Regional Hegemony Quests in the Middle East from the Balance of Power System to the Balance of Proxy Wars: Turkey as Balancing Power for the Iran - Saudi Rivalry

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* Makale Geliş Tarihi: 09.03.2017 Kabul Tarihi: 18.09.2017
** Asst. Prof., International Relations, Kırklareli University, E-mail: muharremeksi@klu.edu.tr
Regional Hegemony Quests in the Middle East
from the Balance of Power System to the Balance
of Proxy Wars: Turkey as Balancing Power for the
Iran - Saudi Rivalry*
Ortadoğu’da Güç Dengesi Sisteminden Vekalet Savaşı
Dengesine Bölgesel Hegemonya Arayışları: İran-Suudi
Rekabetinde Dengeleyici Güç Olarak Türkiye
Muharrem EKŞİ**
Abstract
This study examines the Iran-Saudi rivalry within the context of the changing balance of
power in the Middle East. The main research questions were determined to be what the dy-
namics of the Iran-Saudi rivalry are and what type of role Turkey may play within the rivalry
between the two countries. Three essential arguments were developed within this context. The
first argument is that the regional balances were broken by the US occupation of Iraq in 2003
and by the ‘Arab Spring’ process resulting in the regional hegemony rivalry between Iran and
Saudi Arabia. The second one is that Iran desired to utilize the Arab Spring process as an
opportunity to become a regional hegemonic power. On the other hand, the policy of the US
to withdraw from and leave the Middle East to its allies Israel and Saudi Arabia caused King
Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud to adopt a regional leadership policy. Within this framework,
the study argued that the rivalry to become the new regional hegemon of the Middle East re-
surged between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two historic rival powers of the Middle East. The
third argument is that the rivalry between the two countries was mainly in the form of a proxy
war but resulted in the fact that the balance of power struggle in the region reached to the proxy
war balance as no country managed to outcompete the other.
Key Words: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Proxy War, Balance Of Power, Hegemony
Öz
Bu araştırmada Ortadoğu’daki İran-Suudi rekabeti, değişen güç dengeleri bağlamında
incelenmiştir. Makalenin temel araştırma sorusu, İran-Suudi rekabetinin dinamikleri
nelerdir ve iki ülke arasındaki rekabette Türkiye’nin rolü ne olabilir olarak belirlenmiştir.
Bu bağlamda üç temel argüman geliştirilmiştir: Birincisi, ABD’nin 2003 yılında Irak
işgali ve ‘Arap Baharı’ sürecinin bölgesel dengeleri bozduğu ve iki ülke arasında bölgesel
hegemon olma rekabetine yol açtığı tezi geliştirilmiştir. İkincisi, İran, Arap Baharı sürecini
bölgesel hegemon güç olmak için bir fırsat olarak kullanmak istemiştir. Öte yandan ABD’nin

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bölgeden çekilmesiyle Ortadoğu’yu müttefikleri İsrail ve Suudi Arabistan’a bırakma
politikası, Kral Salman’ı bölgesel liderlik politikasına yöneltmiştir. Bu çerçevede araştırmada
Ortadoğu’nun iki tarihsel rakip gücü olan İran ve Suudi Arabistan arasında Ortadoğu’nun
yeni bölgesel hegemonu olma rekabetinin başladığı argümanı ileri sürülmüştür. Üçüncüsü,
iki ülke arasındaki rekabetin ağırlıklı olarak vekalet savaşı biçiminde yürütüldüğü, ancak
her iki ülkenin de birbirlerine üstünlük sağlayamaması, bölgede güç dengesi rekabetinin aynı
zamanda vekalet savaşı dengesine dönüştüğü argümanı ileri sürülmüştür.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Suudi Arabistan, İran, Türkiye, Vekalet Savaşı, Güç dengesi,
Hegemonya
Introduction
After the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, the balance of power in the Middle
East started to change. Likewise, Iraq was no more one of the balance of
power in the Middle East policy. However, the development that really turned
the balance of powers upside down in the Middle East was the Arab Spring
process that started in 2010. In this process, Libya, Egypt and Syria were no
more the balance of power of the Middle East policy, creating a big gap of
power vacuum in the region. Moreover, the strategy of the US to shift its power
from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific resulted in a new rivalry of hegemonic
power in the Middle East. Russia started to settle in the Middle East over the
Syria crisis and adopted the strategy to replace the US in the region. On the
other hand, the US administration implemented a strategy of maintaining its
influence in the Middle East through its allies. Accordingly, the US shifted its
power to China, a superpower candidate, and opted to leave the Middle East
to its allies: Israel and Saudi Arabia1.
King Salman, who came to the throne in Saudi Arabia in January 2015,
followed a hawkish policy and started the Yemen operation in March, which was
a clear display of its ambition to become a regional hegemony in the Middle
East2. This started the rivalry of becoming the new the regional hegemon of the
Middle East between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two historic rival powers of the
region. Yemen and Syria turned to be the areas of proxy wars between the two
powers. On the other hand, the nuclear reconciliation between Iran and the
5+1 countries in July 2015 and the Iran-US rapprochement started to escalate
the rivalry between the Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, the Yemen operation
was a clear demonstration of the limits of the Saudi Arabia to become a
regional hegemon3. The policy of Saudi Arabia to turn its oil and capital wealth
1 Fahad Nazer, “ABD’yle Suudi Arabistan’ın “özel ilişkisi” sürecek mi?”, Al-Monitor, Gulf Pul-
se, Nisan 8, 2016, Erişim tarihi: 04.12.2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/origi-
nals/2016/04/us-saudi-relations.html#
2 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Saudi Arabia and the quest for regional hegemony”, Hurstpublishers, 19
July 2016, Erişim tarihi: 18.12.2016, http://www.hurstpublishers.com/saudi-arabia-quest-re-
gional-hegemony/
3 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Saudi Airstrikes on Yemen: Limits to Military Adventu-

