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The Chemistry of Relations: The periodic table examined through the lens of C.S. Peirce’s philosophy.
Abstract
This thesis explores Charles Peirce’s reception of Dmitri Mendeleev’s periodic arrangement of the chemical elements, the further impact of chemistry on Peirce’s philosophy, such as his phenomenology and diagrammatic reasoning, and the relations between Peirce's theory of iconicity and Mendeleev's periodic table. It is prompted by the almost complete absence in the literature of any discussion of Peirce’s unpublished chemistry manuscripts and the lack of attention given to the connections between Peirce’s early study of chemistry and his later philosophy. This project seeks to make a contribution to this otherwise neglected area of Peirce scholarship.
... Germany became, in the nineteenth century, the leading country in experimental psychology. Thus, this chapter retraces some treads of Kantian 78 For an assessment of the influence of chemistry on Peirce's philosophy, see Campbell (2017). and post-Kantian thought which are particularly significant for Peirce's theory of perception. ...
The main issue of the study is the perception of TV moderators’ image by young audience. By means of qualitative content analysis of popular Czech and Kyrgyz TV moderators and questionnaire survey in the Czech Republic and Kyrgyzstan, the author demonstrates how the perception of the TV moderator image can be influenced by gender and cultural background of audience. Moreover, it was established that besides the visual aspects of TV presentation personal characteristics play a significant role in the process of formation of young audience opinion about the talk show moderator. In addition, a relationship between the evaluation of communication strategies and popularity of moderators was found together with the fact that Czech respondents are in their evaluation more distinctive than the Kyrgyz ones.
This article offers an overview of current approaches to the study of diagrams and their roles in scientific knowledge making. The discussion is developed in three parts. The first investigates and questions historical and philosophical analyses of the suppression of diagrams in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It attempts to sketch an alternative historiography of diagrammatic practices in which the insights of advocates of diagrammatic reasoning in a time of “objectivity without images” take center stage. The second part turns to the American philosopher, scientist, and logician Charles Sanders Peirce as a representative defender of diagrammatic reasoning and diagrammatic representation in the late nineteenth century, and it investigates his legacy on current approaches to diagrams. The final part exposes a puzzling paradox in the literature, characterizing it as a false dichotomy between “the representational view” and the “object-based view” of diagrams. The article concludes that this dichotomy reveals more about the identities of scholars embracing particular disciplinary traditions than about the diagrams themselves, and it suggests that this can be overcome by attending to diagramming as a practice at the intersections of representation, manipulation, and experimentation.
span>Charles-Adolphe Wurtz (1817-1884) fue uno de los químicos más importantes del siglo diecinueve y sus investigaciones ejercieron una poderosa influencia en el desarrollo de la química. Su nombre está asociado estrechamente con síntesis químicas muy conocidas de las cuales la más importante es la de alcanos por la acción del sodio sobre sus derivados halogenados. Desarrolló las fórmulas de los ácidos fosforoso e hipofosforoso, descubrió el oxicloruro de fósforo, las aminas, los glicoles y el butanol terciario, un método práctico para la síntesis de ésteres (incluyendo la glicerina), la reacción aldólica, y efectuó un estudio a fondo del ácido láctico. Aparte de estos descubrimientos, jugó un papel importante en el desarrollo de la teoría estructural.</span
Josiah Parsons Cooke established chemistry education at Harvard University, initiated an atomic weight research program, and broadly impacted American chemical education through his students, the introduction of laboratory instruction, textbooks, and influence on Harvard's admissions requirements. The devoutly Unitarian Cooke also articulated and defended a biogeochemical natural theology, which he defended by arguing for commonalities between the epistemologies of science and religion. Cooke's pre-Mendeleev classification scheme for the elements and atomic weight research were motivated by his interest in numerical order in nature, which reflected his belief in a divine lawgiver.
