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Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study
Abstract
ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has become a key political and military actor in the Middle East and in North Africa. This essay aims at outlining ISIS warfare through an analysis of its operations in the frame of hybrid warfare theory proposed by Frank Hoffman. Therefore, the paper deals with: the role of terrorist tactics in ISIS warfare and the relationship between terrorism and insurgency; ISIS use of technology, mainly with regard to suicide attacks and to drones; and the relevance of urban warfare. Finally, the paper highlights how ISIS operates and the most threatening features of its warfare.
... Regular and irregular warfare methods by Russian proxy forces (Fox, 2022) and ISIS are often referred to in this section (Batyuk, 2017;Beccaro, 2018Beccaro, , 2022. The deployment of U.S. Special Operation Forces in Russia's neighbouring countries is also drawn upon as a response to Russian hybrid measures (Thompson, 2020). ...
... The structures needed for a safe space are a centralized command and unity across social and political issues (Hartwig, 2020). The use of HW tactics by non-state actors such as ISIS, Boko Haram, and Houthi Movement is covered in the literature (Stoddard, 2020), and their activities in different regions, in which North Africa is often struck (Beccaro, 2018(Beccaro, , 2022. How to develop countermeasures for these groups is also covered, in which it is brought up that Poland has a key focus in their defence strategy on developing anti-terror instruments (Gasztold & Gasztold, 2022), and that the United States has practiced counter-terrorist measures in Afghanistan (Englund, 2019). ...
... As Beccaro noted, suicide attacks represent a form of precision strike warfare. 96 SVBIEDs are trucks and cars loaded with explosives and driven by suicide bombers. Daesh SVBIEDs differ from previous SVBIED-use by NSAGs because Daesh systemically welded iron plates to the vehicles to protect drivers from being shot and prevent them from being stopped before the intended explosion. ...
... Para dar cuenta de todo ello, las redes sociales -e, incluso, videojuegos online-han sido utilizadas intensivamente por Daesh, así como para difundir todo tipo de amenazas a Occidente, para captar adeptos, así como para reclamar la autoría de diversas acciones de terror (Estévez, 2016;Tapia, 2016). En general, el Daesh ha demostrado desde sus orígenes una gran capacidad para el terrorismo híbrido, combinando los ataques físicos con el uso de las tecnologías, tanto para la difusión del terror en las plataformas digitales como, incluso, para realizar ataques mediante drones (Beccaro, 2018). ...
Alcázar, M. y Villaplana, F.R. (2023): El presente capítulo aborda desde una perspectiva criminológica los atentados yihadistas de Niza, en julio de 2016, y de Berlín, en diciembre de ese mismo año. En ambos casos, un camión fue utilizado para arrollar a las personas que se encontraban disfrutando de espacios públicos, provocando un gran número de víctimas mortales y de personas heridas. Los atentados utilizando camiones como armas se sumaron desde entonces como recurso al repertorio de acciones terroristas posibles de realizar en Occidente. Estos atentados pertenecen al ámbito de los ataques terroristas con vehículos o de vehículo-ariete (vehicle-ramming attack), entre los que se encuentran los posteriores atropellos en Barcelona y Cambrils, también perpetrados por terroristas adheridos a Daesh, solo unos pocos meses después. Las consecuencias de esta nueva forma de atentar han implicado cambios en las estrategias de seguridad de las autoridades, incluyendo el diseño de los espacios públicos, en los protocolos policiales de investigación y de respuesta a amenazas terroristas, así como en el estudio de la propia naturaleza terrorista y de sus métodos.
... In past decades, Malaysia has endured various threats from internal and external militant groups, such as the Japanese Red Army, Communist Guerillas, Al-Maunah, Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf dan Sulu terrorists (Zachary 2003a(Zachary , 2003bLiow 2004;Bakashmar 2008;Kheng 2009). Compared to previous militants, Daesh is perceived to be more dangerous due to its cross-border access, technological sophistication and large-scale operations (Weiss and Hassan 2015;Beccaro 2018). Daesh also has expertise in exploiting social media to disseminate its propaganda, which eventually appeals to some Malaysians who seek to join under the popular narratives of "martyrdom" and "Daulah Islamiyah" (Mohammad Aslam 2017). ...
Malaysia is no exception when it comes to the Daesh threat. Several vulnerable Muslim populations have been previously targeted by Daesh via specific modus operandi to fulfil the terrorism agenda. Based on a persistent concern about Daesh-related issues and their consequences, this article critically explores the role of the security agency, the Counter-Terrorism Division within the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP), in addressing Daesh radicalisation in Malaysia. It examines the process and effectiveness of the top down and ‘soft’ approaches undertaken by the RMP via the rehabilitation and deradicalisation of former Daesh detainees before they rejoin society. The research is qualitative, and is based on a focus group discussion and in-depth interviews with representatives from the Counter Terrorism Division, terrorism experts, government officials and former detainees. The findings show that the RMP’s efforts to curb Daesh intimidation have been effective in terms of decreasing the number of new terrorism incidents, militant recruitment and the establishment of networks and cells. The introduction of ‘Module 30′, which involves theological and psychological improvement, and civil order, along with vocational training and ‘lifelong-monitoring’, has significantly contributed to rehabilitating and deradicalising the majority of former Daesh convicts in Malaysia, such that they embrace peace and renounce violence and religious extremism.
