather than used to define the data to
be collected. While one might object that some types of
experiences might not be valid for inclusion in the field of
entities, empirical analyses should be able to show that the
inclusion of specific kinds of data either distorts solutions or
significantly increases dimension or variance in models.
Inclusion of non-entity data points might also be useful in
showing the relationship of entity types to non-entity con-
cepts, providing bridges into the realm of ordinary phenom-
ena of consciousness). If we are to establish that there are
unique features of psychedelic entity experiences that require
explanation, it is through the comparison of a consistent
profile of psychedelic entity experiences with entity experi-
ences that occur under other conditions. The possible unique
nature of psychedelic entities cannot be effectively assessed
apart from broader comparisons with all kinds of entities,
with their similarities and differences providing crucial data
for revealing the possibility of an objective psychedelic entity
experience and its natures.
Our data on entities must be inclusive in many senses. Do
entity experiences require a sense of a presence outside of
oneself, exterior to the body? Or can entities also be
experienced inside of the body or even just in the mind,
such as in interdimensional experiences or possession phe-
nomena? Recognition that our experience of the external
world is a model produced in the mind undermines any rigid
distinction between perception of internal and external
entities, but such differences in experiences should be part
of the data we collect from entity reports. Furthermore,
psychedelic entity experiences are typically conceptualized
as internal to the mind, rather than in the external world,
requiring that all forms of internal entity experiences be
considered for comparative purposes.
Since entities can be purely mental experiences, the
experiences of dreams may also involve entities, especially
incubus or succubus experiences, where there is a clear sense
of being attacked by an entity in sleep. The experiences of
other beings occurring during dreams provide a prototype of
the entity experience, and dreams provide a normal and
natural framework for assessing the possible unique qualities
of psychedelic entity experiences. Indeed, the qualities of
entities in dreams may manifest many, if not all, of the
principal qualities of psychedelic entity experiences. On the
other hand, if there are differences between psychedelic-
induced and dream experiences of entities, this can reveal
what is special about the psychedelic entity experiences.
Consequently, entitiology must encompass a number of
existing areas of inquiry and by necessity will incorporate at
least a part of the domain of the entities reported in the
following areas of study:
Angelology,
Demonology,
Spiritology,
UFOology,
Folklore and Mythology studies of elves, fairies, dwarfs,
pixies, imps, gnomes, goblins, leprechauns, little people,
and similar phenomena reported in cultures around the
world,
Possession, Mediumship, and Shamanism,
Ghosts, apparitions, and poltergeist phenomena,
Psychiatric syndromes, especially abnormal body syn-
dromes and experiences such as the “Old Hag”and other
terrorizing dreams.
A systemic coding and analysis of the features of these
various accounts can determine whether or not a single type
or several types of psychedelic entity experiences occur.
And only through comparison with profiles obtained for
reports of what are conceptualized as angels, fairies, extra-
terrestrials, and shamanic spirits can we determine, if there
are unique features of psychedelic entities.
The data coded can include the labels given by percipients
(i.e., elf, extraterrestrial, monster, etc.), but the data need to
emphasize descriptions, characteristics seen or inferred such
as physical features, behaviors, intentions, activities, as well
as the set and setting of the percipient and entity.
Some of the general areas for coding of descriptive data
regarding entities would include:
Appearances (shape, color, features, relative size to
human, and other objects present);
Humanoid versus non-humanoid, animal or machine
forms;
Behaviors by percipient and entity;
Intentions inferred;
Forms of communication;
Content of messages received;
Personal meanings for percipient;
Emotions expressed by entity and evoked in percipient;
Agency versus mechanical;
Physical versus non-physical appearances;
Type of consciousness altering conditions present for
percipient;
Types of drugs and dosage;
Non-drug alterations of consciousness –night time,
isolation, chanting, prayer, fasting, etc.;
Manifestations of innate modular intelligences, brain
functions, or operations –by entity and percipient.
The variable list used should be derived from grounded
research as well as theory. Ideally, literature from the
Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018) |9
Ontology of psychedelic entities

numerous areas that have already assessed the specific
qualities and characteristics of various types of entities
(i.e., elves, leprechauns, angels, extraterrestrials, etc.) would
be extracted and used as the basis of the descriptive vari-
ables coded. We need to know how psychedelic entities
appear and are experienced, as well as what they are not
like. The summary of the features of angelology (Fox &
Sheldrake, 2014) is an example of preexisting variable areas
ideal for such an inquiry.
The sequencing of features in the experiences should
be a part of the data. Ideally, some of the personal features
of respondents are also assessed, using standardized
assessments [this can employ instruments, such as the
Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (Pekala,
Steinberg, & Kumar, 1986); the Five Dimensions of
Altered States of Consciousness (Studerus, Gamma, &
Vollenweider, 2010); and the Abnormer Psychischer
Zustaende (Dittrich, 1998;Dittrich, Von Arx, & Staub,
1981,1985)] of the personal tendency for experiences of
alterations of consciousness.
Hypotheses regarding psychedelic entity experiences
A cursory examination of reports of diverse entity types
suggests the following hypotheses for this study.
Hypothesis 1: There is not a single type of psychedelic entity
experience, but a number of different subtypes of psyche-
delic entity experiences.
Hypothesis 2: The distinguishing features of different sub-
types of psychedelic-induced entity experiences reflect the
central features of profiles of experiences reported for other
types of entities.
Hypothesis 3: People reporting psychedelic entity experi-
ences will have higher than mean scores on standard
measures [this can employ instruments, such as the Phe-
nomenology of Consciousness Inventory (Pekala et al.,
1986); the Five Dimensions of Altered States of Conscious-
ness (Studerus et al., 2010); and the Abnormer Psychischer
Zustaende (Dittrich, 1998;Dittrich et al., 1981,1985)] of
susceptibility to alterations of consciousness, dissociation,
hypnotic susceptibility, etc.
Determining an objective psychedelic entity phenome-
non reveals the qualities to be explained, providing a basis
for determining what is involved in the conceptual psyche-
delic entity. If the converging data from different cultures
and types of entities point to common features of an
objective entity, this would point to something that trans-
cends the human cultural situation. This is found in the
relationships that manifest something beyond the appear-
ance that we perceive, whatever are the common principles
of psychedelic entities beyond their obvious diversity.
An example of “entity studies”: The Census
of Hallucinations
These relationships among features that systematic study of
the qualities of psychedelic entity experiences might reveal
are illuminated by the findings of the classic 19th century
Census of Hallucinations (Sidgwick, Johnson, Myers,
Podmore, & Sidgwick, 1894). This survey study asked
people, “Have you ever, when completely awake, had a vivid
impression of seeing or being touched by a living being or
inanimate object, or of hearing a voice; which impression, so
far as you could discover, was not due to any external
physical cause?”Seems like a possible entity experience!
Their findings may also contribute to our understanding
of entity experiences. Principal features of those entity
experiences involving deaths were also generally character-
ized by their occurrence after awakening from sleep; a
vision of a family member; and information that they had
suffered a life-ending event, which was later verified. This
seems to tell us something about the causal nature of these
specific entity experiences –the prior condition of being in a
sleep-induced alteration of conscious, an image of a close
family member emerging from the unconscious, and their
death, which was later confirmed. Welcome to the world of
supernatural entities!
HUMANS’INNATE INTELLIGENCES,
MODULES, AND OPERATORS
Why should we assess psychedelic entity experiences within
the frameworks of evolutionary psychology? Simply be-
cause evolutionary psychology and the cognitive science of
religion (see Atran, 2006;Barrett, 2000;Boyer, 2001,2017;
Clements, 2017;Pyysiäinen, 2009) have shown that opera-
tions of innate brain mechanisms can explain the virtual
universal distribution of spirit beliefs and experiences. Of
particular relevance are the perspectives on how the typical
features of spirit experiences and beliefs can be explained in
terms of the functions of the brain’s innate operators or
innate modules. The similarities of entity characteristics
with the functions of humans’innate human cognitive
features support the hypothesis that these innate functions
are the source of entity experiences.
