Representation of Future Generations in United Kingdom Policy-Making

Abstract

Global existential and catastrophic risks, particularly those arising from technological developments, present challenges for intergenerational justice. We aim to present a solutions-based approach to the challenge of intergenerational inequality. We examine options for representing future generations in our present policymaking structures, drawing on case studies from Singapore, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Scotland and Wales. We derive several factors which contribute to the success of some of these institutions, and discuss reasons for the failure or abolition of others. We draw out broad lessons which we can apply to policymaking in England, and make policy recommendations based on these findings.

Full text

Representation of Future Generations in United Kingdom Policy-Making
Global existential and catastrophic risks, particularly those arising from technological developments,
present challenges for intergenerational justice. We aim to present a solutions-based approach to the
challenge of intergenerational inequality. We examine options for representing future generations in our
present policymaking structures, drawing on case studies from Singapore, Finland, Hungary, Israel,
Scotland and Wales. We derive several factors which contribute to the success of some of these
institutions, and discuss reasons for the failure or abolition of others. We draw out broad lessons which
we can apply to policymaking in England, and make policy recommendations based on these findings.
1. Introduction
Global catastrophic and existential risks pose central challenges for intergenerational justice and the
structure of our current democracy. The Global Challenges Report 2016 defines global catastrophic risk
as risk of an ‘event or process that, were it to occur, would end the lives of approximately 10% or more of
the global population, or do comparable damage’ (Global Challenges Foundation et al, 2016). A subset of
catastrophic risks are ‘existential’ risks, which would end human civilisation or lead to the extinction of
humanity (Global Challenges Foundation et al, 2016). Catastrophic and existential risks may be
categorised in terms of ongoing risks, which could potentially occur in any given year (e.g. nuclear war;
pandemics), versus emerging risks which may be unlikely today but will become significantly more likely
in the future (e.g. catastrophic climate change; risks stemming from emerging technologies). Ongoing
risks have existed for some time now and are generally well-understood. However, emerging risks,
particularly those arising from technological developments, are less understood and demand increasing
attention from scientists and policymakers. These technological developments include advances in
synthetic biology, geoengineering, distributed manufacturing and artificial intelligence (AI) (Global
Priorities Project et al, 2014). Although the impact of these technologies is still very uncertain, expert
estimates suggest a non-negligible probability of catastrophic harm.
In this article we rely on two main premises. The first is that future generations are under-represented in
current political structures partly due to political ‘short-termism’ or ‘presentism’ (Thompson, 2010).
Governments primarily focus on short-term concerns, which mean that they may systematically neglect
global catastrophic risks and, accordingly, future generations (Global Priorities Project et al, 2014). The
problem of presentism transcends political divisions: people across the political spectrum are concerned
about its effects, and should care about mitigating global catastrophic risks. This situation is exacerbated
in that the good of mitigating global catastrophic and existential risks is typically global. Individual
political actors (even whole countries) bear many costs in providing for such goods, whereas the benefits

are dispersed globally. In addition to the benefits of mitigating existential risks being global, many of the
beneficiaries are future people who do not exist presently and as such have no voice in the political
process. There is a clear lack of incentives to mitigate such risks, and market failure should be expected
(Beckstead et al, 2013).
The second key assumption is that we as a society consider the rights and interests of future generations to
be important. It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a complete account of the philosophical
arguments on this matter. It is sufficient to note that although significant philosophical problems have
been pointed out, chiefly due to the fact that the actions of present people have a causal impact on the
values, number and identity of future individuals (Parfit, 1984), there are several theories of
intergenerational justice that may support this assumption (Gosseries, 2008).
The need to include explicit pathways in governance structures for accountability to the rights and needs
of future generations has been noted (Global Priorities Project et al, 2014). Some thought has been put
into how future generations may be represented in relation to environmental risks such as climate change,
resource depletion and biodiversity loss; this research is reflected in the sustainable development
literature (Brown Weiss, 1990). However, this problem has not been explored in relation to society’s
burgeoning awareness of technology-related catastrophic and existential risks. In addition, such pathways
have not been fully explored in the United Kingdom (UK) context. This policy paper hopes to fill this gap
in the literature.
We aim to present a solutions-based approach to the challenge of intergenerational inequality. This paper
will examine options and challenges for representing future generations in our present policymaking
structures. In practice, Wales and Scotland both have institutional forms of representation for future
generations. We therefore focus here on England, while also considering options that could be
mainstreamed throughout the UK.
In Part 2 of this paper, we explore case studies of future generations representation from several different
countries, including Singapore, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Scotland and Wales. We derive several factors
which contribute to the success of these institutions, and discuss reasons for the decline of some. We draw
out broad lessons which we can apply to policymaking here. We go on in Part 3 to discuss the specific
UK policy context which may affect the appropriate solutions, and in Part 4 we explore policy options
and make recommendations based on our previous findings. Present generations pose a much greater risk
to future generations than any past generations posed to the present generation, due to a combination of
fast economic growth and unprecedented scientific advancement and technological development

