The Political Economy of Normative Trade Power Europe: Negotiating Trade Deals with Developing Countries
Abstract
‘In this eloquently written book, Arlo Poletti and Daniela Sicurelli assess rival explanations for the European Union’s trade policy towards small and developing trading partners. Through careful cross-case comparison, they uncover how and why the motives of policy-makers, business groups and NGOs make high normative aspirations diverge from actual negotiation outcomes.’
— Dirk De Bièvre, University of Antwerp, Belgium
This book critically engages with a long tradition of scholarly work that conceives of the European Union as a peculiar international actor that pursues a value-based, normatively oriented and development-friendly agenda in its relations with its international partners. The EU is a pivotal player in international trade relations, holding formidable power in trade but also exercising substantial power through trade. Trade policy therefore represents a strategic field for the EU to shape its image as a healthy economy and a global power. In this field, the EU has declared a twofold ambitious goal, namely that of fostering economic growth in Europe while, at the same time, promoting development and growth abroad, both in developed and developing countries. In other words, the EU aims to increase its competitiveness in world trade while acting as an ethical and normative power. Here, Poletti and Sicurelli explore the tension between these two roles.
Arlo Poletti is Associate Professor of International Political Economy at University of Trento, Italy.
Daniela Sicurelli is Associate Professor of International Relations at University of Trento, Italy.
... These include retailers at the end of the supply chain and goods-producing firms that import intermediate inputs playing a pivotal role in the production process (Eckhardt 2015). These import-dependent firms, which support trade liberalization because they have an interest in accessing cheap imported goods, have increased the political weight of the protrade domestic coalitions in the EU and systematically affect EU trade policy choices across the board (Eckhardt and Poletti 2016;Poletti and Sicurelli 2018;Poletti et al. 2021;Yildirim et al. 2018a and2018b). Moreover, the central role played by the EU in GVCs has had a systematic impact not only on the types of trade policy preferences that are channelled in the EU trade policymaking process but also on the nature of the system of interest representation that underpins it. ...
... A large body of literature documents the traditional EU role as a powerful trade actor, one that has not only been capable of affecting the trade policies of other countries but also of shaping the rules that govern international trade relations (see Conceição-Heldt 2011;Dür and Zimmermann 2007;Eckhardt 2015;Meunier 2005;Poletti and Sicurelli 2018;Siles-Brügge 2014;Young andPeterson 2006 and2014). Two factors have enabled the EU to exercise significant structural influence on global trade governance: the size of its domestic economy and share of global imports and the characteristics of the rules and institutions governing EU trade policymaking. ...
... In addition, the fact that many other prominent WTO members were concluding PTAs created a domino effect by incentivizing the EU to follow suit in order to avoid being left behind and, therefore, lose significant market shares (Dür 2007). Moreover, the strong economic interdependence between the EU and many Asian countries within GVCs created strong incentives to pursue bilateral trade agreements with them (Eckhardt and Poletti 2016;Poletti and Sicurelli 2018;Poletti et al. 2021). Irrespective of the specific drivers of these trade agreements, it is clear that starting in the mid-2000s, the EU could no longer play a dominant role in shaping global trade governance and thus sought instead to shape international trade relations through bilateral and regional trade agreements. ...
The European Union (EU) is the world's largest trading bloc—ranking first both as a trader of manufactured goods and services and as a destination and source of international investments—and has traditionally been able to play a pivotal role in international trade relations. Three factors have contributed to the EU acquiring such formidable trade power: the delegation of national powers to conduct external trade policy at the supranational level at the very beginning of European integration, the sheer size of its domestic economy, and the consensual character of decision-making procedures governing trade policy. These factors have traditionally enabled the EU to wield huge influence in international trade relations, making it both capable of achieving policy outcomes largely in line with its trade preferences and of shaping global trade governance. At the same time, since the early 2000s, the political environment within which EU trade policymaking is shaped has changed considerably: relative economic power in the global economy shifted towards Asia, the EU economy became more deeply integrated into global and regional value chains, trade policy discussions became more politicized, and security issues forcefully entered the trade policy agenda. This chapter aims to offer an overview of the legal framework that governs EU trade policymaking, the actors that contribute to shaping the content of EU trade policy, the historical evolution of the EU's role as a global trade power, and the main transformations that are likely to shape the evolution of EU trade policy strategies in the years to come.
... Some scholars assert that DG trade incorporates labour and environmental standards into preferential trade agreements because Europe is a normative power that either deliberately or inadvertently exports its norms (Morin, Dür, and Lechner 2018;Postnikov 2023). Others claim that labour and environmental standards are a way of protecting its own commercial interests (Poletti and Sicurelli 2018;Poletti, Sicurelli, and Yildirim 2021). A final group of scholars suggests that EU trade agreements are converging on a common form because re-using text reduces transaction costs and because the EU, systematically constrained by its large number of veto players, carries forward past compromises to avoid contestation Elsig 2017, 2019;Postnikov 2023). ...
... The normative power Europe hypothesis is not without its critics. Many scholars counter it by claiming that this characterization of the EU is empirically false (Young and Peterson 2014), selectively applied (Pollack 2017), or simply a façade for market access concerns (Poletti and Sicurelli 2018;Poletti, Sicurelli, and Yildirim 2021). Indeed, even if the EU is normatively motivated in its pursuit of sustainable development, the external application of its norms is often received with scepticism, especially because their protectionist effect rests systematically on weak scientific evidence (Sicurelli 2023). ...
... Because the EU is endowed with highly trained, relatively immobile citizens, this suggests that political cleavages are likely to emerge along educational lines, as inefficient producers of low-tech, undifferentiated products are stuck in sectors which struggle to compete on international markets (Flaherty and Rogowski 2021). Import-competing firms specializing in low-skilled production are expected to mobilize in defence of their interests and to use any means available, including labour and environmental standards, to lobby for selective protection (Lechner, 2016;Poletti et al., 2021;Poletti & Sicurelli, 2018). ...
