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Today threat landscape evolving at the rapid rate with many organization continuously face complex and malicious cyber threats. Cybercriminal equipped by better skill, organized and well-funded than before. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) has become a hot topic and being under consideration for many organization to counter the rise of cyber-attacks. The aim of this paper is to review the existing research related to CTI. Through the literature review process, the most basic question of what CTI is examines by comparing existing definitions to find common ground or disagreements. It is found that both organization and vendors lack a complete understanding of what information is considered to be CTI, hence more research is needed in order to define CTI. This paper also identified current CTI product and services that include threat intelligence data feeds, threat intelligence standards and tools that being used in CTI. There is an effort by specific industry to shared only relevance threat intelligence data feeds such as Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) that collaborate on critical security threats facing by global financial services sector only. While research and development center such as MITRE working in developing a standards format (e.g.; STIX, TAXII, CybOX) for threat intelligence sharing to solve interoperability issue between threat sharing peers. Based on the review for CTI definition, standards and tools, this paper identifies four research challenges in cyber threat intelligence and analyses contemporary work carried out in each. With an organization flooded with voluminous of threat data, the requirement for qualified threat data analyst to fully utilize CTI and turn the data into actionable intelligence become more important than ever. The data quality is not a new issue but with the growing adoption of CTI, further research in this area is needed.
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Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Vol. 10, No. 1, April 2018, pp. 371~379
ISSN: 2502-4752, DOI: 10.11591/ijeecs.v10.i1.pp371-379 371
Journal homepage: http://iaescore.com/journals/index.php/ijeecs
Cyber Threat Intelligence Issue and Challenges
Md Sahrom Abu1, Siti Rahayu Selamat2, Aswami Ariffin3, Robiah Yusof4
1,3Malaysian Computer Emergency Response Team, Cybersecurity Malaysia
2,4Faculty of Information Technology and Communication,
Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka, Malaysia
Article Info
ABSTRACT
Article history:
Received Jan 9, 2018
Revised Mar 2, 2018
Accepted Mar 18, 2018
Today threat landscape evolving at the rapid rate with much organization
continuously face complex and malicious cyber threats. Cybercriminal
equipped by better skill, organized and well-
funded than before. Cyber
Threat Intelligence (CTI) has become a hot topic and being under
consideration for many organization to counter the rise of cyber-attacks. The
aim of this paper is to review the existing research related to CTI. Through
the literature review process, the most basic question of what CTI is
examines by comparing existing definitions t
o find common ground or
disagreements. It is found that both organization and vendors lack a complete
understanding of what information is considered to be CTI, hence more
research is needed in order to define CTI. This paper also identified current
CTI product and services that include threat intelligence data feeds, threat
intelligence standards and tools that being used in CTI. There is an effort by
specific industry to shared only relevance threat intelligence data feeds such
as Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC)
that collaborate on critical security threats facing by global financial services
sector only. While research and development center such as MITRE working
in developing a standards format (e.g.; STIX, TAXII, CybOX) for threat
intelligence sharing to solve interoperability issue between threat sharing
peers. Based on the review for CTI definition, standards and tools, this paper
identifies four research challenges in cyber threat intelligence and analyses
contempo
rary work carried out in each. With an organization flooded with
voluminous of threat data, the requirement for qualified threat data analyst to
fully utilize CTI and turn the data into actionable intelligence become more
important than ever. The data qual
ity is not a new issue but with the growing
adoption of CTI, further research in this area is needed
Keywords:
Cyber Threat Intelligence
Data
Information
Intelligence
Copyright © 2018 Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science.
All rights reserved.
Corresponding Author:
Md Sahrom Abu,
Malaysian Computer Emergency Response Team,
Cybersecurity Malaysia,
43300 Seri Kembangan, Selangor D.E, Malaysia.
Email: sahrom@cybersecurity.my
1. INTRODUCTION
The latest threat landscape, shows that it is very difficult to prevent an attack and security breach
due to attacker’s capabilities to target vulnerabilities in people and process as well technology [1]. Cyber
criminals have improved their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to the point where they have
become difficult to detect and challenging to investigate and remediate [2]. Their TTPs become less
predictable, more persistent, more resourceful, better funded, much more organized and motivated by money.
