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Capitalism Nature Socialism
ISSN: 1045-5752 (Print) 1548-3290 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcns20
The Commons: A Social Form that Allows for
Degrowth and Sustainability
Johannes Euler
To cite this article: Johannes Euler (2019) The Commons: A Social Form that Allows
for Degrowth and Sustainability, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 30:2, 158-175, DOI:
10.1080/10455752.2018.1449874
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2018.1449874
Published online: 13 Mar 2018.
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The Commons: A Social Form that Allows for
Degrowth and Sustainability
Johannes Euler
a,b,c
a
Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities (KWI), Essen, Germany;
b
Commons-Institut,
Bonn, Germany;
c
ZOE. Institute for Inclusive and Sustainable Economies, Bornheim
(Rheinland), Germany
ABSTRACT
This theoretical article opens with the reconstruction of a value-critical argument
which claims that capitalism is a form of society that is structurally unsustainable.
The reason for this is the need for ever-increasing value production which stems
from the core of capitalism (the commodity form, competition, profit
maximization, private production) and its internal and external limits. Based
on this, the article calls for a fundamental social transformation and positions
the commons as a social form that has the potential to replace the
commodity form as societal foundation. Constituted by social practices
(commoning) that are based on voluntariness, autonomy and needs-
satisfaction, commons do not have an inbuilt growth compulsion. Therefore,
the article concludes, the commons may enable humanity to deal with the
question of sustainability on the basis of social structures that include the
possibility of a solution.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 22 July 2016; Accepted 10 October 2017
KEYWORDS Commons; sustainability; capitalism; collective action; degrowth
Introduction
Economic growth is made responsible for many of the problems of our times,
particularly forcefully since the emergence of degrowth movements (cf.
Jackson 2009; Burkhart et al. 2017). Knowledge about the problems at hand
has been available for decades and could have been taken more seriously at
least since the Report to the Club of Rome in 1972 (Meadows et al. 1972).
Normative claims for ecological as well as social sustainability
1
—and more
© 2018 The Center for Political Ecology
CONTACT Johannes Euler johannes.euler@kwi-nrw.de
1
In this article sustainability is understood as a state of affairs in which the ecological and the social coexist
(not to imply they are originally separate) in ways that are not fundamentally destructive for either of
them, and where it is likely that this will remain so in the future. The current state could, thus, be con-
sidered unsustainable as today the ecological sphere is fundamentally endangered by the social sphere.
This, in turn, has severe ramifications for the social sphere. The question of what endangered means and
how those spheres are to be defined remains controversial. Any definition of sustainability is (most
likely) a discursive one, and so is shaped by specific cultural influences.
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM
2019, VOL. 30, NO. 2, 158–175
https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2018.1449874
lately “socially sustainable economic de-growth”(Martínez-Alier et al. 2010,
1741) have been presented. They usually oppose notions of “green”or
“sustainable growth”as fundamentally unrealistic, or even as an oxymoron
from the point of view of thermodynamics, as Georgescu-Roegen (1993)
points out.
Degrowth can be seen as aiming at a socially and ecologically sustainable
society by reducing economic growth.
From an ecological perspective, de-growth implies physical de-growth or
downsizing economic throughput as measured by material and energy flows.
The debate rests on how much downsizing is necessary for sustainability and
whether there is an optimal scale of the economy. (Martínez-Alier et al.
2010, 1743)
Oftentimes the arguments are made from ecological or physical perspectives
or look at value systems or drivers of growth within capitalist societies. Those
arguments tend to remain within the capitalist frame of thinking. In contrast,
in this article, I will ponder the structural fundamentals of capitalism and
explain the growth compulsion in capitalist societies from that standpoint.
If the roots of the growth imperatives reach down to the very basis of the
capitalist system, then the question of alternatives needs to be asked and
begin to be answered on this very level. Hence, the question to tackle in
this article is: What are the structural foundations of economic growth in
capitalist societies and what could a potential alternative that allows for
degrowth look like?
The first of the two main theses of this article is that capitalism is structu-
rally unsustainable because it builds on structures of insufficiency—there is no
“enough”to it. This line of argument will build heavily on Marx ([1890]
1969), as well as value-critical readings of his works (e.g. Postone 1993;
Kurz 2012; cf. Jappe 2014), especially on the reconstruction of an argument
made by Ortlieb (2014).
2
If this argument holds (and this condition is impor-
tant to emphasize), then the second line of thought—the one on alternatives—
will become particularly viable.
