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5. Village Networks, Land Law, and Myanmar's Democratization
... There is an emerging, vibrant, and increasingly complex civil society sector in Myanmar, ranging from small, grassroots groups to large, intergovernmental agencies. Especially after Cyclone Nargis slammed into Burma in May 2008, and given the much-criticized inept and callous state response, networks of community-based organizations grew stronger out of necessity, expanding their space and preventing the government from maintaining precyclone restrictions (Wells & Kyaw Thu Aung, 2014). ...
... Civil society networks, including journalists' networks, have begun directly intervening in policy making by contributing recommendations to President Thein Sein and to the speakers and other members of the lower and upper houses of parliament (Wells & Kyaw Thu Aung, 2014). All this bodes well for efforts to change the culture of fear and complacency. ...
This article offers an assessment of media and their role in the ongoing political transition in Myanmar, and an overview of lessons learned from other countries undergoing transition. It demonstrates how media function in this process as active agents of stability, restraint, change, or all three, and assesses how Myanmar’s experiences reinforce or challenge common assumptions about democratic transition. The discussion draws from interviews over many years with journalists, editors, advocacy groups, and policy makers and participant observation in media offices and at media-related events. The research examines the origins of the recent changes, the importance of history, the role of civil society—including ethnic and formerly exile media—and issues of political economy and media diversity.
Available at http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/3358/1533
... Third, the joint rule of the NLD and military also closed spaces for civil society involvement. Although the opening up under President Thein Sein brought an end to state repression and increased civil society activism and political advocacy (Wells and Aung 2014;Bünte 2018), the NGO community under Aung San Suu complained about the NLD's lack of openness and limited input into the policy-making process. Such constraints, combined with the fragmented character of civil society, meant that although civil society organizations played important roles in society, they did not provide viable alternative channels for popular representation (Stokke and Aung 2019). ...
... Community mobilization for public services has occurred in various places in Myanmar mostly because of the void of a functioning state (Wells & Aung, 2014). These experiences of handling things on their own have empowered communities and ordinary citizens. ...
Myanmar’s energy planning is highly centralized. The state-managed energy infrastructure has struggled to meet growing demand for electricity and connect populations living in remote regions to the national electricity grid. The 2021 military coup has further undermined the centralized energy system, and the shortcomings call for alternative solutions to achieve energy security. Decentralized renewable energy systems, such as small-scale community hydropower and solar power schemes, have been an affordable way for communities to gain access to energy in many parts of the country and community-based approaches to energy are growing in importance. This paper highlights ongoing exclusions in energy access and evaluates the limitations of centralized electrification, before turning to examine the viability of decentralized offgrid energy options in Myanmar. We examine decentralized community-based pico- and micro-hydropower schemes developed and managed locally with the support of a local civil society organization (CSO) in the Danu Self-Administrated Zone to illustrate that community-managed energy systems fill a critical gap in electricity provision left by the government. The study finds that local communities’ lack of technical capacity and financial resources has been partly mitigated by the support given by the CSO which harbors a network of technical experts and development cooperation partners. An intimate relationship between the CSO and local communities is a key factor in their successful collaboration. Myanmar’s current political, economic, and humanitarian crises, however, is putting the power of community collective action to the test. International partners have an important role to play in ensuring energy access and security for people in Myanmar by strengthening their support for decentralized energy solutions under challenging post-coup contexts.
... The period of military rule was characterized by state suppression of opposition political movements, but also the emergence of regime-initiated mass organizations (Burma Center Netherlands and Transnational Institute 1999;Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2007). The democratic opening has brought a rapid growth in civil society organizations, and has also expanded the space for political advocacy (Wells and Aung 2014). This opening is reflected in the increased numbers and activities of CSOs that seek to engage with local public administration or influence policy-making at the Union level. ...
This article analyses Myanmar's transition from authoritarianism and asks if it represents a transition towards democracy or a hybrid form of rule. Starting from theoretical debates about modes of transition, the article examines competing discourses on Myanmar's opening and argues that it resembles an imposed more than a negotiated transition. Next, the article analyses the links between this mode of transition and its outcomes, and finds that contemporary Myanmar is characterized by a combination of formal institutions for democratic representation, civilian government and power-sharing, and problems of weak popular representation, limited civilian control of the military, and continued centralization of state authority. The article concludes that Myanmar's political trajectory remains open-ended, but also that Myanmar, at least for the time being, seems more accurately described as a relatively stable hybrid regime than as a country that is in transition to democracy.
