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1. Introduction
Since 2009, Boko Haram has become well-known
in Western media due to its violent attacks
mainly in the northern part of Nigeria. Currently,
it is able to carry out terrorist acts not only within
the territory of Nigeria, but also in neighbouring
countries. Formation of this movement has been
put into the connection with a general Islamic
revivalist movement as well as with the failure of
the state in Nigeria. However, author of this text
argues, that its operation in the northern
Nigerian states such as Borno is enabled also by
the environmental conditions. Desiccation of the
Lake Chad has had an impact on human security
in the region. Population has become more
vulnerable due to these environmental changes
and therefore, it became an easy target for Boko
Haram’s violent actions and in some respect, it
even supported it. Many has been written about
the origin of Boko Haram (e.g., Adesoji 2011;
Agbiboa 2013b), their strategies (e.g., Agbiboa
2013a) and regional consequences (e.g., Thurston
2016). However, this article offers an alternative
view on this organization from different
perspective, relying to a large extent on analysis
of environmental factors causing insurgencies
and violence.
From the methodological point of view, this text
is an intrinsic case study (Ženka & Kofroň 2012).
This approach has been adopted since
Desiccation of Lake Chad as a cause
of security instability in the Sahel region
Kateřina Rudincová
1
*
1
Department of Geography, Faculty of Sciences, Humanities and Education,
Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic
* Corresponding author: katerina.rudincova@tul.cz
Abstract: The Lake Chad basin is one of the most unstable regions in Africa. The lake itself
has shrunk and nowadays it covers less than 10 % of its area in 1960. These environmental
changes have wider geopolitical consequences in the whole region, which encompasses
countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Therefore, it seems that environmental
threats may act as the detonators for larger political conflict as well as for a struggle for land
and may cause growing instability in affected countries. The region is fragile, owing to the fact
that several terrorist and Islamist groups are operating there. The most serious threat in the
Lake Chad basin is militant Islamist group Boko Haram, which is based in north eastern
Nigeria, but it is also active in neighbouring countries. As a result of both ecological changes
and security threats, people are losing their traditional sources of income from herding and it
is likely that there will be large waves of migration from the area. The paper focuses on the
environmental challenges in the Lake Chad basin and their effect on the security in the region.
The main attention will be paid to the strategies and actions of militant terrorist groups such as
Boko Haram that will be analysed in the wider regional geopolitical context.
Key words: Lake Chad, Boko Haram, Nigeria, terrorism, environmental issues
Highlights for public administration, management and planning:
• It is necessary to increasingly address the environmental causes of human insecurity in the
region as precursors of the deprivation of living conditions and political unrest.
• Cooperation between the states in the Lake Chad Basin and international organizations is
crucial in order to fight terrorism in northern Nigeria effectively.
Received: 17 Oct 2017 – Received in revised form: 22 Dec 2017 – Accepted: 22 Dec 2017
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„qualitative case study is an approach to research
that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon
within its context“ (Baxter & Jack 2008, p. 544).
Therefore, the main aim of this text is to
determine if the desiccation of Lake Chad affects
the security issues in the analysed region.
Moreover, the emergence of Boko Haram is
studied in connection with the broader issues of
terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in Africa.
Concerning outline of this paper, the first part
deals with the theoretic framework and evaluates
the impact of the environmental changes on the
conflict potential, applied on the case study of
the Lake Chad Basin. It deals with the
environmental and socio-economic issues in the
Lake Chad basin and tries to evaluate possible
causes of the emergence of Boko Haram in
northern Nigeria. Second part of the article is
dedicated to the analysis of formation of Boko
Haram, its ideology and strategies. The final part
of the text puts the Boko Haram operation into
wider geopolitical regional context and evaluates
its possible cooperation with other Islamist
terrorist groups in the region.
2. Causes of insecurity in northern Nigeria
Recently, there have been vast literature
published on the causality between climate
change and violent conflict (e. g., Scheffran et al.
2012; Homer-Dixon 1994; Homer-Dixon &
Deligiannis 2009). On one hand, some authors
argue, that climate change influences resource
scarcities, which leads to a violent conflict (e.g.,
Burke et al. 2009). On the other, there are
authors who argue, that climate change itself
does not produce conflict, but it is the lack of
adaptability of governments and their
effectiveness which may lead to conflict over
resources (e.g., Barnett & Adger 2007; Salehyan
2008; Cook & Bakker 2012).
