Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances to Empowered Apparatus, Evolving Trends and Implications of Arms Trade in Qatar and the UAE

Abstract

The Gulf countries have become an increasingly lucrative market for international arms trade, especially since the shrinking of Western defence budgets added fuel to the global export race in their direction. Amidst the profuse literature on security relations of the Gulf with outside powers, however, few publications aimed at explaining the incentives driving this trade beyond security motives on the part of clients, and economic determinism on the part of suppliers. This paper, which focuses on evolving trends of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE, aims at filling this gap by offering an overview of their multifaceted internal and international drivers and the way it has impacted the rules of the regional and global security game. Qatari and Emirati defence procurement used to be a means to an end that had little to do with addressing threats they faced on their own, let alone gaining more power on the international stage. Because they were small – and young – states unable to overcome their own security dilemma, their military acquisition served other main purposes. The author hence begins by focusing on the famous “glitter factor” implied in their arms acquisitions. She starts by giving an overview of the reactions that this importance of – sparkly – appearances in Gulf countries’ arms purchases stirs before trying and analysing the internal and international motivations behind this reality. Then, the essay turns to all indirect ways through which arms trade in Qatar and the UAE guarantee the security and stability of the state and, above all, the regime. Pointing to multiple international and domestic political, social and strategic determinants playing out in this area, the author argues that it perfectly illustrates their multifaceted survival strategy as “Small Princes-States”. Finally, the study turns to new dynamics of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE as a consequence of new external incentives – chief among which was the global economic context combined with the regional turmoil and its associated vacuum of power – meeting with new internal priorities. The author points to the two countries’ recent assertiveness, analyses the impact this has on the Client State – Supplying State – Industrial company triangle, and questions whether or not this can lead to new rules of the regional and global security game.

Full text

e Arms Trade, Military Services and
the Security Market in the Gulf States:
Trends and Implications
Edited by David B. Des Roches
and Dania afer
GerlachPress

Contents
Introduction 1
Dania afer and David B. Des Roches
1 Security Puzzle in the Gulf: New Sectors and New Challenges 8
Cihat Battaloglu
2 GCC Arms Imports: Strategic Assessment and
Economic Benets to the United States 23
John Duke Anthony
3 e Istanbul Cooperation Initiative as an Element of the Security
Architecture of the Gulf Sub-Region 44
Radosław Bania and Robert Czulda
4 Countering Iran From Within: Demographic and Economic
Diversication in GCC Countries 63
Hiam Nawas
5 Defense Gaps in the GCC: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia and
the Royal Saudi Air Force 80
Victoria Heath
6 Coordination Problems of Coordinated Market Economies:
Implications for Arms Trade and Military Services in the Gulf Region 99
Joachim Kolb
7 Building an Integrated Missile Defense Architecture for Gulf States:
Perceptions, Capabilities and Challenges 119
Brahim Saidy
8 Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances to
Empowered Apparatus, Evolving Trends and Implications of
Arms Trade in Qatar and the UAE 135
Emma Soubrier
9 Arab Gulf Military Institutions: Professionalism and
National Development 152
Imad K. Harb
About the Contributors 169

135
8
Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances
to Empowered Apparatus, Evolving Trends and
Implications of Arms Trade in Qatar and the UAE
Emma Soubrier
Introduction
e Gulf countries have become an increasingly lucrative market for the international arms
trade, especially since the shrinking of Western defence budgets raised their prole as a market
in the global export race. Amidst the literature on security relations of the Gulf with outside
powers, however, few publications aim to explain the incentives driving this trade beyond
security motives on the part of clients, and economic determinism on the part of suppliers.
is paper, which focuses on evolving trends of the arms trade with Qatar and the UAE, aims
to ll this gap by oering an overview of their multifaceted internal and international drivers
and the way it has impacted the rules of the regional and global security game.
e Gulf region has been one of the world’s top arms markets for a long time. is is
not surprising given the “triangular contest for inuence among Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia
which helps explain the Iran-Iraq War and Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait”1 amidst the Gulf
“regional security complex” – generated by “the interaction of anarchy and geography”.2 To
be sure, many academic works on the arms trade from the 1970s to the mid-1990s used this
region as a case study. But it is worth noting three points. First,
Most of the arms trade literature is rather descriptive. Patterns of global arms ows
[…] are a common focus, as are the transfer policies of specic arms-producing nations.
Ironically, such emphasis has generated a good deal of quantitative data on arms
transfers but […] has generally failed to make use of it in any rigorous way to explore
relevant causal relationships.3
Second, most of the literature from the Cold War focused on the competition between
the two superpowers and how it played out in the arms trade to ird World countries.