(Bostrom, 2014). The time is ripe for the futures studies and existential risk communities to connect with
policymakers on these important issues.
2. Institutional case studies of representation of future generations
Over the last two decades, several national governments have set up institutional structures to attempt to
address short-termism in decision making, with varying levels of success. These institutions have taken a
variety of different structural and functional forms, providing a useful data set by which we can analyse
factors contributing to their success. Here we focus on institutions explicitly aimed at the interests of
future generations, rather than those which may merely have an indirect effect on future generations (such
as environmental protection agencies).
We discuss the main variables in institutions in terms of structure, function and degree of power.
Structurally, commissioners and committees have been used, with varying amounts of resources at their
disposal. The independence of such institutions from government has varied considerably, from taking the
form of companies at arm’s from government, to being composed of parliamentarians themselves.
Similarly, the responsibilities and powers of each institution ranges from a minimalist research and
advocacy role, to the power to delay or block legislation. Subject scope also varies, as does the
individuals and organisations that institutions work with: in particular, we find that only one institution
has explicitly considered global catastrophic or existential risks in its work. In addition, the historical and
social context within which these institutions were created, and the accompanying political pressures,
naturally differ among countries. We analyse these variations to determine if their successes can be
transferred to the English context.
It is important for the purposes of our analysis to specify what indicators are being used to assess the
success of these representative institutions. Broadly, one of the most important indicators of success for
these institutions is the impact they have had on present decision making to take intergenerational
interests into account. Unfortunately, this indicator is necessarily vague; almost all institutions differ
somewhat in their functions and powers, and giving a narrow definition of ‘impact’ will wrongfully
exclude institutions which take alternative measures to ensure present representation of future generations
in decision making. However, it will become clearer what kinds of impacts are desirable.
Another success indicator is increasing dialogue and giving a clearer articulation of intergenerational
issues in the political and public spheres. Presently, as we have already seen, the issue of representing the
rights and interests of future generations is not well articulated (if at all) in the UK political context.

Simple awareness of these issues is an essential step towards their having an impact upon decision
making.
A third key indicator of success is longevity. A trend with intergenerational representation mechanisms is
that such institutions generally face challenges to their status within a short period after their creation. But
longevity is essential for successful representation of future interests.
The institutions discussed are summarised in Table 1, which shows dates of operations, position with
respect to the executive and the legislature, scope, and powers.
Table 1: Institutions for Representing Future Generations
Country
Dates of
operation
Position with respect to
executive and legislature
Scope
Functions and
Powers
Finland
1993-
Standing Committee of
Parliament
Futures in general; can
choose own scope
Research/advisory
Education
Hungary
2008-
2012
Structurally independent
from government
Issues which may affect
the constitutional right
to a healthy environment
Research/advisory
Complaints
investigation
Legal enforcement
Israel
2001-
2006
Parliamentary committee
Environment, natural
resources, science,
development, education,
health, state economy,
demography, planning
and building, quality of
life, technology, law,
any other matter
considered relevant
Research/advisory
Initiate legislation
Veto legislation
Scotland
2005-
Structurally independent
from government
Futures in general; can
choose own scope
Research/advisory
Education
Singapore
2009-
Within the Prime
Minister’s Office
Risk and futures; can
choose own scope
Research/advisory
Education
Wales
2016-
Structurally independent
from government
Sustainable development
Research/advisory
Recommendations
are binding

2.1 Finland: Committee for the Future
Created in 1993, the Committee for the Future is a Standing Permanent Committee of the Finnish
Parliament. It consists of 17 parliamentarians representing all parties, in proportion to the makeup of
parliament itself (The Parliament of Finland, n.d.). The Committee serves a variety of functions: it acts in
a ‘think tank’ role for government by analysing research regarding the future and assessing possible
implications for the work of parliament; it conducts dialogues with other organs of government on any
foreseeable long terms issues affecting policy or the work of the bodies in question; it prepares responses
to Government reports on the future of Finland which are commissioned by the Prime Minister every four
years; and it engages in public outreach (Groomsbridge, 2006). Aside from these reports, it is free to
choose its own methodology and the scope of issues upon which to focus (Association of Secretaries
General of Parliaments, 2004). It is also responsible for and must cover the implications of technological
development for society. Formally, the Committee has little power to intervene in legislation or policy
decisions, and has no power to receive and act legally upon complaints from the general public.
Nevertheless, the Committee appears to have had substantial impact. It has demonstrated agenda-setting
power in the Parliament, and the government has tended to adopt the Committee’s responses to its reports
(Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments, 2004). The Committee is also the longest running
institution assessed in this analysis, which indicates that it has achieved a stable relationship and balance
of power with government.
This success may be due to a number of factors. First, the Committee’s work had legitimacy from the
beginning due to widespread cross-party and public support during its creation (Groomsbridge, 2006). At
that time Finland already had a substantial history of futures studies, concentrated in the Finnish Society
for Future Studies. The Committee’s continuing public outreach work can only sustain this legitimacy.
Secondly, the Committee has enough power to have an impact, whilst not enough power to provoke any
major challenges to its status. Despite the lack of significant independence from government, it has been
able to set its own agenda for the most part, meaning it can challenge a wide scope of issues which it sees
as relevant to future generations. The fact it is composed of parliamentarians allows the opportunity for
informal intervention by its members, lends its findings political weight, and is a strength in that its
proceedings are highly integrated with those of parliament (Groomsbridge, 2006).
2.2 Hungary: Commissioner for Future Generations
The Hungarian Commissioner for Future Generations was one of the strongest representative mechanisms
for future generations yet created. The Commissioner was established in 2008, but only continued until