... Moreover, it is difficult to keep unit cohesion for a regular army in such a terrain. 48 Therefore, the defenders of the urban area have the advantage, provided by large areas of restrictive terrain, to incorporate into their defensive plans. Even with air support, aerial surveillance and precision weapons, it would take the armour, the commandos and the special forces to go into the city and clear the area block by block, house by house, room by room, and thus, at a high cost to defeat just a few hundred insurgents. ...
This paper analyses the Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) al-Bab battle and
presents the lessons learned. OES started with a mixed force of Free Syrian
Army, Turkish special forces and armoured units. During the operation, the aims
and the force structure gradually changed, yet not the command structure.
When OES aimed to capture al-Bab, ISIS employed conventional active defence
strategy. The OES commander’s insistence on employing special forces
increased own casualties and al-Bab was seized only after resorting to
a conventional urban attack. OES presents tactical and operational lessons for
the militaries on structure and execution of operations against an irregular
adversary employing conventional means.
... Recent definitions of hybrid threats and warfare note that these strategies are dominantly employed by authoritarian states against democratic states (Giannopoulos et al 2020), even though the US has been accused of conducting hybrid activities against Russia and Iran, for example (Carden 2017;Ghaffari 2019). Non-state actors also present as aggressors, including groups classified as terrorists (Mumford, 2016) especially ISIS (Beccaro, 2018). Both the statecentric as well as terrorist-oriented focus explains what can be perceived as the significant amount of scholarship on hybrid threats/ warfare using mostly realist frameworks (Filipec, 2019; Muradov, 2019) They use the state as a security referent thereby downplaying or ignoring the roles other actors such as civilians, and the role ordinary people play in the ways conflict develops. ...
The following article examines the relevance of gender and intersectional analyses to better understanding hybrid threats, in particular those that are increasingly targeting civilian environments. The authors first present relevant concepts including hybrid threats and warfare, resilience, disinformation, civilian agency, and intersectionality as a method. Thereafter they discuss how disinformation is used to destabilise societies by directly attacking civilian spaces and attempting to foment polarisation and unrest, if not conflict. The authors then discuss how the concepts of disinformation and civilian agency are illuminated through gender and intersectional analyses, speaking to complex, civilian contexts by examining how gender (and race) have been employed to attempt to foment destabilisation. They conclude with some brief reflections about the role of gender and intersectional approaches in understanding hybrid threats and warfare, not just in European but also for other parts of the world.
... For instance, the main features, components, forms and methods of hybrid warfare have been analyzed by Beccaro (2018), Hoffman (2007), Hoogensen (2018), Malksoo (2018), Puyvelde (2015), Renz (2016), Renz & Smith (2016), Ştefănescu & Papoi (2018) and others. The scholars have emphasized that a hybrid warfare is a war with a combination of principally different types and means of warfighting: 1) classical means with the use of armed forces and military hardware, 2) the use of non-professional forces and militarized units (citizen soldiers, militants, "little green men", etc.) and 3) informational technologies. ...
... Our research is based on the theoretical assumptions and practical results made and achieved by scholars who analyzed the essence, agents and types of the process of socialization, asocialization, desocialization, resocialization of an individual (Carlson, 2008;Engler, 2008;Eysenck, 1997;Friedman & Schustack, 2015;Gersick & Rubenstein, 2017;McLeod, 2017;Kurylo, Savchenko, & Karaman, 2018); who studied the essence and mechanisms of information and psychological warfare in the information society (Arquilla, 1999;Beccaro, 2018;Libicki, 1996;Molander, Riddile, & Wilson, 1996); who developed the meaning of the interdisciplinary phenomenon of "aberration" (McFarland, 2004;Stephens, 1995;Savchenko & Karaman, 2017). ...
... The widespread effects and the "low" cost of suicide attacks put terrorism first amongst societies where radicalization allows for mass manipulation and recruitment of "martyrs" willing to sacrifice for killing infidels. When regular forces extensively outnumber insurgents or the terrain is not favourable for guerrilla warfare, the only tactic that remains is terrorism [2]. Neither these actions are "recent" or "innovative" , the suicide attacks of the Japanese kamikaze pilots generated the same feelings of fear and terror among US WW2 soldiers. ...
The time of conventional conflicts and warfare between states or regular armies has come to an end. The recent theatres of operations have shown us that the Irregular Warfare, marked by the concealment of combatants among the civilian population, has captured the way of conducting military actions. The paper identifies the role of local communities in conflict zones, and their influence in the outcome of armed confrontations.
... ISIS's choice of Raqqa as a power base was historically grounded and somewhat predictable. As the heart of the Abbasid Caliphate of Harun al-Rashid during the late 8 th and early 9 th centuries AD, Raqqa holds a significant place in the history that ISIS sought to capitalize on in ideological, economic, and military terms (Lister 2015, 257;Beccaro 2018). Seizing control of the Tabqa Dam effectively brought all these elements together. ...
