The Polish Ordinary Courts in Dialogue on International Law

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VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts
inDialogue on International
Law
Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak*
1. Introductory Remarks
Polish ordinary courts1 adjudicate inareas ofcriminal law andcivil law, includ-
ing labour andsocial security law. Theright to afair trial requires that thecase
isverified by at least two court instances2 andthis rule ispreserved both by civ-
il andcriminal procedure.3 Instrictly defined matters acase can be resolved by
thePolish Supreme Court, which acts as acourt ofcassation. Itmust be noted that
Polish law does not classify theSupreme Court as apart ofthe ordinary courts sys-
tem.4 However, due to thevalue ofits judgments for theordinary courts we shall
consider it as such.
Polish courts issue judgments on thebasis ofPolish law, which encompasses
also public international law. Pursuant to Art.9 ofthe Polish Constitution, theRe-
public ofPoland shall respect international law binding upon it. Ratified interna-
tional agreements areone ofthe sources ofauniversally binding law ofthe Repub-
lic ofPoland (Art.87(1) ofthe Constitution). They constitute part ofthedomestic
* Dr iur., Assistant Professor, Department ofEuropean Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law
andAdministration, University ofLodz, Poland.
1 In Poland there areat present 321 district courts, 45 provincial courts and 11 appellate
courts, Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej, ‘Lista sądów powszechnych’, <https://bip.ms.gov.pl/
pl/rejestry-i-ewidencje/lista-sadow-powszechnych/> (access: 21 November 2015).
2 Arts. 45(1) and175(1) ofthe Polish Constitution.
3 Art.367(1) ofthe Code ofCivil Procedure andArt.425(1) ofthe Code ofCriminal Procedure.
4 Art.175(1) of the Polish Constitution, Art. 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, Arts. 24–27
ofthe Code ofCriminal Procedure.
http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-707-7.07

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
334
legal order andshall be applied directly after their promulgation inthe Journal
ofLaws ofthe Republic ofPoland (Dziennik Ustaw), unless their application de-
pends on theenactment ofastatute (Art.91(1) ofthe Constitution). An interna-
tional agreement ratified upon prior consent granted by astatute shall have prece-
dence over statutes if such an agreement cannot be reconciled with theprovisions
ofthese statutes (Art.91(2) ofthe Constitution). Since theentry into force ofthe
Polish Constitution international law, at least intheory, isquite broadly applied by
Polish courts. Theaim ofthis paper isto show whether when this happens courts
use theexpertise ofinternational andforeign courts or even enter into theconver-
sation with thejudges from other jurisdictions.
Awide understanding ofthe notion ofjudicial dialogue has been adopted for
thepurposes ofthis study. Thenotion will denote here any referral made by Polish
ordinary courts to decisions ofother jurisdictions. Inorder to answer theposed
research question, thefollowing screening method was applied. Courts’ rulings
arein Poland published inInternet databases. These databases were searched with
theuse ofselected keywords, for example: ‘international’, ‘custom’, ‘convention’, ‘tri-
bunal’, to find therelevant case law. They were then analysed with theview ofiden-
tifying instances ofdialogue andclassified accordingly.
Having collected theresearch material, it was noticeable that thedecisions
from other jurisdictions that arethe most frequently mentioned by Polish courts
arethese ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights (ECtHR) andthe Court ofJus-
tice ofthe European Union (CJEU). Both theEuropean Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) andEU law form apart ofthe Polish law andthey areoften di-
rectly applicable by thecourts. Thejudgments ofthese two jurisdictions arewide-
spread, many ofthem areavailable inPolish andare broadly commented by Polish
scholars. Due to agreat quantity ofthe judgments referring to thedecisions ofthe
ECtHR andthe CJEU, thescope ofthe research was limited only to those deliv-
ered inyears 2010–2015. Thereferrals to thedecisions ofthe other international
bodies, e.g. the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) or theInter-
national Court ofJustice (ICJ) or courts ofother States were occasional. There-
fore, they were examined inamore detailed manner andno time limits applied.
Thestudy does not deal with theprocedural references to thedecisions offor-
eign courts where theapplication offoreign law ensues from theobligation based,
e.g.ontheRegulation 593/20085 or international private law.6
5 Regulation (EC) ofthe European Parliament andthe Council on thelaw applicable to contrac-
tual obligations (Rome I) (2008) O.J. L 177/6.
6 As an example ofthis type ofjudgments we may present thejudgment inCase IV CSK 309/12
(Supreme Court, 8 February 2013), inwhich theCourt referred to thejudgments ofthe German
courts on theinterpretation ofthe rules ofthe Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch on thecompensation
for traffic accidents, which theCourt had to apply on thebasis ofthe Hague Convention on
thelaw applicable to traffic accidents of4 May 1971. Thecourts, on thebasis ofArt.1143(3)
ofthe Code ofCivil Procedure, asked theMinistry ofJustice for theexplanation ofthe foreign
legal practice.

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 335
As it has been pointed out already inthis volume by M.Górski, thejudicial
dialogue may be classified vis-à-vis thecriterion ofappropriateness. Thedialogue
can be proper, fake or decorative and, eventually, failed.7 We will explore theexam-
ples from all these categories, yet themain focus will be to identify theexamples
ofproper dialogue. By doing so we would like to show theparticipation ofPol-
ish ordinary courts inthe development ofinternational law, inthe strengthening
therule oflaw or searching for common judicial standards.
2. Examples ofaProper Dialogue
The aim ofthis part of the paper is to present decisions ofPolish courts,
inwhich they enter into proper dialogue with international andforeign bod-
ies. Aproper dialogue means courts’ rulings “referring to accurately collected
case law ofother courts andanalysing it properly from methodological point
ofview.”8
The research revealed four main substantive law categories where such dia-
logue appears. Polish courts refer to thedecisions of international andforeign
courts mainly incases concerning human rights, EU law andcustomary inter-
national law. Thefourth group covers every other area oflaw inwhich thecourts
enter into dialogue on international law.
2.1. Human Rights Protection
The first area, inwhich Polish ordinary courts enter into adialogue with in-
ternational bodies, isthe field of human rights protection. Poland isa party to
numerous human rights treaties andthese rights form an essential element ofthe
Polish legal system.
Thesubstantial part ofthe dialogue ismade up ofreferences ofthe courts to
thedecisions ofthe ECtHR. This range ofcases will be addressed only very brief-
ly, as it isatopic ofamore detailed analysis made inthis volume by M. Górski.9
Itseems sufficient to indicate that ordinary courts areacquainted with thejudg-
ments of the ECtHR. Many decisions of the Court, especially those rendered
7 See thecontribution to this volume: M. Górski, Dialogue between national courts ofselected
Central andEastern European States andthe ECtHR concerning theECHR.
8 See: ibidem.
9 See: ibidem.

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
336
against Poland, aretranslated into Polish andthey arepublished on thewebsites
ofthe Ministry ofJustice10 andthe Ministry ofForeign Affairs.11
The decisions ofthe ECtHR arementioned by ordinary courts mostly inthe
following areas: the right to a fair trial,12 the obligation of a State to protect
thepersonal goods of the arrested andthe imprisoned persons whilst ensuring
appropriate conditions oftheir imprisonment,13 theuse ofthe provocation inthe
criminal procedure,14 thefreedom ofspeech,15 thecompensation for thearbitrary
arrest.16 Inall cases ECtHR judgments aregenerally invoked to support thecourts’
own reasoning.
As an example ofaproper judicial dialogue we shall discuss ajudgment de-
livered by theWroclaw District Court inX P 384/13.17 Thecase concerned disci-
plinary sanction imposed on aschool teacher (the plaintiff) who during thestaff
meeting criticised the behaviour of the school director. The plaintiff opposed
to thefact that thedirector announced theresults ofthe teachers’ evaluation by
thestudents inpublic during themeeting, but instead should have done so inpri-
vate with every teacher. Theplaintiff, inthe view ofthe director, questioned his
competences and depreciated his authority. As a result, the director punished
theplaintiff giving her acaution.18
The plaintiff argued before thecourt that the penalty violated her freedom
ofspeech, as enshrined inArt.54 ofthe Polish Constitution andin Art.10 ECHR.
To solve the case, theWroclaw District Court referred to numerous judgments
ofthe ECtHR on Art.10 ECHR, especially inrelations between employee andem-
ployer, inorder to establish astandard ofprotection ofthis right, which iscommon
for theEuropean States.
At thebeginning it was necessary to establish theattribution ofprotection
under Art.10 ECHR. The first judgment mentioned by theWroclaw District
10 Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej, ‘Orzecznictwo Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka’,
<https://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/prawa-czlowieka/europejski-trybunal-praw-czlowieka/orzec-
znictwo-europejskiego-trybunalu-praw-czlowieka/> (access: 2 October 2015).
11 Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej, ‘Nowe tłumaczenia wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału Praw
Człowieka na język polski’, <https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/europejski_
trybunal_praw_czlowieka/aktualnosci/nowe_tlumaczenia_wyrokow_europejskiego_trybu-
nalu_praw_czlowieka_na_jezyk_polski> (access: 2 October 2015).
12 Supreme Court cases: III CZP 16/10 (30 November 2010); III KK 327/12 (5 April 2013); IKZP
14/14 (26 June 2014); IPZ 19/14 (28 October 2014); case II AKz 340/10 (Wroclaw Appellate
Court, 17 June 2010).
13 Case III CZP 25/11 (Supreme Court, 18 October 2011); case IACa 758/12 (Szczecin Appellate
Court, 20 December 2012); case IACa 966/12 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 31 January 2013).
14 Supreme Court cases: III KK 152/10 (30 November 2010); II KK 265/13 (19 March 2014).
15 Case IACa 662/12 (Łódź Appellate Court, 1 October 2012); case II AKa 91/11 (Lublin Appellate
Court, 6 June 2011); case IACa 201/12 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 20 September 2012).
16 Case II KK 296/11 (Supreme Court, 13 June 2012).
17 Case X P 384/13 (Wroclaw District Court, 7 June 2013).
18 InPolish: upomnienie.

