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Karadeniz Araştırmaları
XV/57 - Bahar 2018 - s.1-16
Makale gönderim tarihi: 23.11.2017
Yayına kabul tarihi: 04.02.2018
TURKEY’S BLACK SEA VISION AND ITS DYNAMICS
Duygu Çağla BAYRAM
*
Özgür TÜFEKÇİ
**
ÖZ
Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılması sonrasında Karadeniz Bölgesi’nin küre-
sel gündemde önemi artmıştır. Bölgede tarihi bağlara ve kıyıdaş dev-
letler arasında en uzun kıyı şeridine sahip olan Türkiye, 1936 Montrö
Boğazlar Sözleşmesi uyarınca Boğazlar’ın kontrolüne sahip olarak
bölgesel bir söylem geliştirmiştir. Türkiye, bölgede bölgeselleşme bi-
lincini oluşturmak ve tüm kıyıdaş devletler arasında ekonomi, politika
ve güvenlik alanlarında işbirliğini geliştirmek için aktif bir politika iz-
lemeye başlamış ve bölgede Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü
(KEİ), Karadeniz Donanma İşbirliği Görev Grubu (BLACKSEAFOR) ve
Karadeniz Uyum Harekâtı (KUH) gibi çeşitli oluşumlar başlatarak li-
der rol üstlenmiştir. Türkiye’nin bu çabalarının bölgeselleşme bilinci
oluşturmasına rağmen, Karadeniz Bölgesi’nin bölgeselleşmesi çeşitli
nedenlerden dolayı bu zamana kadar mümkün olmamıştır. Bu neden-
ler şu şekilde özetlenebilir: İlk olarak, bu girişimler bölgesel bir anla-
yıştan yoksunluğu yansıtmaktadır ve aslında Türkiye’nin de kendine
özgü bölgesel bir anlayışı yoktur. Bunun yanısıra, bölgeselleşmenin
dinamikleri çeşitli bölgesel, siyasi ve ekonomik kuruluşlara mensup-
tur ve her biri iç ve dış ilişkilerinde farklı önceliklere sahiptir. Diğer
bir ifadeyle, bölgeselleşme, kıyıdaş devletler tarafından daha çok Batı
ile işbirliği olarak görülmüştür. Ayrıca Türkiye, terör tehditleri, Orta
Doğu durumu gibi kendi güvenlik meseleleriyle ilgilenmek zorunda-
dır. Ve son olarak, Türkiye’nin tarihi rakibi ve bölgede dominant güç
olan Rusya, neredeyse tüm bölgesel girişimlerde mevcuttur. Rus-
ya’nın varlığı, Karadeniz Bölgesi’nde bölgesel işbirliğini teşvik etmek-
ten ziyade, çoğunlukla rekabete neden olmaktadır. Çalışma, bölgesel-
leşme kavramının kısa bir tanımlamasıyla başlamaktadır. Çalışmanın
ikinci kısmı, bölgede Türk girişimlerine bir arka plan sağlamak adına
Karadeniz Bölgesi’nin tarihi sınırlarını çizmektedir. Sonrasında, Tür-
kiye’nin girişimleri ve Rusya ile ikili ilişkilerini kapsayan Türkiye’nin
Karadeniz vizyonu tartışılmıştır. Çalışma, esasen, bölgeselleşme açı-
sından Karadeniz’in eksik yönlerine ve Türkiye’nin bölgesel girişimle-
rinin sınırlarına dikkat çekmekte ve ‘’Türkiye’nin Karadeniz vizyonu
*
PhD Candidate, Karadeniz Technical University, Department of International Relations, Trabzon -
Turkey, ORCID: 0000-0003-0353-1176, caglabayramm@hotmail.com
**
Assistant Professor, Karadeniz Technical University, Department of International Relations,
Trabzon, Turkey, ORCID: 0000-0002-4335-2909, ozgurtufekci@ktu.edu.tr
Duygu Çağla Bayram – Özgür Tüfekçi
2
nedir?’’ ve ‘’bu vizyonu etkileyen dinamikler nelerdir?’’ sorularına ce-
vap aramaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bölgeselleşme, Türkiye’nin Karadeniz Vizyonu,
KEİ, Karadeniz Donanma İşbirliği Görev Grubu, KUH.
