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* Dovydas Rogulis, Lithuanian Riemen’s Union International Aairs Coordinator. E-mail: dovydas.
rogulis@sauliusajunga.lt
Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya,
Afghanistan, And eir Impact On Relations With
Russia After e Cold War
Dovydas Rogulis*
Abstract
is thesis seeks to nd out how NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan
have aected relations with Russia. In order to achieve the aim and hypothesis of the study, the
critical geopolitical approach is chosen as a theoretical framework.
A schematic critical geopolitics conceptualization of Gearóid Ó. Tuathail is used as the method of
research. is thesis mostly pays attention to three essential parts of the critical geopolitics: “formal
geopolitics” (analyses of think tanks, specialists, etc.), “practical geopolitics” (the decisions of policy
makers, ocial statements, documents, strategies and speeches) and “popular geopolitics” (the
discourse of the media and surveys). e combination of these three elements allows determining the
certain NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan.
With regard to evidences of crises, NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses are assessed from very
positive, positive, neutral, to negative and very negative. It provides an opportunity to see how
both sides have acknowledged these crises and how in long terms NATO’s military interventions in
Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have inuenced relations with Russia in international order.
Moreover, descriptive method, discourse analysis and a comparative approach are used to scrutinize
Russian and NATO’s geopolitical discourses towards crises. e analyses of NATO’s and Russian
geopolitical discourses show that the hypothesis dierent NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses
towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have aected reciprocal relations is correct. e
crisis of Kosovo in 2008 marks the end of the Russian exible policy towards NATO and marks a
new beginning of a permanently hostile geopolitical discourse against NATO in Europe. NATO
military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have negatively aected relations with
Russia mostly in Europe. Mutual cooperation and diplomatic disputes towards crises in Libya and
Afghanistan are minor in comparison with the NATO-Russian relations in the European continent.
Consequently, Russia concentrates most of its attention to the geopolitical tradition towards Europe.
Keywords
Critical geopolitics, geopolitical discourses, international relations, NATO, Russia, Kosovo,
Libya, Afghanistan, the US
Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review vol. 36 (2017)
DOI: 10.1515/lfpr-2017-0001
© 2017 Dovydas Rogulis. is is an open access article licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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58 Dovydas Rogulis
Introduction
After the Cold War new ideas started to appear in academic discourse. e
classical and modern geopolitics, realism, neorealism, and neoliberalism are no
longer adequate to fully explain the changes and transformations of the world since
the 1990s. Geography as a fundamental factor of geopolitics lost its signicance.
Power balance, game theories, and self-interest are not the driving forces of the
state in the international order. Nowadays since 1990s countries with the same
ideologies, values, and identities started to (re)unite and (re)establish regional
or even global organizations and alliances. In 1949 NATO was established as a
military defense alliance, which unied Western countries against the Soviet
menace. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the external threat of NATO also
disappeared. Consequently, NATO had to search for a new vision in order to exist
as an alliance.
Since 1990s NATO’s transformation was signicant in several aspects that
geography, general mapping system, and classical and modern geopolitics are not
able to explain. e Alliance expanded and incorporated new allies all around
Europe; it implemented new overseas missions outside its boundaries; it expanded
its capabilities from peacekeeping and reconstruction missions to humanitarian
aid and the ght against piracy and global terrorism. In addition, in the last two
decades NATO transformed its military and modied eectiveness.
Changes in the international system were a fundamental factor that propelled
NATO’s new geopolitical and military developments. Eventually, NATO as a
military alliance became a political tool, which has been used to implement Western
countries’ policies toward the rest of the world. Consequently, NATO’s military
missions have interfered in Russia’s geopolitics, which has encouraged a reshaping
of Russia’s relations with the Western military alliance. NATO’s actions challenged
the Russian geopolitical interests in the world. As the result, it was necessary to
rethink the Russian security strategy, modernize its military capabilities, and
mobilize the support of the media and the local citizens against NATO.
is research is topical due to its deep review of past NATO military conicts
that determined the contemporary relations of NATO and Russia. American and
NATO military interventions made Putin to conclude that the West is dangerous and
unpredictable.1 In the current multipolar world, the relations of NATO and Russia
could determine the balance of power in Europe (war in Ukraine), Caucasus (frozen
conict in Georgia), and in the Middle East (Syria). e struggle and resistance of
1 Janis Berzins, Russian new generation warfare is not hybrid warfare, e war in Ukraine: Lessons for
Ukraine, (2015), 41.
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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Russia toward NATO leads to new debates, negotiations, and conicts, which might
highly inuence regional and even global geopolitics, economies, and social aairs.
is research seeks to nd out how dierent crises in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Libya were acknowledged by NATO and Russia. e hypothesis of this research
claims that dierent NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses toward crises in
Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan have aected reciprocal relations. With regard to the
hypothesis, the aim of the research is to nd out how NATO military interventions
in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan have aected relations with Russia. In order to
fulll the aim of this research three goals are introduced: to conceptualize the critical
geopolitical theory and relate it to NATO and Russian positions; to compare and
contrast Russian and NATO’s geopolitical discourses toward the Kosovo, Libyan
and Afghanistan crises and clarify the consequences for the mutual relations and
cooperation in the international order; to encapsulate all insights.
Research methods: Descriptive method, discourse analysis, and a comparative
approach will be applied.
is research is dierent from other similar works with its exclusive approach to
NATO and Russian relations, which were aected by NATO military interventions
in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan. is research reviews history for more than a
decade, which actually allows a better look at military operations from a distance. As
an alternative to nowadays popular neoclassical realism theory, the critical geopolitics
is chosen as a new approach to explain the international order from the dierent
broader perspective. Critical geopolitics seeks to investigate geopolitics as a cultural,
social, and political practice. Critical geopolitics helps to review not only what is
“outside” of actor/state, but what is “inside,” the “domestic” and the “foreign,” “there”
and “here”.2 Analysis of three dierent cases gives an opportunity to anticipate and
indicate how NATO and Russia have acknowledged these crises and how their dierent
geopolitical discourses toward crises have led to reciprocal accruing disagreements,
which eventually inuenced contemporary conicts in Ukraine and Syria.
Conceptualization of the critical geopolitics and its relation to
NATO and Russian position
In the late 1980s, critical geopolitics appeared as a critique of modern
geopolitics. However, the key critical geopolitical literature emerged only in the
1990s. e end of superpower rivalry, which had shaped the structure of (geo)
2 G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, e Geopolitics Reader, Routledge; second edition
(2006), 8.
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political thought for over 40 years, further fueled interest in the spatiality of power
in geography and throughout social science.3 e rethinking of power structure
required critical thought that progressively was labeled as critical geopolitics.
According to Gearóid Ó. Tuathail and Simon Dalby, the main scholars of the
critical geopolitics school, critical geopolitics “has emerged out of the work of a
number of scholars in the elds of geography and international relations who, over
the two last decades, have sought to investigate geopolitics as a social, cultural and
political practice”.4 Critical geopolitics is not about “the outside” of the state but
about the very construction of boundaries of “inside” and “outside,” “here” and
“there,” the “domestic” and the “foreign”.5 For instance, the construction of Russian
foreign policy also involves domestic policy, and it also reshapes political identity
of indigenous and external actors. e same could be said about NATO, the ght
against global terrorism aects member states and their political discourse.
Furthermore, “the main goal of the critical geopolitical approach is not just
to characterize the geography of politics, but to analyze the actual politics of the
geographical specication of politics”.6 In other words, critical geopolitics does
not only concentrate on the relations only between states, but it also analyzes how
particular relations and policies were created, approved, and implemented.
John Agnew, another critical geopolitics writer, claims that “critical geopolitics
can be dened in a broad way as the critical sense that world politics is underpinned
by assumptions and schemas about the ways in which geographical divisions of the
world, strategic plans, and global images enter into the making foreign policy”.7
One can presuppose that premises and schemas are socially constructed by particular
people who were inuenced by identity, history, geographical position, etc.
