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Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning
Abstract
There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people’s predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.
... Memory effects of font size are in most cases absent or tiny. The large discrepancy between JOLs and memory performance with respect to font size has been termed a "metacognitive illusion," and it is a wellestablished phenomenon in the metamemory literature (see the meta-analysis by Chang & Brainerd, 2022;Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Undorf et al., 2018). One may dispute whether it should be termed an illusion when under certain boundary conditions, small memory effects are also observed, but the massive overestimation of the effect in JOLs justifies this term in our opinion. ...
... In the analysis of memory performance, only concreteness and personal significance reached significance (both z > 5.7, both p < 0.001). JOLs, in contrast, were also predicted by font size, t(7,187) = 4.31, p < 0.001, thus replicating the well-established font size metacognitive illusion (Chang & Brainerd, 2022;Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Undorf et al., 2018). 7 Importantly, the font size/group interaction was not significant, t(7,187) = −1.27, ...
... Similar effect sizes of font size in the incentivized and the control condition in the absence of a corresponding memory effect underlines the stability of this illusion. In our view, this is a strong additional argument against an interpretation that would attribute the font size effect on JOLs as an expression of demand characteristics induced by the experimental setup (see Undorf et al., 2018). ...
The accuracy of metacognitive judgments is rarely incentivized in experiments; hence, it depends on the participants' willingness to invest cognitive resources and respond truthfully. According to arguments promoted in economic research that performance cannot reach its full potential without proper motivation, metacognitive abilities might therefore have been underestimated. In two experiments ( N = 128 and N = 129), we explored the impact of incentives on the accuracy of judgments of learning (JOLs), memory performance, and cue use in free recall of word lists. We introduced a payoff scheme with 5 cents maximum per judgment to promote the accuracy of predicting recall success while simultaneously discouraging strategic responding in the memory test. Incentivizing JOLs had no effect on memory performance. Metacognitive accuracy in terms of resolution (Kruskal's Gamma) was slightly improved in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2. On the more negative side, the incentives boosted JOLs indiscriminately, producing substantial overconfidence. A deeper analysis including cues like word concreteness, imagery, arousal, frequency, subjective relevance, and font size showed the usual and simultaneous cue effects on JOLs. However, cue effects were largely unaffected in size by incentivizing JOLs. In summary, incentives for accuracy do not improve the resolution of JOLs to an extent that outweighs the large inflation of overconfidence. Based on the current results, one cannot recommend the future use of incentivized studies in the field of metamemory.
... However, although positive USs are positive and negative USs are negative on average, there is still substantial variation in how positive or negative a particular US is to the individual participant, and this variation in the USs' extremity has been shown to relate to the size of the EC effect in previous research . JOL research has shown that people judge emotional content as more memorable than non-emotional content (e.g., Hourihan et al., 2017;Undorf et al., 2018;Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). We also observed this effect in Experiment 1, although it was significant only for positive US. ...
... With subjective US extremity, subjective CS-US fit, and subjective ease of processing, our experiments identified multiple cues that people rely on when making JOLs in an EC paradigm. However, because each experiment was devoted to one cue only, we cannot know whether people base their JOLs on all three cues when manipulated simultaneously (Undorf et al., 2018). Moreover, JOLs might be based only on a unified feeling of fluency which is fed by US extremity, subjective CS-US fit, and subjective ease of processing (Undorf & Bröder, 2020). ...
... Especially for fit and fluency, there is a considerable amount of research showing that these two cues are related (e.g., Winkielman et al., 2012). At the same time, previous JOL research found that people base their JOLs on multiple cues (Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Bröder, 2020), suggesting that this could happen as well in an EC context. Nevertheless, cue integration in JOLs made in an EC paradigm should be investigated systematically in future studies. ...
Evaluative Conditioning (EC), the change in liking towards a neutral stimulus due to its pairing with a positive/negative unconditioned stimulus, is a central effect in attitude formation. Current research emphasizes the role of explicit memory in EC. However, human memory is no passive information-storage device, but people actively monitor and control their own memory processes. In the present research, we examined whether people can monitor their memory processes in attitude formation via EC and let participants predict whether they will remember the stimulus pairings in the future (judgments of learning, JOLs). In seven preregistered experiments, judgments of learning predicted actual memory of stimulus pairings above chance, showing that people can indeed monitor their memory in EC. Higher JOLs were also associated with stronger EC effects. Surprisingly, actual memory explained this effect only to a small degree. Following a Brunswikian perspective, we identified several variables contributing to the correlation between JOLs and the EC effect, such as the extremity of the unconditioned stimuli, the fit between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli, and the feeling of processing ease, which all correlated with higher JOLs and stronger EC effects. Further experiments showed the robustness of these effects across different boundary conditions, such as whether judgments and memory tests target the valence or the identity of the stimuli. Our results attest to the role of metamemory in attitude formation via EC, whereby expecting that one will remember a stimulus predicts actual memory but also the size of the EC effect over and above actual memory. By integrating two previously unrelated research areas, our studies provide important theoretical insights into both attitude formation and metamemory.
... Moreover, JOLs showed moderate relative accuracy, suggesting that reliance on valid probabilistic cues is an important factor for relative accuracy. Similarly, studies with verbal materials found that JOLs are based on multiple cues most of which have predictive validity and are moderate in their relative accuracy (e.g., Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Koriat, 1997;Undorf et al., 2018). ...
... As expected, both JOLs and MJs monotonically increased with increasing scene memorability. This again indicated that the cue basis of the two metamemory judgements is similar and suggested that several cues diagnostic of memorability underlie each type of metamemory judgement (for evidence that multiple cues are integrated in JOLs for scene pictures and for verbal materials, see, for example, Undorf & Bröder, 2021;Undorf et al., 2018). Importantly, MJs increased more strongly with scene memorability in the JOLs-first than in the MJs-first condition, indicating that MJs become more sensitive to scene memorability effects after a JOL task. ...
... For instance, previous studies have found that processing fluency as indicated by short self-paced study times is used as a cue for other's memory predictions only after learners had made JOLs for their own memory (Koriat & Ackerman, 2010;Undorf & Erdfelder, 2011). Therefore, from a cue-weighting perspective (Undorf et al., 2018), it may be that completing a learning phase with JOLs fosters the use of valid cues for MJs. These valid cues might include mnemonic cues such as the ease of encoding (Begg et al., 1989;Chandler, 1994;Hertzog et al., 2003) or perceiving pictures (Besken, 2016;Fei-Fei et al., 2007;Undorf et al., 2017) and intrinsic cues such as emotionality and concreteness (Undorf & Bröder, 2020). ...
There are conflicting findings regarding the accuracy of metamemory for scene pictures. Judgements of stimulus memorability in general (memorability judgements [MJs]) have been reported to be unpredictive of actual image memorability. However, other studies have found that judgements of learning (JOLs)—predictions of one’s own later memory performance for recently studied items—are moderately predictive of people’s own actual recognition memory for pictures. The current study directly compared the relative accuracy and cue basis of JOLs and MJs for scene pictures. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants completed an MJ task and a JOL task in counterbalanced order. In the MJ task, they judged the general memorability of each picture. In the JOL task, they studied pictures and made JOLs during a learning phase, followed by a recognition memory test. Results showed that MJs were predictive of general scene memorability and relied on the same cues as JOLs, but MJ accuracy considerably improved after the JOL task. Experiment 3 demonstrated that prior learning experiences drove this increase in MJ accuracy. This work demonstrates that people can predict not only their own future memory performance for scene pictures with moderate accuracy but also the general memorability of scene pictures. In addition, experiences with one’s own learning and memory support the ability to assess scene memorability in general. This research contributes to our understanding of the basis and accuracy of different metamemory judgements.
... Although most of the early work on the font size effect on JOLs and memory has mainly studied font size in isolation, recent work has looked at the degree to which participants integrate multiple cues when engaging in metamemory processes (Fan et al., 2021). To illustrate, it has been shown that people integrate font size with item relatedness (Price & Harrison, 2017;Rhodes & Castel, 2008), item value as manipulated through pairing word items with arbitrary numbers indicating their relative importance , with font style (Price et al., 2016), as well as with the number of study presentations (Kornell et al., 2011;Undorf et al., 2018) to inform their JOLs. Moreover, it has been shown that font size, number of study presentations, concreteness, and emotionality affect JOLs not only at the aggregate level, but also at the individual level (Undorf et al., 2018). ...
... To illustrate, it has been shown that people integrate font size with item relatedness (Price & Harrison, 2017;Rhodes & Castel, 2008), item value as manipulated through pairing word items with arbitrary numbers indicating their relative importance , with font style (Price et al., 2016), as well as with the number of study presentations (Kornell et al., 2011;Undorf et al., 2018) to inform their JOLs. Moreover, it has been shown that font size, number of study presentations, concreteness, and emotionality affect JOLs not only at the aggregate level, but also at the individual level (Undorf et al., 2018). Together, the studies reveal that the degree to which font size informs JOLs and memory is conditional and depends on the other cues present at encoding. ...
... Specifically, found that the magnitude of the effect of value was significantly greater than that of the font size, as high-value words were better recalled than low-value words, regardless of their perceptual fluency, and participants' metacognitive judgments mapped onto their performance. The present work aims to replicate and extend the prior work by Undorf et al. (2018) on the effect of emotional valence and font size on metacognition and recall performance. Such manipulation could provide novel insights into the theoretical framework that underlies cue-weighting (see Bröder & Undorf, 2019), such that people may differentially weigh and utilise cues available at encoding when one cue is known to have a greater impact on both metacognitive predictions and actual memory. ...
... In most meta-reasoning studies, as demonstrated above, as well as in most metamemory research (e.g., word pairs: Koriat, 1997;Undorf et al. 2018; knowledge questions: , the tasks have been verbal. The present study examined how iJOS integrates two clearly distinctive information sources while comparing a non-verbal task, Raven's matrices, to a verbal task, Compound Remote Associates (CRA; Bowden & Beeman, 1998, Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003. ...
... We examined whether one set of processes (top-down or bottom-up) dominates the other when people have access to both sources of information while making a quick iJOS. Such integration of different sources of information has been recently studied in memorization tasks (see Undorf et al., 2018), but has not yet been systematically examined in metareasoning contexts. ...
... Some researchers argue that people's cognitive resources are too limited to handle more than one cue at a time (Todd et al., 2012). There is evidence from memorization tasks that adults do integrate multiple heuristic cues when they judge their learning (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001;Koriat et al., 2006;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Bröder, 2020). Nevertheless, it is possible that under time constraints, as required for judging solvability based on a brief glance, they may rely on only one kind of cue (see Pachur & Bröder, 2013, for a review). ...
Initial Judgment of Solvability (iJOS) is a metacognitive judgment that reflects solvers’ first impression as to whether a problem is solvable. We hypothesized that iJOS is inferred by combining prior expectations about the entire task with heuristic cues derived from each problem’s elements. In two experiments participants first provided quick iJOSs for all problems, then attempted to solve them. We manipulated expectations by changing the proportion of solvable problems conveyed to participants, 33%, 50%, or 66%, while the true proportion was the 50% for all. In Experiment 1 we used the non-verbal Raven’s matrices and examined nameability as the element-based heuristic cue. Unsolvable matrices were generated by switching locations of elements in original Raven’s matrices. In Experiment 2 we used the verbal Compound Remote Associate (CRA) problems and examined word's frequency in the language as the element-based heuristic cue. Unsolvable CRAs were random word triads from the same word pool. The results were consistent in suggesting that quick iJOS integrates prior expectations and experience-based heuristic cues. Notably, iJOS was predictive for the subsequent solving attempt only for Raven's matrices.
... This is the case even though success is often unaffected by font size (Rhodes & Castel, 2008). When a larger font size does increase success, it was found to disproportionately inflate judgments of learning (e.g., Halamish, 2018;Undorf et al., 2018). The BEVoCI method allows us to expose such biases and compare them statistically across conditions. ...
... Previous studies have documented extensive integration of 4-5 cues for meta-memory judgments, with all cues varying across items within participants (Undorf & Bröder, 2021;Undorf et al., 2018). Notably, in those studies Brunswik's lens models were used to assess the overall validity of judgments based on the combined set of cues. ...
... The present study joins meta-memory studies (Undorf & Bröder, 2021;Undorf et al., 2018) in demonstrating that people can integrate multiple cues at the same time. In particular, in the present study confidence reflected the effects of between two and four cues at the same time. ...
Solving problems in educational settings, as in daily-life scenarios, involves constantly assessing one’s own confidence in each considered solution. Metacognitive research has exposed cues that may bias confidence judgments (e.g., familiarity with question terms). Typically, metacognitive research methodologies require examining misleading cues one-by-one, while recent research has revealed the integration of multiple cues stemming from the same stimuli. However, this research leaves open important questions about including the weight balance among cues and their changes across task design (e.g., instructions) and/or population characteristics (e.g., background knowledge). The present study presents the Bird’s-Eye View of Cue Integration (BEVoCI) methodology. It is based on hierarchical multiple regression models, allowing efficient exposure of multiple biases at once, their relative weights, and their malleability across task designs and populations. Notably, the BEVoCI can be applied both to planned studies and to existing datasets. I demonstrate its application in both ways. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, I introduce two nonverbal problem-solving tasks, the Comparison of Perimeters (CoP) and the novel Missing Tan Task (MTT), while Experiment 3 reanalyzes data collected by others, comprising algebra problems solved by children and adults. The experiments demonstrate exposing biases, their malleability across conditions, and the non-straightforward association between performance improvement and overcoming biases, and the results of Experiment 3 provide strong support for the generalizability of the methodology. Pinpointing sources of bias is essential for guiding educational design efforts.
... McDonough & Gallo, 2012;Mueller et al., 2014;Rhodes & Castel, 2008), words spoken in a louder versus softer voice (Frank & Kuhlmann, 2017;Rhodes & Castel, 2009), and abstract versus concrete words (e.g. Undorf et al., 2018). In terms of emotional stimuli, researchers have examined JOLs for a variety of stimulus types. ...
