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Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning
Abstract
There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people’s predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.
... However, Rhodes (2016) contended that focusing on a single cue might not be sufficient to explain how individuals make their memory predictions in real life and that real-life decisions usually require them to consider more than one cue to assess their subsequent memory performance. However, the investigation of multiple cue use in metacognitive memory predictions produced mixed evidence (for a review, see Undorf et al., 2018). Some studies find that participants use all cues presented to them to the same extent (Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Jang & Nelson, 2005;Mueller et al., 2014;Price & Harrison, 2017;Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Undorf & Bröder, 2020Undorf et al., 2018), whereas other research shows that certain cues override others (Besken, 2016;Susser & Mulligan, 2015;Tatz & Peynircioglu, 2020;Undorf & Erdfelder, 2013). ...
... However, the investigation of multiple cue use in metacognitive memory predictions produced mixed evidence (for a review, see Undorf et al., 2018). Some studies find that participants use all cues presented to them to the same extent (Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Jang & Nelson, 2005;Mueller et al., 2014;Price & Harrison, 2017;Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Undorf & Bröder, 2020Undorf et al., 2018), whereas other research shows that certain cues override others (Besken, 2016;Susser & Mulligan, 2015;Tatz & Peynircioglu, 2020;Undorf & Erdfelder, 2013). ...
... Even though perceptual disfluency manipulations for single-word materials typically lower memory predictions, they affect actual memory performance in different manners, depending on the type of manipulation used. Specific perceptual fluency manipulations such as font size do not affect actual memory (Mueller et al., 2014;Rhodes & Castel, 2008 or produce a very small advantage for large over small fonts (Halamish, 2018;Mendes & Undorf, 2021;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Zimdahl, 2019). Other disfluency manipulations, such as perceptual interference and auditory generation, produce higher memory performance for the disfluent condition . ...
The current study investigated the joint contribution of visual and auditory disfluencies, or distortions, to actual and predicted memory performance with naturalistic, multi-modal materials through three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants watched food recipe clips containing visual and auditory information that were either fully intact or else distorted in one or both of the two modalities. They were asked to remember these for a later memory test and made memory predictions after each clip. Participants produced lower memory predictions for distorted auditory and visual information than intact ones. However, these perceptual distortions revealed no actual memory differences across encoding conditions, expanding the metacognitive illusion of perceptual disfluency for static, single-word materials to naturalistic, dynamic, multi-modal materials. Experiment 3 provided naïve participants with a hypothetical scenario about the experimental paradigm used in Experiment 1, revealing lower memory predictions for distorted than intact information in both modalities. Theoretically, these results imply that both in-the-moment experiences and a priori beliefs may contribute to the perceptual disfluency illusion. From an applied perspective, the study suggests that when audio-visual distortions occur, individuals might use this information to predict their memory performance, even when it does not factor into actual memory performance.
... Moreover, the font size effect proved robust even when participants were given warnings about the nature of the illusion or with the availability of more effective memory cues such as semantic relations between words. Subsequently, the font size effect has been replicated in numerous experiments (e.g., Blake & Castel, 2018;Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Hu et al., 2015;Kornell et al., 2011;Luna, Nogueira, & Albuquerque, 2019b;Mcdonough & Gallo, 2012;Mueller et al., 2014;Price & Harrison, 2017;Su et al., 2018;Susser et al., 2013;Tatz & Peynircioğlu, 2020;Tatz et al., 2020;Undorf et al., 2018). ...
... Three effect sizes from Undorf et al. (2018;Experiment 4), Double (2019; Experiment 3, no-JOL condition), and Tatz and Peynircioğlu (2020; Experiment 4) were identified as influential outliers and were excluded from the meta-analysis of memory performance. As shown in Fig. 5, this meta-analysis indicated that memory for larger-font items was slightly better than for smaller-font items, g = .05, ...
... One possible explanation is that the available cues/strategies increase with stimulus complexity, which may limit people's abilities to process multiple cues simultaneously. This has important implications for the cue integration approach (e.g., Peynircioğlu & Tatz, 2019;Undorf et al., 2018), which posits that multiple cues can be integrated in making metacognitive judgments-namely, certain characteristics of increasing stimulus complexity, such as richer relational information, may divert people from incorporating surface cues such as font size into metacognitive judgments. Here, there is a missing type of stimulus that would provide incisive information-namely, related word lists. ...
The font size effect is a metamemory illusion in which larger-font items produce higher judgments of learning (JOLs) but not better memory, relative to smaller-font items. We conducted meta-analyses to determine what is currently known about how font size affects JOLs and memory accuracy. In addition, we implemented both univariate and multivariate meta-regressions to isolate the moderators of JOL effects and memory effects. The results revealed a small-to-moderate effect of font size on JOLs. There was also a small but significant effect of font size on memory. This suggests that JOLs and memory accuracy both increase with font size, rather than being completely dissociated. Moreover, JOL-memory dissociation only occurred when font size ranged between very small and intermediate. Our working explanation is that the memory effects of font size are tied to (dis)fluency, but its JOL effects are not. Some boundary conditions were identified for font size effects on both JOLs and memory. Specifically, larger font sizes only reliably increased both JOLs and memory accuracy (a) when font sizes ranged from intermediate to very large, (b) when study materials were unrelated word lists, (c) when JOLs were solicited immediately after encoding, and (d) when study time was relatively brief.
Supplementary information:
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11409-021-09287-3.
... People are known to base metamemory judgments such as JOLs on commonly shared intrinsic or extrinsic cues pertaining to the stimuli and to the learning conditions (Koriat, 1997; for a review, see Rhodes, 2016). Examples include word frequency, valence, arousal, font size, and the number of study opportunities (e.g., Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018). Such cues can affect JOLs through theory-based and experience-based processes. ...
... As mentioned above, the notion that JOLs are based on probabilistic cues is generally agreed on by metamemory researchers (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009;Koriat, 1997;Rhodes, 2016). For example, in a study by Undorf et al. (2018), study words varied in emotionality, concreteness, font size, and frequency of study presentations. These attributes of the stimuli and the learning conditions may affect the to-be-predicted criterion (memory performance) and may inform people's JOLs. ...
... We do not mean to suggest, however, that participants used each of these characteristics when making JOLs. Based on prior research, it is plausible that valence, arousal, concreteness, and word frequency affected JOLs and memory performance, even though not necessarily to the same degree or in the same direction (Fiacconi & Dollois, 2020;Hourihan, Fraundorf, & Benjamin, 2017;Mendes & Undorf, 2021;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Bröder, 2020;Witherby & Tauber, 2017). In contrast, there is no reason to expect that JOLs and memory performance depended on the number of letters. ...
Studies of the mind often focus on general effects on cognitive processes, whereas influences of idiosyncratic interactions between participants and items evade experimental control or assessment. For instance, assessments of one's own learning and memory processes—metamemory judgments—are attributed to people's reliance on commonly shared characteristics of study materials (e.g., word frequency) or learning conditions (e.g., number of study opportunities). By contrast, few studies have investigated how idiosyncratic information such as the personal significance of items affects memory and metamemory. We propose that hitherto elusive idiosyncratic influences on metamemory can be measured by the C component of Egon Brunswik's (1952) lens model. In two experiments, we made randomly chosen items personally significant (Experiment 1) or assessed the personal significance of items (Experiment 2). Personal significance increased both metamemory judgments and memory performance. Including personal significance as a predictor in the lens model reduced C, whereas including familiarity from a previous encounter did not. Hence, at least part of the lens model's C parameter captures idiosyncratic influences on metamemory. The C parameter may serve as a useful tool for future research.
... When faced with multiple cues at encoding, if participants show a weak relationship between what they expect to remember and later recall, this metacognitive disconnect could result in the forgetting of valuable information. Rather than incorporating a single cue such as processing fluency or value in their metacognitive monitoring judgments, participants should engage in responsible remembering (see Murphy & Castel, 2020, 2021a, 2021b) by simultaneously incorporating multiple cues but also differentially weighting these cues (i.e., cue-weighting, see Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Koriat, 1997;Undorf & Bröder, 2020;Undorf et al., 2018). Specifically, responsible remembering mechanisms may allow for the strategic encoding of important information to maximize memory utility and avoid forgetting valuable information, despite variation in encoding or perceptual processing fluency. ...
... Accordingly, the present experiments allowed us to examine the influence of both value and perceptual processing fluency on metacognitive monitoring and later remembering, providing insight regarding the notion of cue-weighting, whereby multiple cues are considered when forming JOLs (Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Koriat, 1997;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Bröder, 2020), as well as theoretical frameworks suggesting that fluency can guide JOLs, despite value influencing recall. Specifically, participants may override perceptual processing fluency as a cue and use value as a stronger indicator of future recall. ...
... Results revealed that increased perceptual processing fluency led to enhanced recall and participants also selectively remembered valuable information at the expense of low-value information, and JOLs mapped onto participants' selectivity (but generally, there were no significant differences in measures of metacognitive accuracy). Thus, the present study is consistent with the idea of cue-weighting (Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Koriat, 1997;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Bröder, 2020) whereby multiple factors inform metacognitive judgments. However, we extend the findings of Soderstrom and McCabe (2011) by indicating that although multiple cues can be used simultaneously to inform JOLs and later remembering, the magnitude of the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic cues on recall can differ and are likely informed by participants' goals. ...
Previous research has indicated that perceptual processing fluency significantly affects metacognitive predictions of performance but not learning outcomes. In the present study, we examined the differential impact of perceptual processing fluency and an item’s value on metacognition and recall. We presented participants with words visually and audibly, with each word paired with a point value counting towards participants’ scores if recalled. The words were either highly perceptually fluent (large font, loud volume) or less perceptually fluent (small font, low volume). Results revealed that both metacognitive monitoring (JOLs) and recall were sensitive to perceptual processing fluency as well as value, but the magnitude of the effect of value was significantly greater than that of font size. Specifically, high-value words were better remembered than low-value words, regardless of fluency, and participants’ judgments mapped onto their selectivity for valuable information. Thus, the current study revealed the differential effects of intrinsic and extrinsic cues on metacognitive monitoring and later remembering such that the cues that can influence monitoring in certain encoding conditions become less impactful when pitted against other intrinsic cues in different encoding conditions.
... However, in natural learning situations, learners frequently encounter multiple cues rather than a single cue. When dealing with multiple cues in making JOLs, people might give different weight to different cues [15]. Will participants engage in the analytic process in which they retrieve a specific belief about how one certain cue influences memory to make JOLs in circumstance of multiple cues? ...
... By comparison, the question about whether and how multiple cues combine to affect metacognitive judgments has received less attention [16]. Undorf and colleagues [15] are arround the first to explore whether multiple cues jointly affect JOLs. They systematically investigated whether participants integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. ...
... An individual-level analysis focusing on cue utilization was conducted [15]. Participants were coded as reliably basing JOLs on font size if their JOLs were higher for large words than for small ones. ...
Previous studies found that metamemory beliefs dominate the font size effect on judgments of learning (JOLs). However, few studies have investigated whether beliefs about font size contribute to the font size effect in circumstances of multiple cues. The current study aims to fill this gap. Experiment 1 adopted a 2 (font size: 70 pt vs . 9 pt) * 2 (word frequency (WF): high vs . low) within-subjects design. The results showed that beliefs about font size did not mediate the font size effect on JOLs when multiple cues (font size and WF) were simultaneously provided. Experiment 2 further explored whether WF moderates the contribution of beliefs about font size to the font size effect, in which a 2 (font size: 70 pt v s. 9 pt, as a within-subjects factor) * 2 (WF: high vs . low, as a between-subjects factor) mixed design was used. The results showed that the contribution of beliefs about font size to the font size effect was present in a pure list of low-frequency words, but absent in a pure list of high-frequency words. Lastly, a meta-analysis showed evidence supporting the proposal that the contribution of beliefs about font size to the font size effect on JOLs is moderated by WF. Even though numerous studies suggested beliefs about font size play a dominant role in the font size effect on JOLs, the current study provides new evidence suggesting that such contribution is conditional. Theoretical implications are discussed.