Other academics argue that the basic concept behind critical geopolitics is that
intellectuals of statecraft construct ideas about places; these ideas have inuence
and reinforce their political behaviors and policy choices.8 However, the discourse
of geopolitics does not belong to exclusively political elites anymore. Critical
geopolitics broadens the analysis of geopolitics from state actors located in formal
3 Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, e Ashgate Research Companion to Critical
Geopolitics, Ashgate, (2013), 6
4 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics, Routledge; second
edition, (2002), 2.
5 Ibid., p. 4.
6 Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, e Ashgate Research Companion to Critical
Geopolitics, Ashgate, (2013), 6
7 Ibid., p. 19-20.
8 Fouberg, Erin H., Alexander B. Murphy, and H. J. de Blij, Human Geography: People, Place, and
Culture (10 ed.), (2012), 535.
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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institutions (such as government ministries, universities or think-tanks) to nonstate
actors.9 For instance, Russian president Vladimir Putin does not create his own
doctrines and strategies, his ideas are inuenced and shaped by political advisers,
policymakers, and even by civil society groups, insurgencies, NGOs, etc.
Consequently, discourses are seen to inuence the rules and conventions by
which political behavior is structured, regulated, and judged.10 e scholars of
the critical geopolitics school claim that geopolitics must be conceptualized as a
form of political practice and a discourse. However, many writers limit the critical
geopolitical approach with particular phrases and ideas. Gearóid Ó. Tuathail and
Simon Dalby are some of among the few scholars who have fully conceptualized
and theorized the critical geopolitical approach. eir input to critical geopolitics is
signicant. ey distinguish ve fundamental arguments of critical geopolitics:
1. Geopolitics is a much wider cultural phenomenon than is normally dened
and comprehended by the geopolitical tradition of wise men’s statecraft.
2. Critical geopolitics bears witness to the irredeemable plurality of space and the
multiplicity of possible political constructions of space. us, it pays particular
attention to the boundary-drawing practices and performances that characterize
the everyday life of states.
3. Critical geopolitics argues that geopolitics is not a singularity but a plurality.
Critical geopolitics must be considered as a political activity carried out by a
range of political actors and not limited to a small group.
4. Critical geopolitics argues that the practice of studying geopolitics can never be
politically neutral. It is always inuenced by certain values, experiences, etc.
5. Ultimately, in conceptualizing geopolitics as “situated reasoning” a critical
perspective also seeks to theorize its broader socio-spatial and techno-territorial
circumstances of development and use. Historically, the question of geopolitics
has always been the question of states and their societies, technological networks
and their relationship to territoriality.
e ve arguments above conceptualize the critical geopolitical approach in
terms of the meaning, space, and stability. However, the critical geopolitics argue
that these three elements are inuenced and shaped by other factors, such as certain
values, identity, history, state apparatus, etc.11 Consequently, the knowledge of these
9 Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, e Ashgate Research Companion to Critical
Geopolitics, Ashgate, (2013), 7.
10 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, Routledge (2004), 31
11 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics, Routledge; second
edition, (2002), 6.
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features is fundamental to the successful operationalization of the state’s/agency’s
“the real geopolitics.” At this point “the real geopolitics” must be understood as the
criticism to the classical geopolitics, which, according to the critical geopolitics, is
outlived and could not explain the contemporary events. However, this research
does not seek to nd out “the real geopolitics” of NATO or Russia.
Gearóid Ó. Tuathail provides a schematic critical geopolitics conceptualization
which is also used as the methodology for this research. e table below presents
its key features.
Graph No. 1: Geopolitics: A Critical Geopolitics Conceptualization.
Source: G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, e Geopolitics Reader, Routledge, second edition
(2006), 8.
Gearóid Ó. Tuathail argues that all states, as recognized territorial units within
an international system of states, have a geopolitical culture.12 Geopolitical culture
is mostly understood as a state’s/agency’s unique identity, position, and inuence
in world politics. In other words, it could be also dened as geopolitical tradition,
which is one of the approaches to the geopolitical culture. States or agencies do
not limit themselves only with one geopolitical tradition. Regarding the certain
characteristics of the state or agency there might be even more than one geopolitical
tradition. In addition, Gearóid Ó. Tuathail asserts that geopolitical culture or
tradition is conditioned by a series of factors:
- A state’s geographical situation
- Historical/political formation and bureaucratic organization
12 G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, e Geopolitics Reader, Routledge; second edition
(2006), 7
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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- Discourses of national identity
- Traditions of theorizing its relationship to wider world
- e networks of power operating in the state.13
Gearóid Ó. Tuathail’s distinction once again approves that the geopolitics is
more than a political geography and mapping. On the one hand, it is a broad and
even complicated structure of certain elements, but on the other hand, it helps
better to understand the actions taken by the particular state or agency in the
international order.
For instance, there might be three dierent geopolitical traditions in the
Russian Federation: “Russia within Europe,” “Eurasian theory,” and “Russia as
a bridge between East and West”.14 Every tradition was inuenced by particular
historical factors, such as Slavophilism, or by western models and institutions,
or by particular technological and economic developments. Besides, the Russian
geopolitical tradition in Europe has been inuenced by European states and
NATO. e Alliance’s actions invoked a particular Russian response and counter-
reaction, which have led to reciprocal accruing disagreements and cooperation.
Regarding NATO’s past historical events and new global severities, geopolitical
traditions could be distinguished as “Euro-Atlantic collective defense” and “crisis
manager.” It is possible to argue that NATO could be considered as a hybrid, a
collective security club and an agency for conict prevention. One the one hand,
NATO concentrates on the security of Euro-Atlantic space, and on the other hand
it seeks to expand its capabilities and participate in various operations and missions
all around the globe. However, as the research suggests later, NATO’s geopolitical
tradition of “crisis manager” was partly unsuccessful due to particular reasons.
Moving on, the geopolitical tradition nds concrete expression in the form
of particular geopolitical discourses. Discourses are not merely speech or written
statements but actually the rules by which verbal speech and written declarations
are made meaningful.15 Moreover, in the critical geopolitics approach, discourses
are not only produced by political elites, but also throughout state-centered society
at multiple sites.16 Gearóid Ó. Tuathail distinguishes critical geopolitics discourse
into “formal geopolitics,” “practical geopolitics,” and “popular geopolitics.”
13 Ibid., p. 7.
14 Ibid., p. 8.
15 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, “Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning
in American foreign policy”, Political Geography Vol. 11, No. 2, March 1992, 95.
16 G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, e Geopolitics Reader, Routledge; second edition
(2006), 9.
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“Formal geopolitics” refers to the experts or the strategic community of the
state who create political doctrines, strategic studies, or specic bureaucratic
reports. For instance, NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and
Allied Command Transformation are the key institutions that promote changes
by driving, facilitating, and advocating continuous improvement of Alliance
capabilities to maintain and enhance the military relevance and eectiveness of
the Alliance. In Russia, the Ministry of Defense and the Security Council are the
leading institutions that ensure the establishment of particular strategies, doctrines,
etc. Undoubtedly, under all these institutions there are many committees, working
groups, think-tanks, and bureaucrats who are responsible for the ecient creation
and implementation of strategies.