Many organization being affected by organised criminal that deploy ransomware and demand payment to
unlock critical data and systems. For example, the latest WannaCry ransomware attack that started on Friday,
12 May 2017, within a day spread over 150 countries and infect more than 230,000 computers [3].
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In recent years, Cyber Threat Intelligence has received a considerable coverage by media and has
been identified as a solution to counter the increased number and the complexity of security incidents. Many
organization has opted to subscribe various threat intelligence collection whether from open-source or
commercial sources. The problem is while too much data consumes and at the same time there is not enough
data. This will lead to information overload issue. As a result, Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform (TISP)
that can manage cyber threat intelligence data and convert this data into actionable intelligence, delivered to
the different tools and assist in incident response has been introduced. Information security vendors and
community are currently offering TISP solutions to provide threat intelligence feed and system that can assist
cyber threat response. The solution can be divided into two categories which is content aggregation that can
provide various threat data feeds and Threat Intelligence Management System for deriving business value
from the collected information. Providers such as FS-ISAC, OASIS, IBM X-Force Exchange, Facebook
Xchange, HP ThreatCentral, Checkpoint IntelliStore, Alienvault OTX, and Crowdstrike intelligence
exchange more focus on content aggregation [4]. While Intelworks, Soltra, Threatstream, ThreatConnect,
Vorstack, ThreatQuotient and CRITs to name a few, and more focus to Threat Intelligence Management
System. Apart from that most of information security vendors has come out with their own definition on
Cyber Threat Intelligence to suit their business strategy and marketing. This confusion happens due to lack of
academic literature discussing CTI between the community about the clear definition of CTI, the standard
and protocol using in threat information sharing. This paper will serve as a guidance to better understand CTI
by identifying the definition, current issue and challenge in CTI.
Section 2 of this paper describes the methodology that being implement for this literature review.
Section 3 presents and describes various definition of CTI covered by the research community and how it
complements the existing intelligence cycle. Section 4 presents the available standard and framework that
being used in CTI. Section 5 identifies research challenge in CTI, providing analysis of the views in each
area. As a conclusion, we provide a discussion and recommendation for future research in CTI.
2. RESEARCH METHOD
2.1. Search Strategy and Selection Criteria
The collection of targeted literature review for analysis in this paper based on keyword search. We
performed information gathering on the definition, issue and challenge to cyber threat intelligence. Figure 1,
shows the outlines our research approach. We started to review the literature from academic databases [5]
such as IEEExplore and the ACM Digital Library. We followed-up citations and references in this literature
to extend the number of relevant sources. We also identified literature by searching databases such as Google
scholar. Using the search terms such as "Cyber Threat Intelligence" and "Actionable Intelligence". We
searched for articles in peer-reviewed journals, books and grey literature (documents issued by government
agencies e: g; federal, state, or local, private consultancies, non-governmental agencies, and private
organizations).
Figure 1. Research Approach Overview
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2.2. Data Analysis
Due to Cyber Threat Intelligence is a new topic, whitepapers from CERTS, software vulnerabilities
and public information sharing platforms were also search for relevance information. The systematic review
conducted using narrative synthesis by summarizing, comparing and contrasting the data for literature written
in English since 2010.
2.3. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
The keyword search process produced a significant number of results. To ensure that only relevant
sources were included for review, articles discovered by the search process were measured against several
criteria. Each source had to meet one or more of the requirements identified. First, the source is directly
addresses at least one specific aspect of cyber threat intelligence, such as relevance, timeliness or actionable.
Second, the source is not directly related to cyber threat intelligence, but provides a definition of one or all.
These requirements are used in order to achieve the paper's aim of providing a concise introduction
to the immediate challenges and issues facing in cyber threat intelligence.
3. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE
As threat landscape evolve and grow more sophisticated, there is still no general agreement to define
cyber threat intelligence with information security community often incorrectly using the terms intelligence,
cyber intelligence and cyber threat intelligence [6]. It is important for information security community to
understand the basic concept to define cyber threat intelligence and how it is derived. As a starting point, this
paper will begin analyzing existing definition and term that always being used extensively and
interchangeably by security community in threat intelligence. We decide to cover four relevant terms in this
field: cyber-attack, cyber-threat, intelligence and cyber threat intelligence.
3.1. Cyber-Threats and Cyber-Attacks
Nowadays, there is no agreement between security community on how to clearly define cyber-attack
and cyber-threat while this term being used interchangeably [7]. We start analyzing CTI definition for this
paper by consider cyber-attack and cyber-threat because it is a basic building block in all hostile cyber
situation [8].