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 337
Court was a2009 Wojtas-Kaleta vPoland19 where theapplication was filed by
ajournalist of the Polish Public Television (TVP S.A.). The applicant as well
as many other journalists andartists signed an open protest letter directed to
theBoard ofTVP S.A. criticizing thereduction inthe number ofcultural pro-
grams to thefavour ofpurely commercial ones. TheECtHR found that therep-
rimand penalty20 imposed on theapplicant was inconflict with Art.10 ECHR,
especially taking into consideration thefact that the applicant’s critique was
done ingood faith andit was not directed against any specific person but only
against theemployer’s policy. In2013 decision theWroclaw District Court found
thesituation inWojtas-Kaleta vPoland analogous to theone before it. Itempha-
sized that theplaintiff was not acting mala fides against thedirector or any other
teacher, but presented ageneral opinion that theresults should be discussed with
everyone inprivate.
Further the Wroclaw District Court referred to the decision in Sosinowska
v Polan d,21 inwhich theapplicant, amedical doctor, criticized thework of her
colleague andhis improper treatment ofpatients. TheECtHR found that theab-
solute prohibition ofcritique ofone doctor directed at thework ofanother iscon-
trary toArt.10 ECHR, especially if thecritique isinduced by thecare for patients’
health. Inthe case at stake, theWroclaw District Court found that theplaintiff’s
action was only adefence ofher colleague, who was criticized inpublic and, there-
fore, atrisk ofostracism by other teachers.
Another case mentioned by the Wroclaw District Court was Fuentes Bobo
v Spain,22 concerning offensive opinions ofthe applicant against his employer
(public television). As aresult ofpronouncement ofhis opinions, theapplicant
was dismissed, which was found by theECtHR to be an excessive anddispropor-
tionate sanction. Before theincident, theapplicant had been for many years an
appreciated employee.
Having established, that thecase at stake falls under therealm ofArt.10 ECHR,
it was indispensable to analyse theprinciple ofproportionality ofintervention.
TheWroclaw District Court found that not every expression ofopinion ispro-
tected by Art.10 ECHR andit may happen that asanction imposed on an em-
ployee isproportionate. As example it pointed out theruling ofthe ECtHR inPal-
omo Sanchez andothers vSpain.23 Theapplicants published amagazine, inwhich
they used vulgar language and pictures criticizing their colleagues for giving
incourt atestimony favourable to their employer. All applicants were dismissed
from their work andthe ECtHR did not found this sanction excessive. Moreover,
theWroclaw District Court notices, that theECtHR cited theadvisory opinion
19 Wojtas-Kaleta vPoland, App. no. 20436/02 (ECtHR, 16 July 2009).
20 InPolish: nagana.
21 Sosinowska vPoland, App. no. 10247/09 (ECtHR, 18 October 2011).
22 Fuentes Bobo vSpain, App. no. 39293/98 (ECtHR, 29 February 2000).
23 Palomo Sanchez andothers vSpain, App. no. 28955/06 (ECtHR, 12 September 2011).

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
338
oftheInter-American Court ofHuman Rights (IACtHR) inOC-5/8524 declaring
that freedom ofspeech isanecessary condition ofdevelopment oftrade unions.
Itresulted thereof that thefreedom ofexpression isalso guaranteed to employees,
who thus have theright to criticize their employers, despite subordination that
exists intheir relations.
On the basis of these opinions theWroclaw District Court concluded, that
theplaintiff’s behaviour could not be regarded as exceeding thefreedom ofex-
pression. Furthermore, referring to Jersild vDenmark25 and Nilsen andJohnsen
vNorway26 theCourt emphasized that
freedom ofexpression constitutes one ofthe essential foundations ofademocratic society
andone ofthe basic conditions for its progress andfor each individual’s self-fulfillment.
Within thelimitations ofparagraph 2 ofArticle 10, it isapplicable not only to ‘information’
or ‘ideas’ that arefavorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as amatter ofindifference,
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such arethe demands ofthat pluralism, toler-
ance andbroadmindedness without which there isno ‘democratic society’. As set forth inAr-
ticle 10, this freedom issubject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly,
andthe need for any restrictions must be established convincingly.27
On that ground theWroclaw District Court found that there was no reason to
impose apenalty on the plaintiff.
The decision ofthe Wroclaw District Court should be considered as an exem-
plary proper judicial dialogue. TheCourt not only cited theopinions oftheECtHR
but also showed their relation to thesubject matter ofthe case before theDistrict
Court. TheCourt compared thefactual background ofthe cases before theECt HR
andthe outcome ofthe ECtHR’s deliberations with thefacts of the case before
the District Court and on this basis drew conclusions as to therequired level
ofprotection offreedom ofspeech andthe appropriateness ofthe sanction im-
posed on theplaintiff by her employer. An additional value ofthis judgment pre-
sents itself inan indirect dialogue ofthe Wroclaw District Court with theIACtHR,
where theECtHR played arole ofan intermediary.
24 Compulsory Membership inan Association Prescribed by Law for thePractice ofJournalism,
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights Series A No. 5 (13 No-
vember 1985): “70. Freedom ofexpression isacornerstone upon which thevery existence
ofa democratic society rests. Itis indispensable for the formation of public opinion. It is
also aconditio sine qua non for thedevelopment ofpolitical parties, trade unions, scientific
andcultural societies and, ingeneral, those who wish to influence thepublic. Itrepresents,
inshort, themeans that enable thecommunity, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently
informed. Consequently, it can be said that asociety that isnot well informed isnot asociety
that istruly free.”
25 Jersild vDenmark, App. no. 15890/89 (ECtHR, 23 September 1994).
26 Nilsen andJohnsen vNorway, App. no. 23118/93 (ECtHR, 25 November 1999).
27 Ibidem, 43.

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 339
Another international body, whose opinions on human rights had some, albeit
limited, influence on decisions ofordinary courts isthe Human Rights Commit-
tee. TheHRC’s case-law ismentioned very rarely, it seems that not many judges
arefamiliar with theCommittee’s activity.
In ICSK 439/1328 theSupreme Court examined inopinion an opinion ofthe
HRC. Thecase before theCourt concerned aSikh, Mr. S.P., who was forced by
theBorder Guards to remove his turban during thecustoms control. He claimed
damages for abreach ofhis personal interests under thePolish Civil Code29 andthe
freedom ofreligion.
Firstly, theSupreme Court invoked andanalysed several of its own judg-
ments andthe case-law ofthe ECtHR. TheCourt referred to X vUnited King-
dom,30 inwhich the applicant was also aSikh who was fined by theBritish Police
due to his riding amotorcycle without acrash helmet, which was required by
British law. His application to theECtHR was rejected by theEuropean Com-
mission for Human Rights as it noticed that thecompulsory wearing ofcrash
helmets isa necessary safety measure for motorcyclists. Therefore, theinter-
ference with theapplicant’s freedom ofreligion was justified by theprotection
ofhealth. Then theSupreme Court cited theruling inPhull vFrance,31 inwhich
thefactual background was similar to theone inthe case at stake. Theapplicant,
who was apractising Sikh, was compelled by thesecurity staff at theairport to
remove his turban for inspection as he made his way through thesecurity check-
point prior to entering thedeparture lounge. TheECtHR found no violation
ofthe ECHR andemphasized that security checks at theairports areundoubt-
edly necessary inthe interests ofpublic safety, particularly as themeasure was
only resorted to occasionally.
Moreover, theCourt made a comparison of the judgment ofthe ECtHR
inMann Singh vFrance32 andthe opinion ofthe HRC inMann Singh vFrance.33
The Supreme Court studied in detail the decisions of these two instances
on the prohibition ofwearing a turban while taking a photo for a passport
anda driving licence, as inthe case of the same person theECtHR and the
HRC have issued contrary decisions. TheECtHR has not found any violation
ofthe ECHR, emphasizing that arequirement ofremoving aturban for thepur-
pose oftaking aphoto for adriving licence andan identity card isnecessary
inademocratic society on thegrounds ofpublic safety as it reduces therisk
offraud from tampering permits lead, andtherefore it falls into themargin
ofappreciation granted to State. TheHRC, on thecontrary, found that there was
abreach ofthe applicant’s right to freedom ofreligion. According to theHRC,
28 Case ICSK 439/13 (Supreme Court, 17 September 2014).
29 Arts. 23 and24 ofthe Civil Code.
30 X vUnited Kingdom, App. no. 7992/77 (European Commission for Human Rights, 12 July 1978).
31 Phull vFrance, App. no. 35753/03 (ECtHR, 11 January 2005).
32 Mann Singh vFrance, App. no. 24479/07 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008).
33 Mann Singh vFrance, App. no. 1928/2010 (HRC, 19 July 2013).

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
340
France has not proven how taking off aturban for purposes oftaking aphoto
would make theidentification ofthe claimant more possible, as ineveryday life
he wears aturban in away, which makes his face perfectly visible. TheHRC
claimed that thesustained character ofthe violation caused by theState’s refusal
to issue requested documents was contrary to the principle of proportional-
ity. The Supreme Court emphasized that thesituation ofthe plaintiff in the
case at stake, Mr. S.P., was different from theone ofMr. Mann Singh. Itcon-
cerned thesafety ofthe passengers andthe flight andit was asingular andan
exceptional interference inMr. S.P.’s freedom ofreligion, whereas theintrusion
inthe rights ofMr. Mann Singh was ofapermanent andalong lasting character,
as he could not obtain important documents for several years due to thelack
ofaphoto.34
The analysis ofthe opinions ofthe ECtHR andthe HRC permitted theSupreme
Court to make aconclusion that there was no violation ofhuman rights ofMr. S.P.
There was an intrusion with theplaintiff’s personal rights andfreedom ofreligion,
but it was necessary inademocratic society andneither was it disproportionate, as
theobligation to remove theturban was imposed only occasionally.
As it may be noticed, inthe area ofhuman rights protection ordinary courts re-
fer to opinions ofdifferent international bodies. Inthat sphere, themost developed
dialogue exists with theECtHR, as theresearch revealed only one example ofadi-
alogue with theHRC. As we may see from theexamples presented above, Polish
courts resort to adetailed analysis ofdecision ofother courts to find acommon
standard ofprotection ofhuman rights andapply it incases before them.
2.2. Customary International Law
One ofthe most natural areas ofdialogue with international andforeign courts
isthe area ofcustomary international law. Themajor subject inthis area isState
immunity. Inthe 2010 Natoniewski35 case thePolish Supreme Court was to decide
whether theFederal Republic ofGermany isprotected by State immunity incases
concerning thedamages caused during theWorld War II. Theplaintiff, Mr.Na-
toniewski, claimed damages (asum of1000 000 PLN) as acompensation for thein-
juries36 suffered during thepacification of Szczecin carried out by theGerman
34 “Wmotywach opinii wskazano, że coprawda państwo może powoływaćsię naochronę po-
rządku ibezpieczeństwa publicznego, wtym naprzeciwdziałanie fałszerstwu dokumentów
itożsamości, jednak skarżone państwo nie wykazało, że dopuszczenie fotografii wturbanie
naruszałoby interes ogólny, skoro posiadacz zawsze występuje publicznie ubrany wten spo-
sób. […] Wreszcie zastosowanie środka było jedynie okazjonalne (inaczej niż wpowołanej
wyżej sprawie Mann Singh) iobiektywnie nie przyniosło powodowi uszczerbku, ponieważ
badanie zawsze odbywałosię wosobnym pomieszczeniu, tylko wobecności funkcjonariusza
prowadzącego kontrolę. Zastosowany środek był zatem proporcjonalny.”
35 Case IV CSK 465/09 (Supreme Court, 29 October 2010).
36 Theplaintiff was a6-year-old child. His head, chest, hands were burned.