136
e Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States
us, analyses tried to understand the sellers’ motivations rather than the buyers’ perception.
ird, even in academic works that did focus on regional arms recipients rather than arms
donors, authors mostly covered the three main actors of the Gulf security complex – Iran,
Iraq and Saudi Arabia – as opposed to the smaller Arab Gulf States.
Now, Qatar and the UAE have both moved their way up on the international arms
trade ladder for a while – as early as the 1980s, they were both in the top ve countries in
the world when ranked according to military spending per capita4 and today they remain
some of the world’s biggest spenders in this area. As a consequence, this is a tting time to
dedicate a study to the specic dynamics of these two arms markets. Of course, beyond an
in-depth understanding of those two countries, such an investigation allows a categorization
of motives that can serve as a framework for analysis of other small states. It can thus be
useful from an empirical but also a theoretical point of view.
Qatari and Emirati defence procurement used to be a means to an end that had little
to do with addressing threats they faced on their own, let alone gaining more power on the
international stage. Because they were small – and young – states unable to overcome their
own security dilemma, their military acquisition served other purposes. is paper thus
begins by focusing on the famous “glitter factor” implied in their arms acquisitions and gives
an overview of the multiple internal and external determinants this involves. en, the essay
anchors Qatar and the UAE in an innovative analytical framework to carve out a place of
their own for them in small states literature and illustrates how their multifaceted strategy
of “Small Prince-States” played out in the eld of the arms trade. Finally, the study turns
to new dynamics of the arms trade in Qatar and the UAE as a consequence of external
incentives meeting with new internal priorities.
Mirages of Power? e “Glitter Factor” under Focus
When it comes to arms trade in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, one of
the rst things that come to mind is the remarkable amount these states have spent on
high-technology armaments. Given the numerous sources of insecurity and instability in
the region, it seems only logical that they would want to acquire adequate means of self-
defence. However, “when an actual invasion took place (August 1990) or a serious threat
materialized (October 1994) the presence of Western troops, not the purchase of arms,
protected them. In other words, the usefulness of this tremendous spending on armaments
is questionable”.5
Hence, it appears that there might be a gap between arms acquisitions of the GCC
countries and their actual capability to deter and defend. is has led analysts to talk about a
peculiar motive in their arms procurement: the “glitter factor”, which points to an emphasis
on buying “the most advanced weapons” rather than on “the readiness, sustainability,
combined arms, and joint warfare capabilities that determine real-world deterrence and
defense”.6 Given this, it is worthwhile to examine this importance of “sparkly” appearances

137
Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances
in Gulf countries’ arms purchases before analysing the internal and international motivations
behind this reality.
Sparkly Appearances Provoking a Wide Range of Reactions
Qatar and the UAE have some of the most sophisticated armaments in the world and their
leaders seem eager to continue this trend, as shown by the recent acquisition of 24 Rafale
jet ghters by Qatar or the purchase of the Falcon Eye spy satellites by the UAE. One
thing is for sure: their impressive military equipment does not leave anyone indierent. In
fact, it would be astounding if it did, considering how these two countries make sure the
world does not forget about their importance in this area. For instance, one can think of
the many international defence- and security-related conferences and events in these two
countries. ese include the International Defence Exhibition & Conference (IDEX) in
the UAE, as well as the Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition & Conference
(DIMDEX), and the C4ISR Summit or QMARSEC. ese arms exhibitions have grown
to become must-attends for defence industrial companies as well as defence ocials from
all over the world. Now, this sparkly military build-up of Qatar and the UAE does not
elicit the same reaction from each observer: the reactions vary from admiration and envy
to sarcasm.
In a way, this build-up of high-technology military equipment matches the other
eorts by these two countries to put themselves on the world map. Everything in Qatar
and the UAE has to be sparkling, gigantic and memorable. Dubai does not just have
tall skyscrapers – it has the tallest building on Earth (Burj Khalifa). Abu Dhabi does
not have just another mosque – it has one of the world’s most elegant and biggest
mosques (Sheikh Zayed Mosque). Doha did not just enter the world of sports – it
will host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. All these make people around the planet admire
these countries and picture them as a modern Eldorado where they sometimes dream
to become expatriates – or where they at least wish to travel as tourists, thanks to the
world-class airlines such as Qatar Airways, Emirates and Etihad. To some extent, the
remarkable military arsenal of these countries stirs the same admiration – sometimes
tinged with envy.
When conducting interviews with Western military ocials and defence industrials
working in or with Qatar and the UAE, I was regularly surprised to encounter something
that had not come to my mind before: their commercial interest to sell all these high-tech
armaments and military equipment to their Gulf partners was in fact equalled by their
jealousy of sorts. As phrased by one of my interviewees, they regretted that their home
country could no longer aord “as shiny, high-performance and numerous new toys”. is is
particularly true nowadays: as a result of the global recession, all Western countries instituted
major cutbacks in their defence and security budgets. Indeed, these budgets have decreased
in the US, Europe, Australia, Canada, and Japan7 and 2012 witnessed the rst decline in
global military spending since 1998. Finally, it must be underlined that this envy stirred by

138
e Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States
the military arsenal of Qatar and the UAE often walks hand in hand with some sarcasm on
the subject.
is comes from the fact that the Gulf States seem to be “long on hardware [but] short
on power”: “ere is less than meets the eye to Gulf Arab military power. Governments have
acquired impressive weapons holdings, but they are too often for show and not for waging
modern warfare”.8 e sparkly appearances of their military arsenals could well be just that
– the “shell of military capability, rather than the reality”, or “Mirages of power”.9
ere are two things to note. First, some criticism of Gulf arms imports is made
regardless of their eciency in deterrence and defence. For instance, these arms imports
are sometimes deemed unprotable because they are neither capital goods nor consumer
goods.
ey deplete national resources without generating needed foods and services for the
public. e only public good they are supposed to produce is security against foreign
attacks. However, the question is how much is enough for the defence of states, which
need their scarce national resources for the development of the civilian sectors of their
economies.10
Second, a pure “glitter factor” may have dened Gulf arms procurement for a while but,
more recently, Qatar and the UAE seem to have moved away from it. is is not to say that
appearances are no longer a determinant in their purchases: there are indeed strong internal
and international incentives for them to keep buying shiny, modern and sophisticated
military equipment.
Prestige 1.0: A Tool to Build National Pride and Identity
As was previously assessed, it is possible to picture the sparkling armaments of Qatar
and the UAE in the same light as their other eorts to make themselves visible on the
world stage. It is interesting to wonder who the primary target of all these endeavours is.
It is argued here that this shiny military build-up might in fact be aimed at an internal
audience.
Qatar and the UAE are both young states (they acquired independence in 1971) and
their population is animated by strong feelings of belonging focused on tribal ties. Hence,
they are still very much concerned with nation-building issues. Now, there are many ways to
forge feelings of national identity within a new nation, and providing the population with
symbols and images which spur pride is one of them.
Why is this that Qatar developed such an army although it is well known that it could
not really weigh in the face of an external aggressor? – ere are several reasons.....
First, there is the issue of territorial defence, then support to internal security forces, but
also an idea of image and prestige.11