ABSTRACT
Following the decline of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea Region has
increased in significance on the global agenda. Turkey, having historic
ties and the longest coastline among littoral states in the region, has
developed a regional discourse, as it has control of the Straits in the
region in accordance with the Montreux Convention of 1936. It has
started to pursue an active policy to create consciousness of regio-
nalism in the region and to enhance cooperation among all littoral
states in the fields of economy, politics, and security; and it has under-
taken a leading role ininitiating various formations in the region, such
as Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Black Sea Naval Coo-
peration Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR), and the Operation Black Sea
Harmony (OBSH). While all these Turkish efforts in relation to the re-
gion have created some consciousness of regionalism, it has not been
possible to regionalize the Black Sea Region thus far, for various rea-
sons. These reasons can be summarized as follows: First of all, Tur-
kish initiatives reflect the lack of regional conception, and in fact Tur-
key itself does not have a distinctive regional conception. On the other
hand, the drivers of regionalism belong to various regional, political,
and economic organizations, and they each have different priorities in
their internal and external affairs. In other words, regionalism is ma-
inly seen by littoral states in terms of cooperation with the West.
Furthermore, Turkey has had to deal with its other security issues,
such as terrorist threats, the Middle East context, etc. And lastly, Rus-
sia, as a historic rival of Turkey and a dominant power in the region,
exists in almost all regional initiatives. The existence of Russia mostly
leads to rivalry rather than the promotion of regional cooperation in
the Black Sea Region. This study begins with a brief definitional dis-
cussion of the concept of regionalism. The second part of the study
bounds the Black Sea Region with its history to provide the backgro-
und to Turkish regionalism in the region. Then, Turkey’s Black Sea vi-
sion is discussed, including its initiatives and bilateral relations with
Russia. The study mainly points out the shortcomings of the Black Sea
with regard to regionalism and the limitations of Turkey’s regional
initiatives, and seeks answers to the questions “what is Turkey’s Black
Sea vision?” and “which dynamics affect that vision?”
Keywords: Regionalism, Turkey’s Black Sea Vision, BSEC, BLACKSE-
AFOR, OBSH.
The Black Sea was one of the most isolated seas until the 1990s in consequ-
ence of the Straits’ sui generis regime. Since the 1990s, the region has been
affected by several alterations. The Cold War ended; the USSR collapsed and
its disintegration caused a power vacuum to occur and the “frozen-
problems” rise in the region; and the 9/11 terrorist attacks caused the inte-
rest in the region of the US and other powers (such as the European Union)
Turkey’s Black Sea Vision and Its Dynamics
3
to rise. Following these developments, the Black Sea Region started to be-
come prominent on the global agenda as one of the primary areas that have
witnessed power struggles. The region gained strategic significance as it
contains alternative routes for transportation of the Caspian, Central Asian,
and Middle Eastern hydrocarbon resources to EU countries. In addition, it
became important to the US for securing the east-west energy corridor
which links Europe to Caspian-area resources. For these reasons, the region
has witnessed a number of regional projects by the great powers since the
fall of the USSR: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Enlargement Policy of the US,
and the Near-Abroad Policy (NAP) of the Russian Federation (Aydın, 2012,
p.49).
Throughout the Cold War the superpowers provided stability in the
region; in the post-Cold War era, managing the region became more difficult
and complicated because of the fall of bipolarity in the early 1990s, which
resulted in the emergence of newly independent states around the region.
Since then and following the collapse of the USSR, the Black Sea Region ca-
me to the fore with the rise of regional conflicts on the one hand, and the
opportunities for transportation of energy resources to the West on the
other. These opportunities shaped the most popular discourse of Turkish
foreign policy in the early 1990s. From that date forward, Turkey came up
with various efforts to encourage the littoral states to cooperate. In other
words, Turkey started to play a leading part in the region with several regi-
onal initiatives.
The Black Sea is regarded by Turkey as a Turkish inland sea -entry and
exit take place via Straits controlled by Turkey- and the country provides
security in the Black Sea Region accordingly. The permanent and smooth
implementation of the Montreux Convention of 1936, or in other words the
maintenance of the status quo, is the primary dimension of the maritime
security domain in Turkey’s Black Sea discourse (Petriashvili, 2015, p.112).
In this paper, first of all, the concept of regionalism will be considered;
then, the Black Sea Region will be described along with its historical backg-
round. In the second part of the study, Turkish regionalism in the Black Sea
will be analysed through consideration of its discourse parameters; regio-
nal initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the
Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR), and the Opera-
tion Black Sea Harmony (OBSH); and last but not least its bilateral relations
with Russia.
The Rise of a New Concept in International Relations: Regionalism
Regionalism is seen as a pattern of international cooperation in internatio-
nal relations (Börzel, 2011, p.8). It is at present a popular phenomenon and
plays an important role in international relations. It organizes states that
have different policies into cooperation and integration (Gochhayat, 2014,
pp.23-24).