This paper traces the cultural missions and salvage archaeology programs along the Euphrates River around Raqqa from the 1950s onwards. We suggest that the varied investments from international expeditions, conservation programs, and technical assistance in Syria have an important, untold history that is relevant to recent developments and conflicts in northern Syria. We explore the intersecting practices of archaeology and assistance, illuminated by archives drawn from international agencies such as UNESCO, as well as companies, consultants, bureaucrats, and archaeologists. Our focus is upon foreign intervention around imperiled heritage, considering not only internal politics but also UNESCO’s 1960s shift from fully funded campaigns to global appeals reliant on foreign governments, corporations, and universities. The outsourcing of salvage allowed specific patrons – national and international – to privilege particular pasts; and it is these histories and legacies that further require us to reassess the place of Raqqa in the current civil war.
Terörist örgütler içinde bulundukları zaman ve zemine göre kırsal alanlar veya şehirleri veya her iki alanı aynı anda eylem ve faaliyet alanı olarak kullanabilmektedirler. 19. Yüzyılda endüstrileşmenin sonucu ortaya çıkan hızlı şehirleşme bir taraftan modern terörist hareketlerin ortaya çıkmasının zeminini oluştururken diğer taraftan terörist hareketlerin hem örgütlenme ve eylem alanı hem de propagandalarının hedefleri olmuşlardır. 20. yüzyılın başlarından itibaren ulusal kurtuluş hareketleriyle ortaya çıkan ve Soğuk Savaş döneminde devam eden süreçte terörist grupların bazıları şehirleri, bazıları kırsal alanları, bazıları ise hem şehirleri hem de kırsal alanları fiziki alan olarak kullanmışlardır. El Kaide tarafından 11 Eylül 2001’de ABD’de ve 2011 sonrasında ortaya çıkan DEAŞ tarafından gerçekleştirilen terör saldırıları, şehirlerde yapılan terörist eylemlerin şiddetinin hangi seviyelere kadar ulaşabileceğini ve insanlar üzerinde yaratabileceği korku ikliminin dehşet verici örneklerini oluşturmuştur. Nitekim hem eylem sayısı hem de öldürücülük açısından şehirler terör eylemlerinin ana hedefi haline gelmeye başlamıştır. Gelecekte dünyada şehirleşmenin hızlı ve kontrolsüz bir şekilde artması, şehirlerin hem fiziki hem de insani boyutta karmaşıklaşması ve hassasiyetlerin çeşitlenmesi, şehirlerin terörist örgüt ve hareketlerin temel eylem alanı haline gelmesine neden olacağı öngörülmektedir. Nitel boyutta ele alınan çalışmada; dünyada hızlı ve kontrolsüz bir şekilde karmaşıklaşan şehirlerin terörist örgüt ve hareketler tarafından nasıl istismar edilebileceği ve güvenlik birimlerinin emniyet ve asayişi sağlamada ne gibi zorluklar ile karşılaşabileceğine ilişkin hususların incelenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Bu kapsamda çalışmada ilk olarak tarihsel süreçte terörist örgütlerin hangi stratejik ve taktik düşünceler ile şehir eylemlerine yöneldikleri ortaya konulacaktır. Müteakiben şehirlerin fiziki ve sosyal boyutta gelişiminin terörist örgütlerin eylem dinamikleri ile güvenlik kuvvetlerinin operasyonel dinamiklerine etkileri incelenecektir.
Geçmişten günümüze bireylerin hayatında var olan göç olgusu, 2000’li yıllar ile birlikte
Orta Doğu’da yaşanan çatışmalar ve devamında dünyada yaşanan küresel gelişmelerin etkisiyle
daha görünür hale gelmiş ve ülkelerin gündeminde daha fazla yer bulmaya başlamıştır.
Günümüzde ülkeler ve bölgeler arasında yaşanan savaş, işgal ve çatışmalar sebebiyle bireyler
hatta kitleler yerlerinden edilmekte ve dolayısıyla göç olgusu anıldığında bireylerin zihninde
savaş, çatışma, sığınma, güvenlik, medyaya yansıyan dramatik olaylar gibi olumsuz çağrışımlar
yer bulmaktadır. 2010 yılında Orta Doğu’da yaşanan uzun soluklu çatışmalar sonucu dünyanın
karşı karşıya kaldığı kitlesel göç hareketliliğinin ardından Şubat 2022 yılında başlayan Rusya-Ukrayna savaşı tıpkı Orta Doğu’da Arap Baharı sürecinde olduğu gibi tüm dünyayı farklı
boyutlarda etkileyen ve göçmen hareketliliğini artıran bir gelişme olmuştur. Savaşın başladığı
ilk üç haftada yaklaşık 3 milyona yakın Ukraynalı Polonya, Macaristan, Romanya, Slovakya
gibi komşu ülkelere ve diğer ülkelere göç etmiş, savaşın başladığı 2022 Şubat ayından Ekim
ayına kadar olan dokuz aylık dönemde ise yaklaşık 11 milyon Ukraynalı savaş sebebiyle
yaşadıkları toprakları geride bırakmak zorunda kalmıştır.