The operation of innate operators is revealed in the
complex behaviors of newborns in a number of areas,
e.g., the response of infants to faces and face-like config-
urations. Otsuka (2014) reviewed studies of face recognition
in infants that show their selective attention to discriminate
human faces. Face recognition is one of the best-studied
cases of a specialized innate cognitive system (Barrett,
2000), a highly developed system which Barrett noted may
reflect the need for kin recognition [Barrett (p. 176) cites
research establishing the specific brain regions for facial
recognition as involving “the fusiform gyrus in the inferior
right temporal lobe.”“Neuroimaging studies in adult parti-
cipants have consistently identified cortical areas related to
face processing including the inferior occipital gyrus (oc-
cipital face area), the middle fusiform gyrus (fusiform face
area) and the superior temporal sulcus”(Otsuka, 2014,
p. 81)]. But the system of face recognition is far more basic,
exhibiting sensitivity for the overall arrangement of the
separate facial features (e.g., eyes, mouth, ears, etc.), as
well as evidence indicating a variety of specialized mechan-
isms for detecting gaze and the expression of emotions.
10 |Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018)
Winkelman

The prominence of eyes in psychedelic art (i.e., Alex Grey)
illustrates the prominent operation of this innate module in
psychedelic experiences (also see in excess of 24 million
hits for “psychedelic eye art”on Google).
Evolutionary psychology (i.e., Barkow, Leda, & Tooby,
1992;Carruthers & Chamberlain, 2000;Confer et al., 2010)
has explanations of why we experience supernatural entities
so naturally. Evolutionary psychology explains a variety of
psychological phenomena as the result of biological adapta-
tions and their behavioral, psychological, cognitive, and
social functions. Evolutionary approaches to human psy-
chology have discovered that the human mind exhibits
modularity, the result of the acquisition of a separate innate
modules or operators that provide specific cognitive func-
tions (Gardner, 1983,2000). The operation of these modules
reflects capacities acquired in the course of Hominin Evo-
lution through natural selection, particularly solutions to
challenges faced by our ancestors and their hunting and
gathering lifestyle.
The evolution of the human mind [Mithen (1996) has
shown how the concept of innate modules explains human
cognitive and social evolution. Innately disposed modular
capacities are key to understanding the emergence of human
cognitive uniqueness involving capacities for representation
through imitation (mimesis), highly controlled physical
behavior (tool use), natural history knowledge (animal
behavior), social psychology (social relations and mind),
and communication (music and language). Mithen proposes
that it was the integration of these various modular functions
that was the final cause of the major expansions in human
cognitive evolution, with language serving as the mecha-
nism through which information was exchanged among
modules. Winkelman (2002,2010) has shown how the
effects of ritual alterations of consciousness drove these
integrative processes through their manifestations in a visual
modality of consciousness] involved the acquisition of
specialized programs, hardwired input systems that provide
for automatic information processing. These psychological
adaptations respond to delimited forms of information and
produce a functional output designed to provide a solution
to a specific problem regularly encountered in adaptation,
particularly in social relations. This evolution of specialized
modular thought operators is reflected in specialized rea-
soning abilities in higher primates that provide cognitive
functions for managing social relationships (Cummings &
Allen, 1998). Prominent among these abilities are reasoning
about hierarchies and coalitions and strategies for manipu-
lating the beliefs and behaviors of others, using a “theory of
mind”to infer the motives and reasoning of others in
society.
A range of findings supports a view of the human mind as
manifesting a variety of unconscious functions that operate
through an integrated assembly of many functionally spe-
cialized modular psychological adaptations [these adapta-
tions are not discrete anatomical entities but are recognized
because of a number of factors. These include the complex-
ity of the behavior, the economy of function and efficiency
of design, and their precision in achieving specific outcomes
(Confer et al., 2010)]. The evidence that Gardner (2000)
cites as establishing innate intelligences includes an expla-
nation for their existence based on evolutionary plausibility;
their role as central core cognitive operations for social life;
their isolated dysfunction as a result of damage to specific
brain regions; their manifestation in idiot savants and child
prodigies with otherwise limited cognitive capacities; a high
facility for their encoding in symbol systems; and support
for their existence from experimental and psychometric
studies.
Cross-cultural homologies in forms or functions of cog-
nition involve what Laughlin, McManus, and d’Aquili
(1992) call neurognostic structures, the neurobiological
structures of knowing that provide the universal aspects of
the human brain/mind. These neurophenomenological rela-
tions involve inherent knowledge structures of the organism
that mediate the organization of experience into certain
forms; these inherent structures underlie concepts such as
archetypes, which are conceptualized as an ancient mode of
organization of the experiences of the collective uncon-
scious. Cross-cultural similarities in mythic accounts led the
psychologist Carl Jung to propose the term archetype to
represent the innate ways in which our mental hardware
perceives reality as a consequence of acquired structures for
representing universal aspects of human experiences. These
innate dispositions of all human minds, our collective
unconscious, provide the impulses that are represented in
symbols and myths (summarized from Winkelman & Baker,
2016).
Other innate structures of perception are discussed by
Gardner (2000, p. 57), who identified 10 basic innate
intelligences (Table 1). These capacities are inherent to the
potentials of our species, but they are differentially devel-
oped as a function of individual differences, socialization
influences, and environmental exposures. d’Aquili and
Newberg (1999) characterize these potentials as innate
systems that function not as encapsulated physical modules,
but as conceptual operators linking functional components
across areas of the brain that provide specific functions.
They propose a number of innate modular systems that
constitute the typical default processing capacities of the
mind (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999; Table 2)
Based on Maclean’s(1973,1990) work, Ernandes (2013)
discusses operators relevant to human cognition as involv-
ing a territorial operator, a hierarchic operator, a space
operator, a time operator, a sequence operator, a display
meaning or semiotic operator for interpretation of behavior
and non-verbal communication that operates both in rela-
tionships among members of the same species as well as in
interaction with different species, including the symbolic
codification of behavior in primates. One of the mammalian
operators involves nursing and other components of mater-
nal care that use audiovocal communication and oxytocin
release to enhance dopamine-mediated attachment dynam-
ics to enhance maternal–offspring contact and bonding.
Relevant here are both the attachment operator for establish-
ing bonds between mother and offspring; and a “falling in
love”operator that mediates the formation of coupling and
pair bonding.
Ernandes proposes that some behavioral operators man-
aged by the mammalian R-complex include “the nutrition/
homeostatic operator, for food and water needs;”“the
specific operator, which allows for the acquisition of a
species’identity;”“the sexual operator”and the “play
Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018) |11
Ontology of psychedelic entities

operator,”which provide behavioral and cognitive func-
tions; and emotional operators, especially “fear operator”
and “aggression operators,”including a predatory aggres-
sion and intraspecific aggression operators.
Universal human emotions (sadness, happiness, fear,
anger, disgust, and surprise) are also cases of highly spe-
cialized neural operators that make such experiences present
across cultures. Damasio (1999) characterizes emotions as
core biological processes based in innate brain devices that
play a regulatory role through non-conscious processes that
are manifested in the body. Emotions have biological roles
of producing specific reactions to situations that require
specific types of responses, which require action from
aspects of our evolved biology that helps regulate survival
behaviors. This biological machinery produces stereotyped
response patterns –emotions –that are experienced as
feelings and manifested in images. Consciousness emerges
as the organism comes to know and experience its own
emotions as information, extending the capacity to maintain
homeostasis and adapt to the environment.
Modular capacities in the production of
supernatural experiences
The cognitive science of religion (e.g., see Clements, 2017)
has shown how the widespread human belief in the spirit
world (and its virtual universality as a cultural belief) results
from basic brain operators. This widespread human tenden-
cy to perceive animate entities wherever we look is a
consequence of the automatic operation of modular capaci-
ties. This tendency is derived from the functions of a variety
of innate human capacities (Boyer, 1992,2001;Guthrie,
1993). Barrett (2000) proposed that supernatural belief is a
direct function of a hyperactive agent-detection device
(HADD). This is an automatic tendency to project the
interpretation of an active agent responsible for ambiguous
events. The basic function of the HADD is to attribute the
intention of some agent as the cause of unexplained phe-
nomena. This agency detection function or agency operator
(Ernandes proposes that while the agency operator may
acquire a rational component from the involvement of the
Table 1. Gardner’s(1983,2000) types of innate intelligences
Original intelligences
An intrapersonal intelligence for looking in at one’s own mind and the ability to use awareness of one’s own capacities, desires, needs, and
knowledge in achieving goals and regulating one’s emotional life and relations with others.
