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Article
Compensation for Expropriated Community
Farmland in Nigeria: An In-Depth Analysis of the
Laws and Practices Related to Land Expropriation for
the Lekki Free Trade Zone in Lagos
Nicholas K. Tagliarino 1, *, Yakubu A. Bununu 2, Magbagbeola O. Micheal 2, Marcello De Maria 3
and Akintobi Olusanmi 4
1Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 72, 9700 AB Groningen, The Netherlands
2Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria 810261, Nigeria;
yaxbununu@gmail.com (Y.A.B.); ademay2k2@gmail.com (M.O.M.)
3School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, Reading RG6 6AH, UK;
m.demaria@pgr.reading.ac.uk
4GeoPlans Systems International Co. Ltd., Ibadan 200272, Nigeria; akintobi.olusanmi@hotmail.com
*Correspondence: n.k.tagliarino@rug.nl
Received: 4 December 2017; Accepted: 6 February 2018; Published: 11 February 2018
Abstract:
In Nigeria, the recurring impoverishment and other negative socioeconomic impacts
endured by landholders affected by expropriation are well-documented and call into question
the Land Use Act’s (LUA) effectiveness in protecting local land rights. The World Bank’s Land
Governance Assessment Framework found that, in Nigeria, “a large number of acquisitions
occurs without prompt and adequate compensation, thus leaving those losing land worse off,
with no mechanism for independent appeal even though the land is often not utilized for a public
purpose”. Such negative outcomes may be due to a number of factors, including corruption, limited
capacity, and insufficient financing as well as Nigeria’s weak legal framework. According to a
recent study of compensation procedures established in national laws of 50 countries, Nigeria’s
compensation procedure lags behind many of the countries assessed because the LUA mostly
fails to adopt international standards on the valuation of compensation. This article examines
Nigerian expropriation and compensation procedures in more detail by combining both an in-depth
legal analysis of Nigeria’s expropriation laws as well as survey and qualitative research that
indicates, to some extent, how expropriation laws function in practice in Nigeria. Based on our
legal assessment, surveys, and interviews with both government and private sector officials involved
in the LFTZ, we found that the Nigerian government failed to comply with international standards
on expropriation and compensation, both in terms of its laws and its practices in the LFTZ case.
This article expands our conference paper written for UN Economic Commission of Africa Conference
on Land Policy in Africa, which took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in November of 2017.
Under Nigeria’s LUA, affected landholders are not granted the right to participate in expropriation
and compensation decision-making or otherwise be consulted on matters affecting their land and
livelihoods. In 2004, the LUA enabled the Lagos State government to set aside 16,500 hectares of
expropriated agricultural land from Lagos coastal communities to develop the Lekki Free Trade
Zone (LFTZ). Following the expropriation, the Lagos State Government (LSG) and Lekki Worldwide
Investment Limited signed a Memorandum of Understand (MOU) with nine affected communities in
2007. The MOU is a legally binding document that promises compensation, alternative land, jobs,
healthcare, and educational opportunities to the communities affected by expropriation. However,
our research suggests that the MOU has not been fully honored. According to a survey of 140 affected
households conducted in August 2017, the government still had not paid sufficient compensation to all
affected communities or had not yet provided them with suitable alternative land, jobs, equity shares
and other entitlements promised by the MOU. While there are several reasons why the MOU has not
Land 2018,7, 23; doi:10.3390/land7010023 www.mdpi.com/journal/land
Land 2018,7, 23 2 of 38
been honored, this article mainly focuses on the failure of the LUA to establish binding obligations on
government officials to compensation, resettle, and reconstruct the livelihoods of affected landholders.
This article argues that the LUA must be reformed so that, whenever land is expropriated for
development projects, the government and private sector entities (i.e., acquiring bodies) have a
legal obligation to provide sufficient and prompt compensation, alternative land, jobs, equity shares,
and other entitlements to affected landholders. Moreover, the LUA should obligate the government
and acquiring bodies to follow a transparent and participatory process when expropriating land and
compensating communities so that, if properly enforced, the reformed LUA can mitigate the risks
commonly associated with expropriation, including landholder impoverishment, displacement, food
insecurity, and conflict.
Keywords:
compensation; land valuation; expropriation; land tenure; compulsory acquisition; land
investment; indigenous land rights
1. Introduction
This article examines the laws and practices related to land expropriation in Nigeria, with a
specific focus on the case of the Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ) [
1
–
3
]. Land expropriation for the LFTZ
in Lagos, Nigeria not only caused affected communities to lose pivotal access to farmland and natural
resources needed for subsistence, but also triggered social unrest and violent conflict [
4
]. In the early
hours of 12 October 2015, a gunshot was fired after communities affected by the Lekki Free Trade
Zone (LFTZ) caused a “public disorder” by barricading the entrance to the project site in protest of the
expropriation of their farmland [
5
,
6
]. The communities reportedly blocked the project site after several
failed attempts at discussing “employment and general welfare issues” with company officials [
6
].
Community members laid “charms” at the project entrance, and police officers proceeded to burn and
remove these charms [
6
]. This provoked an escalation in the protest [
6
]. The incident resulted in the
death of Tajudeen Disu, Managing Director of the Lekki World Wide Investment Limited (a major
investor in the LFTZ) [
6
]. Disu reportedly died from a gunshot, but there were conflicting accounts of
who fired the shot [
6
]. A Tribunal of Inquiry report (hereinafter “White Paper”) written in March 2016
by judges and government officials indicated that Disu was caught between police and communities
trying to appease the community protesters when the shot was fired [
6
]. According to the White Paper,
The situation got escalated into commotion and Mr. Disu was invited by Dangote to
intervene
. . .
Mr. Disu arrived at the scene in the company of the Chairman of the Lekki
Coastal Area Development Association
. . .
the Baale of Tiye (a local community)
. . .
The policemen were on one side of the road while the people were on the other side
. . .
Mr. Disu and the said two who accompanied him stood facing the people with their back
to the policemen
. . .
the people allege that all the while, the policemen were shooting
firing canisters of teargas, the police deny this
. . .
Mr. Disu put his hands up
. . .
Suddenly,
Mr. Disu went down [6].
The investigation concluded “Mr. Disu could only have been shot either by a Policeman or
by a member of the community.” In response to Disu’s death, the police arrested 10 Okunraiye
community members they claimed were responsible [
7
]. Meanwhile, community members stated in a
sworn affidavit that a stray bullet fired by police killed Disu [
6
]. The White Paper recommended a
“fresh investigation of the killing” by local detectives, but it remains unclear what is the status of the
investigation. Overall, this incident shows how the failure of governments and project developers to
fully compensate and reconstruct the livelihoods of affected landholders can lead to protest, social
unrest, and even violence. As demonstrated by empirical research on many other land conflicts across
Africa, loss of land and insufficient compensation payments are often significant drivers of conflict [
8
].
Land 2018,7, 23 3 of 38
The quagmire of conflicting information emanating from this deadly event is emblematic
of the general complexity and contentiousness surrounding the LFTZ. Based on interviews with
respective stakeholders, the viewpoints of government and private sector officials and those of affected
communities regarding the LFTZ were often in direct opposition of one another. While government
and company representatives we interviewed stated that the LFTZ will serve the public interest by
stimulating local economic growth and create jobs, a general observation from our interviews with
local communities is that tensions are running high among community members; many respondents
to the survey expressed strong opposition to the LFTZ and skepticism that it will enable them to reap
socioeconomic benefits.
Eleven years prior to Disu’s death, in 2004, the Lagos State Government (LSG) set aside
16,500 hectares of undeveloped land to build the LFTZ [
6
,
9
].
1
Still under construction, the LFTZ
is designed to eventually become the largest trade zone in Africa [
10
]. Project developers claimed the
LFTZ would be a catalyst for economic development in Lagos state and a major attraction for foreign
direct investment [
10
]. The former Commissioner of Trade and Investment in Lagos Dr. Olusegun
Aganga stated in 2012 that investors in the free zone would be exempted from all taxes, custom, duties
and levies; this measure would enable the creation of 300,000 direct and 600,0000 indirect jobs in the
next five years [
11
]. According to the former Lagos State Governor, Babatunde Raji Fashola, “every
time we [Nigeria] import goods, we invariably without knowingly exports jobs because we keep those
industries off shore away from our economy busy. In addition, we can win by keeping the jobs here in
our land” [
10
]. Under the Nigeria’s Land Use Act (LUA), State Governors have broad authority to
justify the use of expropriation for economic development. Even though the expropriation as serving
the public interest of creating jobs for Nigerians and stimulating local economic growth, the LFTZ
is tax-free for foreign investors according to BBC report [
9
]. Foreign companies can bring their own
employees into the LFTZ and take profits back to their home countries [
10
]. Since most of the LFTZ
has not yet been built, it remains to be seen whether Nigerians will reap significant economic benefits
from the project.
This article argues that, regardless of whether the LFTZ will ultimately serve the public
interest, the process of developing the LFTZ indicates poor compliance, both in law and in practice,
with internationally recognized standards on expropriation, compensation, and resettlement.
Indigenous communities historically used the expropriated land for farming, grazing, collecting
firewood, retrieving medicinal plants, and other customary practices. In response to losing their rights
and access to farmland, they demanded compensation, alternative land, jobs, and equity shares from
the companies involved in the LFTZ. In 2007, the LSG, Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited (LWIL),
and nine affected communities signed a legally binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
The MOU promised compensation, alternative land, jobs, healthcare, and educational opportunities to
the communities affected by expropriation. However, our research indicates that, as of August 2017,
many of these entitlements had still not been provided.
This article presents an interdisciplinary study that combines both a legal analysis of the laws
applicable to expropriation and compensation in Nigeria as well as survey and other empirical research.
The main research questions examined are:
1.
Do Nigeria’s laws comply with internationally recognized standards on expropriation,
compensation, and resettlement?
2.
Did the government follow international standards on expropriation, compensation,
and resettlement in the LFTZ case?
1
The LFTZ was initiated through a joint venture between a state-owned company called Lekki Worldwide Investments
Limited (LWIL), the LSG, and a Chinese consortium of companies led by the China Civil Engineer Construction Corporation
(CCECC). This joint venture resulted in the establishment of the Lekki Free Zone Development Company (LFZDC).
The Chinese consortium owns sixty percent of the LFZDC equity, LWI: Holds 20%, and other Nigerian investors hold 20%.
Land 2018,7, 23 4 of 38
3.
What are some recommendations for reforming Nigeria’s legal framework related to
expropriation, compensation, and resettlement so that it complies with international standards?
In August 2017, the authors surveyed 140 affected households from 10 different communities
affected by land expropriation for the LFTZ. The reason we developed a methodology that combines
both legal and survey research is that we aimed to assess the law on the books as well how the law
operates on the ground in Nigeria. As discussed in Section 5of this paper, the responses to survey
indicate, to some extent, whether the government has effectively enforced the law when expropriating
land for the LFTZ. The survey responses also provide some indication of landholder perceptions of
government expropriation practices for development projects. For more detail on the survey method
and results, see Section 5below.
1.1. Legal Reform as a Solution to Arbitrary Expropriation and Insufficient Compensation
Using expropriation power, government bodies in Nigeria and other countries have often justified
the expropriation of community land for development projects on the grounds that such projects will
stimulate local economic growth, create jobs, or otherwise serve a “public purpose” [
1
,
12
]. However,
in many countries, the law either does not precisely define “public purpose” or grants government
authorities broad discretion to interpret what constitutes a “public purpose” [
13
]. Subjected to little
oversight, these authorities can acquire vast parcels, even when it is unclear whether the public will
actually realize economic benefits from the project [14].
Even when expropriation is used for genuine public purposes, one-time, lump-sum monetary
compensation for expropriated land has proven time after time to be insufficient in ensuring
the livelihood reconstruction and long-term socioeconomic stability of affected communities [
15
].
Empirical studies conducted in a broad range of countries indicate that a cash payment, by itself,
often cannot prevent the impoverishment and other risks associated with expropriation [
16
–
19
].
Expropriated rural farmers, for example, may have difficulty using the cash to purchase alternative
farmland and, with limited knowledge of other occupations and income-generating activities, may fall
into poverty if they are unable to do so. As a response to the recurring issue of insufficient compensation,
scholars and practitioners have advocated for project developers to start investing more financial
resources into resettlement processes and allowing affected populations to share in the project benefits
while obtaining access to education, healthcare, and other basic amenities [
20
]. According to Cernea,
resources for financing resettlement processes can come from economic rents (i.e., windfall profits)
generated by development projects (e.g., natural resource extractive projects) and that benefit-sharing
between affected populations and project developers is feasible as shown in a number of documented
cases, including development projects initiated in China, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, and Japan [21].
This article argues that statutory reform of Nigeria’s LUA is key to ensure that more investment
in the reconstruction of landholder livelihoods occurs when land is expropriated. While there are a
number of factors that contribute to affected landholder impoverishment, such as corruption, lack of
financing, lack of political will, and limited capacity, the lack of a legal framework has been shown to
be a significant factor: a study published by the World Bank in 1996 found that income restoration was
lacking in countries that initiated displacing projects without first establishing country-wide policy or
legal frameworks for resettlement and income restoration [
22
]. The same study found that projects
with sufficient funding for resettlement, initiated in countries with policy and legal frameworks
that protect the rights of affected landholders, enabled successful income restoration of landholders
post-expropriation [22].
From a theoretical standpoint, it can be well-argued that expropriation laws must contain clearly
defined, robust provisions to prevent arbitrary government decision-making on expropriation and
compensation. According to the principle of “legality”, government expropriation actions should be
limited by enacted laws that are clearly written with adequate precision and clarity; as argued by
Raz, laws should provide effective guidance in order to prevent governments from making arbitrary,
ad-hoc decisions [23,24]. Dagan further comments,
Land 2018,7, 23 5 of 38
Ad hocism contravenes the conception of the rule of law
. . .
