Case-Driven Theory-Building in Comparative Democratization: The Heuristics of Venezuela’s “Democratic Purgatory”

Abstract

This chapter outlines the utility for employing case study methodologies to provide sufficient external validity upon which to craft policy relevant to maintaining healthy democratic politics. The broader theoretical context is an investigation into the conditions that might structurally condition democracies to fail via democratic means. Venezuela’s democratic decline serves as the basis for the heuristic case study, wherein the objective is to identify the failures of the Venezuelan case in a larger framework that addresses the complexity of institutional design in democratic political systems states broadly. Cases are selected based upon the objective of the researcher, and similarly, the case study methodology chosen rests firmly on their research goals. Lastly, the chapter outlines the research design necessary for satisfying broader inquiry within the more modest approach to how heuristic case studies can be used to inform both theory and policy.

Full text

15© The Author(s) 2018
A. Kachuyevski, L. M. Samuel (eds.), Doing Qualitative Research
in Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72230-6_2
CHAPTER 2
Case-Driven Theory-Building inComparative
Democratization: TheHeuristics
ofVenezuela’s “Democratic Purgatory”
ChristopherM.Brown
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the logic and utility for engaging
in heuristic case study research in the discipline of comparative politics,
with a particular emphasis on democratic theory as well as democratiza-
tion as set of policy objectives. The broad research question addressed
was, “Under what conditions might democracies fail through democratic
means?” The question illuminated cases of democratic breakdown in
advanced democracies that were replaced through democratic mecha-
nisms. In short, the larger agenda sought to address how democratic sys-
tems could be overthrown through constitutional processes. The basis for
the present chapter establishes the research design necessary for satisfying
this inquiry with the more modest question addressed herein being how
can heuristic case studies be used to inform research in comparative
democratization.
Democratic Purgatory
The primary purpose of this research is to explain those factors that have
led to the breakdown of democratic political systems, in order to identify a
pattern of democratic collapse that can act as a “model” of democratic
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failure. This work continues the tradition of looking beyond the categori-
zation of regime types as being either democratic or non-democratic. In
doing so, it allows for a deeper classication of democratic regime types
that focuses on the quality of democratic political regimes. The institu-
tional design of a political system is critical to establishing the rules by
which political representation operates for a democratic regime to function
effectively. This study can help to provide an explanation for the decline of
democratic quality in a real-world context. To these ends, Venezuela has
been selected as an illustrative case study.
This is not a novel endeavor: the study of democratic breakdowns is
one that has gained considerable attention in the discipline of the political
sciences. As such, initial efforts to explain the breakdown of democracy
reside in the comfortable milieu of political science. However, existing
explanations provided by the literature on democratic breakdowns assume
that democracies fail through the efforts of non-democratic forces that are
capable of overthrowing the people’s representatives by force of arms. In
short, democratic breakdown is an act of violence that is committed by a
non-democratic opposition that is able to put itself into power at the cost
of the existing democracy. This research addresses the breakdown of con-
solidated democratic systems through a heuristic study of an existing case
of a constitutional overthrow. The scope of this investigation is to study a
consolidated democratic political system that has undergone a democratic
breakdown through “democratic means.” The implications of the present
research on democratic purgatory have real-world application for those
political systems that are currently transitioning and/or consolidating
their democracies as well. The key lesson for democratization is the need
for the promotion of regime adaptability, and not simply regime stability.
DePloying theheuristic case stuDy
Case studies are essential tools for developing theoretical explanations for
understanding real-world phenomena. In their most common application,
case studies are often employed as elements for theoretical proof (or dis-
proof). Often simply used as anecdotal support, case studies reveal an
important descriptive role; however, when deployed as the basis for a sys-
tematic methodology approach, they can serve as solid foundations for
making analytical claims that can claim external validity.
Eckstein (1992) denes a case study as “the study of individuals”
wherein the individual (or “case”) can only be dispelled by looking not at
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concrete entities but at the relationships that exist between the individual
and the wider population (Eckstein 1992, 123–124). In other words,
cases explain not the “concrete entity” or the item that is observed (i.e.,
properly labeled the “observation”) per se but the “measure made of
them.” Cases are fundamentally about relationships or how those individu-
als (be they cases or observations) are used or studied (Eckstein 1992,
123–124). International relations provides fertile ground for comparative
case studies, and yet the discipline seems to struggle with traditional
incomprehensibilities between knowledge claims from those who value
the general versus the specic. Some of this confusion rests on the use of
the term “case” in social science.