Duygu Çağla Bayram – Özgür Tüfekçi
4
The concept of regionalism began as a new trend in the literature of
the international relations discipline after the end of the Second World War.
Before discussing what regionalism is, the question “what is a region?” sho-
uld be answered. A “region” is generally defined as a group of countries
located in the same geographic space (Mansfield and Solingen, 2010, p.146).
The region can be created or re-created, formally or informally, by count-
ries, or more specifically by politicians. Thus, it can be seen that the notion
of the region exists as a historical rather than a geographical concept (Hett-
ne, 1999, pp.3-5).
Heywood (2011, p.482) defines regionalism as “the theory or practice
of coordinating social, economic or political activities within a geographical
region comprising a number of states.” However, there is no clear consen-
sus on the definition of regionalism. The lack of a common definition is due
to the fact that it is unclear where one region ends and the next begins
(Mansfield and Solingen, 2010, p.146). While regionalism is mainly a pro-
cess serving to promote political, economic, and/or social cooperation or
integration between states in the same region (Heywood, 2011, p.481), it is
certainly an ideology, a political project, and also a dynamic process (Goch-
hayat, 2014, pp.10-12). From this point of view, it can be stated that the
establishment of regionalism has some requirements, among which are
cooperation for mutual interest or acquisition, geographical proximity, mu-
tual interdependence, and the concept of regional consciousness and iden-
tity (i.e. common history-religion-custom, descriptions of the ‘other’, etc.)
(Gochhayat, 2014, p.12). However, these requirements change over time,
taking on different dimensions or attaining different significance. They are
not stationary.
The so-called new regionalism rose in the late 1980s and early 1990s
as a result of globalization. Therefore, it can be seen that there is an interac-
tion between regionalism and globalization. Because of that, states have
embraced regionalism as a way of managing the effects of globalization
(Heywood, 2011, p.488). Globalization, in other words, becomes a driver for
regionalism, since regionalism is a reaction of states to the challenges of
globalization by increasing economic interdependence (Börzel, 2011,
pp.16–18). In addition, there is also a mutual effect between the two levels:
regionalism, or more specifically regional organizations, affects state beha-
viour and policy on the one hand; and states form or join regional organiza-
tions to implement their own rules or policies on the other (Mansfield and
Solingen, 2010, p.159).
Even if the reality is arguable and complex, there is a popular wisdom
on regionalism in which the pre-Cold War and the post-Cold War eras are
seen as the two sides of a dividing line between old regionalism and new
regionalism (Fawcett, 2012, p.9; Söderbaum, 2003, pp.3-4; Hajizada, 2012,
pp.22-25). The new regionalism, rising since the late 1980s especially as a
response to globalization, has been expressed in the creation of regional
trade blocs, whereas old regionalism had conducted regional cooperation
Turkey’s Black Sea Vision and Its Dynamics
5
and integration over a number of political, economic, and security issues
(Heywood, 2011, p.480; Hajizada, 2012, pp.22-25).
Regionalism can be classified into three categories: (1) economic regi-
onalism, (2) security regionalism, and (3) political regionalism. In the first
type of regionalism, and also the so-called new regionalism of the early
1990s, economic interests and gains are the priority of regional integration
among states that are geographically proximate. The second type of regio-
nalism relates to the cooperation of regional states for security reasons, to
protect themselves against a common enemy, and/or to gain protection and
power over their own region or regional issues when faced withexternal
forces or enemies. In the last category, states attempt to enhance their pres-
tige and diplomatic voice, and strengthen their common values (Heywood,
2011, pp.482-483).
Fawcett (2004, pp.4-10) divided the historical development of regio-
nalism into three waves: (1) regional institutions: the first wave, 1945-
1965; (2) regionalism: the second wave, 1965-1985; and (3) regionalism:
the third wave, 1985-present (Behr and Jokela, 2011, pp.19-26).
The establishment of regional organizations started after the end of the
Second World War (Heywood, 2011, p.480). In the years that the colonial
period was ending, newly founded states benefited from regional organiza-
tions and used them as a means to have a voice in international politics.
Furthermore, regional organizations helped newly founded states to resist
the superpowers during the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization could be cited in this
context (Hasgüler and Uludağ, 2007, pp.307-317 and 329-330).