Mies (2014, i112) claims that “many people who are critical of the destruc-
tion of the environment, the crises of the economy in all countries and the lack
of perspectives all over the globe are searching for an alternative.”For her, the
“present interest in new commons …shows that more and more people
understand that our present capitalist world system cannot solve any of the
problems it itself has created”(i106). And Mattei (2011, 11) argues that
“We need a new common sense recognizing …that each individual’s survival
depends on its relationship with others, with the community, with the
environment.”Building on these thoughts, the second thesis of this article
2
Exner (2014) employs (but does not elaborate extensively) a similar line of argument where he describes
the money form as structurally responsible for economic growth.
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 159
is, therefore, that commons could be the foundation of a society allowing
exactly this—a sustainable way of producing human livelihoods.
Anti-enclosure and anti-expropriation movements, as well as (re)appro-
priation struggles, have played and continue to play a vital role in the formu-
lation of emancipatory thoughts and ideas, in the provision of spaces and
means of (re)production, in the construction of social ties and solidarity etc.
In order to provide a sound line of argument and due to the limitations of
space a decision had to be made on the story to tell, namely that of movements
or of social structures. The decision was taken in favor of the latter. Movements
and struggles shall be recognized and can be considered an important reference
point for this article, however. But movements also need goals that transcend
the very struggle they are involved in (cf. Euler and Gauditz 2017). Otherwise,
they risk being fragmented and fighting the symptoms only. This may lead to
partial improvements but not necessarily to a transformation towards a society
that actually adheres to planetary boundaries.
The Fundamentals of Capitalism
Even though there is certainly still much to be done in terms of relevant
understanding and description, in this article it is taken for granted that
humanity is facing severe environmental (and social) problems (cf. Jackson
2009; Fatheuer, Fuhr, and Unmüßig 2015; Graham 2015, 76). We can think
of climate change as an obvious example, as well as losses to biodiversity,
deforestation, clean water scarcity, exhaustion of natural resources and
many more. It seems as if there are not many areas about which one can
say that the (global) human society is not having trouble with. The question,
then, is not “Do these problems exist?”but “Why do they?”This section will
try to sketch out an answer to this.
In order to get started, it seems necessary to clarify what is meant by society
in this context. It is not understood, as sometimes is assumed in liberal the-
ories, as opposed and external to isolated individuals (cf. Meretz 2009).
Society is understood in dialectical terms, as consisting of and determined
by humans. At the same time as humans create the societal conditions in
which they live as a society, they themselves are conditioned by that
society. The specific type of society in question changes over time and capit-
alism is but one of its possible forms—neither the only one, nor the last one,
but the historically specific one dominant at the moment (Marx [1890]1969;
Postone 1993, 5). We, human beings, create our own living conditions. Under
capitalism, this means that we produce our livelihoods predominantly in form
of commodities (Marx [1890]1969, 49). In Marx’s terminology commodities
have a twofold (or dual) character. First and foremost, they are always con-
crete, they are something in real terms, be it pens or guns, for instance.
They are thus always distinct and possess some use value. Second, they are
160 J. EULER
abstract in the sense of having value (and exchange value being its “real
expression”). This value is created as a social relation, it does not have
much to do with the physical attributes but rather with the commodities’
exchangeability relative to other commodities. Hence, it is a social relation.
The existence of value is necessary since capitalist production is conducted
in separated entities that compete with each other.
Generally, demand and supply are mediated on markets. The form of inter-
action dominant on markets is (equivalent) exchange—someone only gets
something if they can pay for it with something of equivalent value (under
capitalism overwhelmingly with money). Meretz (2017, 418) argues that
“[p]eople do not communicate about their needs and efforts in order to
satisfy them; rather, distinct products ‘communicate’on the market
through exchange, resulting in an objective measure of their relation, called
‘value’.”Capital, then, is the value used and destined for creating more
value, through investments. It is self-valorizing value that needs to expand
constantly (Marx [1890]1969, 167). Put differently, if money is (re-)invested
to produce commodities in order to make more money, that is capital. This
logic is dominant under capitalism and results in an expansive and self-per-
petuating cycle of capital investment, accumulation and re-investment. In
this context, we need to distinguish between two forms of wealth. On the
one hand, there is concrete, real wealth (either material or immaterial).
This form of wealth depends on use value. On the other hand, there is abstract
wealth, whose foundation is value. Abstract wealth requires a material bearer,
however (Ortlieb 2013). Chairs have a material side, computer programs
need to be produced and applied at special devices, and even ideas become
commodities in form of books or virtual bites.
The end of capitalist production is neither concrete wealth nor consump-
tion (which would have natural limits and possibilities to restrain it). The end
is to make money, to maximize profits. From the perspectives of degrowth
and sustainability, this is problematic because there is no (natural) limit to
it. Capitalism requires that the money earned is not primarily used for con-
sumption purposes but that a good chunk of it be reinvested in order to
make more money. Competition makes this necessary as companies can
only endure the pressures of competition if they reinvest money so that
they increase their productivity and are thus not “outcompeted”by their com-
petitors.