Cases are not monolithic. Because what is normally thought of as the
study of a particular case involves the collection and organization of a vast
amount of information in the form of variables, units of analysis, and data
points (often informally thought of as observations), it becomes necessary
to recognize that a case study despite being comprised of a single indi-
vidual, within the case itself there are a lot of composite parts (King etal.
1994, 52). Consequently, there is a good deal of confusion as to what
separates the case from the any of its observations. Whereas Eckstein
claims a case “technically as a phenomenon for which we report and inter-
pret only a single measure on any pertinent variable” (Eckstein 1992,
124), social scientists “have continued to use the word ‘case’ to refer to a
full case study … and reserve the word ‘observation’ to refer to measures
of one or more variables on exactly one unit” (King etal. 1994, 52–53).
Interpreted broadly, Hammersley and Gomm (2000, 2) contend that “all
research is case study: There is always some unit, or set of units, in rela-
tions to which data are collected and/or analyzed.” This is one of the
more pressing concerns in social science research and generates general
suspicion regarding condence in case-based research. Nevertheless, the
concept of case-based research is central to the logic of analysis (Ragin
1992a, b, 1).
Ragin (1992a, b, 3) claims that “a case may be theoretical or empirical
or both; it may be a relatively bounded object or a process and it may be
generic and universal or specic in some way. [As such, simply asking]
‘what is a case?’ questions many different aspects of empirical social sci-
ence.” Gerring (2001, 35) argues that work in the social science in par-
ticular is about concept formation and that “work on a subject necessarily
involves reconceptualization of that subject.” He echoes Alvesson and
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Sköldberg’s (2000, 25) concern that scholars should be aware that they
“make lexical and semantic choices as they write and thus participate,
wittingly or unwittingly, in an on-going interpretative battle. This is so
because language is the tool kit with which we conduct our work.” Despite
its resistance to obvious designation, it is in this way that the case study
exists as its own methodology. Case study research should be thought of
as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a
larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004, 342). In this way, case study
methodology not only is descriptive but also allows for some degree of
expected representativeness to phenomena in the larger world (i.e., exter-
nal validity).
Generalizability
Cases should have within-case value (i.e., conclusions gained from the
study itself have validity in the context in which the study was done).
However, can ndings from case studies lead to generalizable hypotheses
that are valid when taken outside of the context in which they were discov-
ered? Empirical generalization “involves drawing inferences about features
of a larger but nite population of cases from the study of a sample drawn
from that population” (Gomm etal. 2000, 103). If relevant characteristics
of the case can be identied and then compared to similar characteristics
in a more general population, then generalizations derived from case stud-
ies can gain a greater degree of condence in establishing external validity
(Gomm etal. 2000, 105). Comparative democratization, by denition,
seeks to understand the relationships between the processes of building
and promoting democratic regimes. What better way to understand those
relationships than by studying them in context and identifying relevant
elements that might lend themselves to comparison? What do scholars of
comparative democratization know that other sub-elds ignore about the
utility of case generalizability?
In practice, the question of generalizability is usually one of degree.
Some scholars undertake case studies to “draw … conclusions about some
general type of phenomenon or about members of a wider population of
cases” and others nd that case studies need only to have intrinsic value
and need not provide a basis for supra-context generalization (Hammersley
and Gomm 2000, 5). Robert E. Stake (1978) presents a complementary
compromise between these two positions in what he calls “naturalistic
generalization.” Stake maintains that case studies are a preferred method
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of knowledge acquisition “because they may be epistemologically in har-
mony with the reader’s experience and thus to that person a natural basis
for generalization” (Stake 2000, 19). Despite being particular in content,
case studies establish the basic elements that lend themselves to facilitating
a wider social understanding: “naturalistic generalization [is] arrived at by
recognizing the similarities of objects and issues in and out of context and
by sensing the natural covariations of happenings. To generalize this way is
to be both intuitive and empirical” (Stake 2000, 22). Since all cases are
situated within wider social contexts that “constitute a panoply of ceteris
paribus conditions which the analyst will need to allow for in some way”
(Mitchell 2000, 170). It is for this reason that Mitchell (2000) suggests
thinking of case study research as a “detailed examination of an event (or
series of related events) which the analyst believes exhibits (or exhibit) the
operation of some identied general theoretical principle” (Mitchell 2000,
170). This means that all case study work is “essentially heuristic [because,]
it reects in the events portrayed, features which may be construed as a
manifestation of some general, abstract theoretical principle” (Mitchell
2000, 170, italics added).