Sometimes “formal geopolitics” and “practical geopolitics” reproduce each other,
particularly when politicians are directly involved in the strategy-making. On the
other hand, “practical geopolitics” is mostly related with the leaders of the state and
foreign aairs policymakers.17 “Practical geopolitics” represents the actual practice
of policy that is usually expressed by ocial political speeches or the state’s/agency’s
actions. In NATO, practical geopolitics is mostly related with the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) where political decisions are adopted by permanent member-state
delegations. In comparison with Russia, NATO’s “practical geopolitics” requires
a consensus among all representatives of member states. Consequently, NATO’s
political decisions and actions (“practical geopolitics”) represent a unilateral position
of the entire Alliance. In theory, the Russian “practical geopolitics” applies to the
already mentioned Security Council, current president Vladimir Putin, prime
minister Dmitry Medvedev, the Minister of Foreign Aairs Sergey Lavrov, and
other important politicians. However, in the practical way, the Russian “practical
geopolitics” belongs to the small circle of the decision makers, especially including
Putin.
Last but not least, “popular geopolitics” refers to the mass media, state rituals,
and public opinion. Taking into account that NATO is an agency/international
actor that unites a group of states, thus both Russia and NATO use mass media
for core dissemination of ideas and propaganda to societies. Similar to mass media,
state rituals also shape and transform the opinion of people. For instance, NATO
represented by the certain media as the exclusive club of democratic countries that
protects human rights, international law, and Russia represented by its media as the
counterbalance to the hegemony of the west (NATO).
17 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics, Routledge; second
edition, (2002), 12.
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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What is more, Gearóid Ó. Tuathail argues that “not all geopolitical discourses
are created or treated equally”.18 On the one hand, some geopolitical discourses
are produced by military or state institutions, military specialists, and universities.
On the other hand, one of the discourses could be also inuenced by civil society:
NGOs, think-tanks, etc. Moreover, journals and newspapers often promote certain
geopolitical discourse that only serves a political agenda.19
Eventually, all three geopolitical discourses interact and inuence each other,
thus the lines between them could blur. Formal, practical, and popular geopolitics
are the outcome of the predominating geopolitical cultures and traditions. In
comparison with Russia as a state actor, NATO is considered as a military alliance;
however, this research seeks to analyze NATO from a dierent perspective and
perception. NATO member states represent a certain Western culture and traditions,
which eventually unite them to the unprecedented agency in the international
order. Undoubtedly, NATO as an international institution/agency depends on its
member states and their political decisions; however, on the other hand, member
states also depend on political and military decisions within NATO (for instance,
NATO’s article V). is research will analyze NATO as an international actor,
which has its political decision and strategy makers. e Western media, as the
representative of the “popular geopolitics,” will be taken into consideration as the
“a watchdog of NATO,” which monitors NATO’s activities.
A critical geopolitical approach helps to look at world aairs critically. It
provides a framework within which indigenous events in one place could be linked
to global politics. Besides, analyses of the geopolitical discourses could provide an
opportunity to predict the future direction of regional or world politics.
is research will mostly pay attention to three essential parts of the critical
geopolitics: “formal geopolitics” (think-tanks, specialists, etc.), “practical geopolitics”
(the decisions of policymakers, ocial statements, documents, strategies, and
speeches are compared and contrasted to each other). Legal documents such as
NATO strategic concepts, Russian foreign and military strategies, UN Security
Council resolutions, Prague Summit declaration, and similar reports are used.
Moreover, ocial speeches of Russian and NATO political leaders are taken from
Ministry of the Foreign Aairs of the Russian Federation and NATO ocial website)
and “popular geopolitics” (the Western and the Russian media and the social
media will be predominantly reviewed and compared. Regarding the circulation
and popularity of the media, the news coverage from BBC, CNN, der Spiegel,
18 G. O. Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge, e Geopolitics Reader, Routledge; second edition
(2006), 9.
19 Ibid., p. 9.
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66 Dovydas Rogulis
Reuters, e New York Times, Izvestia, Kommersant, Lenta, and Pravda newspapers
are analyzed. Moreover, several surveys such as Financial Times/Harris March–
April 2011 and e German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Transatlantic
Trends survey 2013” about public opinion toward the crises are used in order to
supplement and justify arguments. e timeframe of the media and surveys are
monitored from 1999 to March 2014).
e combination of these three elements will allow determining the certain
NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses toward crises in Kosovo, Libya, and
Afghanistan. With regard to evidence of crises, NATO’s and Russian geopolitical
discourses will be evaluated by the author of the article from very positive, positive,
neutral, to negative and very negative. It will provide an opportunity to see how both
sides have acknowledged these crises and how in the long-term NATO’s military
interventions in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan have inuenced relations with
Russia and the international order.
Ultimately, this research suggests that attention to long-lasting processes could help
to realize how international actors create and recreate regional or global politics
and how their dierent geopolitical discourses of crises have led to reciprocal
disagreements and cooperation (between NATO and Russia). After analyzing
all three critical geopolitics— “formal geopolitics,” “practical geopolitics,” and
“popular geopolitics” —the table below recapitulates evaluations of NATO’s and
Russia’s geopolitical discourses toward Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan crises in
the period of 1999–2014. It provides an opportunity to look at NATO’s military
operations and realize how it shaped relations with the Russian Federation.
1
2
3
4
5
Kosovo 1999 Afghanistan post-2001 Kosovo 2008 Libya 2011 Afghanistan2014
Graph No. 2: NATO’s and the Russian geopolitical discourses toward crises
Source: made by the author regarding research. Discourse towards crises:
5 – very positive; 4 – positive, 3 – neutral; 2 – negative, 1 – very negative.
Dash line—Russia; Solid line—NATO.
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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NATO’s geopolitical discourse
NATO’s geopolitical discourse with regard to Kosovo crisis in 1999 stayed
very positive. “Practical geopolitics” (NATO’s political decisions) were strongly
supported and partly inuenced by the “popular geopolitics.” Among specialists
who represent “formal geopolitics,” the 1999 bombings of Kosovo are seen as the
most successful NATO’s operation after the end of the Cold War. NATO was able
to amplify its military attacks on Yugoslavia because the Alliance had successfully
created the perception that it was responding in a measured and proportional way
to the events on the ground.20
After several years the idea of Kosovo independence among NATO members
already started to appear in 2005. In the year 2006, NATO diplomats were rmly
persuaded that “while Russia would be uncomfortable with Kosovo’s independence
they would still go with it”.21 In the year 2007, the troika group, which consisted of
the US, EU, and Russia negotiated the future of Kosovo. e unilateral declaration
of Kosovo’s independence, supported by most NATO countries, came just weeks
after the Contact Group report had armed that there would be no imposed
solution.22 e gridlock of negotiations between dierent parties was broken by
the self-willed Western countries’ decision to support Kosovo’s intention to become
independent.
However, the question of the Kosovo sovereignty divided NATO member
states into two dierent camps. NATO’s “practical geopolitics” turned out as
fragmented and not unilateral. e majority of NATO member states approved the
conrmation of Kosovo’s independence, but the rest opposed it. Spain, Slovakia,
Romania, and Greece still do not recognize the status of Kosovo. e main purpose
for their reaction is the contemporary domestic political and ethnic issues that
these countries face. Nevertheless, NATO still tried to cooperate with Kosovo as
one united Alliance.
e same as in 1999, “popular geopolitics” played important role establishing a
certain NATO’s geopolitical discourse. e Western media paid exclusive attention
in February 2008 to the declaration of Kosovo’s independence. During the month
of February, BBC covered the story of Kosovo 79 times. BBC mostly analyzed the
impact of Kosovo’s independence on the Balkans region, Russia, and NATO.23 Even
20 John Norris, Collision course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo, Praeger Press (2005), 299
21 Judah Tim, Kosovo: what everyone needs to know, Oxford University Press, USA (2008), 135-136
22 James Hughes, “Russia and the Secession of Kosovo: Power, Norms and the Failure of Multilateralism”,
Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 65, No. 5, (July 2013), 1011
23 BBC.co.uk, “Recognition for new Kosovo grows”, March, 18, 2008; Source: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/7251359.stm
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though CNN wrote only 21 stories about Kosovo in one month, these articles were
more positive rather than unbiased regarding the question of the independence
of Kosovo. Some articles simply gloried NATO: “Kosovo’s dream to become
independent dates back decades, but only after NATO intervened militarily almost
a decade ago did ethnic Albanians begin to feel their dream could become true”.24
By contrast Der Spiegel mentioned Kosovo’s case 39 times and stayed more or less
impartial the entire time about the reaction of Western countries, Serbia, and
Russia.25 Journals and newspapers often promoted a certain geopolitical discourse
that served a political agenda that was more favorable to Kosovo’s state rather than
to Serbia.
