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Transformation
Research
and
Academic Responsibility
The social theory gap in narratives of radical change
Ingolfur Blühdorn / Felix Butzlaff / Michael
Deflorian / Daniel Hausknost
IGN Interventions Mar|2018
Edited by the Institute for Social Change and Sustainability (IGN)
http://www.wu.ac.at/IGN/
2
IGN
Interventions Mar |
2018
Please cite as:
Blühdorn, I. / Butzlaff, F. / Deflorian, M. / Hausknost, D. (2018) „Transformation Research
and Academic Responsibility. The social theory gap in narratives of radical change“, IGN-In-
terventions Mar|2018, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE AND SUSTAINABILITY (IGN), Vienna University
of Economics and Business, Austria.
This article is based on a translation provided by Daniel Hill of our article
„Transformationsnarrativ und Verantwortlichkeit: Die gesellschaftstheoretische Lücke der
Transformationsforschung “, https://www.wu.ac.at/ign/aktuelle-publikationen/
This English-language version has been revised in a number of respects.
Copyright © 2018 by Blühdorn, I. / Butzlaff, F. / Deflorian, M. / Hausknost, D. All rights reserved. This publica-
tion may be reproduced and distributed for academic and non-commercial purposes. It may not be reprinted,
recorded or transmitted without the prior written permission by the authors. For permission requests, write to
the publisher at the address below.
Corresponding author: Prof. Dr. Ingolfur Blühdorn, Institute for Social Change and Sustaina-
bility (IGN), Vienna University of Economics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 2, 1020 Vienna,
Austria, https://www.wu.ac.at/IGN/; Email: IGN@wu.ac.at
Transformation
Research
and Academic Responsibility
Transformation Research and Academic
Responsibility
The social theory gap in narratives of radical change
Ingolfur Blühdorn / Felix Butzlaff / Michael Deflorian / Daniel Hausknost
Abstract
Parts of the transformation literature seem strangely disconnected from the sociological analysis of
contemporary capitalist societies. Starting out from this diagnosis of a social theory deficit and guided
by the distinction of three levels of transformation proposed by the German Advisory Council on Global
Change (WBGU), the present article first deals with a niche player – the degrowth movement – to
which considerable expectations regarding its transformative potential are linked. Next, it widens the
perspective to the societal mainstream and explores how, in only marginally growing economies, ex-
clusionary and illiberal populist movements, rather than sustainability-oriented values, have become
the determining force. Finally, the focus is on the capabilities of the democratic state, which is usually
expected to adopt a vital role in the transformation to sustainability. Overall, the investigation into
transformative capacities at these three levels leads to a rather sceptical assessment of the ability and
willingness of modern consumer societies to achieve sustainability. We therefore argue that the social
science branch of the transformation debate ought to take more care in putting their transformation-
related diagnoses, recommendations and strategies on proper social-theoretical foundations.
keywords: sustained unsustainability; socio-ecological transformation; post-growth movement; so-
cietal value change; environmental state
We are greatly indebted to Fred Luks as well as to an external, anonymous reviewer for their con-
structive and very helpful comments on the original version of the paper.
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Interventions Mar
|2018
1. Introduction
The election of Donald Trump as the 45th Pres-
ident of the United States rendered more evi-
dent than ever what had already emerged dur-
ing the 2009 UN Climate Summit in Copenha-
gen: the end of an internationally coordinated
and cooperative policy for one bio-physical
world, one climate, and one global society.
Trump’s “America First!” has replaced these
ideas with a clear commitment to the logic of
growth, the primacy of national interests, and
the unconditional prioritisation of the econ-
omy over social justice, climate protection and
ecology. This politics of unsustainability (Blüh-
dorn 2011, 2013a, 2016), which at least in the
US now appears to have been given official sta-
tus, is of course neither specifically American,
nor fundamentally new. In the German-lan-
guage literature the phenomenon is discussed,
inter alia, as the imperial mode of living (Brand
& Wissen 2018) of the externalisation societies
(Lessenich 2016) in the global North. At the
same time, however, major effort is being in-
vested in constructing new narratives of hope.
While older promises of ecological modernisa-
tion seem to be losing some of their plausibil-
ity, the UN Sustainable Development Goals, for
example, which came into force in 2015, are ac-
corded considerable importance. Especially in
the German-speaking world, this also applies to
the influential Great Transformation scenario
of the German Advisory Council on Global
Change (WBGU 2011). According to the WBGU,
a sustainability-oriented shift in social value
preferences can already be observed. Pioneers
of change at society’s grassroots, in conjunc-
tion with a proactive state and transformative
science, have already initiated the transition to
a sustainable society (see also e.g. Paech 2013;
Schneidewind 2015; Wagner & Grunwald
2015).
