Benjamin S. Lambeth is a senior staff member of the Rand Corporation, specializing in Soviet political and military affairs. He served previously in the Office of National Estimates and Office of Political Research, Central Intelligence Agency.
1. For detailed discussion of the principal differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic thought and how they affect U.S. national security planning, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy (The Rand Corporation, R-2034-DDRE, December 1976) and How To Think About Soviet Military Doctrine (The Rand Corporation, P-5939, February 1978). See also Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Fall 1978, pp. 138-155.
2. One notable dissenting view, which argues that the Soviet leaders have now come to accept the desirability of mutual deterrence notwithstanding the seeming suggestions of formal Soviet military doctrine to the contrary, may be found in Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," International Security, Summer 1978, pp. 112-147. For a cogent critique of this article, see Donald G. Brennan, "Commentary," International Security, Winter 1978, pp. 193-198.
3. In this regard, my colleague Nancy Nimitz has argued that among the factors of military capability, external political trends that affect the practical utility of a given array of forces, and national determination (or "resolve"), the Soviet leaders assign the greatest importance to the latter of these in determining their overall strategic prowess and regard the first (military capability) as, at best, a necessary but quite insufficient key to Soviet security. "Soviet Perceptions of the Military Balance" (unpublished manuscript).
4. V. M. Kulish, Military Force and International Relations (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1972), p. 29.
5. For an insightful amplification on this point, which convincingly scores much of what passes for "strategic analysis" in the United States as being little more than uninspired and operationally irrelevant number-crunching, see Edward Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance, Survival, March-April 1979, pp. 57-60.
6. A. Migolat'ev, "Who is Forcing the Arms Race and Why?" Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', No. 10, October 1977, p. 87.
7. Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, "The Peace Program in Action," Kommunist, No. 14, September 1975, p. 5.
8. Lieutenant General P. Zhilin, "The Great October and the Defense of the Socialist Homeland," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 10, October 1977, p. 18.
9. G. Sviatov, "United States Policy Regarding Armed Forces Construction and Arms Limitation," Voprosy Istorii, No. 2, February 1978, p. 90.
10. Yu. Oleshuk, "The Bankrupt Arguments of the Opponents of Detente," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia, No. 10, October 1977, p. 44.
11. For further discussion, see Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (The Rand Corporation R-2154-AF, September 1977).
12. Kulish, Military Force and International Relations, p. 103.