The Black Sea Region: Definition
The Black Sea is an inland or landlocked sea between Eastern Europe and
Western Asia, bordered to the south by Turkey, to the north by Moldova
and Ukraine, to the northeast by Russia, to the east by Georgia, and to the
west by Bulgaria and Romania. It is connected to the Aegean Sea and the
Mediterranean Sea by the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Darda-
nelles, and to the Sea of Azov by the Kerch Strait, and receives many great
rivers such as the Danube, the Dnieper, and the Don.
This is a geographical definition of the Black Sea Region. However, two
common definitions exist: a narrow one and a broad one. According to the
narrow definition, the region includes only the Black Sea littoral states -
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. According to the
broad definition, on the other hand, the so-called Wider Black Sea Region is
defined as the geographical region through which the Danube, Dnieper, and
Don rivers pass and where they empty into the Black Sea. It forms the cent-
re of Eurasia, which encompasses the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Anatolia,
and the Caucasus. It includes the twelve BSEC members -Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Turkey, and Ukraine (Manoli, 2011, p.1).
Duygu Çağla Bayram – Özgür Tüfekçi
6
The expression of the Black Sea Region is not only a matter of geog-
raphy but is also related to politics, economics, and security, as the notion of
the Wider Black Sea Region is clearly a political output of the systematic
power struggle focused on the region.
The Black Sea Region: Historical Background
Turkey has the longest seaboard among all the littoral states and has a
commanding jurisdictional lead over the Straits in the region by virtue of
the Montreux Convention of 1936 (Kiniklioğlu, 2006, p.55).
Historically, there was a discourse in which the inland Black Sea was
known as the “Turkish Lake,” between 1453 and 1809, because Turkey (the
Ottoman Empire) had full control over the Straits from the date of the
conquest of Constantinople in 1453 until the Ottoman Empire’s position
weakened vis-à-vis Russia and Europe in the 19
th
century. After this period,
control over the Straits was bilateral at first, later becoming multilateral
(Kiniklioğlu, 2006, p.55). The Straits regime was changed several times
during this process, and the last and extant step of these changes was the
Montreux Convention of 1936. Thanks to the Montreux Convention the
Black Sea then stayed off the global agenda and remained relatively steady
until the disintegration of the USSR.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea has been back on the glo-
bal agenda. Following the demise of the USSR, ethnic-oriented frozen conf-
licts (in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria) re-
appeared across the region and Russia started to play a dominant role again
owing to its “Near-Abroad Policy”
1
(Ozdamar, 2010, p.352-358; Tuysuzoglu,
2014, p.92). Following the 9/11 attacks, the region started to become a
focus of American and European interests. Now, the Black Sea Region has
become an energy-oriented game-board in the international arena (Kinikli-
oğlu, 2006, p.56).
Turkish Regionalism in the Black Sea: The Pillars of Turkey’s Vision
Turkey’s geographical position, as a neighbouring country to the former
USSR, has had a vital meaning for the West. The notion of Turkey as a “brid-
ge between East and West” became popular in the discourse of both Turkey
and NATO during the Cold War period. During this period, Turkey provided
security and balance against the USSR (the Eastern Bloc) in the region as it
was the only littoral state on the Black Sea among NATO members (the
Western Bloc). While Turkey, as a NATO member, managed to preserve the
Western Alliance’s interests in the region, the other countries surrounding
the Black Sea were involved in the Eastern Bloc. Thus, Turkey’s Black Sea
1
The “Near-Abroad Policy” was formed in 1993. “Near-abroad” mainly refers to the former Soviet
space. After the dissolution of the USSR, countries of the former USSR were identified as the “near-
abroad” in the new Russian policy in order to maintain its own control over these countries, as
Russia views these countries as its strategic sphere of influence.
Turkey’s Black Sea Vision and Its Dynamics
7
policy was characterized by its links with the Western Bloc in the Cold War
period (Aydın, 2012, p.52).
By the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR directly affected
the geopolitics of the region, as a power vacuum occurred there. Since that
time, Turkey, as a traditional rival to the USSR, has pursued an active policy
with a sense of leadership and has appeared as a rising regional power.
Turkey initially tried to take advantage of the power vacuum through
BSEC. In the post-Cold War period, Turkey’s policy spheres in the region
have been reflected in regional organizations such as BSEC (1992) and
BLACKSEAFOR (1998), operations such as OBSH (2004), and the implemen-
tation of policy preferences related to energy transmission lines.