Even though Kosovo with a support of Western countries successfully declared
its unilateral independence, the entire NATO’s geopolitical discourse could be
understood as neutral. One the one hand, “popular geopolitics” covered positive
news about Kosovo’s independence, but on the other hand, “practical geopolitics”
was represented as fragmented and dispersed. e similar changes of NATO’s
geopolitical discourse could be observed in the crisis of Afghanistan.
From the beginning, in the post-2001 Afghanistan the “popular geopolitics”
played a fundamental role reecting the US and its Allies campaign in Afghanistan
and shaping societies’ perception related to the war against terrorism. is can
be illustrated by an analysis of the quantity of Western media’s articles, which
were based on “terrorism” or on “terrorism in Afghanistan.” For instance, three
months after the 9/11 events BBC news wrote only 98 stories about terrorism
in Afghanistan and 2016 news about terrorism itself. Similarly, the German
newspaper Der Spiegel, in the same period wrote 322 stories about terrorism and
only 15 articles about terrorism in Afghanistan. After the tragic events in New
York, one of the main newspapers in the United States, e New York Times wrote
a record amount of news about terrorism – 2420 times, and as the oset, only
908 stories about Afghanistan’s terrorism. NATO’s rst overseas missions tested
its capabilities to deploy military units far from its boundaries, verify capacity to
stabilize, and reconstruct a failed state. e successful rst few years changed the
perception of NATO: the Alliance appeared as the global policeman with the United
States in front. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan holds broader international
implications with regard to the eectiveness of international strategies to combat
24 Alessio Vinci, “Analysis: Kosovo now and then”, CNN February 15, 2008, Source: http://www.cnn.
com/2008/WORLD/europe/02/15/kosovo.vinci/index.html?iref=allsearch
25 Der Spiegel, “Debatte um Unabhängigkeit: USA erkennen Kosovo an - Deutschland und viele EU-
Staaten wollen mitziehen”, March 18, 2008; Source: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/debatte-
umunabhaengigkeit-usa-erkennen-kosovo-an-deutschland-und-viele-eu-staaten-wollen-mitziehen-
a-536051.html
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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terrorism and insurgency.26 Notwithstanding, NATO was not entirely able to
function without international partners, particularly Russia. To sum up, in the
rst years of the military operation in Afghanistan, NATO’s geopolitical discourse
could be explained as positive.
Table 1: e Western media`s coverage of a “terrorism” and the “terrorism in Afghanistan”.
11/09/2001 to 11/12/2001 11/09/2002 to 11/12/2002
“Terrorism” “Terrorism in
Afghanistan” ‘“Terrorism” “Terrorism in
Afghanistan”
BBC 2016 98 701 8
Der Spiegel 322 15 165 2
e New York Times 2420 908 602 96
Source: Made by the author regarding the data of the news.
Since 2005, NATO has turned to counterinsurgency to win the hearts and
minds of the indigenous populations, thus the mission has expanded. NATO’s
leadership was too focused on liberal convictions in the abstract and too unaware
of the mission’s consequences.27 e divisions between NATO member states
have been a fundamental factor that impacted NATO’s geopolitical discourse in
the mission in Afghanistan. Internal disputes and the occasional independent act
of some NATO members, particularly the United States, upset external actions
in Afghanistan and ultimately overrode the principles of the Atlantic political
leadership. Inecient unilateral American policy toward Afghanistan distracted
the whole Alliance’s strategy. Contemporary relations between Afghanistan and
NATO switched from bad to worse. Excluding Afghanistan’s internal divisions and
counterinsurgency, the media, or in other terms, “popular geopolitics” is another
fundamental factor that has impacted NATO’s geopolitical discourse. e early
Western societies’ enthusiasm was transformed by the anxiety and later on, during
the economic crisis, deep public disappointment became a normal phenomenon.
e media is a key factor informing the Western population more often about the
failures in Afghanistan rather than successes. In the last several years the fatalities
26 Ivan Dinev Ivanov, Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions and Capabilities, Rowman &
Littleeld, (2011), 201.
27 Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: e Liberal Disconnect, Stanford Security Studies (2012),
214
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of NATO troops have reached the same number of casualties as the rst eight years
(2001–2008) of the war. Furthermore, the media has published contemporary
interviews with Afghanistan’s president who declares that “the entire NATO
exercise was one that caused Afghanistan a lot of suering, a lot of loss of life,
and no gains”.28 e hostility of Afghanistan’s politicians and society is constantly
published in various newspapers and mostly it is negative content news rather than
positive.29 Consequently, the whole NATO’s geopolitical discourse toward crises in
Afghanistan could be dened as negative.
In 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, under the mantle of “responsibility to
protect,” came at a crucial turning point in the history of the world.30 e vital
aim of NATO was to stop the Libyan government from using force against its
own people. e concept of “protecting the Libyan people” was also interpreted
dierently within NATO. NATO’s “formal” and “practical” geopolitical discourses
toward Libya gradually intensied and eventually NATO launched air strikes
simultaneously coordinated with the opposition troops’ ground attacks.
According to Ivo H. Daalder, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
and, James G. Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander
of the U.S. European Command, “the alliance responded rapidly to a deteriorating
situation that threatened hundreds of thousands of civilians rebelling against an
oppressive regime”.31 NATO’s “formal and practical” geopolitical discourse was
aimed to protect civilians, enforce no-y zone and continue with the weapons
embargo.
Notwithstanding the ocial opinion of NATO, the mission in Libya revealed
the deciencies of the Alliance and its strategic concept (2010), when the gap
between the coalition of the willing (the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom), who always drive military campaigns, and the rest of the member
states became wider than any time before. Operation Unied Protector was not
run by “political NATO” (practical geopolitics), but rather “command-and-control
NATO” (formal geopolitics), where again the coalition of the willing was leading
28 Yalda Hakim, “Afghanistan’s Hamid Karzai says NATO caused great suering”, BBC, October 7,
2013; Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-24433433
29 Emma Graham-Harrison, “Relationship between Hamid Karzai and US grows ever more poisonous”,
e Guardian, January 28, 2014; Source: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/29/
relationship-hamidkarzai-us-afghanistan
30 Campbell Horace, Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya, Monthly Review Press
(2013), 256
31 Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya e Right Way to Run an
Intervention”, Foreign Aairs vol 92, Nr. 2, (March/April 2012), 2.
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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the agenda setting and whole military campaign.32 Together with a fragmentation
within NATO, the geopolitical discourse toward the crisis in Libya and the overall
NATO geopolitical tradition “crisis manager” decreased dramatically.
Furthermore, analyzing NATO’s “practical geopolitical” discourse, political
disputes over the Libyan campaign mostly appeared between the United States
and France, which were pushing the American government to contribute to the
campaign and help the European Allies to deal with the Gadda regime. At the
same time (2011), NATO was simultaneously involved in peace-keeping mission in
Kosovo and ghting against terrorism in Afghanistan, where thousands of NATO
forces were still deployed.