... Across three experiments, the authors found no evidence that higher JOLs reflect increased physiological arousal, but rather reflect the way that emotional lists are constructed, which makes their distinctive content more salient. In a yet more recent study, Undorf et al. (2018) demonstrated that individuals can utilise multiple cues when making JOLs, including number of study presentations, font size, word concreteness, and emotionality of the items. Consistent with previous studies, the authors found that participants gave higher JOLs to emotional than to neutral items. ...
... Furthermore, the authors suggested that their findings were consistent with those of Hourihan et al. (2017) in that the effects of emotionality on JOLs are cognitive rather than physiological in nature. However, Undorf et al. (2018) did not investigate the types of cognitive mechanisms that underlie JOLs for emotional items, nor did they differentiate between emotional words of different valence (positive versus negative). Tauber et al. (2017) produced findings that are perhaps more relevant to the question of why JOLs are higher for emotional stimuli. ...
Previous research has shown that emotionally-valenced words are given higher judgements of learning (JOLs) than are neutral words. The current study examined potential explanations for this emotional salience effect on JOLs. Experiment 1 replicated the basic emotionality/JOL effect. In Experiments 2A and 2B, we used pre-study JOLs and assessed memory beliefs qualitatively, finding that, on average, participants believed that positive and negative words were more memorable than neutral words. Experiment 3 utilised a lexical decision task, resulting in lower reaction times (RTs) for positive words than for neutral words, but equivalent RTs for negative and neutral words, suggesting that processing fluency may partially account for higher JOLs for positive words, but not for negative words. Finally, we conducted a series of moderation analyses in Experiment 4 which assessed the relative contributions of fluency and beliefs to JOLs by measuring both factors in the same participants, showing that RTs made no significant contribution to JOLs for either positive or negative words. Our findings suggest that although positive words may be more fluently processed than neutral words, memory beliefs are the primary factor underlying higher JOLs for both positive and negative words.
... Because extrinsic cues usually have weaker influences on JOLs (Koriat, 1997), it is reasonable to expect that the effects of font size on JOLs, which are not modified by pair relatedness (an intrinsic cue), would also not be modified by list relatedness (an extrinsic cue). Additionally, the cueintegration framework (Peynircioğlu & Tatz, 2019;Undorf & Bröder, 2020;Undorf et al., 2018) also predicts that the font size effect will persist under conditions of list relatedness. According to this account, people simultaneously process and integrate multiple cues when making JOLs, and hence, JOLs are sensitive to multiple cues if these cues affect JOLs when manipulated in isolation. ...
... According to this account, people simultaneously process and integrate multiple cues when making JOLs, and hence, JOLs are sensitive to multiple cues if these cues affect JOLs when manipulated in isolation. In support of this prediction, prior studies have shown that the effect of font size remains robust when other, more diagnostic, cues (e.g., word frequency, word concreteness, pair relatedness) are provided along with font size (Fan et al., 2021;Price & Harrison, 2017;Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Undorf et al., 2018). ...
... Specifically, the availability of a relational cue (list relatedness) reduced the effects of an item-specific cue (font size). This has important implications for the cue-integration framework of JOLs (Peynircioğlu & Tatz, 2019;Undorf & Bröder, 2020;Undorf et al., 2018). To recap, this account predicts that people can integrate multiple cues when making JOLs, and thus JOLs should reflect the effects of multiple cues simultaneously if those cues affect JOLs when manipulated in isolation. ...
The font size effect refers to the metacognitive illusion that larger fonts lead to higher judgments of learning (JOLs) but not better recall. Prior studies demonstrated robust JOL effects of font size under conditions of intra-item relation (i.e., cue–target relatedness within a word pair), even though intra-item relation is a more diagnostic cue than font size. However, it remains an open question whether the JOL effects of font size persist under conditions of inter-item relation (i.e., relations across items on a single-word list). In the current study, we examined the JOL and recall effects of font size when font size and inter-item relation were factorially manipulated in three JOL-recall experiments. Additionally, to manipulate the salience of inter-item relation, we presented related and unrelated lists in a blocked manner in Experiment 1 but in a mixed manner in Experiments 2 and 3. Our results showed that the JOL effects of font size are moderated or eliminated when inter-item relation is manipulated simultaneously with font size. Moreover, the smaller font led to better recall for related lists but not for unrelated lists across all three experiments. Therefore, our results demonstrate that individual cues may not be integrated with equal weight, and there can be a trade-off between item-specific and relational processing during the JOL process. Additionally, highlighting key information with larger fonts may not be optimal with related items.
... However, Rhodes (2016) contended that focusing on a single cue might not be sufficient to explain how individuals make their memory predictions in real life and that real-life decisions usually require them to consider more than one cue to assess their subsequent memory performance. However, the investigation of multiple cue use in metacognitive memory predictions produced mixed evidence (for a review, see Undorf et al., 2018). Some studies find that participants use all cues presented to them to the same extent (Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Jang & Nelson, 2005;Mueller et al., 2014;Price & Harrison, 2017;Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Undorf & Bröder, 2020Undorf et al., 2018), whereas other research shows that certain cues override others (Besken, 2016;Susser & Mulligan, 2015;Tatz & Peynircioglu, 2020;Undorf & Erdfelder, 2013). ...
... However, the investigation of multiple cue use in metacognitive memory predictions produced mixed evidence (for a review, see Undorf et al., 2018). Some studies find that participants use all cues presented to them to the same extent (Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Jang & Nelson, 2005;Mueller et al., 2014;Price & Harrison, 2017;Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Undorf & Bröder, 2020Undorf et al., 2018), whereas other research shows that certain cues override others (Besken, 2016;Susser & Mulligan, 2015;Tatz & Peynircioglu, 2020;Undorf & Erdfelder, 2013). ...
... Even though perceptual disfluency manipulations for single-word materials typically lower memory predictions, they affect actual memory performance in different manners, depending on the type of manipulation used. Specific perceptual fluency manipulations such as font size do not affect actual memory (Mueller et al., 2014;Rhodes & Castel, 2008 or produce a very small advantage for large over small fonts (Halamish, 2018;Mendes & Undorf, 2021;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Zimdahl, 2019). Other disfluency manipulations, such as perceptual interference and auditory generation, produce higher memory performance for the disfluent condition . ...
The current study investigated the joint contribution of visual and auditory disfluencies, or distortions, to actual and predicted memory performance with naturalistic, multi-modal materials through three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants watched food recipe clips containing visual and auditory information that were either fully intact or else distorted in one or both of the two modalities. They were asked to remember these for a later memory test and made memory predictions after each clip. Participants produced lower memory predictions for distorted auditory and visual information than intact ones. However, these perceptual distortions revealed no actual memory differences across encoding conditions, expanding the metacognitive illusion of perceptual disfluency for static, single-word materials to naturalistic, dynamic, multi-modal materials. Experiment 3 provided naïve participants with a hypothetical scenario about the experimental paradigm used in Experiment 1, revealing lower memory predictions for distorted than intact information in both modalities. Theoretically, these results imply that both in-the-moment experiences and a priori beliefs may contribute to the perceptual disfluency illusion. From an applied perspective, the study suggests that when audio-visual distortions occur, individuals might use this information to predict their memory performance, even when it does not factor into actual memory performance.
... Moreover, the font size effect proved robust even when participants were given warnings about the nature of the illusion or with the availability of more effective memory cues such as semantic relations between words. Subsequently, the font size effect has been replicated in numerous experiments (e.g., Blake & Castel, 2018;Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Hu et al., 2015;Kornell et al., 2011;Luna, Nogueira, & Albuquerque, 2019b;Mcdonough & Gallo, 2012;Mueller et al., 2014;Price & Harrison, 2017;Su et al., 2018;Susser et al., 2013;Tatz & Peynircioğlu, 2020;Tatz et al., 2020;Undorf et al., 2018). ...
... Three effect sizes from Undorf et al. (2018;Experiment 4), Double (2019; Experiment 3, no-JOL condition), and Tatz and Peynircioğlu (2020; Experiment 4) were identified as influential outliers and were excluded from the meta-analysis of memory performance. As shown in Fig. 5, this meta-analysis indicated that memory for larger-font items was slightly better than for smaller-font items, g = .05, ...
... One possible explanation is that the available cues/strategies increase with stimulus complexity, which may limit people's abilities to process multiple cues simultaneously. This has important implications for the cue integration approach (e.g., Peynircioğlu & Tatz, 2019;Undorf et al., 2018), which posits that multiple cues can be integrated in making metacognitive judgments-namely, certain characteristics of increasing stimulus complexity, such as richer relational information, may divert people from incorporating surface cues such as font size into metacognitive judgments. Here, there is a missing type of stimulus that would provide incisive information-namely, related word lists. ...
The font size effect is a metamemory illusion in which larger-font items produce higher judgments of learning (JOLs) but not better memory, relative to smaller-font items. We conducted meta-analyses to determine what is currently known about how font size affects JOLs and memory accuracy. In addition, we implemented both univariate and multivariate meta-regressions to isolate the moderators of JOL effects and memory effects. The results revealed a small-to-moderate effect of font size on JOLs. There was also a small but significant effect of font size on memory. This suggests that JOLs and memory accuracy both increase with font size, rather than being completely dissociated. Moreover, JOL-memory dissociation only occurred when font size ranged between very small and intermediate. Our working explanation is that the memory effects of font size are tied to (dis)fluency, but its JOL effects are not. Some boundary conditions were identified for font size effects on both JOLs and memory. Specifically, larger font sizes only reliably increased both JOLs and memory accuracy (a) when font sizes ranged from intermediate to very large, (b) when study materials were unrelated word lists, (c) when JOLs were solicited immediately after encoding, and (d) when study time was relatively brief.
... People are known to base metamemory judgments such as JOLs on commonly shared intrinsic or extrinsic cues pertaining to the stimuli and to the learning conditions (Koriat, 1997; for a review, see Rhodes, 2016). Examples include word frequency, valence, arousal, font size, and the number of study opportunities (e.g., Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018). Such cues can affect JOLs through theory-based and experience-based processes. ...
... As mentioned above, the notion that JOLs are based on probabilistic cues is generally agreed on by metamemory researchers (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009;Koriat, 1997;Rhodes, 2016). For example, in a study by Undorf et al. (2018), study words varied in emotionality, concreteness, font size, and frequency of study presentations. These attributes of the stimuli and the learning conditions may affect the to-be-predicted criterion (memory performance) and may inform people's JOLs. ...
... We do not mean to suggest, however, that participants used each of these characteristics when making JOLs. Based on prior research, it is plausible that valence, arousal, concreteness, and word frequency affected JOLs and memory performance, even though not necessarily to the same degree or in the same direction (Fiacconi & Dollois, 2020;Hourihan, Fraundorf, & Benjamin, 2017;Mendes & Undorf, 2021;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Bröder, 2020;Witherby & Tauber, 2017). In contrast, there is no reason to expect that JOLs and memory performance depended on the number of letters. ...
Studies of the mind often focus on general effects on cognitive processes, whereas influences of idiosyncratic interactions between participants and items evade experimental control or assessment. For instance, assessments of one's own learning and memory processes—metamemory judgments—are attributed to people's reliance on commonly shared characteristics of study materials (e.g., word frequency) or learning conditions (e.g., number of study opportunities). By contrast, few studies have investigated how idiosyncratic information such as the personal significance of items affects memory and metamemory. We propose that hitherto elusive idiosyncratic influences on metamemory can be measured by the C component of Egon Brunswik's (1952) lens model. In two experiments, we made randomly chosen items personally significant (Experiment 1) or assessed the personal significance of items (Experiment 2). Personal significance increased both metamemory judgments and memory performance. Including personal significance as a predictor in the lens model reduced C, whereas including familiarity from a previous encounter did not. Hence, at least part of the lens model's C parameter captures idiosyncratic influences on metamemory. The C parameter may serve as a useful tool for future research.
... When faced with multiple cues at encoding, if participants show a weak relationship between what they expect to remember and later recall, this metacognitive disconnect could result in the forgetting of valuable information. Rather than incorporating a single cue such as processing fluency or value in their metacognitive monitoring judgments, participants should engage in responsible remembering (see Murphy & Castel, 2020, 2021a, 2021b) by simultaneously incorporating multiple cues but also differentially weighting these cues (i.e., cue-weighting, see Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Koriat, 1997;Undorf & Bröder, 2020;Undorf et al., 2018). Specifically, responsible remembering mechanisms may allow for the strategic encoding of important information to maximize memory utility and avoid forgetting valuable information, despite variation in encoding or perceptual processing fluency. ...
... Accordingly, the present experiments allowed us to examine the influence of both value and perceptual processing fluency on metacognitive monitoring and later remembering, providing insight regarding the notion of cue-weighting, whereby multiple cues are considered when forming JOLs (Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Koriat, 1997;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Bröder, 2020), as well as theoretical frameworks suggesting that fluency can guide JOLs, despite value influencing recall. Specifically, participants may override perceptual processing fluency as a cue and use value as a stronger indicator of future recall. ...
... Results revealed that increased perceptual processing fluency led to enhanced recall and participants also selectively remembered valuable information at the expense of low-value information, and JOLs mapped onto participants' selectivity (but generally, there were no significant differences in measures of metacognitive accuracy). Thus, the present study is consistent with the idea of cue-weighting (Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Koriat, 1997;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Bröder, 2020) whereby multiple factors inform metacognitive judgments. However, we extend the findings of Soderstrom and McCabe (2011) by indicating that although multiple cues can be used simultaneously to inform JOLs and later remembering, the magnitude of the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic cues on recall can differ and are likely informed by participants' goals. ...
Previous research has indicated that perceptual processing fluency significantly affects metacognitive predictions of performance but not learning outcomes. In the present study, we examined the differential impact of perceptual processing fluency and an item’s value on metacognition and recall. We presented participants with words visually and audibly, with each word paired with a point value counting towards participants’ scores if recalled. The words were either highly perceptually fluent (large font, loud volume) or less perceptually fluent (small font, low volume). Results revealed that both metacognitive monitoring (JOLs) and recall were sensitive to perceptual processing fluency as well as value, but the magnitude of the effect of value was significantly greater than that of font size. Specifically, high-value words were better remembered than low-value words, regardless of fluency, and participants’ judgments mapped onto their selectivity for valuable information. Thus, the current study revealed the differential effects of intrinsic and extrinsic cues on metacognitive monitoring and later remembering such that the cues that can influence monitoring in certain encoding conditions become less impactful when pitted against other intrinsic cues in different encoding conditions.