Throughout the history of philosophy, chemical concepts and theories have appeared in the work of philosophers, both as examples and as topics of discussion in their own right, and scientists themselves have often engaged with theoretical, conceptual, and methodological issues that fall within what one would now recognize as philosophy of chemistry. This chapter offers a summary of the history of philosophy of chemistry since Kant, alongside a critical examination of why chemistry has been relegated to the sidelines so frequently in recent philosophy of science. This history offers a unique vantage point from which to consider the interests and assumptions, often implicit, that underlie 20th-century philosophy's view of what science is or perhaps should be. These include the inheritance of logical positivism and empiricism, with its particular focus on theories expressed in the language of mathematics and understood as axiomatic systems, and the widespread acceptance of reductionist views of theoretical explanation. Against this background, much of chemistry disappears. Being perhaps too grounded in laboratory and experimental practice, and often practical in its aims and correspondingly pragmatic in its methods, chemical science seldom resembles an orderly top-down enterprise from fundamental theoretical principles. Many of its central "theories," like molecular structure, are expressed in systems of visual representation rather than mathematical equations. This chapter is further is devoted to brief discussions of historical individuals, both chemists and philosophers, whose work is relevant for contemporary philosophy of chemistry.
Following several authors, we point out the importance of relations in the conceptual frame of chemistry. We propose that an important characteristic of chemistry is given by the epistemological challenge associated with selectively related entities. We also suggest that internal relation ontologies have been seen by chemists as better suited for assessing this challenge, and that this ontological perspective has played an important role in shaping chemical concepts.
Since its inception in 1869, the periodic system — icon of modern chemistry — has suffered from the problematic accommodation of the rare-earth elements. The substance of this paper intends to retrace Mendeleev’s shifting attitudes with regard to the rare-earth crisis during the period 1869–1871. Based on a detailed examination of Mendeleev's research papers from that period, it will be argued that the rare-earth crisis played a key role in inducing a number of important changes in Mendeleev’s philosophical viewpoints with regard to the epistemological concept of a chemical element and the nature of elementary groups. Many of Mendeleev's most cherished beliefs got endangered by the nature of these elements. Their mystifying properties forced him to revise his ideas about primary and secondary groups, the elements as basic and simple substances, and the use of short and long form tables. They made him question the validity and universality of the periodic law, and led him into hypothesizing about the internal structure of matter and constitution of atoms.
The renowned English chemist and meteorologist John Dalton (1766–1844) published A New System of Chemical Philosophy in two volumes, between 1808 and 1827. Dalton's discovery of the importance of the relative weight and structure of particles of a compound for explaining chemical reactions transformed atomic theory and laid the basis for much of what is modern chemistry. Volume 2 was published in 1827. It contains sections examining the weights and structures of two-element compounds in five different groups: metallic oxides; earthly, alkaline and metallic sulphurets; earthly, alkaline and metallic phosphurets; carburet; and metallic alloys. An appendix contains a selection of brief notes and tables, including a new table of the relative weights of atoms. A planned second part was never published. Dalton's work is a monument of nineteenth-century chemistry. It will continue to be read and enjoyed by anybody interested in the history and development of science.
The periodic table of elements is among the most recognizable image in science. It lies at the core of chemistry and embodies the most fundamental principles of science. In this new edition, Eric Scerri offers readers a complete and updated history and philosophy of the periodic table. Written in a lively style to appeal to experts and interested lay-persons alike, The Periodic Table: Its Story and Its Significance begins with an overview of the importance of the periodic table and the manner in which the term "element" has been interpreted by chemists and philosophers across time. The book traces the evolution and development of the periodic table from its early beginnings with the work of the precursors like De Chancourtois, Newlands and Meyer to Mendeleev's 1869 first published table and beyond. Several chapters are devoted to developments in 20th century physics, especially quantum mechanics and and the extent to which they explain the periodic table in a more fundamental way. Other chapters examine the formation of the elements, nuclear structure, the discovery of the last seven infra-uranium elements, and the synthesis of trans-uranium elements. Finally, the book considers the many different ways of representing the periodic system and the quest for an optimal arrangement.