So, how are cases employed to build theory? Following Eckstein’s
work, there are ve types of case studies, and each one depends on its rela-
tion to theory. They are the congurative-idiographic study, the
disciplined- congurative study, the heuristic case study, the plausibility
probe, and the crucial-case study. In this order, there is a sliding scale of
generalizability. On one end, the initial objective places the priority on the
intrinsic authenticity of the self-contained case itself (congurative). The
other end begins with the goal of the case as indicative of theory (crucial
case). While each of these categories should be thought of in terms of
“ideal types,” the illustrative point is that case and theory are not in oppo-
sition to one another, but can be represented by different methods based
on the objective of the researcher. In other words, the signicance afforded
to a case can be found in the intentions of the researcher who crafts the
research design. Each of the types of cases has, at their core, particular
research agenda that is unique.
Types ofCase Study Methods
The congurative-idiographic study is “congurative” because an attempt
is made to demonstrate a near-total picture of the case itself. It is consid-
ered “idiographic” either because the case presentation was done in such
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a way as to “allow facts to speak for themselves or bring out their signi-
cance by largely intuitive interpretation” (Eckstein 1992, 143–144).
Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) insist that the idiographic label attached to
this category reects the emphasis of case over theory: “the use of the term
idiographic (as contrasted with nomothetic)1 quite directly indicates that
the case will not be generalizable or that the case study will not seek to
establish general rules of behavior” (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 372).
Deploying cases in this manner allows for the greatest possibility of
authenticity and the least amount of generalizability. It is by design that
the researcher’s objective is to understand the case itself and not an
attempt at broader generalization. This case study method is expressly not
theory- driven; theory does not provide the context for the investigation,
nor is the case study intended to generate theoretical propositions
(Lijphart 1971, 691–692).
The next type—one that is still primarily case-focused, but that does
give theory a larger role—is the disciplined-congurative case study.
However, theory does not take an active part in the disciplined-
congurative case study. It acts as a sort of mirror to which the case may
be held so that the researcher might best see it. Theory is mainly used as
“the bases for case interpretation ... such interpretations can be sound only
to the extent that their bases are in fact valid as general laws” (Eckstein
1992, 139). The case is analyzed through the use of general variables that
are part of available hypotheses to explain some outcome (George and
Bennett 2005, 51). The disciplined-congurative study begins with the
goal of examining a case as a bounded system where theory plays a role
within that system. These cases are thought to be “interpretive” case stud-
ies in Lijphart’s classication (Lijphart 1971, 691–692). The cases are
selected primarily for the value of the case itself (hence little generalization
is anticipated), but their use of theory provides for a greater connectedness
to the wider social world.
An intermediate type that is highlighted by Lijphart consists of those
types of case studies that begin with a notion of proving or disproving
existing generalizations. These are the “theory-conrming” and the
“theory- inrming” case study methods. Their goal is to strengthen or
weaken the existing theoretical claims, and not to generate new claims.2
Deviant cases may also t into this type. Deviant cases are those in which
it is demonstrated that whatever phenomenon is discovered deviates sig-
nicantly from the existing generalization that is expected to explain that
phenomenon. Lijphart gives greater theoretical value to deviant cases
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because “they weaken the original proposition, but suggest a modied
proposition that may be stronger” (Lijphart 1971, 692). I would argue
that deviant cases have essentially two types of case study research—the
rst task of the case study consists of identifying and/or explaining the
deviation from the standard expectations. A second case study interpreta-
tion is then required to offer a new modied proposition. So, essentially, a
deviant case consists of a “theory-inrming” method, followed by a
“hypothesis-generating” method (see below). Lijphart appears amenable
to this duality since he concedes, “The validity of the proposition in its
modied form [as suggested by the deviation] must be established by fur-
ther comparative analysis” (Lijphart 1971, 692). The critical point is that
the value of the case in relation to theory rests upon the objective of the
researcher. With deviant cases, multiple intentions signify multiple
methods.
The keystone of the case-theory typology is the heuristic case study.