... In actual learning environments, people have several cues available that could be used as a basis for their monitoring judgments. Even so, researchers have primarily investigated how monitoring judgments are influenced by single cues, manipulated in isolation (for exceptions, see Undorf & Bröder, 2020;Undorf et al., 2018). Thus, a current goal for theory is to understand how people integrate cues when making judgments of learning (JOLs; Rhodes, 2016). ...
... Participants provided higher JOLs for emotional relative to neutral words, and their JOLs for positive and negative words did not differ. This emotional salience effect on JOLs has been consistently replicated using a variety of stimuli (e.g., Hourihan, 2020;Hourihan & Bursey, 2017;Tauber et al., 2017;Undorf et al., 2018;Witherby & Tauber, 2018;Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010; for a review, see Witherby, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2021). Valence may impact JOLs due to participants' beliefs (i.e., the belief that emotional information is more memorable compared to neutral information), experiences during learning (i.e., emotional information is processed more fluently compared to neutral information), or both (Witherby, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2021). ...
... The present outcomes are also important for understanding how people integrate multiple cues when monitoring their learning, which is important because people often have multiple cues available when learning in applied contexts. Recently, Undorf et al. (2018) found that participants integrated four cues (concreteness, valence, font size, and number of study presentations) when making JOLs (cf. Undorf & Bröder, 2020). ...
Contemporary theories of metacognitive monitoring propose that beliefs play a critical role in monitoring of learning. Even so, recent evidence suggests that beliefs are not always sufficient to impact people's monitoring. In seven experiments, we explored people's beliefs about the impact of mood and item valence on memory and whether people use their beliefs about these cues when monitoring their learning. Participants expressed mood-congruent beliefs (Experiments 1, 6, and 7). That is, they believed people in a negative mood would remember more negative items than positive and neutral items. To evaluate whether they use this belief when monitoring their learning, participants studied emotional (positive and negative) and neutral pictures (Experiments 2 and 3) or words (Experiments 4, 5, and 7), made a judgment of learning (JOL) for each, and completed a free-recall test. In Experiments 2-5, participants completed the learning task while in a negative or neutral mood. The negative mood was induced with an established mood induction procedure. In contrast to the belief-based hypothesis, participants did not make mood-congruent JOLs; JOLs were not influenced by mood. By contrast, JOLs were consistently higher for emotional relative to neutral items. Thus, although participants demonstrated a mood-congruent belief, they did not use this belief when monitoring their learning. These outcomes demonstrate that simply having a belief about a person-centered cue (e.g., a belief about the impact of a person's mood on memory) is not sufficient for that belief to impact monitoring of learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
... However, in natural learning situations, learners frequently encounter multiple cues rather than a single cue. When dealing with multiple cues in making JOLs, people might give different weight to different cues [15]. Will participants engage in the analytic process in which they retrieve a specific belief about how one certain cue influences memory to make JOLs in circumstance of multiple cues? ...
... By comparison, the question about whether and how multiple cues combine to affect metacognitive judgments has received less attention [16]. Undorf and colleagues [15] are arround the first to explore whether multiple cues jointly affect JOLs. They systematically investigated whether participants integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. ...
... An individual-level analysis focusing on cue utilization was conducted [15]. Participants were coded as reliably basing JOLs on font size if their JOLs were higher for large words than for small ones. ...
Previous studies found that metamemory beliefs dominate the font size effect on judgments of learning (JOLs). However, few studies have investigated whether beliefs about font size contribute to the font size effect in circumstances of multiple cues. The current study aims to fill this gap. Experiment 1 adopted a 2 (font size: 70 pt vs. 9 pt) * 2 (word frequency (WF): high vs. low) within-subjects design. The results showed that beliefs about font size did not mediate the font size effect on JOLs when multiple cues (font size and WF) were simultaneously provided. Experiment 2 further explored whether WF moderates the contribution of beliefs about font size to the font size effect, in which a 2 (font size: 70 pt vs. 9 pt, as a within-subjects factor) * 2 (WF: high vs. low, as a between-subjects factor) mixed design was used. The results showed that the contribution of beliefs about font size to the font size effect was present in a pure list of low-frequency words, but absent in a pure list of high-frequency words. Lastly, a meta-analysis showed evidence supporting the proposal that the contribution of beliefs about font size to the font size effect on JOLs is moderated by WF. Even though numerous studies suggested beliefs about font size play a dominant role in the font size effect on JOLs, the current study provides new evidence suggesting that such contribution is conditional. Theoretical implications are discussed.
... It is important to note that the cues measured in the study do not encompass all cues that a person can use, and that a person can use multiple cues to make their judgments (Morris, 1990;Undorf et al., 2018). We focused on cues that past literature suggested might change with summary modality, but we acknowledge that other cues, such as familiarity or interest in the topic, may play an important role in prediction magnitude (Koriat, 1997;Thiede et al., 2010). ...
... In addition to showing that summary modality can affect metacomprehension relative accuracy, our study provides the first experimental evidence, to our knowledge, that people use multiple cues when making metacomprehension judgments (see Undorf et al., 2018 for evidence in metamemory). Each of the cues measured (word count, LSA, summary time, latency to begin summaries) were related to predictions of future comprehension performance. ...
... The well-established cues, accessibility of information and the situation model, seemed to both be utilized by participants to approximately the same extent, expanding our knowledge of how these cues are used. Thus, similar to a recent metamemory study (Undorf et al., 2018), we argue that participants use multiple cues in order to make predictions about their comprehension performance, but the cues can vary in validity, and some may be weighted more than others. Most of the cues (LSA was the exception) were valid, as they were significantly related to comprehension performance, but the gamma correlations were fairly low, indicating that there may be other more valid cues that should be used for prediction judgments. ...
Metacomprehension refers to the ability to monitor and control reading comprehension. It is important for individuals to be accurate in their judgments of comprehension, as this can affect academic performance. One type of accuracy, relative accuracy, tends to be low, meaning individuals cannot adequately differentiate well-known from less well-known information. Fortunately, past research has shown that relative accuracy increases with delayed summarization. The literature has only assessed written summaries as an intervention, but oral summaries tend to be faster and easier and therefore may be a better study tool. Individuals use cues to make judgments, which may differ between modalities. This study investigated whether modality impacts relative accuracy and if differences in cue use might explain these effects. We found that written summaries benefitted relative accuracy compared to a control group, with relative accuracy greater than chance. In contrast, oral summarizers only marginally differed from chance accuracy and did not differ from the control group. An analysis of summary characteristics suggests that participants use multiple cues in order to make judgments. We conclude that spoken summaries are likely better than not summarizing at all, but the written modality is the better summary technique to increase relative accuracy. By increasing relative accuracy, delayed written summaries may increase effectiveness of studying, thereby maximizing a student’s academic potential.
... For example, when making a confidence judgment people consider their global beliefs about their capabilities as well as their cumulative performance on the task thus far 3,35,36 . Both confidence judgments and decisions are affected by multiple features www.nature.com/scientificreports/ of the stimulus 36 , and people are able to strategically integrate these sources of evidence 37,38 . However, a wide range of evidence suggests that confidence judgments integrate evidence from multiple sources, including one's experience with similar decisions in the past 36,39 and global beliefs about one's competence 7,38,40 . ...
... Both confidence judgments and decisions are affected by multiple features www.nature.com/scientificreports/ of the stimulus 36 , and people are able to strategically integrate these sources of evidence 37,38 . However, a wide range of evidence suggests that confidence judgments integrate evidence from multiple sources, including one's experience with similar decisions in the past 36,39 and global beliefs about one's competence 7,38,40 . In addition, confidence judgments are independently affected by both decision accuracy and the difficulty of the task, with increasing confidence for correct decisions and decreasing confidence for incorrect decisions as the task becomes easier [41][42][43] . ...
Determining one’s confidence in a decision is a vital part of decision-making. Traditionally, psychological experiments have assessed a person’s confidence by eliciting confidence judgments. The notion that such judgments can be elicited without impacting the accuracy of the decision has recently been challenged by several studies which have shown reactivity effects—either an increase or decrease in decision accuracy when confidence judgments are elicited. Evidence for the direction of reactivity effects has, however, been decidedly mixed. Here, we report three studies designed to specifically make reactivity effects more prominent by eliciting confidence judgment contemporaneously with perceptual decisions. We show that confidence judgments elicited contemporaneously produce an impairment in decision accuracy, this suggests that confidence judgments may rely on a partially distinct set of cues/evidence than the primary perceptual decision and, additionally, challenges the continued use of confidence ratings as an unobtrusive measure of metacognition.
... For example, demonstrated that people remembered high-value information even if presented in a small font, indicating that item value may supersede font size. Thus, when participants have other cues to use as a basis for their JOLs, such as value or the semantic relatedness of a word pair, the font size bias can be reduced (Rhodes & Castel, 2008; but see Undorf et al., 2018, for instances of other cues that do not reduce the font size effect). ...
... Previous research on metamemory and font size has consistently shown an effect of font size on JOLs, but a much smaller or negligible effect of font size on actual memory performance (font size generally has minimal effects on memory; Halamish, 2018;Luna et al., 2018;Murphy & Castel, 2022b;Price et al., 2016;Undorf et al., 2018; for a review, see Chang & Brainerd, 2022 1 ). This discrepancy may reflect the lack of differential processing or cognitive engagement with larger font words compared to smaller font words. ...
People are often presented with large amounts of information to remember, and in many cases, the font size of information may be indicative of its importance (such as headlines or warnings). In the present study, we examined how learners perceive the importance of information in different font sizes and how beliefs about font size influence selective memory. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with to-be-remembered words that were either unrelated or related to a goal (e.g., items for a camping trip) in either small or large font. Participants rated words in large font as more important to remember than words in small font when the words in a list were unrelated but not when the words were schematically related to a goal. In Experiments 2 and 3, we were interested in how learners’ belief that font size is indicative of importance translates to their ability to selectively encode and recall valuable information. Specifically, we presented participants with words in various font sizes, and larger fonts either corresponded to greater point values or smaller point values (values counted towards participants’ scores if recalled). When larger fonts corresponded with greater point values, participants were better able to selectively remember high-value words relative to low-value words. Thus, when to-be-remembered information varies in value, font size may be less diagnostic of an item’s importance (the item’s importance drives memory), and when the value of information is consistent with a learner’s belief, learners can better engage in selective memory.
... In particular, the BEVoCI method allows exposing the differential effects of each cue on the two dependent variables. Recent studies suggest that people integrate four and even five cues in their memory judgments and in confidence in problem solutions (Ackerman forthcoming; Undorf et al. 2018;Undorf and Bröder 2021). The BEVoCI method allows examining whether such multiple cue integration is reflected in originality judgments as well. ...
... Second, in line with previous research with other metacognitive judgments (Ackerman forthcoming; Undorf et al. 2018;Undorf and Bröder 2021), we found cue integration of four cues in originality judgments. The fact that BEVoCI allows to directly compare the predictive role of a quantitative measure of the semantic distance relative to other cues advances metacognitive and creativity research both theoretically and methodologically (Beaty and Johnson 2021;Dumas et al. 2021;Kenett 2019). ...
Is my idea creative? This question directs investing in companies and choosing a research agenda. Following previous research, we focus on the originality of ideas and consider their association with self-assessments of idea generators regarding their own originality. We operationalize the originality score as the frequency (%) of each idea within a sample of participants and originality judgment as the self-assessment of this frequency. Initial evidence suggests that originality scores and originality judgments are produced by separate processes. As a result, originality judgments are prone to biases. So far, heuristic cues that lead to such biases are hardly known. We used methods from computational linguistics to examine the semantic distance as a potential heuristic cue underlying originality judgments. We examined the extent to which the semantic distance would contribute additional explanatory value in predicting originality scores and originality judgments, above and beyond cues known from previous research. In Experiment 1, we re-analyzed previous data that compared originality scores and originality judgments after adding the semantic distance of the generated ideas from the stimuli. We found that the semantic distance contributed to the gap between originality scores and originality judgments. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the examples given in task instructions to prime participants with two levels of idea originality and two levels of semantic distance. We replicated Experiment 1 in finding the semantic distance as a biasing factor for originality judgments. In addition, we found differences among the conditions in the extent of the bias. This study highlights the semantic distance as an unacknowledged metacognitive cue and demonstrates its biasing power for originality judgments.
... Carefully note that herein the relationships of an item with both available schemas-their consistency and inconsistency-are conceptualized as two independent metamemory cues. Recent research showed that people can integrate multiple cues in judgment formation (e.g., Undorf & Bröder, 2020Undorf et al., 2018). In previous experiments on schema-based source monitoring, consistency and inconsistency were confounded such that items were highly consistent with one source and simultaneously inconsistent with the other source. ...
... Taken together, JOLs relied (a) on item-inherent consistency and (b) on the pair-inherent (mis)match of an item with its actual source. Thus, participants integrated multiple metamemory cues in their predictions, as also shown in previous research with different types of cues (e.g., Undorf & Bröder, 2020Undorf et al., 2018). People seem to be unable to ignore an item's source when making a JOL, even though item memory is (often) unaffected by source information. ...