In 1913, English physicist Henry Moseley established an elegant method for "counting" the elements based on atomic number, ranging them from hydrogen (#1) to uranium (#92). It soon became clear, however, that seven elements were mysteriously missing from the lineup--seven elements unknown to science. In his well researched and engaging narrative, Eric Scerri presents the intriguing stories of these seven elements--protactinium, hafnium, rhenium, technetium, francium, astatine and promethium. The book follows the historical order of discovery, roughly spanning the two world wars, beginning with the isolation of protactinium in 1917 and ending with that of promethium in 1945. For each element, Scerri traces the research that preceded the discovery, the pivotal experiments, the personalities of the chemists involved, the chemical nature of the new element, and its applications in science and technology. We learn for instance that alloys of hafnium--whose name derives from the Latin name for Copenhagen (hafnia)--have some of the highest boiling points on record and are used for the nozzles in rocket thrusters such as the Apollo Lunar Modules. Scerri also tells the personal tales of researchers overcoming great obstacles. We see how Lise Meitner and Otto Hahn--the pair who later proposed the theory of atomic fission--were struggling to isolate element 91 when World War I intervened, Hahn was drafted into the German army's poison gas unit, and Meitner was forced to press on alone against daunting odds. The book concludes by examining how and where the twenty-five new elements have taken their places in the periodic table in the last half century. A Tale of Seven Elements paints a fascinating picture of chemical research--the wrong turns, missed opportunities, bitterly disputed claims, serendipitous findings, accusations of dishonesty--all leading finally to the thrill of discovery.
The periodic table of elements provides an arrangement of the chemical elements, ordered by their atomic number, electron configuration, and recurring chemical properties. The Periodic Table: A Very Short Introduction considers what led to the table’s construction and shows how the deeper meaning of its structure gradually became apparent with the development of atomic theory and quantum mechanics, which underlies the behaviour of all of the elements and their compounds. This new edition celebrates the completion of the seventh period of the table, with the ratification and naming of elements 113, 115, 117, and 118 as nihonium, moscovium, tennessine, and oganesson, and incorporates recent advances in our understanding of the origin of the elements.
The objective of this book is to reconstruct historical episodes and experiments that have been important in scientific progress, and to explore the role played by controversies and rivalries among scientists. Although progress in science has been replete with controversies, scientists themselves either ignore or simply downplay their role. Such presentations lack the appreciation of the dynamics of ‘science-in-the-making’. This book provides methodological guidelines - based on a historical perspective of philosophy of science- that facilitate an understanding of historical episodes beyond that of inductive generalizations. These guidelines suggest that progress in science is not merely based on the accumulation of experimental data, but rather dependent on the creative imagination of the scientific community. This work shows that interpretation of experimental data is difficult and inevitably leads to alternative models/theories thus facilitating the understanding of science as a human enterprise.
constitutive of reference in laboratory sciences as cultural sign systems and their manipulation and superposition, collectively shared classifications and associated conceptual frameworks,· and various fonns of collective action and social institutions. This raises the question of how much modes of representation, and specific types of sign systems mobilized to construct them, contribute to reference. Semioticians have argued that sign systems are not merely passive media for expressing preconceived ideas but actively contribute to meaning. Sign systems are culturally loaded with meaning stemming from previous practical applications and social traditions of applications. In new local contexts of application they not only transfer stabilized meaning but also can be used as active resources to add new significance and modify previous meaning. This view is supported by several analyses presented in this volume. Sign systems can be implemented like tools that are manipulated and superposed with other types of signs to forge new representations. The mode of representation, made possible by applying and manipulating specific types of representational tools, such as diagrammatic rather than mathematical representations, or Berzelian fonnulas rather than verbal language, contributes to meaning and forges fine-grained differentiations between scientists' concepts. Taken together, the essays contained in this volume give us a multifaceted picture of the broad variety of modes of representation in nineteenth-century and twentieth-century laboratory sciences, of the way scientists juxtaposed and integrated various representations, and of their pragmatic use as tools in scientific and industrial practice.