As yet, the discrepancy between such narra-
tives of hope and the reality of the politics of
unsustainability has received surprisingly little
academic attention, even though the suppos-
edly self-critical externalisation societies have,
both internally and externally, already devel-
oped into aggressive exclusion societies. Right-
wing populist movements and protectionist
governments rally with fierce determination in
favour of clear boundaries between those who
really need help and those who only want to
gain undeserved advantages. And strikingly,
the behaviour of Donald Trump only reaffirms
the call of political leaders in Europe for even
more solidarity in the fight for our values, our
freedom, and our way of life. Admittedly, the
latter have long been recognized as impossible
to generalise, as imperial and as socially, politi-
cally and ecologically destructive; yet, they
must still be defended at any price. Thus, there
is a glaring contradiction between the societal
transformation, which sustainability research
and many political actors are urgently calling
for – and which, according to some, is already
recognizable – and the transformation which is
actually taking place. Significant parts of the
transformation literature therefore seem
strangely disconnected from the sociological
analysis of
contempo-
rary capital-
ist societies.
In our en-
deavour to
draw atten-
tion to this socio-theoretical deficit, we delib-
erately do not pursue the (fully legitimate)
elite-critical analysis of power relations that ef-
fectively block any transformation to sustaina-
bility. Instead, we investigate how sustained
unsustainability is deeply rooted in society at
large. Based on the WBGU’s proposed differen-
tiation of various levels of transformative ac-
tion (WBGU 2011), we first address a niche
player, the degrowth movement, and examine
to what extent the high expectations com-
monly placed on this movement as a pioneer of
change are actually justified. Then, we explore
how in societies whose economies grow, de-
spite considerable efforts, only moderately, il-
liberal populist movements have emerged as
the primary force determining political debates
in the societal mainstream – a trend which is
exactly contrary to the assertion of an immi-
nent change in values towards sustainability. In
section four, we critically examine the possibil-
ities and limitations of the democratically legit-
imized state, which is generally given a central
role in sustainability transformation.
A crucial societal responsibil-
ity of the social sciences is to
examine popular transfor-
mation narratives for their
sociological plausibility.
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Blühdorn / Butzlaff / Deflorian / Hausknost
Transformation
Research and Academic Responsibility
Overall, our call for a more careful, socio-theo-
retical foundation in the transformation de-
bate is based on our commitment to the socie-
tal responsibility of sustainability research. As
regards our understanding of this responsibil-
ity, we reject
the WBGU con-
cept of trans-
formative re-
search that is
expected to de-
velop ‘relevant
and credible so-
lutions for the
identified prob-
lems’ (WBGU
2011: 322); for it cannot be the task of social
science to put itself at the service of agendas
whose origins and designs are apparently no
longer up for discussion. However, believing in
a sociology that critically reflects on the stand-
ards and practices of its own critique (Boltanski
2010), we do see the social sciences as having
an essential social responsibility, indeed: to
thoroughly examine popular transformation
narratives for their sociological plausibility. For,
at times, such narratives can – quite contrary
to their originators’ ambitions – actually have a
stabilising, rather than transformative, effect
on the status quo of sustained unsustainability.
From an eco-political perspective, they would
then, in fact, appear as irresponsible.
2. Pioneers of the post-growth
society?
Degrowth is one of the central guiding ideas in
the debate on the socio-ecological transfor-
mation. As an eco-political strategy, it is a criti-
cal counter position to the concepts of green
growth and ecological modernisation (Jackson
2011; Paech 2012). The degrowth movement is
often described as an important collective ac-
tor driving structural change towards sustaina-
bility (Demaria et al. 2013; D’Alisa et al. 2015).
Given the obvious symptoms of crisis in the
Western economic model as a whole (Streeck
2014), it takes a critical view of capitalism (Kal-
lis et al. 2015: 11). Placing much emphasis on
alternative and subversive practices, it re-
sponds to the widely-felt desire to take imme-
diate, personal and meaningful action, e.g. in
food cooperatives, borrowing shops, alterna-
tive footwear workshops and a variety of other
experimental projects. Not least because of
this diversity, degrowth is regarded as a space
for debate and action in which a mosaic of al-
ternatives for socio-ecological transformation
evolves (Burkhart et al. 2017).The degrowth
idea takes its starting point from the recogni-
tion that infinite economic growth on a finite
planet is impossible. Degrowth thinkers believe
that the 21st century will see a degrowing or
collapsing world economy, and that contempo-
rary societies ought to prepare for the societal
turbulence this will entail. For them, the ines-
capable degrowth to come presents an oppor-
tunity to construct a new type of society: post-
growth, post-fossil and post-capitalist. Indeed,
degrowth economists have developed models
showing that a relatively prosperous and equi-
table steady-state economy would, in principle,
be feasible (Victor 2008; Jackson 2009; Langen
2017).
However, the institutional, socio-cultural and
political feasibility of a biophysically stable
economy has neither been proven nor tested.
After all, the history of modernity has been a
history of biophysical expansion. From an ana-
lytical point of view, then, material degrowth
may be a necessity, but from a political point of
view, a peaceful, stable and equitable post-
growth society may well be impossible. This
glaring gap between the necessity and impossi-
bility of degrowth is what characterises this
heterogeneous movement and what often
makes its normative concepts and demands
look naïve, implausible, paternalistic and factu-
ally depoliticising.