Item memory and source memory are different aspects of episodic remembering. To investigate metamemory differences between them, the authors assessed systematic differences between predictions of item memory via Judgments of Learning (JOLs) and source memory via Judgments of Source (JOSs). Schema-based expectations affect JOLs and JOSs differently: Judgments are higher for expected source-item pairs (e.g., "nightstand in the bedroom") than unexpected pairs (e.g., "bed in the bathroom"), but this expectancy effect is stronger on JOSs than JOLs (Schaper et al., 2019b). The current study tested theoretical underpinnings of this difference. Due to semantic priming, JOLs should be influenced by the consistency between an item and any of the schemas activated at study. JOSs, however, should be influenced by the (in)consistency between an item and its actual source. In three experiments, source-item pairs varied in strength of consistency and inconsistency. Participants provided item-wise JOLs and JOSs. Regardless of an items' actual source, JOLs were higher the more consistent an item was with any of the source schemas, but only if that schema was activated by occurring as a source at study. JOLs were also biased by the actual source: JOLs were lower the more inconsistent an item was with its actual source. By contrast, JOSs were primarily influenced by an item's (in)consistency with its actual source (positively for consistency, negatively for inconsistency). Thus, participants metacognitively differentiated item memory and source memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
... Even if fluency per se is used as a heuristic cue, different contributing factor to the general feeling of fluency can be weighted differently depended on the situation. Previous research has shown that individuals can integrate multiple fluency cues for metacognitive judgments and strategically put more weight on certain fluency cues that they consider diagnostic for the specific situation (e.g., motor fluency; Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf and Bröder, 2020). ...
... We have argued that this positive influence on recognition performance is due to the higher weighting of less salient performance cues that are most noticeable under fluent task conditions. As other researchers (Undorf et al., 2018) have shown, participants seem to be able to strategically put more weight on different cues that influence fluency feelings. If highly salient fluency manipulations are first introduced during the test, these manipulations might have a strong weight in the general experience of fluency, which in these cases would drastically increase false alarm rates. ...
Fluency of processing has shown to influence recognition judgments. Fluency most commonly induces a liberal response bias to judge fluently processed information as well-known because knowledge of a high correlation between the frequency of encounters, memory strength, and thus fluency of processing has been acquired in the past. In this study, we aimed to show that high fluency can increase recognition judgment sensitivity as well if the participants had encountered fluent and non-fluent processing during training. Thirty-three participants have been trained with a 12-element sequence in a serial reaction time task. During training, the response stimulus interval alternated block-wise between constant (fluent) and variable (non-fluent). Participants showed a higher capability of discriminating between old and new test sequences under fluent than under non-fluent test conditions. Furthermore, participants did not show any liberal or conservative bias after they have been trained with alternating fluency.
... Further, dividing attention may limit the impact of explicit metacognitive cues on monitoring judgments more than implicit metacognitive cues. Learners may need to allocate more attentional resources to account for explicit beliefs than implicit fluencies (e.g., Undorf et al., 2018). ...
... Adjusting JOLs away from an anchor requires attentional resources (Epley & Gilovich, 2004). In other words, learners' general beliefs about learning conditions affect how they shift their predictions away from an anchor; utilizing those overarching beliefs to inform item-by-item JOLs may be an effortful process (Undorf et al., 2018). Further, the betweenparticipants design of the current experiments prevents comparisons between the different conditions within each participant. ...
Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505–514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental Review, 35, 64–78, 2015), but the impact of multitasking on metacognitive monitoring and control is less clear. Metacognition may compete with ongoing cognitive processing for mental resources (e.g., Nelson & Narens, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125–141, 1990) and would be impaired by dividing attention; alternatively, metacognition may require little attention (e.g., Boekaerts & Niemivirta, Handbook of Self-Regulation [pp. 417–450], 2000) and would not be impacted by dividing attention. Across three experiments, we assessed the influence of divided attention on metacognition. Participants made item-by-item judgements of learning (JOLs) after studying word pairs under full or divided attention (Experiment 1) and made restudy choices (Experiments 2 & 3). Dividing attention had little impact on the resolution of learners’ metacognitive monitoring, but significantly impaired calibration of monitoring, the relationship between monitoring and control, and the efficacy of metacognitive control. The data suggest that monitoring may require few cognitive resources, but controlling one’s learning (e.g., planning what to restudy and implementing a plan) may demand significant mental resources.
... In the domain of human memory, the focus of this paper, this includes an extensive literature on subjective judgments of memory experience, such as remember-know judgments (Geraci et al., 2009;Umanath et al., 2023;Yonelinas, 2002) and on the notion of mental time travel (Greenspan & Loftus, 2024;Schacter et al., 2017). The research concerning memory and consciousness also includes an extensive literature on metamemory, that is, our awareness of our own mnemonic processes (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009;Efklides, 2011;Koriat, 2024;Umanath et al., 2025;Undorf et al., 2018). These literatures expand every day at a rate faster than any individual person can keep up with, and we applaud this work. ...
The Doctrine of Concordance is the implicit assumption that cognitive processes, behavior, and phenomenological experience are highly correlated (Tulving, 1989). Tulving challenged this assumption, pointing to domains in which conscious experience did not accompany a particular measured cognitive process and to situations in which consciousness did not correlate with the observable behavior. Schwartz (1999) extended this view, asserting that the underlying cognitive processes that produce conscious experience may differ from those that produce observable behavior. Though research on conscious experience blossomed during the last quarter century and progress has been made in moving past the Doctrine of Concordance, we argue that some subdomains within memory research remain hampered by an implicit endorsement of it. We outline two areas of memory research in which current research and interpretations appear to fall prey to the Doctrine today: research on the dual- vs. single-process theory in recognition memory, including work on remember/know judgments, and research on retrospective memory confidence. We then describe four areas of research that show progress in understanding conscious experience by rejecting the Doctrine of Concordance: These are 1) metacognitive disconnects in the science of learning, 2) recognition illusions, 3) déjà vu experiences, and 4) aha experiences. We claim that there is often a dissociation between the mechanisms that create conscious experience and the underlying cognitive processes that contribute to behaviors, which may seem causally correlated with conscious experience. Disentangling the relations between process, behavior, and conscious experience in the human mind’s operation are important to understanding it.
... However, the specific manifestations of these need further study. In recent years, exploring how learners integrate multiple cues for memory monitoring has gradually become a research trend in metamemory, as opposed to examining the effect of a single cue on metamemory [20,48,49]. This trend should be capitalized on to examine how learners integrate different cues associated with encoding types to make JOLs. ...
Previous research has shown a clear self-reference effect in our memory. However, the question arises as to whether this effect could extend to higher cognitive domains such as metamemory. Thus, this study examined the effects of different encoding types on judgments of learning (JOLs) and explored the role of beliefs in this process. A one-way (encoding type: semantic, self-referential) within-participants design was employed in Experiment 1, which found no self-reference effect in JOLs. In Experiment 2, we manipulated participants’ beliefs to explore their effect on JOLs under different encoding strategies. The results showed that learners’ metamemory beliefs about encoding types influence JOLs. Learners who believed that self-referential and semantic encoding had the same memory effect tended to give equal JOLs to both words. However, learners who believed that self-referential encoding had a better memory effect than semantic encoding gave higher JOLs to self-referentially encoded words. The conclusions are as follows: There is no self-reference effect in JOLs, but learners’ metamemory beliefs about encoding types influence JOLs.
... In other domains, some metacognition researchers have postulated that participants may use difference sources of information at different points in time to determine their judgments, based on the kinds of information that are accessible to them at any particular point in time (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001;Undorf et al., 2018). I suspect that this is true for retrospective confidence judgments as well. ...
Retrospective confidence refers to the phenomenological experience of the level of certainty that retrieved information is, in fact, correct. Retrospective confidence judgments are examined across a range of sub-disciplines in psychology from perception to memory research, and in education and legal applications. This paper focuses on retrospective confidence judgments directed at memory. Typically, retrospective confidence judgments are explained by direct-access models. Direct-access models postulate that people have direct access to the strength of the retrieved memory. In contrast, inferential models posit that people use accessible heuristic cues to determine their retrospective confidence judgments. This paper outlines existing models from both the direct-access approach and the inferential approach. I then present the outcomes of studies that support the need to include inferential models in any explanation of retrospective confidence judgments. These heuristics include cue and encoding fluency, retrieval fluency, retrieval of related information, vividness of the retrieval, and self-consistency. I then present an integrative model to account for how retrospective confidence judgments are made.
... Other recent research on people's metacognitive judgments in relation to memory tasks has been influential in shedding further light on the sources of information that people use in addition to processing fluency when making metacognitive judgments. This research has been especially valuable in revealing how people appear to integrate multiple cues that stem from the same stimulus item when making judgments of learning (e.g., Undorf and Bröder 2021;Undorf et al. 2018). In such studies, Brunswik's lens model (e.g., see Kaufmann 2022) has been used to assess the overall validity of confidence judgments based on a combined set of cues. ...
Metareasoning refers to processes that monitor and control ongoing thinking and reasoning. The “metareasoning framework” that was established in the literature in 2017 has been useful in explaining how monitoring processes during reasoning are sensitive to an individual’s fluctuating feelings of certainty and uncertainty. The framework was developed to capture metareasoning at an individual level. It does not capture metareasoning during collaborative activities. We argue this is significant, given the many domains in which team-based reasoning is critical, including design, innovation, process control, defence and security. Currently, there is no conceptual framework that addresses the nature of collaborative metareasoning in these kinds of domains. We advance a framework of collaborative metareasoning that develops an understanding of how teams respond to the demands and opportunities of the task at hand, as well as to the demands and opportunities afforded by interlocuters who have different perspectives, knowledge, skills and experiences. We point to the importance of a tripartite distinction between “self-monitoring”, “other monitoring” and “joint monitoring”. We also highlight a parallel distinction between “self-focused control”, “other-focused control” and “joint control”. In elaborating upon these distinctions, we discuss the prospects for developing a comprehensive collaborative metareasoning framework with a unique focus on language as a measure of both uncertainty and misalignment.
... Mnemonic factors are characteristics of the retrieval context that index learning (e.g., retrieval fluency; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993). Finally, extrinsic factors are characteristics of the encoding conditions that facilitate learning (e.g., study duration; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; imageability of studied items; Undorf et al., 2018). Extrinsic factors are particularly relevant to the present work because witnesses would presumably consider factors such as their quality of view or how much they attended to the vehicle when forecasting identification accuracy. ...
General Audience Summary
In the process of solving crimes, police sometimes present witnesses with objects, such as vehicles, that they suspect were used in the commission of a crime. In the only previously published study of vehicle-identification procedures, witnesses demonstrated a poor ability to discriminate between correctly suspected and incorrectly suspected vehicles (Smith, Mackovichova, et al., 2020). We reasoned that this relatively low discriminability might have been attributable to witnesses attending to other aspects of the crime and away from the getaway vehicle. Accordingly, we evaluated the role of selective attention to the getaway vehicle on the ability of witnesses to discriminate correctly suspected vehicles from incorrectly suspected vehicles. As predicted, witnesses who allocated their attention toward getaway vehicles had relatively high levels of discriminability. In Experiment 1, witnesses who were instructed to attend to the getaway vehicle were better able to discriminate correctly suspected vehicles from incorrectly suspected vehicles than were witnesses who were instructed to attend to the culprit or video (control). In Experiment 2, both self-appraised focus on the getaway vehicle and preidentification confidence distinguished witnesses with relatively high discriminability from witnesses with relatively low discriminability. Finally, suspect-identification accuracy was strongly related to postidentification confidence. These results suggest that when law enforcement personnel follow science-based best-practice recommendations for administering lineups, witnesses might be able to forecast their discriminability on a later vehicle lineup and that police can rely on postidentification confidence for assessing likely identification accuracy.
... The results of Experiment 2 replicated the concreteness effect that has been commonly reported in previous metamemory studies; that is, concrete words produced larger JOLs and better recognition rates than abstract words [52,102]. Consistent with previous studies [103], despite judging abstract words as more difficult than concrete words, participants did not seem to allocate sufficient resources to compensate and achieve the same recognition as concrete words. ...
Nowadays, use of a second language (L2) has taken a central role in daily activities. There are numerous contexts in which people have to process information, acquire new knowledge, or make decisions via a second language. For example, in academia and higher education, English is commonly used as the language of instruction and communication even though English might not be students’ native or first language (L1) and they might not be proficient in it. Such students may face different challenges when studying and learning in L2 relative to contexts in which they study and learn in their L1, and this may affect their metamemory strategies. However, little is yet known about whether metamemory processes undergo significant changes when learning is carried out in L2. The aim of the present study was to investigate the possible consequences on learning derived from studying materials in L2 and, more specifically, to explore whether the interplay between monitoring and control (metamemory processes) changes as a function of the language involved. In three experiments, we explored whether font type (Experiment 1), concreteness (Experiment 2), and relatedness (Experiment 3) affected judgments of learning (JOLs) and memory performance in both L1 and L2. JOLs are considered the result of metacognitive strategies involved in the monitoring of learning and have been reported to vary with the difficulty of the material. The results of this study showed that people were able to monitor their learning in both L1 and L2, even though they judged L2 learning as more difficult than L1. Interestingly, self-perceived difficulty did not hinder learning, and people recognized L2 materials as well or better than L1 materials. We suggest that this might be an example of a desirable difficulty for memory.
... However, if JOLs encourage additional processing of irrelevant cues, particularly at the expense of processing relevant cues, then the cue-processing account proposes that negative reactivity should occur. These accounts are in line with the idea that individuals flexibly attend to and integrate information from multiple cues when making metacognitive judgments (Undorf and Bröder 2020;Undorf et al. 2018). ...
Judgments of learning (JOL) are one of the most commonly used measures of metamemory. There is mixed evidence that eliciting JOLs while participants are studying word pairs influences their subsequent recall, a phenomenon known as reactivity. The majority of studies have found that positive reactivity occurs when word pairs are related. This finding suggests that when the final test is sensitive to the cues used to make a JOL (e.g., pair relatedness), a benefit to recall is observed. Here, in three experiments, JOL reactivity is examined in the presence of a salient, yet non-diagnostic cue—font size. The results show that when study time is limited and font size is made salient, eliciting JOLs impairs future recall. It is argued that JOLs prompt participants to evaluate salient cues in the learning environment to evaluate whether they will affect future recall. This increased processing of salient cues can impair recall if it comes at the expense of processing less salient but more informative cues. These findings suggest that the relevance to the test of the cues processed when JOLs are performed determines the direction of reactivity effects, with both positive and negative reactivity being possible depending on how diagnostic the salient metacognitive cues are for recall.