... It is important to note that the cues measured in the study do not encompass all cues that a person can use, and that a person can use multiple cues to make their judgments (Morris, 1990;Undorf et al., 2018). We focused on cues that past literature suggested might change with summary modality, but we acknowledge that other cues, such as familiarity or interest in the topic, may play an important role in prediction magnitude (Koriat, 1997;Thiede et al., 2010). ...
... In addition to showing that summary modality can affect metacomprehension relative accuracy, our study provides the first experimental evidence, to our knowledge, that people use multiple cues when making metacomprehension judgments (see Undorf et al., 2018 for evidence in metamemory). Each of the cues measured (word count, LSA, summary time, latency to begin summaries) were related to predictions of future comprehension performance. ...
... The well-established cues, accessibility of information and the situation model, seemed to both be utilized by participants to approximately the same extent, expanding our knowledge of how these cues are used. Thus, similar to a recent metamemory study (Undorf et al., 2018), we argue that participants use multiple cues in order to make predictions about their comprehension performance, but the cues can vary in validity, and some may be weighted more than others. Most of the cues (LSA was the exception) were valid, as they were significantly related to comprehension performance, but the gamma correlations were fairly low, indicating that there may be other more valid cues that should be used for prediction judgments. ...
Metacomprehension refers to the ability to monitor and control reading comprehension. It is important for individuals to be accurate in their judgments of comprehension, as this can affect academic performance. One type of accuracy, relative accuracy, tends to be low, meaning individuals cannot adequately differentiate well-known from less well-known information. Fortunately, past research has shown that relative accuracy increases with delayed summarization. The literature has only assessed written summaries as an intervention, but oral summaries tend to be faster and easier and therefore may be a better study tool. Individuals use cues to make judgments, which may differ between modalities. This study investigated whether modality impacts relative accuracy and if differences in cue use might explain these effects. We found that written summaries benefitted relative accuracy compared to a control group, with relative accuracy greater than chance. In contrast, oral summarizers only marginally differed from chance accuracy and did not differ from the control group. An analysis of summary characteristics suggests that participants use multiple cues in order to make judgments. We conclude that spoken summaries are likely better than not summarizing at all, but the written modality is the better summary technique to increase relative accuracy. By increasing relative accuracy, delayed written summaries may increase effectiveness of studying, thereby maximizing a student’s academic potential.
... For verbal materials, immediate JOLs are moderately accurate (e.g., Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009;Koriat, 1997). 1 This accuracy is due to people basing their JOLs on probabilistic cues, many of which are predictive of actual memory (Koriat, 1997;Rhodes, 2016;Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf & Bröder, 2020). The cues that underlie JOLs are often classified into different groups (Koriat, 1997). ...
... Extrinsic cues are bound to specific study conditions and can be randomly assigned to study items; examples include presentation time or the frequency of study presentations. Evidence is accumulating that people base their JOLs for verbal materials not only on single cues but on multiple intrinsic and extrinsic cues simultaneously (e.g., Bröder & Undorf, 2019;Tatz & Peynircioğlu, 2019;Undorf et al., 2018). For instance, Undorf et al.'s (2018) participants studied single words and made JOLs for recalling each word at a later test. ...
... Beer garden Highway Kitchen Stadium JOL judgment of learning (on a 0-100 scale); % Hits percentage of hits; % False alarms percentage of false alarms; P r = corrected hit rate according to Snodgrass and Corwin (1988), which is computed as p(hit) − p(false alarm) Even though contextual distinctiveness and color affected JOLs at the aggregate level, it was still possible that no participant integrated the two cues in his or her JOLs (cf. Undorf et al., 2018). The reason is that main effects of the two cues at the aggregate level could result if each participant's JOLs were based on only one cue, but different participants based their JOLs on different cues. ...
Memory for naturalistic pictures is exceptionally good. However, little is known about people’s ability to monitor the memorability of naturalistic pictures. We report the first systematic investigation into the accuracy and basis of metamemory in this domain. People studied pictures of naturalistic scenes, predicted their chances of recognizing each picture at a later test (judgment of learning, JOL), and completed a recognition memory test. Across three experiments, JOLs revealed substantial accuracy. This was due to people basing their JOLs on multiple cues, most of which predicted recognition memory. Identified cues include intrinsic picture attributes (e.g., peacefulness of scenes; scenes with or without persons) and extrinsic aspects of the study situation (e.g., presentation frequency; semantic distinctiveness of scenes with respect to the context). This work provides a better understanding of metamemory for pictures and it demonstrates close parallels between metamemory for naturalistic scenes and verbal materials.
... Also, fl uency can inform metamemory quickly and without much effort (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999 ). Fluency-based metamemory judgments have the potential to integrate various infl uences on learning and remembering (Koriat, 1997 ;Undorf et al., 2018 ). Finally, relying on fl uency can produce accurate metamemory judgments even when declarative knowledge about memory is incomplete or fl awed (Koriat, 1997 ). ...
... Another research strategy has been to orthogonally manipulate fl uency and actual memorability. For instance, several JOL studies manipulated font size independently of other manipulations that have a profound impact on memory performance such as word pair relatedness (Price & Harrison, 2017 ) or number of study presentations (Kornell, Rhodes, Castel, & Tauber, 2011 ;Undorf et al., 2018 ). In the extreme, researchers created situations in which there is an inverse relationship between fl uency and actual memorability. ...
... Also, most research has evaluated fl uency contributions to metamemory illusions by manipulating only one or two cues. It may be that fl uency contributions increase when multiple varying cues are available and, consequently, relevant beliefs are more diffi cult to use (Undorf & Erdfelder, 2013 ;Undorf et al., 2018 , but see Undorf & Br ö der, 2019 ). ...
... In sum, we showed that context may affect JOLs both directly and indirectly by influencing participants' use of item-specific cues. These findings broaden our understanding of how cues may be utilized (e.g., Koriat, 1997) and integrated (e.g., Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder, 2018) in JOLs. ...
... With respect to physical attributes of items, font size is typically considered an intrinsic cue (e.g., Rhodes, 2016), which is consistent with Koriat's (1997) definition of intrinsic cues involving intra-item features. Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder (2018) suggest that one test for classifying cues as intrinsic or extrinsic might be whether the cue can be separated from the study item. By this logic, they consider font size to be ambiguous (i.e., a word need not have a font size, but a written word does). ...
... Another purpose of this study was to examine whether manipulations to context might interact with similar manipulations to study items. Currently, one important goal of metacognition research is to delineate how multiple cues are integrated in JOLs (e.g., Rhodes, 2016;Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018). Additive cuing (i.e., one cue does not influence how another cue is utilized) has been suggested by Undorf et al. (2018) who found that participants tended to simultaneously give higher JOLs to large words, repeated words, concrete words, and emotional words, but the extent to which each individual cue was utilized was not altered by any of the other cues. ...
Varying item-specific features such as size (Rhodes & Castel, 2008) or blur (Yue, Castel, & Bjork, 2013) often produces metamemory illusions in which one type of item receives higher judgments of learning (JOLs) without being recalled better. In this study, we explored how similar manipulations to context would influence JOLs. When to-be-recalled words varying in size (or blur) were accompanied by backgrounds also varying in size (or blur), the traditional JOL illusions were reduced (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5) compared to when there were no backgrounds (Experiments 3a, 3b, and 4). Thus, the item-specific and contextual cues were used interactively. Further, the background manipulations also sometimes themselves led to metamemory illusions regarding JOLs for the to-be-remembered items. In general, there were robust individual differences in how participants used the cues, including how they incorporated the contextual cues into their JOL decisions. In part, this may explain why interactive cue utilization did not always emerge at the group level. In sum, we showed that context may affect JOLs both directly and indirectly by influencing participants’ use of item-specific cues. These findings broaden our understanding of how cues may be utilized (e.g., Koriat, 1997) and integrated (e.g., Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder, 2018) in JOLs.
... In contrast, researchers have only just begun to investigate cue integration in metacognitive judgements. A recent study tested whether people can integrate intrinsic and extrinsic cues in their JOLs (Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018). Across four experiments, participants studied single words and estimated the probability of recalling each word at test. ...
... Based on studies that manipulated concreteness of word pairs in isolation (e.g., Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989;Tullis & Benjamin, 2012), we expected that JOLs and recall performance would both increase with concreteness. Studies that investigated the effects of word emotionality all found higher JOLs for positive and negative items as compared with neutral items (Hourihan, Fraundorf, & Benjamin, 2017;Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012;Undorf et al., 2018;Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). Free recall performance for single words showed a similar pattern (Hourihan et al., 2017;Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012;Undorf et al., 2018;Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010), whereas cued recall performance was similar for negative and neutral word pairs or worse for negative than for neutral word pairs but better for positive than for neutral word pairs (Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). ...
... Studies that investigated the effects of word emotionality all found higher JOLs for positive and negative items as compared with neutral items (Hourihan, Fraundorf, & Benjamin, 2017;Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012;Undorf et al., 2018;Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). Free recall performance for single words showed a similar pattern (Hourihan et al., 2017;Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012;Undorf et al., 2018;Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010), whereas cued recall performance was similar for negative and neutral word pairs or worse for negative than for neutral word pairs but better for positive than for neutral word pairs (Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). Based on these findings, we expected that emotionality would increase JOLs. ...
People base judgements about their own memory processes on probabilistic cues such as the characteristics of study materials and study conditions. While research has largely focused on how single cues affect metamemory judgements, a recent study by Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder found that multiple cues affected people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgements of learning, JOLs). The present research tested whether this finding was indeed due to strategic integration of multiple cues in JOLs or, alternatively, resulted from people's reliance on a single unified feeling of ease. In Experiments 1 and 2, we simultaneously varied concreteness and emotionality of word pairs and solicited (a) pre-study JOLs that could be based only on the manipulated cues and (b) immediate JOLs that could be based both on the manipulated cues and on a feeling of ease. The results revealed similar amounts of cue integration in pre-study JOLs and immediate JOLs, regardless of whether cues varied in two easily distinguishable levels (Experiment 1) or on a continuum (Experiment 2). This suggested that people strategically integrated multiple cues in their immediate JOLs. Experiment 3 provided further evidence for this conclusion by showing that false explicit information about cue values affected immediate JOLs over and above actual cue values. Hence, we conclude that cue integration in JOLs involves strategic processes.
... Here, we propose a traditional tool of judgment analysis, Egon Brunswik's (1952) lens model, to analyze participants' resolution abilities further by decomposing the correlation between JOLs and performance into a competence measure called matching (symbolized by G) and two measures of reliability for the JOLs (R JOL ) and performance (R REC ), respectively. We demonstrate the usefulness of the approach by re-analyzing five experiments from our own lab, four of which have been published before in Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder (2018). We emphasize that we do not claim originality for using Brunswik's framework in metamemory research. ...
... These varied cues and the additional word characteristics used in the lens model analyses are provided in Table 1. A detailed description of Experiments 1 to 4 is provided in Undorf et al. (2018), a detailed account of Experiment 5 will be given in the following paragraph. All manipulated cues in the studies were chosen because they had been established in the literature as variables affecting JOLs when manipulated in isolation. ...
... All manipulated cues in the studies were chosen because they had been established in the literature as variables affecting JOLs when manipulated in isolation. We refer the reader to Undorf et al. (2018) for a respective elaboration of the literature leading to the choice of these cues. If an intrinsic cue was not actively manipulated in one study, it was nevertheless included in the lens model equation if norming data for the words were available. ...
Metamemory research makes extensive use of judgments, such as judgments of learning (JOLs). In a JOL, people
predict their chance of remembering a recently studied item in a memory test. There is a general agreement that
JOLs rely on probabilistic cues that are combined in an inference process. Accuracy as measured by the gamma
correlation between JOLs and actual performance is usually mediocre, suggesting limited metacognitive abilities.