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 341
army on 2 February 1944. Mr. Natoniewski claimed that there was no possibility to
apply State immunity when theState breached jus cogens norm. There isanotice-
able trend inpublic international law to indicate that incase ofconflict between
jus cogens norm andState immunity, aperemptory norm issuperior anddeprives
therule ofState immunity ofall its legal effects.37 Natoniewski gave thus theSu-
preme Court apossibility to participate ininternational legal discussion on there-
lationship between thetwo norms.
To determine whether Germany could be sued before Polish courts theCourt
carefully considered many international andnational courts decisions. At thebe-
ginning theSupreme Court distinguished between two groups ofjudgments pre-
senting two different views. According to thefirst approach, thejurisdictional
immunity ofState has still an absolute character, whereas, according to thesec-
ond one, certain restrictions may apply. Apart from thereferrals to thejudgments
ofthe ECtHR38 and the CJEU,39 theCourt examined thejudgment of the ICJ
of2002 inDemocratic Republic ofthe Congo vBelgium.40 For thePolish Supreme
Court theICJ judgment was an example ofadecision adopting thefirst ofthe
above mentioned views. Inthis case theICJ held that even thebreach ofjus co-
gens would not enable theabolition ofthe immunity ofthe Minister ofForeign
Affairs ofthe Congo while inoffice. At thetime when theICJ issued its ruling,
there was abroad discussion on immunity ofState officials in case ofserious
crimes under international law. TheHouse ofLords inPinochet41 andthe French
Cour de Cassation inQaddafi42 decided that inthis situation, aState official isnot
protected by immunity. However, thePolish Supreme Court inits decision inNa-
toniewski did not make any distinction between immunity ofState andthat ofthe
Minister ofForeign Affairs. Upon abroad inquiry into thedecisions from other
jurisdictions, theCourt also indicated, that even if there isatendency ininter-
national law to exclude theState immunity incase ofaserious breach ofhuman
rights law, the ICJ would need to make apronouncement on theJurisdictional
37 Al-Adsani vtheUnited Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001), joint dissent-
ing opinion ofjudges Rozakis andCaflish, joined by judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto
andVajić.
38 Al-Adsani vtheUnited Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001); McElhinney
vIreland, App. no. 31253/96 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001); Kalogeropoulou andothers vGreece
andGermany, App. no. 59021/00 (ECtHR, 12 December 2002); Waite andKennedy vGermany,
App. no. 26083/94 (ECtHR, 18 February 1999).
39 C-292/05 Erini Lechouritou andothers vDimosio tis Demokratias tis Germanias (CJEU, 15Feb-
ruary 2007); C-172/91 Volker Sonntag vHans Waidmann, Elisabeth Waidmann and Stefan
Waidmann (CJEU, 21 April 1993).
40 Case concerning thearrest warrant of11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic ofthe Congo vBel-
gium) (ICJ, 14 February 2002).
41 Commissioner of Police for theMetropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet (House ofLords,
24March 1999).
42 Case 00–87215 Qaddafi (French Cour de Cassation, 13 March 2001).

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
342
Immunities ofthe State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) case43 that was at
thetime pending.
The Supreme Court examined there also numerous decisions of the courts
ofother States, i.a. of: theUnited Kingdom,44 theUnited States,45 Ita ly46 andGreece.47
Itwas part ofthe Court’s research into international custom on jurisdictional im-
munity ofStates anddefinitely it isworth an approval that theCourt did not limit
thescope ofits examination only to international bodies, but it made adetailed
scrutiny ofvarious foreign courts’ case law. In cases concerning thedetermina-
tion ofan existence or alack ofacustomary international law, it isindispensable
that thecourts ofdifferent States study opinions ofother courts on both, national
andinternational level.
The Supreme Court decided, that thePolish judicial practice acknowledges
State jurisdictional immunity as apart ofinternational customary law andisap-
plicable by national courts on thebasis ofArt.9 ofthe Polish Constitution. Theim-
munity has its source inthe principle ofequality ofStates (par inparem non habet
imperium) andit isan expression ofState sovereignty. Its aim isto preserve friend-
ly inter-State relationships.48 TheCourt, referring to its own previous decisions,49
indicated that till 1950’s State immunity was absolute inevery aspect, but nowa-
days this absolute character isconnected only with asovereign activity ofaState
(acta iure imperii), whereas aState isnot entitled to it when adispute arises from
acommercial transaction entered into by aState or other non-sovereign activity
ofState (acta iure gestionis).
43 Jurisdictional immunities ofthe State (Germany vItaly: Greece intervening) (ICJ, 3 February
2012).
44 Jones vSaudi Arabia (House ofLords, 14 June 2006).
45 Liu vRepublic ofChina (United States Court ofAppeals, 9 Circuit, 29 December 1989); Repub-
lic ofAustria vMaria Altmann (United States Supreme Court, 7 June 2004); Guy von Dardel
vtheUSSR (United StatesDC Circuit Court ofAppeals, 15 October 1985).
46 Ferrini vGermany 5044/2004 (Italian Corte di Cassazione, 11 March 2004); Civitella 1072/08
(Italian Corte di Cassazione, 21 October 2008).
47 Perfectory Voiotia vGermany (Distomo) 111/2000 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 4 May 2000);
Margellos vGermany 6/2002 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 17 September 2002).
48 The Supreme Court in Natoniewski stated that: “Ostatecznie w polskim orzecznictwie
podwpływem wypowiedzi piśmiennictwa przeważył pogląd uznający nagruncie art. 9 Kon-
stytucji za źródło tego immunitetu powszechnie przyjęty zwyczaj międzynarodowy. […]
Upodstaw immunitetu jurysdykcyjnego państw obcych leży zasada równości państw (par
inparem non habet imperium). Jest on wyrazem poszanowania suwerenności państw. Zmie-
rza doutrzymania między państwami przyjaznych stosunków.”
“Finally, thePolish jurisprudence decided that on thebasis ofArt.9 ofthe Polish Constitution
it isthe commonly accepted international custom that isthe source ofthis immunity. […]
Thebasis ofthe jurisdictional immunity offoreign States isthe principle ofequality ofStates
(par inparem non habet imperium). Itis theexpression ofthe respect to theState sovereignty.
Itaims at keeping friendly inter-State relationships” (transl. by theauthor).
49 Supreme Court cases: III PZP 9/90 (26 September 1990); III CSK 293/07 (13 March 2008).

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 343
On theother hand, theSupreme Court noticed on thebasis ofthe detailed in-
formation supplied by theMinistry ofJustice that whenever States regulated State
immunity, State jurisdictional immunity isexcluded incases ofinjury or dam-
age occurred inthe territory ofState ofthe forum. The same rule was adopted
inthe European Convention on State immunity.50 There arealso judicial decisions,
which accept this rule,51 but there exist also such that contradict it.52 However,
even if anew rule ofcustomary international law has been recently created andit
permits claiming damages from aState for injuries it caused andwhich occurred
inthe territory ofState ofthe forum, it does not mean, inthe view ofthe Supreme
Court, that it can be applied to theevents that took place decades ago.53
Moreover, jurisdictional State immunity concerns especially theactions that
occurred during thetime ofwar or armed conflict andcannot be upheld by such
recently created exception. Thequestions ofinjuries or damages arethen regu-
lated by peace treaties between sovereign States. Inrelations between individuals
andStates jurisdictional immunity isgranted.
The Supreme Court noticed also that some foreign courts present aview, that
jurisdictional State immunity isexcluded incase ofbreach ofjus cogens norms, as
it means that aState impliedly renounces its immunity.54 Yet theCourt underlined
that inits opinion State may expressly relinquish its immunity, but therenounce-
ment cannot be implied andit does not belong to anational court to interpret
international law inaway unaccepted by other States, andthe jus cogens exception
isnot commonly recognized.55 Moreover, the jus cogens norms concerned (pro-
50 European Convention on State Immunity (adopted on 16 February 1972, Basel). Art. 11:
“AContracting State cannot claim immunity from thejurisdiction ofacourt ofanother Con-
tracting State inproceedings which relate to redress for injury to theperson or damage to
tangible property, if thefacts which occasioned theinjury or damage occurred inthe territory
ofthe State ofthe forum, andif theauthor ofthe injury or damage was present inthat terri-
tory at thetime when those facts occurred.”
51 Liu vRepublic ofChina (United States Court ofAppeals, 9 Circuit, 29 December 1989); Perfec-
tory Voiotia vGermany (Distomo) 111/2000 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 4 May 2000); Fer-
rini vGermany 5044/2004 (Italian Corte di Cassazione, 11 March 2004); Hugo Princz vFederal
Republic ofGermany (United StatesDC Circuit Court ofAppeals, 14 April 2003); Hirsch vState
ofIsrael andState ofGermany (United States District Court (New York), 8 April 1997); Bruce
Smith vSocialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (United States Court ofAppeals, 2 Circuit,
26 November 1996).
52 Margellos v Germany 6/2002 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 17 September 2002); Jones
vSaudi Arabia (House ofLords, 14 June 2006).
53 Republic ofAustria vMaria Altmann (United States Supreme Court, 7 June 2004).
54 Liu vRepublic ofChina (United States Court ofAppeals, 9 Circuit, 29 December 1989); Guy von
Dardel vtheUSSR (DC Circuit Court ofAppeals, 15 October 1985); Perfectory Voiotia vGermany
(Distomo) 111/2000 (Greek Special Supreme Court, 4 May 2000); Ferrini vGermany 5044/2004
(Italian Corte di Cassazione, 11 March 2004); Civitella 1072/08 (Italian Corte di Cassazione,
21October 2008).
55 Hugo Princz vFederal Republic ofGermany (DC Circuit Court ofAppeals, 14 April 2003); Hirsch
vState ofIsrael andState ofGermany (United States District Court (New York), 8 April 1997);
Bruce Smith vSocialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 95–7930, 95–7931, 95–7942 (United

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
344
hibition oftorture, prohibition ofgenocide) have substantive character, whereas
jurisdictional State immunity isof procedural nature so they cannot reciprocally
influence one another.
It isworth underlining that theSupreme Court’s judgment inNatoniewski was
noticed andhad an impact on international level, as it was referred to by theIn-
ternational Court ofJustice inits decision inJurisdictional Immunities ofthe State
(Germany vItaly: Greece Intervening)56 andby theEuropean Court ofHuman Rights
inJones andOthers vtheUnited Kingdom.57 TheICJ’s ruling concerned therespon-
sibility ofGermany for damages caused during World War II, so thecircumstances
were exactly thesame as inNatoniewski. First, agreeing with thePolish Supreme
Court, theICJ noticed, that theBasel Convention58 does not cover theimmunity
ofaState for theacts ofits armed forces. Then theICJ described indetail therea-
sons, why thePolish Court decided that Germany had jurisdictional immunity
incases on theacts committed during World War II andmentioned, that thePol-
ish Supreme Court was one ofthe bodies presenting opinion that State immunity
does not depend on thegravity ofthe act ofwhich it isaccused or theperemptory
nature ofthe rule which it isalleged to have violated.
The judgment ofthe ECtHR concerned theright to afair trial (Art.6 ECHR).
Theapplicants claimed they had been tortured inthe Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia
by its officials andbrought civil claims before thecourts ofthe United Kingdom.
Theclaims were dismissed, as the courts decided in favour ofState immunity,
which was granted to theKingdom ofSaudi Arabia andits officials even inthe
case ofan alleged breach ofthe jus cogens norm, namely theprohibition oftor-
ture. TheECtHR was provided by theapplicants andthe United Kingdom with
acomparative material on thepractice of21 Members ofthe Council ofEurope
andmany other States worldwide inthe area ofState immunity. Theinformation
presented contained also the decision in Natoniewski. For the European Court
ofHuman Rights thedecisive factor was however thejudgment ofthe Internation-
al Court ofJustice inJurisdictional Immunities ofthe State (Germany vItaly: Greece
Intervening).
The above-mentioned cases prove, that where important issues ofinternational
law areconcerned the dialogue between different courts ismultilateral andone
can observe an interaction, what has positive influence on development ofinter-
national customary law.
States 2 Circuit Court ofAppeals, 26 November 1996); Jones vSaudi Arabia (House ofLords,
14 June 2006); Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97 (ECtHR, 21 November
2001); McElhinney vIreland, App. no. 31253/96 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001); Kalogeropou-
lou andothers vGreece andGermany, App. no. 59021/00 (ECtHR, 12 December 2002); Waite
andKennedy vGermany, App. no. 26083/94 (ECtHR, 18 February1999).
56 Jurisdictional Immunities ofthe State (Germany vItaly: Greece Intervening) (n. 44).
57 Jones andOthers vtheUnited Kingdom, App. nos 34356/06 and40528/06 (ECtHR, 14 January
2014).
58 European Convention on State immunity (adopted on 16 May 1972 inBasel).