3. 4. 2. "SOMETHING ON CERIUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 3. 4. 3. THE DISCOVERY OF LANTHANUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3. 4. 4. THE DISCOVERY OF DIDYMIUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3. 4. 5. THE NAME DIDYMIUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3. 4. 6. THE DISCOVERY OF TERBIUM AND ERBIUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3. 5. The Cork Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3. 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3. 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Chapter 4. THE 50 YEARS FOLLOWING MOSANDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 F. SZABADVARY and C. EVANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4. 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4. 2. The Terbium Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4. 3. Samarium and Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4. 4. The Division of Erbium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4. 5. Separating the Twins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 4. 6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4. 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Chapter 5. ELEMENTS NO. 70, 71 AND 72: DISCOVERIES AND CONTROVERSIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 HELGE KRAGH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 5. 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 5. 2. The ytterbium earths unti11905 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 5. 3. Auer von Welsbach: aldebaranium and cassiopeium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 5. 4. Urbain: neo-ytterbium and lutecium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 5. 5. The ytterbium controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5. 6. Celtium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 5. 7. Hafnium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 5. 8. New light on old elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5. 9. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 5. 10. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 5. 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Chapter 6. THE SEARCH FOR ELEMENT 61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 JACOB A. MARlNSKY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 6. 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 6. 2. Separations and Identifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 6. 3. Discovery Confirmed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 6. 4. Announcing, Claiming and 'Naming Element 61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 6. 5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 vii PART II - APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Chapter 7. CARL AUER VON WELSBACH A PIONEER IN THE INDUSTRIAL APPLICATION OF RARE EAR THS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 E. BAUMGARTNER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
How do attempts to foresee the future actually change it? For thousands of years, humans have called upon foresight to shape their own actions in order to adapt and survive; as Charles Darwin revealed in his theory of natural selection, the capacity to do just that is key to the origin of species. The uses of foresight, however, can also be applied to help us further our understanding across a variety of realms in everything from warfare, journalism and music, to ancient civilizations, space weather and science. In a thought-provoking new addition to the Darwin College Lecture Series, eight distinguished authors each present an essay from their area of expertise devoted to the theme of 'foresight'. This provocative read reveals foresight as a process that can be identified across all areas of human endeavour, an art which can not only predict the future, but make it anything but inevitable.
This book explores the relationship between the content of chemistry education and the history and philosophy of science (HPS) framework that underlies such education. It discusses the need to present an image that reflects how chemistry developed and progresses. It proposes that chemistry should be taught the way it is practiced by chemists: as a human enterprise, at the interface of scientific practice and HPS. Finally, it sets out to convince teachers to go beyond the traditional classroom practice and explore new teaching strategies.
The importance of HPS has been recognized for the science curriculum since the middle of the 20th century. The need for teaching chemistry within a historical context is not difficult to understand as HPS is not far below the surface in any science classroom. A review of the literature shows that the traditional chemistry classroom, curricula, and textbooks while dealing with concepts such as law, theory, model, explanation, hypothesis, observation, evidence and idealization, generally ignore elements of the history and philosophy of science. This book proposes that the conceptual understanding of chemistry requires knowledge and understanding of the history and philosophy of science.
“Professor Niaz’s book is most welcome, coming at a time when there is an urgently felt need to upgrade the teaching of science. The book is a huge aid for adding to the usual way - presenting science as a series of mere facts -also the necessary mandate: to show how science is done, and how science, through its history and philosophy, is part of the cultural development of humanity.”
Gerald Holton, Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics & Professor of History of Science, Harvard University
“In this stimulating and sophisticated blend of history of chemistry, philosophy of science, and science pedagogy, Professor Mansoor Niaz has succeeded in offering a promising new approach to the teaching of fundamental ideas in chemistry. Historians and philosophers of chemistry - and above all, chemistry teachers - will find this book full of valuable and highly usable new ideas”
Alan Rocke, Case Western Reserve University
“This book artfully connects chemistry and chemistry education to the human context in which chemical science is practiced and the historical and philosophical background that illuminates that practice. Mansoor Niaz deftly weaves together historical episodes in the quest for scientific knowledge with the psychology of learning and philosophical reflections on the nature of scientific knowledge and method. The result is a compelling case for historically and philosophically informed science education. Highly recommended!”
Harvey Siegel, University of Miami
Chemical structure and atomism were lively topics for chemists in the 1860s. Yet the central achievement of intercalated theoretical, laboratory, and didactic practices of chemistry in that decade was neither structure theory nor a triumph of atomism. Instead, a project that was crucial to the subsequent success of chemical structure and atomism made a large step in its ongoing development. This was the stabilization and production of chemical knowledge on the page. After 1861 the core of this project came to involve the graphical formulas of Alexander Crum Brown, which became “Frankland’s notation,” which became modern structural notation. This account of the early trajectory of Crum Brown’s graphical formulas focuses on how those formulas became paper tools.
