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Pınar Akpınar is Scholar and Project Manager at the Conflict Resolution and Mediation Stream of Istanbul Policy Center.
FROM BENIGN DONOR TO SELF-ASSURED
SECURITY PROVIDER:
TURKEY’S POLICY IN SOMALIA
Pınar Akpınar
December 2017
DECEMBER 2017
CONTACT INFORMATION
Istanbul Policy Center
Bankalar Caddesi Minerva Han No: 2 Kat: 4
34420 Karaköy–İstanbul
T. +90 212 292 49 39
ipc@sabanciuniv.edu, ipc.sabanciuniv.edu
FROM BENIGN DONOR TO SELF-ASSURED SECURITY PROVIDER: TURKEY’S POLICY IN SOMALIA
Pınar Akpınar
From Benign Donor to Self-assured Security Provider: Turkey’s Policy in Somalia
10 p.; 30 cm.
ISBN: 978-605-2095-10-2
Cover Design and Pagelayout: MYRA
1. Edition: 2017
Printed by: İmak Ofset Basım Yayın San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti.
Atatürk Cad. Göl Sok. No : 1 Yenibosna Bahçelievler/İSTANBUL
Tel: 0212 656 49 97
ISBN: 978-605-2095-10-2
Istanbul Policy Center
Bankalar Caddesi Minerva Han No: 2 Kat: 4
34420 Karaköy-Istanbul
T. +90 212 292 49 39
ipc@sabanciuniv.edu
ipc.sabanciuniv.edu
|3
DECEMBER 2017 | IPC POLICY BRIEF
Introduction
The opening of a Turkish military training base in
Mogadishu by Somali Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kh-
yare and the Turkish Chief of Staff General Hulusi
Akar on September 30, 2017 sparked discussions as
to whether Turkey is now set to play a more ambi-
tious role in Somalia. Being its largest forward base
in the world, with a cost of 50 million USD and the
initial goal of training more than 10,000 soldiers, the
base is a solid indication of Turkey’s enduring sup-
port for its lead partner in the Horn of Africa.1 It is
also a step forward from the benign donor role that
Turkey has been capitalizing on in Somalia into a
self-assured security provider role.
This policy brief aims to investigate the reasons for
and implications of Turkey’s military base in Soma-
lia. What are the implications of this base for Turkey,
Somalia, and the regional geopolitics in the Horn of
Africa? Could its new security involvement damage
the benign role Turkey has been carefully crafting in
the country? This policy brief aims to answer these
questions by first offering background on Turkey’s
engagement in Somalia, then focusing on the surg-
ing rivalry in the region, and finally by investigating
the possible implications of Turkey’s base.
Turkey’s Engagement With Somalia
Turkey’s full-fledged engagement with Somalia be-
gan in 2010 when it hosted the first Istanbul Confer-
ence on Somalia from May 21-23 within the framework
of the Djibouti Agreement to establish a roadmap
for peacebuilding and development in Somalia. Bi-
lateral agreements were signed between Turkey and
Somalia in fields of military, education, and techni-
cal and scientific cooperation.2 A year after the con-
ference, on May 9-13, 2011, the 4th UN Conference
on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), of which
Somalia is a member, was hosted in Istanbul during
which Turkey made pledges to help LDCs on many
fronts.3 The Horn of Africa, and particularly Soma-
lia, was hit by a deadly famine the same year, which
quickly drew Turkey’s attention to the country.
Subsequently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan paid a visit to the country during the fam-
ine as the first non-African leader to visit Somalia in
20 years. Despite poor security conditions, Erdoğan
visited Somalia along with his family, several mem-
bers of his cabinet, businessmen, NGO representa-
tives, and even renowned Turkish celebrities. The
visit was validation of Turkey’s solid commitment to
carry Somalia on to the international agenda through
a robust humanitarian and development campaign.4
Since then, Somalia has been one of the largest re-
cipients of Turkish aid, which has so far amounted
to over 700 million USD.5 It was even announced as
one of two poster children of Turkey’s humanitarian
diplomacy alongside Syria.6 In 2015, Somalia was the
second largest recipient of Turkish aid after Syria.7
Turkey has successfully crafted a benign image in
the country over the past seven years through the
utilization of its soft power assets. In line with its
policy of humanitarian diplomacy, it has mobilized
its official and civilian actors to contribute to the
reconstruction of Somalia through humanitarian
assistance, development aid, trade, and mediation.