What explains the politicization of EU trade agreement negotiations? Resonance with the contestation of others! In this thesis, I present a generic theory of politicization developed in relation to trade policy, but which is broadly applicable across policy fields. I argue that politicization is caused by actors who are not affected by policy decisions reacting to contestation by those who are. My theory is that actors form coalitions by advocating for resolutions to the problems of others strategically, to influence the closure of their own field of interaction, or the control of enforcement resources within it. I call this strategic behaviour 'resonance' and construct a conditional logic through which different actors are motivated to take such political action. I build on Bartolini's (2018) distinction of political action as being motivated by the will to achieve the behavioural compliance of others by affecting conditions of closure or control. From this theoretical starting point, I derive a set of ideal-typical situations in which resonating with counterparts from another field will resolve dilemmas for different types of political actors. I test the theory using a combination of statistical analysis, network science and quantitative text analysis to determine if actors 'resonate' as the theory anticipates. The thesis demonstrates the plausibility of the theory using cases spanning EU trade agreement negotiations over the past 20 years. It shows that even though politicization often begins because of stakeholder contestation, further contestation and the eventual institutionalization of politicized issues are the result of strategic behaviour by actors who resonate with stakeholders to resolve dilemmas of their own.
... They include, most importantly, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its top official, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Other EU bodies that commonly share this perspective are the more political directorates in the Commission (such as International Cooperation and Development, European Neighbourhood Policy and External Relations (before it was merged into the EEAS) and the European Parliament (Poletti and Sicurelli, 2018). With respect to specific EU members, the more liberal northern, states (such as the Scandinavian countries) are especially keen on linking SNTIs and other political issues to trade benefits (Ahnlid, 2013;Bossuyt et al., 2020). ...
... In negotiations with partners that are less strategically consequential, in contrast, those actors who emphasize economic interests will be more successful in fending off pressure to link market access to SNTIs (Bossuyt et al., 2020). This logic is especially germane to more distant partners located in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), East and South Asia and Latin America (Poletti and Sicurelli, 2018). Even if these countries experience violence and instability, their spillover into the EU is less likely and less pressing for this organization and its members. ...
... Bossuyt et al. (2013, p. 75) add that 'This is a striking observation given that security issues in Africa have been high on the EU agenda in the past decade'. Instead, EPA negotiations emphasized agriculture, sustainable development and human rights (Poletti and Sicurelli, 2018). This is explained, at least in part, by the fact that DG Trade was lukewarm about political conditionality in economic partnership agreements compared with other EU stakeholders (Bossuyt et al., 2013, p. 75). ...
Economic agreements concluded between the EU and third parties increasingly take on security matters, such as counter‐terrorism, nuclear proliferation and international criminal law. Highlighting the remarkable variation in the presence and content of these security non‐trade issues (SNTIs), we argue that it is best explained by the EU's intensity of foreign policy interests vis‐à‐vis its partners. Specifically, different stakeholders have divergent views on this matter: some advocate strong linkage between trade and security, while others prefer to tackle these issues separately. We expect the former perspective to determine the content of economic agreements when the partner is in the EU's backyard. The latter perspective will dominate in negotiations with more distant partners. We test these expectations with a new data set of SNTIs in EU agreements. Employing quantitative methods and controlling for several alternative explanations, we find ample support for the theoretical framework.
... This type of value-oriented trade policy goes beyond the conventional international political economy (IPE) explanations focused on the distributional consequences of trade liberalization and ensuing political conflicts among its domestic winners and losers (Milner 1999). The Political Economy of Normative Trade Power Europe (Poletti and Sicurelli 2018) aims to empirically probe the foundations of NPE in trade and explore just how much the EU's trade policy is driven by normative preferences as opposed to material factors, or in the language of the authors, whether the EU represents a 'normative' or 'traditional market' trade power. The book explores this question focusing on the EU's preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with the developing world, including Latin American, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. ...
... To understand this, one needs to examine further the comparative institutional dynamics of trade policymaking in the EU and other major trade powers, such as the US. Poletti and Sicurelli (2018) briefly discuss the role of EU-level institutions in shaping the European normative agenda in trade. Yet, both traditional and normative trade policies are likely to be an outcome of societal preferences (so neatly mapped out by the authors) and political institutions (e.g. ...
... Yet, with all the limitations Commercial Realism is an essential reading for any student of EU trade and foreign policy. It complements the societyfocused explanations of EU trade policy exemplified by Poletti and Sicurelli (2018) showing the richness of contemporary research on EU trade policy. Its insights could be also applied to explain trade relations of other powerful actors. ...
This review article focuses on three state-of-the-art works on EU trade policy putting them in the larger context of international trade. Each of them generates innovative theoretical and empirical insights into the politics of EU trade policy. Taken together, they represent the diversity and depth of EU trade policy scholarship in recent years which has achieved significant conceptual and methodological maturity and can help us understand some of the most critical trends in international trade pertaining to the EU, especially when productively combined with international and comparative political economy approaches. The article also contemplates on some questions stemming from these works suggesting new directions for the students of EU trade.
... The FTAs have been a means to extend the EU's normative power in trade policy preferences (e.g. Alvstam and Lindberg 2019, Poletti and Sicurelli 2018, Sampson and Theuns 2023, Sicurelli 2015, Zurek 2019, such as non-tariff barriers, the primary example being technical barriers to trade (TBT). They include standards, testing and certifications covered by the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade from 1994 (Hanson 2010: 40) and the related conformity assessment procedures that are relevant in the case of Japan. ...
... This conforms to Young's (2017) notion on the current politics of different FTAs: they are even more interconnected than was previously acknowledged (cf. Poletti and Sicurelli 2018). The shift in the global configuration of trade negotiations gave room for others -such as the EU and Japan -to take a more active role. ...
... However, this solidarity-based discourse rests on weak empirical foundations (Smith, 2018;Young and Peterson, 2014). While sustainable development provisions have become an integral part of the EU's 'new generation' trade agreements (Van den Putte and Orbie 2015), several empirical works show that the design of these provisions within the Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), with developing countries varies significantly, particularly with regards to their degree of bindingness, enforceability, and transparency (Adriansen and Gonzàlez-Garibay 2013;Harrison et al. 2019;Poletti and Sicurelli 2018). ...
... In some of the PTAs signed by the EU with developing countries sustainable development provisions are unequivocally binding, rendered enforceable through the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism, and include transparency measures that ensure public oversight over their implementation. In other instances, the way in which these provisions are formulated contributes to significantly watering down their binding force, while enforcement mechanisms and transparency measures are weak or absent altogether (Poletti and Sicurelli 2018). This means there are significant differences not only in the way the EU promotes sustainable development through trade with respect to other major trading players (Postnikov 2019;Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014;2020), but also in the way in which the EU itself approaches different developing countries. ...