An interpersonal intelligence, a capacity to work effectively with others through an understanding of their motivations and intentions,
engaging a “theory of mind”to infer others’mental processes.
A capacity for linguistic intelligence (actually involves several capacities).
Alogical-mathematical reasoning capacity for carrying out mathematical processes to solve problems, a capacity that manifests in extreme
forms in the idiot savants with superhuman math processing capacities.
Abodily-kinesthetic intelligence manifested in mimesis, dancing, and the capacity to use the body to solve problems and build things.
Amusical intelligence to create and perform with sound and instruments.
Aspatial intelligence for creating patterns in space, ranging from navigation skills to sculpturers.
Additional intelligences
Anaturalist intelligence that “demonstrates expertise in the recognition and classification of the numerous species –the flora and fauna –
of his or her environment”(2000, p. 36). This provides a capacity to recognize species, differentiate among species, and to identify
relations between and among species.
Aspiritual intelligence manifested in “a desire to know about experiences and cosmic entities that are not readily apprehended in a
material sense”(2000, p. 40) and providing skills in meditating, entering alterations of consciousness, and engaging with spiritual, noetic,
and transcendent experiences. Within this spiritual intelligence is a personal quality that Gardner called charisma, an ability to engage in a
powerful emotional contact with others that also instills in them the quest for this spiritual awareness.
An existential intelligence that reflects the cognitive aspects manifested in the spiritual intelligence, “an ability to locate oneself with
respect to the furthest reaches of the cosmos, :::the significance of life, the meaning of death, :::a concern with cosmic issues”(p. 44).
Table 2. Innate cognitive operators (Newberg & d’Aquili, 2001)
Acausal operator that prompts the mind to interpret experiences of the universe as a sequence of specific causes and effects, providing
mechanisms of supersensible forces and powers to fulfill such explanations when direct evidence is lacking.
Aholistic operator that perceives a “wholeness in the midst of diversity”(p. 190), a view of reality as an integrated whole, giving humans
an experience of the absolute and transcendent.
Abinary operator that reduces complicated relationships to simple pairs of opposites.
Areductionist operator that allows the mind to see a whole broken down into component parts.
Aquantitative operator with the capacity of abstraction of quantity from perception, engaging in operations to provide estimations of
number, time, and distance.
Aeureka operator that provides rapid problem-solving that reaches the consciousness suddenly through unconscious processes rather than
by trial and error.
Several linguistic operators, one related to speech and based on neocortical components involving Broca’s area, and one for understanding
of meanings involving Wernicke’s area.
12 |Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018)
Winkelman

neocortex’s causal operator, its basis is in reptilian and
limbic operators) expanded in its functions across the course
of primate evolution to enhance our capacity for detection of
predators. This natural selection resulted in adaptations that
were overly sensitive for the detection of agency because
erroneous responses (false positives) had few costs in
comparison to the possible loss of life resulting from the
failure to detect the presence of a predator. We are hyper-
tuned to detect an active intentional agent where information
is ambiguous or incomplete, and the perception of entities
during psychedelic experiences would be a clear example of
such decision-making.
This projection is facilitated by the human expansion of
the assumptions of an “unseen other”with assumptions
regarding the status, mental states, and intentions of these
others. The human capacity for modeling others’cognitive
states using our previous experiences makes it inevitable
that we project our human cognitive dynamics into the
interpretation of ambiguous circumstances we interpret as
involving others. The unknown and ambiguous experiences
within nature are animated with the projections of our own
psychodynamics as the framework for the interpretation,
giving our internal dynamics as the basis of our perceptions
of the unknown. Thus, the ancient innate capacity for
agency detection was further honed in humans for detection
of human-like agents, making nature humanized (anthropo-
morphized) with our own self properties, social character-
istics, and emotional qualities.
The experiences of spirits reflect the human capacity for a
“theory of mind;”this capacity to infer the mental states and
intentions of others is discussed by Gardner (2000) in terms
of an innate intrapersonal intelligence. The intrapersonal
intelligence is a metacognitive operator that provides an
awareness of the contents of one’s own mental states and the
ability to relate that awareness to circumstances in the social
and physical environment. This same capacity for represent-
ing our own mental states allows for the “theory of the
mind,”a capacity for an inferred awareness of the contents
of other people’s minds.
Ernandes (2013) characterizes this innate function of
“theory of mind”as providing capacities for meta-
representation, a metacognitive “thinking about thinking,”
including thinking about the mental states of others, pro-
viding forms of “mindreading”and “mental state attribu-
tion”revealing the likely internal states of others. The
ability to assess others’motives and intentions and the
implications that these have for our self involves using our
own self-models for representations of the mental states of
those others.
Interpersonal intelligence is a social psychological oper-
ator for the internalization of the identities and properties of
others. This interpersonal intelligence is a key concept for
understanding a necessary aspect of human social behavior,
the capacity to assume the perspectives, and the identity of
social others. Collective human behavior is dependent upon
processes of individual internalization of and identification
with the properties of social others, especially dominant
others. These processes are fundamental to human sociali-
zation and identity formation, and provide a basis for the
internalization of norms and adopting for our own self the
models and perspectives exhibited by socially significant
others. This capacity also induces us to accept the notion of
significant others with expectations for our behavior.
Spirits are typically conceptualized as being like persons
with normal human minds and desires, perceive events,
formulate beliefs regarding the world, and act to carry out
specific intentions that are reasonable to the intuitive frame-
works of humans (Winkelman, 2004). Projection of a
concept of a human-like entity is an inevitable part of how
humans conceptualize the unknown. We project human
characteristics and an expectation of human-like entities,
an inevitable aspect of default human cognitive function
derived from adaptations to conditions in which we benefit-
ted from knowing the expectations of human others and
their thoughts and attitudes about us that we internalized as
scripts for our self.
Our brains are further wired to detect the specific goals of
the behaviors of others, embodied in the mirror neurons that
fire when one performs an action –as well as when
perceiving another doing the same action. This mimetic
operator (Ernandes notes that the mimetic operator, local-
ized in the amygdalar complex of the paleomammalian
brain, also plays a central role in the modulation of facial
expression) is an extension of a basic or communicative
operator found across species, the isopraxic operator. This
drives an individual to mentally represent and perform the
actions observed in the behaviors of another member of the
species. In humans, this isopraxic operator is extended in
mimesis through the operation of mirror neurons (Garrels,
2005,2011). Ernandes notes that a function of isopraxic
operators is to produce a pattern in which animals of a group
all behave in the same way. These capacities are a funda-
mental tool for conspecific recognition, entailing an aware-
ness that an “other”is like one’s self, a member of one’s
own species group.
Religious concepts of supernatural agency and causation
reflect uses of a number of innate psychological systems that
are linked together in ways that provided adaptive responses
to the developmental and communication needs of more
complex social groups. Pyysiäinen (2009, p. 13) proposed
that the general dynamic of religious behavior combines the
operation of the hyperactive agency detection with two other
operators that he calls the “hyperactive understanding of
intentionality device,”“the tendency to postulate mentality
and see events as intentionally caused even in the absence of
a visible agent”(Pyysiäinen, 2009, p. 13) and the “hyper-
active teleofunctional reasoning device,”a“tendency to see
objects as existing for a purpose.”The innate nature of these
reasoning processes is revealed in studies of children’s
natural tendency to offer pervasive teleological explanations
of events they experience, postulating an intentional design
by a supernatural agency.
Newberg and d’Aquili (2001) similarly characterize the
neuropsychological mechanisms underlying religious
experiences and behaviors as primarily involving a causal
operator and a holistic operator. The innate function of the
causal operator provides mechanisms of supersensible
forces and powers to fulfill explanations with cause and
effect mechanisms when direct evidence is lacking. The
holistic operator perceives a wholeness to reality, an inte-
grated whole that provides an experience of the absolute and
transcendent.
Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018) |13
Ontology of psychedelic entities

This use by religion of modular functions of the social
mind provides an understanding of how supernatural
thought involved exaptations of previous modules, new
adaptations targeted by natural selection to enhance social
behaviors through the use of natural symbols, such as
animal representations of social groups manifested in to-
temism. Cross-cultural similarities manifested in shamanis-
tic and mystical traditions reflect underlying innate modules
which are reflected in experiences related to those modular
functions, such as animal identities, soul flight, death-and-
rebirth, visions, and emotions of bliss, detachment, and void
(Winkelman, 2010).
The operation of modules and operators in the production
of religious behavior is not their independent function, but
their combination to create a general model that links
various elements of reality together to provide general
explanatory models of how the universe operates (Ernandes,
2013). These combinations of innate intelligences are key
aspects of how supernatural experiences contributed to new
forms of intelligence, constituting symbols derived from the
integration of operations from different cognitive modules
(Winkelman, 2010). This combination of modules in the
production of supernatural thought may have begun in
the linking of the natural history or animal species module
to the modules for personal and social identity. For instance,
concepts of animacy and nature beings mix properties
of personal and natural modules, while totemic groups
represent the production of social identities with animal
elements, exploiting modules for representing the natural
world (Winkelman, 2010).
These beliefs involve the activation of the naturalist or
natural history intelligence. This prehistoric hunter–
gatherers’intuitive biology that provided a template for
learning about animals was extended as a system to orga-
nize information in other domains of significance, in
particular, for thinking about personal and social identity.
Consequently, an innate intelligence regarding animals
provided the basis for creating a universal analogical
system for extension of meaning through animal meta-
phors as representations of personal and social identity;
these provide powerful adaptations for integrating social
groups (one of the most prevalent aspects of “animal”
thought is found in shamanistic incorporation of animal
spirits and their abilities. Typically, these animals provide
a personal social relationship and aspect of personality and
personal powers, or as a group symbol for spiritual and
collective relationship to the group. This use of the animal
world also provided a natural system of knowledge for
organizing relations within a group and between societies.
Totemism provides a system for differentiating societies by
means of analogy, using the innate differences existing
among species to represent society, representing differ-
ences among humans through the innately recognized
differences among species of animals. These cognitive
inventions of shamanism were a natural outcome of the
integration of the different innate modules caused by ritual
alterations of consciousness. These modes of experience
provide access to different aspects of the self, including
animal selves, as well as the disembodied self or an out-of-
body experience) (Winkelman, 2010).
Hypotheses of innate functions in entity experiences
The appearance of different innate operators in entity
experiences, including the sequences of presentation and
co-occurrence, should follow patterns that reflect the sequen-
tial effects of psychedelics on neurotransmitter systems, the
modular operators, and the operation of the triune brain.
Hypothesis 4: The central shared properties across psyche-
delic and other types of entity experiences are a direct
reflection of innate social modules, which will be exhibited
much more than cognitive operators (i.e., mathematical–
logical, language). The fact that these are perceived as
entities with social significance means that the social opera-
tors are being activated.
Hypothesis 5: Psychedelics will produce entity experiences
that manifest the lack of specific innate modules (i.e.,
absence of space, time, language abilities, and logical–
mathematical reasoning). These innate capacities that do
not manifest in psychedelic entity experiences should be
explicable in terms of modular systems that are deactivated
by psychedelics (i.e., the default mode network and the lack
of sense of self).
Hypothesis 6: The features distinguishing different subtypes
of psychedelic entity experiences will involve different inter-
related configurations of innate operators. The hypothesis that
entity experiences derive from the stimulation and release of
the human modular brain functions should receive support
from findings that the core distinguishing features of different
subtypes of entity experiences are a reflection of the natural
interactions among our innate operators (such as simulta-
neous experiences maternal love and suckling and infantile
forms versus anger, dominance, and aggression).
Hypothesis 7: There are patterns in the sequences of opera-
tors that are manifested in the psychedelic entity experiences
that reflect sequences of psychedelic action on the brain.
A predictable sequence of features experienced under the
influence of psychedelics would support hypotheses of
entity experiences as a direct result of their brain interfer-
ence. The sequences of experiences under psychedelics will
reflect the order of effects on major brain and neurotrans-
mitter systems and their consequences for the stimulation
and release of these innate modules. The emergence of
modular operator features in psychedelic (entity) experi-
ences will directly reflect the sequences of return of brain
functions after their destabilization by psychedelic interfer-
ence with neurotransmission functions.
Forms of self as innate processes
If the alien entity experience is an internally produced
experience, not an external phenomena, who is the entity
that is being experienced? There are frequent reports of
psychedelic entity experiences in which percipients allege
being told by the entity that it is an aspect of their own self.
Perhaps we should take these revelations as true. But who is
this other self?
14 |Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018)
Winkelman

The existence of various forms of self, with differential
access to innate operators, provides a basis for different
experiences of the self as an “other.”There are a number of
forms of self development attested to in developmental
studies, psychiatric assessments, and transpersonal devel-
opment models. A general perspective is that there are
stages in the development of the self, with each stage
superseded across time through subsequent development.
These prior stages of self remain within the cognitive and
emotional structures, but not normally engaged with con-
sciousness. These other selves may however still influence
behaviors and desires and figure significantly in the emo-
tional life of the person, operating as semi-autonomous
complexes, particularly in projections and dreams.
This psychologizing of psychedelic entity experiences is
reflected in Gallimore and Luke’s(2016) characterizations
of DMT-induced experiences of dwarfs and elves as repre-
senting dynamics of the collective unconscious, particularly
symbols of archetypes of the Self. They note that these can
form self-contained psyches with autonomous psychic com-
plexes potentially “capable of a consciousness of their own”
(p. 12). This autonomy of alternative self forms is mani-
fested in experiences of possession, characterized by the
presence of an entity that can take control of the person’s
experience, voice, and body.
Process of internalization of the self of another and
socially projecting it in social relations is a basic feature
of the autodynamics of the human persona. This internali-
zation and socially projection of self is manifested not only
in normal experiences but also in unusual psychological
phenomena where a person assumes the identity of someone
else, often a spirit. This process is manifested in possession
experiences, where meek, submissive, and socially margin-
alized women assume the personalities of dominant spirits
and command a social following and high prestige for their
alter status as a medium of the gods. In modern societies,
these same dynamics are manifested in dissociative identity
disorders (previously referred to as multiple personality
disorder). These terms refer to psychological phenomena
where a person has a number of different personalities and
shifts between them, often in a response to trauma. Notably,
most personalities have amnesia for the others, a dissocia-
tion that is also a notable feature of the compartmentalized
innate modules.
Seligman and Kirmayer (2008) characterize dissociation
as involving an evolved mechanism [Winkelman (2010) has
addressed how dissociation is an adaptive reaction which
enables an individual to continue to function in relation to
their parents or caregivers by dissociating from the emo-
tional stress that is experienced in the relationship with
them. Dissociation involves a regulation of attention
mechanisms that allow a selective suppression of percep-
tions and memories and reducing physiological stress. These
processes of dissociation involve psychological defense
mechanisms that allow the emotional self to continue to
function in the face of trauma that has devastated the
personal self. Sar and Ozturk (2007) propose that dissocia-
tion involves a detachment of the psychological self from
the sociological self. This sociological self, which functions
in the interface between the individual and society, allows
for a reestablishment of connections between the inner and
outer world (Winkelman, 2010)] that functions to relieve the
effects of extreme interpersonal emotional stress. Stressful
parental relationships can disrupt the integration of individ-
ual consciousness and result in the formation of a separate
personality with a dissociated dynamics that results from
selective suppression of memories. Dissociation provides an
emotional distance from the trauma that permits an inhibi-
tion of the normal flight-or-fight response, enabling the child
to seek adaptive solutions in the relationship rather than
facing the risks associated with flight (Sar & Ozturk, 2007).