... Other information might be drawn from past experiences or expectations about the future (see Table 1 for examples). Because of the large number of cues that learners might focus oneven on multiple cues simultaneously (Undorf et al., 2018)-it seems conclusive that some cues are more predictive of future performance than others. Indeed, it was shown that comprehension-based cues, such as the self-judged ability to explain a text, are more predictive of performance than information about the quality of a text itself (Thiede et al., 2010). ...
Metacognitive accuracy is understood as the congruency of subjective evaluation and objectively measured learning performance. With reference to the cue utilisation framework and the embedded-processes model of working memory, we proposed that prompts impact attentional processes during learning. Through guided prompting, learners place their attention on specific information during the learning process. We assumed that the information will be taken into account when comprehension judgments are formed. Subsequently, metacognitive accuracy will be altered. Based on the results of this online study with pre-service biology teachers, we can neither confirm nor reject our main hypothesis and assume small effects of prompting on metacognitive accuracy if there are any. Learning performance and judgment of comprehension were not found to be impacted by the use of resource- and deficit-oriented prompting. Other measurements of self-evaluation (i.e. satisfaction with learning outcome and prediction about prolonged comprehension) were not influenced through prompting. The study provides merely tentative evidence for altered metacognitive accuracy and effects on information processing through prompting. Results are discussed in light of online learning settings in which the effectiveness of prompt implementation might have been restricted compared to a classroom environment. We provide recommendations for the use of prompts in learning settings with the aim to facilitate their effectiveness, so that both resource-oriented and deficit-oriented prompts can contribute to metacognitive skill development if they are applied appropriately.
... The metamemory illusion about font size, first reported by Rhodes and Castel (2008), refers to people predicting a higher possibility of recalling large-than small-font words, but their memory performance has no significant difference between these two fonts. Many studies have replicated this phenomenon (e.g., Blake & Castel, 2018;Hu et al., 2015;Kornell et al., 2011;Luna et al., 2019;McDonough & Gallo, 2012;Mueller et al., 2014;Price & Harrison, 2017;Su et al., 2018;Susser et al., 2013;Tatz & Peynircio glu, 2020;Undorf et al., 2018). However, a few recent studies and meta-analyses have shown that font size also affects memory (Chang & Brainerd, 2022;Halamish, 2018;Luna et al., 2018;2019). ...
The font-size effect on judgments of learning (JOLs) refers to large-font words being rated as more memorable than small ones when required to predict memory performance during the study phase. This study examines perceptual contrast as the prerequisite for this font-size effect on JOLs and explores how perceptual contrast leads to this effect. In Experiment 1, perceptual contrast was achieved by inserting words with one font (e.g., 18 pt) into a series of words with another font (e.g., 70 pt) at a particular proportion (1:4). In Experiment 2, perceptual contrast was manipulated by presenting two different font words up and down in a pair. The results of both experiments showed that: (1) participants rated higher JOLs for large than small fonts under the contrast conditions, but the JOL difference between the two fonts was not significant under the no-contrast conditions; (2) the JOLs of small-font words under the contrast conditions was reduced compared with the no-contrast conditions, but the JOLs of large-font words under the contrast conditions was increased compared with the no-contrast conditions. These results indicated that perceptual contrast was the prerequisite for the font-size effect on JOLs. The reason for this effect is that, compared to no-contrast conditions, perceptual contrast reduces the JOLs of small-font words while increasing the JOLs of large-font words. This study may deepen researchers' understanding of the mechanism of the font-size effect on JOLs and help educators effectively guide students to learn.
... This has been shown for other metacognitive judgments. Undorf et al. (2018), for example, demonstrated that in the presence of multiple cues during the learning phase, people adaptively integrate these cues when making judgments about the chance to recall what they learned. Thus, it may be that people use different cues for inferring TOTs under different circumstances. ...
Tip-of-the-tongue states are subjective experiences that unrecalled target words will be remembered. This study investigates if the visual fluency of familiar faces affects the likelihood of tip-of-the-tongue experiences (TOTs) as well as name recall and name recognition. To manipulate visual fluency, three levels of clarity for 396 celebrity faces were set: high, medium, and low clarity. Four hundred and twenty-nine participants were asked to recall the last names of the celebrities for all clarity levels, and, if they did not recall, to indicate if they experienced a TOT. Following the TOT question, they performed a name recognition test. Results showed that higher-clarity faces resulted in higher TOT rates than lower-clarity faces for unrecalled faces. Name recall was also higher for clearer faces. However, clarity level did not affect the correct answer rate on the name recognition test. These results support the view that perceptual cue-based factors influence TOT experiences.
... In addition, recent research indicates that cue integration, namely, exposing and analyzing multiple cues inherent in the task, has the potential to afford a more thorough understanding of the mechanisms underlying metacognitive appraisals (e.g. Ackerman, 2023;Undorf et al., 2018). We call future research to use our methodology to examine other cues and their potential interactive role in load-related appraisals. ...
It is well established in educational research that metacognitive monitoring of performance assessed by self-reports, for instance, asking students to report their confidence in provided answers, is based on heuristic cues rather than on actual success in the task. Subjective self-reports are also used in educational research on cognitive load, where they refer to the perceived amount of mental effort invested in or difficulty of each task item. In the present study, we examined the potential underlying bases and the predictive value of mental effort and difficulty appraisals compared to confidence appraisals by applying metacognitive concepts and paradigms. In three experiments, participants faced verbal logic problems or one of two non-verbal reasoning tasks. In a between-participants design, each task item was followed by either mental effort, difficulty, or confidence appraisals. We examined the associations between the various appraisals, response time, and success rates. Consistently across all experiments, we found that mental effort and difficulty appraisals were associated more strongly than confidence with response time. Further, while all appraisals were highly predictive of solving success, the strength of this association was stronger for difficulty and confidence appraisals (which were similar) than for mental effort appraisals. We conclude that mental effort and difficulty appraisals are prone to misleading cues like other metacognitive judgments and are based on unique underlying processes. These findings challenge the accepted notion that mental effort appraisals can serve as reliable reflections of cognitive load.
... Numerous studies have demonstrated that emotion is a cue for individuals to make JOLs, meaning that JOLs are influenced by the emotional properties of the memory material (Fairfield et al. 2015;Hourihan and Bursey 2017;Hourihan 2020;Schmoeger et al. 2020;Undorf et al. 2018;West and Mulligan 2021;Witherby and Tauber 2018). The majority of studies that have examined the effect of emotion on JOLs have focused on younger groups and have found that younger adults tend to give higher JOLs to emotional stimuli than to neutral stimuli (Hourihan 2020;Schmoeger et al. 2020). ...
The positivity effect for metacognitive judgments (judgments of learning, JOLs) of emotional words in recognition memory was shown in older adults, in contrast to younger adults, who typically displayed the emotional salience effect. This is compatible with the socioemotional selection theory, which suggests the presence of a positive stimulus bias in older adults’ cognitive processes. This study examined whether the positivity effect and age-related differences could be extended to a picture study to determine whether the positivity effect in older adults is robust in the metacognitive domain. Younger and older adults studied negative, positive, and neutral pictures, followed by JOLs and then a recognition test that asked participants to judge whether the picture was shown in the studying stage or not. Age-related differences were found not only in recognition memory performance for emotional pictures but also in JOLs and their accuracy. Younger adults showed an emotional salience effect for both memory performance and JOLs. Older adults’ JOLs showed a positivity effect, but their actual memory performance was influenced by emotion, and this inconsistency between metacognitive judgments and memory performance is a metacognitive illusion. These findings support the cross-material replicability of a positivity bias in older adults in the metacognitive domain and suggest that we should be cautioned about the detrimental effects of this metacognitive illusion in older adults. It illustrates an age difference in the effect of emotion on individual metacognitive monitoring ability.
... Correct explicit knowledge and beliefs may foster accurate metacognitive judgments. For instance, the belief that dramatic events are remembered better than everyday events may help learners to accurately predict that they will recall emotional stimuli better than neutral stimuli (Undorf et al., 2018;Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010 knowledge about how emotion impacts memory is often incomplete insofar as they are unaware of the fact that memorial benefits of emotional stimuli do not extend to the cued recall of word pairs. Thus, basing JOLs on one's belief about memory for emotional information may contribute to unduly high JOLs for emotional word pairs (Undorf & Bröder, 2020;Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). ...
... Only studies examining the differences in JOLs between emotional (either positive or negative) and neutral stimuli were included. Studies that combined positive and negative stimuli as "emotional materials" and did not separately report the results for positive and negative materials were excluded (e.g., Undorf & Bröder 2020;Undorf et al., 2018). Studies which did not include a neutral (control) condition were excluded (e.g., Kelly & Metcalfe 2011). ...
Emotional information pervades experiences in daily life. Numerous studies have established that emotional materials and information are easier to remember than neutral ones, a phenomenon known as the emotional salience effect on memory. In recent years, an emerging body of research has begun to explore the effect of emotion on metamemory. Preliminary findings show that participants offer higher judgments of learning (JOLs) to emotional than to neutral stimuli, a phenomenon termed the emotional salience effect on JOLs. The present meta-analysis integrated data from 1,887 participants, extracted from 17 qualifying studies, to examine the effects of emotion on JOLs and memory and to explore potential moderators of these effects. The results showed a medium-sized (g = 0.53 [0.41, 0.64]) emotional salience effect on JOLs, which was moderated by age and material type, as well as a small to medium (g = 0.38 [0.25, 0.51) emotional salience effect on memory, which was moderated by test format. These findings establish that emotionality is a salient cue in the theoretical framework of metamemory, and also provide some practical implications (e.g., in eyewitness testimony). However, more research is needed, especially employing high-powered pre-registered experiments, to address the signals of publication bias detected in this meta-analysis.
... However, they can also refer to goal-unrelated cues, which may be less predictive of actual memory. In fact, people integrate multiple cues during metacognitive judgment formation (Koriat, 1997;Undorf et al., 2018). ...
Metacognition plays a role in environment learning (EL). When navigating, we monitor environment information to judge our likelihood to remember our way, and we engage in control by using tools to prevent getting lost. Yet, the relationship between metacognition and EL is understudied. In this paper, we examine the possibility of leveraging metacognition to support EL. However, traditional metacognitive theories and methodologies were not developed with EL in mind. Here, we use traditional metacognitive theories and approaches as a foundation for a new examination of metacognition in EL. We highlight three critical considerations about EL. Namely: (1) EL is a complex process that unfolds sequentially and is thereby enriched with multiple different types of cues, (2) EL is inherently driven by a series of ecologically relevant motivations and constraints, and (3) monitoring and control interact to support EL. In doing so, we describe how task demands and learning motivations inherent to EL should shape how metacognition is explored. With these considerations, we provide three methodological recommendations for investigating metacognition during EL. Specifically, researchers should: (1) instantiate EL goals to impact learning, metacognition, and retrieval processes, (2) prompt learners to make frequent metacognitive judgments and consider metacognitive accuracy as a primary performance metric, and (3) incorporate insights from both transfer appropriate processing and monitoring hypotheses when designing EL assessments. In summary, to effectively investigate how metacognition impacts EL, both ecological and methodological considerations need to be weighed.
... Cue selection, cue weighting, and even cue integration may differ between younger and older adults. Although the integration of multiple cues has been demonstrated for metamemory judgments in younger and older adults (Hines et al., 2015;Undorf et al., 2018), there is minimal evidence for age differences in cue use in metacomprehension (Dunlosky et al., 2006), so this will need to be explored further. ...
This study explored whether age differences in task-specific metacomprehension accuracy are partly explained by age differences in generalized metacomprehension (GM) or the use of GM as a task-specific judgment anchor. GM was measured before and after a summarization and metacomprehension judgment task and then correlated with prediction judgment magnitude to assess anchoring, and correlated with comprehension and task-specific metacomprehension accuracy to assess GM accuracy. Age differences in these relationships were then tested. GM was related to judgment magnitude but despite age differences in GM ratings, age did not moderate anchoring or GM accuracy. Age differences in task-specific metacomprehension accuracy do not seem to be explained by age differences in GM accuracy or its use as a judgment anchor. However, results are the first to show that older adults anchor task-specific metacomprehension judgments on their GM, providing unique evidence for the Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Metacomprehension in advanced age.
... Zhao et al. (2020) found that as the encoding strength increased, the illusion of JOL caused by font size gradually disappeared. Undorf et al. (2018), Undorf and Bröder (2019), and Hertzog et al. (2013) argued that people will integrate multiple cues when making JOL, but there is no guarantee that individuals will use all given cues. That is, the role of some cues may be ignored by the individual or masked by other cues. ...
Do students learn better with texts that are slightly harder-to-read (i.e., disfluent)? Previous research has yielded conflicting findings. The present study identified the boundary condition that determines when disfluent texts benefit learning. We used eye-tracking to examine the joint influence of text legibility (fluent vs. disfluent) and signaling (signaling vs. non-signaling) on multimedia learning. The results revealed that both disfluent text and signaling led to better transfer test performance, and there was also an interaction between them. Specifically, the disfluent text led to better learning outcomes with or without signaling; however, in the fluent text condition, only signaling facilitated learning. Eye movement analyses indicated that signaling guided learners to pay more attention to important content in the learning materials. The current results suggest that signaling can enhance individuals’ perceived fluency or familiarity to the material and guide the attention during multimedia learning, and the positive impact of disfluency on multimedia learning seems to be more stable and ubiquitous. We discuss these under the framework of disfluency effect and attention-guiding effect.
English as a second language (L2) has become the medium of instruction in numerous contexts even though many people may have difficulties to read and study in L2. According to the self-regulated framework, metacognitive strategies are essential to achieve successful learning, but they are resource-consuming and their use might be compromised in demanding contexts such as learning in L2. In Experiment 1, nonbalanced bilinguals read high- and low-cohesion texts in L1 and L2 and self-rated their learning using a judgment of learning (JOL). Then, they answered open-ended questions and responded a customized questionnaire regarding their strategies. In Experiment 2, we introduced two bilingual groups varying in L2 proficiency. Overall, participants could adjust their JOLs and detect the difficulty of the texts correctly in L1 and L2. However, results evidenced some nuances in learning strategies related to L2 proficiency. We discuss these findings within the context of the self-regulated learning.