Besides, the same year, the Financial Times and the Harris Datadase did a survey
in the United States and the other Alliance member states regarding the military
campaign in Libya. In the table below, the survey shows the striking skepticism of
NATO member states’ public opinion toward the overseas mission. However, even
the success in Libya did not alter and reshape beliefs of societies. In 2011, mostly
all NATO member states were still in an economic recession or slowly recovering
after the last economic crisis. Skepticism of the societies and the neglect of the
public opinion prove that NATO’s decision to go against Libya was based on a
few ambitious Alliance countries (France and the UK) and their unilateral political
decisions and eventually criticized by “popular geopolitics.”
Table 2: Public opinion toward crisis in Libya.
Financial Times/Harris March–April 2011
Support (%) Neither (%) Oppose (%)
United States 32 31 37
Britain 36 28 36
France 40 28 32
Germany 34 27 39
Financial Times/Harris March-April 2011
Support (%) Neither (%) Oppose (%)
Italy 29 21 50
Spain 37 29 34
32 Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: e Liberal Disconnect, Stanford Security Studies (2012),
44.
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Question of the survey: To what extent do you support or oppose the
current military intervention in Libya? Source: Harris Database: http://www.
harrisinteractive.com/vault/HI_UK_Corp_News_FT-Harris-Poll-Apr-2011.pdf
In overall, NATO’s geopolitical discourse in Libya could be understood as
neutral. Even though Gadda’s regime was changed, internal disputes within NATO
and criticism from “popular geopolitics” decreased a whole NATO’s geopolitical
discourse to neutral – neither positive, nor negative.
Russia’s geopolitical discourse
In the 1999 in Balkans Russia’s geopolitical discourse was hostile and critical
to NATO’s military operation against Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
is could be linked to Russia’s past experiences in Afghanistan and Chechnya
(1994–1996) when the application of hard power did not help to solve ethnic
problems. Additionally, Russia was deeply concerned about the air strikes in FRY
where Russian business was interrupted. Despite these facts Russia still sought to
be involved in the international decision making, which aimed at rebuilding the
devastated areas.
During 1999 Russia changed its own “practical geopolitical” position at
least a few times. At that time the Russian President Boris Yeltsin faced a great
diplomatic pressure from NATO member states, particularly from the United
States. And even though on June 23, 1999 Russia armed its commitment to full
implementation of the provisions and goals of the UN resolution UNSCR 1244,
Russia was still de facto secondary to decision-making.33 After ve months NATO
and Russian ambassadors met once again and emphasized “their commitment to
full implementation of the provisions and goals of UNSCR 1244”.34 Furthermore,
both sides also agreed “to cooperate closely in ensuring the protection of Kosovo’s
minorities and the establishment of a multi-ethnic, democratic society”.35 Ocial
agreements, however, did not fully represent the real situation on the ground in
33 Statement by the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council on the Security Situation in Kosovo (June
23, 1999); Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ocial_texts_27424.htm?selectedLocale=en
UN SC resolution 1244 (1999); Source: http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement
34 Press statement: meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council at Ambassadorial
level (November 17, 1999); Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ocial_texts_27413.
htm?selectedLocale=en
35 Ibid., Press statement: meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council at Ambassadorial
level
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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Kosovo. Russia’s political elite (“practical geopolitics”) and a whole Russian “formal
geopolitical” position was still overwhelmingly against NATO’s intervention. After
long months of endless negotiations between both sides, Russia nally did not even
have its own sector in the territory of Kosovo.
Moreover, all diplomatic agreements, negotiations and NATO military
operations against Serbia were constantly monitored by the Russian media. To the
contrast of the NATO “popular geopolitics,” the Russian “popular geopolitics” (the
media) appeared biased and one-sided in its coverage of the Kosovo events. Western
countries, particularly NATO member states, were seen as aggressors. e Russian
media was one of the main sources for information about the NATO campaign
in FRY and a serious generator of the certain Russian geopolitical discourse. For
instance, in more than two months (March 23 to June 10, 1999) the newspaper
Kommersant wrote 147 stories about Kosovo. Many of the articles criticized NATO
for invasion, for its activities supporting KLA, for constantly the increasing number
of civilian casualties, etc.36 In addition, Kommersant stayed positive about Serbia,
Milosevic, and the high morale of the Serbian people.37 A similar situation could
be recognized in another Russian newspaper Pravda. Even though Pravda wrote
less (only 52 articles in more than two months period), the content was similar.
e newspaper was more positive about FRY than about NATO.38 Eventually, the
Russian “popular geopolitics” mostly can be characterized as an anti-NATO, pro-
Russian, and pro-Serbian. In 1999 the NATO invasion and geopolitical discourse
toward the crisis in Kosovo did more damage to relations between NATO and
Russia than any other event in the 1990s.
Looking from the general perspective, if NATO’s a whole geopolitical discourse
was evaluated as very positive than with regard to the evidences and analyses, the
Russian geopolitical discourse toward the crisis in Kosovo could be determined as
very negative. e active involvement of NATO’s “formal and practical geopolitics”
led to the limitations and hostility of the Russian decision and strategy makers.
36 Афанасий Сборов, “Милошевич раздражает многих”, March 26, 1999; Source: http://www.
kommersant.ru/doc/215622?isSearch=True. Геннадий Сысоев, “Война без правил”, April 6,
1999; Source: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/15336?isSearch=True
37 Kommerstant.ru, “Я теперь знаю, как бывает в аду”, March 26, 1999; Source: http://www.
kommersant.ru/doc/215619?isSearch=True
38 Pravda.ru, “ Сегодня представители блока левых сил Украины пикетировали посольство
США”, March 25, 1999; Source: http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/25-03-1999/904126-0/.
Pravda.ru, “ Представитель СРЮ обвиняет НАТО в сговоре с Армией освобождения Косово
с целью усиления влияния Альянса на Балканах”, April 1, 1999; Source: http://www.pravda.
ru/news/world/01-04- 1999/900472-0/. Pravda.ru, “Силовой Метод Решения Проблемы
Косово Завел Нато В Тупик”, March 6, 1999; Source: http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/06-04-
1999/900558-0/.
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Later, in February 2007, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, expressed
Russia’s importance in European aairs. His controversial speech at the Munich
security conference emphasized two matters of fundamental importance: Russia
sought to play greater role in the international arena and second, Russia would be
pursuing its own independent policy regarding its political interest.39 In January
2008, just one month before the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, Moscow
issued a new foreign policy strategy. Relations between NATO and Russia were
recognized as an equal partnership, based on the international law and balance of
power – “one’s security at the expense of security of the Russian Federation” could
not be violated.40
Russian “formal and practical discourses” were aected by NATO’s
monopolization of the European aairs and its unilateral decisions. By 2008,
the centralization of political power could be noticed in the Russian geopolitical
discourse toward the crisis in Kosovo. e media, which are a fundamental
element of “popular geopolitics,” became closely related and even dependent on
the Kremlin political elite, the “practical geopolitics.” Consequently, the “popular
geopolitics” was a main distributor and reector of Moscow’s entire negative
geopolitical discourse toward Kosovo and the upholder of its independence—the
NATO Alliance.
For instance, the newspaper Kommersant in February 2008 covered 54 stories
about the independence of Kosovo. Mostly all stories, which were more informative
than biased, were related to the ocial reaction of Moscow. Many articles analyze
the strong response of the Russian government, the President, and diplomats.
Kommersant often emphasized the active role of President Vladimir Putin, who
appears as the leader uniting CIS and the symbol of the Russian “practical
geopolitics”.41
As the inverse to Kommersant, Izvestia, the ocial Russian news agency,
during the same period covered 160 stories about Kosovo’s independence, which
was threefold more than Kommersant did. In addition, when Kosovo declared its
unilateral independence; on the same day Izvestia published 20 stories, which were
more polemical rather than informative news. Izvestia claimed that Kosovo did
not have a future; it would not achieve full freedom and once Kosovars had the
39 Oliver Rolofs, ”A Breeze Of Cold War”, MSC, February 2007; Source: https://www.
securityconference.de/en/about/munich-moments/a-breeze-of-cold-war/
40 e Foreign Policy Concept Of e Russian Federation (2008); Source: http://archive.kremlin.ru/
eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml
41 Владимир Соловьев, “Президент и провожающие его лица”, Kommersant.ru, February 22,
2008; Source: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/855848?isSearch=True
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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opportunity, thousands of them would ee to western Europe. Consequently, the
certain agenda of the Russian “popular geopolitics” helped the ruling elite to set
a particular geopolitical discourse, which was nothing more than anti-Western.