139
Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances
e shiniest military equipment as well as the tallest buildings, the most extravagant tourist
resorts and facilities, and the best world-class airline companies serve the same purpose: to
give Qatari and Emirati citizens the idea that they belong to a rich, important and attractive
country that the world looks at with admiration and envy – which they should be proud of.
is reality is particularly salient in the UAE because it is formed of seven emirates,
each of which has its own history, territory and population whose feelings of belonging
are primarily turned toward their emirate rather than the larger state. Even today, most
Emiratis with whom I met described themselves according to their specic emirate. Hence,
it comes as no surprise that the country invests in such an arsenal to promote the image
of a strong, credible and united state. is can be linked with the fact that, in the UAE,
“developing the armed forces [was] part of a larger goal: the centralization of power. e
main objective of this rationalization [came] from the state’s necessity to assert its authority
on all [its] territory and populations. us, the armed forces [aimed] at state-building”.12
I argue that endowing themselves with the most sophisticated armaments complements a
broader scheme of nation-building.
As for Qatar, the regime in power is less concerned with uniting a heterogeneous
population. However, it is possible to point to an interesting internal/international nexus
in the military build-up. It has been argued that “the majority of Qataris seems pleased
that their little country, previously known for little more than being unknown, is today
known around the wider region and world for mostly positive reasons. […] e Qatari
elite, therefore, has an almost entirely free hand when it comes to foreign aairs”.13 is
echoes our assumption that “providing the population with symbols and images which spur
pride”, among which is their modern military arsenal, eventually serves a goal of securing
the regime in place. is also allows us to underline that while the primary target of the
“glitter factor” in military purchases might very well be internal, this logic also works with
an external audience.
Prestige 2.0: A Tool to Build International Esteem and Credibility
In addition to building national pride as a part of nation-building, high-tech armament
acquisitions arguably aim to attract international attention to address state-branding issues.
ere would thus be more to the supercial “glitter factor” than meets the eye. Indeed, the
motivation of the two small Gulf States when buying sophisticated / sparkly equipment
would really be to acquire credible means of defence – regardless of their ability or non-
ability to use them on their own. is procurement scheme allows them to be regarded as
future eligible partners on the regional and international stage, and thus to gain status and
credibility in the eyes of global powers.
Again, this logic is particularly accurate for the UAE. As discussed, Emirati leaders
used the consolidation of federal armed forces to enhance their credibility and legitimacy.
eir will to be regarded as credible players within the international order is reected in
their participation in peacekeeping operations,14 which enhances their prestige but also

140
e Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States
“[increases] the political cost of violating their neutrality, which in turn [strengthens] their
own security”.15 Participating in operations alongside Western powers calls for equipment
which is interoperable with them. is also expands the explanation of their sophisticated
military purchases beyond a mere “glitter factor”.
Although this thinking is logical, one should underline two points. First, international
participation did not prevent the aforementioned sarcastic description of the Qatari and
Emirati military arsenal as a mere illusion of power. Second, and more importantly, what is
true of the UAE is not necessary accurate for Qatar. is is due to the fact that more broadly,
in the face of similar security challenges, Qatar and the UAE have adopted contrasting
strategies.16
eir dierences lie in their respective choices favouring the development of either
hard power or soft power capabilities.17 Abu Dhabi’s preference went to the former, defending
an idea of credibility, while Doha opted for the latter, rather defending an idea of legitimacy.
However, one should also note that their respective policies eventually combine all aspects
(hard power / soft power, credibility / legitimacy, state-building / state-branding). What this
means is that the UAE and Qatar ultimately end up in some sort of competition which plays
out in the eld of high-tech equipment and is labelled the “glitter factor competition”. is
competition can be understood in sociological terms, and be related to the Freudian concept
of the “narcissism of small dierences”:
e phenomenon that it is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and
related to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds and in
ridiculing each other.18
Although there are contrasts in the strategies developed by Qatar and the UAE, it can be
said that their goal in the end remains to keep the world interested in them in order to
ensure their survival. is leads us to focus on their peculiar survival strategies as small Gulf
States. We now oer to look at their arms trade beyond their sparkling appearances, to show
the international and domestic determinants driving it, along their multifaceted strategy as
“Small Prince-States”.
Arms Trade Illustrating the Multifaceted Strategy of Two “Small
Prince-States”
Amidst the literature on arms trade in the Gulf, most publications point to the obvious
as a motive for purchasers: regional anarchy and power dynamics which lead to high risks
of insecurity and instability, particularly for the Gulf small states. While they are right in
underlining these security incentives, this analysis lacks depth. As was previously noted, there
is a gap between their impressive military arsenal and their real capabilities to deter and