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to a regional hegemony was not sufficient, as its economic power alone cannot
make it a regional hegemony due to its inadequate military power4. Therefore,
Saudi Arabia needs to make ally with a country with more military capacity to
become a hegemonic power.
At this point emerges the option of alliance between Turkey and
Saudi Arabia to become a joint regional hegemons. It was clear that the two
countries could not become the hegemonic power of the region despite the
support of the US. However, the eventual alliance between the two countries
was overshadowed by the fact that Turkey was a rival of Saudi Arabia just like
Iran. Likewise, Turkey leaded by AK Party followed a policy of becoming a
regional power in the Middle East between 2003 and 2013; however, the Arab
Spring disrupted this policy. Therefore, it is anticipated that the future of the
US-Iran rapprochement at the regional level and the progress of the relations
between Saudi Arabia and Turkey will determine how the balance of power in
the Middle East will be shaped. On the global level, it could be argued that the
US-Russia relations and their Middle Eastern policies will determine both the
balance of power and the fate of the region.
From the Balance of Power to the Proxy War
The regional balance of power system in the Middle East based upon the actors
like Iraq, Iran, Israel, Egypt and Turkey started to change in 2000s. Firstly, Iraq
was no longer a regional power with the US occupation in 2003. The main
change started with the Arab Spring process in 2010; and Turkey, Egypt and
Syria, that were the main regional actors of the Middle East, ceased to be the
power centres. Even further, they were no longer the actors of the Middle East
as they were replaced by Iran and Saudi Arabia. The regional hegemonic rivalry
resurged between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. This rivalry takes
place in the form of proxy wars.
The concepts of proxy war, balance of power and hegemony will be
used as analytical instruments to understand and analyze the developments
in the Middle East. Likewise, the dynamics and the theoretical framework of
the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia consist of the concepts like balance
of power, security dilemma and proxy war.
Balance of Power
Historically, the Middle East is interpreted with the balance of power system.
That is, the region is conceptualized within the balance of power theory. The
region is constructed with the concepts like realpolitik, geopolitics, geostrategic,
rism”, E-International Relations, May 20, 2015, Erişim tarihi: 26.12.2016, http://www.e-ir.
info/2015/05/20/saudi-airstrikes-on-yemen-limits-to-military-adventurism/
4 F. Gregory Gause III, Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East, Council on Foreign Relations, Council
Special Report No.63, December 2011, New York, p. viii.

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security, war and terror. Historically again, the region is understood since the
World War I as the game area, conflicts of interest, hegemonic struggles of
the great powers and external powers. The competitive relations between Iran
and Saudi Arabia reflect the classical balance of power theory; therefore, the
balance of power needs to be explained theoretically and conceptually within
the disciplines of International Relations. First of all, the balance of power in
the narrow and simple sense can be described as a condition and structure
with no hegemonic power among states and where states have relatively equal
or similar powers5. In fact, balance of power is a concept of Realism among the
mainstream theories of International Relations as well as a separate theory
itself6. If the two are combined, balance of power is a theoretical concept.
Realist paradigm basically considers the international politics to be power
relations and even it reduces the whole politics to the power politics. In this
sense, the power-seeking is a priority for states in the classical realism.
On the other hand, Neorealism presupposes that states give priority
to maintain and the balance of power. In another words, neorealism is based
upon the balance of power in the struggle between the states and argues
that this provides stability of the international system. On the other hand,
defensive realism suggests that a balancing country will emerge once a state
gains too much power7. In this sense, it could claim that first Turkey and then
Saudi Arabia emerged as balancing countries against the power increase
of Iran in a process when Syria, Egypt and Iraq were no more actors in the
Middle Eastern balance of power following the US occupation of Iraq in 2003
and predominantly Arab Spring in 2011. On the other hand, one can suggest
that the balancing power function of Turkey emerged in the balance of power
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. John Mearsheimer, an offensive realist,
argues that the system by nature will push countries to gain more power and
to become hegemons8. In this context, the circumstances that took place after
the withdrawal of the regional powers of the Middle East, i.e. Iraq, Egypt, Syria
and Turkey, pushed Iran and then Saudi Arabia to pursue a regional hegemony.
Based on this fact, the balance of power also offers a structural approach.
Accordingly, bipolar or multipolar balance of power structures emerge in the
international and regional system9. Within the framework of the Middle East
politics, it is probable to notice a multipolar structure in the region until 2003
5 T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (ed.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the
21st Century, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 2004, p.2.
6 a.g.e., p.9.
7 a.g.e., p.32.
8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, New York,
London, 2001, p.157.
9 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History & Theory, Routledge, London and New York,
1996, p.188.

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including Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Israel and Turkey. On the other hand, balance
of power could be established bilaterally and multilaterally. As it can be
discussed later, when the balance of power could not be established between
Iran and Saudi Arabia; Gulf countries and Turkey stood by Saudi Arabia that
would create a multilateral balance of power against Iran (Shia crescent: Iraq,
Lebanon, Syria). One of the strategies of balance of power is to achieve it by
applying the alliance system10. However, the rivalry creates security dilemma
between the two countries. The security dilemma was first developed as a
concept in 1950 by John H. Herz11. According to Herz, the security dilemma
serves as a mechanism that shapes the relations between actors in the event
of anarchy12. In simple words, when a country adopts a policy of improving
its security by armament after perceiving a threat from another country, the
other country also adopts the policy of improving security that results in the
security dilemma. The security dilemma becomes another dynamic other than
the balance of power that shapes the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
As it will be discussed later, the security dilemma is in fact the source of the
rivalry between two countries. In other words, the security dilemma nourishes
the rivalry between two countries.
On the other hand, the balance of power is fundamentally related to the
international distribution of power. The balance of power in the international
distribution of power can emerge as a simple or complex balance of power. In
the simple balance of power, there is a kind of equality between the powers of
two countries while the complex balance of power refers to the condition of
more than two rivalries in the complexity of balance of power. If it is adapted
to the Middle East, there is a simple balance of power between Iran and
Saudi Arabia in the narrow sense, while the complex balance of power may
include Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel as regional power in the region.
In fact, Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, ranks states hierarchically as superpower,
great power, and regional power in determining the power category in the
international system13. Iran and Saudi Arabia are listed as regional powers in
the geopolitics of Middle East after 2011. Regional power can be defined as a
power that is effective in its own region, but has limited global effect and no
involvement in most of the global developments. On the other hand, regional
powers can have an impact on the policies of great powers. At the same time,
regional power could be defined as a state that has a hegemonic function
10 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, A. A. Knopf, 1948, p.187.
11 In addition to Herz, Robert Jervis and Herbert Butterfield are the first to develop the concept.
Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis”, Security Studies, 18:3, 587-623,
2009, p.587.
12 John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities, Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 14.
13 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, New York, 2003, p.34-35.