The Black Sea has a different meaning for Turkey than it does for the
other littoral states. The reason for this is that the Straits controlling entry
to and exit from the Black Sea are located within the boundaries of Turkey,
and Turkey assumed international responsibility for energy security, fro-
zen-conflicts, and other security-related issues in the Black Sea Region with
the Montreux Convention (Petriashvili, 2015, p.106). Likewise, the impor-
tance of Turkey’s geopolitics in the Black Sea is directly associated with
Turkey’s sui generis right to control the Black Sea through the Straits. Ac-
cordingly, “Maintaining control over the Turkish Straits is a key aspect of
Turkey’s Black Sea policy” (Baran, 2008, p.90). The unchanging policy
toward the Straits in Turkey’s geopolitics makes it one of the most promi-
nent countries involved in Black Sea geopolitical discourse in the region.
Turkey is the pivotal state in the development of a discourse specifi-
cally for the Black Sea, and in the permanent implementation of it. Herein,
Turkish discourse toward the region took shape based on security and geo-
economic dimensions. Turkey focused on the field of military security in the
2000s, after having actively striven for regionalization in the 1990s. The
importance of a military component in Turkey’s Black Sea discourse is what
has led to policies for the Black Sea being based on security. Furthermore,
as voiced above, the existence of the Straits has also caused Turkey’s disco-
urse to become more security-oriented. When it comes to the geo-economic
dimension, Turkey’s main purpose in the region is to become a hub for
energy and transportation lines.
All in all, Turkey’s policies toward the Black Sea have aimed to create
multilateral cooperation and stability, increase trade relationships, and
maintain maritime security over the region. BLACKSEAFOR and OBSH are
evaluated as regional maritime-domain security arrangements. It is no-
teworthy that the balance of power, or in other words stability, has always
been important for Turkey. Therefore, Turkey has focused on maritime
security, shaped by the Montreux Convention, and has chosen to defend the
status quo in the region (Petriashvili, 2015, p.112).
Duygu Çağla Bayram – Özgür Tüfekçi
8
The First Stage of Turkey’s Black Sea Regionalism: BSEC
Turkey has pursued an active policy in the Black Sea Region especially since
the collapse of the USSR. BSEC is the primary example of Turkey’s active
effort in this regard.
BSEC was created in 1992 as a result of a Turkish initiative aimed at
increasing regional cooperation mainly in the economic field (Aydın, 2012,
p.53). The organization has also aimed at contributing to regional peace and
security (Aydın, 2005, p.63). In addition to the littoral states, BSEC includes
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Moldova, and Serbia as member sta-
tes; and Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Po-
land, Slovakia, Tunisia, the United States, and the Czech Republic as obser-
ver states (Aydın, 2005, p.62).
BSEC is the most effective and institutionalized organization and the
pioneer of regionalism in the region, as evidenced by its successs in estab-
lishing institutions such as the Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC (PABSEC),
a Permanent Secretariat (PERMIS), the Association of Black Sea Capitals
(BSCA), the Business Council (BSECBC), the Black Sea Trade and Develop-
ment Bank (BSTDB), and the International Centre for Black Sea Studies
(ICBSS) (Aydın, 2004, pp.22-25).
Furthermore, BSEC could be considered a soft power actor, mainly
strengthening economic cooperation. In addition, BSEC has contributed to
the emergence of regional identity; consequently, its achievements could be
seen as regionalism-oriented. In other words, BSEC paved the way for the
emergence of a consciousness of regionalism in the region.
On the other hand, BSEC could yet still be seen as a fruitless formation.
First, the works initiated by BSEC have been considered Turkey’s trump
card against the EU, rather than being seen as forming a frame for rational
economic cooperation and political security (Davutoğlu, 2007, p.161). Se-
cond, the member states of BSEC have various political and economic di-
mensions; each of them belongs to various regional, political, or economic
organizations, and each has different political priorities. They also prioritize
other organizations to pursue their own foreign policies. The lack of corre-
lation between BSEC and other powers such as NATO and the US could be
seen as another failure. In addition, there is no alternative to BSEC and the-
re are no new functional formations in the region.
All these failures are due not only to the problems in the region but al-
so, clearly, to the fact that the views of different actors vary considerably as
to the geographical extent of the Black Sea Region, and this has made it har-
der for regionalism to take shape there. The Black Sea Region is economi-
cally and politically heterogeneous, and therefore the littoral states need to
add a Black Sea dimension to their own national and foreign policies (Ma-
noli, 2011, p.6).