Further pursuing this critical reflection, one
central motif of the degrowth movement and
the related social science literature is to cri-
tique and eventually overcome the everyday
practice of consumerism. The patterns of con-
sumer behaviour in modern societies are not
considered as rooted in genuine human needs,
but rather the expression of interests imposed
on individuals in order to ‘preserve prevailing
Popular transformation
narratives can actually
have a stabilising – ra-
ther than transformative
– effect on the status
quo of sustained unsus-
tainability and would
then, in fact, appear as
irresponsible.counter-
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social conditions’1 (Muraca 2015: 109). Being
the perpetual target of the consumer goods in-
dustry and being continuously pressured by the
competition for social distinction, alienated cit-
izens are said to be locked into an ‘iron cage of
consumerism’ (Jackson 2009: 87-102). Because
they are ‘prisoners of the growth regime’ (Mu-
raca 2015: ibid.), they are said to be unable to
ever achieve their desired happiness. Yet, criti-
cal reflection on these alienated patterns of be-
haviour is assumed to open the door to alter-
native practices, rendering it possible to
change one’s self and, ultimately, society as a
whole (Eversberg & Schmelzer 2016: 13).
This narrative is reminiscent of
the social movement literature
of the 1970s and 1980s as well as
the diagnoses of Marcusean crit-
ical theory. Yet, from today’s
perspective, it raises doubts, both theoretically
and empirically. Undeniably, there are signals
in contemporary societies of discomfort with
consumerism, nurtured not least by the de-
structive social and ecological consequences of
consumer culture. From a sociological perspec-
tive, however, the attempt to present this cul-
ture as primarily determined by imposed inter-
ests, as pathological, or even as a deliberately
instituted programme of stultification seems
rather simplistic. Instead, to the same extent
that image-construction and external self-
presentation take priority over traditional no-
tions of character and inner values, consumer
practices are becoming the central means of
building and articulating individuality (Bauman
2007; Blühdorn 2013b; Ritzer & Murphy 2014).
And the fact that this kind of constructed self is
always ephemeral and requires constant re-
newal, is by no means just a deficit but actually
provides the opportunity to articulate – in the
society of singularities (Reckwitz 2017) – flexi-
ble, multi-layered and contradictory identities.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that members
of the degrowth community do by no means
fully liberate themselves from the central sym-
bols of modern lifestyles: smartphone owner-
ship or regular air travel are widespread in
these communities, too (Eversberg 2016: 93).
1To improve accessibility, all direct quotations
from German-language publications have been
translated into English.
Such practices may be perceived as irritating,
but they retain a central function in terms of
identity construction. Therefore, from a socio-
logical point of view, the assertion that the con-
sumer culture is a ‘mega-policy of individual at-
rophy’ (Paech 2013: 205) is not tenable. And
given the prevailing ideals of a good and ful-
filling life, the reverse assertion that liberation
from imposed consumerism opens the door to
true fulfilment and the realisation of the au-
thentic self is not very plausible either.
Secondly, the proposition that the degrowth
movement is being regarded as an avant-garde
of the structural transformation of society is
based on its focus on everyday
life and the experimental imple-
mentation of alternative models
(Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie
2017: 47), such as community
gardens, open workshops, or housing projects.
Participants in so-called ‘real laboratories of
change’ (Welzer et al. 2014), so the argument
runs, not only experience a liberation from the
pathologies of imposed consumerism, but also
advance actual, socio-ecological transfor-
mation (Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie 2017:
14). Ultimately, it is, supposedly, the radically
new experience of individual autonomy that
motivates practitioners to pursue self-transfor-
mation in other areas of life as well (Muraca
2015: 107f). Particularly in urban areas, this
everyday environmentalism is regarded as a
promising strategy to overcome the contradic-
tion between the actual value orientations of
individuals and the current hegemonic logic of
industrialist consumer capitalism (Schlosberg &
Coles 2015).
Once again, substantial doubts seem to be jus-
tified. It is true that, in the critical-creative mi-
lieu, in particular, there is an interest in more
sustainable practices and social forms of life,
which go beyond capitalist mass consumption.
Prominent examples include local community
gardens and organic vegetable cooperatives.
However, such deviations from established
patterns of consumption and behaviour often
remain highly selective and symbolic. Even at
Deviations from established
patterns of consumption of-
ten remain highly selective
and symbolic.
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Blühdorn / Butzlaff / Deflorian / Hausknost
Transformation
Research and Academic Responsibility
the level of individuals, there is little evidence
that the experience of self-efficacy acquired in
these small, alternative contexts would initiate
a profound transformation in behaviour and
thought patterns. Instead, empirical studies of
political consumption as well as urban farming
reveal significant and lasting contradictions in
everyday life (Connolly & Prothero 2005;
Dobernig & Stagl 2015). Studies comparing the
environmental behaviour of various social mi-
lieus come to the conclusion that especially in
the critical-creative milieus, lifestyles are
clearly above the average consumption level
with regards to material resources and energy
(e.g. Umweltbundesamt 2016; Moser & Klein-
hückelkotten 2017). And the assertion
(Howaldt & Schwartz 2017) that structural so-
cietal change towards sustainability will occur
because new social practices spread through
imitation (Tarde 2009) and because they ‘are
better able to solve or satisfy specific problems
or needs’ (Howaldt & Schwarz 2010: 54) ap-
pears stunningly simplistic.
