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CHAPTER 3
THE CASE OF MOBILITY AS A
SERVICE: A CRITICAL REFLECTION
ON CHALLENGES FOR URBAN
TRANSPORT AND MOBILITY
GOVERNANCE
Kate Pangbourne, Dominic Stead,
Milos^Mladenovic
¡and
Dimitris Milakis
ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a reflective critique of Mobility as a
Service (MaaS), an emerging development seeking a role within
the Smart Mobility paradigm. We assess a range of its future
implications for urban policymakers in terms of governance and
sustainability (i.e., social and environmental impacts). We begin
by describing the origins of the MaaS concept, along with the
features of precursor technologies and current early examples.
We then reflect on the marketing of MaaS and use it to consider
how we might anticipate some potentially less desirable aspects
33
of the promoted business models. Finally, we discuss the implica-
tions for governance.
Keywords: Smart mobility; governance; sustainability; Mobility as a
Service
INTRODUCTION
Urban governance is experiencing significant challenges, not least an accel-
erating shift from public to private provision, sometimes associated with
austerity policies. At the same time, a scalar shift for transport governance
is seen in the trend for devolution of responsibility to institutions at local
and regional levels. We are also witnessing significant shifts in social prac-
tices and expectations, facilitated by advanced mobile information and
communications technologies (ICTs), an increased dependence on online
service provision and a rise in demand for and supply of ‘flexibility’in the
provision of various types of service. Simultaneously, there is an ongoing
and urgent need for the transport sector to address local and global pro-
blems that it plays a significant role in creating: urban congestion, noise,
air pollution, public health, transport safety, unequal access to services
and climate change emissions (Stead, 2016).
In this chapter we illustrate our account of this urban and mobility
governance challenge by analysing one ‘spearhead effort’that is generally
referred to as Mobility as a Service (MaaS), a recent concept in the ‘Smart
Mobility’arena. MaaS represents a hybrid innovation, as a platform tech-
nology combined with a business model for delivering integrated access to
transport services. This is sometimes termed a ‘multi-sided platform’.Asa
tool for integration, it can, in principle, incorporate all currently available
transport modes as well as emerging technologies such as self-driving vehi-
cles, and as such can make it a tempting development for public authori-
ties. Moreover, the MaaS concept could expand to include urban logistics
and other services (e.g., gym, cinema or restaurant bookings), integrating
these with the transport service needed to access them. However, under-
pinning the apps and the packages offered to users, there are business
models. The choice of business model and the detailed design of the value
offer is not trivial, raising important questions about inclusiveness and
34 Kate Pangbourne et al.
sustainability, potentially threatening the common good. Given these ques-
tions, we highlight the risks to achieving a more sustainable transport sys-
tem through the commodification of access to mobility by commercial
intermediaries who provide ICT-based aggregation services to both end
users and transport service providers. Furthermore, we unpack these issues
to address the question of what MaaS might mean for the governance of
mobility and urban development. Due to limited space we are unable to
broaden the analysis to other critical issues such as the risk of mobility
enclosure and its impact on the human right for freedom of movement, or
the details of market regulation (for example in relation to acting as a
‘reseller’for transport tickets) and consumer protection (in relation to
both data and transport service levels), but we acknowledge that these
issues are also of significant interest.
CONSTRUCTION OF MOBILITY AS A SERVICE
As a recent mobility concept, the definition of what is, or is not, MaaS is
not fully solidified (see Chapter 4 for a review of why definitions matter).
Jittrapirom et al. (2017) review 12 conceptualizations, classifying a set of
core MaaS characteristics. These characteristics include the integration of
transport modes, tariff options, a single platform, multiple actors, use
of technologies, registration requirement and a user-centred orientation
with personalization and customization. Overall, MaaS tends to consist of
a platform that integrates access to information about and payment for
multiple combinations of transport services.