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 345
The other example ofPolish cases on State immunity which had aconsidera-
ble impact internationally concerns immunity from enforcement. Theformer em-
ployee ofthe Nigerian Embassy inPoland wanted to institute theenforcement pro-
ceedings against her employer andrequired reinstitution andimposition offine.59
Basing on theICJ’s judgment inJurisdictional Immunities ofthe State (Germany
v Italy: Greece Intervening), theProvincial Court emphasized that State immu-
nity inthe enforcement proceedings iswider than the jurisdictional immunity.
Amere fact that there has been a final judgment delivered by anational court
againstaState does not mean that theenforcement proceedings can be institut-
ed against that State on such basis. Theinternational custom on immunity from
jurisdiction andthe immunity from enforcement differs as each ofthem has its’
separate prerequisites. For theenforcement proceedings against other State’s prop-
erty it has to be ascertained that theproperty isused for thepurposes other than
non-commercial government actions or theState has expressly agreed to theappli-
cation ofthe enforcement proceedings to agiven property, or theState has indicat-
ed aproperty that can be theobject ofthe enforcement proceedings.60
The Warsaw Provincial Court referred as well to thejudgments ofthe courts
ofother States. One ofthem was the 1977 landmark decision ofthe German
59 Case XXI Pz 95/14 (Warsaw Provincial Court, 26 June 2014).
60 “Wtym miejscu naszczególną uwagę zasługuje wyrok Międzynarodowego Trybunału Spra-
wiedliwości zdnia 3 lutego 2012r. wsprawie Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening –jurisdic-
tional immunities ofthe State, w którym Trybunał wskazał, że immunitet chroniący przed
środkami przymusu własność państwa znajdującą się na terytorium obcego państwa jest
szerszy niż immunitet jurysdykcyjny. Zfaktu wydania wyroku przeciwko obcemu państwu
nie wynika ipso facto, że państwo to może być podmiotem środków przymusu naterytorium
państwa forum wcelu wykonania wydanego wyroku –normy zwyczajowego prawa między-
narodowego odnoszącesię doimmunitetu egzekucyjnego iimmunitetu jurysdykcyjnego są
więc różne imuszą być oddzielnie stosowane. Trybunał sformułował także warunki, które
muszą być spełnione, aby środek przymusu mógł być zastosowany przeciwko mieniu nale-
żącemu dopaństwa obcego: mienie to musi być wykorzystywane dodziałań niesłużących
celom rządowym ocharakterze niekomercyjnym lub państwo to wyraźnie zgodziłosię naza-
stosowanie środka przymusu lub wskazało mienie, októre chodzi dlacelów zaspokojenia
roszczenia prawnego.”
“Here aspecial attention should be given to thejudgment ofthe International Court ofJus-
tice of3 February 2012 incase Germany vItaly: Greece Intervening –jurisdictional immunities
ofState, inwhich theCourt indicated that theimmunity protecting from coercive measures
aState property placed on aterritory ofother State isbroader than jurisdictional immuni-
ty. Itdoes not result ipso facto from amere fact ofgiving ajudgment against foreign State,
that aState can be an object ofcoercive measures on aterritory of aforeign State inthe
aim ofthe execution ofagiven ruling –the rules ofinternational customary law on immu-
nity from enforcement proceedings andjurisdictional immunity arethus different andthey
should be applied separately. The Court has also elaborated conditions, which should be
fulfilled, ifthecoercive measure against theproperty ofother State isto be applied: theprop-
erty should not be used for governmental purposes ofnon-commercial character or theState
has expressly agreed for theapplication ofcoercive measure or has designated property that
can be used for thesatisfaction ofalegal claim” (transl. by theauthor).

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
346
Constitutional Court inPhilippine Embassy,61 inwhich theGerman Court stated
inter alia that thereceivables from acurrent ordinary bank account ofan em-
bassy ofaforeign State existing inthe forum State andintended to cover theem-
bassy’s expenses and costs are not subject to execution by theforum State.62
TheWarsaw Court invoked also thejudgments, inwhich the courts of other
States decided that thebank accounts used by aforeign State only for thecom-
mercial transactions purposes donot have theprivilege ofimmunity from en-
forcement proceedings.63
On the basis of these judgments the Warsaw Provincial Court ordered
theDistrict Court for thecapital city ofWarsaw to ascertain, whether theen-
forcement proceedings on thereinstitution could be instituted against theNi-
gerian Embassy. Aseparate analysis should concern thepossibility ofthe im-
position ofa fine, especially taking into account that it may encroach upon
theprinciple ofequal sovereignty ofStates. As thereinstitution belongs to labor
law, andthus forms apart ofacta de iure gestionis, thefine isarepressive meas-
ure, so thedefendant inthe case at stake might remain protected by theimmu-
nity from enforcement.
Deciding on theexistence ofa norm ofcustomary international law andits
scope requires referring to decisions ofinternational andforeign courts. Theabove
mentioned examples ofproper judicial dialogue, although scarce, show that ordi-
nary courts can carry on adetailed scrutiny ofopinions ofother bodies andon
that basis draw their own conclusions that arenoticed on theinternational level, as
theexample ofNatoniewski shows.
2.3. Application of EU Law
The dialogue on EU law between ordinary courts andthe CJEU occurs much
more often andit isof adifferent scope andcharacter, due to therole that EU law
plays inthe national law ofthe EU Member State. Thedialogue between Polish or-
dinary courts andthe CJEU occurs usually through theprocedure ofpreliminary
rulings, what isdescribed inthis volume by A. Czaplińska.64
Nevertheless, for thepurposes ofthis contribution it isworth to mention oth-
er examples ofthe references to EU law. The Warsaw Appellate Court inI ACa
61 Case 2 BvM 1/76 (German Constitutional Court, 13 December 1977).
62 “Forderungen aus einem laufenden, allgemeinen Bankkonto der Botschaft eines frem-
den Staates, das im Gerichtsstaat besteht und zur Deckung der Ausgaben und Kosten der
Botschaft bestimmt ist, unterliegen nicht der Zwangsvollstreckung durch den Gerichtsstaat.”
63 Alcom Ltd. vRepublic ofColombia (House ofLords, 12 April 1984). Here theHouse ofLords
reaffirmed what theGerman Constitutional Court said that abank account used by theState
or an embassy to cover theday-to-day expenses of an embassy, clearly serves sovereign
purposes andtherefore isimmune from enforcement measures. See also: Islamic Republic
ofIran vSociété Eurodif andothers 82–12462 (French Cour de Cassation, 14 March 1984).
64 See inthis volume: A. Czaplińska, ‘The Preliminary Reference Procedure as an Instrument
ofJudicial Dialogue inthe EU –the CEE Perspective’.

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 347
1663/1365 not only referred to thejudgments ofthe CJEU, but made acritical
examination ofLuxembourg Court’s jurisprudence andentered into areasoned
discussion with theCJEU. TheAppellate Court decided not to apply to theCJEU
under theprocedure ofpreliminary ruling.
The dispute inthe case at stake concerned copyrights andthe unlawful use
ofthe plaintiff ’s song inelection spot ofone ofcandidates to thePolish Parliament,
which was accessible through clickable Internet link.
The Warsaw Appellate Court differed with the CJEU’s opinion expressed
inC-466/12 Svensson,66 inwhich theCourt ofJustice held that theprovision on
awebsite ofclickable links to works freely available on another website does not
constitute an “act ofcommunication to thepublic”, because there can be no ‘new
public’ as every person having access to theInternet may view any websites avail-
able therein. TheWarsaw Appellate Court, pointing to thejudgment inC-306/05
SGAE,67 concerning works communicated by means oftelevision sets installed
in hotel rooms, decided that the CJEU in C-466/12 Svenson has erroneous-
ly departed from its previous jurisprudence. According to theAppellate Court,
thewebsites areaddressed to different public indifferent States, they arepublished
indifferent languages andit cannot be said apriori that aclickable link to aweb-
site does not break copyrights, because agiven work has already been published
on another website, so anyone could access it freely. TheWarsaw Appellate Court
also emphasized that thedetermination ofan “act ofcommunication to thepub-
lic” should always be based on adetailed analysis ofacase also when it concerns
clickable Internet links.68
Moreover, theAppellate Court showed an interesting approach to foreign juris-
dictions. TheCourt rejected thearguments ofthe defendant based inthe rulings
ofthe courts ofthe United States ofAmerica,69 stressing that thecontinental copy-
right system, so theone inPoland andin theEU, isvery different from theAmeri-
can one. On this ground, theCourt held that theUS-courts’ decisions could not be
taken into consideration when applying therelevant Polish andthe EU laws. They
65 Case IACa 1663/13 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 7 May 2014).
66 C-466/12 Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine Sahlman, Pia Gadd vRetriever Sverige AB
(CJEU, 13 February 2014).
67 C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) vRafael Hoteles SA (CJEU,
7 February 2006).
68 “Rozumowanie Trybunału prowadzi bowiem downiosku, że wprzypadku wydania książki
przez wydawcę inny wydawca, drukując iwydając zapośrednictwem tych samych kanałów
dystrybucji taką samą książkę natakich samych warunkach, nie narusza monopolu autor-
skiego. Wniosek taki logicznie wypływa zrozumowania Trybunału, jednak nie może być on
zaakceptowany jako prawidłowy zarówno nagruncie ustawy polskiej, jak iustawodawstwa
Unii Europejskiej. Wkonsekwencji, wopinii Sądu Apelacyjnego nie możnasię w tej części
zgodzić zrozumowaniem Trybunału, acozatym idzie –nie można przyjąć, iżwkażdym wy-
padku umieszczanie odwołań (linków) nie narusza monopolu autorskiego.”
69 Itis not indicated by theWarsaw Appellate Court which American judgments have been men-
tioned by thedefendant.

