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THEMATIC
PAPER The scientific standing of psychoanalysis
Mark Solms
University of Cape Town, South
Africa;
email mark.solms@uct.ac.za
Conflicts of interest. None.
© The Author 2018. This is an
Open Access article, distributed
under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
licence (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which
permits non-commercial re-use,
distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the ori-
ginal work is unaltered and is
properly cited. The written per-
mission of Cambridge University
Press must be obtained for com-
mercial re-use or in order to cre-
ate a derivative work.
This paper summarises the core scientific
claims of psychoanalysis and rebuts the
prejudice that it is not ‘evidence-based’.I
address the following questions. (A) How does
the emotional mind work, in health and
disease? (B) Therefore, what does
psychoanalytic treatment aim to achieve?
(C) How effective is it?
A.
As regards the workings of the emotional mind,
our three core claims are the following.
(1) The human infant is not a blank slate; like all
other species, we are born with innate needs.
These needs (‘demands upon the mind to
perform work’, as Freud called them, his
‘id’) are felt and expressed as emotions.
The basic emotions trigger instinctual
behaviours, which are innate action plans
that we perform in order to meet our
needs (e.g. cry, search, freeze, flee, attack).
Universal agreement about the number of
innate needs in the human brain has not
been achieved, but mainstream taxonomies
(e.g. Panksepp, 1998) include the
following.
1
•We need to engage with the world –
since all our biological appetites (includ-
ing bodily needs) can only be met there.
This is a foraging or seeking or ‘wanting’
instinct. It is felt as interest, curiosity
and the like. (It coincides roughly but
not completely with Freud’s concept of
‘libido’.)
•We need to find sexual partners. This is
felt as lust. This instinct is sexually
dimorphic (on average) but male and
female inclinations exist in both genders.
•We need to escape dangerous situations.
This is fear.
•We need to destroy frustrating objects
(things that get between us and satisfac-
tion of our needs). This is rage.
•We need to attach to caregivers (those
who look after us). Separation from
attachment figures is felt not as fear
but as panic, and loss of them is felt as
despair. (The whole of ‘attachment the-
ory’relates to vicissitudes of this need.)
•We need to care for and nurture others,
especially our offspring. This is the
so-called ‘maternal instinct’, but it exists
(to varying degrees) in both genders.
•We need to play. This is not as frivolous
as it appears; play is the medium
through which social hierarchies are
formed (‘pecking order’) and in-group
and out-group boundaries maintained.
The (upper brain-stem and limbic) anat-
omy and chemistry of the basic emotions
is well understood (see Panksepp, 1998
for a review).
(2) The main task of mental development is to learn
how to meet our needs in the world. We do not
learn for its own sake; we do so in order to
establish optimal action plans to meet our
needs in a given environment. (This is
what Freud called ‘ego’development.)
This is necessary because innate action pro-
grammes have to be reconciled with actual
experiences. Evolution predicts how we
should behave in, say, dangerous situa-
tions, but it cannot predict all possible dan-
gers (e.g. electrical sockets); each
individual has to learn what to fear. This
typically happens during critical periods
in early childhood, when we are not best
equipped to deal with the fact that innate
action plans often conflict with one another
(e.g. attachment v. rage, curiosity v. fear).
We therefore need to learn compromises,
and we must find indirect ways of meeting
our needs. This often involves substitute-
1
Here I am focusing on emo-
tional needs –which are felt as
separation distress, rage, etc. –
not bodily drives –which are felt
as hunger, thirst, etc. –or sen-
sory affects –which are felt as
pain, disgust, etc. (See Panksepp,
1998.) The way in which I use
the term ‘action plans’in this
article is synonymous with the
use of the term ‘predictions’in
contemporary computational
neuroscience.
BJPSYCH INTERNATIONAL VOLUME 15 NUMBER 1 FEBRUARY 2018 5
formation (e.g. kicking the cat). Humans
also have a large (cortico-thalamic) capacity
for satisfying their needs in imaginary and
symbolic ways. It is crucial to recognise that
successful action programmes entail successful
emotion regulation, and vice versa. This is
because our needs are felt as emotions;
thus, successful avoidance of attack reduces
fear, successful reunion after separation
reduces panic, etc., whereas unsuccessful
attempts result in persistence of fear and
panic, etc.