Turkey’s Black Sea Vision and Its Dynamics
9
The Progress of Turkish Regionalism in the Black Sea: BLACKSEAFOR
and OBSH
BLACKSEAFOR was initiated by Turkey in 1998 in order to increase coope-
ration among military forces in the Black Sea, and was formally established
in 2001. It is a naval initiative consisting of only littoral states -Bulgaria,
Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine-with the aim of fulfilling
search and rescue operations in the sea, providing humanitarian assistance,
mine clearance activities, environmental protection, and goodwill visits
(Karadeniz, 2007, p.108). The strengthening of friendship and good relati-
ons among the littoral states and improving peace and stability in the re-
gion are also among its aims (Aydın, 2005, p.69).
BLACKSEAFOR is the most important military organization in the
Black Sea and is primarily focused on improving naval cooperation among
the littoral states. Since 2004, tackling organized crime, terrorist threats,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and trafficking have been
included in the organization’s scope (Karadeniz, 2007, p.108).
OBSH was initiated by Turkey in accordance with the UN Security Co-
uncil Resolutions 1373, 1540, and 1566 in March 2004. Russia joined on
December 27, 2006, Ukraine signed its participation protocol on January
17, 2006, and Romania joined on March 31, 2009 (Aydın, 2012, p.55).
OBSH can be described as similar to NATO’s “Operation Active Endea-
vour” and is mainly aimed at increasing the ability of the littoral states to
deal with security issues, deter terrorist threats and illegal acts in the re-
gion, and provide protection for the Turkish Straits (Karadeniz, 2007,
p.110; Baran, 2008, p.89; Özarslan, 2012, pp.147-148).
Turkey’s Black Sea Regionalism and Bilateral Relations with Russia:
Current Situation and Implications for the Future
It is quite obvious that Turkish-Russian bilateral relations play a pivotal and
determinative role in the Black Sea Region, and more specifically in Tur-
key’s attempts to promote regionalism there. Russia is the most influential
power in the region, and the Black Sea is a top priority for Russia on the
grounds that it is the gateway to the warm seas and a buffer zone between
Russia and the West. The Black Sea Region also plays a vital role as an
(East-West/ Southern) energy corridor, through which oil and natural gas
pipelines pass.
Turkey and Russia are the status quo powers of the region. Both count-
ries are interested in preserving the current legal regime of the Straits (the
Montreux Convention, as one of the pillars of Turkey’s sovereignty) and
ensuring maritime security. Moving on from this point, the Black Sea is seen
by both Turkey and Russia as their own zone of influence. Related to the
enlargement of the West, the Black Sea is a Turkish-Russian lake for both
countries. The Western powers are welcome to engage in the region only
through the partnership and mediation of the bilateral hegemony there
(Minchev, 2006, p.16). Turkey and Russia both want to retain their positi-
Duygu Çağla Bayram – Özgür Tüfekçi
10
ons as the major powers, and so they oppose any foreign presence in the
region (Minchev, 2006, p.10). With the membership of Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, once the backyards of the USSR, in NATO (2004) and the EU (2007),
these countries have positioned themselves under the umbrella of the West,
and therefore the presence of the West in the region is now an unavoidable
fact; and that means the USA too has reinforced its power in the region. The
interest shown in the Black Sea by the USA, NATO, and the EU bothers Rus-
sia more particularly. To reduce the Western impact in the region, Russia
strives to block the membership of Georgia and Ukraine in the Western
Alliance (Minchev, 2006, p.10; See. Polat, 2017; İrge, 2017; Çelikpala, 2010;
Yılmaz, 2007; Tufekci, 2016, 2017). And when required, Russia does not
hesitate to use hard power, as it already has a hard power-oriented foreign
policy (Balcer, 2009, p.81). The war with Georgia which began on August 8,
2008 (the Five-Day War
2
), was clear proof of that.
Georgia could be seen as having a sufficient number of the prerequisi-
tes for membership (Minchev, 2006, p.21). And Ukraine, for its size, loca-
tion, and economic and societal potential, is in a strategic position in the
region because the West considers it a counterbalance against Russia
(Minchev, 2006, p.19). Crimea (and in particular the port of Sevastopol),
which was under the dominion of Ukraine in the post-Soviet era, is one of
the two key strategic points for control over the region (the other being the
Turkish Straits). Related to the expansion of the West, the Colour Revoluti-
ons in the Black Sea region (the Rose Revolution of Georgia in 2003 and the
Orange Revolution of Ukraine in 2004), in the name of the democratization
process led by the USA, brought anti-Russian leaderships to power. It can
be said that the main reason for the Russian-Georgian War was that the
Georgian administration, driven by Russia, had changed in favour of Wes-
tern-oriented policy since the Rose Revolution in the country. Russia res-
ponded to Georgia’s and Ukraine’s implicit efforts to establish close ties
with the West by the recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s inde-
pendence from Georgia (both in 2008), and the annexation of Crimea (in
2014), officially part of Ukraine. Despite the West’s sanctions and embar-
goes on Russia, in light of Russia’s reaction to the developments in the re-
gion Turkey avoided taking a firm stand against Russia and proposed multi-
lateral cooperation under the name of the Caucasus Stability and Coopera-
tion Platform (CSCP) after the Russian-Georgian War (Üstün, 2016, p.5).