3
Hence, one can say it is “accumulation for the sake of accumulation”
(Marx [1890]1969, 621) that is the true end of economic activity under capit-
alism. Consumption and production are mere means to it (Ortlieb 2013).
In this respect, Kurz (2012, 286), among many others, builds on the Marxian
notion of inner and an outer expansion of capital. Outer expansion relates to
the sphere of reproduction, which is not yet—and, Kurz declares, can never
3
And for this, surplus value or, ultimately, profit (surplus value over capital invested) is needed.
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 161
be—fully captured by capital, as well as to the valorization of new territories
(287–288). This phenomenon could be called the expansion of markets, subdu-
ing more and more parts of the world and people’s lives under the accumulation
logic. In the end outer expansion it is the expansion of the commodity form. In
contrast, inner expansion can be understood as the subsumption of non-capi-
talist production processes under the requirements of capital (289).
4
This
means that those processes are increasingly adapted to the imperatives of
return-to-investment, competition and production of abstract wealth.
Capital is also conceptualized as constant and variable (Marx [1890]1969,
214). The first consists of machinery, factory buildings, raw materials, etc., and
the latter is human labor power. The (average) effort needed for the
production of a commodity is put into relation with the efforts needed for the
production of other commodities. This social relation is the value that is attached
to the commodity, and must be subdivided into the part that the laborer receives
to cover the costs of their reproduction on the one hand and into what is called
surplus value on the other. The latter can be translated into profit, which is the
surplus value relative to the capital invested. Its realization depends on the price
the seller attains on the market after the production process.
Surplus value can be increased in absolute or relative terms (Marx [1890]
1969, 531). Absolute surplus value can be understood as either intensifying or
prolonging the working time of laborers (ideally with no increases in wages).
This is necessarily limited by our physiology—humans cannot work infinitely
long hours, or with infinite intensity. Relative surplus value can be attained by
increasing labor productivity (more commodities can be produced with the
same amount of labor). This can be done, for instance, by improving machin-
ery or increasing the motivation of laborers.
What is the Problem? The Devil in the Details
Attempting to increase surplus value is not a question of mere goodwill; it is
necessary for the average individual company—the larger the competitive
pressure, the more so. This leads to an increase of the mass of surplus value
at the level of society as a whole (Marx [1890]1969, 321ff.; cf. Kurz 2012,
278). The companies that are able to get extra profits can invest more into
their future production, which gives them a competitive edge. Other companies
may catch up, in which case the effects will eventually level off (Ortlieb 2013).
5
Once this new, higher degree of productivity has become the new average, the
extra profits disappear and the products become cheaper. But the same will
constantly be attempted elsewhere, and so labor productivity will continue to
4
This is what Marx described as the transition from formal to real subsumption.
5
Automation is a good example of this. In more and more cases tasks are delegated to machines that men
and women cannot do as profit-efficiently as those machines.
162 J. EULER
rise and more and more concrete wealth will be produced with less and less
labor input. According to Ortlieb (2013), due to increases in productivity,
the quantitative relation between abstract wealth and the material expenditures
needed for its production have changed dramatically. “Capitalist production,
therefore, develops technology, and the combining together of various
processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all
wealth—the soil and the labourer”(Marx 1906, 556).
Kurz (2012, 294) argues that with the spread of microelectronics a new era
of production has started. He claims that it is the foundation of what he calls
the third industrial revolution, which allows for the institution of rationaliz-
ation processes of formerly unthinkable extent and quality. It has spread
very fast and far so that the inner expansion of capital has almost come to
its limits. Kurz claims that the rapid decrease of labor input per commodity
and an increase in markets (products that could enter mass production)
lead to a situation in which the increase in labor productivity and the
increased production quantities could not overcompensate for the (relatively)
reduced inputs of labor power. “The ‘rationalization,’which makes inputs of
human labor dispensable, is for a first time in the capitalist history faster and
takes on a larger degree than the connected cheapening of commodities and
the correspondent extension of markets”(Kurz 2012, 296; translation J.E.).
6
Ortlieb (2013) holds that as long as commodities can be sold (profitably),
they will be produced in unlimited amounts. “[I]f the production of more and
more material wealth becomes necessary for the realization of the same
surplus value, capital’s material output must accordingly grow even more
rapidly than the mass of surplus value”(Ortlieb 2014, 106). In turn,
Postone (1993, 311) argues that “the ever-increasing levels of productivity
generated by capital accumulation entail directly corresponding increases in
the masses of products produced and of raw materials consumed in pro-
duction.”Hence, one can conclude that (1) there is a growth compulsion in
capitalist societies, and (2) this compulsion is based on the fundamentals of
the capitalist structures and their manner of livelihood (re)production.