Sustainable development provisions have become an integral part of the EU's 'new generation' trade agreements. Yet, a growing number of empirical works show that their design varies significantly, even in the trade agreements signed with countries at similar (low) levels of development. We contend that this variation can be accounted for by discussing how the growing integration of the EU economy with specific developing countries across Global Value Chains (GVCs) affects the domestic politics of regulatory export in the EU. European firms that operate within GVCs rely on imports of inputs produced in low-labour cost countries. These firms tend to oppose the export of those regulatory burdens that generate an increase of their imports' variable costs. The political mobilization of these actors weakens domestic coalitions supporting regulatory export strategies, which explains why the EU adopts a more lenient approach over the inclusion of sustainable development provision in PTA negotiations with some developing countries.
... The trade policy of the European Union (EU) increasingly includes a focus on so-called non-trade policy objectives (NTPOs) such as the promotion of human rights, labor standards or environmental protection in partner countries (Hirsch 2017;Lechner, 2016;Poletti and Sicurelli 2016;Raess et al. 2018). This is reflected in linkage strategies, i.e. conditioning access to the EU market on NTPO commitments by partner countries (Borchert et al., 2018), and inspired a long line of literature emphasizing that the successfully pursuing NTPOs through trade policy hinges on garnering support from domestic organized interests, including different business interests and civil society organizations (CSOs) (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006;Young and Peterson 2014;Poletti and Sicurelli 2018;Dür et al. 2019). Yet, despite the quality of these works little is known about the alignment of EU policymakers' preferences with those of CSOs and other stakeholder groups and the degree to which different actors have similar preferences. ...
... Eliasson and Garcia-Duran 2018) and that EU policymakers increasingly consider the views of CSOs in using trade policy to pursue NTPOs. The literature on 'normative power Europe' highlights the EU's pursuit of sustainable development goals in 'new generation' of trade agreements, with civic society supporting the foundations of a value-based discourse in trade policy (Van den Putte and Orbie 2015; Poletti and Sicurelli 2018;Young and Peterson 2014). We complement this scholarship by providing new evidence on preference alignment between organized interests and policymakers on the one hand, and between various stakeholders on the other. ...
EU trade policy increasingly focuses on the achievement of so‐called non‐trade policy objectives (NTPOs) such as the promotion of human rights or environmental protection, motivating research on the political economy determinants and effectiveness of linking of trade policy and NTPOs. This research note reports selected findings from a new expert survey of stakeholder perceptions on trade‐NTPO linkage. These suggest that EU institutions’ views align more with those of civil society organizations than business, but also reveal significant differences in the perceived effectiveness of trade‐NTPO linkage strategies. Many stakeholder groups believe that policy instruments other than trade agreements are better tools to pursue NTPOs. These findings suggest that further research on EU trade policy and nontrade issues should consider the broader range of external policy tools available to the EU in pursuit of NTPOs and the determinants of differences in preferences for alternative policy instruments.
... A rich literature on EU trade policy has emerged over the past two decades (see e.g. Conceição-Heldt 2011;Dür 2017;Dür and Zimmerman 2007;Eckhardt 2015;Meunier 2005;Poletti and Sicurelli 2018;Siles-Brügge 2014;Young and Peterson 2006;2014). Much of this work starts from the assumption that policymakers act as transmission belts for the demands of organized domestic societal groups (Dür 2008). ...
... Regarding non-trade interests, the GVC perspective expects a decrease in the EU's propensity to include NTIs with trading partners with which it is highly integrated in GVCs (Poletti and Sicurelli 2018). Unless they are linked to greater productivity, higher labour standards in a third country can make plants in that country less competitive, because they increase labour costs. ...
Two recent developments have the potential to fundamentally alter the conventional view of EU trade policy-making: the emergence of global value chains (GVCs) and the recent backlash against globalization. In this paper we summarize the conventional wisdom after which we delineate the main expectations derived from the GVC and the globalization-backlash perspectives. In so doing, we focus on the EU's trade and non-trade preferences, and the EU's ability to achieve its preferences in international trade negotiations. We then discuss the research agenda that would allow testing the expectations derived from these different perspectives. A key point that emerges from this discussion is that the conventional perspective, the GVC perspective, and the globalization-backlash perspective may all be needed to fully understand EU trade policy. The challenge is to know under which conditions which of these perspectives best explains the process and outcomes of EU trade policy-making.
... Indeed, sustainable development provisions have become an essential component of the EU's new generation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which foresee a specific Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapter. FTAs with developing countries differ mainly in terms of bindingness, enforceability, and transparency (Adriansen and Gonzàlez-Garibay, 2013; Poletti and Sicurelli, 2018;Harrison et al., 2019). ...
Trade agreements between the European Union (EU) and developing countries are often used to promote sustainable development within economic cooperation. The EUTunisia trade relations have a long history, starting with the Association Agreement in place and the ongoing negotiations for the new Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement, for further liberalizing the agricultural sector. This study investigates the effects on sustainability of these bilateral relations, with a focus on Tunisian olive oil value chain, considering both the current Free Trade Agreement (FTA) impacts and the future DCFTA agreement expected effects. A two-steps qualitative process consisting of a desk analysis and stakeholders’ consultations has been undertaken to report socioeconomic and environmental effects, suggesting policy interventions to be considered within the negotiations framework. Main actions needed encompass an inclusive renovation of Tunisian olive oil sector, a rethinking of exports’ tariff quota system to the EU, with special attention to organic olive oil, and waterefficient cultivation systems interventions.
... Together with other advanced economies, the EU has been a proponent of new issues, such as an emphasis on transparency (Lej arraga 2013, 23). The EU is often addressed as a norm promoter in international trade policies (Garcia and Masselot 2015;Poletti and Sicurelli 2018;Sampson and Theuns 2023;Sicurelli 2015;Zurek 2019) aiming to advance its interests by using trade policy tools such as FTAs in geopolitical settings. ...
... In this scholarly debate, one sees a dominance of positivist research and problematic historical, epistemic and culturalist avatars of Eurocentrism. The extensive literature on TSD chapters generally starts by pointing out the special character of the EU as a normative power in international trade (Poletti & Sicurelli 2018;Nessel & Orbie 2022). From this starting point, the works quickly move to a discussion on the effectiveness of these clauses in third countries (Hradilova & Svoboda 2018;Roozendaal 2019), with a traditionally mandatory opposition of EU-US approaches (Van den Putte 2015; Portella 2021). ...