(3) Most of our action plans (i.e. ways of meeting
our needs) are executed unconsciously.
Consciousness (‘working memory’)isan
extremely limited resource, so there is
enormous pressure to consolidate and
automatise learned solutions to life’s pro-
blems (for a review see Bargh &
Chartrand, 1999, who conclude that only
5% of our goal-directed actions are con-
scious). Innate action programmes are
effected automatically from the outset, as
are the programmes acquired in the first
years of life, before the cortical (‘declara-
tive’) memory systems mature. Multiple
unconscious (‘non-declarative’) memory
systems exist, such as ‘procedural’and
‘emotional’memory (which are mainly
encoded at the level of the basal ganglia).
These operate according to different
rules. Not only successful action plans are auto-
matised. With this simple observation, we
can do away with the unfortunate distinc-
tion between the ‘cognitive’and ‘dynamic’
unconscious. Sometimes a child has to
make the best of a bad job in order to
focus on the problems which it can solve.
Such illegitimately or prematurely automa-
tised action programmes are called ‘the
repressed’. In order for automatised pro-
grammes to be revised and updated, they
need to be ‘reconsolidated’(Tronson &
Taylor, 2007); that is, they need to enter con-
sciousness again, in order for the long-term
traces to become labile once more. This is
difficult to achieve, not least because most
procedural memories are ‘hard to learn
and hard to forget’and some emotional
memories –which can be acquired through
just a single exposure –appear to be indel-
ible, but also because the essential mechanism
of repression entails resistance to reconsolidation
of automatised solutions to our insoluble pro-
blems. The theory of reconsolidation is
very important for understanding the
mechanism of psychoanalysis.
B.
The clinical methods that psychoanalysts use flow
from the above claims.
(1) Psychological patients suffer mainly from
feelings. The essential difference between
psychoanalytic and psychopharmacological
methods of treatment is that we believe feel-
ings mean something. Specifically, feelings
represent unsatisfied needs. (Thus, a patient suf-
fering from panic is afraid of losing some-
thing, a patient suffering from rage is
frustrated by something, etc.) This truism
applies regardless of aetiological factors;
even if one person is constitutionally more
fearful, say, than the next, their fear is still
meaningful. To be clear: emotional disorders
entail unsuccessful attempts to satisfy needs.
(2) The main purpose of psychological treat-
ment, then, is to help patients learn better
(more effective) ways of meeting their needs.
This, in turn, leads to better emotion regulation.
The psychopharmacological approach, by
contrast, suppresses unwanted feelings. We
do not believe that drugs which suppress
feelings can cure emotional disorders.
Drugs are symptomatic treatments. To
cure an emotional disorder, the patient’s
failure to meet their underlying need(s)
must be addressed, since this is what is
causing their symptoms. However,
symptom relief is sometimes necessary
before patients become amenable to psy-
chological treatment, since most forms of
psychotherapy require collaborative work
between patient and therapist. It is also
true that some types of psychopathology
never become accessible to collaborative
psychotherapy.
(3) Psychoanalytical therapy differs from other
forms of psychotherapy in that it aims to
change deeply automatised action plans. This
is necessary for the reasons outlined
above. Psychoanalytic technique therefore
focuses on the following.
•Identifying the dominant emotions (which
are consciously felt but not necessarily
recognised as belonging to the self, etc.).
•These emotions reveal the meaning of
the symptom. That is, they lead the
way to the (ineffective) automatised pro-
grammes that gave rise to the feelings.
•The pathogenic action programmes
cannot be remembered directly for the very
reason that they are automatised (i.e.
unconscious). Therefore, the analyst
identifies them indirectly, by bringing to
awareness the repetitive patterns of behav-
iour derived from them.
•Reconsolidation is thus achieved through
reactivation of mainly subcortical long-
term traces via their derivatives in the pre-
sent situation (this is called ‘transference’
interpretation). Only cortical memories
can be ‘declared’.