The development of chemical theory in the nineteenth century has been relatively little studied, compared with other sciences and other periods; much remains still to be explored. One notable example is chemical atomism, and its adjuncts such as valence and structure theory. Nonexistent at the beginning of the century, a generation or two later these ideas had moved to the very center of the science, which they still inhabit. The chemical atomic theory embodies outstanding examples of paper tools that provide not only explanatory and expository functions for what is already accepted as known, but also heuristic guidance in the further construction of a science. It may be of interest, therefore, to attempt an analysis of what some recent studies have revealed about this subject, along with indications of where further historical efforts may yield additional rewards.
Peirce's understanding of perception is crucial in situating his philosophy within a broad range of issues. Yet a cursory reading of Peirce seems to indicate that what he says about perception is both incomplete and inconsistent, leading both to an early neglect of his account of perception and to widely varying interpretations of his claims, as interest in them began to grow. The following analysis of Peirce's view of perception will try to resolve the ambiguities by bringing into focus the systematic completeness of Peirce's understanding of the process of perceiving and the object of perception, at the same time showing its relevance for a range of contemporary issues Peirce holds that the scientific method is the only genuine method of fixing belief, for it is the only method by which beliefs must be tested and corrected by what experience presents (CP 5.384). And the very first stage of scientific inquiry requires human creativity. Peirce calls the process of creative hypothesis formation ‘abduction’ to distinguish it from the inductive process of data collection. He rejects the claims of British Empiricism, that knowledge begins with first impressions of sense. He also rejects the claims, such as that put forth by Descartes, that it begins with immediate cognitions or indubitable intuitions. All knowledge begins with perception, but perception is not the having of brute givens. Rather, there is a creative element in perceptual awareness, an interpretive creativity brought by the perceiver.
INTRODUCTION Charles Sanders Peirce was the founder of pragmatism - the view that our theories must be linked to experience or practice. His work is staggering in its breadth and much of it lies in a huge bulk of manuscripts and scraps. His few published papers include those of the 1870s series in Popular Science Monthly called “Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” most notably “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” and “The Fixation of Belief.” His Lowell Lectures in 1898 and 1903 and his Harvard Pragmatism Lectures in 1903 also contain essential material. But much of what is important is only now being published in the definitive chronological edition: The Writings of Charles Sanders Peirce Peirce was a difficult man and this was no doubt partly responsible for his being frozen out of what he most desired: a permanent academic position. He worked instead for the U.S. Coast Survey – his scientific and mathematical endeavors there had a significant influence on his logic, on his work in statistical inference, and on his epistemology and metaphysics. He is perhaps best known today for his theory of truth and his semeiotics, as well as for his influence on William James and John Dewey. But because of the scattered nature of his work and because he was always out of the academic mainstream, many of his contributions are just now coming to light.
The figure of Russian chemist Dmitrii Ivanovich Mendeleev (1834-1907) has long inspired the fascination of both chemists and philosophers. His bearded visage, which peers from the margins of countless chemistry textbooks, seems to recall the magus of medieval lore, and the principal achievement for which he is recognized - his formulation of the periodic system of chemical elements-hangs in every chemistry classroom in the world and might be the most ubiquitous icon of science today. He explored a variety of topics in physics and chemistry over the course of a very active scientific and political career. Distinctive about Mendeleev's work was his close (although not systematic) attention to various philosophical topics relating to his chemical work. This chapter briefly discusses Mendeleev's life, scientific research, and some of his views on the philosophy of chemistry. Mendeleev's early research projects, beginning in the mid-1850s, dealt largely with organic chemistry, the largest and most dynamic branch of chemistry at the time, particularly among the younger generation of Russian chemists. Mendeleev was often inconsistent concerning his attitude toward the existence of fundamental entities in chemistry, vacillating between strict realism in some areas, through instrumentalism to anti-realism in others. The entities he assigned to the three categories in many ways defy conventional interpretations of matter theory or chemistry.