Heuristic case studies are both case-focused and theory-minded. Eckstein
tells us that where “disciplined-congurative study assumes that ‘general
laws’ are available,” it stops well short of making any attempt at theory-
building (Eckstein 1992, 143). This is what separates it from those that
are more overtly case-centric. The goal of the researcher is to utilize the
case as a means to identify themes or concepts that may be helpful outside
of the case itself. While in-case hypotheses are possible in the specically
case-centric types, heuristic case studies make it an explicit research plan to
tease out mechanisms that exist in a particular case study that might sur-
vive in other situations. Eckstein declares that the heuristic case study
“means ‘serving to nd out’” (Eckstein 1992, 143).
The fourth type of case study in Eckstein’s typology is the plausibility
probe. Plausibility probes work in a similar manner to the “disciplined-
congurative” case, but theory and case switch places with each other in
the primary focus of study. Instead of interpreting the case through a par-
ticular theory, plausibility probes serve to measure whether a case will
work within a particular theoretical construct. In the case of a plausibility
probe, a smaller “test case” is employed to see whether the theory is, in
fact, capable of holding up under the conditions of the smaller and/or less
costly test prior to embarking on a much larger research plan. The plausi-
bility probe may consist of minimal attempts to “establish that a theoreti-
cal construct is worth considering at all” or it may take the form of
modestly complex comparative studies (Eckstein 1992, 148–149). The
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plausibility probe employs the case as a “test case” of sorts, with the main
objective centering on a testing of the theory, not so much of the case.
The nal category is the “crucial” case study. Crucial cases are ones that
t the theory being tested and cannot be explained by any other theory,
that is, the case “must-t” the theory (Eckstein 1992, 158). King et al.
(1994) provide a succinct rejection of the possibility of the crucial-case
study and any claim to a one-to-one causation assigned to it. They cor-
rectly observe, “[V]ery few explanations depend upon only one causal
variable; to evaluate the impact of more than one explanatory variable, the
investigation needs more than one implication observed” (King et al.
1994, 210). Since chance exists in all endeavors, even if the most cogent
argument of causation could be established, there is no guaranteeing that
the soundest argument is true.
Heuristic Case-Driven Theory-Building
Cases are selected based upon the objective of the researcher, and simi-
larly, the method chosen by the researcher rests rmly on their goals. In
short, generalizability (external validity) begins with the intended aspira-
tion of the researcher. The heuristic case should be utilized for case-based
research that intends to lend that case for the construction of case-derived
explanations with broader application, wherein “the analyst examines a
specic set of concepts in order to develop generalizable theory from par-
ticular instances” (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 374–375). The heuristic case
study requires fewer specics than those cases that are more case-specic
since the goal is really to discover a phenomenon that can ultimately be
found that supersedes the case itself (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 375). The
heuristic case study is “an opportunity to learn more about the complexity
of the problem studied, to develop further the existing explanatory frame-
work, and to rene and elaborate the initially available theory employed by
the investigator in order to provide an explanation of the particular case
examined” (George and Bennett 2005, 51–52). However, its primary
value lay in its ability to be “used as a means of stimulating the imagination
in order to discern important new general problems, identify possible
theoretical solutions, and formulate potentially generalizable relations that
were not previously apparent” (George and Bennett 2005, 51).
The important point regarding whether the case is considered a heuris-
tic is the degree to which the case hinges on being “instructive for theory,
and subject to rigorous inquiry, [and] can be identied” (Eckstein 1992,
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146). Although most scholars recognize the importance of historical les-
sons, George (1979) observes that people do disagree over not only what
those lessons are but also to what extent they might be applied to any
present or future situation (George and Bennett 2005, 43). So as to give
history a more “universal” meaning, George contends that lessons of
social reality must be stated “in a systematic and differentiated way from a
broader range of experience … in other words … into a comprehensive
theory that encompasses the complexity of the phenomenon or activity in
question” (George and Bennett 2005, 43). It is possible for historical case
studies to offer up lessons primarily through the development of “scientic
generalizations and general laws of at least a probabilistic character”
(George and Bennett 2005, 45). To overcome the critique that cases are
by nature too particular, thus eluding generalization, George claims that
cases can and should be compared based not on their contextual particu-
larities, but by formulating “the idiosyncratic aspects of the explanation for
each case in terms of general variables” (George and Bennett 2005, 46).
These general variables would be embedded in a “theoretical framework of
independent, intervening and dependent variables” (George and Bennett
2005, 47). In this way, the cases could be made comparable through the
construction of like criteria that exist beyond any particular context.