Asya ve Avrupa kıtası arasında geçiş güzergahında bulunan Türkiye tarihsel bağlamda
birçok göçmene ev sahipliği yapmış, geçmişte olduğu gibi bugün de göç ve göçmen
hareketliliğinin yoğun yaşandığı coğrafyalardan biri olmaya devam etmiştir. Coğrafi konumu,
turizm destinasyonu ve çokkültürlü yaşam ortamı ile birçok yabancı ve yatırımcının gerek
yerleşik amaçlı gerekse yatırım amaçlı gayrimenkul edinimi konusunda dikkatini çeken bir ülke
konumunda olan Türkiye’de Rusya-Ukrayna savaşının etkisiyle özellikle İstanbul ve Antalya
gibi illerde Rusya ve Ukrayna uyruklu yabancılara konut satışlarının önemli ölçüde arttığı
dikkat çekmektedir. Antalya Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası (ATSO) verilerine göre, 2022 yılında
satılan 4.248 konutun 889’u Rusya uyruklu yabancılara satılmıştır ayrıca 2022 yılında satılan
her beş konuttan biri Antalya’da gerçekleştirilmiştir. Dolayısıyla savaş dönemlerinde
gayrimenkul satın alma veya satma yönünde alınan kararların gayrimenkul sektöründe
hareketlenmelere sebep olduğu görülmektedir.
Çalışma kapsamında güncel bir konu olan Rusya-Ukrayna savaşı sebebiyle yaşanan göç
hareketliliğine odaklanılarak Rusya ve Ukrayna uyruklu yabancıların Türkiye’de gayrimenkul
edinimlerine yönelik detaylı bilgilere yer verilecektir. Bu kapsamda çalışmada Rusya-Ukrayna
savaşı özelinde artan göç hareketliliğinin Türkiye gayrimenkul sektörü üzerindeki olumlu ve
olumsuz etkileri üzerine değerlendirmeler yapmak amaçlanmaktadır. Şubat 2022 yılında
başlayan ve hala devam etmekte olan Rusya-Ukrayna savaşının özellikle İstanbul ve Antalya’da
yabancılara satılan konut sayısında artışlara yol açtığı, aynı zamanda diğer illere göre yabancılar
tarafından daha fazla tercih edilen iller konumunda olan İstanbul, Antalya gibi illerde
gayrimenkul bedelleri ve kira fiyatları üzerinde dalgalanmalar meydana getirdiği sonucuna
ulaşılmıştır. Savaşın seyrine göre ilerleyen dönemlerde Rusya ve Ukrayna uyruklu yabancıların
Türkiye’de gerek yerleşik amaçlı gerekse yatırım amaçlı gayrimenkul taleplerinin artacağı ve
bu durumun uzun dönemde Türkiye gayrimenkul piyasasında olumlu veya olumsuz birtakım
etkiler meydana getirebileceği öngörülmektedir
The paper focuses on how technology impacts on irregular conflicts, i.e. conflicts fought by non-state actors. The ability to inflict destruction and produce casualties is no longer directly related to the ability to organize large numbers of people and manage vast stores of resources that has been typical of large, organized state armies, and consequently smaller groups can now inflict more serious and extensive damage than their predecessors. It follows that the relationship between irregular fighters and technology is one of the most crucial elements in understanding contemporary conflicts. The paper is divided into five sections. The first is a brief paragraph focused on the definition problem, explaining why and how we use the term ‘irregular fighters’, and the second is a historical overview on how the relationship between ‘irregular fighters’ and technology has changed in the last two centuries. The third section is a study of current trends in the relationship between modern technology and current irregular warfare. The fourth section is intended to study current impacts of technology on irregular warfare, looking at ISIS’s operations in 2016–2017 and its use of drones. Finally, the conclusions section presents both lessons learned and findings.
This article examines the case of the Syrian Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat or PYD) to explain the survival strategies of the non-state armed actor (NSAA). Although the Middle Eastern State System remarkably remained stable after the end of Mandates, the legitimacy of states has been eroded by a combination of colonial legacy, neo-patrimonialism, and authoritarianism, laying the seeds for the rise of non-state challengers to states. At the beginning of the Syrian uprising, the PYD did not fight against the Syrian regime but established its autonomy in northern Syria by taking advantage of the chaos. Using the process-tracing method, the article explains the survival of the PYD until the territorial defeat of the so-called Islamic State and offers parameters of the territorial logic, its organizational structuring, and relations with the states to explain the survival strategies of the PYD. Finally, the study concludes that while the territorial and organizational structuring logics of the NSAA shape its strategies, its complex relationship with states determines its survival.
Following Moltke’s dictum that ‘no battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy’, military learning and adaptation has long been a staple of military studies. Over the past fifteen years, much of the literature has been focused on Western armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Little attention has been paid thus far to adaptation by the Iraqi armed forces in their fight against ISIS. Whereas the Iraqi army was routed by the group in 2014, three years later it managed to take back almost all the territory lost to ISIS. How was that possible? This article discusses military adaptation by the Iraqi armed forces and their role in the military defeat of ISIS in Iraq. Combining an academic theoretical framework on military adaptation with a primary source-based investigation of the Iraqi fight against ISIS, we reconstruct how the Iraqi armed forces learned from their mistakes in 2014 and which role this process played in the military defeat of ISIS in Iraq.
During the years of the Syrian civil war (2011-) the Syrian army
changed its modus operandi in the Strategical, operational, and
tactical level. The change accord because the previous operational
concept failed, and the army forces were unable to carry major
offensive operations. This paper will examine the reasons for the
changes, how they were implemented and how they affect the
rebuilding of the Syrian army in the near future.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) have been developed for different purposes for many years. But recently drones have been used in terrorist activities in Conflict Zones and Turkey. From now on governments are facing the reality of UAVs in terrorist actions day by day. In this paper the concept of the UAV is described in detail and some case examples about how they are used in terrorist activities are given. Existing Counter-UAV (counter-drone) systems are analyzed according to their capabilities. The aim of this study is to draw attention especially to swarm attacks with drones and to guide the defence community about the requirements of C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems) solutions.
ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has been a key political and military actor in the Middle East and in North Africa. Although it is currently in retreat, it has conquered, controlled, and ruled areas of Syria, Iraq, and Libya. This essay outlines threats posed by ISIS in Libya and in North Africa. The analysis is divided into three sections. The first section takes into account the hybrid military nature of ISIS. The notion of hybrid warfare describes the way in which non-state actors fight: a mix of traditional infantry tactics using modern weapons; guerrilla operations; and terrorism. The second section focuses on Libya. Over the summer of 2014, Libya collapsed into civil war between duelling governments. This turmoil offered ISIS an opening to set up a bridgehead along the Libyan coast. The role of ISIS is analysed in the context of Libyan political and security chaos, underlining both ISIS’s role in the conflict and ISIS’s operations in Sirte. The third section takes into account ISIS’s operations in the North Africa between 2015 and 2016. The group has proved to be resilient; although the loss of its North African capital was a strategic blow, this has not removed ISIS’s ability to execute small-unit raids, and bombings. In conclusion, the paper aims to demonstrate both the hybrid nature of ISIS, which affects various military and political approaches and allows ISIS to withstand classic counterterrorism operations. It also considers ISIS’s ability to operate across borders and to exploit local instability.
The importance of understanding how terrorist organisations learn and innovate cannot be overstated. Yet there is a remarkable paucity of literature systematically addressing this subject. This article contributes to an evolving conceptualisation in this area by proposing a preliminary typology of learning and innovation as undertaken by modern jihadist groups. It identifies and discusses four categories: a) intergroup learning within a single domestic setting; b) inter-group learning between two or more local groups across a state or national boundary; c) inter-group learning between a transnational group and one or more domestic groups, and finally; d) intra-group learning or ‘self-learning’.
Drawing on English and Arabic Islamic State (IS) communiqués produced by its central media units, wilayat information offices and broader supporter base, this study examines the strategic logic of IS information operations (IO). It argues that the overarching purpose of IS's IO campaign is to shape the perceptions and polarise the support of audiences via messages that interweave appeals to pragmatic and perceptual factors. Pragmatic factors—such as security, stability and livelihood—are leveraged in IS messaging by promoting the efficacy of its politico-military campaign and denigrating its enemies’ efforts via rational-choice (logic of consequence) appeals. Perceptual factors—which are tied to the interplay of in-group, Other, crisis and solution constructs—are leveraged via identity-choice (logic of appropriateness) appeals that frame IS as the champion of Sunni Muslims (the in-group identity), its enemies as Others complicit in Sunni perceptions of crisis, and IS as the only hope for solving this malaise. With this approach, IS seeks to resonate its message across a diverse ‘glocal’ constituency and supercharge supporters towards action. IS simultaneously targets its enemies with messaging that manipulates the inherent dualities underlying perceptual and pragmatic factors, vigorously counters criticisms and ‘baits’ opponents into ill-conceived IO responses.
This essay describes terrorism as a mode of warfare and examines its unique characteristics, by comparing this method of struggle to other forms of violent conflict. It further emphasizes the role of terrorism as a strategy of insurgence and delineates the main strategic ideas by which terrorists have hoped to achieve their political objectives. The study evaluates terrorists’ success in obtaining political goals and the conditions which affect their ability to materialize their objectives.The author concludes that the mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is dictated by circumstances rather than by choice, and that whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle. Terrorism, which is the easiest form of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes.
This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a new foreword by John A. Nagl, author ofCounterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam(Praeger, 2002).
On the morning of September 11, 2001, the entire world was introduced to Al Qaeda and its enigmatic leader, Osama bin Laden. But the organization that changed the face of terrorism forever and unleashed a whirlwind of counterterrorism activity and two major wars had been on the scene long before that eventful morning. In Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know, Daniel L. Byman, an eminent scholar of Middle East terrorism and international security who served on the 9/11 Commission, provides a sharp and concise overview of Al Qaeda, from its humble origins in the mountains of Afghanistan to the present, explaining its perseverance and adaptation since 9/11 and the limits of U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts. The organization that would come to be known as Al Qaeda traces its roots to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Founded as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Al Qaeda achieved a degree of international notoriety with a series of spectacular attacks in the 1990s; however, it was the dramatic assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 that truly launched Al Qaeda onto the global stage. The attacks endowed the organization with world-historical importance and provoked an overwhelming counterattack by the United States and other western countries. Within a year of 9/11, the core of Al Qaeda had been chased out of Afghanistan and into a variety of refuges across the Muslim world. Splinter groups and franchised offshoots were active in the 2000s in countries like Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen, but by early 2011, after more than a decade of relentless counterterrorism efforts by the United States and other Western military and intelligence services, most felt that Al Qaeda's moment had passed. With the death of Osama bin Laden in May of that year, many predicted that Al Qaeda was in its death throes. Shockingly, Al Qaeda has staged a remarkable comeback in the last few years. In almost every conflict in the Muslim world, from portions of the Xanjing region in northwest China to the African subcontinent, Al Qaeda franchises or like-minded groups have played a role. Al Qaeda's extreme Salafist ideology continues to appeal to radicalized Sunni Muslims throughout the world, and it has successfully altered its organizational structure so that it can both weather America's enduring full-spectrum assault and tailor its message to specific audiences. Authoritative and highly readable, Byman's account offers readers insightful and penetrating answers to the fundamental questions about Al Qaeda: who they are, where they came from, where they're going-and, perhaps most critically-what we can do about it.