Only relatively stable and
predictable law can serve as a ‘safe basis for individual planning’, which is a prerequisite
of people’s ability to ‘form definite expectations’ and ‘plan for the future’
. . .
case-by-case
adjudication similarly threatens
. . .
the rule of law
. . .
which stands here for ‘the absence
of arbitrary power on the part of the government’ [25].
Clearly prescribed laws that provide citizens with a set of rights and protections when facing
expropriation can serve as a reference point when citizens wish to challenge government and private
actor expropriation and compensation decisions in court. At the same time, clear guidance in
expropriation laws can also protect investor interests by decreasing the risk of arbitrary expropriation
of development projects. As stated by Cotula et al.,
Specific-enough wording for compliance requirements to be enforceable and transparency
in their application are key to ensure fair implementation in the public interest—avoiding
on the one hand creeping expropriation of the investment through arbitrary government
application of these requirements, and on the other collusion between government officials
and investors to avoid sanctioning where investment plans are not complied with [26].
Nigeria’s LUA in its current form contains legal gaps, ambiguities, and grants broad discretion
to State Governors to make expropriation and compensation decisions with limited oversight by the
judiciary. For these reasons, the law leaves affected populations vulnerable to expropriation without
adequate compensation or remedies in the event that their tenure rights are violated. To ensure that
compensation covers the losses borne by affected landholders, this article argues that the LUA should
require the government to follow clear legal procedures that ensure government transparency and
landholder participation throughout the expropriation, compensation, and resettlement processes.
If sufficiently clear and robust, such procedures can enable affected landholders the right to seek redress
in court and allow for judges to effectively scrutinize expropriation and compensation decision-making.
Specific recommendations for reforming the LUA are provided in Section 6(the conclusion) of
this article.
1.2. Definition of Terms Used in This Article
•
“Expropriation” for purposes of this article refers to the power of government to acquire legally
recognized tenure rights, without the willing consent of the tenure holder, in order to serve a
public purpose or otherwise benefit society. In this paper, “expropriation” refers to eminent
domain, takings, compulsory purchases, compulsory acquisitions, and other names given to this
government power around the world.
•
“Affected populations (communities)” are the populations whose tenure rights are affected
by expropriation.
•
“Tenure rights” are the rights of individuals or groups, including Indigenous Peoples and
communities, over land and resources. Tenure rights include, but are not limited to ownership,
freehold possession rights, use rights, and rental, customary and collective tenure arrangements.
The bundle of tenure rights can include the right of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion,
and alienation.
•
“Forced eviction” refers to the involuntary removal of persons from their land, homes,
and/or communities.
While the issue of “forced eviction” is also briefly discussed in this article, “forced eviction”
is not synonymous with expropriation. Forced evictions may occur for a “public purpose” or
for other purposes—for example, in some cases, informal settlers may be forcibly evicted from
government-owned land for any purpose. The key difference between “expropriation” and “forced
eviction” is that expropriation usually requires the government to show land was acquired for a
“public purpose” and it usually requires some form of compensation payment for legally recognized
Land 2018,7, 23 6 of 38
tenure rights. Forced eviction, on the other hand, is broader: it may occur because of an expropriation
or for another reason. Although international human rights law dictates that people must be consulted
before they can be forcibly evicted [
27
], domestic laws often grant governments authority to forcibly
evict informal occupants from government-owned land without requiring them to prove the eviction
is for a “public purpose” or pay compensation to these occupants.
1.3. List of Acrononyms
The following acronyms are used throughout this article:
•Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
•Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA)
•Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
•Land Use Act (LUA)
•Lagos State Government (LSG)
•Lekki Free Zone Development Company (LFZDC)
•Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited (LWI)
•Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ)
•Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGs).
1.4. Roadmap
This article is divided in to six sections. Section 2discusses empirical research on land conflicts due
to expropriation and forced eviction in Nigeria and other countries. Section 3highlights international
standards on expropriation, compensation, and resettlement. Section 4provides a legal analysis of
Nigerian laws that apply to expropriation, compensation, and resettlement. Section 5provides an
in-depth examination of the LFTZ case, and includes a discussion of the findings from in-person
surveys of affected communities conducted in August 2017. Section 6draws conclusions from
the research and provides a set of recommendations for the Nigerian government to follow when
expropriating land and compensating, resettling, and reconstructing the livelihoods of communities
affected by development projects.
2. Empirical Research on Land Conflicts due to Expropriation and Displacement in Nigeria and
Other Countries
The negative social and economic impacts associated with expropriation and witnessed in the
LFTZ case, including violent conflict, displacement, and impoverishment, have been well documented,
both in Nigeria and in other countries [
28
–
30
]. This section provides a discussion of land conflicts that
have resulted from development projects and were in many cases caused by expropriation. This section
also provides some background and context for the LFTZ case by citing cases of forced eviction and
expropriation that have occurred in Nigeria.
Government failure to recognize customary tenure rights to land and resources held by indigenous
and local communities is commonly cited as a key source of land conflict [
31
]. Across many parts
of Nigeria and other agrarian economies in Africa, there are billions of hectares of undeveloped
commons customarily held and used by indigenous and rural communities for farming, grazing,
firewood, medicinal plants, spiritual practices, and other basic needs [
32
]. For centuries, these ancestral
lands have been essential to the survival, wellbeing, and cultural identity of local communities.
Yet governments continue to assert ownership over the vast majority of land, wrongly assuming
these area are vacant, idle, and terra nullius (i.e., nobody’s land) [
33
]. While there is a growing
recognition of customary land rights in several national laws, governments often retain underlying legal
authority over community land; due to this, governments have discretion to lease or otherwise transfer
large tracts of community land to private companies for large-scale development projects [
34
–
36
].
Community use of agricultural land for farming and subsistence purposes often directly contrasts with
Land 2018,7, 23 7 of 38
commodification, a primary goal of many development projects [
37
]. The failure of governments and
private companies to recognize, respect and protect community land rights is commonly cited among
NGOS and civil society as a trigger for conflict, displacement, human rights abuse, and environmental
degradation [38].
Throughout the Global South, governments and project developers have on many occasions
exposed themselves to financial as well as other risks by failing to negotiate with communities
prior to compulsorily acquiring their land [
8
]. An examination of over 362 land disputes in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America found that the vast majority were caused by community displacement
and insufficient compensation, while over two thirds of these disputes resulted in significant delays
and work stoppages [
8
]. A recent study of 51 cases of land conflict in Asia found 47% of these
cases involved violence, 65% led to a material impact for project backers, and 45% of conflicts were
triggered by displacement [
39
]. Other research on land conflicts in India shows that such conflicts have
been pervasive and have stalled investment projects worth billions of dollars [
40
]. Dell’Angelo et al.
conducted a meta-analysis of large-scale land acquisitions and found, among other results, that:
Acquisitions are generally characterized by imbalanced power relations, and they are not
conflict free. The degree of conflict varies through different forms of coercion, such as when
deals are closed without the informed consent of previous land users, who are excluded
from the negotiation process, not adequately informed about the implications of these
acquisitions, or evicted and forced off the land which is often associated with instances of
physical violence [41].
Other research highlights how competition over land and resources coupled with missing legal,
institutional, and traditional/customary protection of land and resource rights can trigger land conflict
in many regions [42].
In Nigeria, empirical research suggests that local landholders commonly view expropriation as a
tool for “dispossessing the poor to elevate the rich” [
1
]. In the Niger Delta, a region of Nigeria that
for many years has been damaged by piracy, kidnappings, and violent conflict over oil, scholars have
argued that the lack of strong and coherent legal framework for protecting the land and resource rights
of local communities has been a root cause of the ongoing conflict [43]. According to Cyril,
The impact of the [LUA] on the Niger Delta was serious, as the people viewed it as an
act of injustice
. . .
having lost ownership of their land to the government, the most the
oil communities could claim from oil multinationals was compensation or surface rents
[compensation for crops and other above-ground resources]
. . .
Since the oil-producing
communities had no legal claim to the ‘ownership’ of oil produced from under their lands
and waters, they had little or no leverage in making successful compensatory claims as a
result of land expropriation [44].
Lack of ownership rights to land, adequate compensation, benefit-sharing arrangements, and jobs
from the oil industry reportedly led several community members in the Niger Delta to take up
piracy and extract oil and money from companies operating in the region through illegal means such
as kidnapping, theft, and violent attacks against refineries and ships [
44
]. A representative from
Transparency International suggested that government officials might have colluded with pirates to
extract money and oil from industries [45].
Outside of the Niger Delta, the Nigerian government has been criticized several times by human
rights organizations for its expropriation practices, which have often resulted in forceful evictions,
particularly in urban areas where millions of Nigerians have been displaced for urban expansion and
redevelopment purposes [
45
,
46
]. Large-scale development projects also caused many displacements in
rural areas [
47
,
48
]. UN Habitat estimated that, between 2000 and 2007, the pattern of forced eviction in
Nigeria left at least two million people displaced from their home in different parts of the country [
45
].
The following paragraphs highlight just a few of the many cases of forced eviction and displacement
in Nigeria.
Land 2018,7, 23 8 of 38
2.1. Forced Evictions in Abuja
In the early 2000s, Abuja’s Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) evicted an estimated
800,000 people to implement the Abuja Master Plan [
49
]. Research shows that the FCDA did not
adequately inform the public ahead of time about which settlements would be demolished [
49
].
Consequently, bulldozers suddenly arrived before affected landholders had the opportunity to find
alternative land and housing. According to a UN Habitat report, “The FCDA demolished homes,
schools, clinics, churches, mosques, and businesses without adequate consultation with communities,
and without providing adequate notice, compensation, or adequate resettlement” [
45
]. Likewise,
another report by two local human rights organizations found that, “the [Abuja] evictions have
resulted in the massive displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from entire communities,
with a spiraling effect on health, education employment, and family cohesion. Some of the demolitions
were accompanied by violence perpetrated by heavily armed security operatives against residents
and business owners” [
49
]. As a result of forced eviction in Abuja, homelessness became pervasive,
families were torn apart, robbery and crime became rampant, and children lost access to healthcare
and education [49].
2.2. Forced Evictions in Lagos
Forced evictions for urban development have also been common in Lagos. In 1996, over
250,000 businesses and homes were demolished in Lagos as part of a three-week slum clearance
operation; an estimated 750,000 people were affected by this operation [
45
]. More recently, the Lagos
state government came under international scrutiny for reportedly stripping communities of their
homes and violating human rights; Amnesty International published a report in 2013 which found
that the Lagos state government violated human rights when forcefully evicting people from their
homes for urban redevelopment in Badia East, where over 200 homes and business structures were
demolished [
46
]. According to the report, the government refused to grant compensation to affected
communities on the grounds that it was “mindful of setting a precedent
. . .
whereby illegal occupiers
of land without development permits have to be paid full compensation upon eviction” [
46
]. At least
10,000 people were forcibly evicted in Badia East between 2013 and 2015 [29].
In November 2016, the LSG reportedly evicted over 30,000 residents of Otodo Gbame, Ilubirin
and Ebute Ikate waterfront communities in Lagos State; an additional 4000 residents were removed
in March 2017 [
50
]. Amnesty International reported that, since 2000, more than two million people
were displaced from their homes in informal settlements and waterfront communities across Lagos
state [
50
]. The government justified these evictions “as a security measure in the overall interest
of all Lagosians”, claiming that these communities posed a security risk without giving further
explanation [
51
]. The government reportedly did not give prior notice and suddenly began bulldozing;
after members of the Otodo Gbame community formed human chains around their houses, armed
police reportedly fired bullets at them and sprayed them with tear gas [
50
,
51
]. This incident forced
communities to flee in terror to nearby canoes while their homes were demolished [
51
]. At least one
person was reportedly shot in the neck by police and died [
51
]. In June 2017, the Lagos High Court
ruled that the government-ordered evictions of Lagos waterfront communities was “unconstitutional”
and ordered that the government stop forced evictions—if respected and enforced by the government,
this ruling could prevent an estimated 270,000 other residents of Lagos from losing their homes [52].
Based on the aforementioned empirical research, it can be argued that land tenure is insecure
in many places across Nigeria and that both rural and urban communities remain vulnerable to
expropriation and displacement. The following sections highlight a key reason for this tenure insecurity
by discussing the LUA’s failure to comply with international standards on land expropriation and
compensation, and protect affected communities in the LFTZ case.
Land 2018,7, 23 9 of 38
3. International Standards on Expropriation and Compensation
Before presenting the findings from the legal and survey research, it is important to first discuss
the various internationally recognized standards on expropriation, compensation, and resettlement.
The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGs) are the first internationally
recognized guiding principles, which aim to protect the land tenure rights of all persons, particularly
vulnerable and marginalized groups [
53
]. The UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS), a body
consisting of 193 governments, endorsed the VGs in 2012. The VGs include a broad range of principles
on legal recognition and allocation of tenure rights, indigenous and customary tenure systems, informal
tenure, land administration, women’s land rights, and other topics. While the VGs are not legally
binding on state actors, they were developed based on 10 regional consultations that brought together
almost 700 people representing 133 countries, and indicate an emerging international consensus among
governments, NGOs, academia, civil society, and the private sector as to how land tenure should
be governed [
54
,
55
]. Section 16 of the VGs establishes standards on expropriation, compensation,
and resettlement (see Table 1). For this reason, the legal analysis conducted in this section of the article
is primarily based on Section 16 of the VGs:
Table 1. Highlights from the VGs.