With capital accumulation being the end in itself of capitalist production,
both humans and nonhuman nature are exploited more and more.
Because capital is not concerned with material but merely abstract wealth,
material wealth will be destroyed as soon and as long as its destruction serves
the processing of value. This can be seen with the erosion of the soil fertility,
as Marx already analyzed, of degradation of air, water quality, etc. (cf. Ortlieb
2014, 112). In some cases, this destructive logic of accumulation—which ulti-
mately rests on the commodity form as the dominant way of human livelihood
6
Kurz is not talking about a relative decrease of the rate of surplus value—also known as the (law of the)
tendency of the rate of profit to fall—but about the absolute decrease of surplus production. This line of
argument is one of the aspects that differentiates the value-critical thinking from more traditional read-
ings of Marx.
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 163
production—might be fought against. But for capitalism to function, this
relation must hold on average. In fact, capitalism is forced by its own structures
to follow an expansive path. This is, one could claim, the fundamental reason for
the structural unsustainability of capitalism (cf. Graham 2015,89).
A very similar conclusion can be drawn from an entirely different theoretical
angle when looking at the possibility of decoupling, which means sustaining
economic growth with less-than-proportional but increasing environmental
damage (relative decoupling) or even decreasing damage (absolute decoupling).
Paech (2012, 93) argues that the theoretical possibility of relative decoupling
resulting in a deceleration of increases in environmental damage fails systema-
tically due to different rebound effects (where gains in resource efficiencydo not
lead to absolute reductions of resource use, e.g. due to an increase in total con-
sumption) and shifting effects (ecological problems are shifted, e.g. geographi-
cally to other regions or temporally to the future). An absolute decoupling would
require the replacement of old hardware with better hardware on a regular basis,
which would only work with planned obsolescence. However, even such an
economy of asset optimization does not imply the potential for long-term
growth (96). Paech claims that “[u]nder conditions of sustained economic
growth it is impossible to discharge the ecosphere in absolute terms. Under
conditions of an absolute discharge of the ecosphereit is impossible to maintain
sustained economic growth”(97; translation J.E.).
Postone (1993, 313) concludes that
any attempt to respond fundamentally, within the framework of capitalist
society, to growing environmental destruction by restraining this society’s
mode of expansion would probably be ineffective on a long-term basis—not
only because of the interests of the capitalists or state managers, but because
failure to expand surplus value would indeed result in severe economic difficul-
ties with great social costs.
Thus, one could argue that no new technology, no “greening of capitalism”
(Graham 2015, 89), no slight modification will suffice.
To make degrowth not a crisis scenario but a hopeful project and to make
human society sustainable in the long run, a real transformation is necessary.
Or, in Trainer’s(2015, 73) words, “[g]etting rid of growth would require an
almost complete remaking of present economic, social, political, geographical
and cultural systems.”Following this argument, what is needed is no less
than a different form of livelihood production. Commons is such a form of
livelihood production, one that could be the foundation of a sustainable
society. This thesis is at the core of the second half of this article.
On Commons and Commoning
Over decades Elinor Ostrom studied various aspects and numerous case studies
related to the commons. In her writings, she made clear that commons can be
164 J. EULER
the foundation of sustainable interactions with nature, while “neither the state
nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-
term, productive use of natural resource systems”(Ostrom 1990, 1). Accord-
ingly, the subtitle of the book “The Wealth of the Commons,”by Bollier and
Helfrich (2012), positions the commons “Beyond Market and State.”
“Beyond”here signifies different but in a way also transcending. Thus,
commons are neither about generalized market competition nor about
centrally planned hierarchies. Commons can be regarded as something quali-
tatively different from both. Ostrom (1990, 2) talks about “self-governing insti-
tutions”and others, as Meretz (2014), about self-organization.
7
Unlike in many cases, for example in (natural) resource economics, here
the term commons shall not be used to describe a specific kind of good.
Goods are not simply commons just by virtue of their natural character-
istics—they are always a product of human activity (cf. Helfrich 2012;
Meretz 2014). Something only becomes a commons—something held in
common—if people relate to it in a specific manner, namely through com-
moning (Euler 2018). Ideally, the manners and rules of the thereby created
togetherness are determined by the participants as peers, as partners. And
the necessary processes of negotiation, deliberation and mediation are
focused on the needs of the affected. Such forms of togetherness took and
still take place (in varying degrees) all around the world. Commoning can
be regarded as an everyday and potentially omnipresent form of producing
and reproducing human livelihood (cf. Meretz 2014).