This book examines strategy in the contemporary world. Part I considers the enduring issues that animate the study of strategy and tackles topics ranging from the causes of war to questions about culture, morality, and war. Part II deals with issues that fuel strategic debates, with chapters on terrorism and irregular warfare, nuclear weapons, arms control, weapons of mass destruction, conventional military power, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, and cyberwar. Part III discusses critical and non-Western approaches to the study of strategy and security that have emerged in recent years and concludes by reflecting on future prospects for strategic studies. This introduction provides an overview of strategic studies, criticisms that are made of strategic studies, and how strategic studies relates to security studies.
Terrorists learn every day to gain further knowledge on how to achieve their violent objectives. Consequently, understanding terrorist learning forms a crucial part of the fight to counter terrorism. However, whilst existing literature within terrorism studies has examined a number of different parts of the learning process there currently fails to exist a comprehensive framework to encompass the learning process as a whole. This article will rectify this oversight by drawing upon wider learning literature to develop a new analytical framework for terrorist learning that provides a definition, considers the actors involved and identifies processes and outcomes. Consequently, the full landscape of current and potential research in this important area is revealed.
The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) is not well understood at this point. This paper starts by comparing the Islamic State to the Vietnamese communists in a revolutionary warfare framework and makes a causal argument that the Islamic State’s defeat of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement in Iraq was the key to its successful establishment of control of most Sunni areas and the mobilization of its population for support. Islamic State operational summaries and captured documents are used to quantitatively establish the impact of the subversion campaign against the Sahwa and Iraqi government and trace the efforts of operatives in tribal outreach and recruiting. This research provides a valuable insight into the return of a powerful method of insurgency as well as a glimpse into the vast clandestine network that provides the strength of the Islamic State movement.
The effort to degrade and defeat the Islamic State is like many other multilateral military efforts – characterized by widely varying contributions to the effort. This article seeks to understand the patterns of contributions. Three sets of explanations are applied: the lessons of Afghanistan and Libya, variations in how potential contributors feel the threat posed by the Islamic State, and domestic political dynamics. While there may be some political processes that overlap with the big lessons and with the threat of the Islamic State, the patterns of contributions thus far suggest that the key drivers of reactions to the Islamic State are the desire not to repeat Afghanistan combined with some impetus provided by Islamic State attacks in the various homelands. The conclusion suggests some policy implications as well as some ideas for future research.
Since the end of the Cold War, a huge debate over how war has been changing has emerged; a common feature is that modern conflicts are not state vs. state wars, but ‘irregular wars’. In order to better understand modern irregular warfare, it is important to analyse past authors and ideas. Carlo Bianco’s concept of Guerra per bande highlights elements of mobility with different cooperating units, of terror, and of complex terrain. The present study offers the first English analysis of Carlo Bianco and underlines the similarities of his work to the hybrid warfare concept.
When insurgent groups challenge powerful states, defeat is not always inevitable. Increasingly, guerrilla forces have overcome enormous disadvantages and succeeded in extending the period of violent conflict, raising the costs of war, and occasionally winning. Noriyuki Katagiri investigates the circumstances and tactics that allow some insurgencies to succeed in wars against foreign governments while others fail. Adapting to Win examines almost 150 instances of violent insurgencies pitted against state powers, including in-depth case studies of the war in Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq war. By applying sequencing theory, Katagiri provides insights into guerrilla operations ranging from Somalia to Benin and Indochina, demonstrating how some insurgents learn and change in response to shifting circumstances. Ultimately, his research shows that successful insurgent groups have evolved into mature armed forces, and then demonstrates what evolutionary paths are likely to be successful or unsuccessful for those organizations. Adapting to Win will interest scholars of international relations, security studies, and third world politics and contains implications for government officials, military officers, and strategic thinkers around the globe as they grapple with how to cope with tenacious and violent insurgent organizations.
Social media have played an essential role in the jihadists’ operational strategy in Syria and Iraq, and beyond. Twitter in particular has been used to drive communications over other social media platforms. Twitter streams from the insurgency may give the illusion of authenticity, as a spontaneous activity of a generation accustomed to using their cell phones for self-publication, but to what extent is access and content controlled? Over a period of three months, from January through March 2014, information was collected from the Twitter accounts of 59 Western-origin fighters known to be in Syria. Using a snowball method, the 59 starter accounts were used to collect data about the most popular accounts in the network-at-large. Social network analysis on the data collated about Twitter users in the Western Syria-based fighters points to the controlling role played by feeder accounts belonging to terrorist organizations in the insurgency zone, and by Europe-based organizational accounts associated with the banned British organization, Al Muhajiroun, and in particular the London-based preacher, Anjem Choudary.