In the context of possession spirits, this dissociation releases
mechanisms for identification with the idealized social
norms that the possessing spirits present (rather than the
pathological models which the parents present). In the
phenomena of possession, the social roles provide mechan-
isms for personal control, exemplified in these higher order
personalities represented in the possessing spirits who redi-
rect the person’s identity and behavior to facilitate personal
and social adaptations to troubling social circumstances.
Alien self phenomena
The sense of engaging with an autonomous alien entity
while in a psychedelic state has parallels with a psychiatric
phenomena of alien control, where the person experiences
certain contents in consciousness but they do not have a
feeling that they belong to their self (Gerrans, 2015;Klein,
2015). Alien control involves experiences of one’s beha-
viors for which one has no sense of ownership and the
similar delusion of thought insertion in which people expe-
rience the presence of thoughts that they do not feel are their
own (Gerrans, 2015). The delusions of alien control involve
an experience of one’s body performing an action without
having a sense of ownership or agency for the behavior, but
rather as is if the actions performed are being controlled by
someone else.
Klein (2015) shows that there are a variety of recognized
clinical states in which there is a lack of ownership of one’s
own mental states, that they are not experienced as belong-
ing to one’s self. The sense that one is not the owner of one’s
mental states is found associated with clinical diagnoses of
schizophrenic thought insertion and somatoparaphrenia,
where the person has objects in awareness, but without a
feeling that they are part of one’s personal consciousness.
Instead, they are viewed as be alien to the self. “The feeling
that this content is ‘mine’is no longer present. That is,
despite maintaining a clear sense of hosting a mental state
(i.e., perspectival ownership), that state is not experienced
as belonging to oneself ”(Klein, 2015, p. 363).
These experiences can result from mental processes
derived from dedicated neural networks involving sub-
experiential processes that may or may not be psychologi-
cally acted upon and brought into consciousness and given
feelings of personal ownership. “Personal ownership is not
an intrinsic property of the intentional object; rather,
ownership requires that consciousness relate to its object
in a particular, self-referential way”(Klein, 2015, p. 362).
Gerrans (2015) proposes a predictive coding model
related to motor control as an explanation of reported
Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018) |15
Ontology of psychedelic entities

delusions of alien control involving a loss of a sense of
personal agency for the intentional actions performed by
one’s body. “The account of the sense of agency for
imaginary action proposed here involves the following
elements. The relevant intention is translated into a motor
instruction that activates all the covert components of the
action control system. However, because actual overt move-
ment is inhibited, there is no translation of these instructions
into movement, and the action remains covert, not overt. An
important feature of the covert system is the prediction of
feedback produced by attenuation of activity in the rIPL
[right inferior parietal lobe]. However, because there is no
proprioceptive reafference to modulate activity in the rIPL,
its level of activation increases, signaling an error. Atten-
tion is captured and higher level cognitive resources are
recruited, which is experienced as the sense of agency for
imaginary action”(Gerrans, 2015, p. 296).
The normal sense of agency for our actions is a conse-
quence of a proprioceptive feedback loop involving visually
guided control. Gerrans notes evidence that the prefrontal
brains’resolution of prediction error (involving frontal–
parietal circuitry) gives one the experience of being in
control of an action. One’s sense of agency for one’s action
involves processes of higher level control involved in the
multisensory integration required for movement. While the
actions are imagined and covert, a sense of agency emerges
because of a lack of modulatory feedback activity in the
rIPL. A sense of agency for these imagined actions is a
consequence of the lack of reafference, which is absent
because actual motor output does not occur.
The mechanism for prediction involves motor cortex
signals that inhibit or attenuate the rIPL areas. Damage to
the rIPL or its temporary dysfunction impairs a person’s
sense of agency for thought and actions they experience.
Notably, the IPL is part of the default mode network
(DMN) that is deactivated by psychedelics. Furthermore,
hyperactivity in the right inferior parietal lobule is also
associated with experiences of passive speech. Gerrans
notes that when one is unable to modulate rIPL activity, the
result is a loss of sense of agency for one’s experiences.
When excessive activity levels in predictive circuitry
cannot be modulated, the subject experiences those actions
as outside of personal control. In the experiences of
imaginary action or imaginary speech, the motor com-
mands that produce feedback predictions lack sensory
feedback, so the predictive circuitry evoked to account
for imaginary action projects an agent to account for it and
attributes it to a form of alien control.
Proto, core, and autobiographical selves
The nature of the self in possession, as well as in entity
experiences, may be revealed by Damasio’s(1999,2001)
clinical studies that identified different forms of the self that
manifest under certain conditions of compromised brain
functioning. The existence of different innate forms of the
self is revealed in several distinctive profiles of social,
psychological, and cognitive deficiencies found in psychi-
atric and neurological patients. These different forms of the
self include:
1. an unconscious proto-self that derives from the mo-
mentary maps of neural patterns that represent the
current conditions of the physical structure of an
organism;
2. a core self that depends on second-order interpreta-
tions derived from experiences of the proto-self,
combined with emotions, which is experienced as
a non-verbal account, a “wordless narrative”based
on images that provide a causal explanation of the
organism–object relationship; and
3. an extended or autobiographical self that depends on
core consciousness and conventional and working
memory to provide the basis for our ordinary identity
and permanent sense of self.
Hypothesis 8: The qualities perceived for self and for the
entity are hypothesized to manifest features of the proto-self
and core self, but lacking the features of the autobiographi-
cal self. The features of psychedelic entity experiences
should reflect qualities of the forms of self identified by
Damasio, including the self experiences and self-related
perceptions and behaviors of both the percipient’s self and
the entity other encountered in the psychedelic experiences.
Research on the effects of psychedelics on the DMN shows
that they result in the disintegration of specific forms of the
self that appear to involve what Damasio calls the autobio-
graphical self. The disintegration of this self also permits the
emergence of other forms of the self.
Damasio characterizes the proto-self as lacking con-
sciousness, without perceptions, interpretations, nor knowl-
edge, but derived from non-conscious processes that
represent the organism in the organism’s own brain
[Damasio (2001) proposes that the proto-self and its
second-order maps are primarily produced by phylogeneti-
cally older structures associated with body regulation and
representation that are along the midline of the brain in the
misencephalic reticular formation (MRF), a collection of
nuclei that regulate basic life processes, including wakeful-
ness, attention, emotions, learning, and sleep]. The capaci-
ties of protoconsciousness are revealed in the continued
activities of people who suffer epileptic automatisms which
compromise attention, emotion, and adequate behaviors,
while nonetheless enabling the person to persist with wake-
fulness; moving and interacting with objects; and walking
through buildings without causing harm to self. Nonetheless
there is no self awareness, no emotions, no response to other
people, nor purposeful action. Damasio notes that “We are
not conscious of the proto-self ”(1999, p. 174), but that it is
a point of reference that can be modified by future plans.
Damasio characterizes the core self as a consciousness
as based in the organism’s representations of the proto-self
and derived from an account produced in response to
modifications in the proto-self’s auto-representations.
Damasio (1999, pp. 169–170) proposes that core self and
consciousness as deriving from the enhanced non-verbal
image of an object and the description that results when an
organism produces a representation of how it’sownstate
of affairs has been affected by information processed
regarding an object. These experiences are a non-verbal
account, i.e., a “wordless narrative”based on images that
16 |Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018)
Winkelman

provide a causal explanation of the organism–object
relationship.
DISCUSSION: MECHANISMS OF PSYCHEDELIC
PRODUCTION OF ENTITY EXPERIENCES
There is good reason to hypothesize that psychedelic entity
experiences are similar phenomena to spirit encounters
found in religious and spiritual traditions around the world,
areflection of a general human tendency to project human-
like qualities onto the universe. Like the psychological
features of spirits and other supernatural entities, psyche-
delic entities manifest natural properties of the human mind
that makes these experiences seem natural and compelling.
These are neurophenomenological relations in the sense that
the neurological activities eliciting innate response catego-
ries are responsible for the phenomenological content of
experience.