There are many definitions to clarify cyber-attack and cyber-threat as both term being the most
discussed issue in mainstream media. In 2013, the US Government defined cyber-threat as a broad definition
that cover wide range of security measures:
It is stated that cyber-threats cover a wide range of malicious activities that can occur through
cyberspace [9]. Such threats include web site defacement, espionage, theft of intellectual property, denial of
service attacks, and destructive malware.
In contrast to US Government, the Oxford English Dictionary [10] defines cyber-threat, “as the
possibility of malicious attempts to damage or disrupt a computer network or system”. While cyber-attack is
“an attempt by hackers to damage or destroy a computer network or system”.
This definition gave us an insight that cyber-threats are the condition when there is a possibility of
malicious activity happens and cyber-attacks are when the incident become reality.
3.2. Data Information and Intelligence
The main question to ask when we want to understand the concept of cyber threat intelligence is
What is intelligence?The most common work as reference to answer this question is a keystone document
by U.S. Department of Defense [11]. Figure 2 shows the relationship between data, information and
intelligence that can lead to actionable intelligence. An actionable intelligence must always be the end goal in
threat intelligence lifecycle to improve cyber security. Organizations need to invest more on human analyst to
conduct analysis and produce actionable threat intelligence. Actionable threat intelligence can provide
sufficient information to make an informed decision that can be acted upon.
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Figure 2. Relationship of Data, Information and Intelligence [11].
There’s a huge difference between noise, threat data, information, and intelligence, and
understanding the difference is essential to getting the most out of threat intelligence platform.
Data is comprised of the basic, unrefined and generally unfiltered information that are usually in the
form of symbols and signals readings [12]. Symbols include words (text and/or verbal), numbers, diagrams,
and images (still &/or video), which are the building blocks of communication. Meanwhile signals include
sensor and/or sensory readings of light, sound, smell, taste, and touch.
Information is prepared data that has been processed, aggregated and organized into a more human-
friendly format that provides more contexts and being useful for some form of analysis[12].
Dalziel [13] describes intelligence from professional perspective as data that has been refined,
analysed and processed and the output must be relevant, actionable and valuable. Those three requirements
can be achieved through logical and analytical process conduct by human that can provide contextual data
and produce useable output.
While in the context of information security, Brown et al [4] describe intelligence as actionable
information or the product of the intelligence lifecycle model, which includes several activities like planning,
data collection, analysis and dissemination [14][15]. However, most of organization today primarily focuses
on data collection and given less attention to other activities of intelligence lifecycle [16].
Comparing to the definition provided by Dalziel [13], the main purpose of intelligence is to support
decision making or operational action such as detection, prevention and response.
Schoeman [17], expressed that tools and data feeds cannot by themselves provide threat intelligence
without human intervention to derived intelligence from information and data. Agreeing with Schoeman, Lee
stated that intelligence of any type requires analysis. Analysis is performed by humans. Automation,
analytics and various tools can drastically increase the effectiveness of analysts but there must always be
analysts involved in the process.
To summarize the data relationship, it can be said that data that collected from operational
environment is processed and refined to produce information. Then the information is analysed and
transformed to actionable format that constitute intelligence
3.3. Existing Cyber Threat Intelligence Definition
In recent years, Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) has become a hot topic in Information Security (IS)
but the lack of literature review on clarifying the concept and companies tend to use their own definition to
distinguish their product may lead to some ambiguity [18]. There are many different definitions to explain
this term. As ambiguous as it can be, Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) can be define comprehensively as
evidence-based knowledge, including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications and actionable advice,
about an existing or emerging threat that can be used to inform decisions regarding the subject's response to
that menace or hazard [19] . This definition stated that the organization can decide their action at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels by using the collection of information that contain the details of
current and emerging threat.
While Cloppert [18] offer several definitions to Cyber Threat Intelligence that based on operations,
analysis and domain. Hence, he defined the Cyber Threat Intelligence Operations as actions taken in
cyberspace to compromise and defend protected information and capabilities available in that domain.
Meanwhile, Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysis as the analysis of those actions and the actors, tools, and
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techniques behind them to support Operations, and Cyber Threat Intelligence domain as the union of Cyber
Threat Intelligence Operations and Analysis.
Based on Cloppert, threat intelligence is not only focus on nation state that bound by some
technique to influencing national policy, but it is more on technical aspect such as tools and technique.