141
Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances
defend. Hence, it is crucial to analyse the indirect ways through which arms trade in these
countries eventually guarantee the security and stability of the state and, above all, the regime.
It is useful to view Qatar and the UAE in an innovative analytical framework where
both are labelled “Small Prince-States”, which points to the fact that the heart of their
survival strategy, visualised as an addition of concentric circles of ‘balanced opposition’, is the
regime in power – the “Prince” – rather than the state or the nation.
e rst section discusses the general logic of Gulf military procurement as a political
act toward international partners, the second claries the specic dynamics of Qatar and the
UAE as “Small Prince-States”, and the last turns to social dynamics on the domestic front.
An Implementing Tool of the “Oil for Security” Pact – Buying International
Protection
Military procurement in the Gulf has long been considered as a political act toward their
allies and protectors more than an actual way to increase their capabilities of self-defence.19
is trend is not new and is part of what is known as the “oil for security” pact. is points
to the close articulation between oil and security in relations between the GCC countries,
particularly Saudi Arabia, and the United States (US), which remains their chief protector to
this day. From the Saudi perspective, this pact mainly consists of “keeping their head down
and relying on the US military umbrella, secured by the oil ow and regular investments in
the American military-industrial complex”.20
When it comes to Qatar and the UAE, the dynamics of their relation to the US took
form after 1990. is stems from two parallel events. In 1990, the end of the Cold War led
to the emergence of a unipolar global environment. For small states everywhere, it increased
the incentives to foster an alliance with the US as the sole global superpower. For the Gulf
small states, 1990 also represented a consolidation of the ‘regional security complex’, dened
as “the degree to which certain geographically grouped states spend most of their time and
eort worrying about each other and not other states”.21
Ten years after the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq War – the rst threats
perceived by the Arab Gulf States which led them to ally within the GCC under Saudi
leadership in 1981 – the small Gulf monarchies had a blunt reality check as they realized
they could not rely on the Saudi security umbrella, let alone on themselves, to ensure their
security and stability, so they turned to the US, and also, albeit to a lesser extent, to the other
Western powers.
us, arms purchases serve as an instrument of foreign policy providing more
security but only indirectly, through the implicit protection guarantee it buys from strategic
partners. It has been argued that “defense manufacturers were able to sell virtually what
they wanted in the Gulf region, often taking advantage of, and proting from, their clients’
lack of knowledge”.22 However, one could also suggest that their clients’ indierence was a
better explanation than ‘lack of knowledge’ since this procurement met their ‘foreign policy
mission’ as dened by local decision-makers.

142
e Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States
is overview of arms trade as an implementation of the “oil for security” pact would
not be complete without giving voice to its critics. ey point to the fact that Gulf States
speak the language of cooperative security but act according to the logic of competitive
security by increasing their security in the most immediate way available: alliances and arms
imports.
e Gulf states quickly demonstrated that they had greater faith in the United States
and the West than they did in each other. [...] In general, any notions of Arab collective
security lay in ruins after the Gulf War as Arab states began emphasizing particularistic
over collectivist interests, focusing on state security over core Arab concerns.23
Others point to the fact that, in order to reduce tensions in the region, emphasis should be
on genuine condence-building measures such as economic reforms and political openings,
rather than on militarization and brinkmanship politics.24 In fact, some argue the US has
a negative role exploiting and capitalizing on the atmosphere of rivalry and distrust that
prevails in the region for its own interest. Some have even argued that the US and its allies
“have used a ctional “Iran threat” as an excuse to maintain domination of the Persian
Gulf ”.25
e arms race may have fuelled the existing security dilemma among the major powers,
but it did not create it. As for the use of a “ctional Iran threat”, it may be more accurate to
point to converging logic of securitisation of Iran by the US and the GCC – i.e. the processes
by which issues become constructed as threats to security. Perceived threats to security can
be ideational as well as material, and tied to the survival not of the state but of a particular
referent group26 – this is precisely the case for Qatar and the UAE, the survival strategies of
which are organized around their regime/ Prince. Let us now clarify the security dynamics
of these two “Small Prince-States”.
Mixing Bandwagoning and Balancing Approaches to Achieve Relative
Autonomy27
Small states literature argues that the security dilemma of these actors is based on a
dichotomy between autonomy and inuence. Should they decide to favour the former, their
preference would go to a neutral and defensive strategy. Should they choose to maximise
the latter, they would adopt a cooperative strategy, relying on alliances which could follow
either balancing or bandwagoning logic, depending on whether they would rather ally
against or with the threats. In any case, it is assumed that small states cannot combine both
autonomy and inuence due to lack of resources, this oensive strategy being restricted
to great powers, which are the only ones with “the power to inuence the structure of
the international system while guaranteeing their security”.28 Qatar and the UAE however
challenge these assumptions: they have achieved a combination of inuence and relative

143
Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances
autonomy by making the most of their security constellation, particularly of the interplay
across the global and regional contexts they evolve in. From 1990, they mixed various degrees
of bandwagoning and balancing approaches at the regional and global levels.
At the regional level, being part of the GCC meant that Qatar and the UAE
bandwagoned with Saudi Arabia as a way to balance the threats coming from Iraq and Iran.
ey also tacitly relied on the US, by virtue of security arrangements between Saudi Arabia
and the US – particularly the 1945 Quincy agreement between Franklin Roosevelt and the
Al Saud family. e US thus represented the main security provider of a cooperative strategy,
as ocialised by the Carter Doctrine introduced in 1980.29 However, Qatar and the UAE
also decided to ally directly with American power to overcome their own security dilemma
within the Arabian Peninsula. ey signed bilateral defence cooperation agreements with
the US in 1992 and 1994 and started buying much more military equipment from the
US, which served the purpose of balancing another perceived threat, this time coming
from Saudi Arabia.30 While bandwagoning with Saudi Arabia under a common American
military umbrella within the GCC, they used the very same global strategic partner to
achieve a goal of relative autonomy against the Saudi power. us, the apparent dichotomy
between maximising inuence and favouring autonomy might actually be a false one.
Moving on to the global level, Qatar and the UAE successfully managed to defend relative
autonomy within the multi-level cooperative strategy they built with the US itself. is had to
do with the fact that in the 1990s, the Gulf became a key destination for the US to maintain
its defence industrial base because of the huge drop in military orders coming from the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries associated with the end of the Cold War.
e multipolar supply pattern in the arms trade [brings forth another] dimension of
structural inuence [: the one] a recipient develops over a supplier through an arms
transfer relationship.31
Well aware of this strategic importance to their American ally, which translates into some
leverage, Qatar and the UAE achieved relative autonomy balancing excessive dependence
on the US by signing bilateral defence cooperation agreements and at the same time
concluding major arms contracts with two other Western countries: France and the United
Kingdom (UK).32
Qatari and Emirati security choices can be visualized as an addition of concentric
circles of ‘balanced opposition’ the heart of which is the survival of the regime– the “Prince”
–rather than the state or the nation. Turning to the domestic determinants of arms trade
helps understanding how the two states managed to ensure this.
An Implementing Tool of the Social Pact – Buying National Obedience
e concentric circles of Qatari and Emirati security choices can be said to echo a
perception of enmity drawn from the “Middle East’s tribal DNA”, illustrated by the Arab