In healthcare, effective communication in complex situations such as end of life conversations is critical for delivering high quality care. Whether residents learn from communication training with actors depends on whether they are able to select appropriate information or ‘predictive cues’ from that learning situation that accurately reflect their or their peers’ performance and whether they use those cues for ensuing judgement. This study aimed to explore whether prompts can help medical residents improving use of predictive cues and judgement of communication skills. First and third year Kenyan residents (N = 41) from 8 different specialties were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups during a mock OSCE assessing advanced communication skills. Residents in the intervention arm received paper predictive cue prompts while residents in the control arm received paper regular prompts for self-judgement. In a pre- and post- test, residents’ use of predictive cues and the appropriateness of peer-judgements were evaluated against a pre-rated video of another resident. The intervention improved both the use of predictive cues in self-judgement and peer-judgement. Ensuing accuracy of peer-judgements in the pre- to post-test only partly improved: no effect from the intervention was found on overall appropriateness of judgements. However, when analyzing participants’ completeness of judgements over the various themes within the consultation, a reduction in inappropriate judgments scores was seen in the intervention group. In conclusion, predictive cue prompts can help learners to concentrate on relevant cues when evaluating communication skills and partly improve monitoring accuracy. Future research should focus on offering prompts more frequently to evaluate whether this increases the effect on monitoring accuracy in communication skills.
Metamemory judgments, defined as predictions of memory performance, are often influenced by misleading cues, such as fluency. However, how fluency cues compete to influence retrospective metamemory judgments is still unclear. The present study investigated how multiple fluency cues concurrently influence immediate feeling of knowing (FOK) judgments with two fluency manipulations—font size (large vs. small font size) as a perceptual cue and level of processing (deep vs. shallow processing) as a conceptual cue. In Experiment 1, participants studied large or small unrelated word pairs and were either directed to process the conceptual aspects of each word pair (deep) or to focus on the perceptual aspects of the word pairs (shallow). Then participants were presented with a cued recall test and asked to make an FOK judgment. Lastly, participants received a five alternative- forced-choice recognition test. Experiment 2 was similar except the deep condition was replaced with a no-processing (no instruction) condition. Results revealed that perceptual fluency (large font size) influenced FOK judgments only when word pairs were processed in the shallow condition in both experiments compared to no-processing condition. This interaction of multiple cues suggests that, participants rely on information which is easily accessible to them (perceptual fluency) for FOK judgements in presence of certain secondary cues despite those cues being less diagnostic of future memory performance. These new insights inform how people integrate different sources of information in metamemory decisions and have broad implications for settings including academic learning and everyday decision making.
In healthcare, effective communication in complex situations such as end of life conversations is critical for delivering high quality care. Whether future specialists learn from communication training with actors depends on whether they are able to select appropriate information or ‘predictive cues’ from that learning situation that accurately reflect their performance and whether they use those cues for ensuing self-judgement. This study aimed to explore whether cue prompts can help residents focusing on predictive cues and improving monitoring accuracy of their communication skills. First and third year Kenyan residents (N = 41) from 8 different specialties were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups (predictive cue prompt versus control group receiving regular prompts) during a mock OSCE assessing communication skills. The use of predictive cues and the appropriateness of judgements of satisfaction were evaluated against a pre-rated video and compared before and after the intervention and across groups. The intervention improved the use of predictive cues from pre to post test. Ensuing monitoring accuracy only partly improved: no effect from the intervention was found on overall appropriateness of judgements. However, when analyzing participants’ completeness of judgements over the various themes within the consultation, a reduction in inappropriate judgments scores was seen in the intervention group. In conclusion, predictive cue prompts can help learners to concentrate on relevant cues when evaluating their communication skills and partly improve learners’ monitoring accuracy. Future research should focus on offering prompts more frequently to evaluate whether this increases the effect on monitoring accuracy in communication skills.
Humans learn by watching others. One aspect of these observations are our Judgments of Difficulty (JODs) about a task. Research has revealed discrepancies in the judgments we make while performing and observing; these discrepancies are alternatively explained by the Simulation and Theory Models of metacognition. This study tested these models by capitalizing on a behavior that naturally occurs during observation: covert performance. We compared the cues to difficulty used by pure observers and covert performers as they watched an automated system (AS) perform a visual search task. Students used peripheral and central cues to difficulty similarly, regardless of whether they purely observed or covertly performed the task, lending support to the Theory Model of metacognition. The study offers an explanation for peoples’ inflated sense of ability while watching others perform and suggests that providing people with experience – not just observation– is a critical part of correcting these faulty judgments.
In the last decade, there has been increased interest in understanding how individuals monitor their memory for emotionally valenced information. Previous research has suggested that individual differences in remembering emotionally valenced information lead to different cues being used for monitoring. In this study, we examined whether depression level as an individual difference affects the monitoring of memory for emotional valence. The results showed that the high-dysphoria group rated the likelihood of recalling negative words higher than the low-dysphoria group did. In contrast, the low-dysphoria group rated positive words as more likely to be recalled later than neutral and negative words. Thus, depression was more sensitive to negative information during monitoring. This suggests that cognitive bias specific to depression also affects the monitoring of memory. Future research should further investigate the interaction between mood state and emotional valence of items.
Students increasingly control their learning as university instructors shift away from lecture formats, courses are offered online, and the internet offers near infinite resources for student-controlled informal learning. Students typically make effective choices about learning, including what to learn, when to learn, and how to learn, but sometimes make less-than-optimal study choices, including trying to study while multi-tasking. Dividing attention among various tasks impairs both learning and learners' control over their learning because secondary tasks divert cognitive resources away from learning and metacognition. This chapter reviews recent studies explaining how dividing attention affects students' metacognition, including their assessments of their own learning and the study choices that they make. This chapter reviews the fundamentals of metacognition, describes the impact of dividing attention on the effectiveness of learners' metacognition, and provides suggestions about how to enhance the efficacy of metacognition when students' attentional resources are limited.
Predictions of one’s future memory performance – judgments of learning (JOLs) – are based on the cues that learners regard as diagnostic of memory performance. One of these cues is word frequency or how often words are experienced in the language. It is not clear, however, whether word frequency would affect JOLs when other cues are also available. The current study aims to close this gap by testing whether objective and subjective word frequency affect JOLs in the presence of font size as an additional cue. Across three experiments, participants studied words that varied in word frequency (Experiment 1: high and low objective frequency; Experiment 2: a whole continuum from high to low objective frequency; Experiment 3: high and low subjective and objective frequency) and were presented in a large (48pt) or a small (18pt) font size, made JOLs, and completed a free recall test. Results showed that people based their JOLs on both word frequency and font size. We conclude that word frequency is an important cue that affects metamemory even in multiple-cue situations.
A. Koriat's (1997) cue-utilization framework provided a significant advance in understanding how people make judgments of learning (JOLs). A major distinction is made between intrinsic and extrinsic cues. JOLs are predicted to be sensitive to intrinsic cues (e.g., item relatedness) and less sensitive to extrinsic cues (e.g., serial position) because JOLs are comparative across items in a list. The authors evaluated predictions by having people make JOLs after studying either related (poker-flush) or unrelated (dog-spoon) items. Although some outcomes confirmed these predictions, others could not be readily explained by the framework. Namely, relatedness influenced JOLs even when manipulated between participants, primacy effects were evident on JOLs, and the order in which blocks of items were presented (either all related items first or all unrelated items first) influenced JOLs. The authors discuss the framework in relation to these and other outcomes.
Learners often allocate more study time to challenging items than to easier ones. Nevertheless, both predicted and actual memory performance are typically worse for difficult than for easier items. The resulting inverse relations between people’s predictions of their memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs) and self-paced study time (ST) are often explained by bottom-up, data-driven ST allocation that is based on fluency. However, we demonstrate robust inverted U-shaped relations between JOLs and ST that cannot be explained by data-driven ST allocation alone. Consequently, we explored how two models of top-down, strategic ST allocation account for curvilinear JOL-ST relations. First, according to the Region of Proximal Learning model, people stop quickly on items for which they experience too little progress in learning. Second, according to the Diminishing Criterion Model, people set a time limit and stop studying when this time limit is reached. In three experiments, we manipulated motivation with different methods and examined which model best described JOL-ST relations. Consistent with the Diminishing Criterion Model but not with the Region of Proximal Learning model, results revealed that curvilinearity was due to people setting a time limit.
Researchers have often determined how cues influence judgments of learning (JOLs; e.g., concrete words are assigned higher JOLs than are abstract words), and recently there has been an emphasis in understanding why cues influence JOLs (i.e., the mechanisms that underlie cue effects on JOLs). The analytic-processing (AP) theory posits that JOLs are constructed in accordance with participants' beliefs of how a cue will influence memory. Even so, some evidence suggests that fluency is also important to cue effects on JOLs. In the present experiments, we investigated the contributions of participants' beliefs and processing fluency to the concreteness effect on JOLs. To evaluate beliefs, participants estimated memory performance in a hypothetical experiment (Experiment 1), and studied concrete and abstract words and made a pre-study JOL for each (Experiments 2 and 3). Participants' predictions demonstrated the belief that concrete words are more likely to be remembered than are abstract words, consistent with the AP theory. To evaluate fluency, response latencies were measured during lexical decision (Experiment 4), self-paced study (Experiment 5), and mental imagery (Experiment 7). Number of trials to acquisition was also evaluated (Experiment 6). Fluency did not differ between concrete and abstract words in Experiments 5 and 6, and it did not mediate the concreteness effect on JOLs in Experiments 4 and 7. Taken together, these results demonstrate that beliefs are a primary mechanism driving the concreteness effect on JOLs.
Much is known about how the emotional content of words affects memory for those words, but only recently have researchers begun to investigate whether emotional content influences metamemory—that is, learners’ assessments of what is or is not memorable. The present study replicated recent work demonstrating that judgments of learning (JOLs) do indeed reflect the superior memorability of words with emotional content. We further contrasted two hypotheses regarding this effect: a physiological account in which emotional words are judged to be more memorable because of their arousing properties, versus a cognitive account in which emotional words are judged to be more memorable because of their cognitive distinctiveness. Two results supported the latter account. First, both normed arousal (Exp. 1) and normed valence (Exp. 2) independently influenced JOLs, even though only an effect of arousal would be expected under a physiological account. Second, emotional content no longer influenced JOLs in a design (Exp. 3) that reduced the primary distinctiveness of emotional words by using a single list of words in which normed valence and arousal were varied continuously. These results suggest that the metamnemonic benefit of emotional words likely stems from cognitive factors.
The perceptual fluency hypothesis claims that items that are easy to perceive at encoding induce an illusion that they will be easier to remember, despite the finding that perception does not generally affect recall. The current set of studies tested the predictions of the perceptual fluency hypothesis with a picture generation manipulation. Participants identified mixed lists of intact images and images whose certain parts were deleted (generate condition) and made predictions about their subsequent memory performance, followed by a recall test. The intact condition always produced higher memory predictions and shorter identification latencies than the generate condition, consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis (Experiments 1 to 3). The actual memory performance for generate images was higher than intact images when aggregate judgments of learning (JOLs) were used (Experiment 1) and equivalent to intact images when item-by-item JOLs were used (Experiment 2 to 3). In Experiment 3, introducing a manipulation that facilitates naming latency for generate images did not increase JOL ratings, providing evidence that not all manipulations that facilitate the ease of perception produce higher JOLs. In Experiment 4, the role of a priori beliefs for the picture generation manipulation was assessed through an online questionnaire. Reading a scenario about the manipulation produced no JOL differences for intact and generate images. The results of the 4 experiments reported here are generally consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis of metamemory, and are discussed in terms of experience-based and theory-based processes in metamemory judgments and Koriat's (1997) cue utilization framework. (PsycINFO Database Record
We examined how font sizes (18pt., 48 pt.) and font styles (regular, italic, bold) influenced younger and older adults' judgments of learning (JOLs) and recall. In Experiment 1 younger adults gave higher JOLs and obtained higher recall than older adults. However, JOLs and recall varied for both age groups as a function of font size and font style manipulations despite a tendency for both groups to predict higher recall for items in large and in regular and italic styles than for small and bold fonts and achieve higher recall for regular than italic or bold items. No age differences were found in relative accuracy, with near-perfect calibration in absolute accuracy for younger and older adults. Experiment 2 presented a description of Experiment 1 and asked participants to predict recall for the various font size/style combinations. Younger and older adults predicted higher recall for large than small font items, regardless of font style, and higher recall for bold than regular or italic styles, regardless of font size. Memory predictions did not align across experiments, suggesting that memory beliefs combine with processing fluency to affect JOLs and recall.
The experience of fluency while learning might bias students’ metacognitive judgments of learning (JOLs) and impair the efficacy of their study behaviors. In the present experiments, we examined whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs (1) when people only experience one level of fluency, (2) when item relatedness is also available as a cue, and (3) across study-test trials. Participants studied a list of paired associates over two study-test trials and made JOLs for each item after studying it. We varied the perceptual fluency of the memory materials by making the font easy (fluent) or difficult (disfluent) to read. We also varied whether we manipulated the perceptual fluency of the items between-participants or within-participants and whether other memory factors—item relatedness and study time—were available for participants to use to inform their JOLs. We were only able to obtain effects of perceptual fluency on JOLs when we manipulated fluency within-participants and eliminated item relatedness as a cue for JOLs. The present results indicate that some effects of perceptual fluency on JOLs are not robust and might only occur under limited—and somewhat contrived—conditions. Therefore, these effects might be unlikely to bias students’ JOLs in actual learning situations.