In judgment and decision-making research, Brunswik's lens model is often used to decompose judgmental
accuracy: A matching index G measures how adequately people's cue weights match the optimal weights, two
reliability indices assess the predictability of judgments and environment, respectively, and a nonlinear component
measures systematic variance not captured by the cues. We employed the lens model equation for the
first time to analyze four published and one new JOL data sets. There was considerable interindividual variance
in metamemory monitoring. Although gamma was on average higher than the Pearson correlation, it still underestimated
metacognitive ability in terms of matching (G). Also, the nonlinear component was considerably
higher than in other judgment domains, pointing to substantial item-person-interactions that we interpret as
idiosyncratic encoding strategies. An exploratory cluster analysis suggests different metacognitive strategies
used by subgroups of participants. We suggest the lens model as a potentially promising tool in metacognition
research.
... Carefully note that herein the relationships of an item with both available schemas-their consistency and inconsistency-are conceptualized as two independent metamemory cues. Recent research showed that people can integrate multiple cues in judgment formation (e.g., Undorf & Bröder, 2020Undorf et al., 2018). In previous experiments on schema-based source monitoring, consistency and inconsistency were confounded such that items were highly consistent with one source and simultaneously inconsistent with the other source. ...
... Taken together, JOLs relied (a) on item-inherent consistency and (b) on the pair-inherent (mis)match of an item with its actual source. Thus, participants integrated multiple metamemory cues in their predictions, as also shown in previous research with different types of cues (e.g., Undorf & Bröder, 2020Undorf et al., 2018). People seem to be unable to ignore an item's source when making a JOL, even though item memory is (often) unaffected by source information. ...
Item memory and source memory are different aspects of episodic remembering. To investigate metamemory differences between them, the authors assessed systematic differences between predictions of item memory via Judgments of Learning (JOLs) and source memory via Judgments of Source (JOSs). Schema-based expectations affect JOLs and JOSs differently: Judgments are higher for expected source-item pairs (e.g., "nightstand in the bedroom") than unexpected pairs (e.g., "bed in the bathroom"), but this expectancy effect is stronger on JOSs than JOLs (Schaper et al., 2019b). The current study tested theoretical underpinnings of this difference. Due to semantic priming, JOLs should be influenced by the consistency between an item and any of the schemas activated at study. JOSs, however, should be influenced by the (in)consistency between an item and its actual source. In three experiments, source-item pairs varied in strength of consistency and inconsistency. Participants provided item-wise JOLs and JOSs. Regardless of an items' actual source, JOLs were higher the more consistent an item was with any of the source schemas, but only if that schema was activated by occurring as a source at study. JOLs were also biased by the actual source: JOLs were lower the more inconsistent an item was with its actual source. By contrast, JOSs were primarily influenced by an item's (in)consistency with its actual source (positively for consistency, negatively for inconsistency). Thus, participants metacognitively differentiated item memory and source memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
... Even if fluency per se is used as a heuristic cue, different contributing factor to the general feeling of fluency can be weighted differently depended on the situation. Previous research has shown that individuals can integrate multiple fluency cues for metacognitive judgments and strategically put more weight on certain fluency cues that they consider diagnostic for the specific situation (e.g., motor fluency; Undorf et al., 2018;Undorf and Bröder, 2020). ...
... We have argued that this positive influence on recognition performance is due to the higher weighting of less salient performance cues that are most noticeable under fluent task conditions. As other researchers (Undorf et al., 2018) have shown, participants seem to be able to strategically put more weight on different cues that influence fluency feelings. If highly salient fluency manipulations are first introduced during the test, these manipulations might have a strong weight in the general experience of fluency, which in these cases would drastically increase false alarm rates. ...
Fluency of processing has shown to influence recognition judgments. Fluency most commonly induces a liberal response bias to judge fluently processed information as well-known because knowledge of a high correlation between the frequency of encounters, memory strength, and thus fluency of processing has been acquired in the past. In this study, we aimed to show that high fluency can increase recognition judgment sensitivity as well if the participants had encountered fluent and non-fluent processing during training. Thirty-three participants have been trained with a 12-element sequence in a serial reaction time task. During training, the response stimulus interval alternated block-wise between constant (fluent) and variable (non-fluent). Participants showed a higher capability of discriminating between old and new test sequences under fluent than under non-fluent test conditions. Furthermore, participants did not show any liberal or conservative bias after they have been trained with alternating fluency.
... Further, dividing attention may limit the impact of explicit metacognitive cues on monitoring judgments more than implicit metacognitive cues. Learners may need to allocate more attentional resources to account for explicit beliefs than implicit fluencies (e.g., Undorf et al., 2018). ...
... Adjusting JOLs away from an anchor requires attentional resources (Epley & Gilovich, 2004). In other words, learners' general beliefs about learning conditions affect how they shift their predictions away from an anchor; utilizing those overarching beliefs to inform item-by-item JOLs may be an effortful process (Undorf et al., 2018). Further, the betweenparticipants design of the current experiments prevents comparisons between the different conditions within each participant. ...
Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505–514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental Review, 35, 64–78, 2015), but the impact of multitasking on metacognitive monitoring and control is less clear. Metacognition may compete with ongoing cognitive processing for mental resources (e.g., Nelson & Narens, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125–141, 1990) and would be impaired by dividing attention; alternatively, metacognition may require little attention (e.g., Boekaerts & Niemivirta, Handbook of Self-Regulation [pp. 417–450], 2000) and would not be impacted by dividing attention. Across three experiments, we assessed the influence of divided attention on metacognition. Participants made item-by-item judgements of learning (JOLs) after studying word pairs under full or divided attention (Experiment 1) and made restudy choices (Experiments 2 & 3). Dividing attention had little impact on the resolution of learners’ metacognitive monitoring, but significantly impaired calibration of monitoring, the relationship between monitoring and control, and the efficacy of metacognitive control. The data suggest that monitoring may require few cognitive resources, but controlling one’s learning (e.g., planning what to restudy and implementing a plan) may demand significant mental resources.
... Bringing to the fore the other two levels highlights that people are quite sophisticated in integrating self-perceptions and task characteristics in their judgments, along with a variety of momentary experiences (e.g., Bajšanski, Žauhar, & Valerjev, in press;Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006;Thompson, Pennycook, Trippas, & Evans, 2018;Undorf et al., 2018). This complex inference process seems to develop throughout childhood and matures only towards adulthood (Koriat, Ackerman, Adiv, Lockl, & Schneider, 2014;van Loon, Destan, Spiess, de Bruin, & Roebers, 2017). ...
... The review above included some examples of heuristic cues (see Box 1). The findings, mentioned above, that people integrate multiple heuristic cues in complex ways (e.g., Bajšanski et al., in press;Undorf et al., 2018) hint that many cues are yet to be discovered. ...
Metacognitive research aims to explain how people regulate their effort when performing cognitive tasks, to expose conditions that support reliable monitoring of chance for success, and to provide a basis for developing improvement guidelines. The essence of the domain is that monitoring drives control: people continually self-assess their chance for success before, during, and after performing a cognitive task, and use these judgments to guide their effort-allocation decisions (e.g., whether to reconsider an answer option, change strategy, seek help, or give up). Thus, factors that underlie metacognitive judgments affect the efficiency with which people perform cognitive tasks. This paper focuses on meta-reasoning-the monitoring and control processes that apply to reasoning, problem-solving, and decision-making tasks. So far, relatively little is known about heuristic cues used for inferring meta-reasoning judgments. This paper reviews the known heuristic cues and offers methodological guidelines for a critical reading of existing research and for designing high-quality studies that will advance this important domain.
... Research on memory and metamemory indicates that differences in font size create a metacognitive illusion: While people think that larger headlines are more memorable than smaller headlines, actual memorability is similar for smaller and larger headlines. In the first laboratory study to investigate the effect of font size on predictions of future memory performance (judgments of learning, or JOLs), Rhodes and Castel (2008) found higher JOLs for words presented in a larger font than for words presented in a smaller font, even though font size did not influence memory performance (for exceptions, see Price, McElroy, & Martin, 2016;Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018). Meanwhile, a number of subsequent studies replicated this font size effect (e.g., Hu, Liu, Li, & Luo, 2016;Kornell, Rhodes, Castel, & Tauber, 2011;McDonough & Gallo, 2012;Miele, Finn, & Molden, 2011;Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014;Price & Harrison, 2017;Susser, Mulligan, & Besken, 2013;Undorf et al., 2018). ...
... In the first laboratory study to investigate the effect of font size on predictions of future memory performance (judgments of learning, or JOLs), Rhodes and Castel (2008) found higher JOLs for words presented in a larger font than for words presented in a smaller font, even though font size did not influence memory performance (for exceptions, see Price, McElroy, & Martin, 2016;Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018). Meanwhile, a number of subsequent studies replicated this font size effect (e.g., Hu, Liu, Li, & Luo, 2016;Kornell, Rhodes, Castel, & Tauber, 2011;McDonough & Gallo, 2012;Miele, Finn, & Molden, 2011;Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014;Price & Harrison, 2017;Susser, Mulligan, & Besken, 2013;Undorf et al., 2018). ...
Words printed in a larger 48-point font are judged to be more memorable than words printed in a smaller 18-point font, although font size does not affect actual memory. To clarify the basis of this font size effect on metamemory and memory, 4 experiments investigated how presenting words in 48 (Experiment 1) or 4 (Experiments 2 to 4) font sizes between 6 point and 500 point affected judgments of learning (JOLs) and recall performance. Response times in lexical decision tasks were used to measure perceptual fluency. In all experiments, perceptual fluency was lower for words presented in very small and very large font sizes than for words presented in intermediate font sizes. In contrast, JOLs increased monotonically with font size, even beyond the point where a large font impaired perceptual fluency. Assessments of people's metacognitive beliefs about font size revealed that the monotonic increase in JOLs was not due to beliefs masking perceptual fluency effects (Experiment 3). Also, JOLs still increased across the whole range of font sizes when perceptual fluency was made salient at study (Experiment 4). In all experiments but Experiment 4, recall performance increased with increasing font size, although to a lesser extent than JOLs. Overall, the current study supports the idea that metacognitive beliefs underlie font size effects in metamemory. As important, it reveals that people's font size beliefs have some accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record
... However, they can also refer to goal-unrelated cues, which may be less predictive of actual memory. In fact, people integrate multiple cues during metacognitive judgment formation (Koriat, 1997;Undorf et al., 2018). ...
Metacognition plays a role in environment learning (EL). When navigating, we monitor environment information to judge our likelihood to remember our way, and we engage in control by using tools to prevent getting lost. Yet, the relationship between metacognition and EL is understudied. In this paper, we examine the possibility of leveraging metacognition to support EL. However, traditional metacognitive theories and methodologies were not developed with EL in mind. Here, we use traditional metacognitive theories and approaches as a foundation for a new examination of metacognition in EL. We highlight three critical considerations about EL. Namely: (1) EL is a complex process that unfolds sequentially and is thereby enriched with multiple different types of cues, (2) EL is inherently driven by a series of ecologically relevant motivations and constraints, and (3) monitoring and control interact to support EL. In doing so, we describe how task demands and learning motivations inherent to EL should shape how metacognition is explored. With these considerations, we provide three methodological recommendations for investigating metacognition during EL. Specifically, researchers should: (1) instantiate EL goals to impact learning, metacognition, and retrieval processes, (2) prompt learners to make frequent metacognitive judgments and consider metacognitive accuracy as a primary performance metric, and (3) incorporate insights from both transfer appropriate processing and monitoring hypotheses when designing EL assessments. In summary, to effectively investigate how metacognition impacts EL, both ecological and methodological considerations need to be weighed.
... Zhao et al. (2020) found that as the encoding strength increased, the illusion of JOL caused by font size gradually disappeared. Undorf et al. (2018), Undorf and Bröder (2019), and Hertzog et al. (2013) argued that people will integrate multiple cues when making JOL, but there is no guarantee that individuals will use all given cues. That is, the role of some cues may be ignored by the individual or masked by other cues. ...
Do students learn better with texts that are slightly harder-to-read (i.e., disfluent)? Previous research has yielded conflicting findings. The present study identified the boundary condition that determines when disfluent texts benefit learning. We used eye-tracking to examine the joint influence of text legibility (fluent vs. disfluent) and signaling (signaling vs. non-signaling) on multimedia learning. The results revealed that both disfluent text and signaling led to better transfer test performance, and there was also an interaction between them. Specifically, the disfluent text led to better learning outcomes with or without signaling; however, in the fluent text condition, only signaling facilitated learning. Eye movement analyses indicated that signaling guided learners to pay more attention to important content in the learning materials. The current results suggest that signaling can enhance individuals’ perceived fluency or familiarity to the material and guide the attention during multimedia learning, and the positive impact of disfluency on multimedia learning seems to be more stable and ubiquitous. We discuss these under the framework of disfluency effect and attention-guiding effect.