The signicance of this type of research strategy is that the researcher
must be reexive—just as that reality is changing, so is the researcher’s
perspective on that reality. Research is not a “one-and-done” operation,
but an ongoing engagement with an elusive truth. In each of the above
options, new data force the researcher to reect upon his/her background
knowledge in a way that forces a corresponding action within their own
research. Put more simply, the expert still has much to learn, and each new
piece of data offers the researcher another opportunity to learn something
that may or may not be useful in helping to explain social reality. Knowledge
or the illusive pursuit of truth in this regard is like a feedback loop, albeit
limited by the attention and interest of each researcher.
Eckstein advocates for several justications for the use of heuristic case
studies. Initially, he establishes that “theories do not come from a vac-
uum, or fully and directly from data … they come from the theorist’s
imagination, logical ability and ability to discern general problems and
patterns in particular observations” (Eckstein 1992, 144–145). The
imagination does not derive theories from the air, but it is given impetus
and support from data and other types of knowledge (Eckstein 1992,
144–145). He says, “[t]he track record of case studies as stimulants of the
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theoretical imagination is good” (Eckstein 1992, 145). And lastly, because
case studies achieve a greater degree of intimacy with the subject and have
few restricts on variable testing, relations that are discovered have a higher
probability of being critical and a lower possibility of superciality
(Eckstein 1992, 144–145). This is precisely why Lijphart referred to them
as “hypothesis- generating” case studies.
The heuristic lends itself to generalization beyond the original case
specically because “the subject supplies a background model by analogy.”
The “feedback loop” of “hypothesis-new data-decision regarding old
hypothesis-options-new hypothesis” yields information that helps to con-
struct background knowledge that becomes the (provisionally) known.
The known case and the unknown case may share some similarities that
warrant further investigation. This is what Diesing refers to as the “repre-
sentative heuristic” (Diesing, 1991). These working hypotheses can be
tested through the inclusion of new data introduced from the new case,
with the same feedback process at work. In addition, with noted similari-
ties will come differences; an application of the hypothesis into new areas
can serve to strengthen the claims, produce variants, or make it irrelevant.
Even if the hypothesis fails to be replicated in the new scenario, it still
produces knowledge.
a case stuDy inDemocratic Decline
The heuristic case study method approaches the case as both having a
within-case cohesion and providing for comparison beyond the individual
case under study. So, a detailed case study is undertaken with an eye
toward understanding causation within the particular case. Through an
investigation of what is gleaned from a deep understanding of the case,
particular elements can be drawn out as the basis for comparative engage-
ment. Each case, when employed through a heuristic, will yield questions
that lend toward externality. In the case of the heuristics of Venezuela’s
democratic decline, three primary questions emerged that lent themselves
to greater generalizability. First, how does the institutional design of
democratic regimes affect political stability? The contextual material of the
actual case itself demonstrates that the elements in society that act as direct
participants in the establishment of a democratic political system are able
to maintain their position in the new order largely through an expansion
of their ability to meet popular demands through corporatist arrange-
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ments. To the extent that these powerful groups can continue to deliver
on political demands, their positions remain relatively stable. While this
institutional structure of democratic governance is less than fully represen-
tative, the effectiveness of employing corporatist arrangements to meet
demands obscures the underlying crisis of legitimacy within the structure.
The effectiveness of the regime may lead to the consolidation of a demo-
cratic political system that is fundamentally “non-democratic” in character.
While corporatist groups may serve to facilitate social mobilization during
the establishment of democratic regimes, they do so only insofar as they
can maintain social control of in-group membership without fully provid-
ing for representative democracy. Once institutionalized, corporatist
arrangements provide for a type of unstable “democratic purgatory”:
democracy is not fully representative, yet it is not completely unresponsive
to the demands of the electorate. Human knowledge begins with a sense
of wonder; researching the case offers an answer to those inquiries. And
yet, each question provides answers which lend themselves to additional
questions.
Discovery of this phenomenon in the Venezuelan case leads the
researcher to the second question: what are the conditions that facilitate
this “democratic purgatory,” and how is this form of “non-democratic”
democracy consolidated? Once the salient features of the Venezuelan case
have been identied, it will then be possible to apply the lessons from
Venezuela to a broader set of democratic states in the spirit of a “con-
trolled comparison” to make the shift to comparative case studies of other
states with similar structural constraints on democracy (George 1979,
49–52). It is important to note that while political stability acts as the
dependent variable for this study, the social stressors that have affected
political stability provide the basis upon which a controlled comparison
can be made. One is able to draw conclusions based upon the Venezuelan
case that leads to the generation of hypotheses that beg broader testing:
provided that regime effectiveness is maintained and the conditions for
democratic purgatory persist, the stability of these regimes allows for
“democratic consolidation,” despite the undemocratic basis of legitimacy.