2012 before having its power substantially reduced (Future Policy, n.d.). Structurally, the Commissioner
was elected by parliament, but under the Act LIX of 1993 on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil
Rights (Ombudsman) 1993 had to fulfil the condition of being a lawyer with expertise in environmental
protection and/or nature conservation law (s 27/A. § (2)). Independence was also assured by the exclusion
of anyone who had, among others, held office or been a member of a political party within the last 4
years, or held other employment or business that could constitute a conflict of interest (ss 3, 27/A(2)).
Structurally, the Commissioner was elected by parliament, but was required to be a lawyer with expertise
in environmental protection and/or nature conservation law (s 27/A. § (2)). Independence was also
assured by the exclusion of anyone who had, among other criteria, held office or been a member of a
political party within the last 4 years, or held other employment or business that could constitute a conflict
of interest (ss 3, 27/A(2) ).
In terms of scope, the primary task of the Commissioner was to ‘ensure protection of the fundamental
right to a healthy environment’, which at the time was enshrined in Hungary’s constitution. The
Commissioner’s core duty was to receive complaints and carry out investigations in relation to all issues
that may affect citizens’ constitutional right to a healthy environment (s 27/B). These investigations often
resulted in legal cases taken by the Commissioner – over 200 substantive cases a year, many of which
resulted in success (Future Policy, n.d.). Through this investigatory role it achieved many successes in
protecting the interests of future generations (Institute for European Environmental Policy, 2015). In
addition, the Commissioner was also responsible for strategic development research, and consulted on
legislation concerning the environment and all levels of government. The Commissioner had considerable
powers, including the power to call for termination of activity damaging the environment, backed up by
police and law enforcement bodies.
Advantages of the Hungarian approach include that the office was legally (and arguably politically)
independent from other government branches and from businesses, and had some legitimacy through its
support from civil society groups and its interaction with individual citizens through its complaints
service. It also maintained transparency and open relationships with all stakeholders during investigations
and reported annually on its work (s 27/H). However, the Commissioner had fairly narrow scope, both in
terms of its issue focus (i.e. environmental issues) and methodology; the Commissioner seems to have
expended a great deal of resources on legal pursuits in response to individual complaints.
Additionally, the institution did not see the longevity essential for long-term representation of future
interests. The role ended in 2011 when Hungary’s four commissioners (on different subjects) were
amalgamated into one position, the powers and mandate of the Commissioner were vastly reduced and it

faced large budget cuts. This change was a part of a new constitution, drafted by the newly incumbent
right-wing Fidesz party. It is likely that, given the Commissioner’s notable interventions in private and
governmental interests, there was significant political pressure to reduce its level of power. Despite the
fact that originally, the Commissioner was brought about by support from across the political spectrum
and from civil society groups, there may still have been a deficit of political understanding of, or
sympathy for, its goals and methods. Whilst the Commissioner did engage with citizens through its
complaints role, it may still have lacked the widespread awareness and support for tackling
intergenerational issues to prevent it being easily dissolved by other political interests.
2.3 Singapore: Centre for Strategic Futures
The Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF) is an in-government, futures think tank established in 2009 within
the Strategic Policy Office, which is itself a part of the Prime Minister’s Office of Singapore (CSF,
2015a).
1
Focusing on the public sector, CSF works to encourage and improve governmental and cross-
department strategic thinking on risk and the future. This can be seen both in the wide audience it has
reached through educational and networking methods within the civil service (CSF, 2015b),
2
as well as
through individual projects with other departments, such as that on the implications of automation on the
Singapore workforce (carried out conjointly with the Minister of Manpower) (CSF, 2015c).
3
Structurally, whilst its position within the Prime Minister’s Office may lend it some authority in political
and policy spheres, it also raises questions of independence. The precarious position it occupies close to
government means it is open to both political pressures on agenda setting and outright dissolution if it
causes much upset for the relevant stakeholders. However, there is reason to think these latter worries do
not pose much of a threat. Singapore has a history of valuing strategic thinking and scenario planning that
dates back to the 1980s (CSF, 2015a), and as such, the relevance of the institution is firmly ingrained in
the civil service and government. Furthermore, the head of civil service has written glowing reviews of
the Centre’s work in introductions to its annual report, ‘Foresight’ (CSF, 2015c).
Functionally, CSF acts mainly as a futures think for government and the civil service. It has worked on a
wide range of issues in doing this, including the effects of automation and renewable energies on
Singapore, as well as more abstract questions of national identity (CSF, 2016). Yet, its most distinctive
1
Centre for Strategic Futures [CSF] 2015, ‘History’, CSF, viewed 25th March 2017, http://www.csf.gov.sg/about-
us/history.
2
Centre for Strategic Futures 2015, ‘Futurecraft’, CSF, viewed 25th March 2017, http://www.csf.gov.sg/our-
work/futurecraft.
3
Centre for Strategic Futures 2015, Foresight 2015, CSF, viewed 25th March 2017,
http://www.csf.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/csf-report-2015.pdf.