... For example, people erroneously predict that their chances of remembering words increase with increasing font size (Luna et al., 2018;Mueller et al., 2014;Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Undorf & Zimdahl, 2019; but see Halamish, 2018). Systematic dissociations between JOLs and memory performance are incompatible with the idea that people base their JOLs directly on the strength of memory traces but rather suggest that people infer their JOLs from cues available during study (e.g., Koriat, 1997;Undorf et al., 2018). ...
Hindsight bias describes people's tendency to overestimate how accurately they have predicted an event's outcome after obtaining knowledge about it. Outcome knowledge has been shown to influence various forms of judgments, but it is unclear whether outcome knowledge also produces a hindsight bias on Judgments of Learning (JOLs). Three experiments tested whether people overestimated the accuracy of their memory predictions after obtaining knowledge about their actual memory performance. In all experiments, participants studied 60 cue-target word pairs, made a JOL for each word pair, and tried to recall the targets in a cued-recall test. In Experiments 1a and 1b, people recollected their original JOLs after attempting to recall each target, that is, after they obtained outcome knowledge for all items. In Experiments 2 and 3, people recollected their original JOLs in a separate phase after attempting to recall half the targets so that they had outcome knowledge for some but not all items. In all experiments, recollected JOLs were closer to actual memory performance than original JOLs for items with outcome knowledge only. Thus, outcome knowledge produced a hindsight bias on JOLs. Our results demonstrate that people overestimate the accuracy of their memory predictions in hindsight.
... We start with analyses of JOLs during study, followed by recognition performance. We then turn to JOL accuracy which we analyzed using the Goodman-Kruskal gamma coefficient, a back-sorting procedure based on Daniels et al. (2009), and a JOL binning procedure based on Undorf et al. (2018). ...
Two experiments examined the effect of prior knowledge on memory and metamemory for names and faces using famous 1960s and 2000s actors as the manipulation of prior knowledge. In Experiment 1, 66 participants studied the names of famous actors, half presented with their faces, with instructions to remember only the names. In Experiment 2, 56 participants studied the faces of these actors, half presented with their names, with instructions to remember only the faces. In both experiments, participants made immediate Judgments of Learning (JOLs) for each to-be-remembered stimulus followed by a test of recognition that used a Recollect/Familiar/No-Memory judgment. We found higher JOLs, recognition memory, and JOL accuracy for 2000s actors. Adding a name to a face or a face to a name increased JOLs while paradoxically decreasing memory. Back-sorting and binning analyses converged on the conclusion that immediate JOLs predicted memories accompanied by recollection but not familiarity.
... JOLs for remember items replicated previous findings showing higher retrieval predictions for emotional than neutral information (Hourihan & Bursey, 2017;Undorf et al., 2018). Although JOLs predicted better memory for negative than positive items, and better memory for positive than neutral items, actual recognition only confirmed better memory for negative item. ...
Directed Forgetting (DF) studies show that it is possible to exert cognitive control to intentionally forget information. The aim of the present study was to investigate how aware individuals are of the control they have over what they remember and forget when the information is emotional. Participants were presented with positive, negative and neutral photographs, and each photograph was followed by either a Remember or a Forget instruction. Then, for each photograph, participants provided Judgments of Learning (JOLs) by indicating their likelihood of recognizing that item on a subsequent test. In the recognition phase, participants were asked to indicate all old items, irrespective of instruction. Remember items had higher JOLs than Forget items for all item types, indicating that participants believe they can intentionally forget even emotional information—which is not the case based on the actual recognition results. DF effect, which was calculated by subtracting recognition for Forget items from Remember ones was only significant for neutral items. Emotional information disrupted cognitive control, eliminating the DF effect. Response times for JOLs showed that evaluation of emotional information, especially negatively emotional information takes longer, and thus is more difficult. For both Remember and Forget items, JOLs reflected sensitivity to emotionality of the items, with emotional items receiving higher JOLs than the neutral ones. Actual recognition confirmed better recognition for only negative items but not for positive ones. JOLs also reflected underestimation of actual recognition performance. Discrepancies in metacognitive judgments due to emotional valence as well as the reasons for underestimation are discussed.
... As compared to girls/women, why were boys/men more confident in their trial-by-trial confidence judgments? As mentioned in the Introduction, confidence judgments can be influenced by multiple theory-and experience-based factors (e.g., Undorf et al. 2018). The observed gender gap in confidence could be explained by differences in judgment cue use by girls/women and boys/men. ...
Prior research has found gender differences in spatial tasks in which men perform better, and are more confident, than women. Do gender differences also occur in people’s confidence as they perform number-line estimation, a common spatial-numeric task predictive of math achievement? To investigate this question, we analyzed outcomes from six studies (N = 758 girls/women and boys/men with over 20,000 observations; grades 1–5 and adults) that involved a similar method: Participants estimated where a provided number (e.g., ¾, 37) was located on a bounded number line (e.g., 0–1; 0–100), then judged their confidence in that estimate. Boys/men were more precise (g = .52) and more confident (g = .30) in their estimates than were girls/women. Linear mixed model analyses of the trial-level data revealed that girls’/women’s estimates had about 31% more error than did boys’/men’s estimates, and even when controlling for precision, girls/women were about 7% less confident in their estimates than were boys/men. These outcomes should encourage researchers to consider gender differences for studies on math cognition and provide pathways for future research to address potential mechanisms underlying the present gender gaps.
... As for the mechanism of JOLs, the most widely accepted theory is the cue-utilization framework proposed by Koriat (1997). According to the cue-utilization framework, JOLs are inference based on some available cues when people are making JOLs (Susser and Mulligan, 2015;Susser et al., 2017;Undorf et al., 2018Undorf and Bröder, 2020). JOLs are based on three different types of cues: intrinsic cues, extrinsic cues, and mnemonic cues. ...
Perceptual fluency is generally thought to affect judgments of learning (JOLs) non-analytically. However, some studies suggested that perceptual fluency may also affect JOLs analytically based on beliefs about the relationship between perceptual fluency and memory performance. The present study aimed to investigate how perceptual fluency affects JOLs. In Experiment 1, participants performed a continuous identification task and a JOLs task to determine whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs. In Experiment 2, we manipulated participants’ beliefs about how perceptual fluency affects memory to explore whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs through belief-based analysis. In Experiment 3, we explored whether participants who believed neither perceptual fluency nor font size affected memory performance still offered higher JOLs to large words than to small words, to explore whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs non-analytically. In Experiment 4, participants performed a continuous identification-JOLs task, and then they performed an observation task to measure their beliefs about fluency and memory. The results of the four experiments suggested that perceptual fluency affects JOLs both non-analytically and analytically based on beliefs about the relationship between perceptual fluency and memory performance.
... Metacognitive monitoring as a cue-driven process One framework within which monitoring can be understood is that of cue-utilization (Koriat 1997;Undorf et al. 2018;Vangsness and Young 2019). Cue utilization proposes that people monitor different sources of information while engaged in a task. ...
Accurate metacognitive monitoring improves performance in a variety of naturalistic contexts. However, the laboratory contexts used to study metacognition differ from naturalistic environments in important ways. Specifically, laboratory experiments require learners to make repeated, overt judgments that are thought to reflect underlying metacognitive processes. We conducted two research studies to determine how the frequency of overt prompts affects cue use, judgment accuracy, and performance. This was accomplished by manipulating the frequency with which participants made judgements of difficulty (JODs) while completing a primary task. We found that participants who made frequent overt prompts attended more strongly to peripheral cues than to central cues. Frequent overt prompts also had differing effects on performance and judgment accuracy: they reduced metacognitive accuracy in a visual search task (Experiment 1) and performance on a standardized exam (Experiment 2). Although our experiments do not identify a clear, causal agent that drives differences in performance and judgment accuracy, these results illustrate the interesting relationship between cue use and metacognitive monitoring.
... As compared to girls/women, why were boys/men more confident in their trial-by-trial confidence judgments? As mentioned in the Introduction, confidence judgments can be influenced by multiple theory-and experience-based factors (e.g., Undorf et al. 2018). The observed gender gap in confidence could be explained by differences in judgment cue use by girls/women and boys/men. ...
Prior research has found gender differences in spatial tasks in which men perform better, and are more confident, than women. Do gender differences also occur in people’s confidence as they perform number-line estimation, a common spatial-numeric task predictive of math achievement? To investigate this question, we analyzed outcomes from six studies (N = 758 girls/women and boys/men with over 20,000 observations; grades 1-5 and adults) that involved a similar method: Participants estimated where a provided number (e.g., ¾, 37) was located on a bounded number line (e.g., 0-1; 0-100), then judged their confidence in that estimate. Boys/men were more precise (g = .52) and more confident (g = .30) in their estimates than were girls/women. Linear mixed model analyses of the trial-level data revealed that girls’/women’s estimates had about 31% more error than did boys’/men’s estimates, and even when controlling for precision, girls/women were about 7% less confident in their estimates than were boys/men. These outcomes should encourage researchers to consider gender differences for studies on math cognition and provide pathways for future research to address potential mechanisms underlying the present gender gaps.
... It is also important to understand how people integrate cues when making JOLs (cf. Undorf and Bröder 2020;Undorf et al. 2018). Witherby and Tauber (unpublished data) investigated the impact of valence on JOLs when font size also varied. 2 Font size was manipulated because it typically has an impact on JOLs (for a review, see Mueller et al. 2014), and hence we could explore whether one cuevalence or font sizeovershadowed the other or whether they have a combined impact on the magnitude of JOLs. ...
When people monitor their memory, their judgments of how much they have learned are influenced by the emotional valence of the to-be-learned material. A challenge is to discover why emotion influences people’s monitoring judgments. Toward meeting this challenge, we discuss theory about how emotions may impact memory monitoring (through beliefs or experiences) and the prevailing evidence relevant to evaluating these theories. To foreshadow, our critical review of the evidence (a) suggests that people’s beliefs about the relation between emotion and memory partly explain the effect of emotion on monitoring and (b) reveals avenues for future research to more fully understand the role of emotion in memory monitoring.
... Metacognitive monitoring as a cue-driven process One framework within which monitoring can be understood is that of cue-utilization (Koriat 1997;Undorf et al. 2018;Vangsness and Young 2019). Cue utilization proposes that people monitor different sources of information while engaged in a task. ...
Recent publications have encouraged researchers to consider how metacognition affects users’ judgments of usability and workload by integrating metacognitive assessments with traditional testing paradigms. However, the repercussions of collecting these measures concurrently are unknown. We used a visual search task to determine how the frequency of metacognitive assessments affected metacognitive accuracy and performance. Frequent assessments did not impact performance on the focal task; however, they did reduce the accuracy of participants’ metacognitive judgments by about 7%. This finding suggests that researchers should consider context when selecting a metacognitive assessment strategy.
... Metcalfe and Kornell (2005) found that some people can quickly skip extremely difficult items, while Undorf and Ackerman (2017) found across several conditions that people invest as much time in memorizing the most difficult items as they invest in items of intermediate difficulty. Notably, all theories that explain these findings assume reliable identification of the most challenging items, based on reliable heuristic cues which are immediately available when the item is encountered (e.g., familiarity of the words, Benjamin 2005; concrete vs. abstract meanings, Undorf et al. 2018). Moreover, these heuristic cues are, again, all semantic and thus depend on the stimuli being verbal. ...
The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake in page 7, particularly in the second paragraph of “Procedure” section of Experiment 1: "… and only 0.3% of the answers were given in four seconds or more." The word "more" should be replaced with "less".
... Notably, all theories that explain these findings assume reliable identification of the most challenging items, based on reliable heuristic cues which are immediately available when the item is encountered (e.g., familiarity of the words, Benjamin, 2005; concrete vs. abstract meanings, Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018). Moreover, these heuristic cues are, again, all semantic and thus depend on the stimuli being verbal. ...