With these characteristics in mind, we briefly describe the emergence
and early development of MaaS concepts drawing from early experiences
in Finland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, three countries
where a more fully realized version of the concept is seeking to challenge
the current landscape of urban transport provision. The MaaS discourse is
driven by business and technology priorities. Hoadley (2017) describes
how lobbying from the digital and intelligent transport systems industries,
supported by innovators in the personal transport sector (e.g., car
sharing), is influencing policy thinking at higher scales. However, as the
involvement of the public transport sector in MaaS has been limited, wider
evidence at city/regional levels is missing.
35Mobility as a Service: A Critical Reflection
The central assumption of MaaS as promoted by MaaS Global (often
credited with inventing the concept) is that transport services can be con-
verted into service packages, as with the telecommunications sector.
Registered users can select a package that bundles access to several trans-
port modes, ranging from conventional public transport to taxis (shared
or solo) and vehicle sharing such as cars, scooters and bicycles (electric or
otherwise). The monthly number of trips by each mode is determined by
packages purchased on the basis of the user’s expectation regarding the
number of trips s/he needs. The expected result is provision of door-to-
door mobility services, with the promise of greater ‘efficiency’and the
opportunity to break car-dependency. The benefits of bundling various
transport services together through one digital interface are presented as
good for both the customer and the operator. Wherever elements of MaaS
are being rolled out under the Smart Mobility banner, we are offered var-
iants of the same dream: ‘seamless and effortless’(MaasAllianceEU),
‘Smarter, Faster, Greener’,‘on-demand tailor-made transport’and ‘instant
Access’(MaaS Scotland).
The vision, as is overwhelmingly clear in the promotional rhetoric,
dominantly focuses on envisioning ‘positive’effects. From the perspective
of a multi-level model of innovation, this rhetoric is an inevitable process
of niche actors challenging the incumbent actors of the regime they are tar-
geting (Shove & Walker, 2007). This is resulting in promotional alliances,
such as the European MaaS Alliance (http://maas-alliance.eu) and
Scotland’s MaaS Scotland (https://maas-scotland.com/), bringing together
public and private actors who have been engaged in concept formation
with a number of prototypes, building and converging towards the first
emergence of the term itself in Finland (Heikkilä, 2014). The prototypes
exist on a continuum starting from what might be termed ‘pre’or ‘partial
MaaS’such as Smartcard-based integrated ticketing systems to full-
integrated apps. In addition, the European Union has funded several pilot
projects that focus on different services or technologies that collectively
have informed the development of the higher level of integration conceptu-
alized for MaaS. For example, as part of Superhub, a MaaS-type approach
was used to try and incentivize people to use sustainable transport.
1
Developments from the sharing economy have informed the develop-
ment of MaaS. Many peer-to-peer products to share vehicles, traffic infor-
mation or offer rides have been developed, such as Flinc, Waze, Car2Go,
36 Kate Pangbourne et al.
BlaBlaCar, ReachNow, Zipcar, CoWheels and Faxi, many of which can in
principle be accessed through a MaaS platform (Flinc was part of the
Berlin field test of MyWay). However, MaaS is not a necessary develop-
ment for most of the new transport technologies, such as electric or self-
driving vehicles. Ultimately, in order to appeal to users and to deliver on
the objectives of local authorities, the full MaaS vision needs a unique sell-
ing point. This is the implicit promise of making more efficient use of
diverse transport services by simplifying access to them in more flexible
combinations, while emphasizing the sharing of mobility resources, thus
speaking both to the policy objectives of mobility governance and of a bet-
ter and cheaper mobility offer for users. This is a key claim of the field
leader, MaaS Global, for its product, Whim.
The imminent introduction of Whim in different national contexts
(Finland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Singapore) suggests
that concept transfer of ‘full MaaS’is already occurring through concerted
effort on the part of MaaS Global. These efforts can engage with actors at
city, regional, national and supra-national scales, to offer more ‘efficient’
door-to-door mobility and promote ‘sustainable urban transport’.However,
there are various unresolved societal issues in deploying commercial MaaS
in real life, some of which are discussed below.