During the Ukrainian crisis over the annexation of Crimea, home to Turkish
2
The “Five-Day War” refers to the Russian-Georgian War on August 8-12, 2008, an open conflict
between Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian forces, and the first full-scale conflict between
Russia and its former satellite country. The main issue that defined the legal background to this
conflict was the implementation by Russia of its Near-Abroad Policy. As Georgia tended to gravitate
toward the West, mostly as a result of the Colour Revolutions led by the West for its own eastward
enlargement, and the hot-spots of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were the regions of Georgia where
ethnic conflicts and discriminations had tended to arise, Russia used these ethnic-based problems
for its own regional enlargement. In the aftermath of the Five-Day War, on 26 August, 2008, Russia
formally recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Turkey’s Black Sea Vision and Its Dynamics
11
ethnic minority Tatars, Turkey again abstained from disturbing its bilateral
relations with Russia, while on the other hand seeking to emphasize the
importance of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political unity
(Erol, 2014, p.10; Üstün, 2016, p.7).
In the light of the above developments, the West’s attempts to spread
democracy and freedom are considered by Turkey and Russia to be expan-
sionist policies that will further damage their interests in the region by en-
couraging even more chaos (Hill and Taşpınar, 2006, p.87). Therefore, they
have developed closer ties in the region through BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, and
OBSH; they endeavour to observe the Montreux Convention; they are both
opposed to the enlargement of the West; both countries are uncomfortable
with too much involvement of external powers in the Black Sea Region; and
they, particularly Turkey, want the countries of the region to be primarily
responsible for their own security.
Indeed, Turkish-Russian relations have been influenced by pragmatic
external economic interests in recent years. Despite the existence of conflic-
ting issues, they have managed to settle their differences by focusing on
energy-oriented economic relations. Yet, although Turkey is a significant
economic partner of Russia and vice versa, it is impossible to see a balance
in the bilateral economic relations because of Turkey’s dependence on Rus-
sian natural gas. Russia is an important natural gas supplier for Turkey, and
the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline project, providing Turkey with Russian
natural gas through the bottom of the Black Sea, which was put into opera-
tion in 2005, has further increased Turkey’s dependence on Russia (Tanrı-
sever, 2012, p.15). Turkey has needed to look for ways to diversify its supp-
liers by getting involved in alternative energy projects in order to lessen its
dependence on Russia.
The two countries have different views on the transportation of Cas-
pian oil and natural gas, as Turkey sees itself as an energy transit country,
while Russia is uncomfortable with this view. Turkey characterizes itself as
an energy transit country (an energy bridge) because it stands between
major oil-producing areas in the Middle East and Caspian Sea regions on the
one hand, and consumer markets in Europe on the other; therefore, Turkey
wants to be an energy hub by transporting Caspian oil and natural gas to
Europe. In accordance with its energy-oriented aims, with the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) Crude Oil Pipeline, which was put into operation in 2006, and
the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Pipeline, in 2007, Turkey has
succeeded in reducing its dependence on Russia and Russia’s influence over
Azerbaijan’s energy resources. Despite Russian insistence on using the Ba-
ku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, the BTC pipeline represents the first indepen-
dent alternative to the Russian route for the export of oil from the region, in
which the Turkish initiative, supported by the USA, was to break the Rus-
sian monopoly over the region’s transportation. Furthermore, the construc-
tion of the Caspian Sea pipeline (the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline/TAP or the
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline/ TANAP), the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (Russian
Duygu Çağla Bayram – Özgür Tüfekçi
12
and Kazakh oil), and the Turkish Stream (Blue Stream II, carrying Russian
gas to the Middle East and southeast Europe) would even further increase
the role of Turkey as an energy transit country. On the other hand, the Ak-
kuyu Nuclear Power Plant project for generating electricity could relatively
increase Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia (Tanrısever, 2012, p.16;
Balcer, 2012, p.9).