Meta-reasoning refers to processes by which people monitor problem-solving activities and regulate effort investment. Solving is hypothesized to begin with an initial Judgment of Solvability (iJOS)—the solver's first impression as to whether the problem is solvable—which guides solving attempts. Meta-reasoning research has largely neglected non-verbal problems. In this study we used Raven’s matrices to examine iJOS in non-verbal problems and its predictive value for effort investment, final Judgment of Solvability (fJOS), and confidence in the final answer. We generated unsolvable matrix versions by switching locations of elements in original Raven’s matrices, thereby breaking the rules while keeping the original components. Participants provided quick (4s) iJOSs for all matrices and then attempted to solve them without a time limit. In two experiments, iJOS predicted solving time, fJOS, and confidence. Moreover, although difficulty of the original matrices was dissociated from solvability, iJOS was misled by original matrix difficulty. Interestingly, when the unsolvable matrices were relatively similar to the originals (Experiment 2), iJOSs were reliable, discriminating between solvable and unsolvable matrices. When the unsolvable matrices involved greater disruption of the rules (Experiment 1), iJOS was not consistently predictive of solvability. This study addresses a gap in meta-reasoning research by highlighting the predictive value of iJOS for the solving processes that follow. The study also provides many future directions for meta-reasoning research in general, and regarding non-verbal problems, in particular.
... Thus, retrieval fluency, rather than the fluency at encoding, may have a stronger effect, drowning out the effects of congruence or encoding fluency (e.g. Dunlosky & Tauber, 2014;Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018). Jemstedt et al. discuss the concept of the cue landscape. ...
We examined the effects of processing fluency on metamemory for written music. In Experiment 1, piano players studied short sequences notated in either treble or bass clef by playing them on a silent keyboard with either their left or right hand, creating a congruent (fluent) and an incongruent (dysfluent) condition (hand/clef match or mismatch, respectively). A subsequent recognition test accompanied by confidence ratings (CRs) gauged retrospective metamemory. Items in the congruent conditions were recognized better (a desirable-difficulty effect), but CRs showed that participants were unaware of this memory difference. In Experiment 2, judgments of learning (JOLs) followed each studied sequence to gauge prospective metamemory. JOLs were higher in the congruent condition, although recognition was unaffected. In Experiment 3, whether the music was fingered on the silent keyboard or not did not influence results. These data are discussed within the framework of metacognitive theories that emphasize the importance of processing fluency.
... to the decision, as in the cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning (Koriat, 1997). In this line, the belief that font size affects memory does not prevent the use of other cues to rate perceived memorability (Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Undorf et al., 2018). Our results seem more consistent with this second perspective. ...
In this research we applied current theories of metacognition to study computer security and tested the idea that users’ password selection is affected by the metacognitive belief that if a password is memorable, then it is not secure. In two experiments, different types of eight‐character passwords and longer, more secure sentences were presented. Participants rated perceived memorability and perceived security of the passwords and indicated whether they would use them in a critical and in a non‐critical service. The results confirmed the belief. Sentences that are in fact highly secure and perceived as highly memorable were also perceived as weak passwords. The belief strongly affected password selection for critical services, but it had no effect on non‐critical services. In sum, long sentences are a particularly interesting type of password because they meet both security and memorability criteria, but their use is limited by a false belief.
... Such an assumption could also at least partly explain why extrinsic cues pertaining to the study situation rather than the item itself are often discounted (Koriat, 1997) because such cues are more relevant at the lower stages of processing and are already in integrated form when a metamemory decision is made. At the very least, it appears then that multiple cues can in fact be combined in making metacognitive decisions (e.g., Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018), even when one of the cues may not be utilized at all when presented separately. ...
We showed that judgments of learning (JOLs) were not affected by presentation modality in a list-learning task, although the typical font-size and loudness illusions emerged in that large-font visual presentations and loud auditory presentations elicited higher JOLs than their less intense counterparts. Further, when items were presented in both modalities simultaneously, large-font/quiet and small-font/loud items received similar JOLs (and were recalled similarly). Most importantly, when the intensity manipulation was compounded across modalities, the magnitude of the illusion increased beyond that observed in a single modality, showing the influence of combining cues. Whereas recall was still the same, large-font/loud items received higher JOLs than either small-font/loud items or large-font/quiet items, and not-intense items received very low JOLs. These differences emerged only when all conditions were presented within a single list and not in a between-subjects design, underscoring the importance of comparative judgments.
... First, it may have limited the resources available to process cues that could be used to reduce the uncertainty of the JOLs. Recent research has shown that most people can integrate at least four cues when making JOLs (Undorf, Söllner, & Bröder, 2018). However, with fewer resources available, participants may be limited in the number of cues they can integrate. ...
Items presented in large font are rated with higher judgments of learning (JOLs) than those presented in small font. According to current explanations of this phenomenon in terms of processing fluency or implicit beliefs, this effect should be present no matter the type of material under study. However, we hypothesized that the linguistic cues present in sentences may prevent using font size as a cue for JOLs. Experiment 1, with short sentences, showed the standard font-size effect on JOLs, and Experiment 2, with pairs of longer sentences, showed a reduced effect. These results suggest that linguistic factors do not prevent font size from being used for JOLs. However, Experiment 3, with both short and long sentences, showed an effect of font size only for the former and not the latter condition, suggesting that the greater amount of to-be-remembered information eliminated the font-size effect. In Experiment 4, we tested a mechanism to explain this result and manipulated cognitive load using the dot-memory task. The short sentences from Experiments 1 and 3 were used, and the results replicated the font-size effect only in the low-cognitive load condition. Our results are consistent with the idea that perceptual information is used to make JOLs only with materials such as words, word pairs, or short sentences, and that the increased cognitive load required to process longer sentences prevents using font size as a cue for JOLs.
Humans learn by watching others. One aspect of these observations are our Judgments of Difficulty (JODs) about a task. Research has revealed discrepancies in the judgments we make while performing and observing; these discrepancies are alternatively explained by the Simulation and Theory Models of metacognition. This study tested these models by capitalizing on a behavior that naturally occurs during observation: covert performance. We compared the cues to difficulty used by pure observers and covert performers as they watched an automated system (AS) perform a visual search task. Students used peripheral and central cues to difficulty similarly, regardless of whether they purely observed or covertly performed the task, lending support to the Theory Model of metacognition. The study offers an explanation for peoples’ inflated sense of ability while watching others perform and suggests that providing people with experience – not just observation– is a critical part of correcting these faulty judgments.
In the last decade, there has been increased interest in understanding how individuals monitor their memory for emotionally valenced information. Previous research has suggested that individual differences in remembering emotionally valenced information lead to different cues being used for monitoring. In this study, we examined whether depression level as an individual difference affects the monitoring of memory for emotional valence. The results showed that the high-dysphoria group rated the likelihood of recalling negative words higher than the low-dysphoria group did. In contrast, the low-dysphoria group rated positive words as more likely to be recalled later than neutral and negative words. Thus, depression was more sensitive to negative information during monitoring. This suggests that cognitive bias specific to depression also affects the monitoring of memory. Future research should further investigate the interaction between mood state and emotional valence of items.
Students increasingly control their learning as university instructors shift away from lecture formats, courses are offered online, and the internet offers near infinite resources for student-controlled informal learning. Students typically make effective choices about learning, including what to learn, when to learn, and how to learn, but sometimes make less-than-optimal study choices, including trying to study while multi-tasking. Dividing attention among various tasks impairs both learning and learners' control over their learning because secondary tasks divert cognitive resources away from learning and metacognition. This chapter reviews recent studies explaining how dividing attention affects students' metacognition, including their assessments of their own learning and the study choices that they make. This chapter reviews the fundamentals of metacognition, describes the impact of dividing attention on the effectiveness of learners' metacognition, and provides suggestions about how to enhance the efficacy of metacognition when students' attentional resources are limited.
This study explored whether age differences in task-specific metacomprehension accuracy are partly explained by age differences in generalized metacomprehension (GM) or the use of GM as a task-specific judgment anchor. GM was measured before and after a summarization and metacomprehension judgment task and then correlated with prediction judgment magnitude to assess anchoring, and correlated with comprehension and task-specific metacomprehension accuracy to assess GM accuracy. Age differences in these relationships were then tested. GM was related to judgment magnitude but despite age differences in GM ratings, age did not moderate anchoring or GM accuracy. Age differences in task-specific metacomprehension accuracy do not seem to be explained by age differences in GM accuracy or its use as a judgment anchor. However, results are the first to show that older adults anchor task-specific metacomprehension judgments on their GM, providing unique evidence for the Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Metacomprehension in advanced age.
Predictions of one’s future memory performance – judgments of learning (JOLs) – are based on the cues that learners regard as diagnostic of memory performance. One of these cues is word frequency or how often words are experienced in the language. It is not clear, however, whether word frequency would affect JOLs when other cues are also available. The current study aims to close this gap by testing whether objective and subjective word frequency affect JOLs in the presence of font size as an additional cue. Across three experiments, participants studied words that varied in word frequency (Experiment 1: high and low objective frequency; Experiment 2: a whole continuum from high to low objective frequency; Experiment 3: high and low subjective and objective frequency) and were presented in a large (48pt) or a small (18pt) font size, made JOLs, and completed a free recall test. Results showed that people based their JOLs on both word frequency and font size. We conclude that word frequency is an important cue that affects metamemory even in multiple-cue situations.
Authorities regulate online transactions to protect consumers from unintended negative consequences. Regulatory cues (e.g. certifications) enable consumers to identify formally approved online gambling offers where unauthorized products are available and blocking access is difficult. However, consumers who gamble online are also influenced by peer endorsement and frequently search for peer usage information to make decisions. This study investigates the interaction of regulatory and social cues and shows that these can be either complementary or substitutionary from a consumer perspective. Australian undergraduate students (N= 195, 72.3% female) indicated preferences toward fictitious online gambling websites in a discrete choice experiment involving active searching for cues. The impact of regulatory cues on decision-making increased when social cues indicated high quantities of website users, and when respondents lacked general trust toward gambling websites, but decreased when user social proximity was signaled. Our preliminary findings suggest regulatory cues should be prominent, and policies could aim to heighten mistrust in unauthorized sites. This study provides a foundation for further research designed to inform consumer protection agencies about how to influence consumer choice of online gambling websites in settings where regulatory and social cues may compete.
Metacognition is a broad term that means different things to researchers in different sub-areas. A major contribution of Anastastia Efklides is to bring together disparate approaches in metacognition under one theoretical perspective. In this paper, we examine the concept of fluency and how it has been employed in metacognition research. Fluency-based judgments are generally considered to be the primary source of inaccuracy of metacognitive judgments as well as the primary reason why metacognitive control goes astray in self-regulated learning. We discuss how and when fluent processing influences metacognition, when fluency leads to accurate judgments and when it leads to illusions.
JOL reactivity refers to the finding that making judgments of learning (JOLs) while studying material influences later memory for that material. Findings of JOL reactivity have been mixed, with some experiments reporting changes to memory when participants make JOLs and others finding no influence of JOLs. Soderstrom, Clark, Halamish, and Bjork (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(2), 553–558, 2015) proposed that JOL reactivity will only occur if the final test is sensitive to the same cues used to inform JOLs. The current study evaluated this account by manipulating the type of final test. In four experiments, participants studied mixed lists of related and unrelated word pairs and either made JOLs or did not make JOLs. Making JOLs generally enhanced memory for related word pairs when a cued-recall test was administered. However, during free recall, JOLs had no influence on memory for target information, likely because cue–target associations (which are used to inform JOLs) are less beneficial in the absence of cues. JOLs improved item recognition memory for words that were studied in related pairs, although the effect was small. Collectively, data from a meta-analysis of these experiments indicate that JOL reactivity depends on the type of final test, with reactivity most likely to occur when the final test is sensitive to the same cues used to inform JOLs. Future work should continue examining different tests and study materials in order to develop a comprehensive theory of JOL reactivity.