Complexities and Contradictions in MaaS for Real
Transport professionals are well aware of the history of unanticipated con-
sequences around many twentieth-century mobility innovations such as
biofuels (Morton et al., 2017). Therefore, in this section we now consider
two interdependent issues with MaaS that are under-examined. Based on
existing deployments of MaaS, we consider that these could be predicted
as having undesirable consequences. First is the choice of the business
model, its formulation and possible impact on aspects of mobility resil-
ience. Second is the promise of freedom, a central component of the MaaS
rhetoric.
Business Models and Resilience
The Multi-Sided Platform nature of MaaS is critical to its value proposi-
tion: the benefits to users on different sides accrue as users on every side
increase in number, increasing the opportunities for interactions and
37Mobility as a Service: A Critical Reflection
subsequent revenue generation (Jittrapirom et al., 2017). Gaining a critical
mass of MaaS users to both demand and supply services is crucial to
success, as highlighted by Finger, Bert and Kupfer (2015) and Sochor,
Strömberg and Karlsson (2015). The business objectives are also an
essential element in whether a MaaS has potential to achieve social or
environmental benefits (e.g., through stimulating beneficial behaviour
change). Some of the business models of early Smart Mobility entrants are
aggressive (e.g., Uber), and many disrupt existing provision (e.g., Uber
disrupts the traditional taxi and private hire markets, and Obike (and
other) dockless bikes have challenged both city authorities’control of their
jurisdiction and existing dock-based bike-share systems). It is not clear
that all the providers are looking to be part of an aggregation model, in
much the same way that, where competition is allowed for bus routes, the
outcome is not integration.
Operators of shared services are increasingly being relied upon as a
substitute for public transport in some jurisdictions (notably the United
States). For example, in Florida, some administrations subsidize residents’
Uber trips instead of extending bus routes. In Altamonte Springs public
transport has been drastically reduced, and all Uber trips are subsidized by
at least 20%. In turn, this could affect mobility resilience, given that Uber
has released audited accounts that show that it is making large losses
despite high turnover (Financial Times, 2017). Given the use of aggressive
customer subsidies to build the business, there are two important concerns.
One must be the risk of business failure which would leave car-less resi-
dents without mobility due to the reduction in support for socially neces-
sary services. This is a risk even if a ride-hailing service is integrated into a
MaaS. If the aggregator has no alternative provider for the journeys that
the ride-hailing service supplied, then those customers who were reliant on
it have no mobility. Whether this is the case may depend on whether or
not certain operators demand (or are offered) exclusivity within the MaaS
product. The second concern is what happens when most Uber users must
pay the full, rather than subsidized, cost of their journeys and there is no
longer a public transport alternative (Lee, 2016) as ride-sharing has been
shown to reduce use of public transport (Clewlow & Mishra, 2017).
Another question is MaaS’s reliance on registration and digitalization,
which create additional barriers for those who are already experiencing
exclusion, adding a loss of mobility to problems caused by, for example,
38 Kate Pangbourne et al.
the digital gap or through lack of access to banking. This is an important
question, since transport operators increasingly offer ‘discounts’to smart-
card and app users, with those using traditional payment methods, such as
cash at the point of use, paying more for the service.
Finally, there has been little discussion on the vulnerability in relation
to MaaS’s dependence on ICT. There is the potential for an entire city to
come to a standstill, should the MaaS system be compromised, for exam-
ple through power failure, ICT failure or a Deliberate Denial of Service
cyberattack. The transport sector is a critical infrastructure, having been
the focus (or means) of criminal and terrorist attacks (Theoharidou,
Kandias & Gritzalis, 2012). While the dangers of a compromised MaaS
system may not be as serious as say a cyberattack on a fleet of self-driving
vehicles, its disruption potential on urban mobility is still substantial, sug-
gesting that if access to transport is mediated via MaaS platforms, these
clearly need to be included in Critical Infrastructure Protection strategies.