We examined two metacognitive judgments, ease of learning (EOL) and judgments of learning (JOL), in music performance. Specifically, we tested whether the extrinsic cue of modality (auditory versus visual presentation), as well as the intrinsic cue of syntax (providing more or less cohesion), would influence such judgments. The participants were piano players in Experiment 1 and other instrumentalists in Experiments 2 and 3. Results showed that modality of the to-be-learned pieces did indeed influence both EOL (all experiments) and JOL (Experiments 2 and 3) ratings. Both ratings were also influenced by syntax (Experiment 3). Thus, successful EOL and JOL were extended to music performance itself. Moreover, unlike in the verbal domain where individuals can often use intrinsic cues but ignore extrinsic cues, both types of cues were used effectively. The findings are interpreted within the framework of cue-utilization theory and salience of cues.
One's memory for past test performance (MPT) is a key piece of information individuals use when deciding how to restudy material. We used a multi-trial recognition memory task to examine adult age differences in the influence of MPT (measured by actual Trial 1 memory accuracy and subjective confidence judgments, CJs) along with Trial 1 judgments of learning (JOLs), objective and participant-estimated recognition fluencies, and Trial 2 study time on Trial 2 JOLs. We found evidence of simultaneous and independent influences of multiple objective and subjective (i.e., metacognitive) cues on Trial 2 JOLs, and these relationships were highly similar for younger and older adults. Individual differences in Trial 1 recognition accuracy and CJs on Trial 2 JOLs indicate that individuals may vary in the degree to which they rely on each MPT cue when assessing subsequent memory confidence. Aging appears to spare the ability to access multiple cues when making JOLs.
An individual’s memory of past test performance (MPT) is often cited as the primary cue for judgments of learning (JOLs) following test experience during multitrial learning tasks (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007, 2008). We used an associative recognition task to evaluate MPT-related phenomena, because performance monitoring, as measured by recognition test confidence judgments (CJs), is fallible and varies in accuracy across persons. The current study used multilevel regression models to show the simultaneous and independent influences of multiple cues on Trial 2 JOLs, in addition to performance accuracy (the typical measure of MPT in cued-recall experiments). These cues include recognition CJs, perceived recognition fluency, and Trial 2 study time allocation (an index of reprocessing fluency). Our results expand the scope of MPT-related phenomena in recognition memory testing to show independent effects of recognition test accuracy and CJs on second-trial JOLs, while also demonstrating individual differences in the effects of these cues on JOLs (as manifested in significant random effects for those regression effects in the model). The effect of study time on second-trial JOLs controlling on other variables, including Trial 1 recognition memory accuracy, also demonstrates that second-trial encoding behavior influence JOLs in addition to MPT.
A major decision that must be made during study pertains to the distribution, or the scheduling, of study. In this paper, we review the literature on the benefits of spacing, or spreading one's study sessions relatively far apart in time, as compared to massing, where study is crammed into one long session without breaks. The results from laboratory research provide strong evidence for this pervasive “spacing effect,” especially for long-term retention. The metacognitive literature on spacing, however, suggests that massing is the preferred strategy, particularly in young children. Reasons for why this is so are discussed as well as a few recommendations regarding how spacing strategies might be encouraged in real-world learning. While further research and applicability questions remain, the two fields—education and cognitive science—have made huge progress in recent years, resulting in promising new learning developments.
Maximum likelihood or restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimates of the
parameters in linear mixed-effects models can be determined using the lmer
function in the lme4 package for R. As for most model-fitting functions in R,
the model is described in an lmer call by a formula, in this case including
both fixed- and random-effects terms. The formula and data together determine a
numerical representation of the model from which the profiled deviance or the
profiled REML criterion can be evaluated as a function of some of the model
parameters. The appropriate criterion is optimized, using one of the
constrained optimization functions in R, to provide the parameter estimates. We
describe the structure of the model, the steps in evaluating the profiled
deviance or REML criterion, and the structure of classes or types that
represents such a model. Sufficient detail is included to allow specialization
of these structures by users who wish to write functions to fit specialized
linear mixed models, such as models incorporating pedigrees or smoothing
splines, that are not easily expressible in the formula language used by lmer.
Open access under: http://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13421-013-0380-z
Decision situations are typically characterized by uncertainty: Individuals do not know the values of different options on a criterion dimension. For example, consumers do not know which is the healthiest of several products. To make a decision, individuals can use information about cues that are probabilistically related to the criterion dimension, such as sugar content or the concentration of natural vitamins. In two experiments, we investigated how the accessibility of cue information in memory affects which decision strategy individuals rely on. The accessibility of cue information was manipulated by means of a newly developed paradigm, the spatial-memory-cueing paradigm, which is based on a combination of the looking-at-nothing phenomenon and the spatial-cueing paradigm. The results indicated that people use different decision strategies, depending on the validity of easily accessible information. If the easily accessible information is valid, people stop information search and decide according to a simple take-the-best heuristic. If, however, information that comes to mind easily has a low predictive validity, people are more likely to integrate all available cue information in a compensatory manner.
Research in metacognition (Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006) suggests bidirectional links between monitoring and control during learning: When self-regulation is goal-driven, monitoring affects control so that increased study time (ST) enhances judgments of learning (JOLs). However, when self-regulation is data-driven, JOLs are based on the feedback from control, and therefore JOLs decrease with ST under the heuristic that ease of encoding is diagnostic of successful recall. Evidence for both types of relationships occurring within the same situation was found for adults. We examined the development of the ability to respond differentially to data-driven and goal-driven variation in ST within the same task. Children in Grades 5 and 6 exhibited a positive ST-JOL relationship for goal-driven regulation and a negative relationship for data-driven regulation but never in the same task. In contrast, the JOLs and recall of 9th graders and college students yielded differential cosensitivity to data-driven and goal-driven variation. The 5th and 6th graders also evidenced an adult-like pattern of JOLs and recall under a partitioning procedure that helped them in factoring the variation in ST due to data-driven and goal-driven variation in ST. The results are discussed in terms of the metacognitive sophistication needed for considering both types of variation simultaneously in making metacognitive judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
Taking part in an experiment is "a special form of social interaction." The S plays a role and places himself under the control of the E; he may agree "to tolerate a considerable degree of discomfort, boredom, or actual pain, if required to do so." The very high degree of control inherent in the experimental situation itself may lead to difficulties in experimental design. The S "must be recognized as an active participant in any experiment." With understanding of factors intrinsic to experimental context, experimental method in psychology may become a more effective tool in predicting behavior in nonexperimental contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Examined the degree to which individuals adapt their decision processes to the degree of interattribute correlation and conflict characterizing a decision problem. On the basis of an effort–accuracy framework for adaptive decision making, it was predicted that the more negatively correlated the attribute structure, the more people will use strategies that process much of the relevant information and make trade-offs. A computer simulation study supported these predictions, and 2 experiments using process-tracing techniques to monitor information acquisition indicated that individuals did indeed respond to interattribute correlation by shifting their processing strategies in ways that are adaptive according to the effort–accuracy framework. In particular, they faced conflict rather than avoided it and generally processed more information, were less selective, and showed more alternative-based processing in negatively correlated environments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The process of vicarious functioning, by which equivalent judgments can result from different patterns of cues, is central to any theory of judgment. It is argued that both linear regression and process-tracing models capture the various aspects of vicarious functioning: the former by dealing with the ambiguities that the organism faces with regard to the substitutions and trade-offs between cues in a redundant environment, and the latter by dealing with cue search and attention. Furthermore, although the surface structures and levels of detail of the 2 models are different, it is shown that process-tracing protocols can be generated via a general additive rule. Therefore, both types of models can be capturing the same underlying process, although at different levels of generality. Two experiments in which both models are built and tested on the same data are presented. In Exp I, experienced MMPI users made diagnostic judgments of the degree of adjustment/maladjustment from MMPI profiles; in Exp II, 1 S evaluated the nutritional quality of breakfast cereals. Results are discussed with respect to (a) links between judgment, choice, and task structure; (b) rule generality and awareness; and (c) advantages of a multimethod approach. (74 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Prior research suggests that older adults judge their learning as well as young adults, but given age-related differences in the processing of emotional materials, older adults may show deficits in their judgment accuracy when they study emotionally charged words. In 2 experiments, we evaluated this possibility by having young and older adults study negative, positive, and neutral words. They made a judgment of learning (JOL) after studying each word and then later had a free recall test. In Experiment 1, young and older adults' JOLs were sensitive to negative words (higher JOLs for negative than neutral words). By contrast, whereas young adults' JOLs were sensitive to positive emotion (higher for positive than neutral words), older adults' JOLs were insensitive. In Experiment 2, we replicated this age-related deficit in sensitivity to positive emotion, as well as evaluated possible explanations for it. As important, in both experiments, JOLs were plotted as a function of input serial position, and the shape of these curves were not influenced by emotional valence or age group. Taken together, these results indicate that healthy aging largely leaves judgments of learning intact for negatively charged words. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
Although successful retrieval practice is beneficial for memory, various factors (e.g., lag and criterion level) moderate this benefit. Accordingly, the efficacy of retrieval practice depends on how students use retrieval practice during learning, which in turn depends on accurate metacognitive monitoring. The present experiments evaluated the extent to which judgments of learning (JOLs) made after correct responses are sensitive to factors (i.e., lag and criterion level) that moderate retrieval practice effects, as well as which cues influence JOLs under these conditions. Participants completed retrieval practice for word pairs with either short or long lags between practice trials until items were correctly recalled 1, 3, 6, or 9 times. After the criterion trial for an item, participants judged the likelihood of recalling that item on the final test 1 week later. JOLs showed correct directional sensitivity to criterion level, with both final test performance and JOLs increasing as criterion level increased. However, JOLs showed incorrect directional sensitivity to lag, with greater performance but lower JOLs for longer versus shorter lags. Additionally, results indicated that retrieval fluency and metacognitive beliefs about criterion level--but not lag--influenced JOLs.
Prior work has suggested that participants use a memory-for-past-tests (MPT) heuristic for judgments of learning (JOLs) in a multitrial learning scenario. That is, when learning the same material in multiple sessions, previous memory performance can be used as a basis for later memory predictions. We explored this issue by evaluating the impact of healthy aging on the use of MPT across trials. Young adults and healthy older adults learned pairs of words, made JOLs, and received a memory test in three study-test trials on the same material. Results indicated that both young and older adults relied on MPT as a basis for JOLs and changes in MPT across trials were nominal. Further, only the most-recent past test influenced JOLs, whereas earlier tests were unrelated to later judgments. JOLs were also influenced by prior-trial JOLs and were related to subsequent memory performance on the same trial. We suggest that these data support both indirect- and direct-memory mechanisms as the bases for the MPT heuristic. Further, in a multitrial learning scenario, in which the same information was being learned, young and older adults used the same bases for their JOLs.
Judgements of learning (JOLs) are self-made predictions of the likelihood that one will later recall information. The influence of stimulus characteristics on JOLs and recall continues to receive attention, yet there are still a number of unexplored lexical word features that may exert an effect on mnemonic processing. Using a standard cue–target paradigm, we focused on the role of word age of acquisition (AoA) and evaluated the role of both cue and target AoA on responses. We replicated the robust delayed-JOL effect and used a novel items analysis approach to examine the relationship between intrinsic word features and accuracy and reaction times for both JOLs and recall. A consistent effect of target AoA was found, even after controlling for a range of covariates previously shown to impact JOLs and recall. These results expand the role of AoA in word processing and suggest that it is a key variable in memory and metacognition; they also support Koriat's (1997)8.
Koriat , A. 1997. Monitoring one's own knowledge during study: A cue-utilisation approach to judgments of learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 126(4): 349–370. View all references cue utilization framework.
The study of metacognition has been attracting the attention of philosophers who are concerned with issues of agency, consciousness, and subjective experience because of the interest in subjective feelings and self-regulation. Optimal cognitive performance depends critically on the effectiveness of self-monitoring and self-regulation. This chapter focuses narrowly on experimental work on the metacognitive processes that occur during learning and remembering. This work is more tightly linked to issues discussed in the context of judgment and decision making. The bulk of the experimental work has concerned three types of judgments. First are judgments of learning (JOLs) elicited following the study of each item. Second are feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments that are elicited following blocked recall. The third are confidence judgments involving assessments about a response that has been produced.
According to analytic-processing theory, when people are asked to judge their future memory performance, they search for cues that will help them reduce their uncertainty for how well they will remember each item. For instance, many people believe that more fluently performing a task is related to better task performance. Thus, when studying items for an upcoming test, items that are believed to be more easily processed are expected to be judged as more memorable. To test this prediction, we had participants judge their learning of words presented for study in two colors (blue or green), because these colors were not expected to differentially impact processing fluency or memory. During the task instructions, some participants were led to believe that one color was easier to process than another, but nothing was mentioned about whether color was related to memory. Across multiple experiments, color did not consistently influence final test performance, whereas people’s judgments were significantly higher for words printed in the color that had been associated with more fluent processing. In a final experiment, a different instruction was used in which one color was associated with being more calming when read. For participant’s who believed that calming was associated with better memory, JOLs were higher for the words presented in the allegedly calming color. This evidence supports analytic-processing theory and further highlights the central (and sometimes subtle) role of people’s beliefs as they judge their learning.
The idea that two distinct modes of thought affect human cognition and behavior has received considerable attention in psychology. In the domain of metacognition, it is assumed that metacognitive judgments are based on both nonanalytic, experience-based processes and analytic, theory-based processes. This study examined whether the experience-based process of intuition underlies people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs). In four experiments, people made JOLs and took a test on compound remote associates, that is, groups of 3 words that were either remote associates of a single solution word (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). Previous research has shown that increased fluency of processing coherent triads produces brief positive affects that may underlie judgments. In all experiments, JOLs were higher for coherent than for incoherent triads. The same was true for recognition memory and free recall performance. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that coherent triads were processed more fluently (i.e., read more quickly) than incoherent triads. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the effect of semantic coherence on JOLs occurred for participants who were aware and unaware of relations between all three triad words, but was more pronounced for aware participants. In sum, this study demonstrates that intuition impacts JOLs over and above theory-based processes.