In 2008 NATO’s geopolitical discourse toward the independence of Kosovo was
neutral, but the entire Russian geopolitical discourse turns out as negative.
Despite events in Kosovo, Russian position toward NATO intervention in
Afghanistan turns out as controversial. In February 2000, the new Russian President
Vladimir Putin thawed NATO–Russia relations, which, after the Kosovo war in
1999, were frozen for three months. e events of September 11 signaled to the
Russian politicians and strategic community (practical and formal geopolitics) how
far terrorism could extend and even threaten such a power as the United States.
Additionally, Moscow was deeply concerned about its own separatist regions and
expanding global terrorism; consequently, it started to cultivate more pragmatic
relations with NATO and its main contributor – the United States.
On September 19, 2001, in an interview with the German ARD Television
company, Putin strongly emphasized that “the response to the aggression with
which the United States has been confronted must be prompt”.42 From the outset
Russia clearly stated its discourse toward the threat of terrorism. In the immediate
aftermath of the 9/11 events, Putin even raised the question of possible Russian
membership in NATO.43 Moscow was ready to cooperate with NATO in all feasible
diplomatic and practical measures.
If in 1999 the Russian geopolitical discourse toward the crisis in Kosovo and
NATO was very negative, then after several years we can observe the signicant
changes. First, the general structure of the Russian geopolitical culture was shaped
by the new state apparatus (new political leaders appeared) and relations with
neighbors (Russia was still economically and politically weak, thus pragmatism
was necessary). Second, the Russian geopolitical tradition toward Asia was impacted
by the growing threat of terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consequently,
these elements inuenced the Russian geopolitical discourse toward the crisis in
Afghanistan.
For the next few years NATO–Russian relations in regard to the Afghanistan
crisis became even tighter. In May 2002 at the Russia–NATO Permanent Joint
Council Meeting, Russia agreed to “strengthen cooperation through a multi-
42 Ministry of the Foreign Aairs of the Russian Federation, “Russian President Vladimir Putin
Interview to German ARD Television Company”, September 19, 2001; Source: http://www.mid.
ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/0C81589342F914BF43256AD20041B18E?OpenDocument
43 Martin A. Smith, “NATO-Russia relations: will the future resemble the past?”, in NATO in search
of a vision, ed. Gulner Aybet and Rebecca R Moore, Georgetown University Press (2010), 108-
109.
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faceted approach, including joint assessment of the terrorist threat to the Euro-
Atlantic area, focused on specic threats, for example, to Russian and NATO
forces, to civilian aircraft, or to critical infrastructure”.44 After the Rome summit in
May 2002 the reciprocal cooperation was improved by the creation of the NATO–
Russia Council where Russia received co-decision responsibilities: “military
crisis management, counterterrorism, non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD)”.45 In 2003 both sides agreed to deepen cooperation ensuring
security in Afghanistan and continue ongoing discussions at the NATO–Russia
Council. In addition, Russia oered “to provide practical support to the NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan”.46 Regarding the
war in Afghanistan, Russia mostly contributed to the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan
border control, transit routes that pass-through Russia, and bilateral training on
practical aspects of the ght against terrorism. One could argue that both sides
NATO and Russia have acknowledged the Afghanistan crisis in the same way –
positively. us, it led to reciprocal cooperation.
Furthermore, as it was already observed, due to the certain entire Russian
geopolitical culture, the media that represents the “popular geopolitics” had close
nexus with the “practical and formal geopolitics.” It could be observed in all cases,
especially in later ones, when the “practical geopolitics” usurped the “popular
geopolitics,” which eventually started to serve (but not inuence) for the entire
geopolitical discourse. As for the results, the Russian government was also supported
by the country’s media, which was inuenced by the 9/11 attacks. Phenomena
comparable to the Western media could be observed in the Russian newspapers as
well. NATO’s and the Russian “popular geopolitics” were shaped by both the threat
of terrorism and the other geopolitical elements (practical and formal geopolitics).
Nevertheless, the September 11 events fueled debates about terrorism, which
was already in the Russian media’s agenda since the second Chechnya war in late
1999. In a three months period (September 11 to December 11, 2001), for instance,
the newspaper Kommersant published 1000 stories related to terrorism, out of them
323 covered terrorism in Afghanistan and it was tenfold more than at the same
44 Ministry of the Foreign Aairs of the Russian Federation, “Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council
Meeting at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held in Reykjavik” May 14, 2002; Source: http://www.
mid.ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/8E21ADD26AF395F843256BBA0034B640?OpenDocument
45 Martin A. Smith, “NATO-Russia relations: will the future resemble the past?”, in NATO in search
of a vision, ed. Gulner Aybet and Rebecca R Moore, Georgetown University Press (2010), 110.
46 8 Ministry of the Foreign Aairs of the Russian Federation, “Meeting Of e NATO-Russia
Council At e Level Of Foreign Ministers NATO HQ, ursday, 4 December 2003, Statement”,
December 5, 2003; Source: http://www.mid.ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/2025FD4144F00CAF432
56DF30032757C?OpenDocument
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
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time one year earlier. Other newspapers, particularly those with close ties to the
Kremlin, backed up the politicians and daily reported their speeches, interviews,
and decisions regarding terrorism issues. e Russian “popular geopolitics” toward
the Afghanistan crisis and NATO switched from negative post-Kosovo coverage to
the positive post-9/11 coverage.47 For instance, according to the newspaper Lenta,
the events of September 11 restored negotiations on the establishment of a NATO
mission in Moscow.48
Eventually, the expansion of warfare in Afghanistan propelled reciprocal
cooperation between NATO and Russia; thus the overall Russian geopolitical
discourse could be acknowledged the same as NATO – positive. Hence, we can
argue that the same geopolitical discourse toward the crisis leads to the natural
cooperation.
However, from the inception of the Afghanistan crisis in 2001, the contemporary
Russian geopolitical discourse toward Afghanistan has changed as well. Despite the
fact that NATO constantly seeks accommodation with Moscow, Russia with its
“current nationalistic and assertive mood, and with its opposition to core NATO
policies, may not desire a truly cooperative partnership”.49 One the one hand, it
illustrates how the entire geopolitical culture could inuence other international
actors (changes in the Russian status apparatus, identity, etc. also shaped NATO’s
geopolitical discourse). on the other hand, it also presents that the single xed event/
issue does not determine the geopolitical discourse in contemporary Afghanistan.
us, the Russian geopolitical discourse was also shaped by the previous military
crises in Kosovo and Libya.
Despite mutual disputes and dierent geopolitical discourses in Europe, from
2010 Russia has provided non-military support to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.
However, Russia’s cooperation with NATO is based only on pragmatic interests. A
major point of the Russian geopolitical discourse is Afghanistan’s role as a producer
and exporter of opium. Nevertheless, ISAF has chosen a policy of least resistance on
opium growing, because it could drive indigenous Afghanis to an armed resistance
against the rest of the NATO troops in Afghanistan. Consequently, it inuences
the Russian geopolitical discourse, which is not satised with NATO’s geopolitical
discourse in Afghanistan. us Russia seeks to further intensifying international
47 Lenta.ru, “Россия и НАТО будут вместе ловить организаторов терактов в США”, September
13, 2001; Source: http://lenta.ru/world/2001/09/13/sammit/
48 Lenta.ru, “Америка обошлась с Европой по-мусульмански”, May 29, 2002; Source: http://lenta.
ru/articles/2002/05/28/nato/
49 Jamie Shea, “NATO at sixty – and beyond”, in NATO in search of a vision, ed. Gulner Aybet and
Rebecca R Moore, Georgetown University Press (2010), 25.