The False Promise of Freedom
Selling of the notion of ‘freedom’in the context of a finite transport net-
work and environmental limits raises the need to have a debate about indi-
vidual and collective rights/responsibilities. MaaS Global advertises itself
as ‘mobility on a whim’, promoting an ideal of individual unfettered free-
dom. This promise is at odds with the challenge of satisfying simultaneous
demand in a finite transport network. By drawing parallels for MaaS
packages with those used in telecoms or media streaming, the impression
is given that any desired trip can be made at any time (any origin to any
destination). However, telecommunications and transport networks have
different network capacity properties. ICT network capacity is more easily
scaled-up as network demand is managed through data package routing
protocols, as data ascribes no emotional or economic value to its path
from origin to destination. Telecommunications network congestion can
be managed in ways that are impossible in a transport network. Data can
be prioritized, held in a buffer, or rerouted through different nodes, not
necessarily the shortest path. This is not the case for humans moving
through urban transport systems, who will know if they are deliberatively
delayed or diverted, and will complain, or even rebel. Thus, it is hard to
see how MaaS can deliver its promise of freedom through its packages of
39Mobility as a Service: A Critical Reflection
different levels of pre-purchased or ‘Pay-As-You-Go’, if the network is at
capacity at the point at which a customer requests service.
The promise of freedom also fails to acknowledge that current problems
of traffic congestion, urban air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions
arise from the aggregate impact of our individual activities. In the drive to
develop a customer base, MaaS could feed unsustainable individual prac-
tices rather than restraining and redirecting people to more sustainable
transport modes. Hoadley (2017) highlights this risk, citing the ‘poor visi-
bility given to public transport in current MaaS discussions and develop-
ments’(p. 7). The same is potentially true for non-motorized transport
modes (walking and cycling) which may be sidelined as mobility options
because they do not generate substantial income for MaaS (see also
Chapter 2 for further discussion on unaligned commercial behaviours).
Furthermore, the potential for a rebound effect, where energy (time or
travel) savings in one area are ‘cashed-in’by increasing use in another
area, is largely ignored (see also Herring & Sorrell, 2008). This is glossed
over in promotional scenarios:
After a month of using MaaS, Melinda’s family life has
completely changed. They have sold Melinda’s car and offer the
other car for short term rental using the MaaS operator’s website
(community car club). In exchange Melinda’s family gets credit
in their MaaS account, which they use to buy mobility services.
(TSC, 2016)
In this example, Melinda’s family have become totally dependent on the
MaaS service for all their mobility, and have been able to make time and
cost ‘savings’. However, the money they accrue by renting out their remain-
ing vehicle is limited to use for other mobility services. Thus, MaaS is able
to frame their mobility practices, by making the offer of credit that can
only be spent within the MaaS system. Should a package allow six taxi
trips per month, for example, the theory of loss aversion (human cognition
is more attuned to avoiding a loss than achieving a gain) (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991) would suggest that users will experience regret if they do
not ‘use up’their trip allowance, potentially resulting in induced trips add-
ing further pressure to the system. This means that the design of packages
and pricing is crucial users should be allowed to ‘roll-over’unused credits
to prevent the risk of induced travel. There is some parallel to the mobile
40 Kate Pangbourne et al.
telecommunications market, where Gerpott and Thomas (2014) have
shown tariff-type impacts on consumers’data usage intensity. Industry
research also suggests that mobile customers buy more expensive packages
than they need to avoid the risk of paying high charges for going over their
data allowances. Since early 2016 in the UK ‘Data Rollover’packages have
started to be introduced as a result (uSwitch, 2017).
IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE
In this section, we consider the governance implications of the issues
highlighted in the preceding sections and raise some key questions, in
order to highlight where stakeholders might be advised to take particular
care before making MaaS a central pillar around which urban transport is
organized. In several respects, MaaS repackages existing Intelligent
Transport System ideas of integration, and sounds intuitive, understand-
able and attractive, in part because achieving ‘seamlessness’between
modes has been a goal of transport authorities for many years. As MaaS is
promoted in this way, it is hard for stakeholders not to embrace it. This
positive framing is a clear attempt to win a significant place in the market
by MaaS providers, who are primarily private companies. However, the
enthusiasm with which organizations are embracing the concept masks
some significant uncertainties around governance in relation to control
and setting strategic goals. While MaaS has developed with little direct
public steering (MaaS International, 2017), in Finland, the Ministry of
Transport has been quite engaged in providing support to help MaaS into
the marketplace (Finnish Transport Agency, 2015), with various incentives
and a hope for ‘another Nokia’(i.e., supporting innovation with money
but little regulation, in keeping with a free-market ideology). However, it
is starting to be recognized that this will need to change, as the steering
efforts so far have not taken into account the full extent of complexity and
unanticipated consequences from MaaS. Clearly, there are different roles
that public authorities can take (e.g., enablement, leadership, laissez-faire).