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and potential in its region14. In this sense, Iran and Saudi Arabia started the
struggle of balance of power after 2011, while they also went into a regional
hegemonic rivalry. The rivalry between the two countries manifests itself in the
form of a proxy war.
Balance of Proxy War
Karl Deutsch simply defines proxy war as the international conflict between two
countries in a third country15. In more details, Andrew Mumford defines proxy
war to be a way of conflict where State A uses proxies in indirect engagements
through secret destructive operations against the State B16. Based on these
definitions, the proxy war is understood to be a way of conflict that takes place
indirectly and secretly in another country through the use of proxies where
states do not fight directly. Historically, proxy war emerged as the product of
the Cold War period as a way of struggle between the US and the Soviets. In
that period, the balance of terror emerged by the mutual destructiveness of
nuclear powers between the two superpowers prevented direct conflict and
caused proxy wars.
On the other hand, the concept of proxy war is getting popular as a way of
conflict within the struggle between countries in the 21st century. Today, proxy
wars take place as an expression of conflicts of interests between countries. It
mainly emerges in countries with escalating civil war after Cold War. Particularly
the change of balance of power and power distributions in the international
system particularly after the Cold War is the principal systemic dynamic that
reveals the fact of proxy war again. Relative weakening trend of the US, the rise
of China, a superpower candidate, and the conflicting interests of Russia and
the US make the proxy war popular. The main hypothesis of Robert Gilpin in
his War and Change book which asserts that the change of international system
will take place through great wars17 is paraphrased towards the argument that
this change will be over the proxy wars. In this sense, it is understood that the
proxy wars play a role that may change the international system.
The new dynamics that create the fact of proxy war:
- Relative weakening of the US
- The Rise of China
- The US-China rivalry
- The Rise of Russia under the leadership of Putin and its quest of great
14 a.g.e., p.37.
15 Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013, p.13.
16 Andrew Mumford, “ Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict”, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 158, Issue
2, 2013, pp.40-46, p. 41.
17 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.

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power status in the international system, its conflict based policy with the
US and the conflicting interests
- Conflicting interests between Russia and the US in Ukraine and Syria; and
the transformation of these two countries into the fields of proxy wars
- The increase of geopolitical rivalry in the 21st century global politics
- The increase of conflicting interests in the 21st century global politics
- New style policies particularly in the Middle East
- The Redesigning process of the Middle Eastern geopolitical system after
the ‘Arab Spring’
- The increase of the failed state phenomenon
- The increase of effects and roles of non-state actors in global politics
- The emergence of terrorist organizations as challengers to the state actor
- The cooperation of states with terrorist organizations and their using it in
proxy wars
- The spread of asymmetric wars
- The avoidance of states from direct battles due to developments in the
military technology
- The evaluation of the proxy war method by the states to be a strategic
choice as a way of conflict and as an instrument to realize their foreign
policy objectives.
- The fact the proxy war contains less risks and costs compared to direct
battles
The above-mentioned facts intensify the proxy wars in the 21st century
especially in Africa and the Middle East. The proxy wars are in the trend of
escalation between the US and China in Africa, between Russia-Iran and
the US in the Middle East, between the EU and Russia in Europe (Kosovo,
Ukraine), and between Russia and the US-NATO in Caucasus18. The proxy wars
particularly in the Middle East started in 2003 with the occupation of Iraq in
2003 and spread through the 2011 Arab Spring process19. In the process after
2003, Iraq lost importance as even an actor let alone becoming a no more
regional power. Iraq became a failed state after occupation and turned to be the
field of proxy war between the US and Iran20. During the Arab Spring process,
Libya became a country of civil war and a failed state and it was no more the
power of the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt became a failed state after
18 Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, Çiğdem Tunç, “11 Eylül Sonrası ABD’nin Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde
Orta Asya”, Avrasya Dosyası, Cilt: 9, Sayı: 3, Sonbahar 2003, pp.5-28, p.12.
19 Aaron Reese, Sectarian and Regional Conflict in the Middle East, The Institute for the Study of War,
July 2013, p.9.
20 Thomas Joscelyn, Iran’s Proxy War Against America, The Claremont Institute, 2007.

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the riots during the Arab Spring process and was no more a regional power
particularly after Egypt’s first elected President Mohammed Morsi whom coup
was made. Turkey managed to shine as a rising soft power in the leadership
of Middle East between 2003 and 2010 relatively, but had to withdraw from its
regional leadership policy by going into the swamp of the Syria crisis in 2011.
Even more, after the start of a long civil war in Syria in 2011, the
country turned to be an area of proxy war between great powers and regional
powers21. In this sense, the balance of power in the Middle East changed all
the way. After an increase of influence in Iraq, Iran achieved the position of
regional power and regional leader in the geopolitics of the Middle East22.
This naturally became a factor that deeply affected the balance of power in the
Middle East. The increasing influence of Iran in the region, especially the Shia
crescent turned to be a source of threat for the Gulf countries particularly for
Saudi Arabia23. The changing balances in the Middle East increased the rivalry
between Iran and Saudi Arabia and this rivalry took the shape of proxy war
between the two countries. The fact that the balance of power in the Middle
East turned upside down with the Arab Spring process increased the quest
for a new regional power and particularly the rivalry between Iran and Saudi
Arabia for the leadership in the Middle East. The fact that the rivalry between
the two countries turned to be a proxy war resulted in the emergence of proxy
war balance instead of balance of power system in the Middle East. In other
words, the regional balance of power system in the Middle East was replaced
by the balance of proxy war. As it will be discussed in detail later in this article,
the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia continued in the form of proxy wars
while the failure of both countries to outcompete the other was conceptualized
as the balance of proxy war24.
Iran’s foreign policy
After the Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, it was not only Iran’s foreign policy
changing, but also a new State of Iran emerged. This changed the balance of
power in the Middle East and leaded to the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). This war
turned to be Iraq’s war of prevention of the regime exportation policy of Iran
after the revolution, Iraq being the most powerful even the leader state of the
21 The Syrian Conflict: A systems Conflict Analysis, ARK Group, February 2016, p.14.
22 Tarek Osman, “Iran’s Play for Middle Eastern Leadership”, Foreign Affairs, January 20, 2017,
Erişim tarihi: 28.01.2017,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-01-20/
iran-s-play-middle-eastern-leadership
23 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “The rise of Iran as a regional power: Shia empowerment and its
limits”, NATO Review Magazine, 2016, Erişim tarihi: 05.11.2016, http://www.nato.int/docu/Revi-
ew/2016/Also-in-2016/iran-regional-power-tehran-islamic/EN/index.htm
24 J. Dana Stuster, “The Limits of Iran’s Regional Ambitions”, National Security Network, Policy
Brief, July 9, 2015, p. 1-9, p.6, Erişim tarihi: 14.08.2016,
http://nsnetwork.org/cms/assets/uploads/2015/07/StusterLimitsIransRegionalAmbitions.pdf