Democratic purgatory produces a paradox whereby democracy can be
undemocratic under certain conditions. Furthermore, these undemocratic
democracies can undergo democratic consolidation as a result of their sta-
bility due to regime effectiveness. However, this condition is not stable:
either these regimes must establish an endogenous basis of political legiti-
macy (one that is not simply a function of regime effectiveness) or the
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democracy will suffer a qualitative decline that may result in a democratic
breakdown. Drawing upon the within-case understanding, a unique phe-
nomenon is unearthed. This phenomenon is contextualized, then theo-
rized. The next step is to test our case-derived hypothesis by examining its
validity beyond the original case.
Returning to the main research question requires the researcher to out-
line some criteria that can be measured that lend themselves to comparison.
Our third question asks what lessons can be drawn from our case to help us
understand the case in a broader social context. Venezuela’s democratic
decline is indeed instructive. So, under what conditions might democracies
fail through democratic means? In states with strong support for democ-
racy, the legitimacy of the political system rests on its effectiveness to meet
the demands of its electorate as well as a function of the political society’s
value consensus and the expectations placed upon a given political regime.
Lacking the ability to respond to the demands of the electorate, political
instability arises as a consequent loss of legitimacy. It is in this context that
alternatives to the political structure arise. It is only when the demands of
the electorate cannot be met (loss of effectiveness) that the corporatist
structure reveals its non-democratic character (loss of legitimacy). The
heuristic case study method was designed to identify hypotheses based
upon the specics of the case, and as a result, Venezuela provides illustrative
and real-world evidence of the social phenomena by design. The heuristic
case study begins like other case studies that seek to describe the historical
trajectory of the political system as it has evolved over time. Internal valid-
ity supported by thick case description and analysis allows for greater con-
dence in the results of our study. Instead of seeing cases as unique only to
themselves, the heuristic grants each case its local signicance, but goes
beyond the specics to draw out more pivotal elements upon which the
congurative elements have hinged. By identifying these structural compo-
nents of the Venezuelan case, they can provide a benchmark for examining
cases that may appear to have similar structural markers.
Research begins with a question that begs to be answered. Understanding
Venezuela’s democratic decline began with a deep case study, examining
the trajectory of the political system as it has evolved over the entire course
of the country’s existence, including the colonial and possibly pre-colonial
socio-cultural context. Since people construct their identities through
their socialization and co-constitution with their environment, under-
standing the social forces that serve as a basis for understanding the param-
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eters for political identity is critical. It may not be necessary in every case
to address all potential elements for identity creation; however, only by
conducting a broad case study investigation does it become apparent
which socio-cultural forces have meaningfully conditioned the contempo-
rary context. History matters for many people, and so it is important to
know what role it plays in forming political allegiances, values, and
aspirations.
Once the case study is complete and a socio-political history has been
outlined, it should be possible to glean certain key factors that have served
as the basis for understanding the research question under investigation.
In Venezuela, the functional arrangements made to establish modern
socio-political systems have also served to institutionalize the particular
interests present at its foundation. In lieu of democracy as an instrument
of the people through representative interests, existing democracy has
institutionalized particular interests (often in the form of political parties)
as the dominant structure governing the will of the citizenry. As a result of
the political system being co-opted through the dominance of political
parties whose interests were institutionalized as the basis for the creation
of the democratic structure, alternative perspectives for policy positions
have been subverted. In the Venezuelan example, the establishment of
democracy by political and military elites has created a democratic system
whereby full political participation is discouraged by the unwillingness of
those in power to accept or incorporate new political actors.
Once the underlying structural conditions were discovered and ana-
lyzed, the larger theoretical underpinnings of democratic decline could be
outlined and labeled. The structural relationships gleaned from the
Venezuelan case have revealed a phenomenon that shows that the type of
consolidation that a regime undergoes is often directly linked to those
forces that serve to provide the basis for democracy during the period of
transition. As a result of the legitimacy and effectiveness afforded to dem-
ocratic regimes, it is possible that consolidated democracy can exhibit a
paradox now known as “democratic purgatory.” Democratic purgatory
arises as a consequence of consolidation whereby the conditions upon
which the regime rests remain inexible to change. In pursuing stability
over exibility, democratic consolidation tends to suffer a system-wide loss
of representation over time. It is a direct consequence of the lack of adapt-
ability in democratic purgatorial regimes that provides the conditions
under which democracy can break down through democratic means.