That the European Union’s common commercial relations with ex-colonies and more broadly the ‘tiers monde’ now rest variously on benevolence, depoliticised practices, equal partnerships and values fuels reigning foundational myths about the EU in global politics. Efforts to disrupt these received presuppositions have come from interpretivist, postcolonial, post-development, post-structuralist and other heterodox research traditions. Yet the academy has been largely impervious to knowledges that genuinely question and subvert, in both theory and praxis, Eurocentric ways of seeing the world and understanding the EU as a ‘benevolent’ trade actor on the world stage. In dialogue with existing heterodox approaches, this article asks how we might puncture the coloniality of dominant knowledge regimes about EU trade relations vis-à-vis the global souths, i.e., peoples and places that the EU deems peripheral and, as such, in need of trade-related interventions in the name of development. To this end, we propose different ‘subject-positions’ with which to unthink and rethink our ways of knowing EU trade policy and the Eurocentrism lurking behind it by turning to decolonial thought. We borrow heavily from the work of Meera Sabaratnam whose ‘decolonising strategies’ in studying world politics we attempt to exemplify through a critical interrogation of the canonical scholarship around three distinct ‘policy worlds’ of EU external trade relations: Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters in free trade agreements. Finally, we think reflexively about the decolonial option and the ruptures it triggers as to what EU trade policy is and the colonial logics sustaining ‘normative’ and ‘geopolitical’ narratives on/by the EU as a trade power.
... The EU trade policy also aims to export EU norms, standards and values (Bilal and Hoekman eds, 2019;Poletti and Sicurelli, 2018). This is an indirect way to promote European economic interests, providing European businesses with a comparative advantage, having already to comply to these rules and norms in the EU internal market. ...
The European Union (EU) is in the process of establishing a European economic
diplomacy, in the context of a more geostrategic EU. One of the aims of the EU is to
combine the promotion of its economic interests with the defence of its values, while
building on and seeking synergies with the interests of its partner countries.
This paper assesses how the EU is formulating its economic diplomacy, and to which
extent it builds on its economic, trade and development policies. Particular attention is being
paid to some of the policies and initiatives at the EU level that de facto constitute part of
a European economic diplomacy. It then reviews how the European economic diplomacy
has been formally spelt out, and to which extent there is a transparent, well-structured
European economic diplomacy, or simply an overall umbrella for various EU initiatives
that can help promote European economic interests. The paper then suggests ways the
European economic diplomacy could be strengthened and perhaps more focused on
key areas.
http://respect.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2021/09/Bilal-2021-04_Europe-Economic-Diplomacy-in-the-making_clean67.pdf
... Neo-realists exposed its utopian and overly immaterial aspect in light of the reality on the ground (Whitman, 2011). Pragmatists argue that the EU's trade policy usually reflects a selective imposition of Normative Power vis-à-vis developing countries, shaped and influenced by pressures of organized groups and their economic interests (Poletti and Sicurelli, 2018). Some describe the "Normative Power Europe" as an empire, emphasizing the unequal power relations which the EU maintains with its neighbours. ...
The Psagot judgment, handed down by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in 2019, provides that products originating in Israeli settlements in territories Israel occupied during regional wars, exported to the EU, should be labelled as such, to allow consumers make an informed political choice. This article argues that the Psagot judgment thus reinforces normative, 'top-down' governmental power with soft, 'bottom-up' consumer power. Psagot's implications for Israel-EU relations is discussed along with the effectiveness of the EU approach in the short and longer terms.
... Whereas the development-oriented dimension of the EPAs is recognised (A. Poletti, D. Sicurelli, 2018), the EPAs have been criticised for their weak economic impact (Langan, 2018). ...
The global governance of trade and development is dynamic and complex, conducted at many levels by a diverse range of institutions. In recent years, the trade and development regimes have only grown more complicated, as the global economy changes and power becomes more diffused – between and among states and also between and among states and non-state actors. GLOBE aims to gain a more thorough understanding of the major developments in the trade and development regimes through mapping the key institutions engaged in the governance of these two issue areas. Because the European Union (EU) is a major player in both the trade and development regimes, this mapping paper will provide insight into where the EU fits within these complex regimes.
This mapping paper aims to achieve two primary objectives. First, it describes the major developments in trade and development governance from a multi-level (global, regional, national) and multi-actor (public, private, public-private) perspective. Second, it identifies the major challenges that a diverse set of global governance institutions face in the trade and governance regimes.
... In line with previous studies (see Poletti and Sicurelli (2018) and Meissner and Mckenzie (2018), among others), our analysis suggests that EU trade policies are driven by two often conflicting goals: ...
The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market on compliance with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. In this paper, we first systematically document the coverage of NTPOs across the main tools of EU trade policy: its (association and non-association) trade agreements and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. We then discuss the extent to which the EU can use these tools as a ‘carrot-and-stick’ mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners. We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU has limited scope to extend or restrict tariff preferences to ‘reward good behavior’ or ‘punish bad behavior’ on NTPOs, partly because multilateral rules require members to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, and can thus more easily be extended or limited, depending on compliance with NTPOs. Our analysis also suggests that the commercial interests of the EU inhibit the full pursuit of NTPOs in its trade agreements and GSP programs.
... Trade policy therefore represents a strategic field for the EU to shape its image as a healthy economy and an ethical trade power. As Poletti and Sicurelli (2018) put it, the EU is an actor committed to using trade agreements in order to promote norms such as economic liberalism, sustainable development, and human rights on a global level (Poletti and Sicurelli 2018: 2). ...
This book assembles some of the most exciting contributions to the field of comparative capitalism studies. The book is a must-read for all scholars that strive to be up-to date in the debate on the developmental state.
--Andreas Nolke is Professor of Political Science at the Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany
This volume extends the earlier “developmental state” literature into the present, and the earlier world-system concept of the semi-periphery into present-day debates about institutions, path dependency, middle-income trap, and authoritarianism. Written from the perspective of the Global East and South, it reads like a breath of fresh air for those of us schooled in the Western narrative of development and modernization.
--Robert H. Wade is Professor of Political Economy and Development at the LSE, UK
The focus of this volume is on the role of the developmental state in a situation in which a series of major crises affects the (semi-) periphery of the global economy. The authors go beyond the established debate on developmental states in East Asia by highlighting a much broader understanding of development and a very different global economic context. They also further the existing debate by covering new country cases. At the same time, they deepen our perspective on developmental states by looking at unusual sectors such as green industrial policy, education and farming.