feature lies in its role to, “not just to think about the future, but also to think about how we think about the
future” (CSF, 2014). The Centre has developed highly rigorous frameworks for thinking about future
trends, risks and opportunities. An example is its ‘Scenario Planning Plus’ (SP+) toolkit, which
incorporates insights from chaos theory on complex systems (CSF, 2015d), and psychological insights on
cognitive biases when thinking about the future (Ho, 2010). Furthermore, it has stressed the need to pick
up on ‘weak signals’ which might be evidence of upcoming, significant future events (CSF, 2015c). A
major benefit of such a framework is its receptivity to low-probability, high-impact events, such as global
catastrophic and existential risks
CSF’s second main role is to encourage and facilitate this thinking across policy-making platforms. In
addition to encouraging individual departments to engage in strategic thinking about the future, the Centre
aims to facilitate wider, ‘whole-of-government’ thinking and coordination on future issues, which is
advantageous since long-term risks and opportunities do not all necessarily fall into neat public service
categories (Ho, 2010). It has partly achieved this through running ‘Futurecraft’ workshops to teach its
SP+ toolkit to members of the civil service, and trainees of the Civil Service College (CSF, 2015b). This
outreach, along with the annual publication of its Foresight reports, means the Centre increases
transparency and is accessible to individuals across the public sector.
CSF lacks any substantive powers to intervene in the legislative process, or penalise those which it sees as
acting against the long-term interests of Singapore. However, this has not been an issue given its role in
promoting long-term, strategic thinking, which mainly requires positive action on its part. Furthermore,
although the Centre has not engaged in extensive outreach work with the general population of Singapore,
it has made efforts to engage with relevant professionals from a range of backgrounds “through incoming
visits, overseas trips, paid consultancies, interviews and curated events” (CSF, 2015e).
As an institute for implicitly representing future interests, CSF has been broadly successful and has
several key, desirable features such as its focus on inculcating strategic thinking on the future across
government to disperse its workload and enhance scope.
However, several features of the Singaporean context mean that this institution may not be easily
transferable to the UK. First, Singaporean politics arguably does not suffer from political short-termism to
the same extent. Partly as a consequence of the design of the parliamentary system, the ruling People’s
Action Party has been in power for half a century. Although individual parliamentarians are at risk of
losing their seats, there is not enough of a threat to undermine the government planning far into the long-
term. The government has acted favourably towards strategic future thinking since the 1980s, and there
are little signs that it will change path in the near future.

Secondly, there are factors intrinsic to Singapore as a nation which dispose it to allocate more resources to
long-term planning. Its relative youth as a nation (having only achieved full independence in 1965) as
well as its precarious location, size and lack of natural resources gives rise to feelings of national
insecurity (similar factors likely influenced the creation of Israel’s Commission for Future Generations).
Furthermore, arguably an increased cultural emphasis on collectivism and national prosperity, and
diminished value placed on individual freedom, creates a context more favourable to long-term planning
and strategy.
2.4 Israel: Commission for Future Generations
4
Established in 2001 by the Knesset (Israel’s parliament), the Israel Commission for Future Generations
was an organ of parliament (The Knesset, n.d.) headed by a Commissioner chosen by an ad-hoc
parliamentary committee and appointed by the Speaker of the parliament. Similarly to Hungary, regarding
independence, the Commissioner could not be someone whom in the last two years had been active in
political life or a member of any political party. The Commissioner was assisted in its role by a Public
Council (an advisory committee) which consisted of scientists, intellectuals, clergymen and other public
figures. The Commission is now disestablished; it was only given a five-year mandate and when the term
of the first Commissioner ended no new Commissioner was appointed, apparently for budgetary reasons
(Göpel and Pearce, 2013).
Functionally, the Commissioner could give opinions on bills and secondary legislation brought before
parliament if they believed it concerned future generations. It also had the power to initiate bills to
advance the interests of future generations, and could play a general advocacy role to parliament and
parliamentarians. It was required to submit an annual report on its activities for that year, creating some
transparency.
The scope of its responsibilities was wide, stretching across 12 policy areas including environment,
development, science, and technology. Furthermore, the explanatory notes to the Knesset Law explicitly
contemplated the possibility of adverse consequences from genetic engineering or other technological
developments. This is the closest reference to existential risks across any of the institutions being
assessed.
As well as holding the power to initiate bills in the Knesset, the Commissioner had an effective veto
power over the passage of legislation which didn’t comply with the interests of future generations. This
4
The Knesset n.d., ‘Commission for Future Generations’, The Knesset, viewed 14th January 2017,
https://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/file/2016/10/Knesset-Paper.pdf.