According to Section 16, States should:
•Provide a clear definition of “public purpose” in law to allow for judicial review
•Minimize the amount of land acquired
•Only acquire the minimum resources necessary
•Be sensitive where proposed expropriations involve areas of particular cultural, religious, or
environmental significance, or where the land is important to the livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable
•Identify, inform and consult affected populations at all stages of the expropriation process
•
Pay fair and prompt compensation to all legitimate tenure rights-holders
·
Provide productive alternative
land and adequate housing
•Explore feasible alternatives to forced eviction in consultations with affected landholders
•Avoid or minimise the need for evictions
According to Section 18.2:
•Policies and laws related to valuation should strive to ensure that valuation systems take into account
non-market values such as social, cultural, religious, spiritual and environmental values
where applicable.
The VGs contain broad, open-ended terminology that is left up to states to interpret. For example,
the VGs call for states to respect “all legitimate tenure rights” but do not define what constitutes
“legitimate” tenure. Moreover, Section 16.3 of the VGs provides that “States should ensure a fair
valuation and prompt compensation in accordance with national law.” Yet this VG principle does
not define the terms “fair valuation” or “prompt”. Presumably, states are permitted to develop their
own definitions of “legitimate tenure” “fair valuation” and “prompt” in domestic laws. Aside from
Section 16, Section 18.2 of the VGGTS establishes additional standards on land valuation and states
“policies and laws related to valuation should strive to ensure that valuation systems take into
account non-market values such as social, cultural, religious, spiritual and environmental values
where applicable.”
There are several other international guidance documents that shed light on the meaning of “fair
valuation” for land. For example, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
publication, Land Tenure Studies 10: Compulsory acquisition of land and compensation (hereinafter
“FAO Handbook”), published in 2008, presents good practices for conducting expropriations and
compensating landholders and recommends that compensation should be based on the principles of
Land 2018,7, 23 10 of 38
equity and equivalence [
56
]. These principles mean that affected persons should receive “no more or
no less than the loss resulting from the compulsory acquisition of their land”. The FAO Handbook is
discussed in more detail in Section 4. Although the FAO Handbook is not officially endorsed by the
international community, it reflects what FAO and many international experts view as good practices
for ensuring equitable access to land and increasing land tenure security.
There are also a number of NGOs that developed guidance on land valuation, including the
International Standards Valuation Council (ISVC), UN Habitat, and True Price. The ISVC produced a set
of standards for determining “market value”, which is a common method of calculating compensation
for land in many countries. The ISVC defines market value as “the amount for which an asset or
liability would exchange on the valuation date between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s
length transaction after proper marketing wherein the parties each acted knowledgeably, prudently,
and without compulsion” [
57
]. Since the definition contains the clause “wherein the parties each acted
knowledgeably, prudently, and without compulsion”, it suggests surveys and negotiations must take
place between affected communities and governments. UN Habitat also recently developed guidance
on valuing unregistered lands in a variety of countries [
57
]. Moreover, the University of Groningen
and True Price are currently working with a variety of academics, private sector bodies, and NGOs to
develop a protocol on fair compensation in cases of land tenure change [58].
Several other international instruments establish standards and good practices for expropriating
land and compensating landholders. For example, the 2016 World Bank Environmental and Social
Standard 5 on Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement (ESS5)
establishes requirements that borrowers of Bank funds must follow if their development projects entail
land acquisition and involuntary resettlement. Under ESS5, the rate of compensation is calculated
as the “replacement cost, and other assistance as may be necessary to help [affected landholders’]
improve or at least restore their standards of living and livelihoods” [
59
]. Replacement cost is defined
as a method of valuation yielding compensation sufficient to replace assets, plus necessary transaction
costs associated with asset replacement [59].
International standards on expropriation and compensation are also established by the IFC
Performance Standards 5 and 7, United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based
Evictions and Displacement, the Asian Development Bank Handbook on Resettlement, the Centre
on Housing Rights and Evictions Pinheiro Principles, and the UN Human Rights Commission
Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement. The UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples also
established standards on expropriation and compensation where the rights of Indigenous Peoples are at
stake
[60,61]
. The aforementioned international standards are discussed in some of the sections below,
but the focus of the legal analysis in this article is on the VGs because they were developed through
regional consultations that brought together almost 700 people, from 133 countries, representing the
public and private sectors, civil society and academia, and thus indicate a growing international
consensus among governments, NGOs, civil society, and the private sector on responsible land
governance standards [55,56].
As explained in Section 4of this article, there are significant gaps between Nigeria’s
legal framework and international standards on expropriation and compensation. For reasons
discussed below, these gaps expose Nigerian landholders to significant risks including landlessness,
homelessness, hunger, poverty, and other socioeconomic risks [16].
4. Comparative Legal Analysis of Land Use Act with International Standards on Expropriation
and Compensation
Recent studies that examine expropriation and compensation procedures in 50 countries across
Asia, Africa, and Latin America indicate that Nigeria’s legal framework lags behind many of the
other countries assessed in terms of its compliance with international standards on expropriation,
compensation, and resettlement [
2
,
13
]. The governing law on expropriation in Nigeria is the Land Use
Land 2018,7, 23 11 of 38
Act (LUA), a law that has been highly criticized by NGOs, scholars, and the public [
62
]. As discussed in
Section 2of this article, the Nigerian government has been condemned by human rights organizations
for its forced evictions and poor expropriation practices. Since there is potentially significant room for
improvement in terms of law and practice in the country, we chose to focus on Nigeria. Moreover, given
how much land was expropriated and the expansive nature of the LFTZ (as discussed in Section 5,
the LFTZ may eventually become the largest free trade zone in Africa), we considered the LFTZ
case to be particularly important and worthy of attention and analysis. In our view, the findings
and recommendations presented in this article can be used to reform laws and practices related to
expropriation, not only in Nigeria but also in other countries in which legal reforms to expropriation
laws are desperately needed.
The Constitution of Nigeria (1999) states that no property can be acquired without “prompt
payment of compensation” and a right to access courts of law or tribunals for the determination
of “his interest in property and the amount of compensation” [
63
]. This constitutional provision is
implemented through Section 29 of the LUA, 1978 which permits State governors to acquire land
for “overriding public interests” [
64
]. The LUA applies to all land expropriations in the country.
Initially passed as a Presidential Decree in 1978 during Nigeria’s military era, this LUA eventually
became an Act in 1990. Widely considered to be an inadequate and flawed law, the LUA has undergone
several failed attempts at revision since its enactment in 1990 [65].
Section 1 of the LUA vests all land in State Governors in trust and administered “for the use and
common benefit of all Nigerians.” Based on this provision, individuals and communities are not legally
permitted to own land in Nigeria. However, under Section 5, State Governors are authorized to grant
statutory rights of occupancies to “any person” rural and urban areas. State Governors can also grant
customary rights of occupancy to “any person or organization” for agricultural, residential, grazing,
and other purposes. The LUA does not define the terms “person” or “organisation” so it is unclear
who qualifies as person or organization for purposes of the LUA; however, in practice these terms have
been interpreted to include individuals or communities. Corporations can also be granted rights to
land under Section 51 of the LUA. Section 6(b)(2) of the LUA states that “no single right of occupancy
shall be granted
. . .
in excess of 500 hectares if granted for agricultural purpose, or 5000 hectares if
granted for grazing purposes.” According to Sections 21 and 22 of the LUA, statutory and customary
rights of occupancy cannot be alienated by assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, or sublease
without the government consent.
Under Section 36 of the LUA, customary occupiers
2
or holders who used land for agricultural
purposes prior to passage of the LUA are considered lawful possessors of their agricultural land “as if
a customary right of occupancy had been granted to the occupier and holder” [
64
]. However, there are
no transitional provisions concerning rural land that is not used for agricultural purposes; presumably
all statutory rights to such land were extinguished upon the enactment of the LUA [
66
,
67
]. In many
parts of Nigeria and other countries, groups of individuals and familiars share common interests
in land areas, and govern, manage, and use land based on long-standing customs and traditions
(i.e., customary tenure). Customary land tenure typically refers to community-based systems of
land ownership and administration that have longstanding origins in the norms and practices of
communities that often go back centuries. Customary land tenure exists in most countries even
though statutory law does not always recognize it. In Nigeria and other countries, legal rights to land
(e.g., titles or deeds) can be granted rights to communities as well as individuals.
Importantly, the LUA does not explicitly recognize legal rights to unfarmed, undeveloped
land
[66,67]
. The Local Government, if it is satisfied that an occupier or holder is entitled to possession,
and upon the production of the occupier’s sketch, diagram or sufficient description of land, may
2
In section 51, the LUA defines customary rights of occupancy as “the right of a person or community lawfully using
or occupying land in accordance with customary law and includes a customary right of occupancy granted by a
local government.”
Land 2018,7, 23 12 of 38
register the holder or occupier and grant a customary right of occupancy (Section 36(3), LUA). However,
State Governors retain broad discretion to revoke rights of occupancy (Section 38, LUA). Moreover,
the World Bank’s LGAF report on Nigeria found that in practice,
Enforcement of rights of the recognized tenure types is
. . .
a problem because most
individual land rights (in rural and urban areas) are not mapped/registered
. . .
the
mechanisms for rights recognition is poor because the absence of legislated procedures
makes land management agencies develop administrative procedures for recognizing land
rights which are often implemented arbitrarily. For instance, although non-documentary
forms of evidence can be used to obtain claims to property, they have less strength than the
documented evidences that are acceptable based on the judgment of the officer in charge [
1
].
For the various reasons discussed in detail below, LUA fails to adopt internationally recognized
standards on expropriation and compensation as established in the Voluntary Guidelines on the
Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGs).
4.1. Definition of Public Purpose
According to Section 16.1 of the VGs, “States should expropriate only where rights to land
. . .
are required for a public purpose. States should clearly define the concept of public purpose in
law, in order to allow for judicial review.” An international survey revealed that “public purposes”
commonly includes public buildings, public utilities, transportation, public parks, and defense
purposes [
56
]. However, in many countries, governments retain broad authority to expropriate land
for “economic development” purposes, including natural resource extraction, agricultural production,
and other revenue-generating activities [
12
]. In Peru, for example, the government issued a ministerial
decree in 2000 declaring oil palm to be a crop that serves the “national interest” [
68
]. This decree gave
the government and expropriating companies broad discretion to extract oil palm from the Amazon
rainforest without following environmental and land use planning requirements. Unless laws clearly
define the concept of “public purpose”, there is a risk that governments will abuse their expropriation
power, which could result in public mistrust of government, tenure insecurity, displacement, and other
negative outcomes [
13
]. For instance, land may be acquired under the pretext of a public purpose
when the actual purpose is to transfer land to private companies that will use the land for purposes
that do not support local economic growth or otherwise benefit the public.
Nigeria’s LUA 1978 fails to comply with VGS principle 16.1 because it provides a vague,
open-ended legal definition of “public purpose” ostensibly granting State Governors broad discretion
to interpret what constitutes a “public purpose.” The LUA does not adequately limit the Governor’s
authority to expropriate land under the pretext of a public purpose and transfer such land to private
companies that aim to use the land exclusively for profit-making activities that may not necessarily
benefit the public. For instance, there is no explicit provision that subjects the Governor’s expropriation
decision to a review by an independent committee or judiciary. The LUA does not require the
government to determine, prior to expropriating land, whether the proposed project is (1) necessary
to serve a public purpose; (2) suitable (reasonably likely to achieve the intended public benefit,
and (3) whether the benefits deriving from the expropriation are proportionate to the costs borne by
affected populations [14].
Section 28 of the LUA grants the Governor the right to revoke a right of occupancy for overriding
public interest. Both statutory and customary rights of occupancy can be revoked. Statutory rights
can be acquired when land is needed for “public purposes within the State”, including when land is
needed for mining or the construction of oil pipelines. Similarly, customary rights can be acquired
for public purposes, mining purposes, the extraction of building materials, and a broad range of
other purposes. According to Francis, the LUA “empowers the local land allocation committees to
expropriate almost any land within their areas of control and to allocate it for either public or private
Land 2018,7, 23 13 of 38
use
. . .
. The tenure of rural land is allowed to remain undisturbed except where it conflicts, at any
point, with the interests of capital holding developers, whether public or private” [66].
Section 51 of the LUA broadly defines “public purpose” as including for “exclusive Government
use or for public use”, for “use by any body corporate”, for mining, public works, or “economic,
industrial, or agricultural development”. The LUA does not subject State Governors’ decisions on
what constitutes a public purpose to oversight by the judiciary. Governors have broad discretion
to establish a justification for compulsorily acquiring land. Since Section 51 states “public purpose
includes . . .
” the list of purposes is not exhaustive, suggesting that the State Governor can expropriate
for other purposes not listed in the Act. The vaguely defined purposes in the LUA are problematic
for a number of reasons. Since there are no checks in place to ensure corporate parties granted
expropriated land continue to serve the public interest, this provision could allow expropriation to
be used exclusively for private economic gain without benefitting the public. Moreover, the LUA
does not limit the State Governor’s authority to acquire land under the pretext of a public purpose
and transfer such land to private companies, even when the actual purpose will not promote local
economic development or otherwise serve a public purpose. The LUA’s broad definition of “public
purpose” opens the door for potential misuse and abuse by the Governor. For instance, the Governor
may acquire land under the pretext of a “public purpose”, where the real motive is to transfer land to
private companies for private gain without ensuring these companies will create jobs or otherwise
boost the local economy.