Gerőcs, Tamás is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of World Economics and SUNY Binghamton, United States.
Ricz, Judit is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of World Economics and Associate Professor at the Department of World Economy, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary.
... Trade policy therefore represents a strategic field for the EU to shape its image as a healthy economy and an ethical trade power. As Poletti and Sicurelli (2018) put it, the EU is an actor committed to using trade agreements in order to promote norms such as economic liberalism, sustainable development, and human rights on a global level (Poletti and Sicurelli 2018: 2). ...
This chapter looks at the origins of the classic developmental states and differentiates between the agency and urgency views explaining the emergence of developmentalist institutions and policies in the twentieth century. By recalling the experiences of the Northeast Asian model-cases it puts special emphasis on the political-economic explanation of Doner et al. (International Organization 59(2): 327–361, 2005), the so-called systemic vulnerability concept, and aims to apply its logic and reinterpret its mechanisms under the new circumstances of the twenty-first century. First it reveals the changes in the external conditions of aspirational developmental states in the first two decades after the Millennium, and highlights the dynamics of contextual changes both in economic and political terms. Then it turns towards the domestic arena and aims to provide a political economy interpretation of the challenges of building developmentalist institutions and strategies in the twenty-first century. The aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the scarcity of catching up success stories and re-open the debate on the origins of developmental states.
... Beyond the attempts to translate the EU's market power and external trade policy into a force for good (Brown, 2000, Hurt, 2003, Storey, 2006, Slocum-Bradley and Bradley, 2010, existing scholarship also embraces a political economy explanation that privileges the strength of domestic political forces. Studies show that domestic producers successfully organize to export the EU's regulatory frameworks by writing them into trade agreements (Poletti and Sicurelli, 2018, Kelemen, 2010, Falkner, 2007. As it stands, provision of market access or development aid under the EPAs are contingent upon fulfilling commitments enumerated in the Cotonou Agreement (Lerch, 2015). ...
This paper provides an empirical analysis of how the good governance initiatives underlying the European Union's sustainable development agenda have affected ratification of the EU-ACP (European Union-African, Caribbean and Pacific) Economic Partnership Agreements in partner countries. In particular, we focus on corruption as a key factor associated with the ratification of EPAs by ACP countries. The theoretical framework advances the argument that the likelihood of ratification is influenced by the adjustment costs a signatory faces in implementing the provisions of a given agreement. Under an environment of high corruption, ACP elites benefit from high tariff levels and weak sustainability standards. EU-ACP EPAs, which entail the lowering of tariffs and improving sustainability standards, would directly clash with the interests of ACP elites and result in hefty adjustment costs. Our analysis shows that this mismatch would mean that in ACP countries where prevailing levels of corruption are high, there would be a decreased likelihood of EPA ratification. While raising questions about the efficacy of tying the EU's trade agreements to a normative agenda, this paper suggests that even for EPA partners with only moderate success in fighting corruption, EPAs may well function as the credible commitment mechanism for such governments to expand trade and attract investment.
... The current literature on trade policies and sustainable development considers the ways that environmental issues can be governed in international settings. In a recent article, Poletti and Sicurelli (2018) discuss how the EU advocates FTAs as a means to promote norms such as sustainable development. They debate the European Union's self-representation as an ethical and normative power, as well as the normative aspirations that are manifest in the EU's negotiations with developing countries since 2010. ...
Palm oil, one of the most contested commodities, has caused a trade dispute between the EU and Indonesia due to its heavy impact on deforestation, biodiversity loss, and social problems while providing a livelihood for millions of people. Discussing EU-Indonesia bargaining on palm oil policy, this paper investigates the positions of the EU and Indonesia in the public discourse and aims to unpack the ‘good and bad’ narratives of palm oil. To do this, we explore international online news and examine the perceptions, sentiments, and emotions reflected in the discourse. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are employed to (1) examine a narrative account of the recent evolution of formal opinions between the EU and Indonesia and (2) perform clustering, sentiment, and emotion analyses on the perceived positive and negative facets, and positions of palm oil-related stakeholders in news articles published in Indonesian and English language. The paper makes three main contributions. First, the findings indicate that the EU, despite its marginal role in Indonesia’s large palm oil industry, has stronger bargaining power as exemplified in its deforestation regulation. Second, the debate in Indonesia is wrapped in perceptions of global trade and hints at new market opportunities in China and India, since the EU position is seen as a challenge to national autonomy. Third, the narrative has spurred not only uniform but polarized sentiments amongst the Indonesian public, particularly on trade discrimination and the ensuing problems to smallholders. Indonesia, being the more vulnerable ‘norm taker’ in the bargaining with the EU, may increase exports to markets without sustainability standards, which would have adverse effects on global sustainability.
Voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) can promote environmental and socioeconomic benefits, yet critics contend that they can also create trade barriers. While prior research reports have been mixed with regard to positive effects on Global South exports, our study examines whether domestic political dynamics and public–private interactions significantly explain these outcomes. We investigate Bonsucro certification for Brazilian sugar and ethanol exports to the EU. Bonsucro verifies that exports meet EU biofuels regulations and additional EU criteria. Should influential European interests drive these criteria to be overly stringent, Brazilian exports could suffer. Through qualitative analysis, we show that import-competing interests do not solely account for EU meta-regulation of VSS. Our staggered difference-in-differences analysis reveals that Bonsucro certification correlates with increased EU exports, although its benefits are concentrated mainly among the largest exporters, contributing to market concentration. These findings have broad implications for debates on hybrid governance and the legitimacy of VSS as environmental policy instruments.
This Chapter examines internal environmental measures as tools for the European Union’s (EU) external action. It notes that the EU, spurred by the environmental integration principle, has become increasingly coercive in externalizing internal environmental measures. Crucially, the external dimension of internal measures makes it relevant to appreciate the role of legislative institutions in constructing the EU as an external actor. The Chapter evaluates this role by assessing the legislative contribution to factors which enhance the potential of internal measures to set green global standards: timing and innovation, stringency and international law compatibility. The Chapter concludes that the Commission generally contributes most to the EU’s externalization of the environmental integration principle on questions of timing and international law compatibility. The Parliament spearheads EU leadership by pushing its environmental ambition. The Council contributes least to establishing EU internal measures as green global standards. Overall, the legislative institutions are increasingly aware of and strategic on the external dimension of EU internal measures. Notwithstanding, the EU’s effectiveness in this external dimension is not seldomly—and understandably—trumped by internal or non-environmental considerations. Consequently, the place of internal measures in EU external sustainability law will raise ever more legal questions in the years to come.