Because of these innate features of our social and psy-
chological toolkit, we are not only able to produce a cognitive
and emotional world of others, but also to relate to those
imagined entities who are not physically present. We easily
enter into discourse with imagined social others, physical and
non-physical, distant and internal, and to continue to engage
with them on an ongoing basis. This involves thinking and
experiencing a variety of interpersonal relations and commu-
nications with others, engaging in discourse with them, and
even entering into phantasy-worlds imagining ways in which
they can fulfill our needs. A central aspect of normal human
thinking and the habitual and automatic operations of our
socioemotional minds is the entertainment of thoughts about
people who are not around, remembering what they said and
imaging what they will say, making inferences about future
interactions and constructing scenarios for ourselves on the
basis of those experiences.
Boyer (2017) proposes that these inevitable human ten-
dencies to construct imagined worlds populated with hu-
man-like entities is the consequence of our great dependence
on social relations and the potential costs of mismanagement
of them. Humans have evolved an intuitive theory of mind
and an over-developed social intelligence because of the
importance of knowing what other members of our group –
as well as other groups—are thinking and intending to do.
“Compared to other species, humans can use vastly more
complex computational tools to infer from observed behav-
ior [others’] mental states, perceptions, beliefs, and
desires”(Boyer, 2017, p. 23). Imagining possible scenarios
of future interactions and possible reactions is a preparation
for timely responses when situations arise.
Scenario construction is an adaptation for excelling in
conditions of hypersociability and complex social interac-
tions, a preparation for possible occurrences. Imagination of
possible future responses is a preparation for performing
them. “Fiction serves a functional role in human cognition,
providing us with harmless, simulated situations in which to
hone our social skills. Fiction functions similarly to the
evolutionary role of play”(Boyer, 2017, p. 22). We appear
to have an innate tendency to create models of future
scenarios into which we project ourselves, and much of it
may be more of a wish for phantasy than a likely scenario. A
variety of products of the human imagination such as day-
dreaming, active imagination, fantasies, and dreams and our
capacity to produce fiction all reflect common underlying
innate capacities of the human mind. This scenario con-
structing processes, combined with our intrapersonal and
interpersonal intelligences, provides the basis for content of
psychedelic entity experiences and spiritual beliefs and
experiences.
The phantasy mode of consciousness
Our capacity to experience interactions with human-like
entities –spirit or psychedelic –must be placed in the
context of our broader capacity for engaging in phantasy.
Horváth, Szummer, and Szabo (2017) propose that psyche-
delic visionary phenomena reflect the activation of a modu-
lar-like representational system for phantasy that blends
various cognitive processes. Lohmar (2016, p. 20; also see
Lohmar, 2010) proposes that this phantasy system involves
a form of expressive thinking that predates language, func-
tioning as a non-linguistic method for solving important
tasks. This form of thought involves the use of image
schemas which represent basic structures of sensorimotor
experience. This expressive system is nonetheless symbolic.
It has a significant role in providing a medium for three
forms of support that are necessary for thinking. Lohmar
(2016, paraphrase) notes that visionary phantasy provides
the ability to retain in mind an object; engender other
cognitions regarding this image object; and manipulate these
to consider future possibilities. Lohmar argues that this form
of thinking evolved to facilitate decision-making in situa-
tions with very mixed motives. The phantasy mode of
consciousness involves a range of conscious acts and men-
tations that blend into the processes of perceiving, antici-
pating events, and planning for the future, as well as
engaging memories and fantasies. Visionary phantasy is
intimately related to a personal representational capacity that
directly reveals to the person an imaginative and familiar
presentation of affective layers of consciousness.
Horváth et al. (2017) suggest that this phantasy capacity
functions constantly in our day-to-day activities, providing
a synthesis of perception, affect, and thinking. In the case
of alterations of consciousness, it often extremely produces
exotic forms of experience with their own story-line narra-
tives and revelations. When released by psychedelics, this
latent human cognitive visionary capacity takes control of
consciousness, providing an internal engagement with a level
of the mind that presents a narrative regarding some signifi-
cant aspects of the affective dynamics of the person.
Phantasy-consciousness emerges from reworking these
experiences into more exotic forms of consciousness
through embellishment with story-line narratives that con-
tain personally significant revelations. This visionary phan-
tasy is intimately related to innate representational capacities
that directly reveal to subject an imaginative presentation of
material from their own personal unconscious. The psyche-
delic visionary state typifies phantasy experiences, a poly-
semic manifestation involving intense affective responses,
visual experiences and imagination, as well as significant
Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018) |17
Ontology of psychedelic entities

intellectual realizations and personal awareness (also see
Winkelman, 2010 on presentational symbolism).
Neurophenomenological mechanisms underlying
psychedelic experiences
To date, we have no compelling reasons to consider psy-
chedelic entity experiences as basically any different than
guardian spirits, hauntings, elf visitations, or any number of
other experiences of spirits. Furthermore, we have good
reason to explain the worldwide distribution of beliefs in
supernatural entities to the operation of innate brain func-
tions. Evidence that psychedelic entity experiences reflect
manifestations of such innate modular brain functions as the
mimetic operator is also supported by evidence derived from
the psychedelic effects on brain functions that provide
plausible mechanisms for psychedelic visionary experiences
(Winkelman, 2017).
But why should psychedelics so powerfully elicit these
kinds of experiences of the alien other, whether in the
shamanic or modern context? The answer must be sought
in the approaches of neurophenomenology that examine the
relationship between brain operation and experience. Neu-
rophenomenology examines how the structure and content
of phenomenal experience can be related to functions at the
neurological level (Laughlin et al., 1992).
As an example, an apparent neurophenomenological
effect of psychedelics involves what Kent (2010) referred
to as frame stacking, a repetition of edges that is reflected in
the appearance of objects. These phenomena of repeated
edges are a consequence of the breakdown of screening and
information integration processes normally imposed by the
serotonergic system in its regulation of lower brain struc-
tures. The resistance of psychedelics to the usual serotonin
reuptake mechanisms causes a repeated firing of a neuron,
rather than allowing its deactivation through reuptake
mechanisms; this repeated firing is presumably responsible
for this visual phenomena manifested in psychedelic experi-
ences and art around the world.
In the case of psychedelic entity experiences, neurophe-
nomenology is concerned with how psychedelic effects on
brain processes produce the effects of experiencing spirits.
Why should psychedelics stimulate the release of these
innate modular operations of the brain?
Deregulation of frontal brain structures
Common features of spirit entity experiences must be
assessed in relationship to known cognitive effects resulting
from the alteration of consciousness on the brain’s percep-
tual mechanisms and representational capacities. There are
similarities in the effects of diverse conditions that alter
consciousness (i.e., endurance running, hypnosis and medi-
tation, as well as drug-induced states and dreaming) that
involve a temporary deregulation of the prefrontal cortex
(PFC; Dietrich, 2003). Common effects of this disruption
are manifested in the loss of the roles of the frontal lobes and
PFC involving higher cognitive functions. This disruption
of the PFC results in the loss of various capacities –capacity
for willful action, deliberate direction of attention, and
aspects of self-awareness, as well as the capacities for
abstract thought, creativity, and planning. When these
higher level brain functions of the cortical regions and the
PFC are downregulated, this allows for the manifestation of
lower brain structures usually repressed by the PFC. This
means the emergence of information and aspects of identity
that are related to our more ancient brain regions.
A basic neurophenomenological dynamic of psychedelic
experiences are revealed in studies (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2012,2014,2016) on their effects on a brain region known
as DMN, a key region for the integration of information
about self and others. There were strong correlation of
scores on experiences of “ego-dissolution”with decreases
in connectivity between specific areas of the DMN (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2016;Lebedev et al., 2015), suggesting that a
number of features of psychedelic entity experiences can be
explained by virtue of such neurological effects. Destabili-
zation of the DMN and ego dissolution likely explains many
of the alien other effects produced by psychedelics, allowing
unconscious aspects of the self to be experienced as an alien.