Turkey also built a large hospital complex, the Moga-
dishu Airport, several vocational centers, an orphan-
age, and school complex, among other facilities.8 In
addition to hosting Turkey’s largest military base in
the world, Mogadishu also hosts Turkey’s largest em-
bassy complex. These efforts are in line with Turkey’s
broader Africa policy that was revisited in 2003 and
followed with the declaration of 2005 as the “Year
of Africa.” Subsequently, the number of Turkish mis-
sions in the continent has increased from 12 in 2009
to 39 in 2017.9
As such, the main pillars of Turkey’s official policy
towards Somalia such as promoting Somalia on in-
ternational platforms; providing intensive and com-
prehensive humanitarian aid; rebuilding the infra-
structure through development projects; helping to
restore security in the country by supporting So-
mali security forces and the African Union Mission
in Somalia; and supporting the process of political
consensus and state building in the country mirrors
its broader Africa policy.10 In this regard, although
the establishment of a military base in Somalia may
seem to be a shift in Turkey’s policy, it is actually a
reflection of its long-term goals, which depend sig-
nificantly on stability in the country. Moreover, it is
also a means to fill in the gap that will be created
from the withdrawal of 22,000 African Union forces
from Somalia at the end of 2018.11
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FROM BENIGN DONOR TO SELF-ASSURED SECURITY PROVIDER: TURKEY’S POLICY IN SOMALIA
Surging Rivalries in the Region
Turkey’s military endeavor in Somalia should also
be examined within the context of surging rivalries
in the Horn of Africa. Contrary to waning U.S. inter-
est and President Donald Trump’s recent pledge to
cut down on aid to Africa, other actors are taking
steps to enhance their presence in the region, of
which opening forward operating bases is an im-
portant part. These bases serve as instruments for
these actors both to ensure their own security by
containing the conflicts existing in these countries
and to increase their existing leverage. While in-
stability in Somalia does not pose a direct security
threat to Turkey, the fact that it has invested heavi-
ly in the country in the last six years makes opening
a military base a worthwhile act. Opening a military
base in Somalia should also be seen as part of Tur-
key’s wider policy of instituting a military strong-
hold from the Arabian Gulf to the Gulf of Aden as
has been signaled from the recent opening of its
military base in Qatar.12 The Yemen crisis has been
particularly influential in fuelling regional rivalries.