Judgments of learning (JOLs) are usually higher for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words, which has been attributed to beliefs about how word frequency affects memory. The main goal of the present study was to explore if identifying word frequency as a relevant cue is necessary for it to affect JOLs. The idea is that for one to base judgments in beliefs of how a variable affects memory, one must first consider that variable. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants studied a list of high- and low-frequency words, made immediate JOLs, and answered questions aimed at identifying the cues used to make those JOLs. The results showed that identifying word frequency as a cue was not necessary for effects on JOLs to occur, suggesting that some participants could not have used beliefs about how word frequency affects memory when making JOLs. In Experiment 3, we measured processing fluency of high- and low-frequency words through a lexical decision task. Participants identified high-frequency words quicker than low-frequency words, suggesting the former to be more fluently processed. In Experiment 4, we explored if response times in a lexical decision task mediated the effect of word frequency on JOLs. Results showed a significant mediation of 8–13%, depending on the analysis technique. We argue that theory-driven processes do not fully account for word frequency effects on JOLs.
Learners often allocate more study time to challenging items than to easier ones. Nevertheless, both predicted and actual memory performance are typically worse for difficult than for easier items. The resulting inverse relations between people’s predictions of their memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs) and self-paced study time (ST) are often explained by bottom-up, data-driven ST allocation that is based on fluency. However, we demonstrate robust inverted U-shaped relations between JOLs and ST that cannot be explained by data-driven ST allocation alone. Consequently, we explored how two models of top-down, strategic ST allocation account for curvilinear JOL-ST relations. First, according to the Region of Proximal Learning model, people stop quickly on items for which they experience too little progress in learning. Second, according to the Diminishing Criterion Model, people set a time limit and stop studying when this time limit is reached. In three experiments, we manipulated motivation with different methods and examined which model best described JOL-ST relations. Consistent with the Diminishing Criterion Model but not with the Region of Proximal Learning model, results revealed that curvilinearity was due to people setting a time limit.
Much is known about how the emotional content of words affects memory for those words, but only recently have researchers begun to investigate whether emotional content influences metamemory—that is, learners’ assessments of what is or is not memorable. The present study replicated recent work demonstrating that judgments of learning (JOLs) do indeed reflect the superior memorability of words with emotional content. We further contrasted two hypotheses regarding this effect: a physiological account in which emotional words are judged to be more memorable because of their arousing properties, versus a cognitive account in which emotional words are judged to be more memorable because of their cognitive distinctiveness. Two results supported the latter account. First, both normed arousal (Exp. 1) and normed valence (Exp. 2) independently influenced JOLs, even though only an effect of arousal would be expected under a physiological account. Second, emotional content no longer influenced JOLs in a design (Exp. 3) that reduced the primary distinctiveness of emotional words by using a single list of words in which normed valence and arousal were varied continuously. These results suggest that the metamnemonic benefit of emotional words likely stems from cognitive factors.
We examined how font sizes (18pt., 48 pt.) and font styles (regular, italic, bold) influenced younger and older adults' judgments of learning (JOLs) and recall. In Experiment 1 younger adults gave higher JOLs and obtained higher recall than older adults. However, JOLs and recall varied for both age groups as a function of font size and font style manipulations despite a tendency for both groups to predict higher recall for items in large and in regular and italic styles than for small and bold fonts and achieve higher recall for regular than italic or bold items. No age differences were found in relative accuracy, with near-perfect calibration in absolute accuracy for younger and older adults. Experiment 2 presented a description of Experiment 1 and asked participants to predict recall for the various font size/style combinations. Younger and older adults predicted higher recall for large than small font items, regardless of font style, and higher recall for bold than regular or italic styles, regardless of font size. Memory predictions did not align across experiments, suggesting that memory beliefs combine with processing fluency to affect JOLs and recall.
The experience of fluency while learning might bias students’ metacognitive judgments of learning (JOLs) and impair the efficacy of their study behaviors. In the present experiments, we examined whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs (1) when people only experience one level of fluency, (2) when item relatedness is also available as a cue, and (3) across study-test trials. Participants studied a list of paired associates over two study-test trials and made JOLs for each item after studying it. We varied the perceptual fluency of the memory materials by making the font easy (fluent) or difficult (disfluent) to read. We also varied whether we manipulated the perceptual fluency of the items between-participants or within-participants and whether other memory factors—item relatedness and study time—were available for participants to use to inform their JOLs. We were only able to obtain effects of perceptual fluency on JOLs when we manipulated fluency within-participants and eliminated item relatedness as a cue for JOLs. The present results indicate that some effects of perceptual fluency on JOLs are not robust and might only occur under limited—and somewhat contrived—conditions. Therefore, these effects might be unlikely to bias students’ JOLs in actual learning situations.
We examined two metacognitive judgments, ease of learning (EOL) and judgments of learning (JOL), in music performance. Specifically, we tested whether the extrinsic cue of modality (auditory versus visual presentation), as well as the intrinsic cue of syntax (providing more or less cohesion), would influence such judgments. The participants were piano players in Experiment 1 and other instrumentalists in Experiments 2 and 3. Results showed that modality of the to-be-learned pieces did indeed influence both EOL (all experiments) and JOL (Experiments 2 and 3) ratings. Both ratings were also influenced by syntax (Experiment 3). Thus, successful EOL and JOL were extended to music performance itself. Moreover, unlike in the verbal domain where individuals can often use intrinsic cues but ignore extrinsic cues, both types of cues were used effectively. The findings are interpreted within the framework of cue-utilization theory and salience of cues.
One's memory for past test performance (MPT) is a key piece of information individuals use when deciding how to restudy material. We used a multi-trial recognition memory task to examine adult age differences in the influence of MPT (measured by actual Trial 1 memory accuracy and subjective confidence judgments, CJs) along with Trial 1 judgments of learning (JOLs), objective and participant-estimated recognition fluencies, and Trial 2 study time on Trial 2 JOLs. We found evidence of simultaneous and independent influences of multiple objective and subjective (i.e., metacognitive) cues on Trial 2 JOLs, and these relationships were highly similar for younger and older adults. Individual differences in Trial 1 recognition accuracy and CJs on Trial 2 JOLs indicate that individuals may vary in the degree to which they rely on each MPT cue when assessing subsequent memory confidence. Aging appears to spare the ability to access multiple cues when making JOLs.
An individual’s memory of past test performance (MPT) is often cited as the primary cue for judgments of learning (JOLs) following test experience during multitrial learning tasks (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007, 2008). We used an associative recognition task to evaluate MPT-related phenomena, because performance monitoring, as measured by recognition test confidence judgments (CJs), is fallible and varies in accuracy across persons. The current study used multilevel regression models to show the simultaneous and independent influences of multiple cues on Trial 2 JOLs, in addition to performance accuracy (the typical measure of MPT in cued-recall experiments). These cues include recognition CJs, perceived recognition fluency, and Trial 2 study time allocation (an index of reprocessing fluency). Our results expand the scope of MPT-related phenomena in recognition memory testing to show independent effects of recognition test accuracy and CJs on second-trial JOLs, while also demonstrating individual differences in the effects of these cues on JOLs (as manifested in significant random effects for those regression effects in the model). The effect of study time on second-trial JOLs controlling on other variables, including Trial 1 recognition memory accuracy, also demonstrates that second-trial encoding behavior influence JOLs in addition to MPT.
A major decision that must be made during study pertains to the distribution, or the scheduling, of study. In this paper, we review the literature on the benefits of spacing, or spreading one's study sessions relatively far apart in time, as compared to massing, where study is crammed into one long session without breaks. The results from laboratory research provide strong evidence for this pervasive “spacing effect,” especially for long-term retention. The metacognitive literature on spacing, however, suggests that massing is the preferred strategy, particularly in young children. Reasons for why this is so are discussed as well as a few recommendations regarding how spacing strategies might be encouraged in real-world learning. While further research and applicability questions remain, the two fields—education and cognitive science—have made huge progress in recent years, resulting in promising new learning developments.
Maximum likelihood or restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimates of the
parameters in linear mixed-effects models can be determined using the lmer
function in the lme4 package for R. As for most model-fitting functions in R,
the model is described in an lmer call by a formula, in this case including
both fixed- and random-effects terms. The formula and data together determine a
numerical representation of the model from which the profiled deviance or the
profiled REML criterion can be evaluated as a function of some of the model
parameters. The appropriate criterion is optimized, using one of the
constrained optimization functions in R, to provide the parameter estimates. We
describe the structure of the model, the steps in evaluating the profiled
deviance or REML criterion, and the structure of classes or types that
represents such a model. Sufficient detail is included to allow specialization
of these structures by users who wish to write functions to fit specialized
linear mixed models, such as models incorporating pedigrees or smoothing
splines, that are not easily expressible in the formula language used by lmer.
Open access under: http://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13421-013-0380-z
Decision situations are typically characterized by uncertainty: Individuals do not know the values of different options on a criterion dimension. For example, consumers do not know which is the healthiest of several products. To make a decision, individuals can use information about cues that are probabilistically related to the criterion dimension, such as sugar content or the concentration of natural vitamins. In two experiments, we investigated how the accessibility of cue information in memory affects which decision strategy individuals rely on. The accessibility of cue information was manipulated by means of a newly developed paradigm, the spatial-memory-cueing paradigm, which is based on a combination of the looking-at-nothing phenomenon and the spatial-cueing paradigm. The results indicated that people use different decision strategies, depending on the validity of easily accessible information. If the easily accessible information is valid, people stop information search and decide according to a simple take-the-best heuristic. If, however, information that comes to mind easily has a low predictive validity, people are more likely to integrate all available cue information in a compensatory manner.
Research in metacognition (Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006) suggests bidirectional links between monitoring and control during learning: When self-regulation is goal-driven, monitoring affects control so that increased study time (ST) enhances judgments of learning (JOLs). However, when self-regulation is data-driven, JOLs are based on the feedback from control, and therefore JOLs decrease with ST under the heuristic that ease of encoding is diagnostic of successful recall. Evidence for both types of relationships occurring within the same situation was found for adults. We examined the development of the ability to respond differentially to data-driven and goal-driven variation in ST within the same task. Children in Grades 5 and 6 exhibited a positive ST-JOL relationship for goal-driven regulation and a negative relationship for data-driven regulation but never in the same task. In contrast, the JOLs and recall of 9th graders and college students yielded differential cosensitivity to data-driven and goal-driven variation. The 5th and 6th graders also evidenced an adult-like pattern of JOLs and recall under a partitioning procedure that helped them in factoring the variation in ST due to data-driven and goal-driven variation in ST. The results are discussed in terms of the metacognitive sophistication needed for considering both types of variation simultaneously in making metacognitive judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
Examined the degree to which individuals adapt their decision processes to the degree of interattribute correlation and conflict characterizing a decision problem. On the basis of an effort–accuracy framework for adaptive decision making, it was predicted that the more negatively correlated the attribute structure, the more people will use strategies that process much of the relevant information and make trade-offs. A computer simulation study supported these predictions, and 2 experiments using process-tracing techniques to monitor information acquisition indicated that individuals did indeed respond to interattribute correlation by shifting their processing strategies in ways that are adaptive according to the effort–accuracy framework. In particular, they faced conflict rather than avoided it and generally processed more information, were less selective, and showed more alternative-based processing in negatively correlated environments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Although successful retrieval practice is beneficial for memory, various factors (e.g., lag and criterion level) moderate this benefit. Accordingly, the efficacy of retrieval practice depends on how students use retrieval practice during learning, which in turn depends on accurate metacognitive monitoring. The present experiments evaluated the extent to which judgments of learning (JOLs) made after correct responses are sensitive to factors (i.e., lag and criterion level) that moderate retrieval practice effects, as well as which cues influence JOLs under these conditions. Participants completed retrieval practice for word pairs with either short or long lags between practice trials until items were correctly recalled 1, 3, 6, or 9 times. After the criterion trial for an item, participants judged the likelihood of recalling that item on the final test 1 week later. JOLs showed correct directional sensitivity to criterion level, with both final test performance and JOLs increasing as criterion level increased. However, JOLs showed incorrect directional sensitivity to lag, with greater performance but lower JOLs for longer versus shorter lags. Additionally, results indicated that retrieval fluency and metacognitive beliefs about criterion level--but not lag--influenced JOLs.