144
e Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States
saying “Me against my brother, me and my brother against my cousin; me, my brother,
and my cousin against the world”.33 e heart of their strategy is preservation of the
regime – a concern they share with the other monarchies of the GCC. It has indeed
been argued that the very creation of this regional entity represented a collective survival
strategy aimed at protecting the monarchical system against an ideological threat from
the Iranian revolution that was more challenging than the conventional threat coming
from Teheran.34 Similarly, the regrouping of the GCC after the beginning of the “Arab
Spring” in 2011 seems to have been encouraged more by a common fear of the risks of
the regional political upheaval to the stability of their regime than for the security of their
state or nation.
As is argued by rentier state theories, Qatar and the UAE as well as other GCC states,
in order to ensure the survival of their regime, have put in place a redistributive “social
contract” of sorts with their citizens that aims at preventing any kind of contestation from
within the state.
e most central pillar of state power in Qatar is the power of patronage, with the
country today being a rentier state par excellence thanks to revenues from hydrocarbon
exports. What ensues is a system of “political tribalism” closely modelled after the
clannishness of a tribe (‘ashariyya).35
We argue that arms purchases can also be understood in this light.
ere are two points to note. First, in addition to other arguments, the gap
between the military spending of Gulf States and their lack of real defence capacity is
no accident. e regional regimes are motivated by a more important consideration: “the
overriding domestic political imperative to keep their conventional militaries weak as a
way to mitigate coup threats from their militaries”.36 Second, in addition to serving as
the cement of political relations with outside powers, arms purchases represent vehicles
to co-opt potential internal opponents. e Al-Nahyan family of Abu Dhabi has evolved
into a resilient and dynamic dynasty because its members have successfully co-opted their
historic tribal rivals and the emirate’s business community into an extensive network of
distributed powers and ‘tribal capitalist’ positions.37 is ensures that rivals of yesterday
become allies of today and remain allies of tomorrow. e arms trade has given them a
perfect ‘playground’ in this regard.
In Qatar and the UAE, foreign defence companies must have a local sponsor to do
business. Moreover, it has become increasingly common for the regime to “suggest” foreign
defence companies associate themselves with local defence companies when answering a
Request for Proposals (RFP), regardless of whatever comparative advantage this would have
in pure economic terms.38 is pattern can be viewed in parallel with the co-optation of
important families into the armed forces in order to ensure as much stability as possible to
the regime:

145
Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances
e profusion of shaykhs and princes in the military does not contribute to the
eectiveness of these militaries against external foes. Yet, at the same time, no dynastic
monarchies have fallen to coups.39
Finally, it is important to note that this logic has become more important now that a wind
of change has started blowing on traditional dynamics of arms trade in Qatar and the UAE.
A Wind of Change: the Emergence of Empowered Military Apparatus
e economic crisis that has aected the West from 2008 onward has set a new context in
which Qatar and the UAE were able to rise as new, truly capable and trustworthy partners.
By contributing to the rescue of Western struggling economies through their sovereign
wealth funds, the two Small Prince-States have enhanced their international status and
gained self-condence.
More recently, the reshaping of the region as a result of the 2011 Arab uprisings has
conrmed the rise of Qatar and the UAE as regional powers since it has led them to expand
their engagement within the region and beyond and adopt more assertive policies. All this
has had an impact on dynamics of arms trade in the two countries.
A New Self-Condence and Assertiveness
e Western economic downturn and associated austerity in security budgets turned
the Gulf region into an even more important “magnet” than before for outside defence
manufacturers and their economies. As a consequence, Qatar and the UAE have become
more demanding in terms of capabilities of the weapons they purchase and the osets they
request as part of military contracts.
In addition to external determinants, this is due to the young Small Prince-States
gaining self-condence as states thanks to their increasing military experience. For example,
the improvement in evaluation and procurement processes in military contracts signed by
the UAE with foreign partners is linked with the aforementioned need for credibility toward
the exterior and legitimacy toward the interior. Emirati leaders making business with the
US after the Gulf War were particularly eager not to repeat previous – “humiliating” –
mistakes such as having purchased Hawk missiles in 1989 that the Pentagon was about to
declare obsolete and stop producing.40
Another evolution is that Qatar and the UAE seem to have shifted their focus onto
“sustainable and mission-oriented procurement and force development, rather than the
‘glitter factor’ competition to buy the most advanced weapons system regardless of mission
priority and their ability to operate and sustain an integrated mix of systems and forces in
combat”.41 is may be due to the inuence of a new generation of military personnel who
have reached senior command and have been educated at universities and military colleges