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Once the structural element surrounding single case study research is
outlined, the methodological focus shifts from a question of reliability
(the prize characteristic of the congurative case study) to one of utility.
The next step toward expanding the utility of democratic purgatory as a
concept can be found through a type of comparative methodology.
Employing Eckstein’s “building block” technique offers an even greater
degree of condence in the hypotheses gleaned from a limited number of
cases (Eckstein 1992, 143–144). George (1979) argues that the “building
block” approach of performing a series of heuristic case studies or a
comparison of two or more is an excellent means to develop theory
because it allows the researcher to move beyond a single case and to ana-
lyze cases using the method of “controlled comparison” (Eckstein 1992,
143–144). As a means to establish a higher degree of condence in one’s
theoretical propositions, multiple cases can be considered and the theory
could be built seriatim:
One studies a case in order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct.
That construct, based on a single case, is unlikely to constitute more than a
slim clue to a valid general model. One therefore confronts it with another
case that may suggest ways of amending and improving the construct to
achieve better case interpretation; and this process is continued until the
construct seems sufciently rened to require no further major amendment
or at least to warrant testing by large-scale comparative study. Each step
beyond the rst can be considered a kind of disciplined-congurative study.
(Eckstein 1992, 144)
In an attempt to understand under which conditions democracies
might fail through democratic means, the larger work has successfully
drawn out the concept of democratic purgatory from the experience of
Venezuela’s political history. The widest avenue for future research entails
investigations of other political regimes that appear to have similarly brittle
and inertly stable democratic regimes. The other regimes may not have
gone as far as Venezuela in dismantling their democracy, but the social
forces embedded in these systems will not be able to bend so far without
breakdown. With the inclusion of more cases, democratic purgatory can
be better understood.
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FinDings
Democratic failures, even “breakdowns,” are easy to distinguish when they
occur at the hands of non-democratic forces that are all too willing to
reject legal means to acquiring power. This is particularly true given that
we can recognize their occurrence on account of their violent and stark
contrast from what once was. What seems more unlikely is that forces that
reject an existing regime as illegitimate would participate in the constitu-
tional acquisition of power provided by the regime that they openly decry
as being illegitimate. In essence, this is exactly what occurred in Venezuela.
Democracy was overthrown through democratic means. The heuristic case
study facilitates a deeper case-level investigation, lending itself to internal
validity of an idiographic nature; however, outlining the case alone is insuf-
cient for the comparativist. The case study is deployed for the purposes of
identifying critical elements that may lend themselves to comparative
study. It is critical to know your case before condently discussing it in
terms of lessons that can be illuminating for other similar cases. The simi-
larities between cases are identied by the heuristic approach.
The stability of a given political regime is contingent upon the degree
of legitimacy that is afforded by those who are in control of that particular
political regime. Intrinsically, political regimes remain stable because of
the degree of legitimacy that the stakeholders of that regime afford to
them. In the course of normal democratic politics, citizens will participate
in elections to promote a candidate who will best represent their interests
and policy preferences. Political parties and other political entities provide
the usual conduit through which citizen interest is aggregated and trans-
lated into policy preference. By way of their participation in the political
regime, these groups work together to reinforce a dual-sense of legitimacy
for the regime. The regime is given legitimacy by interest groups and
political parties that participate in the politics of the regime. Thus, it is the
regime’s participants that give legitimacy to the regime, which in turn
bestows legitimacy on those groups to participate in that regime.
Participation rests upon to the degree in which those groups nd the
regime to be legitimate. The same is true for the membership of those
groups; citizens participate as group members with the expectation that
doing so will offer some sort of reward (or at least provide escape from
sanctions that might arise from non-membership).
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In the course of increased democratization, the demands of the elector-
ate, translated through representative political organizations, will be met
so as to ensure continued participation in the political regime. This dem-
onstrates the utility of effectiveness in the stability of a particular regime.