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Middle East at that time. Apart from that, the Iran-Iraq war was a war of regional
hegemony. After the revolution, Iran built its foreign policy on the leadership
of Muslims, particularly the Middle East. The regime defined itself as the
defender and protector of all Muslim societies. Iran first began to build the
Shia geopolitics over the Shia population by religious discourse25. It increased
its influence on Shiite people and produced a sectarian-ideology-based
foreign policy that aspires to make those people the strategic instruments of
the propaganda policy of Iran.
Although the Shia population in the world is around 10% of the Muslim
population, the condition in the Middle East provides a critical advantage to
Iran to become a regional leader. The Shia population in Iraq constitutes the
60-65% of the total population, 70% in Bahrain, 35% in Yemen (Zeydi-Zaydis),
35% in Lebanon, 30% in Kuwait, 20% in Qatar, 16% in United Arab Emirates
(UAE), 10-12% in Syria (Nusayris-Alawis) and 15 in Saudi Arabia26. Among
them, the Shia population in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Gulf Countries are within
the influence area of Iran. The Shia geopolitics that Iran intends to create is
called as the Shia Crescent in the Middle East. The Shia Crescent concept was
first coined by King Abdullah of Jordan. The King made a statement in 2004
and said that the Sunni Arab countries were encircled by the Shia Crescent
extending from Iran to Lebanon covering Iraq and Syria27. Similarly, Hosni
Mubarak, the former president of Egypt stated on a TV channel in 2006 that
the Shia population living in the Middle East felt commitment towards Iran
more than the countries they lived in28. Finally, longstanding Saudi foreign
minister Prince Saud bin Faisal made similar corresponding statements with
these two leaders29.
As it can be seen, the policy of Iran to create a Shia Crescent was defined
by the neighbouring Sunni countries as a source of threat and a security
problem30. The main reason of Iran to develop a foreign policy generally over
the Shia people is based upon the idea that it cannot win the support of the
Sunni states in its strategy of regional leadership. On the other hand, religion
25 Heshmatollah Falahat Pisheh, “Shi’ite geopolitics and Iran’s foreign policy”, International Jour-
nal of Economy, Management and Social Sciences, Vol(3), No (5), May, 2014. pp. 278-281, p. 278.
26 Mari Luomi, Sectarian Identities or Geopolitics? The Regional Shia-Sunni Divide in the Middle East, The
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 2008, p.3.
27 Ian Black, “Fear of a Shia full moon”, The Guardian, January 26, 2007, Erişim tarihi: 25.09.2016;
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/26/worlddispatch.ianblack
28 Fadi A. Haddadin, “ The ‘Shia Crescent’ and Middle East Geopolitics”, Foreign Policy Associ-
ation, January 31, 2017, Erişim tarihi: 02.02.2017, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2017/01/31/
shia-crescent-middle-east-geopolitics/
29 Juan Cole, Kenneth Katzman, Karim Sadjadpour, Ray Takeyh, “A Shia Crescent: What Fallout
for the United States?”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 2005, pp. 1-27, p.3.
30 Kayhan Barzegar, “Iran and the Shiite Crescent: Myths and Realities, Journal of World Affairs,
Fall/Winter 2008, Vol. XV, Issue 1, pp. 87-99, p.87.

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was instrumentalized as rhetoric in the foreign policy of Iran. This refers to the
fact that Iran underlines the Shia identity in the regions where Shia people
live and the Muslim identity anywhere. In this sense, Iran intrinsically follows
a pragmatic foreign policy with the ambition of becoming a regional leader31.
Therefore, Iran chose the public diplomacy that takes place from the state
towards the people instead of the classical diplomacy from state to state.
With the public diplomacy policy rested on winning the support of people,
Iran formulated its policy about managing the people32. Thus, Iran developed
its policy of winning the support of the Shiite people first and then becoming
the protector of Muslims over a religious discourse by securing the leadership
in the issue of Palestine33. Likewise, the Iranian President Hatemi launched
the Initiative for Dialogue between Civilizations at the UN in 2001 and tried to
realize its policy of leadership in the Muslim world at a global level.
The increasing influence of Iran after the US occupation of Iraq in 2003
started to get a new momentum with the ‘Arab Spring’ process in 2011. Iran
regarded the Arab Spring as a movement of Islamic awakening and desired to
play the role of leadership of this movement. Iran took the Arab Spring as an
opportunity to overthrow the Sunni governments and tried to make the Shiite
people in Sunni countries rebel. This policy of Iran was perceived as a threat
for the survival by the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Likewise, Saudi
Arabia responded militarily to the campaign of Iran in Bahrain. After that,
Saudi Arabia instead of Iraq became a counter-hegemonic power against Iran
in the Middle East. Thus, the historical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia
escalated after the Arab Spring. Proxy wars took place between these countries
in the Gulf Countries, Iraq, Yemen and Syria.
Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia
Just like Iran, Saudi Arabia also regards itself as the natural leader of the
Muslim world based upon the fact that it consists of two holy cities of Islam,
i.e. Mecca and Medina. Within this framework, Saudi foreign policy was built
on the objective of leadership of the Muslim world particularly including the
security of the regime34. The reason of having the regime security as a main
31 R. K. Ramazani, Independence without Freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy, University of Virginia Press,
Virginia, 2013, p.184.
32 Frederic Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik et. al, Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam
Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, USA, 2009,
p.21.
33 Latife Reda, “Origins of the Islamic Republic’s Strategic Approaches to Power and Regional
Politics: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Khomeini’s Discourse”, Middle East Critique, 25:2,
181-203, 2016, p.182; Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz, “Islam, Models and the Middle
East: The New Balance of Power following the Arab Spring”, Perceptions, Winter 2013, Volume
XVIII, Number 4, pp. 139-170, p.143.
34 Ertan Efegil, “Suudi Arabistan’ın Dış Politikasını Şekillendiren Faktörler”, Ortadoğu Analiz, Cilt
5, Sayı 53, Mayıs 2013, pp. 104-113, p.106.