Thirdly, trust in the pioneering power of the
degrowth movement is based on the hypothe-
sis that it presents an integrating central idea
acting as an umbrella for ‘different groups,
forms of resistance, social conflicts and alterna-
tive social concepts’ (Muraca 2015: 105). This
view is controversial, though, even within the
movement itself (Burkhart et al. 2016). In fact,
a myriad of different ideological orientations
are found among degrowth sympathisers
(Eversberg 2016). Some of the widely shared
positions are the belief in grass-roots democ-
racy (Hausknost 2017a) or the assumption that
a degrowth democracy will secure the integrity
and autonomy of nature and future genera-
tions. Yet, the hope that degrowth might func-
tion as a new bracket for diverse emancipatory
movements is countered by the fact that the
term remains, at least for the time being,
chronically vague in substance. On the one
hand, its openness is viewed as a strength be-
cause it offers space for a multitude of ideas
and courses of action (D’Alisa et al. 2015: xxi;
Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie 2017: 49). But
even within the movement’s own ranks, there
isnot much consensus regarding collective
rules for the central demand of doing with less.
This is hardly surprising, since it is difficult, if
not impossible, to launch an alternative socio-
economic order from below and within the
overwhelming dynamics of the incumbent cap-
italist model. Efforts to plant the seeds of
change in community gardens and repair cafés
are much more likely to be absorbed or ignored
by the established order than posing a serious
challenge to it. As the degrowth movement has
no well-developed concept of power but seems
to champion the deliberate absence of power,
it is dependent on individualised, morally moti-
vated action in small groups. It thus has the
tendency to happily retreat into private suffi-
ciency and to the field of material practice ra-
ther than engaging in political organisation and
strategic action. This is consistent with the logic
of progressive individualisation and differenti-
ation, and points to the possible absorption
and dispersal of the movement as just another
private lifestyle choice within the neoliberal
universe. Even more so, degrowth is failing to
create a normative basis for a transformative
project at the societal or even international
level.
Hence, degrowth so far does not offer a suita-
ble substitute for earlier socio-ecological uto-
pias, i.e. it does not provide an operational nor-
mative principle for a great societal transfor-
mation. A clear vision as regards the form of
political organisation which might render a
degrowth society a practically viable alterna-
tive is still lacking. As it is, the movement may,
in a sense, actually offer spaces in which iden-
tification with the socio-critical and emancipa-
tory project can be articulated, without having
to commit to any particular values, behaviours
or personal restrictions. Thus, the discursive
critique of growth and consumerism and the
practical experience of micro-alternatives may,
in fact, serve individuals and society at large to
cope with their cognitive dissonance and to
hold on to the imperial mode of living. Func-
tioning as a compensation strategy, degrowth
narratives might, thus, even strengthen the re-
silience of crisis-stricken capitalism (Blühdorn
2017). This consideration seems all the more
relevant as the degrowth narrative largely ne-
glects the fact that, beyond its own niches, a
completely different post-growth reality has
begun to evolve.
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3. The reality of the exclusion
society
In the transformation literature, the post-
growth society figures as a normative ideal and
guiding principle which assumes that, along-
side the new society, a new kind of human be-
ing will emerge with entirely different ideas of
self-determination, success and happiness
(Soper 2007). But along the way a de facto
post-growth society has emerged in industrial
countries that has little in common with such
movement ideals: The growth-dependent
promises and hopes of traditional modernisa-
tion remain fully intact, but for major segments
of society, they remain forever unattainable
because economic growth rates are moderate,
at best, and unlikely to return to earlier levels.
These societies are indeed experiencing funda-
mental changes adding up to a significant shift
of values and culture – but whether this is ben-
eficial to the envisaged sustainability transfor-
mation seems rather questionable. It is useful,
therefore, to further pursue some points,
which have already come up in the above dis-
cussion of the degrowth movement as a niche-
actor, and explore them in more detail with a
view to the societal mainstream.
Most pertinent here is the question of the
availability and social acceptance of socio-eco-
logical imperatives or behavioural rules that
could guide the project of a great transfor-
mation. Very important in this context is the
significant decline in the willingness of today’s
citizens to lastingly assign and commit them-
selves to any particular social milieu or even
political grouping. Membership numbers of po-
litical parties, trade unions or churches have
been in decline for many years (Wiesendahl
2011). At the same time, however, the number
of those trying to feed their individualised con-
cerns into politics in ad hoc campaign networks
is increasing (Butzlaff 2016). Processes of indi-
vidualisation and emancipation have disem-
bedded people from traditional social contexts,
causing them to develop their notions and
strategies of self-realisation in an increasingly
individualised and flexible way. On the one
hand, this means liberation from old, patroniz-
ing roles; at the same time, however, this
emancipation also limits the possibility to initi-
ate collective action and new forms of subjec-
tivation via group contexts – which would,
most probably, be a prerequisite for any sus-
tainability-oriented social transformation.