In 1844, Eben Horsford studied chemistry in Liebig's laboratory in Germany. Justus von Liebig was one of the most influential in teaching chemistry with the laboratory method. Horsford then brought Liebig's methodology to the United States, which would then turn influence to Charles W. Eliot. When Eliot became president of Harvard, he modified Harvard's admission policies to allow science and science laboratory courses to be admission options. Furthermore, as chair of the Committee of Ten and as an instigator of the College Entrance Examination Board, Eliot made sure that laboratory work became integral in high school curricula. A pattern of teaching science as a combination of lecture and laboratory developed and became formalized and ingrained. Thus, the laboratory method promoted by Liebig, imported by Horsfor, and championed by Eliot became an established teaching method in science education in the United States.
Two different concepts of iconicity compete in Peirce's diagrammatical logic. One is articulated in his general reflections on the role of diagrams in thought, in what could be termed his diagrammatology - the other is articulated in his construction of Existential Graphs as an iconic system for representing logic. One is operational and defines iconicity in terms of which information may be derived from a given diagram or diagram system - the other has stronger demands on iconicity, adding to the operational criterion a demand for as high a degree of similarity as possible and may be termed optimal iconicity. Peirce himself does not clearly distinguish these two iconicity notions, a fact that has caused some confusion. By isolating them, we get a clearer and more refined conceptual apparatus for analyzing iconic signs, from pictures to logic. This paper investigates the two iconicity notions and addresses some of the problems they involve.
This book elucidates and defends C.S. Peirce's pragmatist account of truth. Peirce was interested in exploring truth's connections to the practices of inquiry, belief, and assertion. This distinctly pragmatic project resulted in the view that truth is what would be agreed upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. The view that a belief is true if it would be indefeasible connects truth to human practices, but which takes truth to be something to be discovered. That is, Peirce's view of truth is much more objectivist than some currently popular brands of pragmatism. In this expanded edition, advances in the understanding of Peirce's theory of truth are noted, and include a new chapter which shows how Peirce's view of truth is friendly to moral judgements.
This major new three-volume bibliography of an annotated listing of American Studies monographs published between 1900 and 1983; There are over 8,000 descriptive entries in a wide range of categories: these include anthropology and folklore, art and architecture, history, literature, music, political science, popular culture, psychology, religion, science and technology and sociology. Compiled by the Center for American Culture Studies at Columbia University under the sponsorship of the American Studies Association, the bibliography will prove to be a unique and invaluable reference work.
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I develop an account of scientific representations building on Charles S. Peirce's rich, and still underexplored, notion of iconicity. Iconic representations occupy a central place in Peirce's philosophy, in his innovative approach to logic and in his practice as a scientist. Starting from a discussion of Peirce's approach to diagrams, I claim that Peirce's own representations are in line with his formulation of iconicity, and that they are more broadly connected to the pragmatist philosophy he developed in parallel with his scientific work. I then defend the contemporary relevance of Peirce's approach to iconic representations, and specifically argue that Peirce offers a useful ‘third way’ between what Mauricio Suárez has recently described as the ‘analytical’ and ‘practical’ inquiries into the concept of representation. As a philosophically minded scientist and an experimentally inclined philosopher, Peirce never divorced the practice of representing from questions about what counts as a representation. I claim that his account of iconic representations shows that it is the very process of representing, construed as a practice which is coextensive with observing and experimenting, that casts light on the nature of representative relations.
Charles Peirce's pragmatist philosophy contains important ideas for understanding the nature of epistemic rationality and rational self‐control. After a discussion of his views about the different demands of theory and practice, the book explains his account of truth, before comparing it with the correspondence theory of truth and tracing its relations to his theory of indexical reference. This is followed by an investigation of his defence of a system of ‘scientific metaphysics’ and its role in rational inquiry. We then turn to a consideration of how his pragmatism and his account of rationality rest upon his acceptance of a modified version of the common‐sense philosophy. This theme in his thought leads him to emphasize the role of sentiments and emotions in epistemic evaluation, and this lies behind his distinctive views about doubt and about why we should not take scepticism seriously. The final two chapters of the book explore Peirce's argument for the reality of God and begin to address the question of how he thought his pragmatist philosophy could be proved.