Okpara et al. (2015) classify three key lineages
between water and conflict: (i) decline of water
quality may act as a source of the conflict; (ii) the
importance of water for livelihoods creates
a source of conflict, and (iii) inadequate water
management affects potential for conflict. In the
case of Lake Chad, particularly the second cause
is observed (see Coe & Foley 2001) which means
that people are mostly deprived of their sources
of livelihood caused by the desiccation of water
sources in the region. As a consequence, they
have become more vulnerable to various kinds of
violence including Boko Haram attacks.
As the previous research suggests, the
desiccation of water sources in sub-Saharan
Africa and scarcity of water serve as
environmental push elements causing migration
of thousands of people (Lonergan 1998).
Deteriorating security situation then makes it
difficult for environmental NGOs to work
effectively in order to stop water resources
degradation (Slavíková et al. 2017). Moreover,
environmental problems connected to drylands
and scarcity of water resources may serve as
causal factors of conflicts (Spiess 2005, p. 831).
However, the scarcity of resources should not be
understood as a single cause of the conflicts.
Instead, it is important to deal with it only as it
was one of the factors contributing to the
emergence of multi-causal conflicts (Hagmann
2005).
Similarly, even though Boko Haram is a rigid
Islamic movement, its emergence may not be
seen only in connection with religious revivalism
and religious ideology, but it also has to be
studied and analysed in connection with the
deprivation of living standards of local population
in northern Nigeria caused to a certain extent by
environmental factors. Jeffrey Seul (1999)
suggests in his article entitled “Ours is the Way of
God” that religion serves solely as an unifying and
mobilising identity and it is not itself a source of
conflicts. Therefore, we may understand the
origin of Boko Haram in connection to deeply
rooted economic, religious and environmental
factors.
Currently, significant part of Sub-Saharan Africa
contends with the environmental and ecological
changes, which are manifested mainly by the
desertification of the Sahel region. The Lake Chad
desiccation, which is the most serious
environmental threat in the region, has both
natural as well as anthropogenic causes. Since
1960s, rainfall in the Chad basin has decreased
significantly and at the same time, the usage of
water for irrigation has increased in order to
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ensure income from agriculture. As a result, the
area of Lake Chad itself has been reduced from
around 25 000 km
2
in 1963 to around 1350 km
2
in
2001 (Coe & Foley 2001, p. 3349; Fig. 1). The
desiccation of the lake has had a great impact on
local population which has been to certain extent
economically dependent on fishing and cattle
herding (Onuoha 2008; Béné et al. 2003).
Therefore, climate change have inflicted serious
human security issues in this area causing the
change of livelihood of about 750 000 people
(Coe & Foley 2001, p. 3349). Wolf et al. (2003)
even identified Lake Chad among the lakes with
the highest potential risk for socio-political stress.
As a response to these changes in the Lake Chad
basin, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) called the deteriorating situation in this
region an ‘ecological catastrophe’ and predicted
the lake to disappear in the horizon of one
century, which may have a devastating impact on
population in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger
(Salkida 2012).
Fig. 1 − Desiccation of the Lake Chad between 1963 and 2007 (source: Rekacewicz 2008)
The worsening ecological conditions in Lake Chad
basin have serious impact on the living conditions
of local population. As Daniel Agbiboa (2013a;
2013b) suggests, therefore, the causes of Boko
Haram’s successful violent campaign in northern
Nigeria may be explained by the relative
deprivation theory. According to this approach,
“violent actions flourish within a context of
grievances caused by relative deprivation”, which
means the discrepancy between what people
would like to have and what they actually have or
they could get. The insurgencies originated in the
northern part, which is the most socio-
economically deprived part of the country, since,
in this environment, radical Islamic groups are
able to challenge the state power and
successfully promote their ideas.
