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Will and practical reason

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Abstract

How is practical reason - the capacity to deliberate practically - related to the will - the capacity to make decisions? According to voluntarism, will and practical reason are separate capacities, whereas according to intellectualism, they are one and the same. I argue for a version of intellectualism. § 1 introduces some well-known problems of intellectualism which are the strongest motivation for voluntarist positions. § 2 distinguishes two kinds of voluntarism and identifies difficulties for each of them. § 3 introduces a view of motivation and intentional action from which intellectualism follows. §§ 4-6 address and resolve the problems from § 1.

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Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, Band 71 (2017), 4
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