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foreign policy principle is that the country has a relatively weak internal
structure and that it was historically built as an artificial state. In fact, Saudi
Arabia was built artificially within the framework of the strategic interests of
British Empire and France during the partition process of the Middle Eastern
lands of the Ottoman Empire after the World War I by these two colonist
empires. On the other hand, regime security was regarded as a main foreign
policy instrument as the Shia population of 15% in the country was exploited
by Iran35. In addition, Iran perceived the Wahhabi Saudi authority as a threat
to itself, which was another reason of giving priority to the regime security36.
As a matter of fact, the regimes of both countries mutually regard themselves
as threats.
Therefore, the Saudi authority follows a status quo policy to maintain
the existing balance of power both internally and externally along the axis of
regime security37. In this sense, Saudi foreign policy is based on maintaining
the existing balances. Likewise, Saudi Arabia perceived the change of balances
in the Middle East during the Arab Spring process as threats to itself and to
the regional status quo that it tried to protect38. It did not hesitate to intervene
immediately to the risk of collapse of the regimes of the Gulf countries during
the Arab Spring which it considered as its zone of influence and even as its
own backyard. When Arab Spring spread to Bahrain, it immediately sent troops
to this country. Again, the Saudi authority found the overthrow of the Mubarak
regime in Egypt to be against its interests and provided huge financial support
to the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi government let alone supporting the overthrow of
the post-Mubarak Morsi government by a coup. In addition, it did not stay
silent to the increase of Iran’s influence in Yemen and went into a proxy war
with Iran. Therefore, these moves of Saudi Arabia are because of its foreign
policy to maintain the balance of power system in the Middle East. Thus,
Saudi foreign policy to maintain the status quo and the existing balance of
power system after the Arab Spring caused it to enter into a regional rivalry
with Iran. The balance of power system in the rivalry between Iran and Saudi
Arabia was replaced by the balance of proxy war as no country outcompeted
the other in the proxy wars as yet.
In the final analysis, the Saudi foreign policy was directed to a new
aggressive foreign policy including the military power instruments during
the Arab Spring and the time of the new King Salman, although the country
35 Joost Hiltermann, “A New Sectarian Threat in the Middle East”, International Review of the Red
Cross, Vol. 89, No. 868, December 2007, pp. 795-808, p. 795.
36 Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, Congressional Research Service, 2017, p.1.
37 Benedetta Berti and Yoel Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy on Iran and the Proxy War
in Syria: Toward a New Chapter?”, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, VIII:3, 2014, pp. 25-34, p.25.
38 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “ Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab
Spring”, Stud Ethn Nation, 11: 513-526, p. 513.

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was an oil-based financial power country and traditionally relied upon petro-
dollar diplomacy39. In addition, the status quo foreign policy evolved to a
revisionist foreign policy to become a regional leader with the administration
of King Salman40. Thus, Saudi Arabia exceeded its effect enhancement policy
by holding financial power, which it followed until the Arab Spring, and it
started a quest for the regional hegemony by adding its military power. The
fact that Saudi Arabia entered into a quest for the regional hegemony through
a shift from the status quo policy to revisionist policy in the Middle East is
based on three essential dynamics. First of all, the regional balance of power
system as a regional dynamic was removed with the Arab Spring. Thus, the
fact that the regional powers including Iraq, Egypt and Turkey had to abandon
the leadership quest of survival policy opened a space to Saudi Arabia, which
eliminated its rivals. The second, country based dynamic is the fact that the
Saudi authority regarded the regional hegemony quest of Iran as a threat to
itself and does not want to leave the leadership of the Middle East to Iran.
The third, global-systemic dynamic is the fact that the US left the leadership
in the region to its allies Israel and Saudi Arabia within the framework of its
strategy to shift its power to Asia-Pacific. These factors resulted in the regional
hegemonic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Iran-Saudi Arabia Rivalry
The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia dates back to the pre-Arab Spring
period. Predominantly, the historic foundation of the rivalry between the two
countries is rested upon sectarian differences. The historical ground of the
rivalry between the two countries is the 1979 Iran Islamic Revolution41. In this
context, there was an ideological rivalry between the two countries at the
beginning. A rivalry inherently started between Wahhabi Sunnism and Shia.
The rivalry between the Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and the Shia Iran is based on
the leadership of the Muslim world beyond the regional leadership. Iran acts
on its organic ties with the Shiite people and follows a policy of increasing its
influence over the Shiite people under Sunni administrations by establishing
a patronage relationship and this shifts the relations with Saudi Arabia from
rivalry to conflict42. The fact that the actors within the Shia crescent/triangle
act in line with Iran proves to be a threat for all Sunni states particularly Saudi
Arabia. Yet Iran becomes an effective actor in the politics of the other countries
39 Toby Matthiesen, “ The domestic sources of Saudi foreign policy: Islamists and the state in
the wake of the Arab Uprisings”, Brookings Working Paper, August 2015, p.7.
40 Sandhya Jain, “Saudi Arabia: King Salman Faces the 21st Century”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 39,
Issue 3, 2015, pp. 280-286, p.280.
41 Hani Ahmed Al-Shboul and Mohammad Salim Al-Rawashdeh, “Iran’s Foreign Policy and the
Balance of Power in the Region”, Journal of Politics and Law, Vol. 6, No. 4; 2013, pp. 200-209, p. 200.
42 Jill Ricotta, “ The Arab Shi‘a Nexus: Understanding Iran’s Influence in the Arab World”, The
Washington Quarterly, 39:2 pp. 139–154, p.142.