146
e Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States
in the West. “ese new decision-makers are aware of the needs of their respective states as
well as the range of equipment available. ey also know, above all, how they can prot by
playing the competition o one against the other”.42
Finally, while Gulf defence markets used to be mostly characterized by imports of o-
the-shelf products and platforms because of a deciency in indigenous military industrial
production capabilities, this is changing, particularly in the UAE.
One of the most prominent examples of this new high technology manufacturing is
Abu Dhabi’s aerospace industry. As Mubadala’s CEO has explained ‘...you can only
make a studied play in ve or six dierent sectors that you can ultimately become
internationally competitive in, and we believe aerospace happens to be one of them’.43
ese trends are in line with the new status of credible powers that Qatar and the UAE claim.
Both countries have become much more assertive in the face of recent regional events. While
the Emirati military policy prior to 2011 resembled one of ‘armed neutrality’ implying no
projection of forces except for the occasional peacekeeping operations, their strategy seems
to have shifted to a projection of hard power capabilities along discreet national interests.
is new assertiveness was illustrated by the UAE military interventions in Bahrain and
in Libya. As for Qatar, the evolution of its policies is allegedly even more striking. While
Qatar used to rely chiey on soft power capabilities with a focus on neutrality through
mediation, it emerged as the major GCC advocate of change in the “Arab Spring”. What
are the consequences of this evolution in arms trade and in foreign and security policies of
Qatar and the UAE?
Implications for the Client State – Supplying State –
Industrial Company Triangle
Qatari and Emirati procurement used to be a means to an end that had more to do
with political and social external and internal incentives than with defence and security
objectives. Recently, they have become more mission-oriented and have focused on actual
force development – all the more so as they increasingly project their forces onto foreign
theatres of operation such as Libya and Yemen.
ese trends have major implications for the client state – supplying state – industrial
company triangle at three levels. First, they push defence manufacturers to adapt their
market approaches. Second, they lead Western governments to increasingly synchronize
their strategies with their national industrial companies. ird, they possibly impact these
governments’ foreign policies along lines that need to be assessed. All in all, this leads to
a shift of the dependency relationship between Gulf States and their Western allies that
could rise to become a real game changer, not only in the Gulf arms trade, but in global
geopolitics.

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Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances
e most obvious adjustment is the repositioning of arms dealers. While it used to
be a relatively easy task to sell military equipment to Qatar and the UAE (considering
that the actual specicities of products mattered less than other unspoken criteria),
industrial companies working with them today are unanimous: it has become a great
challenge to please these clients. In addition to the extra care companies have to
invest in their regional marketing and sales campaigns, there are issues arising from
the increasing Qatari and Emirati demands for transfers of defence knowledge and
technologies.
Western defence companies have to work more closely than ever before with their
governments. Indeed, even though Qatari and Emirati procurement processes have become
more complex and professional, this does not mean that the political aspect of the arms
trade has disappeared. In a context where the two Small Prince-States have become experts
in playing competitors against one another, defence manufacturers need support from
their home countries’ ocials more than ever to close a sale. e multiplication of defence
ministers’ visits to the two countries these past few years is a telling indicator of this new
imperative.
Finally, while the arms trade is still viewed as a political act in the Gulf, recently the
dependency relationship between Gulf States and their Western allies may have slightly
shifted. In the context of the “Arab Spring”, the GCC countries appear to have decided
to use their economic power as a bargaining chip in exchange for concessions from their
Western partners that are coherent with their own interests and perceptions of power
dynamics in the region. is logic is particularly visible in arms deals. An example was
a RFP for armoured vehicles in 2013 in the UAE which pitted three companies against
each other: Otokar (Turkey), Nexter (France) and Patria (Finland). Despite submitting
a proposal which lacked solid technical parameters, the Turks were originally given the
contract – a move that was interpreted as a reward for an appreciated stance on the Syrian
issue. But when Turkish foreign policy toward Syria evolved in what the Emiratis saw
as a negative direction – the Turks moving away from a very rm position against the
Syrian regime – the contract was taken away from the Otokar company and the RFP was
reopened.44
Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s decision to give $3 bn dollars to the Lebanese Armed
Forces in order to buy French products was interpreted as a “tactical divorce” of Gulf
countries with the US which France made the most of. ere are even observers who
suggest French diplomacy has recently adopted rm positions toward Iran and Syria
precisely because this increased its chances of signing contracts with Gulf countries.45
Hence, the new assertiveness of Qatar and the UAE could be seen as an inverted mirror
of the evolving policies of their strategic partners such as European countries, which move
away from assertive policies toward more conciliatory policies. e Europeans may be
modifying their policies in order to appease the Gulf States they wish to obtain military
contracts from.