In contrast, Lee [18] proposed the definition for Cyber Threat Intelligence: as the process and
product resulting from the interpretation of raw data into information that meets a requirement as it relates to
the adversaries that have the intent, opportunity and capability to do harm”. From his study, Lee mentioned
that threat intelligence involved the process of data transformation to information that relate to adversary.
Based on the definition reviewed, it shows that the definition given by Cloppert not only considers
CTI being used to gain an advantage over the adversary, but that the adversary also uses it to gain an
advantage over the defender. The definition given is also refers to more technical aspects such as tools and
techniques. Compared to Lee, the definition given is refers to the intent, opportunity and capability to do
harm.
3.4. Summary of CTI Definition
An analysis to the literature has shown that there is no widely accepted definition of cyber threat
intelligence. Researchers tend to define the term based on their working environment and business nature.
However, there is several key points that we can get from the existing definition namely context and element
of CTI. Context is the pillar of CTI. Without context, CTI can easily become unmanageable stream of alert.
Context allows security analyst to understand the type of threat or threat actor they are dealing with, so they
can formulate an appropriate response plan. There are three main elements of CTI which are relevant,
timeliness and actionable. The complete CTI definition need to cover these three elements to make sure only
relevant threat data collected, analyze and processed in timely manner and the result can produce actionable
intelligence to assist decision making.
4. SOURCE OF THREAT INTELLIGENCE
The AlienVault [20] survey at Black Hat 2016 outlined that most of the correspondent rely on their
own detection processes as a source for their threat intelligence strategy. Sixty-six percent of the respondents
stated that data source come from their internal detection process, forty-eight percent from trusted peers,
forty-four percent from paid subscription services, thirty-eight percent from government agencies, thirty-
seven percent from crowdsourced/open source communities and twenty-eight percent from blogs or online
forums. An organisation can use their internal detection process as main source to gather data as it can
provide higher visibility into their environment and will lead to a better use of information and tools in
efficient way. While considering a government feed, or by pulling data from a crowdsourced platform as an
option to give a comprehensive view of the overall threat landscape. A clear picture about their threat
landscape can ease up organisation effort to develop, maintain and refine intelligence requirements that
support business operation in planning and direction phase of Intelligence Lifecycle [11]. Hence, we can
conclude that there are three categories of CTI source which are internal, external and community.
Internal sources for threat data collected from within the organization specifically internal network
and SIEM that being implemented in organization. Threat data from internal network can be in the form of
email log, alerts, incident response report, event logs, DNS logs, firewall log, etc.
External sources have a wide coverage of data and it requires verification by someone that have
knowledge about organization threat landscape to determine its relevancy. Data feed from external can be
from “Open source” intelligence (i.e., security researcher, vendor blogs, and publicly available reputation and
block lists) that provide indicators for detection and context without any cost. However, the downside for
open source intelligence is the data quality issue [21]. While private or commercial sources of threat
intelligence are typically only available on a paid basis. It can include threat intelligence feeds, structured
data reports (such as STIX), and unstructured reports (such as PDF and Word documents). Compared to open
source, these feeds have a service level agreement on data quality through cyber threat intelligence update
mechanism from vendor.
The threat data source from community category covered any CTI shared through trusted channel
between members with the same interest. An example of formal community groups such as Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) organized under the National Council of ISACs (NCI) specifically
covered higher education or financial services. While Research and Education Networking (REN-ISAC) is a
trusted community for research and higher education.
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5. STANDARDS AND TOOLS IN THREAT INTELLIGENCE
To ease and speed up the intelligence sharing among organization, the need for structured automated
exchange of information is required. Due to that, there is an increase of development to standard for threat
intelligence sharing (e.g. CybOX, STIX and TAXII) and the development of threat intelligence sharing
platform to support automated information sharing (e.g. MISP, OTX) [22]. As of today, STIX is considered
as the de-facto standard for describing threat intelligence data and widely used by threat intelligence sharing
platform [23].
5.1. Standards
There are many standards available for an organization to adapt depend on their specific needs.
MITRE has developed three standards (CybOX, STIX, TAXII) as a package that were designed to work
together for different needs in CTI management system. CybOX is refers to Cyber Observable eXpression
XML schema. CYBOX characterize chronology and time range between events. CybOX XML schema is
used to represent STIX observable that describe cyber artifact or event such as IPv4 address, with a few
related objects [24]. STIX is Structured Threat Information Expression that leverage CybOX vocabulary for
describing cyber threat information, so it can be shared, stored, and analyzed in a consistent manner. The
architecture that represent STIX consist of nine construct such as observables, indicators, incidents, tactics,
technique and procedure (TTP), exploit target, courses of action, campaigns, threat actors and reports.