But it is not only about the social processes. Commons are created through
an interplay between commoning and the matter people interact with.
8
That is
why Bresnihan (2016, 123) speaks of more-than-human commons—he even
attributes agency to the matter. Euler (2018, 15) tries to capture this notion
by conceptualizing commons as “social form of (tangible and/or intangible)
matter determined by commoning.”Clearly, commoning is not a constant,
always identical social practice, but is shaped by the people involved, their cul-
tural backgrounds, their surroundings and the commons they (re)produce.
The term “commoning”is derived from the verb to common and has its
origins, at the latest, in medieval England (Linebaugh 2008). It was under-
stood as cultivating commonly administered land in communal property or
7
There are different approaches to the commons that can and must be distinguished. From a Marxist
angle, especially the Ostrom school can be criticized (cf. Exner 2015). De Angelis (2017, 21), for
example, criticizes Ostrom for lacking “a critical stance on the often-threatening environment, including
capital and the state.”To delve deeper into this debate is a task for another article, however. The argu-
ments presented here are informed by different traditions in an attempt to create a coherent line of
argument.
8
It is clear that social practices look differently depending on whether material or immaterial things are
dealt with, simply because the subject matter is different, i.e. because in the latter case distributional
questions may play a less important role. But the principles that those social practices are based on
need not be fundamentally different.
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 165
as freely using the forests for collecting firewood. Meretz (2012) claims that
such “traditional commons”are mainly oriented towards the extraction and
use of already existing resources. Newer, “emerging”commons (not to be
simply equated with digital or immaterial commons) like Community-sup-
ported Agriculture, Free Software or Open-Hardware differ in the sense
that they are focused on the production of something new which, in turn,
can be an input to the same or other commons-projects (2012).
Different from relations based on hierarchies or markets, commoning
rests on a high degree of voluntariness. This voluntariness is reflected in
the fact that the sharp distinction between production and reproduction
existing otherwise wears away in the case of commoning. Oftentimes
users contribute to production and producers use what they produced,
and hence a trend towards “produsage”has been identified (cf. Bruns
2008; Euler 2016). In the case of Wikipedia, for instance, many users
write or modify articles once in a while and authors not only produce
the online encyclopedia but also use its content. In the case of commu-
nity-supported agriculture projects, people connect with farmers to com-
monly produce food (and much more). The “community,”mostly from
nearby cities, provides the financial means, helps with the work and
decides with the “professionals”about the modalities and questions like
what and how shall be planted. More aspects of the food sovereignty move-
ment could be stated here. The housing project “Mietshäusersyndikat,”
which retrieves houses (more than 100 up to this point) from the real
estate market and creates spaces for self-organization and political action,
can be named as another example.
Commons-Society
Dyer-Witheford (2007, 82) argues: “If the cell form of capitalism is the com-
modity, the cellular form of a society beyond capital is the common. A com-
modity is a good produced for sale, a common is a good produced, or
conserved, to be shared.”Thus, commons could be seen as constitutive
elements of an alternative mode of production and therefore as the foundation
of a different form of society. This is important, first, because it helps to for-
mulate a direction for attempts to transform society. Transformational move-
ments need a sense of where to go so that they do not merely defend against
neoliberalism and capitalism in general. Second, this is important because
commons make an immediate impact, they offer spaces that allow people
to (learn how to) act differently in the here and now, as well as and help
build alternative networks and reduce dependence on capitalist structures.
It must be made clear, however, that contemporary commons and common-
ing show many aspects of the capitalist mode of production, i.e. in the belief
systems but also through the fact that people are still forced to earn an income
166 J. EULER
somehow and to use money to obtain certain goods they need. Thus, all these
commons (and all commoning) that exist today are still influenced by the
capitalist system with all the problems and contradictions that come with
it. But they bear a potential that can be unfolded further. This is why they
are called a cellular form: they are the seeds that might sprout into a new
plant.
Ultimately, the commodity form is historically specific—it is only one
way of framing (and influencing) the manner in which people transform
their environment and use the products of that transformation. It is only
one answer to questions such as “Who does what?,”“Why is it done?”
and “At whose disposal will the products be placed?”Those are questions
that need to be answered on the level of society. It helps to imagine
society as a large network where the knots and the links are formed accord-
ing to certain characteristics (which in turn determine the way society as a
whole is organized). Currently, many of the links and knots depict the
characteristics of the commodity form, and in such a dominant way that
the society is to be considered capitalist. A network that is not dominated
by the commodity form but instead by the commons, would probably look
rather different from what we can observe today. For instance, the links, the
relationships at hand, would not be based on equivalent exchange but on
contributing and taking what is needed and considered right and important
(cf. Euler 2018, 13).