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e Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States
Towards New Rules of the Regional and the Global Security Game?
e new assertiveness of Qatar and the UAE and the associated redenitions of the
aforementioned triangle in arms trade may have implications at the regional and global level.
First, their proactive policy within the MENA region can be said to have a destabilizing
eect on the regional and sub-regional contexts. Second, the development of a local defence
industry may represent the rise of a new order for the international arms trade.
When it comes to destabilizing eects of Qatari and Emirati assertiveness, a rst
risk factor lies in the divergence of interests that these countries defend. And while they
are aligned when it comes to preventing Iran to expand its inuence and power in the
region, a second risk factor lies in the rhetoric and action Qatar and the UAE deploy in
this regard.
Qatar’s competition with Saudi Arabia aggravated tensions between rival groups on
the ground in Egypt as well as in Syria, where both supported forces against Bashar al-
Assad, but not the same forces. e divergence among the Gulf States today, in a context
where their actions have real consequences on the reshaping of their environment, has the
potential to create new security challenges for everyone.
e same can be said of the hard-line rhetoric and actions against a demonized
“Iranian invisible hand” perceived by Gulf leaders as a threat to their legitimacy. An example
was the 2011 Bahrain operation conducted by Saudi Arabia and the UAE under the
banner of the GCC, which was “justied” by the assumption that Iran was using the Shia
community there to revive its regional hegemony by destabilizing the “weakest link” of the
GCC countries. Using such rhetoric, in Bahrain as well as in Syria and Yemen, the Gulf
States fuel the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia communities which is one of the
greatest dangers to regional and international stability.
When it comes to new rules to be taken into account by defence manufacturers, a
word should be said on the development of the local defence industry, particularly in the
UAE, generally born out of osets demands. e same is true in Qatar. is means both
countries are not only actors on the rise in terms of inuencing dynamics of international
relations today, but also in terms of inuencing dynamics of the international arms trade, by
becoming supplying states as well as mere client states.
e last decade had already witnessed the birth of several defence companies in the
UAE. In December 2014, a step toward more eciency and rationalisation was announced
with the launch of the Emirates Defence Industries Company (EDIC), an integrated
defence platform which involves 11 subsidiaries of Mubadala, Tawazun, and Emirates
Advanced Investment Group (EAI).
In the middle to long term, this local industry could take back shares of the Gulf
defence markets, which would represent a great economic loss for the West and accelerate
the shift in the dependency relationship between the Gulf Small Prince-States and their
Western allies. At IDEX 2015, it has not gone unnoticed that the majority of defence
contracts which were signed were with Emirati companies, for example.

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Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances
Conclusion
e literature on arms trade in the Gulf focuses mainly on technical aspects, on security
motives, on economic determinism, and on the main actors of the security complex rather
than on the smaller Arab Gulf States. is paper oers a new perspective at three levels.
Focusing on Qatar and the UAE, it argues that the dynamics they shape in the client state
– supplying state – industrial company triangle has challenged assumptions on small states
and is likely to redene the traditional logic of power and dependency in international
relations today. Moreover, it argues that the arms trade in these countries is driven by ideals
and a wide range of social and political incentives that eventually address security issues but
may be less focused on territorial defence than on the stability of their “Prince”. Finally,
pointing to the recent development of local defence capabilities and industry, it argues that
this could represent a new regime for the international arms trade.
Several policy recommendations can be drawn from this. Regarding the increasing
inuence of the GCC countries’ actions on reshaping their environment and the associated
possible destabilizing eect, there must be further GCC cooperation, among themselves
but also with Iran, in order to take their place as a new – and upright – centre of gravity of
the Arab world. Regarding the development of local capabilities, more GCC cooperation
is also needed to build a truly eective – and interoperable – regional security architecture.
To achieve these goals, GCC leaders would be well advised to move away from state-centric
/ regime-centric approaches which lead to “myriad cross-cutting obstacles to regional and
global governance”.46 Finally, at the very heart of a long-term empowerment of the GCC
military apparatus lies the necessity to implement new policies on education and training
aimed at nationalizing the labour force working in national defence elds and building truly
local capabilities for tomorrow.
It is however necessary not to expect drastic changes. Even if there are signs of new
dynamics in arms trade in Qatar and the UAE, one ought to underline that the extraneous
motives in the arms trade– prestige, (geo)politics, the social contract, etc. – will retain an
important role in the short to middle term – not least because so many actors taking part in
the local arms trade have an interest in the status quo.
Notes
1 Gregory F. Gause, e International Relations of the Persian Gulf, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010, p. 6.
2 Barry Buzan, “ird World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective”, in Brian L.
Job (ed.), e Security Dilemma: National Security of ird World States, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
1992, p. 169.
3 David T. Kinsella, “Conict in Context: Arms Transfers and ird World Rivalries during the Cold
War”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 3, August 1994, p. 557-558.
4 In 1982, the top countries in terms of military spending per capita were: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman,
the UAE, and Israel ( Joe Stork & Jim Paul, “Arms Sales and the Militarization of the Middle East”,