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
348
could only be used as an evidence on theevolution ofthe copyright law inone
ofthe most technically developed States inthe world.70
Another example arethe decisions ofthe Polish Supreme Court, [in:] II CSK
406/10,71 II CSK 541/1072 andII CSK 326/10,73 all adopted on the16 February
2011 by thesame judges. Thecases concerned thedetermination ofthe court’s ju-
risdiction ininsolvency proceedings, when adebtor runs business intwo or more
different States andthe interpretation ofArt.3(1) and(2) ofthe Council Regula-
tion (EC) No. 1346/2000.74 Theplaintiffs requested theopening ofthe insolven-
cy proceedings inPoland, whereas there was already an insolvency proceeding
inprogress against thesame entrepreneur, instituted inFrance. Inits reasoning
theSupreme Court referred to thetwo orders ofthe High Court ofJustice inLon-
don delivered inEnron Directo SA,75 inwhich theHigh Court ofJustice devel-
oped thetheory ofmind of management andrebutted thepresumption based
on theregistered office. Thetheory applied by theHigh Court inLondon was
examined indetail andconfronted by thePolish Supreme Court with thebusiness
activity theory, advanced by theCJEU in C-341/04 Eurofood.76 Theaim ofthe
Supreme Court was to discuss two different approaches to thequestion at hand
andto choose themost proper one.
Ultimately, theSupreme Court decided infavor ofthe business activity the-
ory, established by theCourt of Justice. TheSupreme Court concluded, that
theunderstanding ofthe Council Regulation by virtue ofthe theory ofmind
of management would be too subjective and it would lessen the protection
ofthe rights ofcreditors. Debtors could manipulate theprerequisites ofestab-
lishing court’s jurisdiction by moving its seat to aState inwhich insolvency law
ismore favorable to them. At theend, thetheory ofmind ofmanagement could
too easily lead to forum shopping. That iswhy, basing its view on teleological
interpretation ofthe Regulation, theSupreme Court chose an approach that to
ahigher degree permits creditors for areal verification ofcircumstances justi-
fying jurisdiction.
70 “Chybione są argumenty oparte na orzeczeniach sądów Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki
Północnej. Zasadniczo różny jest system prawa autorskiego kontynentalny –którego częścią
jest tak Polska, jak iUnia Europejska –orazsystem amerykański. Wskazane orzeczenia opie-
rająsię na instytucji fair use, która nie może być porównywana doinstytucji dozwolonego
użytku. Nie mogą one dlatego stanowić podstawy dorozważań wzakresie stosowania pra-
wa wniniejszym postępowaniu, mogą jedynie dawać wskazówkę codozmian w rozumie-
niu prawa zachodzącym naterenie jednego znajbardziej zaawansowanych technologicznie
państw.”
71 Case II CSK 406/10 (Supreme Court, 16 February 2011).
72 Case II CSK 541/10 (Supreme Court, 16 February 2011).
73 Case II CSK 326/10 (Supreme Court, 16 February 2011).
74 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (2000])
O.J.L 160.
75 Enron Directo SA (High Court ofJustice inLondon, 4 July 2002 and10 December 2002).
76 C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd. (CJEU, 2 May 2006).

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 349
The application ofEU law may require not only references to theCJEU case
law, but sometimes also to thedecisions ofthe EU Member States’ courts. On one
hand there arerulings inwhich Polish courts enter into adiscussion with CJEU
andforeign courts, by making detailed analysis andpresenting their own conclu-
sions. On theother, there arealso examples ofthe decisions ofordinary courts
in which courts simply enumerate appropriate CJEU’s rulings to support their
opinions, without much critical deliberation.77
2.4. Other Areas of Judicial Dialogue
Other instances, where ordinary courts deal with international law anddiscuss
international or foreign courts’ decisions escape any categorization. These cases
arelumped inthis final part, as they dohave one common feature, namely their
sole purpose isto strengthen thecourts’ own reasoning.
The first case discussed concerns theapplication ofthe Convention on theCon-
tract for theInternational Carriage ofGoods by Road (CMR Convention).78 Inits
judgment inIACa 111/1379 theSzczecin Appellate Court referred to thedecisions
ofthe French Cour de Cassation80 andof theBelgian Koophandel te Antwerpen81
inwhich theCourts underlined that to determine thecarrier’s liability, theentire-
ty ofcircumstances has to be taken into account, also whether therobbery had
been committed by athird person. TheSzczecin Appellate Court pointed out that
theverification, whether thecarrier followed all obligations andstandards binding
upon them requires taking into consideration particular circumstances ofagiven
case. Arobbery might, but as well might not, be areason for arelease ofthe carrier
from his liability.
The Warsaw Appellate Court inI ACa 696/0382 andthe Szczecin Provincial
Court inVIII Ga 31/1383 both cited therulings ofthe Belgian Hof van Beroep te
Antwerpen84 andTribunal de Commerce de Liège85 andadditionally the Warsaw
Appellate Court referred to thedecision ofthe French Cour de Cassation.86 These
77 Theexamples ofdecision ofthe Supreme Court’s which contain decorative dialogue arethe
following: II PK 207/12 (27 February 2013), IV CSK 202/13 (28 February 2014), III CZP 113/13
(7February 2014).
78 Convention on theContract for theInternational Carriage ofGoods by Road (CMR Conven-
tion) (19May 1956).
79 Case IACa 111/13 (Szczecin Appellate Court, 9 May 2013).
80 TheCourt referred to theparticular case as: (French Cour de Cassation, 14 May 1992).
81 TheCourt referred to theparticular case as: (Belgian Koophandel te Antwerpen, 3 March 1976).
82 Case IACa 696/03 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 4 February 2003).
83 Case VIII Ga 31/13 (Szczecin Provincial Court, 8 March 2013).
84 TheCourt referred to theparticular case as: (Belgian Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, 8 Novem-
ber 1989).
85 TheCourt referred to theparticular case as: (Belgian Tribunal de Commerce de Liège, 27 June
1985).
86 TheCourt referred to theparticular case as: (French Cour de Cassation, 18 April 1989).

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
350
judgments were mentioned to strengthen theCourts’ thesis that an entrepreneur
acts as aforwarding agent only if this isstipulated expressly inthe contract. Inall
other instances an entrepreneur isconsidered to be acarrier.
In all theabove-mentioned cases ordinary courts used foreign decisions to sup-
port their own reasoning andto demonstrate that their interpretation ofvarious
provisions ofthe CMR Convention isin line with theopinions ofother courts.
Ordinary courts use this technique especially if they deal with a ground-
breaking interpretation or with new legal problems, e.g. inthe field offinancial
instruments. Theexample isthe decision ofthe Bialystok Appellate Court87 that
concerned thecontract ofthe currency option. TheAppellate Court started its
reasoning by comparing Polish andGerman regulations ofthe currency option
contracts. Itfound many similarities anddecided to analyze indetail theGerman
case law, especially inthe area of the bank’s informative obligations towards its
clients. TheAppellate Court found German case-law relevant to interpret Polish
regulations.88
87 Case IACa 833/12 (Bialystok Appellate Court, 21 January 2013). TheCourt referred to Case XI
ZR 33/10 (German Bundesgerichtshof, 22 March 2011).
88 “Dodać tylko należy, że z wyroku niemieckiego Trybunału Federalnego zdnia 22 mar-
ca 2011roku (XI ZR 33/10), który dotyczy zakresu obowiązków informacyjnych ilojalno-
ściowych banku wobec klienta wzwiązku z zawieraniem transakcji pochodnych, wynika,
żebank powinien odpytać klienta naokoliczność ryzyka inwestycyjnego, które jest wstanie
podjąć –niezależnie odwykształcenia ekonomicznego klienta, wyjaśnić ryzyko ‘produktu’,
tak by klient wzakresie tego ‘produktu’ miał zasadniczo ten sam poziom wiedzy cobank,
uświadomić klientowi negatywną dlaklienta, inicjalną wycenę produktu, gdyż taka wycena
sama wsobie wskazuje napoważny konflikt interesów banku iklienta, uświadomić kliento-
wi konflikt interesów, jeżeli struktura ryzyka ‘produktu’ jest przez bank celowo przesunięta
naniekorzyść klienta. Trybunał Federalny nie wiązał przy tym obowiązków informacyjnych
banku zestatusem konsumenckim klienta. Prowadzenie działalności gospodarczej przez
klienta nie ma wpływu naobowiązki informacyjne banku. Istotny dlaobowiązków infor-
macyjnych banku jest jedynie brak wystarczającej wiedzy klienta dlaoceny ryzyk ztransak-
cji napoziomie zasadniczo zbliżonym, wzakresie zawieranej transakcji, dowiedzy banku.
Kwalifikacje zawodowe klienta nie mają zasadniczo znaczenia. Trybunał Federalny zwrócił
uwagę, że doświadczenie zawodowe klienta musiałoby właściwie dotyczyć przygotowy-
wania izawierania transakcji pochodnych, tak by klient niejako ‘odkuchni’ posiadł wiedzę
natemat skutków konkretnej, zawieranej transakcji porównywalną zwiedzą banku. Ogólna
wiedza natemat transakcji nie byłaby więc wystarczająca. Przyjęcie, że klient był zoriento-
wany wryzykach wywoływanych przez transakcję tylko natej podstawie, iżzawierał trans-
akcje winnym banku, jest nieuprawnione. Doświadczenie klienta uzasadniające odstąpie-
nie odwyczerpującego poinformowania owłaściwościach imożliwych skutkach transakcji
musiałoby dotyczyć takich samych transakcji, przy czym nie chodzi tylko otyp transakcji,
czy ich podtyp. Spostrzeżenia Trybunału Federalnego znajdują zastosowanie dorealiów
polskich, albowiem Trybunał ten rozstrzygał właściwie na podstawie ogólnych zasad od-
powiedzialności odszkodowawczej ex contractu (§ 280 niemieckiego kodeksu cywilnego),
apoczęści również napodstawie przepisów niemieckiej ustawy oobrocie papierami warto-
ściowymi (§ 31.1.2 niemieckiej ustawy oobrocie papierami wartościowymi), odpowiadają-
cych regulacjom art. 471 k.c. i§ 6 ust. 1 rozporządzenia Ministra Finansów zdnia 28 grudnia

