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Dear Editors,
I am writing a response to Des Kennedy’s review of Staemmler’s Agression,
Time and Understanding.
We are born into a world already there. This is one of Merleau-Ponty's
foundational themes. What he meant by this is something he pointed to
repeatedly in his various writings; there is no non (or pre)-interpreted perception.
While he averred that our embodiment throws us into inescapable, direct and
immediate contact with our world, it is always "our world" of appearance and
experience, our lived-“bodymind.”
I am taken aback that Des Kennedy equates direct and immediate perception
with non-interpreted perception. Our bodies—in the immediacy of any moment--
are very active interpreters, as Merleau-Ponty points out continually. Perhaps
Kennedy equates the word “interpretation,” with cognition (and disembodied
cognition at that, as if such a thing is possible), and such an equation would
leave Kennedy believing that interpretation is not something that our bodies are
involved in, and also that interpretation is the same thing as a “mere” projection.
In other words, Des has separated embodiment from thought in a way that
neither Merleau-Ponty nor Staemmler does. In so doing, it is no wonder that
Kennedy assume that Staemmler has a “representational theory of mind,” which
he does not. Frankly, I cannot understand how the quote that Kennedy used from
Merleau-Ponty; “perception is inseparable from the consciousness which it has,
or rather is, of reaching the thing itself,” is different from what Staemmler says, in
that one’s consciousness is a major shaper of one’s perception of “the thing
itself.”
Staemmler's writings always bear careful reading. As Kennedy points out,
Staemmler's reasoning is always precise and nuanced. He goes step-by-step,
often beginning with common sense assertions that he describes in detail and
then he turns around and refutes the assertions with scholarly research and a
creative integration of alternative perspectives. This may leave the reader with a
mistaken reading of the points Staemmler wishes to make, especially if one
reads Staemmler cursorily.
One example of what I believe is a misunderstanding, is Kennedy’s reading of
Staemmler’s discussions of memory and the present moment. When Kennedy
states that Frank-M. Staemmler puts such terrible events as the incest, or rape
into question, I believe he misunderstands Staemmler in a way I find disturbing
and provocative. Staemmler does point out the plasticity of memory (which we all
have had experience with, as our memories and those of our patients undergo
revision as our life contexts change, and as our development proceeds). But it is
quite a leap to say that he would be skeptical of patient's stories of rape and
abuse. Quite the contrary. He is interested in our world of meanings. To quote
Staemmler,
This may seem quite simple at first, but if you look at it a little closer, it
appears more difficult. For in psychotherapy we in most cases don't only
have to deal with simple facts and external events but with the meanings
our clients attribute to facts and events. I'd like to explain this with a
„classical“ example: If a client remembers his mother, it can mean to him
to still feel controlled, dominated or tortured by her today. Or it may have
the meaning of a memory of a cute old lady to whom he loves to talk from
time to time. It is not the fact that he had a mother nor the fact that
perhaps she used to control and torture him during his childhood. In case
the former events don't mean a problem to him today, he does not have to
work on them. So in therapy, not the facts but the meanings somebody
attributes to the facts are essential. (p. 340)
As therapists, we are supposed be "agnostic" about the historical facts, anyway!
Our job is to work with our patients' experience, to help them to elaborate and
gain flexibility with their entire world of experience, not to judge it's veracity.
Kennedy reads as Frank as reducing humans to a bunch of interacting neurons. I
am not greatly interested in neuroscience myself, but as I read his book, I formed
a very different opinion than did Kennedy. As I see it, Staemmler carefully and
systematically showed how non-reductionistic science actually brings us back
around to what Kennedy most wants; a holistic appreciation of our experience of
being-in-time, and also, a humane, contextualist perspective on experiences of
remembering.
I am one of those by whom Kennedy is baffled. I think this book is a very
important contribution to Gestalt Therapy theory and practice. I hope everyone
reads it, and that is why I write this letter. I don’t want potential readers to be
dissuaded by Kennedy’s review so I offer my disagreements in the hope that now
readers might be intrigued to see where they will land!
Lynne Jacobs