Judgements of learning (JOLs) are self-made predictions of the likelihood that one will later recall information. The influence of stimulus characteristics on JOLs and recall continues to receive attention, yet there are still a number of unexplored lexical word features that may exert an effect on mnemonic processing. Using a standard cue–target paradigm, we focused on the role of word age of acquisition (AoA) and evaluated the role of both cue and target AoA on responses. We replicated the robust delayed-JOL effect and used a novel items analysis approach to examine the relationship between intrinsic word features and accuracy and reaction times for both JOLs and recall. A consistent effect of target AoA was found, even after controlling for a range of covariates previously shown to impact JOLs and recall. These results expand the role of AoA in word processing and suggest that it is a key variable in memory and metacognition; they also support Koriat's (1997)8.
Koriat , A. 1997. Monitoring one's own knowledge during study: A cue-utilisation approach to judgments of learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 126(4): 349–370. View all references cue utilization framework.
A. Koriat's (1997) cue-utilization framework provided a significant advance in understanding how people make judgments of learning (JOLs). A major distinction is made between intrinsic and extrinsic cues. JOLs are predicted to be sensitive to intrinsic cues (e.g., item relatedness) and less sensitive to extrinsic cues (e.g., serial position) because JOLs are comparative across items in a list. The authors evaluated predictions by having people make JOLs after studying either related (poker-flush) or unrelated (dog-spoon) items. Although some outcomes confirmed these predictions, others could not be readily explained by the framework. Namely, relatedness influenced JOLs even when manipulated between participants, primacy effects were evident on JOLs, and the order in which blocks of items were presented (either all related items first or all unrelated items first) influenced JOLs. The authors discuss the framework in relation to these and other outcomes.
The study of metacognition has been attracting the attention of philosophers who are concerned with issues of agency, consciousness, and subjective experience because of the interest in subjective feelings and self-regulation. Optimal cognitive performance depends critically on the effectiveness of self-monitoring and self-regulation. This chapter focuses narrowly on experimental work on the metacognitive processes that occur during learning and remembering. This work is more tightly linked to issues discussed in the context of judgment and decision making. The bulk of the experimental work has concerned three types of judgments. First are judgments of learning (JOLs) elicited following the study of each item. Second are feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments that are elicited following blocked recall. The third are confidence judgments involving assessments about a response that has been produced.
Researchers have often determined how cues influence judgments of learning (JOLs; e.g., concrete words are assigned higher JOLs than are abstract words), and recently there has been an emphasis in understanding why cues influence JOLs (i.e., the mechanisms that underlie cue effects on JOLs). The analytic-processing (AP) theory posits that JOLs are constructed in accordance with participants' beliefs of how a cue will influence memory. Even so, some evidence suggests that fluency is also important to cue effects on JOLs. In the present experiments, we investigated the contributions of participants' beliefs and processing fluency to the concreteness effect on JOLs. To evaluate beliefs, participants estimated memory performance in a hypothetical experiment (Experiment 1), and studied concrete and abstract words and made a pre-study JOL for each (Experiments 2 and 3). Participants' predictions demonstrated the belief that concrete words are more likely to be remembered than are abstract words, consistent with the AP theory. To evaluate fluency, response latencies were measured during lexical decision (Experiment 4), self-paced study (Experiment 5), and mental imagery (Experiment 7). Number of trials to acquisition was also evaluated (Experiment 6). Fluency did not differ between concrete and abstract words in Experiments 5 and 6, and it did not mediate the concreteness effect on JOLs in Experiments 4 and 7. Taken together, these results demonstrate that beliefs are a primary mechanism driving the concreteness effect on JOLs.
According to analytic-processing theory, when people are asked to judge their future memory performance, they search for cues that will help them reduce their uncertainty for how well they will remember each item. For instance, many people believe that more fluently performing a task is related to better task performance. Thus, when studying items for an upcoming test, items that are believed to be more easily processed are expected to be judged as more memorable. To test this prediction, we had participants judge their learning of words presented for study in two colors (blue or green), because these colors were not expected to differentially impact processing fluency or memory. During the task instructions, some participants were led to believe that one color was easier to process than another, but nothing was mentioned about whether color was related to memory. Across multiple experiments, color did not consistently influence final test performance, whereas people’s judgments were significantly higher for words printed in the color that had been associated with more fluent processing. In a final experiment, a different instruction was used in which one color was associated with being more calming when read. For participant’s who believed that calming was associated with better memory, JOLs were higher for the words presented in the allegedly calming color. This evidence supports analytic-processing theory and further highlights the central (and sometimes subtle) role of people’s beliefs as they judge their learning.
The idea that two distinct modes of thought affect human cognition and behavior has received considerable attention in psychology. In the domain of metacognition, it is assumed that metacognitive judgments are based on both nonanalytic, experience-based processes and analytic, theory-based processes. This study examined whether the experience-based process of intuition underlies people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs). In four experiments, people made JOLs and took a test on compound remote associates, that is, groups of 3 words that were either remote associates of a single solution word (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). Previous research has shown that increased fluency of processing coherent triads produces brief positive affects that may underlie judgments. In all experiments, JOLs were higher for coherent than for incoherent triads. The same was true for recognition memory and free recall performance. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that coherent triads were processed more fluently (i.e., read more quickly) than incoherent triads. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the effect of semantic coherence on JOLs occurred for participants who were aware and unaware of relations between all three triad words, but was more pronounced for aware participants. In sum, this study demonstrates that intuition impacts JOLs over and above theory-based processes.
Studies have demonstrated that perceptual fluency—the ease of perceiving stimuli—does not contribute to higher predictions of future memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs) for words presented in a larger font (48 pt) than for words presented in a smaller font (18 pt). Here, we investigated whether stimulus size can affect JOLs through another mode of perceptual fluency. We presented stimuli that were initially so small as to be entirely unrecognizable but that gradually increased in size. Stimuli were pictures of common objects (Experiment 1), faces (Experiment 2), and words (Experiments 3 and 4). People indicated when they could identify the stimulus and then made a JOL. The time required for participants to identify each stimulus was our measure of perceptual fluency. In Experiments 1 to 3, we manipulated the speed of the clarification process across trials. Results showed that the less time it took to identify the clarifying stimuli, independent of clarification speed, the higher one’s JOLs. Moreover, fast clarification increased JOLs indirectly by decreasing identification time. In Experiment 4, one group of participants (learner group) could base JOLs on both perceptual fluency and beliefs about how stimulus size affects memory performance, while the other group (observer group) could base JOLs only on beliefs. Inverse relations between identification time and JOLs occurred only in the learner group. These results demonstrate that perceptual fluency may produce size effects on JOLs and support the idea that fluency is an important factor in JOLs.
The perceptual fluency hypothesis claims that items that are easy to perceive at encoding induce an illusion that they will be easier to remember, despite the finding that perception does not generally affect recall. The current set of studies tested the predictions of the perceptual fluency hypothesis with a picture generation manipulation. Participants identified mixed lists of intact images and images whose certain parts were deleted (generate condition) and made predictions about their subsequent memory performance, followed by a recall test. The intact condition always produced higher memory predictions and shorter identification latencies than the generate condition, consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis (Experiments 1 to 3). The actual memory performance for generate images was higher than intact images when aggregate judgments of learning (JOLs) were used (Experiment 1) and equivalent to intact images when item-by-item JOLs were used (Experiment 2 to 3). In Experiment 3, introducing a manipulation that facilitates naming latency for generate images did not increase JOL ratings, providing evidence that not all manipulations that facilitate the ease of perception produce higher JOLs. In Experiment 4, the role of a priori beliefs for the picture generation manipulation was assessed through an online questionnaire. Reading a scenario about the manipulation produced no JOL differences for intact and generate images. The results of the 4 experiments reported here are generally consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis of metamemory, and are discussed in terms of experience-based and theory-based processes in metamemory judgments and Koriat's (1997) cue utilization framework. (PsycINFO Database Record
Understanding people's metacognitive judgments: An isomechanism framework and its implications for applied and theoretical research People think about their thoughts and decisions a lot, such as when they judge how well they are performing a task or evaluate the quality of their decision processes and products. The accuracy of such judgments is important, because inaccurately judging progress on a task or the quality of a decision can lead to non-optimal behavior and decisions. Consider two illustrations. When students are preparing for an upcoming exam, they intermittently ask themselves, “Do I know this information well enough to correctly answer questions about it on the exam?” Overconfidence in making these judgments of learning can lead to premature termination of study and in turn to underachievement (Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012; for further details, see Metcalfe, Chapter 26 , this volume). Likewise, when radiologists evaluate a radiographic image, they often judge how confident they ...
Prior research has demonstrated that certain types of fluency can influence memory predictions, with more fluent processing being associated with greater memory confidence. However, no study has systematically examined whether this pattern extends to the fluency of motoric output. The current study investigated the effect of a motoric-fluency manipulation of hand dominance on judgments of learning (JOLs) and memory performance. Participants predicted better memory for fluently written than nonfluently written stimuli despite no differences in actual recall. A questionnaire-based study suggested that the effect of motoric fluency on predictions was not due to peoples' a priori beliefs about memory. These findings are consistent with other fluency effects on JOLs.
The cue-utilization view to judgments of learning (JOLs) assumes that both ease of processing during study and people's beliefs about memory may contribute to people's predictions on the likelihood of remembering recently studied information. However, a recent study (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(2), 378-384, 2013; Experiment 3) found that processing fluency does not contribute to the effect of pair relatedness on JOLs, that is, to higher JOLs for related paired associates as compared to unrelated paired associates. We investigated whether this finding primarily depends on specific aspects of the paired associates employed or on the measure of processing fluency used in the previous study. In our first two experiments, participants therefore studied lists with (a) uniformly high associative strengths versus (b) a wide range of associative strengths. Results showed that processing disfluency-operationalized as number of trials to acquisition in Experiment 1 and as self-paced study time in Experiment 2-partially mediated the effect of relatedness on JOLs for both types of lists. Finally, in Experiment 3, the contribution of processing fluency to the relatedness effect increased with study-test experience. Unlike Mueller et al., we thus found that processing fluency contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs. These findings are consistent with the assumption that ease of processing is an important basis for JOLs.
How are multiple variables integrated into a unitary response? This fundamental problem— integration of multiple variables—faces every field of psychology. Solid support for three exact mathematical integration laws—averaging, adding, multiplying—has been given by extensive empirical work by investigators in many countries. These three integration laws operate in almost every area of human psychology: person science, social attitudes, child development, learning/memory, language, psychophysics, and judgment—decision. These laws have nomothetic generality across persons and cultures together with idiographic capability for true measurement of personal, individual value. These integration laws are thus a foundation, both conceptual and empirical, for unifying psychological science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)
Historically, judgment research has been mainly concerned with identifying regularities in sensation (e.g., discriminability laws) and assessing judgment accuracy. More recently, the focus has shifted toward specifying the information processing mechanisms underlying judgment and modeling them, for example, as cognitive strategies. We contrast this strategy approach with previous prominent research programs on judgment and provide an overview of various process-level accounts that have been proposed in terms of computational models (e.g., compensatory and noncompensatory cue-abstraction strategies, evidence accumulation, exemplar processing, and parallel constraint satisfaction). Importantly, empirical investigations show that the cognitive processes underlying judgment differ considerably as a function of the individual's cognitive capacity and characteristics of the task environment (e.g., information cost, cognitive capacity, cue inter-correlations, relationship between cues and the to-be-judged criterion). We argue that these systematic contingencies in strategy use can be understood as adaptive responses to costs in learning, information acquisition, and strategy execution. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:665-681. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1259 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Evidence suggests that processing fluency affects many kinds of judgments. For instance, when words are presented either in large (48 point) or smaller (18 point) font sizes during study, people’s judgments of learning (JOLs) are higher for the words presented in the larger font size. This font-size effect presumably arises because items presented in a larger font size are easier to process at study, which in turn leads to higher JOLs. In the present studies, we evaluated this fluency hypothesis against an alternative one that the font-size effect occurs because people believe that words printed in a large font size are better remembered. In Experiments 1 and 2, we measured differences in processing fluency during study to evaluate whether fluency could account for any of the relationship between font size and JOLs. In Experiments 3a and 3b, college students read about the font-size experiment and then predicted whether hypothetical particpiants would better remember the large or smaller words. In Experiment 4, we evaluated whether the effect occurred for prestudy JOLs, which are made prior to studying the to-be-learned words and hence cannot be affected by processing fluency. Surprisingly, the evidence across experiments supported the belief hypothesis and did not support the fluency hypothesis. Thus, the font-size effect does not exemplify the effect of fluency on JOLs, and more generally, these outcomes suggest that measuring processing fluency is essential for establishing its role in people’s judgments and decision making.