It is important, however, to recognize that electoral demands are far from
static. As a political system develops over time, the political regime must
be responsive to shifting demands. Democratic viability rests upon both
legitimacy and/or effectiveness; what is critical is not stability per se, but
adaptability. In modern democracies, popular sovereignty is expressed
through the structure of representation that exists in a given political
regime. Therefore, the viability of a democratic political regime rests upon
the adaptability of the regime’s structure of representation.
Venezuela provides an ideal heuristic case for what happens when the
democratic consolidation is heavily conditioned by a structure of represen-
tation that is rendered inexible during the transition. Democratic purga-
tory regimes are consolidated democracies that have, as their core
constituency, a set of corporatist elements that facilitate consolidation, but
of a particular type. Venezuelan democracy was inclusive and yet main-
tained an appropriate structure of representation only for those forces that
existed at the transition to democracy. In the course of seeking an answer
to this political enigma, it was revealed that despite the operational deni-
tions employed by the literature on democratization, Venezuela’s political
development yielded what appeared to be a unique phenomenon: the
breakdown of democracy through democratic means. To best capture this
phenomenon and to ll the gap in the existing literature, this method-
ological approach found that Venezuela was in the grip of a syndrome
labeled “democratic purgatory” by identifying the key elements that pro-
vided the past foundation for democratic legitimacy. While it was alluded
to the conditions that dene democratic purgatory, the same that presage
democratic breakdown where it can be found are not unique to Venezuela.
Addressing cases via the heuristic case study method serves to establish
policy choices over the course of time that serve to undermine the basis for
democratic rule and the citizenry’s expectations of effective governance.
In doing so, heuristic case study methodology is useful in identifying a
particular gap in the existing theory through an intimate exposition of the
case itself, but it also provided for a model of democratic purgatory that
lends itself to comparative study of political regimes that exhibit similar
characteristics.
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conclusions
This chapter sought to outline the utility of heuristic case studies as a
particular type of case study research. The importance of case studies
was revealed through a discussion of their diversity and the suitability
for each type based on the perspective of the researcher and his/her
own research goals (as articulated in part by their research question
and their subjective interests). In seeking to explain the breakdown of
a consolidated democracy though constitutional democratic proce-
dures, I employed the Venezuelan breakdown that led to a regime
change ushered by Hugo Chavez in 1999. In seeking to explain the
breakdown of a consolidated democracy though constitutional demo-
cratic procedures, I employed the Venezuelan breakdown that led to a
regime change ushered by Hugo Chavez in 1999, as a heuristic case
study by illustrating the structural factors found in Venezuela that
helped to explain the breakdown. The conditions for democratic pur-
gatory are not unique to Venezuela, however, and that these same
structural factors can presage a democratic breakdown wherever they
can be found.
Case studies have always suffered the critique of having limited exter-
nal validity; that is to say that anything learned from a single case is often
marked as “case-specic knowledge.” Heuristic case study methodology
appreciates the depth of the individual case by examining the specic
case with due diligence. It does so to gain an understanding of the rich-
ness of the single case, but with the expanded goal of redeploying the
benets of case study research toward broader theoretical application.
Structural conditions discovered through an in-depth case can be used as
guides for rendition when examining other cases that may share similar
conditions without sacricing the vibrancy of the single case. Instead of
focusing on differences, heuristic case studies chose to explore and cel-
ebrate similarities between or among cases. In the case of Venezuela’s
political development and democratic breakdown, the heuristic case
study has been useful in identifying a particular gap in the existing the-
ory, but it also provides a model of democratic purgatory that allows for
a basis for comparison with other political regimes that exhibit similar
characteristics.
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notes
1. Lincoln and Guba (1979) state that the terms “nomothetic” (meaning
“based on law”) and “idiographic” (meaning “based on the particular indi-
vidual”) come to the sciences from the German philosopher Wilhelm
Windelband in an attempt to distinguish the natural sciences (“nomo-
thetic”) from the social sciences (“idiographic”). The spirit of this binary
opposite still operates in the background of people’s understanding of what
is meant by the idea of the “sciences” as discussed above. In Yvonna
S.Lincoln and Egon G.Guba, “The Only Generalization Is: There Is No
Generalization,” in Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts, eds. Roger
Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster (London: Sage, 2000), 33.
2. A strong case could be made that any new conrmation (and/or “inrma-
tion”) does, in fact, create new claims by advancing knowledge. However,
since new claims are not expressly the objective of these case study methods,
they should be placed closer to the congurative end than the “crucial” end.
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