•Such reconsolidation is nevertheless dif-
ficult to achieve, mainly owing to the ways
in which non-declarative memory sys-
tems work, but also because repression
entails resistance to the reactivation of
6BJPSYCH INTERNATIONAL VOLUME 15 NUMBER 1 FEBRUARY 2018
insoluble problems. For these reasons,
psychoanalytic treatment takes time –i.
e. numerous and frequent sessions –to
facilitate ‘working through’.
Mental healthcare funders need to learn
how learning works. For a more detailed
account of the mechanism of psychoana-
lytic therapy, see Solms (2017).
C.
Psychoanalytic therapy achieves good outcomes –
at least as good as, and in some respects better
than, other evidence-based treatments in psych-
iatry today.
(1) Psychotherapy in general is a highly effective
form of treatment. Meta-analyses of psycho-
therapy outcome studies typically reveal
effect sizes of between 0.73 and 0.85. An
effect size of 0.8 is considered large in psy-
chiatric research, 0.5 is considered moder-
ate, and 0.2 is considered small. To put
the efficacy of psychotherapy into perspec-
tive, recent antidepressant medications
achieve effect sizes of between 0.24 and
0.31 (Kirsch et al,2008;Turneret al,
2008). The changes brought about by psy-
chotherapy, no less than drug therapy, are
of course visualisable with brain imaging.
(2) Psychoanalytic psychotherapy is equally effective
as other forms of evidence-based psycho-
therapy (e.g. cognitive–behavioural therapy
(CBT)). This is now unequivocally estab-
lished (Steinert et al,2017). Moreover,
there is evidence to suggest that the effects
of psychoanalytic therapy last longer –and
even increase –after the end of the treat-
ment. Shedler’s(2010) authoritative review
of all randomised controlled trials to date
reported effect sizes of between 0.78 and
1.46, even for diluted and truncated forms
of psychoanalytic therapy. An especially
methodologically rigorous meta-analysis
(Abbass et al,2006) yielded an overall effect
of 0.97 for general symptom improvement
with psychoanalytic therapy. The effect
increased to 1.51 when the patients were
assessed at follow-up. A more recent
meta-analysis by Abbass et al (2014) yielded
an overall effect size of 0.71, and the finding
of maintained and increased effects at
follow-up was reconfirmed. This was for
short-term psychoanalytic treatment.
According to the meta-analysis of de Maat
et al (2009), which was less methodologically
rigorous than the Abbass studies, longer-
term psychoanalytic psychotherapy yields
an effect size of 0.78 at termination and
0.94 at follow-up, and psychoanalysis
proper achieves a mean effect of 0.87, and
1.18 at follow-up. This is the overall finding;
the effect size for symptom improvement (as
opposed to personality change) was 1.03 for
long-term psychoanalytic therapy, and for
psychoanalysis it was 1.38. Leuzinger-
Bohleber et al (2018) will shortly report
even greater effect sizes for psychoanalysis
in depression. The consistent trend toward
larger effect sizes at follow-up suggests that
psychoanalytic therapy sets in motion pro-
cesses of change that continue after therapy
has ended (whereas the effects of other
forms of psychotherapy, such as CBT,
tend to decay).
(3) The therapeutic techniques that predict
the best treatment outcomes, regardless of
the form of psychotherapy, make good sense
in relation to the psychodynamic mechanisms out-
lined above. These techniques include (Blagys
& Hilsenroth, 2000):
•unstructured, open-ended dialogue
between patient and therapist
•identifying recurring themes in the
patient’s experience
•linking the patient’sfeelings and percep-
tions to past experiences
•drawing attention to feelings regarded
by the patient as unacceptable
•pointing out ways in which the patient
avoids such feelings
•focusing on the here-and-now therapy
relationship
•drawing connections between the ther-
apy relationship and other relationships.
It is highly instructive to note that these
techniques lead to the best treatment out-
comes regardless of the type of psychother-
apy the clinician espouses. In other words,
these same techniques (or at least a subset
of them; see Hayes et al,1996) predict opti-
mal treatment outcomes in CBT too, even
if the therapist believes they are doing
something else.