Turkey is certainly a major power in the region and also a natural
bridge between Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Europe, but
not a leading player (Balcer, 2009, p.79-80). Although the rapprochement
can be clearly seen between Turkey and Russia with recent developments
in the Black Sea, admittedly it is a geopolitical reality that Turkey remains a
competitor to Russia and the historical characterization of their relations is
predominantly one of rivalry. Therefore, Turkey should counterbalance its
relations with Russia by including and evaluating Russian policies toward
the region in order to form regional policies, and should pursue attempts to
balance with Western policies as well. It should also consider that no regio-
nal initiatives can succeed without Russia. In other words, it should seek to
maintain good relations with both Russia and the West, and attend to the
need to balance the significance of Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Western
relations. In addition, Turkey should seek to further develop its relations
with the other Black Sea countries within the frame of regional cooperation
without creating any problems with Russia, and should develop its energy
cooperation with the Caspian and the Middle Eastern countries. Above all,
Turkey can indeed realize its aims in the region if it succeeds in resolving its
major internal security problems (Balcer, 2012, p.14).
Conclusion
Turkey started to create a Black Sea vision following the disintegration of
the USSR in the 1990s and, from that date forward, has tried to play a lea-
ding role in the region. For this reason, Turkey first initiated BSEC in order
to increase cooperation among the littoral states and enhance security, sta-
bility, and peace in the region. BLACKSEAFOR and OBSH are other initiati-
ves of Turkey that concern the security arrangements in the Black Sea mari-
time domain.
The Black Sea Region eternally means a great deal to Turkey. The fact
that the region is so vitally important for Turkey, and vice versa, can be
explained by three juxtaposed pivotal factors, as follows: First and fore-
most, it is a matter of location. To clarify, Turkey has the longest shoreline
among all the littoral countries; the Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles,
known as the Turkish Straits) controlling entry to and exit from the Black
Sea are located within the boundaries of Turkey, and Turkey has sui generis
jurisdiction over them in accordance with the Montreux Convention of
1936. Furthermore, Turkey has a bridge-position between the East and the
West, and a crossroads position between Europe and Asia, and even Africa.
Accordingly, Turkey is geographically located on the transition path of
Turkey’s Black Sea Vision and Its Dynamics
13
75 percent of the known energy resources in the world. That is, Turkey is
located at the crossroads of the regions with about three-quarters of the
world’s oil and natural gas reserves. Second, Turkey has a dominant histori-
cal and geopolitical background across the region. To clarify, Turkey has
ethnic-ties with the Turkic States as the regions surrounding the Black Sea
in general and with Azerbaijan in particular. Last but not least, Turkey is a
secondary power after Russia in the region. To clarify, there are six littoral
states in the region, each of which represents some degree of power. They
are Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey. It is possible to
say that, excluding Russia, of the other five Turkey has the relative size,
economic power, and political influence to shape the region.
In light of the facts mentioned above, it is worthy of note that Turkey
always has to determine its Black Sea vision with an eye to the aforementi-
oned reasonable grounds. At this juncture, Turkey’s Black Sea vision could
be briefly summarized as development-, cooperation-, stability-, and peace-
oriented initiatives. Moving on from this, Turkey gives itself the leading role
across the region. In demonstrating this, the most prominent factor is Tur-
key’s endeavours to set up energy-oriented projects in order to provide the
transition flow from the East to the West, and to reduce its dependence on
Russia and Russian regional monopoly.
It would not be wrong to claim that the states in the region are not as
much interested in this topic as Turkey, whereas Turkey tries to pursue an
active policy by taking a leading role. In a manner, BSEC became effective
for regional discourses that strengthen Turkey’s Black Sea vision and cont-
ributed to creating a regional consciousness in the Black Sea Region.
However, regionalism is mainly seen by the newer states as cooperation
with the West. Even as regionalism took hold as a discourse, in practice it
could not take form at the desired level throughout the 1990s.
In sum, regionalism throughout the Black Sea Region has been an inef-
fective concept up to now because it has not yet been possible to activate
the drivers of regionalism in the region. The Russian Federation, as the suc-
cessor to the USSR, is still a dominant power in the region. Therefore, it can
be stated that Turkey’s regionalism discourses, policies, and even initiatives
in the Black Sea Region have not been able to show success yet, and the
Black Sea Region can be considered a non-regionalized region, with only
Turkey (playing a leading role but a secondary power in the region vis-à-vis
Russia) and Russia having the main control or influence over the region.
Duygu Çağla Bayram – Özgür Tüfekçi
14
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