As a result regional powers are lining up to open
bases in the Horn or support existing machiner-
ies. For instance, while Saudi Arabia is preparing to
open a base in Djibouti, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) has a base in Eritrea, is funding Puntland’s
Maritime Police Force, and will soon open a base
in Somaliland.13 The Africa policies of these powers
bare similarities with Turkey, which relies on mili-
tary bases, aid, and ports as main instruments.14
In a similar vein, following suit with the United
States, Japan, and France, China has opened its
first overseas military base in Djibouti in August
which, according to Chinese officials, aims to oper-
ate solely as a logistics base to support its peace-
keeping and humanitarian missions in Yemen and
Somalia.15 There are, however, concerns that China
may be aspiring for more in the region.16 Djibouti
is particularly significant due to its proximity to
Yemen and strategic location at the Bab al-Man-
dab Straight, which is the chokepoint of the Red
Sea along the marine route that transfers Gulf oil
to Europe.17 The base was also opened on the 90th
birthday of the People’s Liberation Army as a dem-
onstration of the importance China gives to the
base. China’s military presence in Africa rang alarm
bells for its usual rival, India, which is not surprising
given the swift competition between the two Asian
powers in the continent. There has already been
speculation in India that the initiative could be part
of China’s “String of Pearls” policy, which allegedly
aims to contain the land and maritime routes in the
Indian Ocean region through military and commer-
cial facilities.18
In addition to China, Europe is also likely to in-
crease its engagement with Africa as part of the
recently launched “Marshall Plan with Africa” un-
der the leadership of Germany. Reminiscent of
the European Recovery Program financed by the
United States after World War II, the plan was first
presented by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in
July during her speech as the president of the 12th
G20 Summit. The proposed plan aims to contain
Africa’s problems within Africa through a compre-
hensive approach. In addition to promoting busi-
ness involvement, the plan also aims to enhance
EU contributions to Africa’s security architecture
through regional organizations such as the African
Union and other potential partners.19 Germany is
also planning to propose an EU-Africa Peace and
Security Partnership framework at the 5th EU-Af-
rica Summit to be held from November 28-29 in
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. German Foreign Minister
Sigmar Gabriel also visited Somalia in May, which
marked the first ever visit by a German foreign
minister to a country in the Horn of Africa.20
Possible implications of Turkey’s
military base
The establishment of a Turkish military base in So-
malia may have various implications for Turkey, for
Somalia, and for regional politics. On the optimis-
tic side, the base could serve to solidify Turkey’s
commitments in the country. Until the base, Turkey
had mainly utilized its soft power tools in Somalia
and enjoyed the role of a benign donor. The base,
however, would carry Turkey a step forward by po-
sitioning it as a security provider and thus an influ-
ential player in the country. Moreover, the Turkish
military also has a clear history unlike, for instance,
the African Union mission, which lacks a very posi-
tive image in Somalia.21
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DECEMBER 2017 | IPC POLICY BRIEF
Somali Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire’s statement
during the opening ceremony of the base claimed
that Turkey is contributing to the reconstruction of
Somalia’s organized “national” force and therefore
helping it overcome clan-based division, which is
often seen as one of the main drivers of conflict
in Somalia. Such speech indicates that Turkey’s
initiative is seen as an extension of its peacemaker
role in the country.22 It is, however, important for
the Somali government themselves to also ensure
meritocracy during the enlargement process of the
military and avoid clan-based recruitment.
Furthermore, Turkey should be careful in striking a
balance between peacemaker and security provid-
er roles since the latter could tarnish Turkey’s im-
partial mediator role in Somalia. Having mediated
five rounds of talks between Somalia and Somali-
land in the last five years, Turkey has been enjoy-
ing a positive mediator role in the country. Unless
well managed and well communicated, a military
role could damage Turkey’s positive image since it
could be seen as a means of empowering one party
against the other. There are already criticisms that
Turkish aid is more focused in and around Moga-
dishu than Somaliland. On the other hand, if well
managed, Turkey’s military presence could also
strengthen its hand as a mediator by enhancing its
ability to provide security reassurance in a possible
peace accord, which is usually important to ensure
sustainable peace in post-conflict settings.
Another risk for Turkey is that Somalia is a post-
conflict country that still faces numerous problems
both with internal actors such as Al Shabaab, which
enjoys noteworthy authority over parts of Somalia;
regional authorities such as Somaliland, which is
seeking its independence from Somalia; and neigh-
bors such as Ethiopia.23 A militarily stronger Somali
government could be considered a threat by these
actors, and Turkey could be blamed for contribut-
ing to it. It is important not to forget that Turkey
has already been a direct target of attacks by Al
Shabaab in Somalia a few times before. In addi-
tion, Al Shabaab has also targeted military bases in
Somalia such as the attack on the Somali military
base in Barire in September24 or the one targeted
at a Kenyan military base in Somalia earlier this
year.25 Furthermore, there are allegations that Tur-
key’s military base was the intended target of the
recent horrendous attack in Mogadishu that killed
more than 300 people and was allegedly carried
out by Al Shabaab.26 As such, the base has already
become a target for terror attacks.