(4) It is therefore perhaps not surprising that
psychotherapists, irrespective of their sta-
ted orientation, tend to choose psychoana-
lytic psychotherapy for themselves!
(Norcross, 2005)
I am aware that the claims I have summarised
here do not do justice to the full complexity and
variety of views in psychoanalysis, both as a theory
and a therapy. I am saying only that these are our
core claims, which underpin all the details, includ-
ing those upon which we are yet to reach agree-
ment. These claims are eminently defensible in
the light of current scientific evidence, and they
make simple good sense.
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THEMATIC
PAPER Psychodynamic psychotherapy training
in South East Asia: a distance learning
pilot program
César A. Alfonso,
1
Limas Sutanto,
2
Hazli Zakaria,
3
Rasmon Kalayasiri,
4
Petrin Redayani Lukman,
5
Sylvia Detri Elvira
5
and
Aida Syarinaz Ahmad Adlan
6
1
Associate Professor of
Psychiatry, Columbia University
Medical Center, New York, USA;
email caa2105@cumc.columbia.
edu
2
Universitas Brawijaya, Malang,
East Java, Indonesia
3
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
Medical Centre, Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia
4
Chulalongkorn University,
Bangkok, Thailand
5
Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta,
Indonesia
6
Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia
Conflicts of interest. None.
© The Authors 2018. This is an
Open Access article, distributed
under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
licence (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which
permits non-commercial re-use,
distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the ori-
ginal work is unaltered and is
properly cited. The written per-
mission of Cambridge University
Press must be obtained for com-
mercial re-use or in order to cre-
ate a derivative work.
Populous countries in the Asia–Pacific region have
adequate psychiatric residency curricula but inad-
equate psychotherapy clinical supervision, and
the paucity of training programs reflects how
underserved psychiatry is in this zone (Ruiz &
Bhugra, 2008; Tasman et al,2009). Cognitive
behavioural therapy is systematically taught in
most of Asia but other modalities such as support-
ive, interpersonal, dialectic behavioural, group,
marital, family and psychodynamic psychothera-
pies are not well supervised. It is challenging to
bridge these gaps given the demands of high
volume services and few formally trained supervi-
sors. Initiatives have been implemented to improve
psychotherapy training in Asia (Alfonso et al,2018).
The most widely recognised among these in-
itiatives is the China American Psychoanalytic
Alliance program, which is largely conducted
through videoconferencing (Fishkin et al,2011).
This article describes an abridged program
designed to provide advanced psychotherapy
training in underserved areas with limited peda-
gogical resources. Although the program was
piloted in Asia, our hope is that it could be adapted
or replicated in other areas with similar needs.
The World Psychiatric Association (WPA)
Psychotherapy, Education in Psychiatry, and
Psychoanalysis in Psychiatry Sections identified that
Asian psychiatrists have a keen interest in improving
psychodynamic psychotherapy education. Liaisons
with the Royal College of Psychiatrists in Thailand,
the Malaysian Psychiatric Association and the
University of Indonesia gave rise to our multi-
national, collaborative, pedagogic endeavour
(Alfonso et al,2018). The WPA pilot program was
designed to take place over 5 years, targeting three
countries (see Table 1).Itwasdesignedtobe
self-sustaining –with the aim of improving the psy-
chotherapy skills of those enrolled in study activities
and teaching psychiatrists how to supervise –so that,
after completion, psychiatrists could work effectively
as psychotherapy supervisors.
Phase 1: full-day workshops to improve
clinical skills
Full-day psychodynamic psychotherapy workshops
took place at meetings sponsored by the national
psychiatric societies in Jakarta, Surabaya, Kuala
Lumpur and Bangkok between 2013 and 2014.
The hosting psychiatric society selected local psy-
chiatrists to run workshop modules according
to the experts’areas of interest (see Table 2).
Clinical correlations and applicability of psycho-
dynamic thinking in a variety of settings were
emphasised. Attendance ranged from 35 to 50 peo-
ple; a manageable number for the maintenance of
8BJPSYCH INTERNATIONAL VOLUME 15 NUMBER 1 FEBRUARY 2018