Even if a Nigerian court decides to review a State Governor’s expropriation decision, the “public
purpose” provision is so broad that it remains unclear on what grounds courts can overrule public
purpose justification decisions. In other words, the LUA does not provide guidance for courts to
scrutinize “public interest” decisions. For this reason, the LUA’s vagueness opens the door for potential
misuse and abuse of expropriation power. In practice, Nigerian courts rarely overrule expropriation
decisions made by the State Governors. In our legal review of expropriation cases, we found only
one instance in which the Lagos High Court ruled that the State Governor’s decision to expropriate
land for development purposes was ruled unconstitutional [
52
]. However, this High Court ruling
did not focus on the “public purpose” issue, but rather held the expropriation and forced eviction of
communities were unconstitutional because there was no resettlement plan in place [69].
4.2. Limitations on the Amount or Type of Expropriated Land
Section 16.1 of the VGS provides that “[States should acquire only] the minimum resources
necessary.” Moreover, Section 16.2 establishes that “States should be sensitive where proposed
expropriations involve areas of particular cultural, religious, or environmental significance, or where
the land is particularly important to the livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable.” Additionally,
Article 9.9 of the VGs and Article 10 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and
Article 16 of ILC Convention 169 provide that Indigenous Peoples shall not be forcibly removed from
their land or territories without their free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) [
60
,
61
,
70
]. The VGs also
states that “States and other parties should hold good faith consultation with indigenous peoples before
initiating any project or before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures
affecting the resources for which communities hold rights.”
The LUA, on the other hand, does not require State Governors to minimize the amount of land
acquired to the amount necessary to achieve a public purpose. Moreover, indigenous and other rural
communities are not granted special protection from expropriation. Section 28 of the LUA merely
states that it shall be “lawful for the Governor to revoke a right of occupancy for overriding public
interest.” Yet there are no restrictions on the type of land that the Governor is permitted to acquire.
The LUA does not oblige the government to respect the indigenous right to Free Prior and Informed
Consent prior to initiating development projects. The LUA does not require the government to be
sensitive to areas of cultural, religious, or environmental significance or areas held by the poor and
vulnerable groups such as indigenous communities when deciding to expropriate.
Land 2018,7, 23 14 of 38
When land is expropriated for development projects, government and private sector bodies must
conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) before initiating development projects in Nigeria.
Under Nigeria’s Environmental Impact Assessment Decree of 1992, “the public or private sector of
the economy shall not undertake or
. . .
authorise projects or activities without prior consideration,
at an early stage, of their environmental effects” [
71
]. The EIA must include a description of the
potential affected environment including specific information necessary to identify and assess the
environmental effects of the proposed activities [
71
]. Section 7 of the Decree states “before the
[Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement] Agency gives a decision on an activity
to which an environmental assessment has been produced, the Agency shall give opportunity to
government agencies, members of the public, experts in any relevant discipline and interested groups
to comment on the environmental impact assessment of the activity” [
71
]. However, as Aldinger points
out, public participation in the EIA process in Nigeria has been average at best due to low levels of
public knowledge and awareness of projects and hearings regarding projects [72].
4.3. The Process of Expropriating Land
Section 16.2 of the VGs calls for states to “ensure that the planning and process for expropriation is
transparent and participatory. Anyone likely to be affected should be identified, and properly informed
and consulted at all stages.” Similar requirements are established in the World Bank ESS5 and IFC
Performance Standard 5; these requirements apply to projects funded by the World Bank and IFC.
IFC Performance Standard 5 requires clients to engage with affected communities and disclose relevant
information on projects to allow participation in the planning, monitoring, and implementation of
projects. Moreover, IFC clients must conduct a census to collect appropriate socio-economic baseline
data to identify the persons who will be displaced by project and determine who is eligible for
compensation and resettlement assistance.
In contrast, the LUA does not require the government to survey affected landholders, provide
information on the project, or consult landholders prior to expropriating land for development projects.
Notices of acquisition do not necessarily have to be served prior to expropriating land. Section 28(7) of
the LUA merely states that rights of occupancy shall be extinguished on receipt by him of a notice or
on such later date as may be stated in the notice. According to Otubu, “the Act does not provide for
pre-acquisition notices to be issued and or served on the affected citizens, thus engendering ambushing
tactics, executive tyranny and surprise conducts on the part of the acquiring authority to the detriment
of the populace” [62].
4.4. Compensation for Unregistered Landholders
Section 16.1 of the VGs call for states to “respect all legitimate tenure rights holders, especially
vulnerable and marginalized groups, by
. . .
providing just compensation in accordance with national
law.” The VGs do not define the term “legitimate tenure”, and leave up to define this term in national
laws [
73
]. Section 3.1 of the VGs calls for states to “respect legitimate tenure holders and their rights,
whether formally recorded or not.” The term “legitimate” with regard to land tenure is commonly
defined as including both legal legitimacy (rights recognized by law) and social legitimacy (rights that
have broad acceptance among society) [
74
]. In addition to the VGs, The UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and IFC Performance
Standard 7 establish that indigenous communities have a right to fair compensation when their lands,
territories, and resources are expropriated [60,61,75].
The LUA only grants compensation for statutory and customary rights of occupancy that are
recognized by the State Governor (Section 6, 29, 36(4), LUA). Although the LUA indicates that a
customary right of occupancy can be recognized based on customary use and occupation, it can be
inferred from the law that landholders must obtain a certificate of occupancy or otherwise register their
land rights with the State Governor in order to be eligible for compensation upon expropriation. Section
36(4) of the LUA provides that Governors may register customary rights of occupancy “if satisfied”,
Land 2018,7, 23 15 of 38
indicating that the Governors have broad discretion to decide whether or not to recognize customary
rights. The World Bank LGAF report found that in Nigeria, “compensation
. . .
is paid for some
unregistered rights (such as possession, occupation etc.) however those with other unregistered
rights (which may include grazing, access, gathering forest products etc.) are usually not paid
compensation” [1].
4.5. Valuation of Compensation
As stated above, the VGs call for the creation of land valuation systems that takes into account
non-market values, such as social, cultural, religious, spiritual and environmental values where
applicable. In 37 of 50 countries analyzed, fair market value (FMV) is the legally required method
expropriating authorities must use to value compensation for land and there are no allowable
alternatives which can be used to value land in areas where land markets are weak or non-existent [
2
].
For a variety of reasons and in a range of locations, “market value” may be an insufficient approach
to value land, especially when indigenous and rural community land is expropriated because there
is no FMV and no clear way to compensate for the social, cultural, spiritual values attached to such
land [
2
]. In India, for example, several laws restrict community rights to sell their land so there is a
lack of robust land markets in many community land areas [76].
In terms of appropriate alternatives to valuing compensation, the “replacement cost” approach
(required by the World Bank Environmental and Social Framework), or a combination of the FMV and
replacement cost approach, may be preferable since “replacement cost” focuses more on the amount it
would actually take to replace lost assets [
77
]. In countries with robust and functioning land markets,
the replacement cost should be approximately equal to fair market value, but this is not always the
case [
2
]. In areas with weak or non-existent land markets, the fair market value may be less than the
replacement cost. The FAO Handbook further explains,
Compensation should be for any disturbances or other losses to the livelihoods
. . .
The disturbance accompanying compulsory acquisition often means that people lose access
to the sources of their livelihoods. This can be due to a farmer losing agricultural fields,
a business owner losing a shop, or a community losing its traditional lands [56].
Under Section 29(1) of the LUA, when land is expropriated, holders and occupiers are entitled to
compensation based only on the land’s “unexhausted improvements.” “Unexhausted improvements”
are defined in Section 51 of the LUA “as anything of any quality permanently attached to the land,
directly resulting from the expenditure of capital or labour by an occupier
. . .
and increasing the
productive capacity, the utility or the amenity thereof and includes buildings, plantations of long-lived
crops or trees, fencing
. . .
but does not include the result of ordinary cultivation other than growing
produce”. In other words, compensation is limited to the improvements and crops on the land, but
does not cover the value of the land itself. Presumably the government has discretion to determine
which assets attached to the land have a level of “productive capacity” that is sufficient to justify
compensation. Since the government has discretion to determine which improvements and crops are
worthy of compensation, all landholders are potentially at risk of receiving insufficient compensation.
Yet indigenous communities who use land for subsistence purposes and for other “unproductive”
purposes (e.g., ancestral burial grounds) are at risk of income loss and poverty since this provision
precludes any holders of unfarmed, undeveloped land from obtaining any compensation when their
land is expropriated [62]. As argued by Otubu,
Not only is there no compensation for bare undeveloped land irrespective of whatever cost
incurred at acquiring the land either from the state or the community
. . .
the Act does not
recognize the need to pay compensation for severance
. . .
no compensation [is payable] for
injurious affection and any other incidental and collateral losses . . . [62].
The LUA does not require that compensation reflect the loss of economic activities and intangible
land values, such as spiritual/cultural values. While there is no clear formula for calculating such
Land 2018,7, 23 16 of 38
values, good faith negotiations between developers and communities could be used to capture the
viewpoints of affected landholders regarding these values. Since the LUA does not contain clear
and robust legal provisions that ensure compensation addresses all of these losses, landholders are
vulnerable to losing land without sufficient compensation.
According to a Nigerian lawyer at Lekki Free Zone Development Company (LFZDC) that we
interviewed, the Lagos Lands Bureau has broad discretion to value compensation for crops and
has often used arbitrary, outdated assessment methods resulting in insufficient compensation rates.
Since the LUA does not contain clear legal provisions that ensure compensation addresses all land
values and livelihood losses, and ensure compensation is adjusted for inflation and reflects current
market rates, landholders may have little recourse or ability to hold the Lands Bureau accountable if
they are dissatisfied with compensation decisions. Even if affected landholders challenge compensation
decisions in court, the LUA does not provide adequate guidance for judges to follow when determining
whether compensation decisions violate the law. In essence, the LUA fails to prevent the Lands Bureau
from engaging in arbitrary, ad-hoc decision-making on compensation, and leaves Nigerian landholders
uncertain about whether they have justiciable legal rights to full compensation.
4.6. Prompt Payment of Compensation
The VGs call for “prompt” payments of compensation, but the VGs do not establish an explicit
deadline by which compensation must be paid. International standards established by the World Bank,
IFC, and other bodies typically call for compensation to be paid to the landholder prior to the taking
of possession of acquired land. For instance, IFC Performance Standard 5 states “the client will take
possession of acquired land and related assets only after compensation has been made available” [
78
].
The FAO Handbook explains “when an acquiring agency takes possession before full compensation is
paid, there may be little incentive for it to make the final payment” [56].
Although Section 44 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 requires “prompt” compensation,
the LUA does not require compensation to be paid prior to the taking of possession of the acquired
land. The LUA does not even establish a deadline for payment of compensation. Ostensibly, this means
that compensation may be paid at any time after the acquisition of land. Landholders may have to
wait years to receive compensation, and could be prone to poverty, landlessness, homelessness, food
insecurity, and other serious risks while waiting. According to the World Bank LGAF report on Nigeria,
“the speed at which compensations are paid to property owners is also very slow
. . .
a large number of
acquisitions occur without prompt and adequate compensation” [1].
4.7. A Right to Negotiate Fair Compensation
Although the VGs do not explicitly call for states to provide affected landholders with the
right to negotiate compensation levels, Section 16.6 of the VGs establishes that “all parties should
endeavor to prevent corruption, particularly through use of objectively assessed values, transparent
and decentralized processes
. . .
” It can be argued that compensation negotiations are necessary to
obtain “objectively” assessed values, since the alternative is compensation rates-based solely on the
government’s opinion. The FAO Handbook explains that “fair and transparent negotiations help break
down barriers between the acquiring agency and these land is being acquired, and permit each party
to better understand the needs of the other” [
56
]. Other international standards call for procedures by
which affected landholders are granted the opportunity to negotiate fair compensation; for instance,
IFC Performance Standard 5 requires projectdevelopers (i.e., clients) to allow communities to give input
on how much compensation they should receive through a process of community engagement [
19
,
78
].
Under the IFC, affected landholders are permitted to reject offers of compensation and participate in
the compensation and resettlement decision-making [78].
The LUA does not grant affected landholders the right to negotiate compensation. As discussed
above, the Lands Bureau is granted broad discretion to determine a fair rate of compensation without a
system of checks to ensure objective assessment. The Lands Bureau can conduct the valuation without
Land 2018,7, 23 17 of 38
consulting, negotiating, or otherwise obtaining input from affected landholders. Without a procedure
by which affected landholders can participate in compensation decision-making, it is unlikely that the
Lands Bureau will be equipped to fully comprehend the magnitude of the livelihood losses that result
from expropriation. The LUA’s “take it or leave it” approach to providing compensation could force
affected landholder into the unfavorable position of having to choose between no compensation and
insufficient compensation.
4.8. The Right to Challenge Compensation Decisions in Court or before Tribunals
Section 16.6 of the VGs also calls for states to provide a right to appeal compensation decisions.
Such appeals may be needed if the government calculates compensation using illegal or incorrect
methods and, consequently, landholders are left with insufficient compensation [13].
Nigerian law complies with this VGs principle because it grants affected landholders the right to
seek redress in court. Section 44 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 provides “any person claiming
such compensation [shall be given] a right of access, for determinations of his interest in the property
and the amount of compensation, to the High Court having jurisdiction in that part of Nigeria.” Also,
Section 39(1)(b) of the LUA grants the High Court exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings to
determine any question as to the persons entitled to compensation payable for improvements on the
land.” However, further research is needed to determine whether landholders are usually afforded
redress in court when they wish to challenge compensation decisions. As previously discussed, since
the LUA does not provide clear procedures or guidance on valuing compensation, it is unclear whether
courts will be able to effectively scrutinize compensation decisions. The World Bank LGAF report
found that “in the instances where complaints about expropriation were lodged [in the three years
prior to the LGAF study], a few were listened to but decisions on them were rarely reached on time” [
1
].