may be one of the reasons the institution was eventually scrapped: alongside cost issues, members of the
Knesset cited “their feelings that the Commission received too much authority to interfere in their work”
(Teschner, 2013).
2.5 Scotland: Future Forum
Set up by the Scottish Parliament in 2005 as a company at arm’s length from the Parliament itself, the
main motivation for the Future Forum was to tackle short-termism in present decision making: to “look
beyond immediate horizons, to some of the challenges and opportunities we will face in the future”
(Wilson, 2016). A Board of Directors helps guide the Forum’s work; its members include backbench
MSPs (Scottish parliamentarians), prominent academic leaders, civil servants and business leaders. The
Forum is autonomous from the Parliament in deciding the focus of its work, though it still depends on it
for funding (Wilson, 2016).
One of the main functions of the Forum has been to “stimulate public debate in Scotland” with respect to
preparing for the future (Wilson, 2016). In doing so, it has engaged with politicians, the private sector,
and the public. It also carries out “futures studies”, reporting on how various areas of Scotland will evolve
in the future.
In terms of success, the institution is laudable for making an active effort to directly promote longer term
thinking in decision making. From 2011-2016, the Forum organized more than 100 events directed to
bringing ““fresh-thinking” into the [Scottish] Parliament” (Wilson, 2016). However, it is hard to assess
the impact of these educational events on policy making in general. Furthermore, the Forum has thus far
been limited in scope, dealing with only a handful of varied individual topics in its future studies research.
This narrow scope is possibly affected by limited powers that Scottish parliament has to deal with issues
relating to economic policy, healthcare budget or existential risk research, and highlights the need for the
UK Parliament to deal with intergenerational issues.
2.6 Wales: Commissioner for Future Generations
The Commissioner for Future Generations is a guardian role focused on sustainable development,
outlined in the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015. This is the most recent institution
considered here: the first Commissioner came into existence on February 1, 2016. The Act imposes
certain obligations regarding sustainable development and well-being targets on 44 listed Welsh public
bodies, and the Commissioner’s main role is to ensure that this is done successfully.

The Commissioner may research how public bodies can best meet these targets, as well as encourage and
give recommendations to these bodies. The Act obliges public bodies to follow these recommendations,
and the Commissioner can carry out reviews at their own discretion to assess their progress. In a wider
role, the current Commissioner has emphasized the need for public bodies to engage with citizens on
discussions of the future of Wales (Office of the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, 2016).
It is too early to assess the success of the Commissioner given the institution’s youth. Whilst it is
promising to see long-term thinking being promoted across public bodies, it does not seem that global
catastrophic and existential risks are being considered. Again, some issues may also not receive attention
to their long-term consequences due to a lack of devolved power on Wales’ part.
Why does the Commissioner exist in Wales but not England? What distinguishes the Welsh case? First, in
Wales there is a more prominent strand of environmental and social awareness than in mainstream UK
politics, and an element of ‘conscious exceptionalism’ which made Welsh politicians enthusiastic to
distinguish themselves from English MPs by adopting a sustainability agenda (Institute for European
Environmental Policy, 2015).
In addition, Welsh environmental policy contains a strong emphasis on ‘management and stewardship’ in
environmental policy – that is, a policy context which foregrounds waste reduction and renewable energy
(Ogwr, 2011). In England, by contrast there is a much greater focus on three prominent short-term issues:
flooding (Harvey, 2017), overcrowding (Dangerfield, 2014), and coastal erosion. These issues are
important, but do not provide as strong a platform for intergenerational sustainability because they
inherently respond to short-term complaints such as housing. It is useful to observe that the future
generations agenda had cross-party support in the Welsh assembly, and secondly that the UK
government’s disbanding of the Sustainable Development Commission – expanded upon in the next
section – “created a shared understanding of the fragility of a purely administrative structure, not backed
by legislation” (Institute for European Environmental Policy, 2015).
2.7 Conclusions
Representative institutions for future generations, whether local or abroad, differ widely in their structure,
functions and power. Although such institutions have only begun to appear in the last two decades,
common trends and features exist. In particular, they tend to face challenges to their existence within a
few years of their creation (usually an election cycle). This is a major problem for securing successful
representation of future generations. The representation mechanisms that we propose will therefore seek
to avoid capricious party politics, either by being firmly constitutionally entrenched, or more realistically