Further aggravating this problem, the pressure
towards individual self-responsibility and the
necessity to rely on one’s personal abilities and
resources for purposes of identity formation
and self-realisation, gives rise to new efforts of
second-order emancipation (Blühdorn 2013b:
143-150): Individuals who are ever less firmly
embedded into societal contexts that predeter-
mine their identity and way of life are increas-
ingly sceptical of the very norms and commit-
ments which the emancipatory movements of
the 1970s and 1980s had once been campaign-
ing for. After all, it seems that for large parts of
the population in advanced democracies, the
further democratisation of society, commit-
ment to the common good, ecologically sus-
tainable forms of life or the ideal of interna-
tional justice are not automatically desirable.
Hence, the beliefs and demands of earlier
phases of emancipation are themselves being
put to a critical test. This has caused, inter alia,
an irritating ambivalence towards democratic
values and procedures (Butzlaff et al. 2013;
Blühdorn 2013b;
Blühdorn &
Butzlaff 2018).
Equally, signifi-
cant parts of the
population do
not necessarily
share moral im-
peratives of eco-
logical behaviour
and post-mate-
rial ideas of happiness, but perceive them as re-
strictive and patronising. The widespread de-
scription of Green parties as prohibitionist pro-
vides clear evidence.
This is directly linked to the aforementioned
observation that in modern societies the im-
portance of consumer-oriented forms of self-
realization and social distinction is not declin-
ing, but rather continues to increase. And inad-
vertently, the emancipatory movements have
themselves actually fostered this develop-
ment. They have always regarded individual
Right
-
wing p
opulist
movements propel the
dissolution of the so-
cial, democratic and
ecological commit-
ments, which earlier
emancipatory move-
ments had secured in
arduous struggles.
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Blühdorn / Butzlaff / Deflorian / Hausknost
Transformation
Research and Academic Responsibility
self-realization as a strength, but disregarded
the fact that their ideal of the liberated, self-
responsible Self requires a high degree of so-
cial, cognitive and cultural capital (Sennet
1999). Such capital, however, is not available to
significant parts of society. Thus, the individu-
alisation of self-realisation on the one hand,
and the unequal distribution of such forms of
capital on the other, have nurtured, across all
sections of society, a strong emphasis on the
materialist dimension – which, in turn, is highly
problematic as regards the transformation pro-
ject: Consumerism, supported by the low price
strategy of discount retailers is accessible for
lower income groups, and has increasingly be-
come the main arena in which individual iden-
tity is developed and displayed (Böhme 2016).
Yet, under the conditions of a de facto post-
growth society, this consumerist mode of self-
realisation comes under severe pressure
(Graefe 2016). As economic growth is at best
moderate, major parts of society do not com-
mand the resources required for the flexible
and fluid forms of consumption-based identity
construction. Welfare-state institutions are no
longer in a position to fill the gap that arises,
but are themselves being restructured or dis-
mantled under the auspices of neo-liberal aus-
terity policies. In this way, new lines of social
division emerge between those
who are able to constructively
use the new freedom and oppor-
tunities because they are well
equipped with the necessary
forms of capital, and those sec-
tions of society that can realize
the promises of social liberalisa-
tion only to a limited extent or
not at all. Thus, the identities and
lifestyles of some parts of society
are no longer just based on the
externalisation of social and ecological costs in
an international or global sense, but they de-
pend, more directly than ever, on the exclusion
of others within society. What until recently
seemed to be an unpleasant but treatable side-
effect is transformed into a necessary condi-
tion: some can realize their ideals because oth-
ers are barred from doing so (Lessenich 2016).
A direct consequence of these developments,
which can be observed in many Western socie-
ties, is the rise of right-wing populist move-
ments. They draw their political strength from
the taxing demands of neo-liberal modernisa-
tion imposed on the individual (Spier 2010; In-
glehart & Norris 2017), and from the structural
challenges that the emancipatory-liberal pro-
ject entails for essential parts of society (Eribon
2016). In this way, right-wing populism has long
since moved from the margins into the very
mainstream of socio-political debate and has
become a determining political force (Mudde
2013; Decker et al. 2016). Its agenda, however,
is in direct contradiction to the hopes of trans-
formation narratives: it propels the dissolution
of the social, democratic and ecological com-
mitments that emancipatory movements had
arduously established. Right-wing populism de-
fines politics and society as a rivalry for scarce
cultural, social and economic resources, which
corrupt elites and parasitic free riders are tak-
ing away from those who legitimately claim
them. And arguing that the much-debated so-
cio-ecological transformation is no more than
an elitist project that essentially cements the
privileged status of those who have already
benefited from recent societal modernisation
(Geiges et al. 2015; Berbuir et al. 2015; Oliver
& Rahn 2016), right-wing populists are reso-
lutely opposed to all demands of
a sustainability-oriented policy.
Instead, they pursue an agenda
of social exclusion, resist forms of
democracy which safeguard mi-
norities and limit the promise of
equality and justice to what they
see as the real people (Blühdorn
& Butzlaff 2018).
Hence, just as the power of the
degrowth movement as a niche
player of comprehensive societal change is
marginal at best, the mainstream of Western
societies is, as regards its value preferences
and ongoing culture shifts, not well positioned
for any socio-ecological transformation either.
And if significant transformative potential can
be found neither among niche players nor in
the mainstream of the ‘threatened majority’
(Krastev 2017: 67), eco-political hopes will in-
variably focus on the leadership of the proac-
tive environmental state.