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due to the relations it has with the Shiite people in the Middle East. Thus,
Iran has the chance to influence and even direct the politics of the countries
with Shiite population in the Middle East. Particularly, Iran, Lebanon and Iraq
shape their politics this way. This makes Iran a regional power by patronizing
the countries of the region and acquires the leadership position. Therefore,
the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry is historically based upon the Sunni-Shia conflict.
On the other hand, the Iran-Saudi rivalry takes place beyond the
sectarian differences. The other dynamics of the rivalry between the two
countries consists of the geopolitical axis. Geopolitically both countries
tended to take the opportunity of the fact that the geopolitics of the countries
in the Middle East was in the process of change again with the Arab Spring
in order to realize their historic assertions of domination in the Gulf43. With
the Arab Spring process, the change of the geopolitics of the Middle East not
only revealed the covert rivalry between the two countries but also moved the
rivalry into a conflict atmosphere in the form of proxy war. The conflict areas
of the Iran-Saudi rivalry where proxy war takes place are Bahrain, Yemen and
Syria. In addition, the rivalry over Egypt looks like to end for now in favour
of Saudi Arabia. Because Egypt was in close relationships with Saudi Arabia
during the Mubarak administration while the collapse of the Mubarak regime
with the Arab Spring caused a loss of position for Saudi Arabia44.
However, the fact that Morsi from the Muslim Brothers supported by
Iran came to power and the subsequent risk of rapprochement with Iran were
considered to be a new source of threat for Saudi Arabia and a development that
destroys the balance of power. Therefore, Saudi Arabia did not only supported
the el-Sisi coup and but also got Egypt aligned with itself by providing huge
amount of economic assistance45. The rivalry on Egypt was gained by Saudi
Arabia as yet. On the other hand, it should be remembered that Iran previously
won in the war with Iraq. Iran won Iraq with the fact that the Shia governments
came to power after the collapse of the Sunni Ba’ath regime in the post-2003
process. This was the reason why Saudi Arabia provided a financial assistance
of 8 billion USD and committed to meet the 5-year petrol demand in order not
to lose Egypt after Iraq46.
On the other hand, Iran took advantage of the riots in the Middle East
that started with the Arab Spring and wanted to break the protection of Saudi
43 Ariel Jahner, “Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf”, Inter-
national Affairs Review, Vol. XX, No.3, Spring 2012, pp. 37-50, p.38.
44 Azzurra Meringolo, “From Morsi to Al-Sisi: Foreign Policy at the Service of Domestic Policy”,
Insight Egypt, N.8, March 2015, pp.1-12, p.3.
45 Karen E. Young, “The Limits of Gulf Arab Aid: Energy Markets and Foreign Policy”, European
Centre for Energy and Resource Security, Vol. 1 07, Summer 2015, pp. 43-53, p.46.
46 “Saudi Arabia announces oil assistance, investments for Egypt”, Ahram Online, Wednes-
day 16 December 2015, Erişim tarihi: 22.12.2016, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsCon-
tent/1/64/173627/Egypt/Politics-/Saudi-Arabia-announces-oil-assistance,-investments.aspx

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Arabia over the Gulf countries while attempting to expand its zone of influence
by urging the Shiite people, that make around 70% of the population of
Bahrain, to upraise against the Sunni authority. However, Saudi Arabia acted
immediately and sent troops to suppress the Shia riot in Bahrain together with
the UAE, its ally in the Gulf. Thus, the policy of Iran to destroy the domination
of Saudi Arabia in the Gulf region failed for now. However, Iran continues to
apply pressure on the oil-rich Gulf countries including Kuwait and Bahrain
over the Shia population. Particularly the disputed islands in the Gulf region
continue to be a source of conflict and element of threat between Iran and the
Gulf countries. Conversely, the Gulf countries advanced their military alliance
relationship with Saudi Arabia and the US, against Iran. In addition to the
threat from Arab Spring, it helps consolidate Saudi influence and helps create
Saudi-led coalition as central power47. Therefore, Gulf region continues to be
the most critical sphere of the power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The control of the Gulf region is the most strategic area of rivalry as it also
refers to the control of oil.
Yemen is another field of rivalry between the two countries. The
Shia Zaidis or Houthis in Yemen, which are around 35% of the population,
constitute the means of Iran in the politics of Yemen. The start of conflict
by the Shia Houthis against the Sunni Hadi government turned the country
into an area of proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia did
not look at the overthrow of the Hadi administration by the Houthis with the
support of Iran and launched an air campaign in 2009 against Yemen first by
declaring the Houthis as terrorist organization. Then, the allies of Saudi Arabia
in Yemen, i.e. Kuwait, the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Qatar and Bahrain
started to provide support to the Yemen operation48. Particularly, Egypt
supported the Yemen operation of Saudi Arabia by 25 fighter jets, the UAE by
30, Kuwait 15 and Qatar 10 warplanes49. Thus, Saudi Arabia managed to create
a multinational power in the Yemen operation. Even Turkey made a statement
of support to the military operation leaded by Saudi Arabia. This was the start
of regional polarization in the Middle East beyond being a field of merely Iran-
Saudi rivalry and a zone of proxy war. Likewise, a Shia block emerged with the
support of Russia, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq for Iran50.
47 Saud Mousaed Al Tamamy, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring:Opportunities and Challen-
ges of Security”, Journal of Arabian Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2012, pp.143-156, p.143.
48 Florence Gaub, “Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Alliance”, European Union Institute for Security
Studies (EUISS), Brief Issue 1, 2016, p.4.
49 “Suudi Arabistan Yemen’de askeri operasyon başlattı”, Ajans23, 26.03.1015, Erişim tarihi:
13.01.2016, http://www.ajans23.com/suudi-arabistan-yemende-askeri-operasyon-baslat-
ti/8518/
50 Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, “Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Rusya’nın Dış
Politikasında Yekın Çevre ve Orta Asya”, Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi/Journal of Turkish World
Studies, XIV/1 (Yaz 2014), p. 155-178, p. 165.