The growing competition among different external
powers in the Horn of Africa is proof of the region’s
rising prominence. However, it also demonstrates
that Turkey needs to carry out a prudent and cau-
tious policy in order to secure a long-standing role
in Somalia. There is already evidence that the area
is turning into a zone in which rival regional pow-
ers exert their influence. For instance, given the
ongoing rivalry between Turkey and the UAE that
has intensified with the Qatar crisis, the fact that
the latter is planning to open a base in Somaliland
could change the balance of power in the country
and risk the chance for peace in the ongoing nego-
tiations between Somalia and Somaliland, which is
being mediated by Turkey.
For Turkey, opening forward operating bases is
also a means to bring in success stories from out-
side and fix the image of the Turkish military, which
has been notably tarnished in recent years. As
such, the failure of such policy could further dam-
age the military’s image and raise criticism at home
for wasting Turkey’s financial and human resourc-
es. Turkey has already experienced enough loss in
the last few years as a consequence of the numer-
ous terror attacks in the country and the ongoing
battle in Syria. It could be difficult for the Turkish
government to justify similar losses within the con-
text of a distant country like Somalia.
Concluding Remarks
Turkey has so far enjoyed a benign donor role in
Somalia, which has generally been appreciated in
the country. Although Turkey’s security provider
role brings with it both risks and opportunities, it
is certainly a solid indication of its commitment
to Somalia and its enthusiasm to assume a great-
er role in the country. While the base has already
been a target for attacks, the fact that Erdoğan’s
name was chanted by thousands during a rally in
Mogadishu organized to denounce Al Shabaab is
an indication that Turkey’s policy already enjoys a
certain level of public recognition.27
6|
FROM BENIGN DONOR TO SELF-ASSURED SECURITY PROVIDER: TURKEY’S POLICY IN SOMALIA
However, a critical dilemma remains. While pro-
viding security is necessary to institute order
and peace in post-conflict countries like Somalia,
the means to achieve it could also trigger further
destabilization. It is important to ensure institution-
alization within the Somali state while strengthen-
ing security forces in order to prevent the use of
force for political gains. It is also important to be
careful about the rising rivalry between regional
powers in the Horn and prevent the area from be-
coming a zone of proxy wars. On the optimistic
side, this rivalry could also benefit the region in
terms of turning into a center of attraction. In this
regard, coordination between different stakehold-
ers, a comprehensive risk analysis, and a prudent
approach could enable Turkey to secure a long-
term presence in Somalia both as a benign donor
and a self-assured security provider.
Endnotes
1 | “Turkey sets up largest overseas army base
in Somalia,” Al Jazeera, October 1, 2017,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/
turkey-sets-largest-overseas-army-base-
somalia-171001073820818.html.
2 | Turkish Foreign Ministry Representative, Press
Conference Proceedings, Istanbul Conference
on Somalia, May 22, 2010, http://www.mfa.
gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-istanbul-somali-
konferansi-sonrasi-bm-genel-sekreteri-ile-
yaptigi-ortak-basin-toplantisi_-22-mayis-2010.
tr.mfa.
3 | Ahmet Davutoğlu, “A New Vision for Least
Developed Countries,” Vision Paper, Center for
Strategic Research, no. 4, 2012, 4-5.
4 | Pınar Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding
in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian
Diplomacy,” Turkish Studies 14, no. 4 (2013):
73 5-757.
5 | Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
(TIKA), Turkish Development Assistance
Reports 2011-2015.
6 | Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey›s humanitarian
diplomacy: objectives, challenges and
prospects,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal
of Nationalism and Ethnicity 41, no. 6 (2013):
865-870.
7 | TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report
2015, Ankara, 2016.
8 | TIKA, Turkish Development Assistance Reports
2011-2015.
9 | Turkish Foreign Ministry, “Turkey-Africa
Relations,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-
africa-relations.en.mfa.