Psychedelic disruption of the DMN permits the operation
of a more fluid and dynamic brain lacking its usual top-
down principles of control. Psychedelics such as LSD,
psilocybin, and ayahuasca cause decreases in DMN brain
activity (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012,2014,2016;Palhano-
Fontes et al., 2015) and the disintegration of normal DMN
functions. This is the consequence of a reduction in the
connectivity of the frontal cortex with lower brain areas
(Alonso, Romero, Ma˜nanas, & Riba, 2015) and the reduc-
tion in oscillatory activity and power in posterior and frontal
association cortices (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013). This
involves a decrease in the functional coupling of the frontal
cortex with the medial temporal lobe, as well as of the
medial PFC with the posterior cingulate cortex. Consequent-
ly, the lower brain dynamics involving ascending circuitry
are released, providing a strong input to the frontal cortex
from the ancient brain systems. This dynamic is hypothe-
sized as the mechanism that releases the innate modules and
promotes their manifestations in consciousness (also see
Winkelman, 2017).
Bottom-up information dynamics
A principal effect of psychedelics involves production of
hypersynchronous ascending slow-wave brain discharges in
the hippocampal-septal-reticular-raphe circuit that impose
impulses from the ancient lower stratum of the brain on the
frontal areas (Mandell, 1980). This pattern of psychedelic
action on the brain is shared by many other agents and
conditions that alter consciousness (Winkelman, 2011).
Alterations of consciousness produced by behavioral and
physiological conditions, as well as pharmacological agents,
cause a reduction in the serotonin inhibition to the hippo-
campal cells, which results in an increase in slow-wave EEG
activity in the hippocampal–septal region.
Research on the mechanisms of action of psychedelics
on the major cortical loops (Vollenweider & Geyer, 2001)
illustrates these effects. Psychedelic effects on the cortico-
striato-thalamo-cortical (CSTC) feedback loops and their
regulatory effects on the gating systems of lower levels
of the brain alter consciousness. This psychedelic interrup-
tion of the CSTC loops and their inhibitory functions release
18 |Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018)
Winkelman

the lower brain structures’sensory gating and enhance the
flow of information to the frontal areas of the brain. Psy-
chedelic interruption of thalamic screening results in a flood
of information from these ancient levels of the brain.
Alonso et al. (2015) confirmed this psychedelic enhance-
ment of a bottom-up information dynamics by psychedelics
with ayahuasca. They assessed ayahuasca-induced changes
in directionality of information flow in the brain, with
changes in the connectivity of brain oscillations. These
changes involved a disruption of the normal coupling
between anterior and posterior areas of the brain that
resulted from reduction in the influence of frontal brain
areas over the posterior areas. This reduction was accom-
panied by increases in the influence of posterior brain
regions on the frontal anterior areas. “These results suggest
that psychedelics induce a temporary disruption of neural
hierarchies by reducing top-down control and increasing
bottom-up information transfer in the human brain”
(Alonso et al., 2015, p. 1).
The release of these lower brain areas is the likely cause
of the enhanced operation of the innate modular operators of
the brain. These operators reflect unconscious cognitive
processes that were acquired deep in evolution, with some
apparently widely shared by other primates and mammals.
These ancient roots of these operators suggest that they are
associated with the function of our ancient brain structures.
Winkelman (2010) has detailed how many features of
shamanic alterations of consciousness can be explained
with reference to the operation of these ancient brain
structures, particularly the paleomammalian brain.
The paleomammalian brain in psychedelic experience
The operations of the paleomammalian brain are also di-
rectly relevant to explaining what Gallimore and Luke
(2016) note as a powerful shock of the DMT experience
caused by an unshakeable feeling of authenticity that makes
it impossible for the individual to deny the reality of the
experience, nor dismiss it as an hallucination, in spite of its
bizarre nature. For many, there is an absolute certainty
regarding the reality of the DMT experience that clashes
so powerfully with people’s most basic assumptions regard-
ing reality that it produces a state of “ontological shock”
(Mack, 1999) regarding the ultimate nature of reality.
Perhaps a totally different reality is what we would expect
if most of our ordinary innate operators are disabled, linked
in unaccustomed ways, or are not integrated with the self
because of the destabilization of the DMN.
One mammalian operator with specific relevance to the
explanation of ontological shock of psychedelic entity
experiences is the “existential (or ontological) operator
[which] assigns a sense of existence or non-existence to
the sensory information processed by the brain ::: [T]his
operator gives a sense of reality to beliefs, regardless of
whether they are non-contradictory or contradictory, or
counterintuitive, according to neocortical operators ::: In
humans, the existential operator, which is cognitive but not
necessarily rational, is linked to limbic emotional opera-
tors”(Ernandes, p. 33). This operator is fundamental to the
strong feelings that the experiences reflect fundamental
truths about the universe and the associated conviction
regarding their reality that frequently accompanies psyche-
delic experiences. The firm convictions produced by psy-
chedelics not only regarding the reality of the psychedelic
entities, but of other revelations as well, implicate the
operation of these paleomammalian brain circuits. As
MacLean noted (1973, p. 123), “It seems that the ancient
limbic system provides the ingredients for the strong affec-
tive feeling or conviction that we attach to our beliefs,
regardless of whether they are true or false!”
We can further attribute the ontological certainty of the
psychedelic entity experiences to the consequences of the
extensive stimulation by psychedelics of our basic innate
programs for organizing experience of reality. In essence,
psychedelic effects in eliciting the innate modules and
operators reflect an overstimulation of these systems, a
supercharged activation of our categories for representing
reality. This neurological effect is likely a consequence of
the resistance of the 5-HT2 psychedelics to normal 5-HT2
reuptake, leaving the psychedelic molecule embedded in the
receptor site where it stimulates the receptor to the point of
habituation and deactivation. There are also extensive
effects of DMT on the receptor systems in stimulating
innate cognitive organs.
Psychedelic effects on receptors and mental organs
explain ontological certainty regarding DMT entities
The reason that psychedelics in general, and DMT in
particular, produce an “ontological shock,”a certainty of
a more compelling experience of reality than ordinary
reality, is revealed by Ray’s(2010)findings. Ray challenges
the predominant theory of psychedelic action being mediat-
ed primarily by action at the serotonin-2 receptors (espe-
cially 5-HT2A). Ray’s(2010) study of the interaction of 25
psychedelics at 51 receptors, transporters, and ion channels
found an affinity of the psychedelic drugs for 18 different
sites. The historical model of psychedelic drug action
primarily through effects on serotonin receptors contrasts
with the dramatic differences in subjective reports from
different chemical classes of substances (see Shulgin &
Shulgin, 1991,1997). Ray (2010,2012,2016) shows that
diverse psychedelic drug profiles reflect their interaction
with dozens of different receptors, with different subjective
effects associated with each psychedelic substance being the
result of the diversity of interactions of various psychedelics
with different receptor systems.
Ray (2012) proposes that this diverse phenomenology
of psychedelic experience reflects their elicitation of the
operation of different mental organs and the capacities
that are the result of the expression of specific genes that
underlie the evolution of specific aspects of the mind.
Mental organs involve a population of neurons that have
common properties and provide a specific mental function
through the expression of a specific modulatory receptor
(e.g., 5-HT1, 5-HT2, 5-HT7, alpha-1, alpha-2, beta, dopa-
mine, histamine-1, imidazoline-1, kappa, mu, sigma, and
cannabinoid-1). The mental organs are defined in terms of
the neurotransmitter receptor that they express, thereby
reflecting the structure of the brain and manifesting the
structure and content of the mind’s functions. Ray considers
the concept of mental organs to be synonymous with
Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018) |19
Ontology of psychedelic entities

receptor in many instances, with receptor representing molec-
ular dynamics and mental organ reflecting the mental level.
Ray characterizes these mental organs as ordinarily un-
conscious, but through receptor stimulation enter into con-
sciousness to provide a system for describing the contents of
the mind, serving to represent internal, external, and social
aspects of reality, as well as functions of language, logic, and
reason, among others. The diverse mental organs revealed in
the typical and distinct effects of various psychedelics have
the functions of providing different forms of consciousness
(i.e., adult vs. childhood); different time scales (long term vs.
short term): salience to specific kinds of contents of con-
sciousness; ontological categories; aspects of religious
(through soul, compassion, and forgiveness); and specific
mental functions (i.e., logic and language). Ray notes the
frequency with which mental organs have an affective quali-
ty, giving consciousness a sense of feeling through which
humans experience consciousness. Their effects on con-
sciousness are not normally individual, but rather combined
together to give a global perception of reality.