4.9. Provision of Productive Alternative Land
Section 16.9 of the VGs establishes that, when acquiring land in a compulsory manner,
“States should, to the extent that resources permit, take appropriate measures to provide adequate
access
. . .
to productive land.” The World Bank ESF and IFC Performance Standards also require
options for alternative land.
The LUA partially complies with this provision because it permits alternative land to be granted
to affected landholders if their right of occupancy is revoked; however, the Governor has discretion
to offer alternatives but is not legally obligated to do so. The LUA grants affected landholders
either monetary compensation or alternative land, but not both. Moreover, there is nothing in
the LUA requiring that alternative land be productive, suitable, or of the same status as the land
acquired. Section 33 of the LUA provides that the “
Governor . . .
may in his or its discretion offer
in lieu of
compensation . . .
resettlement in any other place or area by way of reasonable alternative
accommodation (if appropriate in the circumstances).” Yet there is nothing in this provision that
guarantees suitable alternative land for affected landholders. More importantly, Nigeria lacks a
robust resettlement and rehabilitation procedure that protects landholders displaced by expropriation
and ensures their livelihood reconstruction post-displacement. Without such a procedure, affected
populations may be far more likely to suffer from displacement, homelessness, joblessness, increased
morbidity, food insecurity, and other risks [
16
]. For a summary of the legal analysis provided in this
Section, see Table 2.
Land 2018,7, 23 18 of 38
Table 2. Summary of the Legal Analysis.
International Standard Origin of the
Standard
Does Nigeria’s LUA
Comply with This
Standard?
Comment
States should clearly define the
concept of public purpose in law, in
order to allow for judicial review
FAO VGs
Section 16.1 No Section 51 of the LUA vaguely defines
“public purpose”
States should acquire only the
minimum resources necessary.
States should be sensitive where
proposed expropriations involve
areas of particular cultural, religious,
or environmental significance, or
where the land is particularly
important to the livelihoods of the
poor and vulnerable.
FAO VGs
16.1–16.2
Mostly no with the
exception of the EIA
Decree 1992
The LUA does not require State
Governors to minimize the amount of
land acquired to the amount necessary to
achieve a public purpose.
Aside from the EIA requirement,
Nigeria’s laws do not require the
government to be sensitive to areas of
cultural, religious, or environmental
significance or areas held by the poor and
vulnerable groups such as indigenous
communities when deciding
to expropriate.
States should ensure that the planning
and process for expropriation is
transparent and participatory.
Anyone likely to be affected should be
identified, and properly informed and
consulted at all stages
FAO VGs
Section 16.2 No
The LUA does not require the
government to survey affected
landholders, provide information on the
project, or consult landholders prior to
expropriating land for
development projects.
States should respect all legitimate
tenure rights holders, especially
vulnerable and marginalized groups,
by providing prompt and
just compensation
Land valuation systems should take
into account non-market values, such
as social, cultural, religious, spiritual
and environmental values
FAO VGs
Sections 16.1
and 18.2
Partial
The LUA only grants compensation for
statutory and customary rights of
occupancy that are recognized by the
State Governor
Compensation is limited to the
improvements and crops on the land, but
does not cover the value of the land itself.
The LUA precludes holders of unfarmed,
undeveloped land from obtaining any
compensation when their land
is expropriated
The LUA does not require compensation
to be paid prior to the taking of
possession of the acquired land. There is
no established deadline for payment.
All parties should endeavor to
prevent corruption, particularly
through use of objectively assessed
values, transparent and
decentralized processes.
FAO VGs 16.6 No
The LUA does not grant affected
landholders the right to
negotiate compensation.
The Lands Bureau is granted broad
discretion to determine a rate of
compensation. There is no guidance on
valuing compensation to allow for judges
to scrutinize compensation decisions.
States should provide a right to
appeal compensation decisions FAO VGs 16.6 Yes
Section 44 of the Constitution of Nigeria
provides the right to appeal
compensation decisions in court
States should, take appropriate
measures to provide adequate access
to productive land
FAO VGs 16.9 Partial
The LUA permits alternative land to be
granted to affected landholders if their
right of occupancy is revoked; however,
the Governor has discretion to offer
alternatives but is not legally obligated to
do so-affected landholders can receive
either monetary compensation or
alternative land, but not both.
There is no established resettlement
procedure which ensures livelihood
reconstruction for affected populations
5. Examination of LFTZ Case
This section provides an overview of the events that unfolded in Lekki since the inception of
the LFTZ. It also reveals findings from in-person surveys of 140 affected households; these surveys
Land 2018,7, 23 19 of 38
were conducted with 10 communities affected by the LFTZ. This section also discusses findings on the
LFTZ case gathered from interviews with government officials and company representatives and desk
reviews of relevant primary and secondary sources.
5.1. Background on the Development of the LFTZ
To address economic stagnation, the Nigerian government has sought out foreign investors to
stimulate economic growth through public infrastructure investment [
79
]. Chinese investors have
been among those most willing to finance development projects in Nigeria [
79
]. Trade between China
and Nigeria increased from 2 billion USD in 2000 to 18 billion USD in 2010, making Nigeria a top
destination for Chinese Foreign Direct Investment [
79
]. In 2015 alone, $9.2 billion of Chinese goods
were shipped from China to Nigeria [4].
Nigeria became a target for Chinese investors following the end of Nigerian military rule and the
democratic election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 [
79
]. Throughout Obasanjo’s presidency,
China and Nigeria signed a series of agreements and MOUs establishing trade offices and investment
centers. Obasanjo’s main goals with China were to trade “oil for infrastructure”, to improve the quality
of Chinese manufactured goods entering the Nigerian market, and to establish tax-exempted export
processing zones (i.e., free trade zones) [
11
]. The Lekki Free Trade Zone is the first zone in Nigeria in
which Chinese companies are majority shareholders [11].
In 2006, the LFTZ was initiated through a joint venture between a state-owned company called
Lekki Worldwide Investments (LWI), the Lagos State Government, and a Chinese consortium of
companies, lead by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), which is now called
China-Africa Lekki Investment Ltd. (CALI, Lagos, Nigeria) [
80
]. This joint venture resulted in
the establishment of the Lekki Free Zone Development Company (LFZDC). The China Railway
Construction Company, China-Africa Development Fund, China Civil Engineering Construction
Corporation, and Nanjing Jianging Economic and Technological Development Corporation established
CALI as a joint venture in March of 2006 [
80
]. CALI owns sixty percent of the LFZDC equity, and LWI
owns 40% [
80
]. Following the Nigeria Export Processing Zones Act 63 of 1992, the Nigerian federal
government and Lagos State government authorized LFZDC as the sole legal entity responsible for
developing, operating, and managing the LFTZ [
4
,
80
]. The main investment sectors of the LFTZ
are manufacturing, oil and gas (storage and distribution), real estate, tourism and infrastructure
development. According to the LFZDC website, the stated objectives of the LFTZ are to stimulate the
Nigerian economy, create a global economic haven, create and encourage integration with foreign
partners, generate employment opportunities, attract foreign investment, diversify the Lagos revenue
base, “ensure effective exploration” of Nigeria’s resources, and create wealth for citizens [80].
Since Chinese investors are the majority shareholders of the LFZDC, it is important to recognize
potential influence that these investors have over the LSG and the possible power dynamics between
investors, the government, and the public. Investors typically have a primary interest in making
profit, and may be incentivized to avoid the costs associated with investing in countries with extensive
regulations, including obligations to compensation and resettle affected landholders. For this reason,
investors may view Nigeria as attractive since there are only minimal compensation requirements
established in the LUA. As it stands, the LUA enables investors to acquire land from governments
relatively easily without having to overcome too many legal hurdles. Investor influence over
development projects may affect whether the LSG decides to reform the LUA to include more
robust compensation and resettlement requirements that safeguard the rights of local landholders.
Reforming the LUA may be unappealing to government and private investors that currently benefit
from the status quo because the establishment of more robust compensation packages and resettlement
and rehabilitation procedures may slow down the land acquisition process and increase costs for
project backers. Nevertheless, even if it is more expensive for governments and investors in the short
term, it may be in their best interests in the long term to fully compensate and otherwise accommodate
affected landholders prior to initiating projects because research has shown that failure to do so could
Land 2018,7, 23 20 of 38
lead to significant work project delays, work stoppages, and increased costs if local communities
choose to protest or challenge projects in court [81].
Another issue to consider is that, even if the LUA is reformed so that it adopts international
standards, the LSG may still decide to turn a blind eye to violations or only selectively enforce the law
in a way that advantages investors as opposed to landholders and the public. For example, the LSG
may promise the public that a proposed expropriation will create many jobs and use “economic
development” as pretext to disguise an expropriation that is actually intended solely to serve private
interests. These potential issues warrant their own study since they are not sufficiently examined in
this article.
In October 2006, LFZDC began developing phase 1 of the LFTZ, which required 1200 hectares of
land for the creation of China-Nigeria Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone [
4
]. The initial agreement
stated that the Chinese consortium must provide $200 million for the LSG to allocate the land, and for
Nigerian investors to invest $67 million in the LFTZ [
9
]. However, there was no stipulation in the
agreement that the Consortium’s money must be paid up front, hence the project faced financing issues.
Consequently, LSG had to spend $67 million of the state’s budget in 2009 to fill this financial gap [9].
According to the LFTZ Master Plan, the LFTZ will serve as a multi-functional economic zone and
a new modern city (see Figure 1). The construction of the LFTZ is divided into four phases:
•
Phase 1 (Southwest Quadrant) will serve a mixed of industries, workers housing, and residences;
•Phase 2 (Southeast Quadrant) will serve petrochemical, oil and gas industries;
•Phase 3 (Northwest Quadrant) will provide workers housing and space for a mix of industries;
•
Phase 4 (Northeast Quadrant) will serve commercial businesses, tourism, residential, and other
purposes. Thus far it appears that only phase 1 has been completed [4,9].
Land 2018, 7, x; doi: FOR PEER REVIEW 20 of 33
According to the LFTZ Master Plan, the LFTZ will serve as a multi-functional economic zone
and a new modern city (see Figure 1). The construction of the LFTZ is divided into four phases:
• Phase 1 (Southwest Quadrant) will serve a mixed of industries, workers housing, and
residences;
• Phase 2 (Southeast Quadrant) will serve petrochemical, oil and gas industries;
• Phase 3 (Northwest Quadrant) will provide workers housing and space for a mix of industries;
• Phase 4 (Northeast Quadrant) will serve commercial businesses, tourism, residential, and other
purposes. Thus far it appears that only phase 1 has been completed [4,9].
Figure 1. Lekki Free Trade Zone Master Plan.
While the construction of phase 1 has been completed, progress on the other phases has been
slow and riddled with delays due to financial planning and other issues [4]. Based on our tour of the
LFTZ, it appears that some factories employ Nigerians. We saw a few Nigerians working security at
the front gate of the LFTZ and producing goods in one of the factories located inside the LFTZ. The
LFTZ officials we interviewed did not provide us information about job creation, but, it was
apparent from our tour and research of the LFTZ that the goal of 300,000 direct jobs for Nigerians
was far from reach.
5.2. MOU between LWIL, LSG, and Affected Communities
After publishing a notice in an Official Gazette, the Government acquired 823 Sq. Kilometers of
land through expropriation in 1993 [6]. In 2004, 16,500 hectares of this land were set aside for the
LFTZ. According to a lawyer we interviewed at Social and Environmental Rights Action Center
Figure 1. Lekki Free Trade Zone Master Plan.
Land 2018,7, 23 21 of 38
While the construction of phase 1 has been completed, progress on the other phases has been slow
and riddled with delays due to financial planning and other issues [
4
]. Based on our tour of the LFTZ,
it appears that some factories employ Nigerians. We saw a few Nigerians working security at the
front gate of the LFTZ and producing goods in one of the factories located inside the LFTZ. The LFTZ
officials we interviewed did not provide us information about job creation, but, it was apparent from
our tour and research of the LFTZ that the goal of 300,000 direct jobs for Nigerians was far from reach.
5.2. MOU between LWIL, LSG, and Affected Communities
After publishing a notice in an Official Gazette, the Government acquired 823 Sq. Kilometers of
land through expropriation in 1993 [
6
]. In 2004, 16,500 hectares of this land were set aside for the LFTZ.
According to a lawyer we interviewed at Social and Environmental Rights Action Center (SERAC),
3
a Nigerian NGO consisting primarily of human rights lawyers, the LSG did not consider compensating
affected communities or providing them with alternative land until SERAC began advocating on
behalf of the communities in 2007. As shown from the survey findings, the LSG apparently left
many community members in the dark about its plans to build the LFTZ and did not promise them
compensation, either in 2007 or in subsequent years prior to our August 2017 survey. After SERAC
decided to represent and defend communities affected by the LFTZ, a series of meetings led to
the development of an MOU in 2007 between the LSG, the Ibeju-Lekki Local Government Council,
nine affected communities, and Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited (LWIL) [
82
]. It is unclear as to
why exactly the LSG finally agreed to develop an MOU, but the lawyer we interviewed indicated that
pressure from human rights advocates and affected communities contributed to compensation plans
becoming part of the government’s agenda. Accredited representatives of the affected communities
signed the MOU, which obtained consent from the village chiefs. However, it is doubtful, based on
our survey research, that all community members were consulted and informed about the MOU prior
to the signing it. Nine communities, which are parties to the MOU, reside along the Lekki coast.