Essentially, the state is ex-
pected to deliver an envi-
ronmental policy that im-
proves the quality of life,
but not a transformation
policy that challenges and
aims to redefine individual
lifestyles and the common
good.
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4. Democratic consensus and the
proactive state
Against the backdrop of increasing societal
complexity and the differentiation of diverse
value systems, a “proactive and enabling state”
(WBGU 2011) is, indeed, being called upon to-
day more than ever to foster a societal trans-
formation towards sustainability. This environ-
mental state is expected to establish “an effec-
tive set of legal instruments supported by an
appropriate policy mix involving private sector,
public-private and public actors” and to create
“suitable spaces at various levels available for
experimentation and ensure leeway” (WBGU
2011: 205). It is thus assigned a crucial role in
any societal transformation. In the context of
neo-liberal hegemony, however, this role is in-
terpreted above all as giving further support to
well-established structures and strategies:
strengthening the dynamics of the market,
public-private partnerships and a policy mix
that interprets societal change primarily as
technological and social innovation. Instead of
enforcing a radical change and challenging a so-
cietal status quo by means of regulatory and
fiscal measures that actively intervene in the
supply and demand of material goods, the bur-
den of transformation is transferred to so-
called change agents and social entrepreneurs,
whose innovative ideas are ex-
pected to facilitate societal
value change from the depths
of civil society and start-up
niches, as discussed above.
From a neo-liberal perspective,
in particular, the state is ex-
pected (or willed) to induce a
sustainable society future, but
at the same time refrains from
assuming any direct responsibility for its estab-
lishment. This creates a dilemma: on the one
hand, confronted with overwhelming scientific
evidence, the state must commit itself to the
goal of a radical socio-ecological structural
change; on the other hand, especially in the age
of hegemonic neo-liberalism, it cannot allow
for a transformation that endangers the perfor-
mance of established indicators of progress,
such as economic growth, competitiveness or
rates of investment.
This dilemma does not, however, arise solely
from the hegemony of neo-liberalism, but first
and foremost from the liberal state’s depend-
ence on democratic legitimation procedures.
Since the rise of the working class and recogni-
tion of its claim for political and economic par-
ticipation and equality, the modern state has
also become a democratic state. In order to be
able to offer a credible promise of prosperity
and progress to the population at large and to
pacify ideological resistance against the domi-
nant logic of capital accumulation, it must en-
sure that the material base (employment, in-
come, welfare benefits) grows at an ever-in-
creasing rate. Thus, the modern state is subject
to a twofold legitimation imperative (Dryzek et
al. 2003): to ensure both political and economic
participation. This way, economic growth ulti-
mately has become a key state imperative
(Skocpol 1979). Some theorists argue that in
modern societies, beyond the traditional legiti-
mation imperative, a genuine sustainability im-
perative may develop, or even that this is al-
ready taking place (Dryzek et al. 2003; Mead-
owcroft 2012). The inclusion of environmental
movements and their core interests into public
policy norms, they suggest, has institutional-
ised environmental protection as a new central
concern of the state, which has developed be-
yond a traditional welfare state into a modern
environmental state. Paradoxi-
cally, however, it is precisely the
undeniable success of institu-
tionalised environmental policy
that proves the inability to cre-
ate an original imperative on
which a proactive state might
base any project of structural
transformation.
This is, firstly, because contemporary environ-
mental policy clearly follows the legitimacy im-
perative of the state and sidesteps prioritizing
an independent sustainability imperative. For
example, policies protecting rivers and forests,
improving the air quality in metropolitan areas
and establishing nature reserves fit seamlessly
into the welfare state logic of securing and im-
proving the general standard of living
(Hausknost 2017b). Secondly, in the past these
Paradoxically, it is precisely
the undeniable success of in-
stitutionalised environmental
policy that proves the inabil-
ity to create an original im-
perative on which a proactive
state might base any project
of structural transformation.
11
Blühdorn / Butzlaff / Deflorian / Hausknost
Transformation
Research and Academic Responsibility
improvements of a common living standard
had specifically been achieved without ques-
tioning the established path dependencies of
industrial development and economic expan-
sion. Improving living conditions at large fur-
ther refined and entrenched the neo-liberal
logic and hegemony (Fücks 2013; Huber 2009).
Yet, it is precisely this reconciliation with the
welfare state on the one hand and the impera-
tive of economic growth on the other, which
deprives environmental policy of its genuine
political and transformational potential. This
reconciliation reduces every effort towards a
comprehensive, anticipatory
sustainability to a mere ethical
postulate; it turns a structural
transformation into a scientific,
elitist and detached pipe dream
that remains unconnected to
any societal reality.