Given the rhetoric of the EU on the necessity of economic integration for the MENA region, this article sheds light on the ‘puzzling’ fragmentation in its regional integration strategy through the cases of the GAFTA and Agadir Agreements. It problematises mainstream analyses and employs a dialectical approach based on the philosophy of internal relations, aiming to surpass existing critical literature that has only partially illuminated facets of the EU’s strategy. The article situates the EU strategy within the dynamics of neoliberal capitalism (and its interconnected tensions) and considers its spatial and temporal scales. It argues that the complex interplay of developments at the EU scale, global competition scale and MENA scale across three distinct time frames (1995–2003, 2004–11, 2012–21) has shaped the EU’s fragmented strategy. On the EU scale, while Brussels presents itself as a leading proponent of neoliberal ideology for global market openness, it strategically elevates the Agadir Agreement at the expense of the GAFTA to meet its economic needs. The global competitive dynamics, however, have constrained this preference, as the EU has been contested by the US in the Agadir Agreement area and China and, to a lesser extent, Russia in other GAFTA member states. Lastly, the agency of MENA states has been noticeable, since the EU encounters difficulties in influencing GAFTA’s regulatory framework and dealing with the diverse interests of state elites in the region. We conclude that the dialectical method of the article holds promise for analysing the regional integration strategies of other global powers.
This article considers the place of trade and gender in EU-Canada relations, with a particular focus on CETA and its functioning in a broader sense. More specifically, the authors seek to understand the process of defining the trade and gender agenda under the CETA framework and the practical ways the EU and Canada have sought to respond to them. The authors examine the challenges and opportunities related to women’s participation in the EU-Canada trade flows, what the instruments developed to support them were, what tools were at their disposal, whether CETA had had a real impact on their business activities, as well as the dynamics of the policy exchange and learning. The authors find that CETA delivers solid structures to design and implement concrete actions, leading to more policy coordination between the EU and Canada on trade and gender issues. However, there are still several gaps that need to be addressed, with the lack of disaggregated data being the most important. Le genre dans l’Accord économique et commercial global entre le Canada et l’Union européenne : un accord commercial de troisième génération qui débuterait une coordination des politiques ? Cet article s’intéresse à la place qu’occupent le commerce et le genre dans les relations entre le Canada et l’Union européenne (UE), et plus particulièrement à la place de l’Accord économique et commercial global (AECG) et de son implémentation au sens large. Plus spécifiquement, nous cherchons à comprendre les processus de définition du commerce et du genre dans le cadre de l’AECG et les façons concrètes dont l’UE et le Canada y répondent. Nous nous interrogeons sur les défis et les opportunités de la participation des femmes aux flux commerciaux entre l’UE et le Canada, sur les outils créés pour les soutenir, sur les outils tels qu’ils ont été mis à leur disposition, sur l’impact réel de l’AECG sur leurs activités commerciales, ainsi que sur les dynamiques d’échange de politiques et d’apprentissage.
The mushrooming of trade agreements and their interlinkages with environmental governance calls for new research on the trade and environment interface. The more than 700 existing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) include ever more diverse and far-reaching environmental provisions. While missed opportunities remain and harmful provisions persist, numerous environmental provisions in PTAs entail promising potential. They promote the implementation of environmental treaties and cover numerous environmental issues. New concepts, data, and methods, including detailed content analysis across multiple institutions, are needed to explain these interlinkages and understand whether and how PTAs with environmental provisions can contribute to tackling global environmental challenges. Making use of the most extensive coding of environmental provisions in PTAs to date and combining quantitative data with qualitative analyses, this Element provides a comprehensive yet fine-grained picture of the drivers and effects of environmental provisions in PTAs. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Bringing together leading experts in trade law and policy, this volume investigates the coherence between the European Union's trade policy and its non-trade objectives. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, it highlights previously unaddressed dimensions of EU policy objectives and outcomes. With a range of illustrative case studies, the contributions offer in-depth analysis while making key issues and policy conclusions accessible to readers without specialist training. Pushing the frontiers of research on trade, investment, and non-trade issues, the volume advances debates concerning the reform of the international trade regime and the EU's adoption of a new trade policy. Bolstered by a diverse range of contributors and perspectives, this expansive collection recognises the achievements of the current EU trade policy, assesses its limits, and puts forth actionable recommendations for how it may be improved.
This paper draws on feminist geographies of space, proposing a feminist critical spatial practice approach to study social movement organizing. Inspired by the work of Jane Rendell, a feminist theorist and architectural historian, we propose embodiment, materiality, affectivity, and alterity as co‐constitutive of feminist organizing. Specifically, we prioritize the intertwining of space and body in resisting extractivism to analyze visual artifacts produced by artists/activists who have joined the anti‐extractivist struggle against mining in Northern Greece, Chalkidiki area. In particular, we focus on how bodies transgress and reconstitute space by affecting its materiality during artistic performances. We argue that the protesting (moving and ensounded) body enacts affective solidarities and invites collective action against exploitative neoliberal regimes. Finally, the article brings together body‐land territory and territorial‐community feminism literature to enrich our understanding of spatial practices of resistance against neoliberal extractivist regimes while highlighting the role of emotions and affect as a means of mobilizing for action and maintaining momentum.
The European Union (EU) has recently emerged as a promoter of human rights in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through social and material trade sanctions. Yet, it used different trade measures in reacting to human rights violations, according to a partner. This paper investigates the reasons for such a selective approach. It finds evidence in support of the thesis that while ideational factors seem to have a low predicting potential, trade and security interests are strongly correlated with the level of interference adopted by the EU on the domestic affairs of the single ASEAN partners. More specifically, security alignment seems to supersede any commercial considerations when it comes to the adoption of punishing trade measures on ASEAN members. The paper leads to the conclusion that ASEAN countries have become increasingly relevant catalysts of EU foreign policy interests and that security strategies have strongly conditioned the role of the EU as a human rights promoter through trade in the region.