by being a cross-partisan organ that recognises its limits and works with the political grain. As such,
several factors can be drawn out from the analysis which may increase or decrease the likelihood of short-
term discontinuation of a future representative institution.
First, institutions which are given too much power, too early in their lifespan, tend to face rejection from
politicians. The Israeli and Hungarian Commissioners illustrate this pitfall. This is a difficult balancing
act, however: an institution with no power is of no use in representing future generations. But the sort of
massive, transformational change needed to protect future generations requires a degree of institutional
strength—strength which appears to be deeply incompatible with current politics. This implies a major
dilemma—a choice between proposals which are ineffective in protecting future generations but
politically realistic, and those which are effective yet unrealistic—which will be returned to in our
conclusions.
The legitimacy of, and public support behind, an institution is a key factor as to whether it will last.
Public and politicians alike need to perceive an institution as legitimate, and its functions and powers
must be proportional to this perceived legitimacy. Public and political (especially cross-party political)
support for future representative institutions is essential for representative institutions to have any level of
power. It is imperative, then, for any such institution to be transparent and accessible in its work, as well
as taking initiative to promote the cause of intergenerational rights and issues to the general public and
decision makers. Civil society movements and support can be very advantageous in the success of
implementing long-term thinking in policy (the creation of the Hungarian Commissioner due to this is
illustrative). Public and political engagement of the cause is key to successfully representing future
generations in the long-term.
Structurally, it has been beneficial to have a multi-disciplinary team working on the issues, as in Scotland
and Hungary. This makes sense given the wide range of issues affecting future generations. Furthermore,
securing the right kind of independence from government is key to ensure criticisms of policy can be
made without fear of dissolution, as well as to maximize impact. Although inclusion of parliamentarians
can risk a conflict of interests, their participation lends political weight to the institution, both in terms of
influence and the importance of the institution. This may be essential for the highly influential, long-lived
Finland Committee. It is also important to ensure independence in agenda setting, at least to an extent, as
observed in Finland and Scotland. However, academic engagement should be used to prioritize issues. In
making these findings we echo the argument of the World Future Council that the key characteristics of
future-representation institutions should be independence, transparency, legitimacy, access to
information, accessibility, and authority (World Future Council, 2014).

We are led to the preliminary conclusion that in the UK Parliamentary context, substantive powers should
not be given to intergenerational representatives, at least initially (contrast the Israeli power to veto
legislation, and the Hungarian abilities to enforce rulings). Instead, a UK-wide representative institution
could play a monitoring role for legislation affecting future generations; carry out and collate relevant
research with respect to intergenerational issues; play an advisory role to government; and work to create
wider public awareness of intergenerational inequality issues.
3. English policy context
Several England-specific factors are important in determining which policy options should be adopted in
order to mainstream the representation of future generations.
3.1 UK Sustainable Development Commission
The UK previously had a Sustainable Development Commission (SDC), responsible for promoting
sustainable development throughout the UK (Sustainable Development Commission, 2009). The SDC
reported to the UK government, providing analysis of government departments’ Sustainable Development
Action Plans and responding to consultation papers which often disagreed with Government Policy (e.g.
Jackson, 2009). The Commission’s work on sustainable development was relevant to future generations,
though they were not its explicit mandate.
However, the Commission was not statutorily independent, which may have limited it in its criticism of
government policy, and also enabled the government to easily remove it in 2010 (Vaughan, 2010).
Although the exact motivations for this are unclear, it seems likely that targeted criticism of government
actions may have had an impact.
3.2 Environmental Audit Committee
Historically, the Environmental Audit Select Committee monitored the sustainability policies of
government departments in a way similar to that prescribed by the Welsh Act. This is an important
precedent in any attempts to introduce future representation into government, in particular because the
Committee in 2011 recommended the creation of a new cabinet minister for sustainable development
(Saltmarsh, 2011), in order to improve the situation post-abolition of the SDC. Our concerns are broader
than this: future representation encompasses a large range of discrete concerns than sustainable
development. However, this is a useful recommendation which may be updated according to our
understanding of intergenerational justice.
3.3 Political discourse regarding future generations

Political discourse in the UK places a strong emphasis on responsibility to future generations. This is
reflected, for instance, in the political discourse surrounding national debt and austerity since 2010, which
revolves around ideas of what today’s voters owe to future UK citizens. The idea that each generation
should ‘live within its means’ has gained support even from the radical political opposition (Watt &
Wintour, 2017) and has been explicitly linked to intergenerational equity by the Prime Minister (Thomas,
2016). Potential exists to ground policies regarding representation of future generations in already
existing concepts in British public discourse.
3.4 Merger of the Department of Energy and Climate Change
In 2016 a restructuring of government departments led to the merger of the former Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department of Energy and Climate Change. The latter once dealt
with many of the sustainability issues that have historically been at the heart of the intergenerational
justice movement. This change has been understood by some as a signal that the government is not
committed to sustainable action on climate change, although the government disagrees (Rincon, 2017).
The new Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy retains a minister for climate change,
and some have argued that it may constitute a better foundation for the decarbonisation of the British
economy (Fankhauser, 2016). If criticisms of the merger are correct, then this may indicate that the
political environment is not supportive of future-planning and issues of intergenerational inequality.
3.5 The UK Constitution
The structure of constitutional law creates a distinct challenge to any attempt to institutionalise
representation of future generations in England. In states like Hungary, future commissions can be created
by constitutional law and protected against governments who must then rely on sweeping change if they
wish to remove them. In the UK, on the other hand, no laws are more fundamental than any others; any
statute can simply be repealed by parliament. In addition, a key constitutional principle is that parliament
may not bind itself for perpetuity. A number of pieces of legislation have attempted to introduce a longer-
term view, with various levels of success, such as the Human Rights Act 1998, the Climate Change Act
2008, and the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010. These demonstrate the possibility of overcoming
constitutional challenges.
Due to the uncodified and organic character of the British constitution, parliamentary politics are
governed by convention to a relatively large degree. These conventions are more helpful to the
implementation of future representation in the UK, because they (as opposed to explicit documents) will
dictate the tools and avenues of institutional form, and in some cases because they may create or enable