In traditional commons, this is often solved through personal relations.
People know each other, trust and have faith in each other. This constitutes
some form of direct reciprocity and often takes the following form: I give
something to you today and have good reason to believe that you will give
me something I need at some other time. A society decisively determined
by direct reciprocity is faced with the problem of scalability. Groups cannot
become too large because the human capacity of having direct and relation-
ships of trust is limited. Additionally, (quasi-)autarkic little groups come
with potentially disastrous problems of group identities, patriarchy, etc.
9
In
contrast, relations of indirect reciprocity function as follows: I do something
that other people might use and have good reason to believe that when I need
something at some other time, this will be provided to me. This is not the case
because I gave something to “the network”beforehand. Quite the contrary,
people did what they did because they like helping me and/or because they
simply like doing the things that I need.
10
9
Erik Swyngedouw rightly argued at the 2016 Conference on Political Ecology in Stockholm that there is
something sinister about communities. The ideas presented here are not about isolated small groups
which aim at self-sufficiency, where most of the areas of life are shared with the same group and
thus leaving or being excluded poses serious threats which is problematic from the point of view of
freedom (Spehr 2003, 44).
10
Thus, no equivalent exchange relation is required (which would contradict the logic of the commons).
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 167
With respect to division of labor, the advantage of large networks can be
illustrated with open source software. If more people read, write, comment,
and modify the programs, the result is more likely to be better as it is con-
trolled by more people—“more eyes see more”—and because the probability
that one person has (and shares) the missing knowledge increases with the
number of contributors.
11
The same argument could be brought forward
with, say, a gardening project where it is useful to have more people to
water, plant, build, etc. This argument holds until the capacity limits are
reached (i.e. ecological/physical limits).
12
The larger the network, the
greater the chance that somebody is able and willing to help me out with
exactly what I need, at just the moment I need it. It is also beneficial to be
part of a large network, as the variety of projects tends to be larger.
By no means does this imply that small-scale communities are entirely out-
dated or that direct reciprocity is a bad thing and will have to wither away
completely. Personal relations and communities have always played and
will continue to play an important role. The argument made here is simply
that people would be part of multiple communities and not just one single
community. The idea is about a complex and dynamic netting of
commons-projects. And in some of those projects direct reciprocity and per-
sonal relations would be an important factor. But they would not be the deter-
mining feature of societal mediation. Society at large may rather be mediated
based on relations of indirect reciprocity.
One way to imagine such a form of societal mediation based on indirect
reciprocity can be observed with Wikipedia and is called stigmergy—the
term is based on the Greek word for sign “stigma”(cf. Siefkes 2009, 7).
Tasks that someone wants done (e.g. to write a new article about something
still missing) can be noted and highlighted. This sign says, “If you know some-
thing about the requested topic, please write an article.”The result is freely
available and the person contributing to the completion has contributed
something to the network. These signs can additionally be compiled in to-
do lists, which can be ranked (e.g. by urgency, recency, importance). This
allows people to contribute exactly what they want and when it is needed,
and to prioritize actions according to needs.
11
Of course, this only unfolds its full potential as soon as structural antagonisms are transcended and the
agendas of contributors are adequately directed at advancing the project at hand, which might be poss-
ible in a commons-society through the structurally positive relation of people towards the advancement
of others (cf. Meretz 2014) which may also offset at least some of the potentially coercive aspects of
social control.
12
Another example would be limits of the group itself in the sense that some activities, for example, those
related to care, require a certain proximity of relations, and so the number of people involved cannot
grow infinitely. In such cases, different subgroups (or new similar groups) can be formed and the proxi-
mity can be reached within the subgroups. One subgroup can still inspire the others (through exchange
of experiences), and thus in this case too having more people in the extended network tends to be
beneficial.
168 J. EULER
Stigmergy is not limited to the digital world. It is applied in many pro-
jects, though obviously in different specific forms. In a housing project, for
instance, lists are made for the groceries and for the next steps in the reno-
vation process. And in gardening projects, signs are set up that display
which plants need attention (watering, harvesting). Ultimately, stigmergy
is a sign-based organizational mechanism that makes communication and
dispersion of information (i.e. on tasks and their completion) possible
without the necessity of personal, time or spatial meetings. The aim of
the stigmergic method is the coherent and comprehensive organization of
local actions.
13
As such, stigmergy is scalable and can, therefore, be a
system that is not only serviceable for mediating people’s activities
within, but also across commons-projects.