... The reform period has also expanded the space for political advocacy (Wells & Aung 2014). This change is reflected in increased numbers and activities of politically oriented CSOs (Lidauer 2012;Maber 2016). ...
Myanmar may for a long time remain in a transitional state with an uncertain future. After a series of political and economic liberalization reforms from 2011 onwards, Myanmar’s political trajectory remains open-ended, although the most plausible scenario remains a continued slow democratization process. The democratic opening has been driven largely by the interest of the military rulers in changing Myanmar’s relations with Western states and thereby gaining leverage vis-à-vis China. Continued military influence, persistent capacity problems in political parties and parliamentary politics, weak channels of political representation and limited administrative capacity give rise to critical questions about the substance of democratization and economic development in Myanmar. The country’s informal economy is one of the largest in the world and is upheld by informal elite pacts that were formed in the military era, often involving high-ranking officers and crony companies. Along with a high level of corruption and lack of redistributive mechanisms the continuing cronyism hinders inclusive growth. If these economic structures persist, social and ethnic conflicts may intensify and progress towards further democratization stall. Despite this, foreign direct investments in resource extraction and other sectors have been on the rise since 2011 and are likely to continue. Myanmar is also ranked as the world’s second-most vulnerable country to climate change. The government needs a better understanding of climate change and its effects – both its direct impacts on Myanmar and its indirect impacts via neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh. As Myanmar remains at a crossroads, smart external assistance may have greater long-term impact in Myanmar than in other recipient countries where the situation is less volatile. However, donors may also become increasingly frustrated and reduce their assistance because of the ongoing Rohingya crisis and because of the limited local capacity to absorb international assistance.
This chapter discusses the institutional foundations of democratic erosion and breakdown in Myanmar. The military coup of February 2021 ended a decade of power-sharing between the military and the National League for Democracy (NLD). This chapter argues that Myanmar´s special form of hybrid presidentialism, which was created by the 2008 constitution, conditioned the transition to civilian rule but also provided the basis for later military dissatisfaction, ultimately leading to a military coup. Since the constitution was never carried by an overarching elite compromise and key actors could not agree on the rules of the political game, power-sharing between the military and the civilian arms of the government became increasingly precarious after 2015. Perilous not in the Linzean sense of an increasing polarization between executive and legislature, and not as increased conflict between political parties, but as growing antagonism between the civilian and military arms of the government. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD increasingly used informal mechanisms to govern, which not only eroded the constitutional framework imposed by the 2008 constitution, but also led to growing dissatisfaction on the part of the military.
Growing precarity amongst rural households in Myanmar is characterised by increasingly debt-fuelled agriculture, decreasing sufficiency and sustainability of rural livelihoods and an absence of social safety nets. This constrains the capacity for viable livelihoods, as risk-averse coping strategies undermine long-term economic sustainability. In this context, informal support networks may be expected to decline or collapse. However, recent evidence demonstrates the widespread emergence of community-based social organisations in rural communities, formed along traditional principles of reciprocity. Analysis of large-scale rural household surveys demonstrates that such organisations are found in nearly 40% of communities in rural Myanmar. These organisations collect and redistribute funds to help with healthcare, education, funerals and other social needs. The presence of such organisations is linked to higher levels of household resilience, achieved through reducing the inequalities linked to gender, disability and poverty, and through providing enabling environments for effective income diversification. Communities with higher levels of migration are more likely to have community-based social organisations, possibly a result of economic and social remittances. In the absence of effective formalised social protection, these social organisations provide most of the social assistance in rural communities, representing new networks of reciprocity in the face of increasing precarity.
Due to its internationally accompanied opening policies, Myanmar’s present economic situation is unique even on a global scale. The present contribution addresses the question if the ranking of Mynamar on position 150 of the UN Human Development Index indeed reflects the country’s economic situation. The paper investigates the historical developments in Myanmar after 1948, the Western sanctions regime after 1988, the integration into ASEAN, the present framework for ‘doing business’, and the dynamics of foreign capital and domestic labor conditions. The paper concludes that the years of political isolation and repression still inhibit the country’s fast economic progress. The future welfare of this politically disrupted country so rich in natural resources does not only depend on its government and its ascending civil society, but also on FDI by foreign companies.
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