an institutional resistance to change - particularly a change as large as a general perspective shift toward
the future.
4. Recommendations
On the basis of the comparative analysis and UK policy context presented above, we make several
recommendations. Each recommendation is followed by a brief explanation.
To begin, we note the following caveat. As noted earlier, there is a certain dilemma in that, globally,
futures institutions with more power than politically acceptable have been quickly abolished, while those
which are politically tolerable are not powerful enough to make the kinds of truly transformational
changes required to protect future generations. In the face of this dilemma, we have chosen proposals
which are practicable and politically feasible, taking the view that a small step forward is better than no
step at all. We acknowledge the criticism that these proposals may not be nearly enough, but note that
they may provide a foundation from which more radical change can be sought.
(a) An All-Party Parliamentary Group on Future Generations should be formed.
5
All-party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs) are multi-party groups of MPs who meet regularly or semi-
regularly to discuss issues of common interest. They are registered formally in parliament and are
required to hold annual elections, but otherwise are informal groups organised by the interests of MPs for
the sake of promoting particular causes. APPGs draw together members of major parties in order to
maximise the possibility of influencing government. They create and enhance cross-party support, and as
such we think that they are a good first step towards creating cross-party support for future generations
issues. During their meetings, they discuss the activities of the governing parties and issues relevant to
their subject of concern, and enlist government ministers to speak on their issues of concern. An APPG
can use the existence of party members who deviate from the partisan line in order to give the issue in
question greater exposure and to introduce it into legitimate party discourse.
An APPG may be a useful stepping stone to eventual institutionalisation of intergenerational justice in
Parliament (perhaps in the form of a Select Committee). APPGs serve to increase the visibility of
particular issues and emphasise their bipartisan support, creating a sense of the issue or ‘constructing’ it
as a shared, objective one. Another important function of APPGs is to act as a channel through which
charities, campaign groups, NGOs and even commercial interests can involve themselves in government
5
This first recommendation has recently been taken up: following the writing of this paper, the All-Party
Parliamentary Group for Future Generations was registered in October 2017, and the authors were involved in the
process of its creation. Nevertheless, it is worth explaining here why such a move matters.

and political lobbying. This means that an APPG for future generations could function as a means by
which the prominent civil society movement for sustainable futures could be translated into political
change.
In practical terms, the lack of an explicit precedent for the representation of future generations in the
British parliament does not eliminate the possibility of an APPG for future generations. Many APPGs
begin with the support of a prominent charity or other NGO, and perhaps the Centre for the Study of
Existential Risk or the Future of Humanity Institute could operate as such a support in this case.
6
This
would be an alliance reminiscent of that between Finland’s Committee for the Future and the Finland
Futures Research Centre in Turku University. Though such support is not a requirement, in practice an
APPG needs some form of support in order to do its work effectively.
(b) Legislation should be passed containing an obligation to include the long-term risks of any
Government Bill in the accompanying Explanatory Note.
We recommend an obligation to describe the long-term risks of any bill introduced into Parliament, and to
include this in the accompanying Explanatory Notes. Micro-level measures such as this are somewhat
outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on institutionalised representation, and we include this as
just one example. Further research should be done into other possible options to promote good risk
management on the micro-level.
(c) The various futures research institutions and think tanks should cooperate to form an expert
advisory panel with a mandate to influence policy.
There are several academic institutes and think tanks in the UK which study catastrophic and existential
risks, sustainable development, and the future of society. These include, but are not limited to, the Centre
for the Study of Existential Risk, the Future of Humanity Institute, the Oxford Martin School, Forum for
the Future, the Centre for Future Studies and the Intergenerational Foundation. A veritable wealth of
expertise is contained here, and these institutions should consider working together to create a committee
tasked with providing advice to government. This is a recommendation which would not require much
immediate action from government, save a willingness to receive advice.
This sort of independent expert advisory group could be formalised in the form of a non-departmental
public body (NDPB), which operates at arm’s length from government. There is clear precedent here, for
instance in the form of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, which is an NDPB. Another
6
In the recently-established APPG, the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk hosts the APPG’s Secretariat.