These communities are:
1. Idasho
2. Idotun
3. Illege
4. Imobido
5. Itoke
6. Okunraiye
7. Illekuru
8. Tiye
9. Imagbon-Segun
Although SERAC represented nine communities in the MOU, there may be as many as
26 communities actually affected by the LFTZ, according to the SERAC representative. The MOU states
that the LFTZ must comply with all applicable national and international legal standards. The MOU
obliges the LSG to provide a number of compensation entitlements to affected communities, including:
•A 2.5% equity share capital in LWIL;
•Workforce development initiatives such as skills training, job creation, and capacity building;
•Access to educational opportunities at primary and secondary schools;
•Access to health care and recreational services;
•Prompt payment of compensation for all genuine claims made by members of affected villages;
3
SERAC is a Nigerian human rights organization that represented nine affected communities when negotiating the 2007
MOU with the LSG and interested companies.
Land 2018,7, 23 22 of 38
•
No less than 750 hectares of unencumbered land for the resettlement of communities displaced by
the project; and
•Certificates of occupancy covering the 750 hectares of unencumbered land.
The MOU also states that the LSG shall not displace the three communities (Idotun, Itoke,
and Okunraiye) whose land is identified for a proposed seaport and, if such seaport is developed,
shall provide no less than 170 hectares of unencumbered alternative land. These communities have
not yet been displaced; however, the seaport is currently under construction and communities in the
area believe displacement is imminent. In their interviews, some communities alleged that they had
been threatened to vacate by company officials involved in the seaport’s construction.
A close examination of the MOU reveals serious flaws. Firstly, the MOU does not provide specifics
regarding where the resettlement land must be located, how many jobs must be provided, how many
schools and healthcare facilities must be built, and how much compensation must be paid.
Secondly, there is no deadline by which MOU entitlements must be honored, meaning they may
be honored at any time. As discussed below, the lack of a deadline enabled the LSG and LWIL to
proceed for the past ten years without honoring the provisions of the MOU.
Thirdly, the MOU lumps all entitlements into one pot to be given to all nine communities, and thus
ignores inter- and intra-community differences, such as different socio-economic and demographic
profiles, endowments of land, crop yields, income levels, and more. According to the MOU,
the 750 hectares promised as resettlement land are supposed to be shared by all nine communities.
As discussed below, the implementation of this MOU provision led to a convoluted tenure arrangement
in which overlapping claims and competing interests prevented affected communities from taking
possession of resettlement land.
Fourthly, the MOU designates a Resettlement Committee
4
as the entity responsible for
implementing the provisions of the MOU, but fails to establish specific obligations that the Committee
must fulfill. There is no requirement in the MOU stipulating how often the Committee must meet and
the MOU does not prescribe a timeframe for fulfilling the various provisions. The MOU further states
that the Committee must ensure that “members of the affected villages and communities have free
and effective access to information relevant to their understanding and participation in the LFTZ.”
The MOU states, in the event of a dispute regarding the MOU, parties can appoint mediators and, if
that fails, can settle the dispute through arbitration. However, the lack of clear deadlines and other
obligations imposed on the Resettlement Committee makes it difficult for affected communities to find
grounds on which to challenge decisions taken by the Committee and otherwise hold the Committee
accountable for ensuring compliance with the MOU.
For the reasons stated above, the wording of the MOU is problematic because it does not impose
specific, concrete obligations on the LSG and LWI that ensure the reconstruction of community
livelihoods post-expropriation. While the empirical research presented in the following sections does
not clarify why the MOU was worded in such a vague manner, this research does show what can
happen when an MOU contains ambiguous language and why clearer MOU provisions are needed to
ensure fair compensation and livelihood reconstruction. The survey findings indicate, to some extent,
whether the LSG abided by the MOU and the LUA as they are currently written. Specifically, the survey
research provides an indication of whether compensation, alternative land, and other entitlements
were paid to communities, and whether the LSG followed a transparent and participatory process
when expropriating community farmland. For this reason, the survey findings serve the purpose of
providing readers with a deeper understanding of the impact of Nigeria’s weak expropriation laws
4
The Resettlement Committee is charged with implementing the MOU and must be comprised of representatives from the
Ibeju-Lekki Local Government Council, LWIL, and affected communities. The LSG must ensure that affected villages and
communities constitute no less than 30% representation of the Resettlement Committee.
Land 2018,7, 23 23 of 38
on local populations, and what steps must be taken to ensure expropriation practices comply with
international standards on expropriation, compensation, and resettlement in the future.
5.3. Survey of Affected Communities
The research findings discussed below are based on surveys conducted in August 2017 with
140 households from 10 different affected communities. To support the information given by
these communities, interviews were also conducted with Social and Environmental Rights Action
Center (SERAC), the Lekki Free Zone Development Company (LFZDC), the Lands Bureau, Lagos
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Cooperatives, and Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited (LWIL).
Public records, including the 2007 MOU and the 2016 “Government White Paper on the Report
of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Cause of Civil Disturbances at the Lekki Free Trade Zone on
12 October 2015
” (hereinafter “Government White Paper”)
5
were also reviewed [
6
]. The evidence
provided here is also supported by secondary sources including news articles.
In August 2017, we surveyed 140 households from 10 affected communities, nine of which
signed the MOU through their representatives, to determine whether they had received compensation,
alternative land, or other entitlements promised by the MOU. The authors conducted the surveys
during group meetings with community members and asked questions reported in the questionnaire
form available in the supplementary files together with the full survey results (see Supplementary
Materials). For the sake of clarity, the main survey questions are displayed in Table 3.
Table 3. List of Survey Questions.
List of Survey Questions
1. How many people live in your household?
2. What is the highest level of education you attained?
3. What is your age?
4. What is your primary occupation?
5. Can you read and write?
6. What types of crops did you grown on your land before the expropriation?
7. How many hectares was your farmland?
8. Approximately how many kilograms (kg) of crops did you grow annually?
9. Was access to your farmland limited as a result of the LFTZ?
10.
How many crops have you grown annually since the expropriation?
11.
Were you informed about the LFTZ before construction began?
12.
Were you consulted about the implications of the project on your community?
13.
Were you given an opportunity to given input in the expropriation?
14. Were you made aware of an environmental impact assessment or social impact assessment conducted for
the project?
15.
Were you given an opportunity to negotiate compensation?
16.
Were you told which factors were considered when calculating compensation?
17.
What types of compensation were you promised? (e.g., money, alternative land, jobs, or equity shares)
18.
Did the amount of compensation provided cover all of your losses?
In order to conduct the surveys, we had to first obtain permission from each community chief.
Once the chiefs consented, they would ask members of the community to come and participate in the
5
As discussed in Section 1, the White Paper was published in response to a clash between affected communities and police
that ensued after communities barricaded the entrance to LFTZ in protest of the project. The incident resulted in the death
of the Managing Director of the LFTZ, Tajudeen Disu. Disu reportedly died from a gunshot, but there were conflicting
accounts of who fired the shot. The police subsequently arrested Okunraiye community members believed to be responsible
for the death. Meanwhile, community members stated in a sworn affidavit that a stray bullet fired by police killed Disu.
Land 2018,7, 23 24 of 38
survey. Under customary norms and practices of the communities, the male heads of household have
sole authority to speak on behalf of the household. A total of seven widows also participated in the
survey. Due to customary rules imposed on us, we were not able to ensure a gender-sensitive
survey was conducted. Respondents had to be selected for the survey based on whether they
were willing and able to participate in the community meetings during which we were allowed
to administer the questionnaire. For these reasons, randomization of the sample was not possible
because we had to comply with communities’ customary norms (i.e., if we refused to comply with
the chief’s rules, we would not be allowed to conduct the surveys). Before beginning the surveys,
we gave community members an opportunity to discuss their opinions about the LFTZ in front of
the whole group. Some of information obtained at the community meetings was included in the
analysis
(See Sections 5.10 and 5.11)
. We then began surveying respondents—one household at a
time—using tablets and a program called Survey CTO, which enabled us to collect and analyze the
survey results electronically.
For this survey, any sampling stratification would be highly speculative, since there is no official
register or list of all those living within the affected communities, so the total population of affected
communities and their socio-economic and demographic composition is unknown. Due to time and
funding constraints, the authors were only able to spend a few hours in each community, so participant
observation and ethnographic data was not collected to supplement the survey data. When asked
how many households and individuals lived within each community, the chiefs and other community
members were only able to give us a rough estimate of total households. Using this information
provided by the chiefs, we estimate that our sample represents around 13% of the total number
of households in the 10 communities based on the estimated total number of households in each
community as shown in Table 4.
6
For information on the gender, age, literacy levels, education, and
employment status of affected communities, see Table 5.
Table 4. Sample composition: respondents by community.
Community No. of Respondents
(Household Heads) [a]
Share (%) of Resp.
in the Sample [b]
Estimated Total No.
of Households [c]
Respondents/Total No.
of Households (%) [d]
Idasho 20 14.29 110 18.18
Idotun 23 16.42 80 28.75
Ilege 6 4.29 120 5.00
Imobido 6 4.29 100 6.00
Itoke 21 15.00 90 23.33
Okunraye 17 12.14 250 6.80
Ilekuru 11 7.86 50 22.00
Tiye 17 12.14 100 17.00
Imagbon-Segun 9 6.43 150 6.00
Oke-Segun 10 7.14 40 25.00
Total 140 100.00 1090 12.84
Table 5. Sample composition: main socio-economic and demographic features.
GENDER
Sex N %
Male 123 87.86
Female 17 12.14
Total 140 100.00
6Estimates were given to respondents by the community chiefs.
Land 2018,7, 23 25 of 38
Table 5. Cont.
AGE
Age group N %
25–34 34 24.29
35–44 42 30.00
45–54 27 19.28
55–64 3 2.14
65+ 34 24.29
Total 140 100.00
LITERACY
Literacy level N %
Cannot read and write 41 29.29
Can sign (write) only 3 2.14
Can read only 3 2.14
Can read and write 93 66.43
Total 140 100.00
EDUCATION
Highest grade completed N %
None/never attended school 27 19.29
Pre-primary/Kindergarten 1 0.71
Primary 49 35
Secondary 50 35.71
Higher 13 9.29
Total 140 100.00
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Current employment status (last week) N %
Worked for pay (salary, wage, self-employed, . . . )51 36.42
Worked without pay (apprentice, family business, . . . )39 27.86
Did not work but have a job (sick, vacation, seasonal, ...) 3 2.14
Did not work but looked for a job 13 9.29
Did not work and didn’t look for a job (unemployed, retired
. . .
)
34 24.29
Total 140 100.00
5.4. Access to Information and Participation during the Expropriation Process
Several survey questions focused on the extent to which households were given access to
information about the LFTZ project, and whether communities were given an opportunity to give input
on project plans or otherwise participate in the decision-making expropriation process. Furthermore,
since Nigerian law stipulates that an EIA must be conducted prior to initiating development projects
that impact the environment, the survey also asked whether respondents were made aware of an EIA
conducted for the project.
As shown in Table 4, our survey coupled with our interview with SERAC indicates that the LSG
failed to adequately survey, inform, and consult many of the affected communities living in the vicinity
of the LFTZ prior to the acquisition of 16,500 hectares of land in 2004. The vast majority of households
interviewed responded that the government and private companies did not inform or consult them
regarding the LFTZ prior to taking possession of the land (see Table 6). Overall, the results from the
survey suggest that the level of participation of local communities during the land acquisition process
was very low, and communities were granted little to no information on the LFTZ project as shown in
Table 7.
Land 2018,7, 23 26 of 38
Table 6. Participation and information of local communities affected by the LFTZ.
Question Yes No
N % N %
Were you informed about the LFTZ project before the project began? 34
24.29
106 75.71
Before the project began, were you consulted about the implications of the
project on your community? 5 3.57 135 96.43
Were you informed about the expropriation before the project began? 21
15.00
119 85.00
Were you given an opportunity to give input in the expropriation plans? 4 2.86 136 97.14
Were you made aware of any environmental/social impact assessment
conducted for the project? 3 2.14 137 97.86
Table 7. Level of information given to each community.
Were You Informed about the LFTZ
Project before the Project Began?
Were You Informed about the
Expropriation before the Project Began?
Community No Yes No Yes
Idasho 18 2 18 2
Idotun 22 1 22 1
Ilege 4 2 5 1
Imobido 1 5 1 5
Itoke 19 2 20 1
Okunraye 13 4 15 2
Ilekuru 5 6 6 5
Tiye 15 2 16 1
Imagbon-Segun 1 8 8 1
Oke-Segun 8 2 8 2
Total 106 34 119 21
5.5. Compensation Paid for Crops
From 2010–2013, the LSG paid some compensation for crops and buildings but not for empty
land, even though the MOU entitles affected communities to compensation for land [
4
,
6
]. Based on
the evidence available, it is not clear exactly how much total compensation was paid or how the
compensation was calculated. According to the Government White Paper, “the scale used by LSG
for compensation in 2010–2013 was drawn up in 2000, at least a 10 year gap. That scale has by
reason of inflation and depreciation of the Naira become obsolete and should have been revised
upwards” [
6
]. The LFZDC, LWIL, the Lands Bureau, and Ministry of Commerce were unable to
provide us with records of compensation payments or details on the methods used to calculate
compensation. The Lands Bureau stated in the interview that some compensation was paid to the local
chiefs and heads of families and that the Bureau is still in the process of compensating communities.
In 2016, a local newspaper reported that Lagos State Governor Ambode paid an initial 66 Million
Naira to affected communities (approximately 183,000 USD) and that Ambode approved an additional
740 Million Naira (approximately 2 million dollars) in compensation for the affected communities [
83
].