Polycentricity could be considered appropriate for structures of complex
network systems based on indirect reciprocity. As the term suggests, it
“connotes many centers of decision making that are formally independent
of each other”(Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, 831). Through this,
the functional differentiation of commons can be exerted and the nature
of the commons can find its equivalent at the macro level with respect to
self-determination, multi-dimensionality, and needs-orientation. Polycentric
systems are based on partial dependence and allow for a high degree of
flexibility. This makes polycentricity appropriate for the multi-dimensional
plurality and concrete distinctiveness of the commons. Stigmergic
mediation and polycentric connectivity could thus be the foundation for
a commons-based society that creates its own basis (commons-based
commons creation) and allows for self-planned and self-organized
(re)production.
I have discussed the logical argument on how such a transformation can be
envisioned from the commons perspective elsewhere (see Euler 2016). Suffice
it to say here that under the current circumstances it must involve consider-
able struggle. “At any moment of capital development …there are commons
and, if capital regards these as a barrier to overcome, then it will set out strat-
egies for their enclosure or co-optation”(De Angelis 2017, 173). Explicitly
fighting enclosures and dispossessions (see e.g. Swyngedouw 2005), as well
as (re)appropriation struggles, are necessary. These would have to go hand
in hand with the creation and protection of commons-projects through
commoning so that the commons networks grow to replace and ultimately
overcome the dominance of capitalist relations.
13
Stigmergy has two aspects. One is that people simply see what needs to be done (e.g. the garbage bin
needs emptying). This is where our surroundings communicate with us. The other aspect is our com-
munication related to it (e.g. to-do lists). This can be done in many different ways, and ultimately
markets are also sign-based mechanisms, one-dimensional and coercive in their totalization. In contrast,
what is needed are stigmergic systems that are able to reflect the multidimensional qualities of life and
the aspects of self-selection and voluntariness.
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 169
Why Commoning Could be a Solution
Inspired to a great extent by both the observation of emerging commons
14
and
conceptual reflection, some principles with which to embrace the emancipatory
potential of the commons have been formulated. Siefkes (2007, 9) argues that
exchanges (of equivalents) are not the fundamental basis of the commons, but
that contributions characterize the social practices of giving, taking, using and
sharing.
15
Additionally, orientation towards need-satisfaction is a basic under-
lying principle of commoning. It is about contributing voluntarily and taking
what is needed, not about (equivalent) exchange relations. An equivalent is
neither required nor applicable. The distinct separation of human activities
into paid and unpaid (often described as production and reproduction labor)
is a fundamental building block of the capitalist mode of production. Ideally,
this is not the case with commons production, as the abstract evaluation mech-
anism is absent and there is no money or other (societally dominant) equivalent
involved. Production and reproduction are not separated into different spheres,
since the production process ceases to be profit-oriented and becomes needs-
oriented instead. Thus, we can say that commons are not only based on both
production and reproduction, but that the distinction might even vanish and
a transcendence of the two might take place. This new category has been
called (re)production (Biesecker and Hofmeister 2010).
Another social separation prevalent in today’s societies is the antagonism
between users (consumers) and producers (Siefkes 2007, 17). Producers have
the incentive to sell their products at a high price while using inputs that are
as cheap as possible. The interest of users, on the other hand, is buying good
quality, durable products at the lowest price possible. This conflict does not
persist when the material well-being of producers does not depend on their
ability to sell products on markets and to make a profit with them. Producers
do not become active through some abstract value (money/profit) or mere
force, but rather through their own (intrinsic) motivation, which is, of
course, enhanced if people actually need and thus appreciate the products.
16
If production was actually needs-oriented and producers produced out of
intrinsic motivation, it would be possible to create products that obey laws
other than money efficiency. Usability, reparability, resource efficiency, etc.
could be in the interest of both consumers and producers because it can be
14
For a critical discussion of free software production, see Barron (2013). It should be noted, however, that
the term emerging commons is not limited to the digital world.
15
Which does not imply that commoners do not take part in the market or that money does not play any
role in contemporary commons-projects. As commons are seed forms, they need to deal with these
“alien”logics, particularly those dominant today.
16
Often the question is asked of what happens to the activities that nobody wants to engage in because
they are frowned upon. One could approach this from different angles. First, is the task really important?
Second, can we do anything so that it becomes more pleasant? Third, can we reduce the impediments
for people that would be willing to do it but cannot for some reason? Fourth, can or should we use
automation so that nobody needs to do it?
170 J. EULER
supposed that creating high-quality, use-oriented products which satisfy
human productive needs much more than low-quality, short-lived products.