option would be for a Policy Advisory Group (PAG) to be formed, which is simply a panel of people who
advise on policy development.
(d) If and when a British Bill of Rights is passed, the opportunity should be taken to include
intergenerational rights.
Institutional security is difficult to acquire in the UK government, exemplified by the case of the
Sustainable Development Commission. One of the best opportunities to constitutionally secure rights for
future generations may be in the currently proposed ‘British Bill of Rights’. Such rights-focused statutes
are typically politically difficult to repeal. If intergenerational justice becomes part of the lexis of codified
‘British rights’, it may have acquired a foothold of such historical significance that repeal would later
become a practical impossibility. However, more research would be needed on the precise legal
formulation and content of such rights.
(e) In the longer term, political momentum should be translated into a formal Joint Committee on
Future Generations.
A joint committee should be formed, charged with scrutinising every government bill for its compatibility
with the rights and interests of future generations, and investigating the extent to which government
departments consider future generations in their operation. A joint committee, unlike a select committee,
is made up of both MPs and Members of the House of Lords. This committee would be modelled on the
Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is charged with scrutinising every government bill for its
compatibility with human rights, and the UK’s compliance with its international human rights obligations.
This is a less immediate option than an APPG (which requires a mere 10 interested parliamentarians to
come together), as a joint committee needs to be created by parliament via its standing orders and
therefore necessitates a more involved process. However, in the medium term a joint committee would
have more power than an APPG and would be a more effective way of representing future generations.
As an alternative option, it is important to note that select committees can appoint sub-committees to
produce reports on particular issues (Maer & Sandford, 2004). In the future generations context, the select
committee on Energy and Climate Change could be an appropriate candidate to appoint such a sub-
committee.
(f) Any Future Generations institution should be explicitly mandated to consider existential risks
arising from technological development, in addition to environmental sustainability.

As previously noted, only the Israeli institution amongst our examples was mandated to consider risks
arising from technological development; the other institutions only considered environmental risks. In
light of the burgeoning research in this field demonstrating that technological risks are a serious issue
(see, for instance, other papers in this special issue), any institution mandated to address international
inequality should expressly consider them.
(g) Civil society needs to mobilise to form a strong cross-party support for representation of future
generations.
A common factor amongst the successful institutions studied is that all were established against a
background of significant support from civil society. In addition, in the cases where that support
continued, and where civil society organisations created significant public awareness of future
generations issues, the institutions were more likely to endure rather than being abolished as soon as they
fell out of political favour. Civil society needs to mobilise to form a strong cross-party support for the
policy measures listed here.
4.1 Proposals we considered but do not recommend
We encountered several ideas which we do not include above, for various reasons. One of these is the
proposal for a “third house of parliament”, or “Guardians”, made by Rupert Read (Read 2012). Under
Read’s proposal these Guardians, appointed randomly amongst citizens on the same principle as juries,
would have the power to (a) veto new legislation that threatened the basic needs and fundamental interests
of future people, and (b) force a review of any existing legislation that threatens such needs and interests.
He also suggests similar structures within local governments. As we found previously, institutions with
veto powers did not last long, and as such we do not think this “third house of parliament” would be
workable. In addition, we share concerns raised by Michael Bartlet about the proposed method of
selection by lot (Bartlet, 2012).
A second idea was an annual, designated day on which the House of Commons would discuss future
generations issues. By analogy, events are held annually in the House of Commons for Human Rights
Day and International Women’s Day. We did not recommend this because although this might serve to
publicise future generations issues, this kind of tokenization of the rights and interests of future
generations could create complacency and ultimately undermine the long-term, year-round work which
needs to be done.
Another alternative way to represent future generations could be through a Royal Commission. A Royal
Commission is an ad hoc advisory committee appointed by the government, in the name of the Crown, for

a specific investigatory and/or advisory purpose. They generally exist for a limited time, on average
taking between two and four years to produce a report, and have had a mixed impact. The work of the
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution spanned 40 years and had considerable influence (Owens,
2012), but other commissions have had less impact or have even been disestablished before reporting
(Institute for Government, n.d.). We do not think a Royal Commission would be an appropriate means of
representing future generations primarily because a Commission is generally time-limited and addresses a
specific issue. The interests of future generations do not support such a “one-time” approach.
5. Conclusions
In response to the issues of intergenerational inequality raised by catastrophic and existential risks, we
have presented several concrete options to represent future generations in current policy-making, founded
on a comparative analysis of similar representative mechanisms worldwide. There are several limitations
to what we have presented here. First, because our scope is necessarily limited, we deal only with ‘macro’
mechanisms; we do not consider more specific legislative proposals in detail. Second, these conclusions
are quite specific to the United Kingdom, and particularly the English context. In particular, the cultural
context surrounding intergenerational issues may significantly differ between societies. Further research
is needed to determine appropriate representative mechanisms in other countries, for catastrophic risks are
a global problem and intergenerational inequality cannot be addressed only by one country acting alone.
Finally, there is the dilemma previously mentioned: are all of these recommendations insufficient to truly
protect future generations? Is it politically impossible to avoid irrevocable damage to future generations?
Perhaps. We consider that some representation is better than none. Further, we do not wish to rule
anything out, nor to lose hope. Future generations need us to keep on. We hope that the examples set by
the six countries analysed here will be taken up across the globe.
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