Presumably all of the compensation was sent to the Resettlement Committee, which, under the MOU,
is charged with allocating compensation and other entitlements among the affected communities.
According to the Guardian article,
Ambode said that an initial 66 million [Naira] had been paid to owners of Parcel A
lands, which houses the Dangote Refinery and some other companies while the new
compensation approved was for host communities of Parcel B, comprising Yegunda and
Abomiti zones [83].
Table 8shows that 56 of 140 households (40%) surveyed were promised compensation, but only
1 household claimed they were given an opportunity to negotiate compensation. Only 4 of those
Land 2018,7, 23 27 of 38
56 households (7%) were told how compensation was calculated. Only 38 respondents out of 140 (27%)
stated that they actually received any compensation (Figure 2), and the vast majority of them (97%)
felt that this compensation did not cover all of their losses (Figure 2).
Table 8. Promised Compensation.
QUESTION YES NO DO NOT KNOW
N % N % N %
Were you promised any compensation for the expropriation? 56
40.00
83
59.29
1 0.71
Were you given the opportunity to negotiate compensation?
(Only if answered YES to previous question) 1
1.79
55
98.21
0 0.0
Were you told how compensation was calculated? (Only if
answered YES to the first question) 4
7.14
52
92.86
0 0.0
Land 2018, 7, x; doi: FOR PEER REVIEW 27 of 33
Were you told how compensation was calculated? (Only if
answered YES to the first question) 4 7.14 52 92.86 0 0.0
Figure 2. Actual compensation and level of satisfaction (n = 140 respondents).
In a few cases only a lump sum payment for all crops was granted, but it was unclear to the
households surveyed how exactly this payment was calculated. In other cases, the respondents were
able to report the value of the compensation received for a specific crop, but again the method used
to calculate this amount remained unclear. For instance, the reported compensation for cassava
ranged from a minimum of 20,000 Naira to a maximum of 100,000 Naira, while the reported
compensation for maize ranged between 10,000 and 20,000 Naira (see Table 9). Moreover, the survey
findings suggest that there is no clear proportionality between the reported compensation and the
average number of hectares of farmland cultivated by households or the average seasonal yield
claimed by respondents before the expropriation.
Despite restrictions on the sample size and the risk of respondents overstating or misreporting
the quantity of cassava or maize produced on an average season before the expropriation, we
calculated the average price at which cassava was reportedly compensated at 12.85 Naira/kg and the
average compensation price paid for maize (1.94 Naira/kg. Both values appear to be only a fraction
of the retail market price we estimated for cassava (average 141.23 Naira/kg; Min = 60; Max = 412.96)
and maize (average 119.66 Naira/kg; Min = 60; Max = 412.96) based on FEWS NET data [84].
7
Even
including those who declared that they were compensated for a crop that their household was not
cultivating at the time of the expropriation, our simulations shows that the reported compensation
tended to be on average much lower in value when compared to a compensation calculated based on
the market price of the crop.
We interviewed an official at the Lagos Lands Bureau who stated that compensation was paid,
but did not provide us with documentation or exact figures on compensation payments. This official
also stated that the Lands Bureau is in the process of providing more compensation to communities.
Some community members we interviewed stated that compensation was, in some cases, as low as
10,000 Naira (27 USD) for all crops. Results from the survey suggest that the calculation of the
amount of compensation to be paid for the loss of crops was often discretional. Indeed, respondents
frequently reported different levels of compensation for the very same crop, even inside the same
community. Alternatively, they reported they were compensated for a crop they did not grow before
expropriation (See Table 9). In turns, the survey results suggest that compensation was often
7
Price estimates are obtained from the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), a project funded
by USAID. We used all of the historical data available for Cassava and Maize Retail Prices in the Mile 12 Market
in Lagos.
Figure 2. Actual compensation and level of satisfaction (n = 140 respondents).
In a few cases only a lump sum payment for all crops was granted, but it was unclear to the
households surveyed how exactly this payment was calculated. In other cases, the respondents were
able to report the value of the compensation received for a specific crop, but again the method used to
calculate this amount remained unclear. For instance, the reported compensation for cassava ranged
from a minimum of 20,000 Naira to a maximum of 100,000 Naira, while the reported compensation for
maize ranged between 10,000 and 20,000 Naira (see Table 9). Moreover, the survey findings suggest
that there is no clear proportionality between the reported compensation and the average number of
hectares of farmland cultivated by households or the average seasonal yield claimed by respondents
before the expropriation.
Despite restrictions on the sample size and the risk of respondents overstating or misreporting the
quantity of cassava or maize produced on an average season before the expropriation, we calculated
the average price at which cassava was reportedly compensated at 12.85 Naira/kg and the average
compensation price paid for maize (1.94 Naira/kg. Both values appear to be only a fraction of the retail
market price we estimated for cassava (average 141.23 Naira/kg; Min = 60; Max = 412.96) and maize
(average 119.66 Naira/kg; Min = 60; Max = 412.96) based on FEWS NET data [
84
].
7
Even including
those who declared that they were compensated for a crop that their household was not cultivating at
the time of the expropriation, our simulations shows that the reported compensation tended to be on
average much lower in value when compared to a compensation calculated based on the market price
of the crop.
7
Price estimates are obtained from the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), a project funded by USAID.
We used all of the historical data available for Cassava and Maize Retail Prices in the Mile 12 Market in Lagos.
Land 2018,7, 23 28 of 38
Table 9. Reported compensation for selected crops and estimates of compensation at market price.
CASSAVA
[1] Community
[2] Reported average
ha of farmland
cultivated before
expropriation
[3] Reported average
Cassava production
before expropriation
(Kg/season)
[4] Reported total value
of the compensation
received for cassava
(NGN)
[5] Reported
compensation
(NGN/Kg)
[6] Value of
compensation at
market price
(Assuming cassava
@141.23 NGN/Kg)
[7] Difference between
reported compensation vs.
compensation at market
price (simulation
@141.23 NGN/Kg)
Imagbon-Segun 5 0 20,000 NA 0 20,000.00
Imagbon-Segun 10 5000 20,000 4.00 706,150 −686,150.00
Okunraye 2 600 20,000 33.33 84,738 −64,738.00
Okunraye 5 3500 40,000 11.43 494,305 −454,305.00
Okunraye 61 2000 60,000 30.00 282,460 −222,460.00
Okunraye 0.4 0 100,000 NA 0 100,000.00
Okunraye 6 5000 65,000 13.00 706,150 −641,150.00
Okunraye 5 0 65,000 NA 0 65000.00
Tiye 1.5 6400 20,000 3.13 903,872 −88,3872.00
Tiye 2 800 25,000 31.25 112,984 −87,984.00
Ilekuru 0.3 9600 42,000 4.38 1,355,808 −1,313,808.00
Idotun 120 8000 30,000 3.75 1,129,840 −1,099,840.00
Idotun 112 57,600 25,000 0.43 8,134,848 −8,109,848.00
Ilege 20 3000 20,000 6.67 423,690 −403,690.00
AVERAGE 25.01 7250.00 39,428.57 ($109 USD) 12.85 ($0.03 per Kg) 1,023,917.50 ($2844) −984,488.93 (−$2735)
MAIZE
Community
Reported average ha
of farmland
cultivated before
expropriation
Reported average
production before
expropriation
(Kg/season)
Reported total value of
the compensation
received for maize
(NGN)
Reported
compensation
(NGN/Kg)
Value of
compensation at
market price
(Assuming Maize
@119.66 NGN/Kg **)
Difference between
reported compensation vs.
compensation at market
price (@119.66 NGN/Kg **)
Imagbon-Segun 7 0 0 NA 0 0
Imagbon-Segun 0 0 10,000 NA 0 10000
Okunraye 5 4500 10,000 2.22 53,8470 −52,8470
Okunraye 6 3000 65,000 21.67 358,980 −293,980
AVERAGE 4.50 1875.00 21,250.00 ($59) 11.94 ($0.03 per Kg) 224,362.50 ($623) −203,112.50 (−$565)
* The market price for cassava is obtained as the average retail price for the period 2004–2017 in the Mile 12 Market, Lagos (source: http://www.fews.net/content/staple-food-price- data);
** The market price for maize is obtained as the average retail price for the period 2009–2017 in the Mile 12 Market, Lagos (source: http://www.fews.net/content/staple-food-price-data).
Land 2018,7, 23 29 of 38
We interviewed an official at the Lagos Lands Bureau who stated that compensation was paid,
but did not provide us with documentation or exact figures on compensation payments. This official
also stated that the Lands Bureau is in the process of providing more compensation to communities.
Some community members we interviewed stated that compensation was, in some cases, as low as
10,000 Naira (27 USD) for all crops. Results from the survey suggest that the calculation of the amount
of compensation to be paid for the loss of crops was often discretional. Indeed, respondents frequently
reported different levels of compensation for the very same crop, even inside the same community.
Alternatively, they reported they were compensated for a crop they did not grow before expropriation
(See Table 9). In turns, the survey results suggest that compensation was often underestimated and
paid discretionally, even within individuals belonging to the same community, in a context where
there is no evidence of a clear and transparent calculation method. This is particularly important,
especially considering that 140 respondents declared that they were cultivating land—both for income
generation and household consumption—before the expropriation, while only 5 stated that they are
still farming after the expropriation.
In Table 9, we attempted to verify whether the amount of the compensation received by
respondents for selected crops—as they reported it in our survey—was consistent with market
prices for crops in Nigeria. While the LUA does not specify whether compensation for crops must
be set at market rates—instead Section 29(4) of the LUA simply grants the “appropriate officer”
discretion to calculate compensation rates—market value is generally used as a benchmark for valuing
compensation in many other countries [
2
]. Column 7 of Table 9shows significant discrepancies
between the amount of compensation provided and the amount that would have been provided
if a “market value” approach to valuing compensation was followed, and therefore supports our
conclusion that insufficient compensation was provided to affected communities in the LFTZ case.
Each row in the table represents a household in our sample that reported the total value of the
compensation received for cassava (see Column 4, upper table) or maize (see Column 4, lower table).
Table 9also shows the community to which each respondent belongs (Column 1), the reported average
size of farmland cultivated before the expropriation (Column 2), the reported average seasonal yield
(Column 3) and the reported total value of compensation received for selected crops (Column 4).
Column 5 shows the average compensation rate in terms of Nigerian Naira per kg. The numbers in
Column 5 were obtained by dividing the total value of the compensation received (Column 4) by the
average seasonal yield for a given crop (Column 3). We focused on two crops only, namely cassava
and maize, due to the availability of information on market values. For these two crops, we were able
to retrieve the average retail price per kilogram—in local currency—at which each crop was sold at
the Mile 12 Market in Lagos. Once we estimated the average price per kg, we multiplied that price
(stated for each crop in the header of Column 6) by the reported average seasonal yield (Column 3),
thus obtaining an estimate for the value of compensation at market price (Column 6). The numbers in
Column 7 represent the difference between the total value of the reported compensation for each crop
(Column 4) and our best estimate of the total compensation calculated using average market prices
(Column 6). Overall, this Table suggests that the compensation provided for some crops was far below
market rates.
5.6. Possible Corruption
There is a noticeable difference between the amount that the LSG reportedly paid (66 million
Naira) and the amount that surveyed communities claimed they received [
83
]. If compensation has
not trickled down to the household level, then it is possible that intermediaries, including members
of the Resettlement Committee, may have taken significant portions of the compensation payments.
Intermediaries could have also included chiefs or other community “elites” involved in the negotiation
around the MOU. Section 29(3) of the LUA provides that compensation may be paid to “the community,
the chief, or leader of the community to be disposed of by him for the benefit of the community in
accordance with
. . .
customary law”, or into “some fund specified by the Governor.” The Government
Land 2018,7, 23 30 of 38
White Paper does not thoroughly investigate crimes of theft or embezzlement, but states “the revelation
at the Tribunal was that beneficiaries of compensation were paid in cash and sometimes through proxies
in circumstances which facilitate diversion of money, theft, embezzlement, manipulation, and fraud
. . .
it is no wonder that some of the alleged beneficiaries denied receiving stated amounts of money shown
against their names” [
6
]. Due to the potential corruption in this case, it can be argued that the actions
of chiefs and other community elites need to be more closely monitored and that these entities need to
be held accountable. Consultation and negotiation with all community members, including women
and youth, during the compensation process is needed to ensure that that payments are satisfactory,
calculated in compliance with international standards, and made to- every affected household.
5.7. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
As discussed in Section 4.2 of this article, when land is expropriated for development projects,
government and private sector bodies are legally required to conduct an EIA before initiating
development projects in Nigeria. When interviewed by the authors, the Lagos Lands Bureau stated
that an EIA was conducted pursuant to the EIA Decree 1992; however, the official we interviewed
was unable to provide us with documentation that indicates an EIA was conducted. None of the
community members we interviewed stated that they were able to view the EIA. Other research
groups were also unable to access the EIA for the LFTZ; according to report by Heinrich Boll Stiftung,
a Nigerian research NGO,
Even though the existence of an EIA report for the LFZ was claimed, it was not made
available throughout the research of this report. Also, the community heads have not seen
the EIA report. Upon asking the LFZDC to make it accessible, they were told to get a copy
from the local government. Getting to the local government they were told that LFZDC
has not submitted any EIA report to them [4].
5.8. Alternative Land
According to our interview with the SERAC representative, a certificate of occupancy for
750 hectares of resettlement land was provided to the Resettlement Committee in 2009 [
4
].
This resettlement land was meant to be shared by all affected communities. However, it encroached on
land held by three other affected communities, so three more affected communities were added to the
MOU [4].