Studies have demonstrated that perceptual fluency—the ease of perceiving stimuli—does not contribute to higher predictions of future memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs) for words presented in a larger font (48 pt) than for words presented in a smaller font (18 pt). Here, we investigated whether stimulus size can affect JOLs through another mode of perceptual fluency. We presented stimuli that were initially so small as to be entirely unrecognizable but that gradually increased in size. Stimuli were pictures of common objects (Experiment 1), faces (Experiment 2), and words (Experiments 3 and 4). People indicated when they could identify the stimulus and then made a JOL. The time required for participants to identify each stimulus was our measure of perceptual fluency. In Experiments 1 to 3, we manipulated the speed of the clarification process across trials. Results showed that the less time it took to identify the clarifying stimuli, independent of clarification speed, the higher one’s JOLs. Moreover, fast clarification increased JOLs indirectly by decreasing identification time. In Experiment 4, one group of participants (learner group) could base JOLs on both perceptual fluency and beliefs about how stimulus size affects memory performance, while the other group (observer group) could base JOLs only on beliefs. Inverse relations between identification time and JOLs occurred only in the learner group. These results demonstrate that perceptual fluency may produce size effects on JOLs and support the idea that fluency is an important factor in JOLs.
Understanding people's metacognitive judgments: An isomechanism framework and its implications for applied and theoretical research People think about their thoughts and decisions a lot, such as when they judge how well they are performing a task or evaluate the quality of their decision processes and products. The accuracy of such judgments is important, because inaccurately judging progress on a task or the quality of a decision can lead to non-optimal behavior and decisions. Consider two illustrations. When students are preparing for an upcoming exam, they intermittently ask themselves, “Do I know this information well enough to correctly answer questions about it on the exam?” Overconfidence in making these judgments of learning can lead to premature termination of study and in turn to underachievement (Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012; for further details, see Metcalfe, Chapter 26 , this volume). Likewise, when radiologists evaluate a radiographic image, they often judge how confident they ...
Prior research has demonstrated that certain types of fluency can influence memory predictions, with more fluent processing being associated with greater memory confidence. However, no study has systematically examined whether this pattern extends to the fluency of motoric output. The current study investigated the effect of a motoric-fluency manipulation of hand dominance on judgments of learning (JOLs) and memory performance. Participants predicted better memory for fluently written than nonfluently written stimuli despite no differences in actual recall. A questionnaire-based study suggested that the effect of motoric fluency on predictions was not due to peoples' a priori beliefs about memory. These findings are consistent with other fluency effects on JOLs.
The cue-utilization view to judgments of learning (JOLs) assumes that both ease of processing during study and people's beliefs about memory may contribute to people's predictions on the likelihood of remembering recently studied information. However, a recent study (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(2), 378-384, 2013; Experiment 3) found that processing fluency does not contribute to the effect of pair relatedness on JOLs, that is, to higher JOLs for related paired associates as compared to unrelated paired associates. We investigated whether this finding primarily depends on specific aspects of the paired associates employed or on the measure of processing fluency used in the previous study. In our first two experiments, participants therefore studied lists with (a) uniformly high associative strengths versus (b) a wide range of associative strengths. Results showed that processing disfluency-operationalized as number of trials to acquisition in Experiment 1 and as self-paced study time in Experiment 2-partially mediated the effect of relatedness on JOLs for both types of lists. Finally, in Experiment 3, the contribution of processing fluency to the relatedness effect increased with study-test experience. Unlike Mueller et al., we thus found that processing fluency contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs. These findings are consistent with the assumption that ease of processing is an important basis for JOLs.
How are multiple variables integrated into a unitary response? This fundamental problem— integration of multiple variables—faces every field of psychology. Solid support for three exact mathematical integration laws—averaging, adding, multiplying—has been given by extensive empirical work by investigators in many countries. These three integration laws operate in almost every area of human psychology: person science, social attitudes, child development, learning/memory, language, psychophysics, and judgment—decision. These laws have nomothetic generality across persons and cultures together with idiographic capability for true measurement of personal, individual value. These integration laws are thus a foundation, both conceptual and empirical, for unifying psychological science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
Historically, judgment research has been mainly concerned with identifying regularities in sensation (e.g., discriminability laws) and assessing judgment accuracy. More recently, the focus has shifted toward specifying the information processing mechanisms underlying judgment and modeling them, for example, as cognitive strategies. We contrast this strategy approach with previous prominent research programs on judgment and provide an overview of various process-level accounts that have been proposed in terms of computational models (e.g., compensatory and noncompensatory cue-abstraction strategies, evidence accumulation, exemplar processing, and parallel constraint satisfaction). Importantly, empirical investigations show that the cognitive processes underlying judgment differ considerably as a function of the individual's cognitive capacity and characteristics of the task environment (e.g., information cost, cognitive capacity, cue inter-correlations, relationship between cues and the to-be-judged criterion). We argue that these systematic contingencies in strategy use can be understood as adaptive responses to costs in learning, information acquisition, and strategy execution. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:665-681. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1259 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Evidence suggests that processing fluency affects many kinds of judgments. For instance, when words are presented either in large (48 point) or smaller (18 point) font sizes during study, people’s judgments of learning (JOLs) are higher for the words presented in the larger font size. This font-size effect presumably arises because items presented in a larger font size are easier to process at study, which in turn leads to higher JOLs. In the present studies, we evaluated this fluency hypothesis against an alternative one that the font-size effect occurs because people believe that words printed in a large font size are better remembered. In Experiments 1 and 2, we measured differences in processing fluency during study to evaluate whether fluency could account for any of the relationship between font size and JOLs. In Experiments 3a and 3b, college students read about the font-size experiment and then predicted whether hypothetical particpiants would better remember the large or smaller words. In Experiment 4, we evaluated whether the effect occurred for prestudy JOLs, which are made prior to studying the to-be-learned words and hence cannot be affected by processing fluency. Surprisingly, the evidence across experiments supported the belief hypothesis and did not support the fluency hypothesis. Thus, the font-size effect does not exemplify the effect of fluency on JOLs, and more generally, these outcomes suggest that measuring processing fluency is essential for establishing its role in people’s judgments and decision making.
The primary purpose of this study has been to give a methodological demonstration of the evaluation of responses to a random sample of test-situations. The specific problem of the perception of size has been used merely as an example. The subject, a graduate student in psychology, was interrupted at irregular intervals during the course of her daily activities, in various outdoor as well as indoor situations, and asked to indicate which linear extension happened to be most conspicuous to her at the moment. In each of these "life" situations, the subject had to give intuitive perceptual estimates of: (1) object size, (a) projective size (visual angle) and (3) distance. The 93 extensions thus obtained from one subject were found to be normally distributed when the logarithms of their measured bodily sizes were plotted. Further, the "ecological" correlation between two of the "geographic" stimulus variables characterizing each of the 93 situations was found to be far from perfect though positive when all size ranges were included. The responses consisted in numerical estimates of each of the extensions given by the subject in a series of five more or less natural attitudes. The results demonstrate again what is known as "perceptual size-constancy", namely the natural focusing of the perceptual system upon the distal stimulus variable "bodily size" and its comparative inability to respond to even such an outstanding mediating proximal stimulus-feature as the retinal proportions, even when an effort is made to do so. In conclusion, the network of abilities characteristic of a certain organism might thus eventually be mapped out in terms of the intimacy, or safeguardedness, of the rapport set up by the organism with the various vitally relevant issues in the nearer or more remote, physical or social regions of the geographic or historic environment.
The fluency of information encoding has frequently been discussed as a major determinant of predicted memory performance indicated by judgements of learning (JOLs). Previous studies established encoding fluency effects on JOLs. However, it is largely unknown whether fluency takes effect above and beyond the effects of item difficulty. We therefore tested whether encoding fluency still affects JOLs when numerous additional cues indicating the difficulty of an item are available as well. In three experiments, participants made JOLs for another participant while observing his or her self-paced study phase. However, study times were swapped in one experimental condition, so that items with short study times (indicating high fluency) were presented for long durations, whereas items with long study times (indicating low fluency) were presented for short durations. Results showed that both item difficulty and encoding fluency affected JOLs. Thus, encoding fluency in itself is indeed an important cue for JOLs that does not become redundant when difficulty information is available in addition. This observation lends considerable support to the ease-of-processing hypothesis.
A recent candidate for explaining metamemory judgments is the perceptual fluency hypothesis, which proposes that easily perceived items are predicted to be remembered better, regardless of actual memory performance (Rhodes & Castel Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137:615-625, 2008). In two experiments, we used the perceptual interference manipulation to test this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with intact and backward-masked words during encoding, followed by a metamemory prediction (a list-wide judgment of learning, JOL) and then a free recall test. Participants predicted that intact words would be better recalled, despite better actual memory for words in the perceptual interference condition, yielding a crossed double dissociation between predicted and actual memory performance. In Experiment 2, JOLs were made after each study word. Item-by-item JOLs were likewise higher for intact than for backward-masked words, despite similar actual memory performance for both types of words. The results are consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis of metamemory and are discussed in terms of experience-based and theory-based metamemory judgments.
Discovering how people judge their memories has been a major issue for metacognitive research for over 4 decades; many factors have been discovered that affect people's judgments, but exactly how those effects are mediated is poorly understood. For instance, the effect of word pair relatedness on judgments of learning (JOLs) has been repeatedly demonstrated, yet the underlying basis of this substantial effect is currently unknown. Thus, in three experiments, we assessed the contribution of beliefs and processing fluency. In Experiment 1, participants studied related and unrelated word pairs and made either prestudy JOLs or immediate JOLs. Participants gave higher estimates for related than for unrelated pairs, suggesting that participants' beliefs at least partially drive the relatedness effect on JOLs. Next, we evaluated the contribution of processing fluency to the relatedness effect either (1) by disrupting fluency by presenting half the pairs in an aLtErNaTiNg format (Experiment 2) or (2) by measuring how fluently participants processed pairs at study and statistically estimating the degree to which conceptual fluency mediated the effects of relatedness on JOLs (Experiment 3). Results from both experiments indicated that fluency contributes minimally to the relatedness effect. Taken together, these results indicate that people's beliefs about how relatedness influences memory are responsible for mediating the relationship between relatedness and JOLs. In general, empirically establishing what mediates the effects of other factors on people's judgments remains a major agenda for advancing theory of metacognitive monitoring.
College students rated the likelihood of recall of individual words presented for free recall learning. Predictions were made using a 7-point scale immediately following an item's presentation in the list. To-be-rated items included those presented 1 time as well as items presented twice in either a massed (MP) or distributed (DP) manner. Twice-presented items were rated as more likely to be recalled than items presented once, and they were recalled as such. However, although MP items were judged more likely to be recalled than DP items, they were not. The finding that Ss misjudged when they knew MP items suggests why processing may be less for massed than for distributed presentations. Results support the attenuation of attention hypothesis regarding the spacing effect in free recall. (12 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
How do people monitor their knowledge during acquisition? A cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning (JOLs) is outlined, distinguishing 3 types of cues for JOLs: intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. In 4 experiments using paired-associates learning, item difficulty (intrinsic) exerted similar effects of JOLs and recall. In contrast, the extrinsic factors of list repetition, item repetition within a list, and stimulus duration affected JOLs less strongly than recall, supporting the proposition that extrinsic factors are discounted in making JOLs. Although practice impaired calibration, increasing underconfidence, it did improve resolution (i.e., the recall-JOL correlation). This improvement was seen to reflect a shift in the basis of JOLs with practice, from reliance on intrinsic factors, towards greater reliance on mnemonic-based heuristics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: (a) the discovery of less-is-more effects; (b) the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; (c) an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; (d) the development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an “adaptive toolbox;” and (e) the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people’s adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies.
The ordinary policy capturing paradigm that focuses on cue-judgement relations is too limited to serve as a basis for a theoretical understanding of human judgement. To get on, we need a Brunswikian approach with a representation of both the task and the judge. Three stable results from studies with linear models are discussed from that perspective. Following Einhorn et al. (1979), the result that linear models usually fit judgement data well is explained by reference to the fact that linear models capture an essential feature of human judgement, viz., vicarious functioning. For the result that judges are inconsistent and that inconsistency varies with the predictability of the judgement task, the theory of quasi-rationality proposed by Hammond and Brehmer (1973) is invoked. Finally, it is argued that the wide interindividual differences in policies usually found show that the level of analysis is inappropriate. A given level of achievement can be reached by many different combinations of weights, and we should not be surprised to find wide interindividual differences at the policy level. We must search for stability at the level of achievement and those aspects that affect achievement, rather than at the level of cue utilisation coefficients.
Emotionality is a key component of subjective experience that influences memory. We tested how the emotionality of words affects memory monitoring, specifically, judgments of learning, in both cued recall and free recall paradigms. In both tasks, people predicted that positive and negative emotional words would be recalled better than neutral words. That prediction was valid for free recall of positive, negative, and neutral words, but invalid for cued recall of negative word pairs compared to neutral and positive pairs; only positive emotional pairs showed enhanced recall relative to neutral pairs. Consequently, people exhibited extreme overconfidence for cued recall of negative word pairs on the first study-test trial. We demonstrate that emotionality does not globally enhance memory, but rather has specific effects depending on the valence and task. Results are discussed in terms of this complex relationship between emotionality and memory performance and the subsequent variations in diagnosticity of emotionality as a cue for memory monitoring.
The article reports four experiments that examine people's ability to predict the outcome of a future test of memory. Our thesis is that memory predictions are implicit judgments of how easily the item is processed while answering the predictive question. If items are processed easily because of factors that also cause memory to succeed, predictions are accurate; if the factors that cause easy processing are irrelevant for memory, predictions are less accurate. The experiments examine factors that influence the prediction taks and the memory test separately; these include item attributes, manner of processing, repetition, and similarity of processing between the prediction task and the memory test. Predictions are most accurate if the prediction task entails the same processes as the test, even if the predictive question is nominally irrelevant to the test; predictions are less accurate if the task and test have different entailments, even if the nominal question is specifically aimed at the test.
This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness,
which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process
B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a
class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical
prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead
to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could
improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.