Indicators like IP addreses for command and control servers and malware hashes are the most frequently use
among the community [25]. TAXII or Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information is an open-
source protocol and service specification to enable sharing of actionable cyber threat information across
organization. TAXII addresses the sensitivity of threat data by providing common, open specifications for
transporting cyber threat information messages, with capabilities such as encryption, authentication,
addressing, alerting, and querying between systems in a secure and automated manner [26].
MILE also developed three standards as package that consist of Incident Object Description and
Exchange Format (IODEF), Structured Cyber Security Information (IODEF-SCI) and Real Time Inter-
Network Defense (RID). IODEF defined by RFC 5070 to normalize data from various sources for human
analysis and incident response. While IODEF-SCI act as an extension to the IODEF standard that adds
support for additional data and RID can be use as communication standard in CTI.
Mandiant also introduced Open Indicators of Compromise (OpenIOC) framework that can
characterize static information.
While Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) developed by Verizon allow
the organization to share incident data and be part of the broad data set analysis.
5.2. Tools in Cyber Threat Intelligence
There is a growing interest from organization and security professional on collecting threat
intelligence data and determining how to process this data. However, without the assistance from threat
intelligence tools this threat data can become unmanageable stream of data. Due to that, many parties have
developed tools that can help organization and security professional to manage the threat information
sharing. There are two tools that can be used for nomenclature and dictionary, Common Platform
Enumeration (CPE) for hardware and Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE) for security software
configurations.
REN-ISAC introduced Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) as a client/server system for
sharing enterprise threat intelligence data. CIF includes a server component that collects and stores threat
intelligence data. Data can be IP addresses, ASN numbers, email addresses, domain names and uniform
resource locators (URLs) and other attributes.
Alien Vault has taken an initiative to release Open Threat Exchange (OTX) for public to share
research and investigate new threats. OTX can cleanses, aggregates, validates and enable the security
community to share the latest threat data, trends, and techniques.
McAfee Threat Intelligence Exchange introduced ‘pull’ service for subscribers, virus definition, or
DAT files contain up-to-date virus signatures and other information that McAfee anti-virus products use to
protect a Linux, Windows or Mac computer against harmful software in circulation. New threats appear each
day and McAfee constantly release new DAT files.
Finally, there is a project by The Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL)
developed Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) [27]. The main purpose for this trusted platform is
to allows the collection and sharing of important indicators of compromise (IoC) of targeted attacks, but also
threat information like vulnerabilities or financial indicators used in fraud cases.
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5.3. Summary for Cti Standards and Tools
There is many tools and standards proposed and under development in CTI. While some of the
standards overlaps with each other, many of them was use for specific objective. Standards also can ease and
speed up the intelligence sharing among organization and form the basis for today’s threat intelligence
sharing platforms.
An organization can combine more than one tools and standards in their CTI program to make it fit
with their specific requirement. Burger et al. [28] proposed an agnostic framework that can help to evaluate
and assess the standard.
6. ISSUE AND CHALLENGES IN CTI
With cyber threat intelligence, type of threat data source and threat intelligence sharing platform
(TISP) examined, it is crucial to look at the current issue and challenges in cyber threat intelligence area. This
section identifies four current issues and challenges facing by consumer and producer of threat intelligence.
6.1. Challenge 1: Threat Data Overload
Threat intelligence has evolved in very short period and there is hundreds of threat data feed
available whether from open source, closed source or free to use. To defend against cyber-attack, it is very
important for customer to have timely access to relevant, actionable threat intelligence and the ability to act
on that intelligence [29]. However, many of them still struggle with an overwhelming amount of threat data
and a lack of staff expertise to make the most of their threat intelligence programs. According to a survey
conducted by Ponemon [30] on 1000 IT practitioners in 2016, 70% of the respondent said threat intelligence
is too voluminous and/or complex to provide actionable intelligence.
To address this issue many organizations have successfully identified a variety of resources and
techniques to help maximize the effectiveness of their threat intelligence. This is support by the result of
survey conducted by Ponemon [31] that show 80% of respondent agree that deploying threat intelligence
platform can help the organization to automate threat intelligence. While 54% urge to have a qualified threat
analyst staff to fully utilize threat intelligence potential.