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eorts under the auspices of the UN aimed at helping Afghanistan and its
neighboring states to meet these challenges.50 Hence, the same issues gravitate
Russia to the cooperation and more pragmatic geopolitical discourse with NATO.
Currently Russia is working on two geopolitical discourses toward Afghanistan
and NATO’s presence there. First, Moscow does not fully reject the presence of
NATO forces in Afghanistan. If CSTO together with Russia might secure the
external borders of Afghanistan, then NATO could still monitor internal security,
but with one obligation – the forthcoming ISAF mission must be based on a UN
SC resolution and UN mandate. And second, both Russia and even China have
attempted to get guarantees from Afghanistan’s government that NATO, especially
the United States, does not establish a long-term military presence in Central
Asia as “a prerequisite for their input into the region-led stabilization program”.51
Such a dichotomy in the Russian geopolitical discourse could be explained by the
uncertainty in the contemporary Afghanistan.
However, in light of the Russian “popular geopolitics,” it is more likely that
the second case might appear as the most acceptable. Already in December 2013
Kommersant announced that “following the discussion [between NATO’s and
Russian representatives], it became clear that the parties fundamentally disagree on
projections about what awaits Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the main body
of the foreign contingent in 2014”.52 Besides that, Kommersant also notices the
pessimistic Russian geopolitical discourse toward Afghanistan after the withdrawal of
NATO forces. Russian ocials believe that contemporary Afghanistan soon will face
unstable scenarios: “the return of Taliban to power, a civil war, or the division of spheres
of inuence between the Taliban and the current regime”.53 A similar opinion could
be also observed in other Russian newspapers such as Izvestia, Lenta, or Pravda, which
constantly reect Moscow’s “formal and practical” geopolitics toward contemporary
Afghanistan. Regarding the past experiences in Afghanistan and contemporary issues
with NATO in Europe (the Ukrainian crisis), it is uncertain that Russia will seek
to stabilize potential future threats in Central Asia or expand its political inuence
inside Afghanistan after the 2014 withdrawal of ISAF. Consequently, the overall
Russian geopolitical discourse in contemporary Afghanistan could be described as
50 Ministry of the Foreign Aairs of the Russian Federation, “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the
Russian Federation”, February 2013; Source: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/nsosndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe
77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument
51 Oksana Antonenko, “e Central Asian states and Russia”, in Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, ed.
Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, Routledge (2011), 215-216
52 Елена Черненко, “Россия и НАТО разошлись на афганском направлении”, Kommerstant.ru,
December 16, 2013; Source: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2369414?isSearch=True
53 Ibid., Елена Черненко, “Россия и НАТО разошлись на афганском направлении”
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neutral. Russia depends on NATO’s activities and the inuence of the geopolitical
discourse in contemporary Afghanistan. Besides, the contemporary issues in Europe
complicate the Russian geopolitical discourse toward Afghanistan. Moreover, knowing
that NATO’s geopolitical discourse is acknowledged as negative in contemporary
Afghanistan, it is unlikely to see the mutual cooperation between both sides as it was
in the beginning of the Afghanistan crisis in 2001.
Despite that, when in March 2011, NATO launched an air strike campaign
against the Gadda regime, several particular features in the Russian geopolitical
discourse toward the Libyan crisis emerged.
On the one hand, Russia’s “formal geopolitics” constantly accused and blamed
NATO of overstepping UN SC resolution 1973 and launching air strikes against
Libya. A few days after NATO began Operation Unied Protector, the Ministry
of Foreign Aairs of the Russian Federation issued a press-release in which Russia
“strongly believes that it is unacceptable to use the mandate derived from UN SC
resolution 1973, the adoption of which was quite an ambiguous step, in order to
achieve goals that go far beyond its provisions, which only provide for actions for the
protection of civilians”.54 Besides, as it was already mentioned regarding the French
military supplies to the insurgents, Russia criticized NATO for violating UN SC
resolution 1970, which was intended to impose an arms embargo on Libya.
Nevertheless, the Russian “formal and practical geopolitics” sought to become
a mediator in the Libyan crisis and together with NATO join a campaign to
implement the UN SC resolution. However, NATO’s “formal and practical
geopolitics” were orientated on a unilateral decision to solve this crisis with air
strikes, thus the Russian geopolitical discourse was not acceptable for NATO.55
One month after NATO launched the air strike campaign, Russia was still not
accepted into “the UN SC resolution 1973 club” where only NATO and its
partners were participating in the intensive bombing campaign. Russia was seeking
to resolve this conict peacefully, not because Russia was deeply concerned about
the civilian casualties and human rights, which are not always recognized in Russia,
but because of pragmatic reasons. Few years before the Arab Spring, Russia agreed
with the Gadda regime to sign bilateral economic agreement where Russia would
cancel all Libyan debt in return for the possibility of Russian business companies to
develop the Libyan civilian infrastructure and build railroads, factories, etc.
54 Ministry of the Foreign Aairs of the Russian Federation, “Statement by Russian MFA Spokesman
Alexander Lukashevich on the Situation around Libya”, March 20, 2011; Sou
55 Ministry of the Foreign Aairs of the Russian Federation, “Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Alexander Lukashevich’s Response to a Media Question about the Situation Surrounding Libya”,
April 4, 2011; Source: http://www.mid.ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/2EF62115FCAC17F1C32578
6900369774?OpenDocument
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80 Dovydas Rogulis
Besides, the Russian “formal and practical geopolitics” sought cooperation with
NATO due to the expectations that it might lead to the “club” of the international
community, which dictates the international order. Eventually, the rejections from
NATO’s side caused the counter reaction from the Russian geopolitical discourse,
which turned out as negative.
Further, Vladimir Putin, the key gure of the Russian “practical geopolitics,”
appeared as a sharp critic of NATO activities in Libya. e “popular geopolitics”
quoted his ocial statements and in comparison with the “practical geopolitics”
(the ocial statements), they were even more rigorous. Vladimir Putin harshly
condemned the NATO air strikes on Libya; he argued that no one has the right
to punish Muammar Gadda without trial; that the country’s whole infrastructure
was being destroyed, and in essence one of the warring sides was attacking the other
under the cover of aircraft.56 Vladimir Putin was only one of the Russian ocials who
criticized NATO so strictly and more often than, for instance, Dimitri Medvedev,
President of Russia at that time. It ones again approve that despite the dierent
crises, the Russian geopolitical discourse is synchronized to each other, especially
the “popular geopolitics,” which does not inuence the entire geopolitical discourse,
but merely serve as the reection of the Russian “practical geopolitics.” In overall,
Russia was inuenced by NATO’s geopolitical discourse towards crisis in Libya.
Undoubtedly, the Russian geopolitical discourse could be emphasized as negative.
e outcome of geopolitical interactions
Undoubtedly, interventions of NATO military forces in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Libya have aected Russian foreign and security policies after the Cold War.
e dramatic changes after 2001 presuppose that in spite of the Kosovo war in
1999, Russia was ready to cooperate with the Alliance. e year 2002 was promising
for both sides; eventually positive reciprocal geopolitical discourses led to the
establishment of the NATO–Russia Council where decisions and actions were taken
by joint agreements. However, NATO’s unilateral decisions and specic geopolitical
discourses toward crises excluded Russia from crisis management in Afghanistan
and especially in Kosovo, which at the beginning of 2008 declared its independence.
e crisis of Kosovo in 2008 dates the end of the Russian exible policy toward
NATO and marks a new beginning of a permanently hostile policy (the geopolitical
discourse) against NATO in Europe. It could be explained by several examples.