Extending data reported by Mohammed Hafez in 2007, we compiled a database of 1,779 suicide bombers who attempted or completed attacks in Iraq from 2003 through 2010. From 2003 through 2006, monthly totals of suicide bombers show a pattern different from the pattern of non-suicide insurgent attacks, but from 2007 through 2010 the two patterns were similar. This biphasic pattern indicates that suicide attacks sometimes warrant separate analysis but sometimes are just one tactic in a larger envelope of insurgent violence. We also show that only 13 percent of suicide bombers targeted coalition forces and international civilians, primarily during the early years of the conflict, whereas 83 percent of suicide bombers targeted Iraqis (civilians, members of the Anbar Awakening Movement, Iraqi security forces, and government entities) in attacks that extended throughout the duration of the insurgency. These results challenge the idea that suicide attacks are primarily a nationalist response to foreign occupation, and caution that “smart bombs” may be more often sent against soft targets than hard targets. More generally, our results indicate that suicide attacks must be disaggregated by target in order to understand these attacks as the expression of different insurgent priorities at different times.
Suicide bombing can be understood as a technology that successfully integrates people, cultures, and hardware into precise, intelligent, lethal weapons systems. Lacking access to the sophisticated electronic guidance systems of their enemies, terrorists have developed a cost-effective alternative technology by using social and cultural pressure to convert human beings into guidance systems for terrorist ordnance. This demonstrates that while terrorists tend to be imitative in their technologies, they can still be effective and difficult to predict. A significant implication that arises from this discussion is that the American tendency to assume that "high-tech" devices will automatically confer an advantage on the United States in the struggle against terrorism should be reconsidered.
This study argues that, in parallel to the developments in the West over the last three decades, several nations and organizations on ‘the other side of the hill’ have also undertaken a significant development in their military thought. This conceptual development is referred to in the study as the ‘Other RMA’ (‘O-RMA’). This study aims to identify and describe O-RMA, to analyze the learning process that led to it and to trace its intellectual origins. This ‘way of war’, whose roots lie in a series of dramatic and tumultuous events that took place in the Middle East between the years 1979 and 1982, is based on the following components: Improving absorption capability, in order to increase survivability and provide a breathing space for the ‘weaker side’, creating effective deterrence, in order to deter the ‘stronger side’ from attacking the ‘weaker side’ and shifting the war to more convenient areas in case this deterrent fails; and winning the war by not losing it, while creating an attrition effect. O-RMA is an exceptionally eclectic conception and its development was not intentional or systematic. This study claims that the main ideas that underlie this conceptual development evolved within the different elements, while maintaining a common image, concerning the military, technological, economic, social and political developments in the West during the 1990s.
The African sun had just risen above the hills surrounding the sprawling city and sent its already dazzling rays streaming into the dusty alleyway. Corporal Hernandez felt the sun on his face and knew that today would, again, be sweltering. He was a squad leader in 2d Platoon, Lima Company and had, along with his men, spent a sleepless night on the perimeter. For the past week his platoon had provided security to the International Relief Organization (IRO) workers who manned one of three food distribution points in the American Sector of Tugala -- the war-tom capital of Orange -- a Central African nation wracked by civil unrest and famine. The situation in Orange had transfixed the world for nearly two years. Bloody tribal fighting had led first to the utter collapse of the government and economy, and ultimately, to widespread famine. International efforts to quell the violence and support the teetering government had failed, and the country had plunged into chaos. The United States had finally been compelled to intervene. A forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was ordered to assist the efforts of the ineffective Regional Multi-National Force (RMNF) and the host of international humanitarian assistance organizations that struggled to alleviate the suffering. The MEU's arrival had stabilized the situation and allowed the precious relief supplies to finally reach the people who needed them most. The Food Distribution Point (FDP) manned by 2d Platoon serviced over 5,000 people daily. The Marines had, at first, been shocked at the extent of the suffering, by the constant stream of malnourished men and women, and by the distended bellies and drawn faces of the children. The flow of food and medical supplies had, however, had a dramatic impact. The grim daily death tolls had slowly begun to decrease and the city had begun to recover some sense of normalcy. Within a month the lives of the Marines had assumed a sort of dull routine.
RICHARD BETTS argues that the September 11 attacks were a response to American primacy and then applies offense-defense theory to explain the intense advantages that terrorist groups have in launching offensive strikes and in exploiting the defenses that a nation can put up in this era of globalization and asymmetric warfare.
As the title indicates, the purpose of the analysis is to revisit the main theses of The Transformation of War a little more than decade after it was published. The first section provides a brief recapitulation of the processes which, especially in view of 9–11, have caused large scale interstate warfare to go down and ‘non-trinitarian’ warfare to go up. The second takes an equally brief look at the most important problem that The Transformation of War has not addressed, that is, information warfare. The third asks whether war in fact is what Clausewitz says it is – a continuation of politics by other means. It concludes that, from the point of view of the vast majority of those who have to fight and die, the answer to that question is very often in the negative; and ends by serving a warning that those who ignore this fact do so at their peril.