Traditionally, the EU has presented itself as a normative trade actor, as opposed to other geopolitical trading powers. However, today, it is increasingly recognized that the EU is undergoing a geopolitical turn which also manifests itself in its trade policy. Yet, confusion remains regarding what a ‘geopolitical EU trade policy’ entails and how the EU sells this new perspective in its trade policy. This article contributes to the ongoing debate on this topic by investigating how the European Commission discursively justifies its geopolitical turn in trade. Methodologically, we analyze EU trade discourse with particular attention for othering strategies. Empirically, we study a most-likely case of ‘geopoliticization of trade’, namely the Commission’s initiative to launch an Anti-Coercion Instrument, by analyzing the most important EU documents covering the ACI so far and EU statements on the ACI in relevant media. We find that the Commission distinguishes a ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ variant of geopoliticization of trade, whereby the former is conceived as ‘good’ and pursued by the EU, while the latter is seen as ‘bad’ and employed by non-EU trading powers. This diverges from previous EU trade discourses since the 2000s, which portrayed the EU as transcending geopolitics – a normative power pursuing free trade and multilateralism – and other powers as essentially geopolitical – self-interested, protectionist, and regionalist. The EU’s new othering strategy legitimizes the EU’s geopolitical turn in trade, by simultaneously turning away from its previous, ‘naively’ normative trade discourse, while also contrasting the EU’s trade policy to the ‘offensive’ geopolitical trade from ‘bad’ trade actors.
The Indo-Pacific region and its politics are now in obscurity, and the power dynamics of US-China competition have become well settled within a new concept of geopolitics. As an economic giant and a distinct power in IR, the EU’s position and strategy in the region are garnering attention. This paper starts by discussing the EU’s perceived systemic rivalry with China and its falling out with the United States, its Atlantic ally since the two World Wars. It then introduces the concept of Europe as a normative power in order to better understand the EU’s policies. It points out how “Normative Power Europe” (NPE) has adapted to its surroundings by introducing the concept of principled pragmatism concept in 2016. The paper then lays out the EU’s security strategies in Asia and highlights its narrative of strategic autonomy, referred to as the Sinatra doctrine. From there, it employs the notion of NPE and principled pragmatism to delineate the EU’s unique stance in the Indo-Pacific region and how it puts this principled pragmatism into practice. Finally, it analyzes how the EU has strategically applied these concepts to succeed in its own way amidst US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific.
European institutions have repeatedly represented the EU as an actor that can use the attractiveness of its market to promote human rights internationally. From this perspective, EU trade sanctions represent a hard power tool to push the government of states accused of major human rights violations to abide by international law. In its reaction to the Rohingya crisis in 2018, despite the European Parliament's call for the lifting of Myanmar's trade preferences, the Council of the EU stated that it would rather tackle the problem by taking a "constructive approach" based on dialogue. We provide a political-economy explanation of this choice, making a plausible case that the political pressures from European importers and exporters, not to jeopardise trade relations with Myanmar, prevailed over the demands of European protectionist groups and NGOs advocating a tougher position. The firms interested in maintaining preferential trade relations with Myanmar were primarily motivated by a desire to avoid a disruption of trade and investment links within global value chains (GVCs) so that they could continue competing with Chinese enterprises.
Trade policy is one of the most integrated policy fields of the European Union’s (EU) external economic relations. By creating a customs union, the EU member states have largely delegated their trade and investment policy competence to the European level. Consequently, the EU can speak with a single voice in international trade fora. Nevertheless, the formulation and conduct of EU trade policy has always remained a controversial issue and underwent a substantial (re-)politization over recent times. How did EU trade policy develop over the last decades? What implications does the institutional design of trade policy have for the EU as an actor in international economic relations? How does the EU conduct its unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral relations with its trading partners? What conclusions can be drawn from these issues for the evaluation of the EU as a trade policy actor? To answer these questions, the chapter traces the institutional development of EU trade policy from the 1950s until today and explores the role of different actors and processes in the formulation of EU trade policy. Subsequently, the chapter examines EU trade policy within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as the EU’s trade relations with different countries and regions. Finally, the chapter evaluates the EU as an international trade and investment actor by making use of different theoretical approaches.
Avrupa Birliği (AB) dış eylemlerinde barış, özgürlük, demokrasi, hukukun üstünlüğü ve insan haklarına saygı ilkelerini, küresel ticaret politikası ile iç içe geçmiş normatif bir yaklaşımı benimsemektedir. Bu anlamda Birlik, üçüncü ülkelerle yürüttüğü ticari iş birliklerini normatif değerlere uyumlu hale getiren kapsamlı bir strateji izlemektedir. Birliğin normatif gücünün uluslararası alanda yayılması konusunda kullandığı en önemli politika alanlarından biri ticarettir. Yıllar içinde dönüşüm geçiren ticaret stratejisi normatif yaklaşıma paralel bir şekilde, AB kuralları, normları ve ilkeleri ile bütünlük kazanmıştır. Ticaret anlaşmaları, sürdürülebilir kalkınma programları ve bu kapsamda yürütülen finansman mekanizmaları, Birliğin normatif gücünün değerlendirilmesi için önemli örnekler sunmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda çalışmada, Birliğin dış eylemleri arasında sınıflandırılan dış ticaret politikasına normatif bir yaklaşımı nasıl entegre ettiği analiz edilmekte ve söz konusu kapsamda geliştirdiği ticaret anlaşması ve sürdürülebilir kalkınma yaklaşımı değerlendirilmektedir. AB’nin, ticaret politikası bağlamında ortaya koyduğu normatif değerlerle bütünleşen pratikler uygulayıp/uygulamadığı değerlendirmenin merkezi sorusunu teşkil etmektedir. Buna göre çalışma, normatif değerleri ile öne çıkan AB’nin ticaret politikası söz konusu olduğunda maddi çıkarlarını önceliklendirebildiği ve değerlerin teşvikini ise göreli olarak arka planda tutabildiği tezini ileri sürmektedir.
Since the 1980s, many developing countries started economic restructuring and an opening up towards global markets, following partly the receipt of the ruling neoliberal economic theory. The results of these processes were mostly ambiguous, however, especially regarding the social consequences. The North African countries, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt were no exceptions. Being strongly connected to the EU economy, these countries have signed free trade agreements to create better access to the European Single Market, but they were opening up their economies to a growing competition as well. Maybe it is not a surprise that the Arab Spring, with a growing social unrest in its background, was started in Tunisia, and was followed with similar events in other North African countries. This chapter examines trade opening in North Africa and presents the impacts of these agreements on North African economies and societies. It puts the trade opening in its domestic political economic environment, why governing elites and insiders were interested in the liberalisation process, and how they were able to transform trade policy reforms in their own interest.