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 351
3. Examples ofaDecorative Dialogue
We have to recall that fake or decorative dialogue means theone “pretending
to refer to thecase-law ofother courts but infact just decorating thereasoning by
random references to inappropriately collected andinaptly analysed decisions.”89
While Polish courts engage infrequently inthe proper judicial dialogue with other
jurisdictions, thedecorative references seem to be more common.
As an example ofadecorative dialogue ofPolish ordinary courts we can point
to thereference to theHuman Rights Committee inadecision which concerned
family law andthe State’s obligation to respect one’s private andfamily life, as en-
shrined i.a. inArt.17 ofthe International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights
2005roku wsprawie trybu iwarunków postępowania firm inwestycyjnych orazbanków po-
wierniczych (Dz. U. z2006roku Nr 2, poz. 8).”
“It must be added that it results from thejudgment of the German Federal Tribunal
of22March 2011 (XI ZR 33/10), which concerns thescope ofinformation andloyalty obli-
gations ofbank towards its clients inconnection with contracts ofderivate transactions,
that abank should question its client on theinvestment risk that theclient is able to
undertake – regardless of client’s economic education. The bank should also explain
therisk ofa‘product’, so that theclient has thesame level ofknowledge ofa‘product’ as
abank itself, it should inform theclient about anegative (from their stance), initial pric-
ing ofaproduct, as this pricing itself shows aserious conflict ofinterests ofbank andits
client, inform client about theconflict ofinterests, if thestructure ofthe ‘product’s’ risk
iswilfully shifted by bank to thedisadvantage ofits client. TheFederal Tribunal did not
connect theinformation obligations ofabank with aconsumer status ofits client. Run-
ning abusiness activity by aclient has no influence on bank’s information obligations.
Thecrucial aspect for bank information obligations isthe lack ofsufficient client’s knowl-
edge on theevaluation ofrisks oftransaction to thelevel fundamentally close to bank’s
knowledge, as far as it concerns given transaction. Client’s professional skills areprinci-
pally ofno importance. TheFederal Tribunal noticed, that client’s professional experience
should be actually connected to preparation andconclusion ofderivate transactions, so
that theclient had practical knowledge on theeffects ofagiven transaction, comparable
to thebank’s knowledge. Ageneral knowledge on transaction isnot enough. Assuming
that theclient was knowledgeable ofrisks caused by transaction only on this ground, that
client had contracts with other bank, lacks justification. Aclient’s experience, justifying
resignation from exhausting information about properties andpossible effects oftrans-
action should concern exactly thesame transactions, but it does not mean only thetype
or subtype ofit. The remarks of the Federal Tribunal areapplicable inPolish reality, as
theTribunal solved thecase actually on thebasis ofgeneral rules ofliability for damages
ex contractu (§280 ofthe German Civil Code), andpartially on thebasis ofthe German
statute on securities trading (§ 31.1.2 ofthe German statute on securities trading), which
correspond to Art.471 ofthe Polish Civil Code and§ 6(1) ofthe regulation ofthe Minis-
try ofFinance of28 December 2005 on the terms and procedures for investment firms
andtrust banks (O.J. 2006.2.8).”
89 M. Górski, op. cit. (n. 8).

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
352
(ICCPR).90 Inits ruling incase II CKN 321/9991 theSupreme Court made only
ageneral remark, that according to theHRC theprohibition ofunlawful inter-
ference inone’s private life means that no intrusion ispermissible, except for
thesituations strictly regulated by law. Nevertheless, thenational legislation that
regulates theinterference ofthe State’s organs inthe sphere covered by Art.17
ICCPR must comply with theobjectives andterms of the Covenant. TheSu-
preme Court did not indicate any specific decision ofthe Human Rights Com-
mittee. Thesole aim ofthis general reference was to add value to its own reason-
ing. TheCourt additionally mentioned (briefly andgenerally) Art.8 ECHR (the
right to respect for private andfamily life) andthe Polish Constitution (Art.3192
andArt.4793) without indicating any decisions ofthe ECtHR or ofthe Polish
Constitutional Tribunal.
For example, at one instance thePolish Supreme Court referred to thejudg-
ment ofthe International Court ofJustice. Incase V CSK 295/07,94 theCourt dealt
with theeffects ofthe nationalization acts ofPolish authorities of2005 andthe
indemnization agreement between Poland andthe United States ofAmerica.95
Following theagreement concluded to solve theproblems ofthe property left by
American citizens after theII World War on theterritory ofPoland, theUnited
States accepted thesum of40 000 000 USD infull settlement anddischarge
ofall claims ofnationals ofthe United States against theGovernment ofPo-
land because ofthe nationalization andother forms oftaking over property by
Poland. TheAmerican citizens were supposed to address their claims before
theUS Government. If they accepted thedamages, they had to renounce their
property rights. Recently some ofthem questioned theamount ofremunera-
tion obtained or claimed damages if they had not used theprocedure offered
by theUS authorities. Thecase at stake was one ofmany similar before Polish
courts. TheSupreme Court referred to its previous case-law andthe judgments
ofthe Polish Constitutional Court on just compensation innationalization cas-
es, andinterestingly, also to theICJ Barcelona Traction96 decision. TheSupreme
Court highlighted that although the civilised nations areobliged to protect
private property, theproperty right is not ofan absolute character, it can be
restricted by law, or even declined to an individual provided that acondition
ofjust compensation isfulfilled. Regarding damages, theCourt noted that there
90 TheInternational Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).
91 Case II CKN 321/99 (Supreme Court, 18 August 1999).
92 Theprinciple ofproportionality.
93 Theright to respect for private andfamily life.
94 Case V CSK 295/07 (Supreme Court, 12 December 2007).
95 Agreement on settlement ofclaims ofUnited States Nationals between theUnited States
ofAmerica andPoland (16 July 1960).
96 Barcelona Traction, Light andPower Company (Belgium vSpain) (ICJ, 24 July 1964).

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 353
isno common international practice97 andonly inthis respect theCourt cited
Barcelona Traction, unfortunately without mentioning any specific paragraphs
ofthe judgment. Inits decision theICJ did not examine themerits ofthe case,
theproperty rights claims nor made any statements concerning theacceptable
level ofprotection ofthis right. Thedispute before theICJ was between Bel-
gium andSpain andit concerned theSpanish acts ofnationalization, inter alia
ofthe property ofthe Barcelona Traction, Light andPower Company, Limited,
whose property rights were infringed. Themain issue before theICJ was to
determine which State may exercise thediplomatic protection. Itappeared that
it was not Belgium, that brought thecase to theICJ but Canada.98 Thecase was
therefore dismissed.
4. Examples ofaFailed Dialogue
Failed dialogue denotes such instance ofadialogue that misses “the opportu-
nity to refer to thecase law ofother courts at all where one should reasonably ex-
pect that such jurisprudence ispresented.”99 There areway too many ofexamples
97 “Namarginesie powyższych rozważań, należy jeszcze zwrócić uwagę, że ocena prawna aktów
nacjonalizacji czy też wywłaszczenia jest wyjątkowo złożona inie może ograniczyćsię tylko
doprzepisów u.d.w. Należy oddzielić odsiebie sam problem wpisu prawa własności Skarbu
Państwa jako rezultatu nacjonalizacji mienia osób prywatnych odjego przesłanek wprawie
wewnętrznym zjednej strony orazaspektów prawnomiędzynarodowych odpowiedzialności
odszkodowawczej państwa zaakt nacjonalizacji zdrugiej strony. Prawo własności nie jest
prawem absolutnym, choć doogólnych zasad prawa narodów cywilizowanych należy jego
ochrona; nie ma także powszechnej praktyki międzynarodowej, gdy chodzi ozasady indem-
nizacji ztytułu wywłaszczeń (por. m.in. wyrok Międzynarodowego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości
wsprawie Belgia przeciwko Hiszpanii –Barcelona Traction, Light andPower Company, Zbiór
Orzeczeń MTS 1970, s.3 in.). Jak podkreślasię zarówno worzecznictwie Sądu Najwyższego
(por. wyrok zdnia 23 września 2004r., III CK 401/03, OSNC 2005 nr7–8, poz. 148), jak iTrybu-
nału Konstytucyjnego (postanowienie zdnia 24 października 2000r., SK 31/99, OTK-ZU 2000
nr7, poz. 262), przejęcie przez Skarb Państwa mienia obywateli innych państw następowało
napodstawie szeregu aktów normatywnych, doktórych należy m.in. dekret zdnia 8 marca
1946r. omajątkach opuszczonych iponiemieckich (Dz. U. Nr 13, poz. 87 zpóźn. zm.) czy też
tzw. dekrety nacjonalizacyjne. Wocenie Sądu Najwyższego wskładzie rozpoznającym niniej-
szą sprawę, Układ rządowy pomiędzy USA aPRL dotyczył nie tyle nabycia własności jako
takiego, ile raczej zasad wypłaty odszkodowań zamienie przejęte zgodnie zprawem obowią-
zującym ówcześnie wPolsce.”
98 Theseat ofthe company was located inToronto, Canada, but it was connected to Belgium
due to thefact that thecompany’s shareholders were Belgian nationals.
99 Górski M., op. cit. (n. 8).

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
354
across theresearch conducted inthis project. This section offers ashort selection
ofsuch instances where courts’ ‘hands-off ’ approach may be considered as highly
problematic.
4.1. Human Rights
There aremany judgments concerning human rights, that arebased solely on
references to thedecisions ofPolish courts andtribunals, without any reference
to therulings ofinternational bodies. TheWroclaw Appellate Court’s decision100
on lustration proceedings may serve as an example. TheCourt carefully analysed
thedecisions ofthe Supreme Court andof theConstitutional Tribunal. Itexamined
thenature oflustration proceedings to determine whether it isof acriminal char-
acter. Although this issue was decided by theEuropean Court ofHuman Rights
inMoczulski vPoland,101 theAppellate Court hardly observed that both theCon-
stitutional Tribunal andthe ECtHR consider this procedure to be acriminal one.102
4.2. International Customary Law
Even though, as it seems, thejudgments concerning State immunity permit
Polish ordinary courts for adetailed analysis ofthe decisions offoreign jurisdic-
tions, theopportunity is not always seized. Case III CSK 293/07103was brought
to theSupreme Court by aPolish company against Turkey. Theformer claimed
compensation for aviolation ofits property right by unlawful seizure ofcompany’s
property on abasis ofthe regulation ofthe Turkish Ministry ofEnergy. TheCourt
was aware that it had to apply customary international law andeven underlined that
it isauthorized to dothat under thePolish Constitution (i.a. Art.9 which states that
theRepublic ofPoland shall respect international law binding upon it). However,
theCourts’ inquiry into international customary law on State immunity ishighly
disappointing. Since customary law isbased on usus andopinio iuris, the court had
to analyse also thecase law ofdomestic andinternational courts.104 Instead ofin-
voking domestic or international courts’ decisions, theSupreme Court mentioned
100 Case II AKz 542/10 (Wroclaw Appellate Court, 26 October 2010).
101 Moczulski vPoland, App. no. 49974/08 (ECtHR, 19 November 2011).
102 “Zarówno Trybunał Konstytucyjny, jak też Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka (o czym
wsposób zdecydowany ijednoznaczny pisze Trybunał Konstytucyjny między innymi wwyro-
ku zdnia 11 maja 2007r., sygn. akt K 2/07; zob. także wyrok Tr ybunału Konstytucyjnego zdnia
4 lipca 2002r., P 12/01, OTKA 2002, nr4, poz. 50) wielokrotnie stwierdzały, że postępowanie
lustracyjne ma charakter penalny. Świadczy otym zarówno charakter czynu, zaktóry spraw-
ca ponosi odpowiedzialność, charakter idolegliwość sankcji zaten czyn przewidzianych, jak
też reguły postępowania, wtoku którego stwierdzane jest ewentualne popełnienie czynu
zarzucanego iorzekane są sankcje będące jego prawną konsekwencją.”
103 Case III CSK 293/07 (Supreme Court, 13 March 2008).
104 C. Mik, ‘Jus cogens incontemporary international law’ (2013) Polish Yearbook ofInternation-
al Law XXXIII 50.