The idea that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' has led to the errone-ous conclusion that defining terrorism is, in the final analysis, a subjective activity about assigning negative connotations to one's opponents and positive connotations to one's proponents. Terrorism, both as practiced and justified by terrorist themselves, is a tool used to achieve a specific outcome by using force or violence on one segment of society with the primary goal of causing fear in the larger society to make change in that society. This article will review the historical development of the use of terror and demonstrate that regardless of the actor, all terrorists share the common belief that terror is a tool of change. The desired change, the chosen target, and the justification of the use of terror can be specific to the society and the perpetrators. The goal of this paper will be to show the common strands of uniformity of the understanding of terror as a tool of change through history. Though there are differences between terrorists and waves of terror, the utility of terror is not different.
A great deal of violence in civil wars is informed by the logic of terrorism: violence tends to be used by political actors
against civilians in order to shape their political behavior. I focus on indiscriminate violence in the context of civil war: this is a type of violence that selects its victims on the basis of their membership in some
group and irrespective of their individual actions. Extensive empirical evidence suggests that indiscriminate violence in
civil war is informed by the logic of terrorism. I argue that under certain conditions, that tend to be quite common, such
violence is counter productive. I specify these conditions and address the following paradox: why do we sometimes observe
instances of indiscriminate violence evenunder conditions that make this strategy counterproductive? I review four possible reasons: truncated data, ignorance, cost,
and institutional constraints. I argue that indiscriminate violence emerges because it is much cheaper than its main alternative
– selective violence. It is more likely under a steep imbalance of power between the competing actors, and where and when
resources and information are low; however, most political actors eventually switch to selective violence. Thus, given a balance
of power between competing actors, indiscriminate violence is more likely at early rather than late stages of the conflict.
Overall, the paper suggests that even extreme forms of violence are used strategically.
A book on the subject of the conduct of small wars where the campaigns do not consist of regular troops. It contains strategy, tactics, and information on all of the minor expeditions in which the British Army was frequently engaged.
This study is organized in three parts. The first part is based on the assumption that in order to take a city apart one must first know how to put it together. A substantial literature on urban design, planning, and management has never been exploited in a study of urban warfare, though a flash of common sense would tell us that these subjects are highly interrelated. The second part attempts to place urban warfare into some perspective. No end of confusion has arisen over the years because of a failure to distinguish what is truly new from what is merely unfamiliar. Aspects of urban life, design, and urban fighting, thought by some observers to be precedent shattering, most often turn out to have been several hundred, if not thousands, of years old. If nothing else, simply knowing that others have faced the same problem has a calming effect, but when those others have found a solution, then the effect is educational. The last part of this study attempts to fuse what has been discussed in the first two parts and suggests how we might make a fresh start at understanding a very difficult form of war in the future. That there are nurban operations, perhaps outright urban war in our future, there is no doubt. The only question is when, and what can we do about it now?
Translated from the French by Daniel Lee. Includes Portrait of the "Centurion", by Bernard B. Fall.
Mary Kaldor's New and Old Wars has fundamentally changed the way both scholars and policy-makers understand contemporary war and conflict. In the context of globalization, this path-breaking book has shown that what we think of as war - that is to say, war between states in which the aim is to inflict maximum violence - is becoming an anachronism. In its place is a new type of organized violence or 'new wars', which could be described as a mixture of war, organized crime and massive violations of human rights. The actors are both global and local, public and private. The wars are fought for particularistic political goals using tactics of terror and destabilization that are theoretically outlawed by the rules of modern warfare.
Kaldor's analysis offers a basis for a cosmopolitan political response to these wars, in which the monopoly of legitimate organized violence is reconstructed on a transnational basis and international peacekeeping is reconceptualized as cosmopolitan law enforcement. This approach also has implications for the reconstruction of civil society, political institutions, and economic and social relations.
This third edition has been fully revised and updated. Kaldor has added an afterword answering the critics of the New Wars argument and, in a new chapter, Kaldor shows how old war thinking in Afghanistan and Iraq greatly exacerbated what turned out to be, in many ways, archetypal new wars - characterised by identity politics, a criminalised war economy and civilians as the main victims.
Like its predecessors, the third edition of New and Old Wars will be essential reading for students of international relations, politics and conflict studies as well as to all those interested in the changing nature and prospect of warfare.
How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World
- John Arquilla
- Raiders Insurgents
- Bandits
The Islamic State Goes Global
- Richard Barrett
Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Foreign Military Studies Office
- J Bunker
- Alma Robert
- Keshavarz
The Military Doctrine of the Islamic State and the Limits of Ba’athist Influence
- Barak Barfi
Depictions of Children and Youth in the Islamic State’s Martyrdom Propaganda
- Mia Bloom
- John Horgan
- Charlie Winter
Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military Implications. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute
- J Bunker
- Robert
Islamic State Wants You to Fear its Snipers. Militant Sharpshooters Star in Propaganda Video.” War Is Boring
- Darien Cavanaugh
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars
- Frank Hoffman
Suicide Attacks: Strategy, from the Afghan War to Syraq and Mediterranean Region. A triple Way to Read the Asymmetric Threats
- Andrea Beccaro
- Claudio Bertolotti
Abd Al-’Aziz Al-Muqrin’s a Practical Course for Guerrilla War
- Norman Cigar
Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online.” In Blind Spot: America’s Response to Radicalism in the Middle East
- Cohen
The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail
- Brian Dodwell
- Daniel Milton
- Don Rassler
Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute
- A Echevarria
How ISIS Makes IEDS: The Supply Chain of Terrorism
- Fatima Bhojani
Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom
- J Bunker
- P. John Robert
- Sullivan