56 Gleb Bryanski, “Putin: Libya coalition has no right to kill Gadda”, Reuters, April 26, 2011; Source:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/us-russia-putin-libya-idUSTRE73P4L920110426
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
And eir Impact On Relations With Russia After e Cold War
First, despite the global economic crisis and the fall of oil prices in the period of
2008–2010, Russia still gradually increased its military spending from $66 billion
(2008) to $93 billion (2013), now 40% more than in 2008.57
Second, in order to create a counterbalance to NATO, Russia propelled
negotiations within CSTO. Consequently, Moscow encouraged the creation of
the Collective Rapid Reaction Force, which was established in 2009, and in 2010
CSTO approved the declaration establishing a CSTO peacekeeping force. Such
attempts suggest that Russia seeks to duplicate NATO’s activities, and eventually
if Russia has an international peacekeeping force, it could have a legal basis to
intervene in crises zones and unilaterally resolve conicts, the same as NATO did
in Kosovo, Libya, or Afghanistan.
ird, dierent geopolitical discourses could also be revealed by Moscow’s
ocial position toward NATO. According to the Russian military doctrine from
2010, NATO is the main external threat to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the
research suggests that the Russian government subsidizes and controls the majority
of media and press, thus journals, television, and newspapers often promote and
reect a certain geopolitical discourse that only serves the Kremlin’s policy, which
is aimed against NATO.
Fourth, the crises indicate that Europe became the fundamental sphere of interest
where the Russian geopolitical tradition has shifted dramatically in the last 15 years.
With less interest and opposition to NATO in other regions, Russia concentrates its
major resources toward European aairs, including the Caucasus region.
With regard to evidences of this thesis, the hypothesis that dierent NATO
and Russian geopolitical discourses toward crises in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan
have aected reciprocal relations is fully satised. NATO military interventions
in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan have negatively aected relations with Russia
mostly in Europe. Mutual cooperation and diplomatic disputes toward crises in
Libya and Afghanistan are minor in comparison with the NATO–Russian relations
in the European continent.
First, contemporary disputes and war in Ukraine prove that Russia is ready to
defend its geopolitical tradition in the direction of Europe. Second, serious Russian
geopolitical discourses of European aairs (disputes in Kosovo, Georgia, Crimea,
and Eastern Ukraine) suggest that the Russian geopolitical tradition toward Europe
is fundamental in comparison with other geopolitical traditions (Eurasia or Russia
as a bridge between East and West). ird, dierent NATO’s geopolitical discourses
with regard to crises led to reciprocal accruing disagreements than to cooperation
57 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database”; Source:
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
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82 Dovydas Rogulis
(with only one exception in Afghanistan 2001, when reciprocal discourse was the
same). And nally, the Russian economic and military capabilities are not strong
enough to oppose NATO’s missions in overseas; thus Russia will concentrate most
of its attention to the geopolitical tradition toward Europe.
Conclusions
e critical geopolitics turns out as a critique of modern geopolitics and
classical geopolitics. e critical geopolitics concentrates on both the relations
between states and creation, approval and implementation of particular policies or
decisions. Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s and Simon Dalby’s conceptualizations of the critical
geopolitics are used as the method of research. Every state or agency consists of
history, geography, identity, state apparatus, and power networks, which determine
the certain geopolitical tradition. Russia’s geopolitical traditions could be named as
“Russia within Europe,” “Eurasian theory,” and “Russia as a bridge between East
and West,” and NATO’s geopolitical traditions as “Euro-Atlantic collective defense”
and “crisis manager.” Every geopolitical tradition consists of several geopolitical
discourses that are divided into “formal geopolitics” (think-tanks, strategy makers,
etc.), “practical geopolitics” (decision makers, ocial statements, documents,
strategies, and speeches) and “popular geopolitics” (the discourse of the media and
surveys). All three geopolitical discourses interact and inuence each other; thus
the lines between them could blur. is could be observed at the Russian case,
when due to specic characteristics of Russia’s geopolitical culture, elements of the
geopolitical discourse become closely related, mostly controlled and monopolized
by the “practical geopolitics.” In the Alliance case, NATO’s “formal and practical
geopolitics” usually cooperate to each other, but the “popular geopolitics” often
criticizes both of them. e combination of three critical geopolitics elements
allows determining certain NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses toward
crises in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan.
With regard to Kosovo crisis in 1999 NATO’s geopolitical discourse stayed
very positive, “practical and formal geopolitics” were strongly supported and
partly inuenced by the “popular geopolitics.” As the contrast to NATO, Russia
acknowledged this crisis as very negative. e active involvement of NATO’s
“formal and practical geopolitics” led to the limitations and hostility of the Russian
decision and strategy makers.
In 2001, NATO’s geopolitical discourse toward Afghanistan could be
explained as positive. With the support from the “popular geopolitics,” NATO
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Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan,
And eir Impact On Relations With Russia After e Cold War
strategy and decisions makers achieved only temporary success in Kabul and its
surroundings. e same geopolitical discourse could be observed from the Russian
side. e expansion of warfare in Afghanistan and the threat of terrorism propelled
reciprocal cooperation between NATO and Russia. e homogeneous geopolitical
discourse united both sides and increased mutual partnership.
However, in 2008 due to lack of consensus within the Alliance, NATO’s
geopolitical discourse toward the independence of Kosovo appeared as neutral.
e overall Russian geopolitical discourse turned out as negative. NATO’s “formal
and practical geopolitics” excluded Russia from the decision making and ignored
the Russian geopolitical discourse toward the European aairs. Consequently, the
Russian geopolitical discourse became more hostile and the perception of mistrust
toward NATO increased.
During the crisis in Libya, NATO’s geopolitical discourse was acknowledged as
neutral. Even though Gadda’s regime was changed, internal disputes within NATO
and criticism from “popular geopolitics” decreased a whole NATO’s geopolitical
discourse to neutral. As the contrast to NATO, the Russian geopolitical discourse
was negative. Similarly to the Kosovo crisis in 2008, Russia was excluded from
the decision making in the international arena. NATO’s rejection of the Russian
geopolitical discourse towards the Libyan crisis provoked the counter reaction from
Moscow.
In the contemporary Afghanistan, due to the division within NATO and
criticism from the media, the entire NATO’s geopolitical discourse could be dened
as negative. However, Russia’s geopolitical discourse turns out as neutral. One
the one hand, Russia is deeply concerned about NATO’s issues in contemporary
Afghanistan and the possible return of Taliban, but on the other hand, due to
contemporary disputes in Europe Russia does not seek to cooperate with NATO
so closely as it did a decade ago.
Taking into account all geopolitical discourses, the performance of NATO
forces has been gradually decreasing and debates about NATO as the ‘crisis manager’
are questionable. Undoubtedly, NATO’s geopolitical discourses inuenced
the relations with Russia. However, the hypothesis of this research “Dierent
NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya, and
Afghanistan have aected reciprocal relations” is conrmed. However, it does not
mean that only NATO military operations were the main factors that inuence
mutual relations with Russia. ere are other signicant factors: NATO expansion,
global terrorism, economic crises, etc.
e crisis of Kosovo in 2008 marks the end of the Russian exible policy
toward NATO and marks a new beginning of a permanently hostile geopolitical
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84 Dovydas Rogulis
discourse against NATO in Europe. Mutual cooperation and diplomatic disputes
toward crises in Libya and Afghanistan are minor in comparison with the NATO–
Russian relations in the European continent. Russia does not have so much interest
and it is basically too weak to oppose NATO’s activities around the globe. e
Russian military operation in Syria shows Russia’s military capabilities are limited;
thus Moscow concentrates its attention to its fundamental geopolitical tradition
towards Europe, especially the post-Soviet area.
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