Ray proposes that the actions of psychedelic drugs on
consciousness involve two major dimensions, breadth and
depth, involving respectively: the number of different men-
tal organs that are activated by a substance (breadth) and the
intensity of consciousness (depth). Ray considers 5-HT2
and 5-HT7 to play intimately intertwined roles in that 5-HT2
shapes the breadth of consciousness by providing the con-
tent through integrating various mental organs, and 5-HT7
mediates the depth of consciousness. Breadth increases as a
function of the number of mental organs that provide input
to consciousness, expanding the contents of consciousness,
with increases in the number of mental organs in conscious-
ness producing a more complex and multifaceted represen-
tation of reality. Increasing depth is a function of increasing
activation of 5-HT7 that provides “resolution, subtlety,
nuance, complexity, tangibility, vividness, and capacity; to
render thought, feelings, and sensory input”(Ray, n.d.,p.2).
The increase in depth is responsible for the ability of psyche-
delic drugs to have dramatic effects such as visual experiences
and ego-loss and at extremely high levels, producing a
discontinuity in the contents of consciousness and a loss of
contact with ordinary reality during which the organs of
consciousness become more salient than external reality.
Of the psychedelic drugs that Ray assayed, DMT had the
greatest depth of effect (relative affinity) and the greatest
breadth of action (see Ray, 2010, Table 1, p. 19) with the
receptorome, the total set of receptor proteins or the genes
that encodes for traditional receptors, receptor molecules, as
well as ion channels and transporters.
This combination of greatest breadth of mental organs
(receptors) and greatest depth of consciousness attests to the
special relations of DMT to the human neurotransmitter
system that enables DMT to produce experiences of reality
that are more profound and multifaceted than our ordinary
experiences of reality. The DMT-mediated expansion of
depth of consciousness through effects on 5-HT7 is what
stimulates the creative genius and imagination beyond the
experiences of actual reality. The experience of intense and
complicated visionary experiences is a consequence of the
great breadth of interaction that DMT has with the receptor-
ome and consequently, the stimulation of a fuller range of
mental organs. In addition, DMT is considered to be one of
the most visual of all psychedelics, a property that enables it
to produce a compelling experience of an alternate reality
that is able to challenge one’s ordinary concepts of reality.
Ray also found that DMT was psychedelic with the
highest relative affinity for any dopamine receptor, with
the highest relative affinity for D1. Ray characterizes
dopamine as an atypical mental organ in that rather than
representing some cognitive capacity or aspect of reality,
dopamine gives salience to conscious experience, marking
both cognitive and affective content with significance for
our biographical memory, imprinting ideas, memories, and
social ideologies at deep levels. Dopamine has the ability to
produce feelings of awe, combined with an uncritical sense of
certainty to experiences, especially those involving religious
and spiritual sentiment. The activation of dopamine by psy-
chedelic drugs in general, and especially the very strong action
at dopamine receptors by DMT, induces the capacity to allow
new social constructs to take precedence over past learning
and produce extreme changes in beliefs and behaviors.
In assessing the affinity of DMT across 17 types of
receptor sites (5-HT7, 5-HT1D, 5-HT2B, alpha2B, alpha2C,
dopamine1, 5-HT2C, 5-HT1E, 5-HT6, 5-HT5A, imidazo-
line1, alpha1B, alpha2A, alpha1A, 5-HT2A, SERT, and
sigma1) and in contrast with 28 other psychoactive drugs
(mostly psychedelics), Ray (2010) found that affinity profile
of DMT had a number of distinguishing properties in addition
to its exceptionally high affinity for all dopamine receptors.
The relative affinity (normalized) of DMT at 5-HT7 was the
highest affinity of any of the 29 drugs assayed; DMT also had
the highest relative affinity at 5-HT1D, 5-HT1E, D1,
alpha1A, alpha1B, and alpha2B receptor sites. DMT also
had the second greatest relative affinity at 5-HT2C, the third
greatest relative affinity at 5-HT5A and alpha2C, and the
fourth greatest relative affinity at 5-HT6 and sigma1. Ray
concludes that DMT is the neurotransmitter with the greatest
breadth of interaction across all receptor sites, the second
greatest breadth of interaction across 10 serotonin receptors, 7
adrenergic receptors, and the 3 alpha2 receptors assayed. This
exceptionally high relative affinity of DMT for many receptor
sites contrasts with the relatively little affinity of serotonin,
dopamine, and norepinephrine for each other’s receptors.
“This is a long list of exceptional properties for any one
drug. DMT is truly distinctive”(Thomas Ray, personal
communication). The ability to stimulate so many receptor
systems at such high levels offers a plausible explanation as
to why the DMT-induced entity experiences give such a
powerful sense of ontological certainty. This ability of DMT
to construct a convincing alternate reality illustrated in the
DMT entities and their ontological certainty is a reflection of
the many receptors and mental organs that DMT stimulates
and forces into consciousness. The ability to stimulate many
different mental organs, far more than typical of ordinary
consciousness, is why DMT experiences are considered to
reveal a credible reality that is perceived as more real than
ordinary reality (which is constructed by the integration of
fewer mental organs). Furthermore, because of the large
number of non-serotonin mental organs activated by DMT,
it produces an experience that is more multifaceted than
ordinary reality with rich, realistic details that provide a
convincing experience of an alternate reality.
20 |Journal of Psychedelic Studies 2(1), pp. 5–23 (2018)
Winkelman

CONCLUSIONS
We need to assess psychedelic entity experiences with respect
to known projective properties of the human mind and its
creative spirit, and specifically with respect to the innate
modules that have been useful in explaining the prevalence of
spirit experiences and beliefs. Our innate modules give us
programs that worry about what others think of us and
imaging what they must be thinking and planning to do.
Comparisons of entity experiences with the great creative
works of fiction literature, movies, and the manifestations of
epic dreams suggest that psychedelic entities experiences do
not substantially exceed anything experienced in dreams,
novels, films, or other expressive productions, including our
famed myth-making and story-telling capabilities. Humans
believe in their religious myths as an unshakable ultimate
reality, so it should not be considered surprising or unusual
that many also have unshakable beliefs in the visionary
experiences induced by psychedelics.
If humans can do unconsciously and through automatic
and unconscious innate modules anything that a psychedelic
entity does, what is left to explain but an active imagination
externalized in a psychedelic experience? Without evidence
of psychedelic entity behavior that manifests a complexity
of interaction that exceeds the ordinary default dynamics of
human interaction, we have nothing to explain. Unless
someone can show that psychedelic entity experiences
exceed such productions of the human consciousness, or
that they can provide information under conditions of
control exemplified in parapsychological experiments, I
think that we are forced to interpret psychedelic entity
experiences as reflecting projective capacities of the human
mind.
Situating psychedelic entity experiences within a broad
range of similar entity experiences may provide evidence of
noumena behind these diverse but similar phenomenal man-
ifestations. But evidence of the existence of a noumenon does
not establish the ontological reality of the claims made about
it. The conceptual explanation of entities provided here
proposes that their properties can be explained in terms of
the overstimulation of ordinary innate cognitive processes.
But even if psychedelic entity experiences are basically
similar to other entity experiences, and furthermore reflect
the basic categories of our innate modular psychology,
psychedelics nonetheless remain as an important tool for
exploring the conditions of these experiences of entities.
Humans’innate psychology may –or may not –explain all
of these experiences, but in any case, psychedelics will
remain a key tool for the exploration of the general brain
conditions facilitating these types of experiences.
Funding sources: The author had no funding for this article.
Author’s contribution: MJW and his psychedelic entities are
responsible for all aspects of this article.
Conflict of interest: The author has no conflict of interest to
declare.
Ethics: The author’s research raised no ethical concerns,
being exclusively based on published sources.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Nicholas
Sampson for helpful suggestions in formulating this
paper and Heather Hargraves for comments on a draft of
the paper.
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