The primary purpose of this study has been to give a methodological demonstration of the evaluation of responses to a random sample of test-situations. The specific problem of the perception of size has been used merely as an example. The subject, a graduate student in psychology, was interrupted at irregular intervals during the course of her daily activities, in various outdoor as well as indoor situations, and asked to indicate which linear extension happened to be most conspicuous to her at the moment. In each of these "life" situations, the subject had to give intuitive perceptual estimates of: (1) object size, (a) projective size (visual angle) and (3) distance. The 93 extensions thus obtained from one subject were found to be normally distributed when the logarithms of their measured bodily sizes were plotted. Further, the "ecological" correlation between two of the "geographic" stimulus variables characterizing each of the 93 situations was found to be far from perfect though positive when all size ranges were included. The responses consisted in numerical estimates of each of the extensions given by the subject in a series of five more or less natural attitudes. The results demonstrate again what is known as "perceptual size-constancy", namely the natural focusing of the perceptual system upon the distal stimulus variable "bodily size" and its comparative inability to respond to even such an outstanding mediating proximal stimulus-feature as the retinal proportions, even when an effort is made to do so. In conclusion, the network of abilities characteristic of a certain organism might thus eventually be mapped out in terms of the intimacy, or safeguardedness, of the rapport set up by the organism with the various vitally relevant issues in the nearer or more remote, physical or social regions of the geographic or historic environment.
The fluency of information encoding has frequently been discussed as a major determinant of predicted memory performance indicated by judgements of learning (JOLs). Previous studies established encoding fluency effects on JOLs. However, it is largely unknown whether fluency takes effect above and beyond the effects of item difficulty. We therefore tested whether encoding fluency still affects JOLs when numerous additional cues indicating the difficulty of an item are available as well. In three experiments, participants made JOLs for another participant while observing his or her self-paced study phase. However, study times were swapped in one experimental condition, so that items with short study times (indicating high fluency) were presented for long durations, whereas items with long study times (indicating low fluency) were presented for short durations. Results showed that both item difficulty and encoding fluency affected JOLs. Thus, encoding fluency in itself is indeed an important cue for JOLs that does not become redundant when difficulty information is available in addition. This observation lends considerable support to the ease-of-processing hypothesis.
A recent candidate for explaining metamemory judgments is the perceptual fluency hypothesis, which proposes that easily perceived items are predicted to be remembered better, regardless of actual memory performance (Rhodes & Castel Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137:615-625, 2008). In two experiments, we used the perceptual interference manipulation to test this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with intact and backward-masked words during encoding, followed by a metamemory prediction (a list-wide judgment of learning, JOL) and then a free recall test. Participants predicted that intact words would be better recalled, despite better actual memory for words in the perceptual interference condition, yielding a crossed double dissociation between predicted and actual memory performance. In Experiment 2, JOLs were made after each study word. Item-by-item JOLs were likewise higher for intact than for backward-masked words, despite similar actual memory performance for both types of words. The results are consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis of metamemory and are discussed in terms of experience-based and theory-based metamemory judgments.
Discovering how people judge their memories has been a major issue for metacognitive research for over 4 decades; many factors have been discovered that affect people's judgments, but exactly how those effects are mediated is poorly understood. For instance, the effect of word pair relatedness on judgments of learning (JOLs) has been repeatedly demonstrated, yet the underlying basis of this substantial effect is currently unknown. Thus, in three experiments, we assessed the contribution of beliefs and processing fluency. In Experiment 1, participants studied related and unrelated word pairs and made either prestudy JOLs or immediate JOLs. Participants gave higher estimates for related than for unrelated pairs, suggesting that participants' beliefs at least partially drive the relatedness effect on JOLs. Next, we evaluated the contribution of processing fluency to the relatedness effect either (1) by disrupting fluency by presenting half the pairs in an aLtErNaTiNg format (Experiment 2) or (2) by measuring how fluently participants processed pairs at study and statistically estimating the degree to which conceptual fluency mediated the effects of relatedness on JOLs (Experiment 3). Results from both experiments indicated that fluency contributes minimally to the relatedness effect. Taken together, these results indicate that people's beliefs about how relatedness influences memory are responsible for mediating the relationship between relatedness and JOLs. In general, empirically establishing what mediates the effects of other factors on people's judgments remains a major agenda for advancing theory of metacognitive monitoring.
Taking part in an experiment is "a special form of social interaction." The S plays a role and places himself under the control of the E; he may agree "to tolerate a considerable degree of discomfort, boredom, or actual pain, if required to do so." The very high degree of control inherent in the experimental situation itself may lead to difficulties in experimental design. The S "must be recognized as an active participant in any experiment." With understanding of factors intrinsic to experimental context, experimental method in psychology may become a more effective tool in predicting behavior in nonexperimental contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
College students rated the likelihood of recall of individual words presented for free recall learning. Predictions were made using a 7-point scale immediately following an item's presentation in the list. To-be-rated items included those presented 1 time as well as items presented twice in either a massed (MP) or distributed (DP) manner. Twice-presented items were rated as more likely to be recalled than items presented once, and they were recalled as such. However, although MP items were judged more likely to be recalled than DP items, they were not. The finding that Ss misjudged when they knew MP items suggests why processing may be less for massed than for distributed presentations. Results support the attenuation of attention hypothesis regarding the spacing effect in free recall. (12 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The process of vicarious functioning, by which equivalent judgments can result from different patterns of cues, is central to any theory of judgment. It is argued that both linear regression and process-tracing models capture the various aspects of vicarious functioning: the former by dealing with the ambiguities that the organism faces with regard to the substitutions and trade-offs between cues in a redundant environment, and the latter by dealing with cue search and attention. Furthermore, although the surface structures and levels of detail of the 2 models are different, it is shown that process-tracing protocols can be generated via a general additive rule. Therefore, both types of models can be capturing the same underlying process, although at different levels of generality. Two experiments in which both models are built and tested on the same data are presented. In Exp I, experienced MMPI users made diagnostic judgments of the degree of adjustment/maladjustment from MMPI profiles; in Exp II, 1 S evaluated the nutritional quality of breakfast cereals. Results are discussed with respect to (a) links between judgment, choice, and task structure; (b) rule generality and awareness; and (c) advantages of a multimethod approach. (74 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
How do people monitor their knowledge during acquisition? A cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning (JOLs) is outlined, distinguishing 3 types of cues for JOLs: intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. In 4 experiments using paired-associates learning, item difficulty (intrinsic) exerted similar effects of JOLs and recall. In contrast, the extrinsic factors of list repetition, item repetition within a list, and stimulus duration affected JOLs less strongly than recall, supporting the proposition that extrinsic factors are discounted in making JOLs. Although practice impaired calibration, increasing underconfidence, it did improve resolution (i.e., the recall-JOL correlation). This improvement was seen to reflect a shift in the basis of JOLs with practice, from reliance on intrinsic factors, towards greater reliance on mnemonic-based heuristics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: (a) the discovery of less-is-more effects; (b) the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; (c) an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; (d) the development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an “adaptive toolbox;” and (e) the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people’s adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies.
Prior research suggests that older adults judge their learning as well as young adults, but given age-related differences in the processing of emotional materials, older adults may show deficits in their judgment accuracy when they study emotionally charged words. In 2 experiments, we evaluated this possibility by having young and older adults study negative, positive, and neutral words. They made a judgment of learning (JOL) after studying each word and then later had a free recall test. In Experiment 1, young and older adults' JOLs were sensitive to negative words (higher JOLs for negative than neutral words). By contrast, whereas young adults' JOLs were sensitive to positive emotion (higher for positive than neutral words), older adults' JOLs were insensitive. In Experiment 2, we replicated this age-related deficit in sensitivity to positive emotion, as well as evaluated possible explanations for it. As important, in both experiments, JOLs were plotted as a function of input serial position, and the shape of these curves were not influenced by emotional valence or age group. Taken together, these results indicate that healthy aging largely leaves judgments of learning intact for negatively charged words. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
The ordinary policy capturing paradigm that focuses on cue-judgement relations is too limited to serve as a basis for a theoretical understanding of human judgement. To get on, we need a Brunswikian approach with a representation of both the task and the judge. Three stable results from studies with linear models are discussed from that perspective. Following Einhorn et al. (1979), the result that linear models usually fit judgement data well is explained by reference to the fact that linear models capture an essential feature of human judgement, viz., vicarious functioning. For the result that judges are inconsistent and that inconsistency varies with the predictability of the judgement task, the theory of quasi-rationality proposed by Hammond and Brehmer (1973) is invoked. Finally, it is argued that the wide interindividual differences in policies usually found show that the level of analysis is inappropriate. A given level of achievement can be reached by many different combinations of weights, and we should not be surprised to find wide interindividual differences at the policy level. We must search for stability at the level of achievement and those aspects that affect achievement, rather than at the level of cue utilisation coefficients.
Emotionality is a key component of subjective experience that influences memory. We tested how the emotionality of words affects memory monitoring, specifically, judgments of learning, in both cued recall and free recall paradigms. In both tasks, people predicted that positive and negative emotional words would be recalled better than neutral words. That prediction was valid for free recall of positive, negative, and neutral words, but invalid for cued recall of negative word pairs compared to neutral and positive pairs; only positive emotional pairs showed enhanced recall relative to neutral pairs. Consequently, people exhibited extreme overconfidence for cued recall of negative word pairs on the first study-test trial. We demonstrate that emotionality does not globally enhance memory, but rather has specific effects depending on the valence and task. Results are discussed in terms of this complex relationship between emotionality and memory performance and the subsequent variations in diagnosticity of emotionality as a cue for memory monitoring.
The article reports four experiments that examine people's ability to predict the outcome of a future test of memory. Our thesis is that memory predictions are implicit judgments of how easily the item is processed while answering the predictive question. If items are processed easily because of factors that also cause memory to succeed, predictions are accurate; if the factors that cause easy processing are irrelevant for memory, predictions are less accurate. The experiments examine factors that influence the prediction taks and the memory test separately; these include item attributes, manner of processing, repetition, and similarity of processing between the prediction task and the memory test. Predictions are most accurate if the prediction task entails the same processes as the test, even if the predictive question is nominally irrelevant to the test; predictions are less accurate if the task and test have different entailments, even if the nominal question is specifically aimed at the test.
This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness,
which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process
B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a
class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical
prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead
to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could
improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
Prior work has suggested that participants use a memory-for-past-tests (MPT) heuristic for judgments of learning (JOLs) in a multitrial learning scenario. That is, when learning the same material in multiple sessions, previous memory performance can be used as a basis for later memory predictions. We explored this issue by evaluating the impact of healthy aging on the use of MPT across trials. Young adults and healthy older adults learned pairs of words, made JOLs, and received a memory test in three study-test trials on the same material. Results indicated that both young and older adults relied on MPT as a basis for JOLs and changes in MPT across trials were nominal. Further, only the most-recent past test influenced JOLs, whereas earlier tests were unrelated to later judgments. JOLs were also influenced by prior-trial JOLs and were related to subsequent memory performance on the same trial. We suggest that these data support both indirect- and direct-memory mechanisms as the bases for the MPT heuristic. Further, in a multitrial learning scenario, in which the same information was being learned, young and older adults used the same bases for their JOLs.