If that were the case, then society could produce what is needed (concrete
wealth) and would not be compelled to increase production or to produce and
use products in ways determined by capital needs and for the sake of ever-
increasing production of abstract wealth. Conflicts between users’needs
and environmental limitations could then appear without being obscured
by the veil of the commodity form and capital accumulation, but as what
they really are. Only in that case can those conflicts be resolved without poten-
tially detrimental second thoughts (i.e. profit maximization).
One of the most fundamental assumptions of conventional economics is
that we always have competing interests because of the fact that everything
in the world is scarce (its availability lower than demand). While it is clear
that we live in a world of limited resources, not all those resources are
scarce as such. The excess demand for a given good is as much a social relation
as the allocation of the limited goods—they are even interlinked. With his
concept of scarcity-generating institutions Hoeschele (2010) points to the
fact that (mainly profitable) forms of scarcity are created and intensified.
Thus, they ought not to be seen as natural, and nor should the assumption
of “unlimited wants”(meaning that more of the same is always better)
makes us believe.
17
We can, therefore, reject the assumption of universal scar-
city. But today for a large part of the world population at least a significant
degree of the most fundamental needs are not satisfied. However, also this
state of affairs cannot be said to be natural, either. While in the past low
levels of labor productivity might have played a role, this is certainly not
the case nowadays. Today those problems need to be explained with the
social relations that we build. With the tremendously increased early 21st-
century productivity the current world population could well be provided
with much more than merely food and shelter.
This is why we might be able to start thinking in a different direction now.
The “realm of necessity”might potentially be left behind and the “realm of
freedom”might be attained. Of course, there is still and always will be the
aspect of limits (especially when regarding the absolute planetary boundaries
and limited availability of certain objects at a given time and in a given place)
that people will have to deal with. In such a world there are still conflicting
needs, as users of goods might in some ways profit from other people not
using them. However, these restrictions can be traced back to natural limits
17
A similar argument holds true for the question of planetary boundaries. The world does have some phys-
ical characteristics and ecological systems function (and collapse) in certain ways. However, nature is
clearly not a mere instrument for humans. Human beings influence the world of which they are at
the same time a part. Thus, the limits are to some extent socially constructed. Additionally, what is con-
sidered a “limit”is also variable and depends on our ways of thinking about and perceiving the world.
For instance, only through the massive emissions of greenhouse gases during the capitalism era has the
atmosphere become a limit within reach, and started to be considered as such.
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 171
instead of societally produced limits. As such, every form of society has to deal
with limit-related problems. One of the most important issues from the view-
point of sustainability is that commons allow people, including the people
that have conflicting needs, to deal with those conflicts in a productive
manner rather than one dominated and framed by different societal structures
(i.e. by means of political or economic coercion, as in command or exchange
structures).
Conclusion
Other than in capitalist societies a commons-society would not be one of sep-
arated forms of wealth. The growth compulsion that evolves from this separ-
ation (based on the commodity form and the necessity of capital
accumulation) is inherent in capitalist societies. The “recognition of the
need to maintain and restore the ‘indispensable metabolism between human-
ity and the rest of nature,’is clearly fettered by the accumulation imperative”
(Graham 2015, 90). In the end, natural resources are input factors used free of
charge, and companies are pushed, under threat of bankruptcy, to commer-
cialize, commodify and destroy the environment for profit. In a commons-
society, it would it neither make sense (from the individual’s perspective)
nor be societally necessary to destroy whole ecosystems to produce the liveli-
hoods for a few people. Participants of commons-projects tend to engage in
them voluntarily, and sustaining or improving the commons they are
involved in makes practical sense inasmuch as it helps maintain or improve
their respective living conditions.
Commons already tend to promote sustainability, as can be seen in many
examples such as community gardens, repair cafés and gift-shops. Different
forms of living together must be learned through practice. Today
commons-projects constitute learning-spaces and experimental laboratories
of social innovation. Commons are not a patent solution. However, common-
ing could be the form of interaction that allows all stakeholders to be involved
and treated as peers. This would make unsustainable practices hard to
conduct and justify. This is not to say that in a commons-society sustainability
is guaranteed, merely that such a society makes it a viable option. It is clear
that under the current circumstances such a transformation must involve con-
siderable struggle. Fighting against enclosures and for (re)appropriation as
well as (re)production of alternative structures and commons-projects
becomes more important with each passing day.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Denis Neumüller for the creative exchange of
thoughts that resulted in the writing of this article, Stefan Meretz and the reviewers
for their helpful comments, and Adi Forkasiewicz for the final editing.
172 J. EULER
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work was performed within the “Fortschrittskolleg FUTURE WATER”and
funded by the Ministry of Culture and Science, Germany.
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