In 2014, a certificate of occupancy of 375 hectares was provided to the Lekki Coastal Development
Association, which is a legal entity managed by the Resettlement Committee [
6
]. The Government
White Paper found that this constituted a breach of the MOU since it is only half of what was promised
by the MOU. Moreover, the alternative land was not clearly demarcated, making the boundaries
unknown. According to our interview with the Ilekuru community, roughly 96 hectares were sold
to a third party, and the remaining portion is largely uncultivable swampland. When interviewed,
Ilekuru community members claimed they were unable to access the resettlement land for farming
and other subsistence purposes because the land is far away from their homes and widely considered
to be uncultivable swampland. Since the MOU is a legally binding document and the LUA provides a
right to alternative, affected communities have a legal right to bring claims and seek redress in court.
The MOU states,
In the event of any dispute, difference or claim arising out or in connection with this
MOU, the parties may appoint mediators
. . .
if the parties fail to reach a settlement via
mediation
. . .
The matter shall be settled by arbitration
. . .
this MOU is a legal document
and nothing in this section shall fetter the constitutional rights of the parties to seek judicial
interpretation and, or enforcement of the terms of the MOU [82].
Land 2018,7, 23 31 of 38
5.9. Jobs and Equity Shares
None of the affected households we surveyed stated that they were employed by LWIL, even
though jobs were promised in the MOU. According the Government White Paper, “LWIL insists that
members of the communities have been favoured with jobs,” but affected communities disagree.
Without records showing that jobs were allotted to communities, it is the word of one against
another [
6
]. Additionally, none of the affected households we surveyed received equity shares in the
LFTZ. Regarding the 2.5% equity share promised by the MOU, the Government White Paper found
these “entitlements have been and are still being denied to the affected communities” [6].
5.10. Arbitrary Detention of Affected Community Members
According to respondents, in 2015, police entered the Idasho community village in the middle of
the night and pulled out several community members, including an elderly woman, from their homes.
These people were arbitrarily detained in a local prison for several months without legal recourse.
Mobile police officers have fired guns into the air to scare off communities from protesting dredging
and other development activities.
Several members of the Okunraiye community also reported that they were arrested for merely
inquiring about the LFTZ project and attempting to discuss the project with the government.
As mentioned in the introduction, 10 of these Okunraiye community members were arrested in
response to Dissu’s death in October 2015.
5.11. Displacement of the Illekuru Community8
One of the 10 communities we interviewed lost their homes as a consequence of the LFTZ.
According to our interview with the community, the people of Ilekuru lived and depended on the
expropriated agricultural land since the 1700s. Historically, the primary occupations of community
members were blacksmithing, farming, hunting and fishing. In the early 2000s, the government
demanded land from the community and promised to resettle them to a new land with structure
and other basic amenities, such as electricity and water. According to one community member,
“the government made promises, but nothing was done.” The government valued their land based on
crops and other perennial trees. As farmers, the community primarily cultivated cassava and banana
majorly, because they were all farmers. Ultimately, the ancestral land of Illekuru was granted to the
Indomie Food Processing Company.
In 2002, the government brought in a bulldozer and heavy machinery and started grading and
leveling the Ilekuru’s land. People from the community protested the bulldozing of their land and
demanded resettlement land. According to a community member we interviewed, “People from the
community stood their ground and temporarily stopped the government caterpillar from working,
we demanded that the government grant us our new resettlement land.” The Government temporarily
suspended work until it could bring in more security personnels (i.e., mobile police). In 2003, the Baale’s
(i.e., community chief’s) house was demolished by the development project. The Ilekuru community
demanded resettlement land. The government promised to grant them 15 hectares of land but only
ended up granting 6.3 hectares. The government promised to give the remaining land at a later point,
but still had not done so as of August 2017. Consequently, many Illekuru community members have
migrated and are living elsewhere. Structures made of brick and bamboo on the original Ilekuru land
were demolished, but the government did not provide financing or alternative housing: the community
was only given 6.3 hectares of bare land. The Ilkeuru community had to use the little income they had
to build new dwellings. The community was given a fraction of the land previously held, and the
8
All of the information described in this section comes from an interview we conducted in August 2017 with the Chiefs and
other members of the community.
Land 2018,7, 23 32 of 38
resettlement area encroached on the Okunraiye community’s land, so both communities were forced
to share the little remaining land.
From our survey of the area, the apparent living condition of the present Ilekuru community
was very poor: the community lacked essentials such as schools, healthcare, and security from theft.
Many members had moved away to find homes elsewhere. Vibrations from dredging conducted by
Dangote Company caused cracks to form in their dwellings. The same dredging also caused flooding
in the nearby Okunraiye community. Some community members could not live with the vibration and
noise and needed to relocate somewhere else. Land surveyors were consulted on the resettlement land
and confirmed that the Ilekuru community could not possess the land because they did not have a
Certificate of Occupancy. The Ilekuru community stated that their resettlement land had more recently
been sold to someone who claimed to have bought the land from Okunraiye community. The said
buyer, unnamed yet presumed by community members to be a powerful politician, told the Illekuru
community to sell their land and collect a small lump sum amount of money or else forfeit their land.
In 2016, the Ilekuru Community conceded and sold their land.
At least three other communities (Idotun, Itoke and Okunraiye) remain vulnerable to displacement
since the LFTZ is currently building a seaport, the expansion of which may displace these communities
in the near future. According to community members, several private contractors warned them to
leave and told them that, if nothing else, the noise and vibrations from construction will force them to
vacate their lands.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
The evidence put forth in this article indicates that the government failed to adequately inform,
consult, compensate and resettle communities whose livelihoods were affected by the development of
the LFTZ. Our interviews and empirical research conducted indicates that the government did not
follow a transparent and participatory process when acquiring land and compensating communities,
and thus did not comply with international standards. Without a sufficient implantation of a legal
framework that limits government authority and protects the property rights and livelihoods of
landholders, there is a continued risk that community land may be compulsorily acquired by
governments for private gains without sufficient public benefit and payment of compensation,
including alternative land, jobs, and benefit shares. As long as the current version of the LUA is
in effect, it will continue to subject affected communities to impoverishment, landlessness, food
insecurity, and other risks commonly associated with expropriation for development projects [
16
].
Of course reforming the law will require significant political momentum, public support, and a shift in
Nigeria’s prevailing paradigm of expropriation, compensation, and resettlement. Equally if not more
important is to the passage of reforms to the LUA is effective implementation and enforcement of the
reformed law. Legal reform will only be as successful as the government institutions and agencies
charged with implementing the law enable it to be. The government should bear in mind that effective
enforcement of the law will require significant financial support and technical capacity. As discussed
in Section 5, the political economy of the LFTZ and other development projects in Nigeria may create
incentivizes for the government and expropriating companies to circumvent costly legal obligations
that entail fully compensating and resettling landholders. For this reason, it is of the utmost importance
that civil society and members of the public are able to closely monitor expropriating actors so that
violators of the law can be brought to court and held accountable for actions that infringe on the land
rights of local populations.
From conversing with community members, it appeared that tensions over expropriation and
compensation could be approaching a boiling point in the coastal areas of Lekki. Unless their demands
are met, community members stated they would continue to protest the project and resist efforts of
expanding the seaport (which would encroach on three communities’ land). Perhaps the anger and
resistance from communities should not come as a surprise to the project developers. Investments in
the LFTZ have reportedly surpassed $100 billion and yet, many affected community members reported
Land 2018,7, 23 33 of 38
they barely have enough income and food to sustain their livelihoods while they wait for the MOU to
be fulfilled [
85
]. Without land to grow crops, communities primarily rely on fishing for subsistence,
which is tedious given the strong water currents, limited water access, and decreasing population
of fish. The Government White Paper reported, “the contribution of displacement, impecuniosity,
unemployment and youthful exuberance is a predictably potentially explosive cocktail capable of
causing a serious break down in law and order” [6].
What can be done to prevent future unrest and the prolonged impoverishment of affected
communities? Honoring the provisions of the MOU is essential to ensure the Lekki communities are
fairly compensated. However, to ensure that future expropriations are conducted in a transparent and
participatory manner that complies with internationally recognized standards on expropriation and
compensation, it is also necessary for the Nigerian legislature to amend the LUA. As it currently stands,
the LUA permits the governments and private companies to protect their reputation by arguing that
they did not violate the law whenever compensation is delayed or insufficient. A major hole in the
law is the lack of a clear, transparent process for calculating compensation that entails landholder
negotiations. Such gaps in the law may continue to cause catastrophic losses for landholders displaced
or affected by expropriation for development projects. In the LFTZ case, the LUA allowed the LSG
to make arbitrary expropriation and compensation decisions behind closed doors using outdated
methods. Overall, reforms to the LUA should include provisions that require governments and private
actors to comply with international standards by ensuring inclusive, democratized decision-making
regarding expropriation and compensation. Specifically, the LUA should:
1.
Provide a clear definition of public purpose to allow for judicial review of State Governor’s
expropriation decisions. State Governor’s should thus be obliged to conduct a “proportionality
test,” which entails examining a proposed expropriation project to determine (a) whether
the expropriation project is necessary to serve a public purpose (there are no less intrusive
alternatives), (b) whether the project is suitable (reasonably likely to achieve the intended public
benefit), and (c) whether the benefits deriving from the expropriation are proportionate to costs
borne by affected populations and the environment [
14
]. The State Governor ’s decision on
whether a project satisfies the proportionality test should be subject to oversight by the courts.
2.
Require government and entities and/or project developers to conduct both an environmental
impact assessment and social impact assessment prior to expropriating so that environmental
and social issues associated with proposed development projects, including the project’s impact
on local land rights, will be thoroughly identified and managed.
3.
Establish a consultation and negotiation process whereby affected landholders must be surveyed,
informed, and consulted about proposed development projects and the potential impact on
their land rights and livelihoods. The LUA should stipulate that all members of communities,
not just the chiefs, must be consulted about proposed projects and compensation entitlements.
Such a requirement may reduce the risk of expropriation and compensation decisions being made
behind closed doors as well as the risk of elite capture of compensation.
4.
Recognize the indigenous right to Free Prior and Informed Consent and require the government to
be transparent and ensure meaningful community participation in expropriation, compensation,
and resettlement decision-making.
5.
Require that compensation must be granted directly to households and establish monitoring
committees to ensure compliance with compensation plans and prevent elite capture by chiefs
and other intermediaries. Require assessors of compensation to consider both the value of land
as well as the value of improvements, crops, economic activities, disturbance to livelihood,
and other incidental and collateral injuries suffered by landholders, even if the land in question
is undeveloped.
6.
Base the calculation of compensation on the “replacement cost” where land is expropriated
in areas where land markets are weak or non-existent and thus “market value” is difficult to
Land 2018,7, 23 34 of 38
ascertain. In cases where compensation is based on market value, the LUA should adopt the
International Valuations Standards definition of “market value.”
7.
Require that compensation must be paid prior to the moment at which the government or private
companies take possession of the land. In cases where possession is taken before compensation is
paid, require the government to pay interest based on the delay.
8.
Require the government to provide affected communities with productive alternative land,
where available.
9.
Require investment and benefit-sharing arrangements whereby companies must allow affected
landholders to own equity in development projects and invest in the education, healthcare
facilities, and other basic amenities for affected landholders.
10.
Establish an independent valuation board with expert valuers charged with consulting and
compensating affected landholders. These expert valuers should consider adopting the principles
established in UN-Habitat’s Guide to Valuation of Unregistered Lands (UN Habitat 2017).
The process for valuing land and crops should be well-documented and transparent, and valuers
should reflect current market rates for the average amounts of crops, livestock, and other
improvements found on the land.
Supplementary Materials:
The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/7/1/23/s1,
Survey Questionnaire and Results- Compensation for Expropriated Community Farmland (LFTZ case).
Acknowledgments:
The authors wish to express their gratitude to the Global Land Tool Network (UN-HABITAT)
for generously supporting our field research. The authors wish to thank Maartje Van Eerd, Senior Expert,
Housing & Social Development (IHS Erasumus University (Rotterdam, The Netherlands)), for her valuable
feedback and guidance throughout the development of this research project. The authors also wish to thank Leon
Verstappen and Bjorn Hoops from the University of Groningen Faculty of Law (Groningen, The Netherlands)
as well as Michael Cernea for their valuable comments and feedback on this article. We also wish to thank
Akintomiwa Moses Olusanmi for assisting with the field research and Lisette Meij from Land Portal Foundation
for her support with budgeting and project administration. The legal analysis used in this paper contains open
access legal indicator data, created by the author and analyzed in this paper, which is published on Land Portal’s
Land Book country pages— https://landportal.org/book/countries. The database assesses whether national
laws in 50 countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America comply with international standards on expropriation,
compensation, and resettlement. The lead author also wishes to thank Peter Veit at the Land and Resource
Rights Initiative, World Resources Institute for helping develop the methodology for the legal indicator data
and the Harvard Law and International Development Society for conducting a preliminary assessment of the
expropriation laws in 30 Asian and African countries.
Author Contributions:
Nicholas Tagliarino wrote most of the article and conducted the legal analysis with
feedback and guidance from the other co-authors. Yakubu Bununu provided extensive feedback and comments on
the article. Bununu also managed the field research and organized meetings and interviews with government and
company representatives. Nicholas Tagliarino, Yakubu Bununu, Akintobi Olusanmi and Magbagbeola O. Micheal
conducted the surveys and interviews with government and company representatives involved in the LFTZ.
Marcello De Maria provided extensive feedback on the article, analyzed the survey data, wrote the section that
discusses the survey findings, and created the figures and tables shown in Section 5that present the survey results.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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