Can EU comprehensive trade agreements effectively promote international labour standards, despite their soft enforcement rules? And if so, under what conditions? This paper addresses these questions by focusing on a hard case study, namely Vietnam’s ratification in 2019 of the ILO Convention 98 on the right to organize and collective bargaining. Such a ratification is an epochal change for a mono-party regime lacking recognition of independent trade unions. This paper shows that the EU has emerged as a key partner of ILO in promoting international law in Vietnam and explains such a result from a political economy perspective. This case study provides insights into the extent to which a trade partner is dependent upon international trade increases the leverage of the EU, and especially the European Parliament, and ultimately affects the ability of the EU to emerge as a normative power through trade.
The European Union (EU) and India are global powers in search of a strategy. The EU is a realist strategic actor, which emphasises economic and political power. It is also a normative power predicated on democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The EU Global Strategy (2016) is an extension of those norms and policies, but also emphasises the internal resilience of extra-European states in international relations and principled pragmatism in EU foreign and security policy. In effect, the EU Global Strategy is a relaunch of EU Foreign Policy. This contribution seeks to focus on what this tells us about the changing nature of the EU-India Strategic Partnership from an EU/European perspective and to what extent the EU Global Strategy can reinvigorate EU-Indian cooperation.
Sustainable development provisions have become an integral part of the European Union's (EU's) ‘new generation’ trade agreements. Yet, a growing number of empirical works show that their design varies significantly, even in the trade agreements signed with countries at similar (low) levels of development. We contend that this variation can be accounted for by discussing how the growing integration of the EU economy with specific developing countries across global value chains (GVCs) affects the domestic politics of regulatory export in the EU. European firms that operate within GVCs rely on imports of inputs produced in low-labor cost countries. These firms tend to oppose the export of those regulatory burdens that generate an increase in their imports' variable costs. The political mobilization of these actors weakens domestic coalitions supporting regulatory export strategies, which explains why the EU adopts a more lenient approach over the inclusion of sustainable development provisions in Preferential Trade Agreement negotiations with some developing countries.
In line with the Lisbon Treaty, the safeguarding and promotion of EU fundamental values has acquired the legal status of a guiding principle and a general objective of the whole spectrum of its external policies, including EU trade policy. In this vein, and with a view to strengthening the linkages between sustainable development, trade, and peace, justice and the rule of law (RoL) in the Agenda 2030, the article examines the RoL as a non-trade policy objective (NTPO) that has been incorporated into the vast majority of EU preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with third countries. In particular, it focuses on the EU’s five “new generation” PTAs with developing countries, located on different continents, emphasizing the PTAs’enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms. We find that, although the PTAs contain far-reaching RoL clauses, the EU lacks a comprehensive strategy of promoting the RoL under its trade policy.
Over the last decade, European Union trade agreement negotiations in the form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CETA) with Canada have been strongly contested. By contrast, many other EU trade negotiations have sailed on with far less politicization, or barely any at all. In this contribution, we assess a series of plausible explanation for these very varying degrees of politicization across EU trade agreement negotiations – conceived of as the combination of polarization of opinions, salience given to them in public debate, and the expansion of the number of societal actors involved therein. Through a review of existing explanations, we show how each of these explanations faces a set of challenges. In the third section, we argue it is useful to conceive of these existing explanations as structural background conditions enabling agency on the part of interest group and civil society organizations. We therefore close by sketching how literature on the relationship between interest group mobilization and public opinion could inform further comparative research on trade policy negotiations and on politicization of EU policy making in general.
Italy has developed a long-dated partnership with Mozambique, where it has emerged as an actor committed to norm promotion in the fields of conflict management, debt relief, and sustainable energy cooperation. This paper challenges the dominant interpretation of such a cooperative relationship that emphasizes ideational motivations and focuses, instead, on the role of Italian investors in the sectors of infrastructure and energy and of the Italian economic diplomacy. A favorable institutional and political climate in Italy has channeled investors' demands in the policy process since the independence of Mozambique. The late institutionalization of Italian development policy, the long gestation of the reform of development policy, and the lack of clear-cut borders between the competences of foreign and development cooperation institutions have empowered business groups that shape the investment strategy of the Italian foreign ministry as actors in development policy-making. Finally, convergence of interests between Italian investors and the NGO Sant'Egidio, which ultimately led to a partnership between these actors, has increased the legitimacy of Italian foreign and development policy toward Mozambique, contributing to consolidating Italy as a norm promoter in the country.
This article looks at the linkages between export to the European Union (EU), export to china and human rights policies. The article argues that countries that export to the EU at high rates are more likely to converge towards its policies than countries that don’t export to the EU. The article also argues that the rise of China as a significant economic actor does not undermine this process. The article tests these arguments by analysing the links between human rights protection in the EU and in China, and export to the EU and to China, on the one hand, and human rights protection in all the countries for which there are data, on the other. The results indicate that countries’ human rights policies are positively associated with the EU’s human rights policies and this association is conditioned by countries’ levels of export to the EU. The results further indicate that export to China does not undermine this pattern. The article draws conceptual and policy implications.
The European Commission has emphatically declared that the EU is committed to harnessing globalization by promoting a normative approach to trade. Based on the case study of the ongoing negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Indonesia, this paper scrutinizes the external conditions for the effectiveness of the European Union (EU) as a norm promoter. Despite the preference of the government to conclude the deal, so far, Indonesia has avoided taking a position on EU-sponsored norms concerning an investment court system and biofuel sustainability standards. This paper explains such a cautious attitude from an international political economy perspective. The proliferation of trade agreements concluded by the EU in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has mobilized the umbrella organization representing Indonesian exporter firms, which has a preferential status as interlocutor of the trade ministry, in support for the European proposals. At the same time, the low degree of trade dependency of the country has empowered Indonesian firms that enjoy the benefits of the large domestic market and, therefore, are in favor of the status quo. Indonesian civil society organizations are also divided on the opportunities and risks associated to the European normative approach to trade. This case study shows how the attempt of the EU to emerge as a normative power through trade has to face the complex political economy incentives and constraints shaping the trade policy of its negotiating partners.
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