Four key choices are set out below.
First, decision-makers need to be able to assess and compare transport
systems/infrastructure investments/policies, but this poses a number of
challenges. The greatest issue is the inevitable uncertainty about the direc-
tion of technological development and its impacts. One way of addressing
41Mobility as a Service: A Critical Reflection
this uncertainty is to create a controlled but open structure for research
and testing.
Second, there needs to be a process for negotiating and ascribing liabili-
ties across a complex web of stakeholders, addressing consumer protec-
tion, developing market rules and defining the role of the public sector.
For example, there is a need to set minimum service-standards to protect
socially necessary services, or ensuring that the cheapest public transport
fares are available to MaaS users, however small their service use may be.
Third, it is important to highlight that the MaaS concept includes a
need for a set of organizations, legislation and other aspects that collec-
tively serve to lock a technology into society. MaaS is a technological
assemblage and not solely an App, the value concept of service packages
or the revenue streams that define the business model. MaaS’s uniqueness
is the potential to involve so many different individual technologies, both
ICT and transport, and the ability to position the concept as an optimizer.
For it to work, it requires the MaaS operators to occupy a very powerful
place in the network both in a co-ordinating space and a price-setting
space. This is something that has proved almost impossible for city-led
transport systems in the past. It is difficult to imagine such a powerful
position in the governance network being easily obtained, but if it is, then
it would certainly need regulating.
Finally, there are risks of inaction by the state because doing nothing is
not the same as no change, as this is already occurring. As models such as
Uber or Lyft have made taking a taxi exceptionally convenient, there is evi-
dence that this reduces public transport use: a taxi can provide door-to-
door service, and where more than one ride-hailing service is present, price
competition results in pulling custom away from transit services (Clewlow
& Mishra, 2017;Sadowsky & Nelson, 2017). MaaS also introduces a
commercial intermediary between citizens and public transport providers,
diluting brand image (Hoadley, 2017), suggesting a reason why it has taken
longer for MaaS platforms to engage with long-established public transport
operators. For example, in the West Midlands, Whim has successfully
negotiated Gett taxis, National Express buses and Midland Metro trams,
the regional city bike and rental car providers, but has not yet persuaded
other large public transport providers such as FirstBus or Arriva. Thus,
relying on MaaS to relieve cities from car dependency and related conges-
tion is an outcome that could be further undermined if the door-to-door
42 Kate Pangbourne et al.
convenience of ride-hailing (and eventually self-driving vehicles) becomes a
reality without strong steering by the state and forward-thinking strategies
in place to address these conflicting forces.
There is a need for strategic thinking about urban technology, as the
integration of the built environment, hard infrastructures and digital ser-
vices. However, no cities have yet incorporated MaaS into transport, envi-
ronment and energy policies (Li, 2017), even though quite large elements
of MaaS are operating in several places, as described above. This is a stra-
tegic omission that reduces the opportunity for MaaS to be designed to
contribute to sustainable urban mobility. According to Li (2017), this is
because everyone believes in the idea that MaaS will automatically contrib-
ute to sustainable urban mobility through ‘efficiency’. However, citizens
and governance actors need to be able to decide which modes should be
prioritized according to the social and environmental needs of their juris-
diction, and specify MaaS packages accordingly. However, it is striking
that both Li (2017) and Hoadley (2017) note the lack of engagement from
city and regional authorities at this stage. For example, the UK Transport
Systems Catapult did not identify a role for transport authorities in the
MaaS ecosystem beyond being a ‘customer’for data (TSC, 2016). This
dominance of producer-led visions is also a feature of autonomous vehicle
innovations as discussed in Chapter 5.