6.2. Challenge 2: Threat Data Quality
It is common practice for security feed provider to market threat feeds as CTI. This statement
support by a study conducted by Ponemon that indicate 70% of threat intelligence feeds are sketchy and not
dependable in terms of quality. Security feed provider need to redesign their security sensors to capture and
enrich the data to help decision-support systems increase the value of threat intelligence and make it
actionable.
There is an initiative by Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) to improve threat intelligence quality that
being shared among community members. Threat intelligence coming from CTA members will be
automatically scored for its quality, and members will be able to draw out threat intelligence only if they
have provided sufficient quality input.
6.3. Challenge 3: Privacy and Legal Issue
When dealing with CTI, there are privacy and legal issues to consider that relates to how the data
can be shared and which laws govern the sharing of data. Many organisations are wary of sharing
information that could reflect negatively on their brand [32]. Some companies may be hesitant to share
information due to the fear of reputation damage that may arise from disclosing attack information. As for
now TISP already provide preliminary functionalities to establish trust between the organisations. However,
it is limited to group-based access control and ranking mechanisms.
6.4. Challenge 4: Interoperability Issue in TISP
Vazquez et al. [33] raised an interoperability issue that face by existing threat sharing platform. The
various standard and format use by threat sharing platform hindered the producer and receiver speak
seamlessly to each other due to data extension is not supported by the used application.
As an initiative, MITRE group has developed three specifications/standards namely CYBOX (Cyber
Observable Expression), STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) and TAXII (Trusted Automated
Exchange of Indicator Information) [24–26].
By adopting to the standard introduced by MITRE, interoperability issue between threat sharing
peers can be solved. However, if there is no data standard can be established between peers due some
constraint, data transformation can come in handy.
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7. CONCLUSION
CTI adoption is still in early state and the needs for research and development is required to fully
utilize its potential. This paper examines available literature that discuss the existing definition of CTI and
the current state of development for common language and tools available in CTI.
We also identify several issues and challenges for data quality and CTI sharing platform. It is not a
new issue for data quality but with the growing adoption of CTI, it is important to look at this as future
research.
An organization can implement threat sharing platform to manage a large volume of threat feeds and
hire a qualified threat data analyst to analyze, process and turn threat data to actionable intelligence. While at
the community level, there is an initiative between community member to validate the threat data and make
sure threat data shared among member have sufficient quality. There is also an effort by research and
development center such as MITRE in developing standards format (e.g.; STIX, TAXII, CybOX) for threat
intelligence sharing to tackle interoperability issue between threat sharing peers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was kindly supported by The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI),
Cybersecurity Malaysia and Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka (UTeM).
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BIOGRAPHIES OF AUTHORS
Md Sahrom Abu is a Senior Analyst at MyCERT, Cybersecurity Malaysia. His main task is
focusing on cyber threats and research.
He graduated from University of Teknologi, Malaysia
for his Bachelor degree. Currently, he is pursuing a postgraduate degree.
Siti Rahayu Selamat is currently a senior lecturer at the Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka,
Malaysia. She received her Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science (Digital Forensics). Her
research interests include network forensic, cyber terrorism, cyber violence extremism, intrusion
detection, network security and penetration testing. She is also a member of Information
Security, Forensics and Networking (INSFORNET) research group and actively doing research
in malware, criminal behavior and cyber violence extremism profiling.
Aswami Ariffin is a digital forensics scientist with vast experience in security assurance, threat
intelligence, incident response and digital forensic investigation with various law enforcement
agencies/regulatory bodies and provided expert testimonies in court. He received his Doctor of
Philosophy in Computer Science (Digital Forensics). Currently, Aswami Ariffin is Senior Vice
President of Cyber Security Responsive Services at CyberSecurity Malaysia. He is regularly
consulted by the government, industries, universities and media on cyber security issues,
strategies, research and development; also invitation as keynote speaker in conferences and
providing expertise in community work.
Robiah Yusof received the BSc (Hons) of Computer Studies and Master of Information
Technology from Liverpool John Moore’s University, UK and Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
respectively. She obtained the Doctor of Philosophy, Network Security from Universiti Teknikal
Malaysia Melaka (UTeM) and currently a senior lecturer at the UTeM. She is also a member of
Information Security, Forensics and Networking (INSFORNET) research group. Her research
interests include network security, computer system security, network administration, network
management and network design
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