10 | Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia,”
740. Also see, Bülent Aras, “Turkey’s Africa
Policy,” The German Marshall Fund of the
United States, On Turkey Series, October 7,
2013.
11 | “Turkey opens military training base in Somalia
capital,” The Washington Post, September 30,
|7
DECEMBER 2017 | IPC POLICY BRIEF
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
europe/turkey-opens-military-training-base-
in-somalia-capital/2017/09/30/06763d42-
a5ed-11e7-b573-8ec86cdfe1ed_story.
html?utm_term=.84168203b735.
12 | Bülent Aras and Pınar Akpınar, “Turkish
Foreign Policy and the Qatar Crisis,” IPC Policy
Brief (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, August
2017).
13 | “The Gulf’s “little Sparta”: The ambitious
United Arab Emirates,” The Economist, April
6, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/
middle-east-and-africa/21720319-driven-
energetic-crown-price-uae-building-bases-far-
beyond-its.
14 | Jon Gambrell, “Qatar crisis shakes East Africa,
a home to Gulf militaries,” Chicago Tribune,
August 30, 2017, http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/sns-bc-ml--qatar-africa-impact-
20170830-story.html.
15 | Joseph Braude and Tyler Jiang, “Why China
and Saudi Arabia Are Building Bases in
Djibouti,” The Huffington Post, September
26, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/joseph-braude/why-china-and-saudi-
arabi_b_12194702.html.
16 | Ibid.
17 | “Qatar Crisis Shakes East Africa, a Home to
Gulf Militaries,” Voice of America, August 30,
2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/qatar-east-
africa-militaries/4006706.html.
18 | “5 reasons why India needs to worry
about China’s military base in Djibouti,”
Hindustan Times, July 16, 2017, http://www.
hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-in-
djibouti-5-reasons-why-india-needs-to-worry-
about-beijing-s-new-military-base/story-
icDCQ8FQA1LyAXifXx7F1J.html.
19 | Marshall Plan Project Group, Federal Ministry
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(BMZ), “Africa and Europe – A New
Partnership for Development, Peace and a
Better Future: Cornerstones of a Marshall Plan
with Africa,” Berlin, January 2017.
20 | “Germany›s Gabriel makes surprise visit to
Somalia,” Deutsche Welle, May 1, 2017, http://
www.dw.com/en/germanys-gabriel-makes-
surprise-visit-to-somalia/a-38655521.
21 | Can Kasapoğlu, “Turkey’s Forward-Basing
Posture,” EDAM Foreign Policy and Security
Paper Series, No: 4, July 2017; Human Rights
Watch, “The Power These Men Have Over Us:
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African
Union Forces in Somalia,” September 8, 2014,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/
power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-
exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces.
22 | Abdirahman Hussein and Orhan Coşkun,
“Turkey opens military base in Mogadishu to
train Somali soldiers,” Reuters, September
30, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-military-
base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-
idUSKCN1C50JH.
23 | Menekşe Tokyay, “Turkey opens $50m
training camp for Somali Army,” Arab News,
October 1, 2017, http://www.arabnews.com/
node/1170416/middle-east.
24 | Mohamed Olad, “General: 30 Killed in Shabab
Attack on Somali Military Base,” Voice of
America, September 29, 2017, https://www.
voanews.com/a/al-shabab-overruns-somali-
military-base/4049424.html.
25 | “Kenya, al Shabaab dispute Somalia base
attack,” TRT World, January 27, 2017, https://
www.trtworld.com/mea/kenya-al-shabaab-
dispute-somalia-base-attack-4848.
26 | “Somalia attack initially targeted Turkish
military base, senior intel official says,”
Daily Sabah, October 18, 2017, https://www.
dailysabah.com/politics/2017/10/18/somalia-
attack-initially-targeted-turkish-military-base-
senior-intel-official-says.
27 | Harun Maruf, “Thousands rally at Mogadishu
stadium, denounce Al Shabaab, chant Turkish
president’s name,” October 18, 2017, 18:23,
Tweet.