The current focus on outsourcing innovation to the private sector com-
bined with the competitive national rhetoric predicated on economic
growth through mobility innovations suggests that government may be
tempted to cede control of outcomes to market forces. This path carries
profound implications for decision-making in transport and urban gover-
nance, as there is a critical governance gap in relation to managing the
Smart Mobility transition if regulation is removed in a bid to placate
private-sector demands. MaaS innovators are primarily private-sector
firms who are attempting to steer the development of the mobility system
in ways that serve their vested interests (Vergregt & Brown, 2007), and
regulatory capture through manipulating transport governance mechan-
isms does have a precedent (Morton et al., 2017). The further commodifi-
cation of urban mobility, while offering opportunities to some consumers,
is not synonymous with being able to steer mobility systems to more desir-
able outcomes. However, there are models where the public sector remains
at the heart of the system if not the technologies.
43Mobility as a Service: A Critical Reflection
In summary, some governance levers could be lost through ideological
pressure to create revenue streams out of previously public goods, endan-
gering the achievement of social and environmental goals that are inter-
twined with mobility provision. While recognizing the positive potential of
MaaS, it should not be presumed to deliver a uniquely positive set of out-
comes for all. Strategic management is needed to set objectives, monitor
mode share changes and to understand social, distributional and environ-
mental impacts, as well as to provide an environment where innovation
(by both the public and the private sectors) can flourish. Risks also need to
be addressed, in order to understand whether the transport efficiency gains
that might be realized through the wholesale adoption of MaaS are jeopar-
dized by a resilience gap.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have highlighted that MaaS represents a conceptual
approach to delivering service to users that is not a fixed product.
Conceptual elements exist through individualized services, but MaaS is
increasingly promoted as an integrated product capable of shaping how
transport is organized and managed in cities. We have illustrated this point
through a short description of the construction of the MaaS concept and
given an account of its emergence in early sites of innovation for integrated
MaaS platforms.
We have highlighted the risks posed by the business models to meeting
key policy aims such as congestion reduction and climate change mitiga-
tion, as well as touching on the social inclusion aspects. We have also
highlighted the potential threat to transport and social resilience through
over reliance on single operators of innovative services, and the potential
effects of innovative services on existing services. The result could be a
deepening of exclusion by over digitalizing and enclosing access to trans-
port services and through cyberattack vulnerability.
The dominant rhetoric surrounding MaaS is technologically determin-
istic and highly optimistic. However, we contend that advertising MaaS as
‘mobility on a whim’promotes a false promise of individual unfettered
freedom that fails to acknowledge that current problems of traffic conges-
tion, air and noise pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions are large-scale
44 Kate Pangbourne et al.
problems arising from the aggregate impact of our individual activities,
with a wide distribution of mobility habits.
While MaaS could be designed to influence behaviours to be more sus-
tainable, the commodification of mobility through the service package
approach requires customers who buy services. Profitability of private
businesses inevitably requires the use of these services. Thus, MaaS has a
strong potential to result in increased mobility amongst those who can pay
for it (and have paid in advance). Steering MaaS developments towards
more desirable and inclusive societal outcomes requires engagement by the
state in the design goals, pricing structures (and subsidies), coverage and
consumer protection. In so doing, it may offer opportunities to overcome
longstanding challenges to truly integrated transport services. The alterna-
tive path where MaaS is seen as the solution through outsourcing the chal-
lenge of mobility co-ordination and where the state shrinks in its capacity
to co-ordinate and steer seems fraught with risks that would be difficult to
reverse. However, the situation is not one of a dichotomy between the
opposing paths of laissez-faire and state-led regulation, though there is a
need to avoid possibly damaging technology lock-ins. While the technol-
ogy is in its foundational development stage, there is an opportunity to
address the consumer issues in a proactive or even participatory way by
stimulating debate about the proper role of the state in addressing citizens’
fundamental mobility needs.
NOTE
1. Many such initiatives are documented by Jittrapirom et al. (2017) and
Kamargianni, Li, Matyas, House, and Count (2016), including UbiGo,
Smile, Tuup, Moovel and Whim.
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