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On the other hand, a kind of Sunni block was emerged with the support
of Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan and even Turkey for
Saudi Arabia in the Yemen case. In addition, the US provided logistics and
intelligence support and stood against Russia that supported Iran. In this
framework, the Iran-Saudi rivalry in the Middle East was not between the two
countries or regional, and it covers the global dimension of a great power
struggle including the US and Russia. On the other hand, neither country
outclassed the other in the proxy wars going on in Yemen nor thus a balance
of proxy war took place. The apparent background of the Iran-Saudi rivalry in
Yemen is the sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia; however, the main
axis of the conflict is the regional power struggle.
Syria is another area of the rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh. During
the Arab Spring process, Syria has been pulled into a long ongoing civil war
since 2011. The civil war in Syria turned to a proxy war between both regional
powers and great powers. While the US and Russia conducts a proxy war in
Syria as great powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the regional powers that
conduct this proxy war51. The relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia started
to deteriorate with the murder of Hariri, the Lebanon Prime Minister, in 2005,
however, the Saudi authority attempted to mend the relations to get Syria
out of the Shia crescent. While Iran supports Assad who is among the Nusayri
population which makes the 12% of the country and which are close to Shia,
Saudi Arabia attempts to get Syria, that is 74% Sunni, out of the Iran axis and
include it within its own zone of influence. However, the balance of power
struggle between the two countries in Syria already turned to a balance of
proxy war as in other regions.
The Regional Dynamic of Rivalry: Arab Spring
The regional dynamics of the Iran-Saudi rivalry consist of the Arab Spring
phenomena that turned the Middle East geopolitics upside down. Arab Spring
did not only collapsed the regimes of the Middle East states but also destructed
the Middle East politics as well as the balance of power in the region. With the
Arab Spring process, Libya, Yemen and Syria were dragged into a civil war and
were no more regional actors. On the other hand, Turkey followed a policy of
regional leadership in the Middle East from 2003 to the Arab Spring process
in 2011, but was dragged into the Syria quagmire and unable to carry out a
regional policy52. Egypt, another power of the region, entered into protection
by Saudi Arabia after the el-Sisi coup. Likewise, Iraq is also under the control
51 Geraint Alun Hughes, “Syria and the perils of proxy warfare”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2014,
Vol. 25, No. 3, 522–538, p.525.
52 Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, “Türkiye’nin Orta Asya politikasına Rusya Federasyonu ve Bölge ül-
kelerinden genel bir bakış”, Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi / Journal of Turkish World Studies, XII/1
(Yaz 2012), s.1-20, s.16.

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of Iran, which leaves only Saudi Arabia, and Iran to conduct a leadership policy
in the Middle East.
The fact that both countries took advantage of the Arab Spring as an
opportunity for regional leadership pursuit and started their quest for a regional
hegemony was the dynamic of this rivalry. Particularly, Iran started to carry out
a policy to include the countries where Sunni regimes collapsed in the Arab
Spring process into its own axis53. Beyond that, Iran framed the Arab Spring
as a movement of Islamic awakening and followed a policy to make the Shia
population in the Gulf countries to riot against Sunni governments54. Saudi
Arabia recognized this intention of Iran in Bahrain and had to use military
power to suppress the Shia riot in the country. Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia
considered the democratization demands during the Arab Spring process to
be a threat against its own regime and the security of the Gulf countries55.
Saudi Arabia had lost an ally like Egypt with Morsi from the Muslim Brothers
coming to power with the Arab Spring process and with the rapprochement
of Egypt with Iran, but it regained the support of Egypt by providing huge
assistance after the el-Sisi coup.
Saudi Arabia acted to ensure the security of the Gulf countries in
particular and tried to strengthen the Gulf Cooperation Council and to increase
its military power56. On the other hand, the Gulf countries wanted closer
relations and more military cooperation with Saudi Arabia against Iran threat
that increased with the Arab Spring. This new cyclical situation created an
opportunity for Saudi Arabia to establish a regional hegemony. Nevertheless,
the Gulf countries had a trend to join in the hegemony of Saudi Arabia by
themselves. Saudi Arabia used this fact to consolidate its already dominant
position in the Gulf region.
Global Dimension of Rivalry: The US’ Changing Middle East Policy
The US primarily started to establish a Middle East policy with the Truman
doctrine in 1951 and determined its strategic interest in the context of
the energy resources of the region, which are unchanged today. With the
Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, which includes military assistance as well as
financial assistance, it started to follow an effective policy in the region. During
this period, the US developed two special relationships in the Middle East
with Saudi Arabia and Israel. Accordingly, the US and Saudi Arabia made
commitments on military and security assistance and oil respectively57.
53 Henner Fürtig, Iran and the Arab Spring: Between Expectations and Disillusion, GIGA German Insti-
tute of Global and Area Studies, No. 241, Nov. 2013, p.9.
54 a.g.e., p.5.
55 Guido Steinberg, Leading the Counter-Revolution Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring, Stiftung Wissens-
chaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2014, Berlin, p.7.
56 Nawaf Obaid, Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine, Belfer Center for Science and International Affa-
irs, John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, May 2014, p.13.
57 Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p.41.

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In other words, the US-Saudi special relationship was established on the
equation of security against oil. In 1960s, Nixon started to implement the
“twin pillar” strategy to supervise the Gulf58. Thus the US started to control the
region through its allies on both sides of the Gulf, i.e. Iran and Saudi Arabia.
However, this policy collapsed with the 1979 Iran Islamic Revolution. Then the
US implemented a dual containment policy for Iran and Iraq in 199359. After
that, the US begun to execute its Middle East policy through Turkey, its NATO
ally, and through Israel and Saudi Arabia which it had special relations with.
Following the September 11 terror attacks in 2001, the US changed its
Middle East policy again and occupied Iraq in 2003 by implementing the pre-
emptive strike strategy within the framework of the Bush doctrine. The US left
its Middle East policy over its allies and started to implement its imperial
project that was directly based on military presence in the region. However,
this policy of the Bush administration failed as it caused the emergence of Iran
as a regional power in addition to pushing Iraq to the zone influence area for
Iran60. During the Obama administration, the foreign policy was reorganized
for the shift of the US power to the Asia-Pacific against China, a superpower
candidate. Accordingly, the Obama administration pulled its military presence
in the region by shifting to the policy of leading from behind61. It could also be
argued that it adopted the strategy of ruling the Middle East through its allies
Israel and Saudi Arabia. In other words, it was stipulated that the gap left by
the US would be filled by Saudi Arabia and Israel.
However, it was soon apparent in a short period of 6 years which was
from 2011 to 2016 that Saudi Arabia was not able to establish a regional
hegemony in the Middle East despite the support of the Gulf countries as well
as the support of the US. Saudi Arabia was neither able to outclass Iran nor
fill the gap left by the US. Yet Saudi Arabia was never a military power with a
capacity to establish a regional hegemony despite its immense financial and
oil power. On the other hand, historically no regional power alone was able
to establish a regional hegemony in the Middle East62. There was always a
multipolar balance of power system throughout the history that dominated
the Middle East politics63. It was evident that Saudi Arabia did not have the
capacity to become regional power or regional leader on its own.
58 Fürtig, Henner, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US
Policy”, The Middle East Journal, Volume 61, Number 4, Autumn 2007, pp. 627-640(14), p. 630.
59 Alex Edwards, Dual Containment” Policy in the Persian Gulf: The USA, Iran, and Iraq, 1991-
2000, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 53.
60 Athına Tzemprın, Jugoslav Jozıć, Henry Lambaré, “The Middle East Cold War: Iran-Saudi Ara-
bia and the Way Ahead”, Croatian Political Science Review, Vol.52 No.4-5 March 2016, p.192.
61 Sanford Lakoff, “Leading from Behind: The “Obama Doctrine” and US Policy in the Middle
East”, Strategic Assessment, Vol. 16, No.1, April 2013, pp. 7-19, p.15.
62 Only exception is the relative hegemony of Egypt in the Middle East between 1950s and 1960s.
63 Lenore G. Martin, “Turkey and the USA in a Bipolarizing Middle East, Journal of Balkan and Near
Eastern Studies, Volume 15, Issue 2: Turkish–US Relations, 2013, p.176.