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 355
its own rulings105 underlining that theprinciple ofState sovereignty does not allow
Polish courts to adjudicate cases against other States acting within their sovereign
powers (acta iure imperii), however theimmunity does not cover non-sovereign
acts (acta iure gestionis). TheCourt referred as well to the1961 Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations106 andthe European Convention on State Immunity,107 but
only superfluously.
Comparable approach can be observed inthe case which factual background
was similar to Natoniewski cited above. Itconcerned compensation for theactions
ofGerman armed forces during theWorld War II. Theplaintiff claimed compen-
sation from theFederal Republic ofGermany for thealleged breach ofhis personal
rights resulting from genetic damages caused by medical experiments carried out
on his father as aprisoner ofaGerman concentration camp. TheWarsaw Provin-
cial Court inits decision inIC 862/07108 referred only to thejudgment ofthe CJEU
inC-292/05 Erini Lechouritou109 to emphasize that acts committed by themilitary
belong to acta iure imperii acts ofaState. They donot fall under thescope ofcivil
matters andtherefore acivil court cannot adjudicate them. TheProvincial Court
took no notice ofother decisions offoreign or international courts that were cited
inNatoniewski. Thus theCourt missed theopportunity offered by thecase to par-
ticipate inthe judicial dialogue.
5. Conclusions
The presented research results demonstrate that except for thedecisions ofthe
European Court ofHuman Rights andthe Court ofJustice ofthe European Union,
thePolish ordinary courts, albeit rarely, refer to thecase law ofthe International
Court ofJustice, the Human Rights Committee andthe courts of other States.
Thereason why such rare references occur rarely lies inthe scope ofordinary
courts’ jurisdiction, which isfocused on private law relations, based primarily on
domestic law. Thesubject matter ofthe cases only sometimes may require taking
into account international or foreign judgments. Ithappens especially if thecase
has some link to international law, such as human rights law, State immunity (cus-
tomary international law) or European Union law.
105 See Supreme Court cases: R 133/26 (2 March 1926); IC 1680/27 (10 February 1928); IIC413/37
(31 August 1937); III PZP 9/90 (26 September 1990); IPKN 562/99 (11 January 2000); ICK380/02
(13 November 2003).
106 Convention on diplomatic relations (Vienna, 18 April 1961).
107 European Convention on State Immunity (Basel, 16 February 1972).
108 Case IC 862/07 (Warsaw Provincial Court, 3 September 2008).
109 Case C-292/05 Erini Lechouritou andothers vDimosio tis Demokratias tis Germanias (CJEU,
15February 2007).

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
356
The most common practice ofordinary courts isto quote thedecisions with-
out their detailed examination. Thepurpose ofsuch citation isonly to support
thecourts’ own reasoning. However, there were also exceptional rulings ofacom-
parative andcritical character as the judgment ofthe Wroclaw District Court
inX P 384/13 concerning thefreedom ofspeech ofan employee, thejudgment
on theobligation to remove aSikh’s turban incertain circumstances as inMr.S.P.
(ICSK 439/13), theorder ofthe Warsaw Provincial Court inXXI Pz 95/14 on
State immunity from theenforcement proceedings andthe judgments ofthe Pol-
ish Supreme Court inNatoniewski (IV CSK 465/09), thedecision ofthe Warsaw
Appellate Court incase concerning clickable links (IACa 1663/13), the three
cases concerning thenotion ofan entrepreneur’s seat for thepurposes ofthe in-
solvency proceedings (II CSK 406/10, II CSK 541/10 andII CSK 326/10) andthe
judgment ofthe Appellate Court in Bialystok on contract ofcurrency option
(IACa 833/12). Inthe above mentioned judgments thePolish courts not only
merely cited thedecisions ofother jurisdictions, but they analysed them indetail
andwidely discussed, considering whether an analogous reasoning could be ap-
plied with respect to Polish law.
For ajudicial dialogue to have its proper discursive character, Polish courts
should not only refer to therulings ofinternational andforeign courts, but their
views should be noticed likewise by international or foreign courts. Itis worth
noticing, that theSupreme Court’s decision inNatoniewski contributed to thein-
ternational dialogue on immunities ofState, owing to its English translation pub-
lished inPolish Yearbook ofInternational Law. Itsubsequently was discussed by
theInternational Court ofJustice inJurisdictional Immunities ofthe State (Ger-
many vItaly: Greece Intervening) andby theEuropean Court ofHuman Rights
inJones andOthers vtheUnited Kingdom. One must conclude, therefore, that if
Polish judges wish to have their part inadiscussion on vital issues ofinternational
law, their decisions should be made accessible inforeign languages.
It must be appraised that some ofthe Polish ordinary courts try, however rare-
ly, to participate inthe dialogue with thecourts of different jurisdictions. Even
though thelack ofknowledge ofagiven foreign language (for example amodern
Greek) impedes thejudges from becoming acquainted with foreign judgments,
they learn about theexternal jurisdictions with thehelp ofthe Ministry ofJustice
or, more often, legal publications inaspecific field. Itis obvious that theactivity
ofscholars inthe sphere ofcomparative law becomes thus more important.
One ofthe examples where thescholarly work had an impact on areasoning
ofa court was the decision ofthe Warsaw Appellate Court inI ACa 410/13,110
where basing on thebook ofJ. Rosén111 theCourt quoted theruling ofthe England
110 Case IACa 410/13 (Warsaw Appellate Court, 28 October 2013).
111 J. Rosén, Intellectual Property at the Crossroads of Trade (Edward Elgar 2012). TheCourt
wrote that it cited thetext ofAmanda Michaels from thementioned book. Itmust be pointed
out, however, that whilst Amanda Michaels isaknown author inthe field ofthe intellectual
property law, she isnot one ofthe authors ofthe invoked book.

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 357
and Wales High Court in Jean Christian Perfumes Ltd andAnor v Thakrar.112
Theaim ofthis citation was to strengthen theopinion presented by theWarsaw
Appellate Court inthe statement ofreasons. Another example isthe resolution
ofthe Polish Supreme Court (IKZP 21/06113), inwhich theCourt, citing thearticle
ofascholar,114 referred to thetwo decisions ofthe High Court ofIreland inFal-
lon115 andto opinion ofthe Belgian Cour de Cassation.116 Theaim ofthese refer-
ences was thepresentation ofdifferent approaches ofnational courts ofother EU
member States to theanalyzed subject matter (European arrest warrant). Similarly,
theabove mentioned cases on theapplication ofthe CMR Convention117 referred
to foreign decisions on thebasis oftheir quoting inthe articles inthe journal Eu-
ropean Transport Law.
In thejudgment inNatoniewski thePolish Supreme Court got theinforma-
tion about thequoted international andforeign decisions andtheir content from
theopinion ofthe Ministry ofJustice, which was delivered on thebasis ofthe Code
ofCivil Procedure.118 Theother sources were thewebsites ofthe CJEU or theIn-
ternational Civil Service Commission or Polish Professional software (e.g. LEX).
TheCourt found some information inthe legal literature, e.g. thePolish magazine
Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego (Public Law Quarterly).
The judicial dialogue ofPolish ordinary courts suffers from several drawbacks.
Usually thereview ofinternational or foreign decisions issuperficial, as it isre-
stricted to amere reference, therefore it can be classified as adecorative dialogue.
Unfortunately, there arealso some other factors or improper practices that hamper
judicial dialogue. For ordinary courts themost noticeable problem isan adequate
quoting ofinternational andforeign decisions that sometimes produce humor-
ous results. Themost remarkable example isnaming theECtHR as “the European
112 Jean Christian Perfumes Ltd & Anor vThakrar (t/aBrand Distributor or Brand Distributors Ltd)
(England andWales High Court, 27 May 2011). Unfortunately, theWarsaw Appellate Court
cites thejudgment with theinaccuracies. TheEngland andWales High Court isnamed “Eng-
lish High Court”, which isincorrect.
113 Case IKZP 21/06 (Supreme Court, 21 July 2006).
114 M. Hudzik, ‘Europejski nakaz aresztowania a nieletni sprawcy czynów zabronionych
–zagadnienia wybrane’ (2006) 8 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 22. What isinteresting, isthe
fact that thearticle was published inAugust 2006, whereas theCourt’s resolution isof July
2006 andthe Court indicated, that theofficial publication ofthe article was pending at
that time.
115 Minister for Justice Equality andLaw Reform vFallon aka Micheal OFalluin (High Court ofIre-
land, 9 September 2005), Minister for Justice Equality andLaw Reform vFallon aka Micheal
OFalluin (High Court ofIreland, 14 October 2005), TheSupreme Court inaccurately wrote
theparty’s name (Falkon instead ofFalluin).
116 Case P.05.0065.N (Belgian Cour de Cassation, 25 January 2005).
117 Case IACa 111/13 (Szczecin Appellate Court, 9 May 2013), Case IACa 696/03 (Warsaw Appel-
late Court, 4 February 2003), Case VIII Ga 31/13 (Szczecin Provincial Court, 8 March 2013).
118 Art.1143(3) ofthe Code ofCivil Procedure reads: “Acourt ex officio determines andapplies
proper foreign law. Acourt may ask theMinister ofJustice for theinformation on thetext
ofthis law andfor theexplanation offoreign judicial practice.”