In contrast, a proactive state
that aims to extend beyond the
democratic and welfare state
legitimacy imperative would
have to actively intervene in
production operations and the dominant con-
sumer logic. It would need to reassess and po-
liticise key questions of welfare, the meaning of
what counts as a good life and of the role of so-
ciety. For a long time, the societal conflicts sur-
rounding these notoriously problematic issues
had been silenced – de-politicised (Hausknost
2014) – by the promise of ever-lasting eco-
nomic growth and continuous improvement of
living standards. However, as outlined in the
previous section, in de facto post-growth soci-
eties these questions are vehemently re-
emerging. And under conditions of intensified
competition, austerity and exclusion, state pol-
icies which, in the name of sustainability or
other collective goals, intervene in private
lives, trigger, more predictably than ever, polit-
ical conflicts that can hardly be controlled. For
example, any attempt to limit meat consump-
tion or interfere with individual patterns of mo-
bility is immediately rejected as elitist and au-
thoritarian. So, essentially, the state is ex-
pected to deliver an environmental policy that
improves the quality of life (e.g. by supporting
the provision of healthy vegetables, efficient
engines and regional noise protection
measures), but not a transformation policy that
aims to challenge and redefine individual life-
styles and the common good.
The transformation possibilities of a state that
is dependent on representative democratic le-
gitimacy are therefore greatly limited. In the
absence of alternative criteria that are able to
gather the support of a societal majority, the
legitimacy imperative of the modern demo-
cratic state remains the glass ceiling of any
state-organized transformation. Any attempt
to undermine the logic of economic growth and
consumption would therefore inevitably lead
to a legitimacy crisis of the state
(Hausknost 2017b). Against the
backdrop of climate change, the
depletion of resources, escalat-
ing social inequalities and the
crisis of capitalism, contempo-
rary public policy is, of course,
under increasing pressure to
find possibilities for re-stabilisa-
tion beyond the paradigm of
economic growth. Yet, if any
such reorientation would really
lead to sustainability, and to
what extent the state would really be able to
steer and shape this transformation process,
remains unpredictable. It is, however, evident
that the dissolution of conventional stabilisa-
tion mechanisms can already be observed.
5. Between rhetoric of departure
and the lack of alternatives
Thus, contemporary post-industrial consumer
democracies are indeed undergoing funda-
mental change. But the transformation pro-
cesses that can factually be observed are far
from what sustainability research and many ac-
tors advocating sustainability transformation
policies demand. For the time being, the popu-
lar transformation literature offers very little to
address this discrepancy. The widespread calls
of a revitalisation of the democratic project, a
genuine self-realisation through alternative he-
donism, a new social contract, or the vision of
a good life for all are well-intended, politically.
From a sociological point of view, however,
they give the impression of helplessness and
being curiously detached from the prevalent
With their narrative of tech-
nological innovation, market-
based policy instruments and
politically active consumers,
the advocates of ecological
modernisation established an
effective protection shield un-
der which the visibly fragile
edifice of liberal consumer
capitalism could be sustained
for several more decades.
12
IGN
Interventions Mar |
2018
societal reality – not least because of their bla-
tant socio-theoretical deficits. Although the
current literature does, occasionally,
acknowledge the contradictory simultaneity of
an increasing awareness of the sustainability is-
sue and the resolute adherence to the imperial
mode of living and the logic of externalisation,
current research on sustainability transfor-
mation consistently avoids addressing the ac-
tual problem:
This is that the politics of unsustainability is not
simply the result of an evil and alienating capi-
talism, but rather – or, at the very least, also –
has emerged from the emancipatory project it-
self. Unsurprisingly, therefore, sustainability
research and its political actors are finding it
ever more difficult to plausibly portray sus-
tained unsustainability as the result of alien-
ated or false consciousness and to address it
with promises of a truly liberating and emanci-
patory alternative. The crux of modern sustain-
ability policy lies exactly in the harmony of the
two logics of capitalism and the emancipatory
project. Yet, significant parts of the transfor-
mation literature determinedly refuse to
acknowledge this new con-
sonance – not least, presum-
ably, because of the political
abyss that it opens up. Nev-
ertheless, the principle of
academic societal responsi-
bility demands that these
new socio-cultural condi-
tions are addressed in a sociologically plausible
manner.
Of course, sustainability research and transfor-
mation efforts which aim at a fundamental
structural change of modern societies cannot
adopt established societal logics, values, and
procedures as criteria and as limits to their im-
agination. At the same time, though, transfor-
mation narratives, which lack an adequate
foundation in social theory, run the risk of in-
advertently stabilising the established politics
of unsustainability. Already in the 1980s, advo-
cates of ecological modernisation had asserted
that the problem of sustainability and resource
over-use and pollution was now clearly
acknowledged, that politics was taking it seri-
ously and that it would now be dealt with con-
structively at all levels of society. With their
narrative of technological innovation, market-
based policy instruments, and politically active
consumers, the advocates of ecological mod-
ernisation thus established an effective protec-
tion shield under which the – already at the
time – visibly fragile edifice of liberal consumer
capitalism could be sustained for several more
decades. Their policies have, undoubtedly,
brought about a number of improvements. Yet,
they have also helped to provide the time and
space for the sustainability crisis to unfold the
full complexity that today’s societies now have
to confront. As the multiple limits – economic,
ecological, social, migration etc. – of the estab-
lished strategies of further sustaining the un-
sustainable now have become more visible
than ever before, and the Polanyian notion of
the great transformation is again coming to the
forefront of the discussion, it is, therefore, all
the more important that new and emerging
narratives of hope are more carefully examined
for their actual transformative potential.