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Turkey as Balancing Power: Potential Turkish-Saudi Alliance
The rapprochement started with the statement of Turkey to support Saudi Arabia
in its Yemen operation and brought the idea of potential alliance between the
two countries64. It could be argued that a dual regional dominant power and
leadership would be conceivable with the partnership and alliance between
Saudi Arabia with financial and oil power and Turkey with population more
than Iran and with military power. I argued that Iran would be outcompeted
in the Iran-Saudi rivalry with the support of Turkey to Saudi Arabia. However,
the alliance of Turkey and Saudi Arabia against Iran includes the risk of
sharpening the Shia crescent block leaded by Iran and the Sunni block leaded
by Saudi Arabia65. In addition, Turk-Saudi alliance may not last long due to
the leadership claims of both countries66. The leadership of alliance is another
issue to be noted. Therefore, it could be anticipated that this alliance would
be for a short term67. On the other hand, this polarization in the Middle East
contains the risk of pushing the region to a more conflict-based atmosphere.
In return, it is understood that it would be more reasonable for Turkey
to play the role of balancing power in the rivalry between the two countries.
Yet the attempts of both Turkey and Saudi Arabia for their regional hegemonic
policy failed and both countries experienced the fact that they did not have
the capacity to become a regional hegemony on their own. A balancing policy
to be followed by Turkey between the two countries would ensure a balance in
the rivalry between the two countries as well as diminishing the instability in
the region. Thus, the balance of power system in the Middle East may evolve to
a multipolar structure like before and the confrontational rivalry in the region
may enter into a détente period.
Conclusion
The Middle East geopolitics and the regional balance of power were broken
with the occupation of Iraq by the US in 2003. The Arab Spring process not only
broke the geopolitics, realpolitik and balance of power of the Middle East but
also turned the region upside down with regard to socio-cultural, political and
financial aspects. Therefore, a redesigning process started in the Middle East.
64 Gökhan Bacık, “The Iranian Moment and Turkey”, The German Marshall Fund of the United States,
No.125, 2016, pp.1-4, p.3. Erişim tarihi: 01.01.2017, file:///Users/Dr/Downloads/Bacik_Irani-
anMoment_May16.pdf
65 Gallia Lindenstrauss and Yoel Guzansky, “Trying to Square the Circle: Can Saudi Arabia Form
a United Sunni Front?”, INSS Insight, No. 679, March 31, 2015, pp.1-4, p.3.
66 Evangelos Venetis, The Struggle between Turkey & Saudi Arabia for the Leadership of Sunni Islam, The
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, Greece, 2014, p. 4.
67 Jarryd de Haan, “Turkey-Saudi Relations in the Middle East”, Independent Strategic analysis
of Australia’s Global Interests, Future Directions International, 16 June 2015, pp. 1-6, p.3,
Erişim tarihi: 26.12.2016, http://futuredirections.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Turkey-
Saudi_Relations_in_the_Modern_Middle_East.pdf

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Maps were redrawn in the region and they tended to enhance their positions.
In this context, the dynamics of rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia included
the followings: 1. Sectarian differences-leadership of the Muslim world, 2.
Geopolitical change, 3. Security dilemma, 4. Balance of power, 5. Regional
hegemony. Iran and Saudi Arabia were alone together following that Iraq was
no more in the Middle Eastern balance of power system after 2003, that Libya,
Syria, Egypt and even Turkey has lost their regional actor positions since 2011
with the Arab Spring process. Both countries took advantage of this condition
to become a regional hegemony.
Particularly Saudi Arabia with the new King Salman left its traditional
status quo policy and entered into a regional hegemony quest by starting to
follow an aggressive and ambitious foreign policy. Thus, Saudi Arabia added
military power to its foreign policy along its financial power and started to
play the role of leadership of the Muslim world and the Middle East region.
However, Saudi Arabia recognized its limits in the Yemen operation and found
out that its military power is not yet sufficient to become a regional hegemony.
On the other hand, the rivalry between the two countries spread not only to the
proxy war area where military tools are used but also to the energy field. Saudi
Arabia started to have difficulties to maintain its cheap oil policy in its rivalry
with Iran and even had to resort to its foreign exchange reserves. Meanwhile,
the US-Saudi alliance started to weaken in the last periods of the Obama
administration and Iran reached a settlement in nuclear negotiations with
P5+1 along with the US-Iran rapprochement that were all critical elements that
weakened the hand of Saudi Arabia in its rivalry with Iran. The fact that the US
shifted its power to Asia Pacific and left the Middle East to its regional allies
Israel and Saudi Arabia was the driving force behind the regional leadership
policy option by Saudi Arabia. However, it could be argued that the new
dimension of the US-Saudi special relationship that will emerge during the
Trump period will have a decisive role in the regional position of Saudi Arabia.
Furthermore, the rivalry between the two countries appears to have
accelerated the polarization process of the Middle East into Sunni and Shia
blocks. Particularly the rapprochement tendency of Turkey with Saudi Arabia
brought the Turkey-Saudi alliance to the agenda. However, it is anticipated
that the Turkey-Saudi alliance will be for a short term due to the conflicting
interests including the leadership problem and the regional hegemony quests
of both countries. Instead, it is argued that Turkey may play a balancing role
in the rivalry between the two countries, which most probably will moderate
competition and prevent blocking. In the final analysis, the result of the
Iran-Saudi rivalry will shape the geopolitics of the region by determining the
balance of power and regional leadership in the Middle East, particularly in
the Gulf region.

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