150
e Arms Trade, Military Services and the Security Market in the Gulf States
MERIP Reports, No. 112, February 1983, p. 5). In absolute terms, and in current prices, military
spending was around $24 770 million in Saudi Arabia, $1 467 million in Qatar and $1 355 million in
Oman (is data was provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “e military
expenditure of the UAE is uncertain and lacking in transparency”).
5 Gawdat Baghat, “Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf ”, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17,
No. 4, Fall 1995, p. 61.
6 Anthony H. Cordesman, Securing the Gulf: Key reats and Options for Enhanced Cooperation,
Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2013, p. iii.
7 Study published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in April 2013.
8 Richard L. Russell, “Future Gulf War: Arab and American Forces against Iranian Capabilities”, Joint
Force Quarterly, Issue 55, 4th quarter, 2009, p. 35-40.
9 “Mirage” is the name of the jet ghters that both Qatar and the UAE purchased from the French
company Dassault but it is also the name given to an optical phenomenon which can occur particularly
in the desert – here, the expression hence also points to an illusion of power. e expression “Mirages
of power” was used as the title of a French documentary on the UAE by Frédéric Compain, aired on
ARTE TV on December 9, 2014.
10 Saideh Lotan, “A Regional Security System in the Persian Gulf”, in Lawrence G. Potter & Gary G.
Sick (eds.), Security in the Persian Gulf, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 122.
11 Christian Chesnot & Georges Malbrunot, Qatar : Les secrets du core-fort, Paris: Editions Michel
Lafon, 2013, p. 156.
12 Victor Gervais, Du pétrole à l’armée: les stratégies de construction de l’Etat aux Emirats arabes unis, Paris:
Etudes de l’Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), 2011, p. 109.
13 David Roberts, “Qatar: domestic quietism, elite adventurism”, in “What Does the Gulf ink about the Arab
Awakening?” Gulf Analysis, London: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), April 2013, p. 10.
14 Emirati soldiers were to be found in Lebanon between 1976 and 1979, in Iraq in 1991, in Somalia from
1993 to 1994, in Kosovo from 1999 to 2001, and in Lebanon again in the early 2000s.
15 Jean-Marc Rickli, “European small states’ military policies after the Cold War: from territorial to niche
strategies”, Cambridge Review of International Aairs, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2008, p. 312.
16 e argument here was developed in the paper presented by the author at the 2014 Gulf Research
Meeting, entitled “Evolving Foreign and Security Policies: A Comparative Study of Qatar and the UAE”.
17 Joseph S. Nye, “e Changing Nature of World Power”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, No. 2,
Summer 1990, p. 177-192.
18 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, New York: W. W. Norton, 1961, p. 61.
19 Jean-Loup Samaan, « Les monarchies du Golfe : un marché d’armement sans armées ? », Moyen-
Orient, n° 17, 2013, p. 53.
20 Emma Soubrier, “Regional Disorder and New Geo-Economic Order: Saudi Security Strategies in a
Reshaped Middle East”, GRM Papers, Cambridge: Gulf Research Center (GRC), September 2014, p. 13.
21 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fears, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, cited in Gregory F. Gause, e
International Relations of the Persian Gulf, p. 3-4.
22 Nadim Hasbani, “e Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States”, Defense & Security
Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2006, p. 81.
23 Michael N. Barnett, “Regional Security After the Gulf War”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111,
No. 4, 1996-1997, p. 608; Baghat Korany, “National Security in the Arab World: e Persistence of
Dualism” in Dan Tschirgi (ed.), e Arab World Today, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, p. 166.
24 Abdullah K. Alshayji, “Mutual Realities, Perceptions, and Impediments between the GCC States and
Iran”, in Lawrence G. Potter & Gary G. Sick (eds.), Security in the Persian Gulf, p. 218.
25 Saideh Lotan, “A Regional Security System in the Persian Gulf ”, in L. Potter & G. Sick (eds.), Ibid., p. 120.
26 Kristian C. Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: e End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era, London:
Hurst, 2011, p. 7.
27 is section comes in large parts from our aforementioned article “Evolving Foreign and Security
Policies”.

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Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearances
28 Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars, Cornell: Cornell University Press,
1996, p. 65.
29 “In his State of the Union address of 23 January 1980, US President Jimmy Carter announced that
“An attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any
means necessary, including military force”. e Carter Doctrine introduced by this declaration bears a
remarkable similarity to the enunciation of British policy in 1903 when Lord Landsdowne, the Secretary
of State for Foreign Aairs, stated in Parliament that “we should regard the establishment of a naval base,
or of a fortied port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests,
and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal”. J. E. Peterson, “e Historical Pattern
of Gulf Security”, in Lawrence G. Potter & Gary G. Sick (eds.), Security in the Persian Gulf, p. 24.
30 “Some of the smaller GCC states have even identied Saudi Arabia as a threat because of its size
and increasing assertiveness within the GCC”. Joseph Kostiner, “Perceptions of Collective Security
in the Post-Saddam Era” in Mehran Kemrava (ed.), International Politics of the Persian Gulf, Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2011, p. 116-117; “e smaller Gulf states have now found a new patron
and protector, the US, which allows them (if they want it) a bit of room to maneuver within the Saudi
orbit”. Gregory Gause, e International Relations of the Persian Gulf, p. 7.
31 T. V. Paul, “Inuence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship”, Asian
Survey, Vol. 32, No. 12, December 1992, p. 1079.
32 Chronologically, their bilateral defence cooperation agreements were signed as follow: Qatar/France in
1994, UAE/France in 1995, UAE/UK in 1996, Qatar/UK in 2006.
33 Philipp Carl Salzman, “e Middle East’s tribal DNA”, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2008,
pp. 23-33.
34 “e GCC (…) is as much a means of reinforcing the domestic security of a set of anachronistic
monarchical regimes as an alliance against external threats”. Amitav Acharya, “Regionalism and
Regime Security in the ird World: Comparing the Origins of the ASEAN and the GCC”, in Brian
Job (ed.), e Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of ird World States, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992,
p. 143-164.
35 Mehran Kemrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013, p. 130.
36 James A. Russell, “Regional reats and Security Strategy: e Troubling Case of Today’s Middle
East”, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, November 2007, p. 21.
37 Christopher M. Davidson, Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, p.
94. “Centuries-old alliances are being incorporated into a present-day system of ‘tribal capitalism’ by
providing the latest generation of Al-Nahyan sheikhs with the loyal captains of industry and malleable
middlemen they need to administer the dozens of entities that are propelling forward Abu Dhabi’s
ambitious strategic plans”. (p. 111)
38 Interviews with Western industrial companies in Abu Dhabi and Doha between October 2013 and
June 2014.
39 Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies,
New York: State University of New York, 1999, p. 35.
40 Victor Gervais, Du pétrole à l ’armée: les stratégies de construction de l’Etat aux Emirats arabes unis, p. 134.
41 Anthony Cordesman, Securing the Gulf, p. 48.
42 Nadim Hasbani, “e Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States”, p. 81.
43 Christopher M. Davidson, Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond, p. 81.
44 Interviews with government ocials and industrial companies in Abu Dhabi in October 2013.
45 Georges Malbrunot, « Iran : pourquoi la France est aussi intransigeante ? », L’Orient indiscret,
November 10, 2013.
46 Abdullah Baabood, “Dynamics and Determinants of the GCC States’ Foreign Policy, with Special
Reference to the EU,” in Gerd Nonneman, Analyzing Middle Eastern Foreign Policies, London:
Routledge, 2005, p. 148.