The questions of whether and to what extent
such meta-critical approaches may mobilise
new political energy, for the time being, have
to remain unanswered. Ad-
mittedly, our analysis above
understands societal devel-
opment much more strongly
as evolutionary and less con-
trollable than approaches
following the tradition of
post-Marxist critical theory
do, or the optimistic transformation narratives
of the WBGU. Also, our arguments might be
criticised for neglecting societal power rela-
tions and not formulating constructive policy
recommendations. Models such as the theory
of second-order emancipation might even be
maliciously taken as a social-theoretical legiti-
mation for the perpetuation of the neo-liberal
status quo. Our objective here, however, is not
to challenge the approaches that focus on
power-relations, but to supplement them in or-
der to facilitate a more complex understanding
of sustained unsustainability. If it wants to be
sociologically plausible and socially responsi-
ble, transformation research will eventually
have to acknowledge that the old paradigm of
alienation and emancipation is simply no
longer sufficient to explain advanced modern
societies and their crises. And in any case, our
If it wants to be sociologically plausi-
ble and socially responsible, trans-
formation research will eventually
have to acknowledge that the old
paradigm of alienation and emanci-
pation is simply no longer sufficient.
13
Blühdorn / Butzlaff / Deflorian / Hausknost
Transformation
Research and Academic Responsibility
argument does not light-heartedly abandon
the norms of the critical project. Quite the con-
trary, our attempt to understand the logic and
implications of the prevailing politics of unsus-
tainability is, ultimately, motivated (even when
reflexively criticising new and emerging narra-
tives of hope!) by precisely those norms which
second-order emancipation comprehensively
remoulds. And if some all-too-simple transfor-
mation narratives are critically questioned
here, this neither implies any assertion of a lack
of alternatives to, nor any justification for, the
societal status quo: climate change, migration
waves, right-wing populism, religious funda-
mentalism and terrorism clearly show that the
politics of unsustainability is already mobilising
considerable political energies. Yet, realisti-
cally, the hope and belief that these energies
can once again be channelled and controlled in
the spirit of the old European project of ration-
ality, enlightenment and democratisation to-
day seems increasingly questionable.
14
IGN
Interventions Mar
|2018
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Ingolfur Blühdorn is Professor for Social Sustainability and Head of the Institute for Social Change and Sustaina-
bility (IGN) at the Vienna University of Economics and Business in Austria. Earlier appointments include, most
importantly, the University of Bath (1995–2015) and various international guest professorships. His academic
work explores the legacy of the emancipatory social movements since the early 1970s and the transformation of
emancipatory politics. He has published widely on issues of eco-political theory, the post-democratic turn, the
politics of simulation, the politics of unsustainability and the post-democratic constellation.
Prof. Dr. Ingolfur Blühdorn, ingolfur.bluehdorn@wu.ac.at, Institut für Gesellschaftswandel und Nachhaltig-
keit (IGN), Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Welthandelsplatz 2, Gebäude D5, A-1020 Vienna, Austria
Felix Butzlaff is Assistant Professor at the Institute for Social Change and Sustainability (IGN) at the Vienna Uni-
versity of Economics and Business. His work deals with transformations of democracy and changing patterns of
mobilization, participation and representation through social movements and political parties. Earlier publica-
tions focused on protest movements and the implications for the mobilization and integration capacities of po-
litical parties and for the acceptance of liberal representative democracy.
Dr. Felix Butzlaff, felix.butzlaff@wu.ac.at, Institut für Gesellschaftswandel und Nachhaltigkeit (IGN), Wirt-
schaftsuniversität Wien, Welthandelsplatz 2, Gebäude D5, A-1020 Vienna, Austria
Michael Deflorian is research and teaching associate at the Institute for Social Change and Sustainability (IGN)
at the Vienna University of Economics and Business. He has received a Master’s Degree in Environmental History
from Uppsala University and a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from Free University of Berlin. In his PhD
thesis, Deflorian investigates whether so-called „pioneers of change“ (e.g. community gardens, repair cafés,
clothing swap initiatives) can be understood as a new type of social movement. Other research areas include the
late-modern subject, the transformation of growth society and degrowth.
Michael Deflorian, MA, michael.deflorian@wu.ac.at, Institut für Gesellschaftswandel und Nachhaltigkeit (IGN),
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Welthandelsplatz 2, Gebäude D5, A-1020 Vienna, Austria
Daniel Hausknost is Assistant Professor at the Institute for Social Change and Sustainability (IGN) at the Vienna
University of Economics and Business. He studied politics and philosophy in Vienna and earned a PhD in Politics
and international Relations from Keele University (UK). His research explores the transformative capacities of
modern democratic societies, with regard to socio-ecological constraints in particular. He is currently interested
in the co-evolutionary relationship between the modern state and the fossil energy system, in modern state
legitimation and in the resulting theoretical and practical challenges for a democratic state after the age of fossil-
driven growth.
Ass.-Prof. Dr. Daniel Hausknost, daniel.hausknost@wu.ac.at, Institut für Gesellschaftswandel und Nachhaltig-
keit (IGN), Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Welthandelsplatz 2, Gebäude D5, A-1020 Vienna, Austria