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
358
Court ofHuman Rights inS.” where ‘S.’ stands for ‘Strasbourg’ or “the Court ofJus-
tice inL.” with ‘L.’ meaning ‘Luxembourg’.119 Thecitation often lacks names ofpar-
ties, dates ofjudgments or case numbers.120 These inaccuracies areeasy to over-
come; nevertheless, they may clearly hamper thejudicial discourse.
119 “Wprawdzie worzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka wS. orazSądu Naj-
wyższego, język iforma wypowiedzi prasowych podlegają ochronie, ale jednak wgranicach
prawa doczci tak jak swoboda wypowiedzi”, [in:] Case IACa 931/14 (Lodz Appellate Court,
30 December 2014). “Orzecznictwo Europejskiego Trybunału w S.”, [in:] Case I ACa 617/13
(Bialystok Appellate Court, 20 December 2013).
120 “M.A. N., C. iinni przeciwko Polsce –decyzja ETPC z dnia 14 maja 2013 r., skarga nr[…]
(w:)M.A. N., Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka. Wybór orzeczeń 2013, LEX/el., 2014”, [in:]
III AUa 21/14 (Szczecin Appellate Court, 23 September 2014); “orzeczenie zdnia 26 kwiet-
nia 1979r. wsprawie […] v. Wielka Brytania (I), skarga […], LEX nr80817; orzeczenie zdnia
23 maja 1991r. wsprawie O. v. Austria, skarga […], LEX nr81177; orzeczenie zdnia 8 lipca
1986r. wsprawie L. v. Austria, skarga […], LEX nr81012”, [in:] I ACa 662/12 (Lodz Appel-
late Court, 1October 2012); “Jak wskazał Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka wwyroku
zdnia 19 kwietnia 2001r. (P. przeciwko Grecji, sprawa 28524/95)”, [in:] IACa 966/12 (Warsaw
Appellate Court, 31January 2013); “Pozostaje ona zatem wwyraźnej opozycji dowskazań
zawartych wuzasadnieniu wwyroku ETPCz zdnia 10 maja 2011r. (nrskargi […])”, [in:] IIAKa
185/14 (Bialystok Appellate Court, 18 September 2014); “Wżadnym przeto wypadku wyrok
Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka z14 czerwca 2011r. –sprawa M. G. przeciwko Pol-
sce, skarga nr[…] nie mógł mieć precedensowego charakteru wniniejszej sprawie”, [in:]
VACa 535/12 (Katowice Appellate Court, 13 February 2014); “Dla rozstrzygnięcia omawia-
nego zagadnienia istotne znaczenie ma też wyrok Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka
z2 marca 2010r., nr13102, P. K. przeciwko Polsce, wktórym podkreślono”, [in:] IACa 40/14
(Warsaw Appellate Court, 26June 2014); “Natle tej dyrektywy, Trybunał Sprawiedliwości
wsprawie C-388/07 rozpoznał kilka pytań prejudycjalnych wprzedmiocie wykładni dyrek-
tywy”, [in:] IV IP 300/09 (Wroclaw Provincial Court, 16 July 2010); “Sprawa mieścisię więc
wpojęciu sprawy cywilnej ihandlowej, rozumianej wsposób ugruntowany worzecznictwie
Trybunału Sprawiedliwości (por. np. wyrok ETS zdnia 14 listopada 2002r., C-271/00 Slg.
2002, I-10489)”, [in:] IV CSK 202/13 (Supreme Court, 28 February 2014); “Także Trybunał
Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej wwyroku zdnia 19 grudnia 2012r. wydanym wsprawie
prejudycjalnej A. e. A. (C-325/11)”, [in:] IACz 1479/13 (Bialystok Appellate Court, 5December
2013); “porównaj między innymi wyroki ETS zdnia 11 lipca 2008r. C-195/08 PPU, Dz.Urz.
UE, C-223 zdnia 30 sierpnia 2008 r. izdnia 22 grudnia 2010 r., C-491/10, PPU, Dz. U. UE,
C-2011.63/23 zdnia 26 lutego 2011r. izdnia 22 grudnia 2010r., C-497/10, PPU, Dz. U. UE,
C-2011.55.17 zdnia 19 lutego 2011 r.”, [in:] I CSK 426/14 (Supreme Court, 17 September
2014). Itis worth noticing, that the‘PPUs’ used inall ofthe cases arenot thenames ofthe
parties to theproceedings, but they areashortcut for ‘preliminary ruling’ (pytanie prejudy-
cjalne). “Wwyroku ETS zdnia 13 grudnia 2007r. wydanym wtrybie prejudycjalnym rozstrzy-
gnięto bowiem, że…”, [in:] IACz 186/12 (Katowice Appellate Court, 6 March 2012); “tak m.in.
wyrok Trybunału Sprawiedliwości z10 kwietnia 1984r. wsprawie 14/83 von C., pkt 26; wyrok
z13listopada 1990r. wsprawie C-106/89 M., pkt 8; wyrok z5 października 2004r. wpołą-
czonych sprawach C-397/01 doC-403/01 P. iin., pkt 113 i115”, [in:] IACa 1166/13 (Warsaw
Appellate Court, 11 March 2014). Itis worth noticing that “wyrok Trybunału Sprawiedliwości
z10 kwietnia 1984r. wsprawie 14/83 von C.” means the“case 14/83 Von Colson andKamann
v.Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (CJEU, 10 April 1984)”, which isavery well-known andrecogni-
zable judgment ofthe CJEU.

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 359
Bibliography
I. Case law
International courts
CJEU
14/83 Von Colson andKamann vLand Nordrhein-Westfalen (10 April 1984)
C-172/91 Volker Sonntag vHans Waidmann, Elisabeth Waidmann andStefan Waidmann (21April 1993)
C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) vRafael Hoteles SA (7February 2006)
C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd. (2 May 2006)
C-292/05 Erini Lechouritou andothers vDimosio tis Demokratias tis Germanias (15 February 2007)
C-466/12 Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine Sahlman, Pia Gadd vRetriever Sverige AB (13 Fe-
bruary 2014)
ECtHR
X vUnited Kingdom, App. no. 7992/77 (12 July 1978)
Jersild vDenmark, App. no. 15890/89 (23 September 1994)
Nilsen andJohnsen vNorway, App. no. 23118/93 (25 November 1999)
Waite andKennedy vGermany, App. no. 26083/94 (18 February 1999)
Fuentes Bobo vSpain, App. no. 39293/98 (29 February 2000)
McElhinney vIreland, App. no. 31253/96 (21 November 2001)
Al-Adsani vtheUnited Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97 (21 November 2001)
Kalogeropoulou andothers vGreece andGermany, App. no. 59021/00 (12 December 2002)
Phull vFrance, App. no. 35753/03 (11 January 2005)
Wojtas-Kaleta vPoland, App. no. 20436/02 (16 July 2009)
Mann Singh vFrance, App. no. 24479/07 (27 November 2008)
Palomo Sanchez andothers vSpain, App. no. 28955/06 (12 September 2011)
Sosinowska vPoland, App. no. 10247/09 (18 October 2011)
Moczulski vPoland, App. no. 49974/08 (19 November 2011)
Jones andOthers vtheUnited Kingdom, App. no. 34356/06 and40528/06 (14 January 2014)
IACtHR
Compulsory Membership inan Association Prescribed by Law for thePractice ofJournalism, Advisory
Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights Series ANo. 5 (13 November 1985)
ICJ
Barcelona Traction, Light andPower Company (Belgium vSpain) (24 July 1964)
Case concerning thearrest warrant of11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic ofthe Congo v Belgium
(14February 2002)
Jurisdictional immunities ofthe State (Germany vItaly: Greece intervening) (3 February 2012)

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
360
Other international bodies
Human Rights Committee
Mann Singh vFrance, App. no. 1928/2010 (19 July 2013)
Polish courts
Supreme Court
Judgments
R 133/26 (2 March 1926)
IC 1680/27 (10 February 1928)
C II 413/37 (31 August 1937)
II CKN 321/99 (18 August 1999)
ICK 380/02 (13 November 2003)
V CSK 295/07 (12 December 2007)
III CSK 293/07 (13 March 2008)
IV CSK 465/09 (29 October 2010)
III CZP 16/10 (30 November 2010)
II CSK 326/10 (16 February 2011)
II CSK 406/10 (16 February 2011)
II CSK 541/10 (16 February 2011)
III CZP 25/11 (18 October 2011)
II KK 296/11 (13 June 2012)
IV CSK 309/12 (8 February 2013)
II PK 207/12 (27 February 2013)
IV CSK 202/13 (28 February 2014)
ICSK 439/13(17 September 2014)
ICSK 426/14 (17 September 2014)
Orders
IPKN 562/99 (11 January 2000)
III CSK 293/07 (13 March 2008)
III KK 152/10 (30 November 2010)
III KK 327/12 (5 April 2013)
IV CSK 202/13 (28 February 2014)
II KK 265/13 (19 March 2014)
IPZ 19/14 (28 October 2014)
Resolutions
IKZP 21/06 (21 July 2006)
III CZP 113/13 (7 February2014)
IPZ 19/14 (28 October 2014)

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 361
Resolutions of Seven Judges
III PZP 9/90 (26 September 1990)
Bialystok Appellate Court
Judgments
IACa 833/12 (21 January 2013)
IACa 617/13 (20 December 2013)
II AKa 185/14 (18 September 2014)
Orders
IACz 1479/13 (5 December 2013)
Katowice Appellate Court
Judgments
V ACa 535/12 (13 February 2014)
Orders
IACz 186/12 (6 March 2012)
Lodz Appellate Court
Judgments
IACa 662/12 (1 October 2012)
IACa 931/14 (30 December 2014)
Lublin Appellate Court
Judgments
II AKa 91/11 (6 June 2011)
Szczecin Appellate Court
Judgments
IACa 758/12 (20 December 2012)
IACa 111/13 (9 May 2013)
III AUa 21/14 (23 September 2014)

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
362
Warsaw Appellate Court
Judgments
IACa 696/03 (4 February 2003)
IACa 201/12 (20 September 2012)
IACa 966/12 (31 January 2013)
IACa 410/13 (28 October 2013)
IACa 1166/13 (11 March 2014)
IACa 1663/13 (7 May 2014)
IACa 40/14 (26 June 2014)
Wroclaw Appellate Court
Orders
II AKz 340/10 (17 June 2010)
II AKz 542/10 (26 October 2010)
Szczecin Provincial Court
Judgments
VIII Ga 31/13 (8 March 2013)
Warsaw Provincial Court
Orders
IC 862/07 (3 September 2008)
XXI Pz 95/14 (26 June 2014)
Wroclaw Provincial Court
Judgments
IV IP 300/09 (16 July 2010)
Wroclaw District Court
Judgments
X P 384/13 (7 June 2013)
Other States’ courts

VI. ThePolish Ordinary Courts inDialogue on International Law 363
Belgium
Cour de Cassation
P.05.0065.N (25 January 2005)
France
Cour de Cassation
82-12462 Islamic Republic ofIran vSociété Eurodif andothers (14 March 1984)
00-87215 Qaddafi (13 March 2001)
Germany
Constitutional Court
2 BvM 1/76 (13 December 1977)
Federal Tribunal
XI ZR 33/10 (22 March 2011)
Greece
Special Supreme Court
111/2000 Perfectory Voiotia vGermany (Distomo) (4 May 2000)
6/2002 Margellos vGermany (17 September 2002)
Italy
Corte di Cassazione
5044/2004 Ferrini vGermany (11 March 2004)
1072/08 Civitella (21 October 2008)
United Kingdom
England and Wales High Court
Jean Christian Perfumes Ltd & Anor vThakrar (t/aBrand Distributor or Brand Distributors Ltd.)
(27May 2011)
High Court of Ireland
Minister for Justice Equality andLaw Reform vFallon aka Micheal OFalluin (9 September 2005)
Minister for Justice Equality andLaw Reform vFallon aka Micheal OFalluin (14 October 2005)
High Court of Justice in London
Enron Directo SA (4 July 2002 and10 December 2002)

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
364
House of Lords
Alcom Ltd. vRepublic ofColombia (12 April 1984)
Commissioner ofPolice for theMetropolis andOthers, Ex Parte Pinochet (24 March 1999)
Jones vSaudi Arabia (14 June 2006)
United States of America
Supreme Court
Republic ofAustria vMaria Altmann (7 June 2004)
Court of Appeals, 9 Circuit
Liu vRepublic ofChina (29 December 1989)
Court of Appeals, 2 Circuit
Bruce Smith vSocialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (26 November 1996)
DC Circuit Court of Appeals
Guy von Dardel vtheUSSR (15 October 1985)
Hugo Princz vFederal Republic ofGermany (14 April 2003)
District Court (New York)
Hirsch vState ofIsrael andState ofGermany (8 April 1997)
II. References
Books and articles
Hudzik M., ‘Europejski nakaz aresztowania anieletni sprawcy czynów zabronionych –zagadnienia
wybrane’ (2006) 8 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 22
Mik C., ‘Jus cogens incontemporary international law’ (2013) Polish Yearbook ofInternational Law
XXXIII 27
Rosén J., Intellectual Property at theCrossroads ofTrade (Edward Elgar 2012)
Webistes
Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej, ‘Lista sądów powszechnych’, <https://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/rejestry-i-ew-
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Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej, ‘Orzecznictwo Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka’, <https://
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wieka najęzyk polski’, <https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/europejski_trybunal_
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