According to Nigerian statistical office, the region
of Northern Nigeria is the least developed. The
literacy in Nigeria differs significantly in the
southern and northern states of the country, with
the lowest literacy rate in the Borno State in
northern Nigeria which reaches only 14.5%
(UNESCO 2012). Northern part of the country has
to deal with the economic issues as well. For
example, the unemployment rate reached even
42.6% in the Zamfara state in 2012 (National
Bureau of Statistics 2012). Unemployment is one
of the most important factors which contribute
negatively to the security in northern Nigeria.
As Sope Elegbe, Research Director of the Nigerian
Economic Summit Groups (NESG) stated: “The
increasing poverty in Nigeria is accompanied by
increasing unemployment. […] Mix this situation
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with radical Islam, which promises a better life for
martyrs, and you can understand the growing
violence in the north. [...] If you link a lack of
education and attendant lack of opportunities to
a high male youth population, you can imagine
that some areas are actually a breeding ground
for terrorism” (cit. in Rogers 2012, p. 4).
Therefore, the emergence of radical groups in
this region is enabled to a large extent by socio-
economic factors. For local population
the recruitment by militant movement may be
then an opportunity to improve its living
conditions.
3. Boko Haram – origin, ideology and strategy
Political development in Nigeria is highly
influenced by the cleavages between Christians
and Muslims. The country is divided into
predominantly Christian south and Islamic north.
Because of the religious diversity and cleavages in
Nigerian society, the 1999 constitution states
explicitly in the Article 10, that “the Government
of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any
religion as State Religion” (Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). Nevertheless,
Islamic sharia law has been introduced in the
northern Nigerian states, which in some cases,
such as in Kaduna State, which is half Christian,
led to a violent confrontation between Muslims
and Christians (Agbiboa 2013a, p. 68). Religious
cleavages are closely interlinked with the ethnic
factor. As it is illustrated by the case of local
conflict in Jos in Plateau state between Hausa and
other ethnic groups such as Afizere or Anaguta in
2008, “the battle for supremacy between Hausa
and Fulani settlers and indigenes… has been
largely exploited by religious bigots and political
jobbers” (Ojie & Ewhrudjakpor 2009, p. 12).
Therefore, religion serves as a mobilization factor
and overarching factor for deeply rooted conflict
in the country.
The ideological roots and origins of Boko Haram
may be traced back to the era of independence in
1960 which was followed by the rise of radical
Islamist Maitatsine movement in 1970s (see e.g.
Adesoji 2010). Eventually, the renaissance of
Sheikh Usman dan Fodio’s ideas of holy war
(jihad) and advancement of conservative practice
of Islam by this movement led to violent clashes
between Maitatsine members and government
forces in Kano in December 1980 and
consequently in Maiduguri in October 1982
(Agbiboa 2013a, p. 71). Moreover, as Roman
Loimeier (2012, p. 138) states, the Boko Haram
movement is “a result of social, political and
generational dynamics within the larger field of
northern Nigerian radical Islam, as represented
most prominently by the Yan Izala movement”.
Origins of this movement date back to 1978 when
it was founded by Sheikh Ismaila Idris in Jos,
Plateau State, Nigeria. It is a Sufi movement
which main aim is to fight everything which is
considered to be a bid´a or non-Islamic elements
in the northern Nigerian society. These Western
influences have been brought to Nigeria to
a large extent by British colonizers. During the
colonial era, the British style of education,
clothing and way of life were introduced. At the
same time, Western education and British
colonial schools supplanted traditional Islamic
education and therefore, it was perceived to be
an instrument of colonization and Westernization
of Nigerian society (Loimeier 2012, p. 139).
The fight against non-Islamic elements within
Nigerian society is enshrined also in the nickname
of the organization Boko Haram. It is
a combination of Hausa word Boko which means
book and Arabic word Haram meaning something
which is forbidden. In a broader sense, Boko
Haram means ‘Western education if forbidden’ or
‘Western education is a sin’. This name denotes
inclination of this group to radical Islamic
teaching which rejects most Western ideas as un-
Islamic (Onuoha 2014, p. 3). Nevertheless, acting
leader of Boko Haram Mallam Sanni Umaru in
2009 rejected the designation ‘Western
Education is forbidden’ and instead stated that
they prefer explanation of the movement’s name
as “Western culture is forbidden”, since “…the
first gives the impression that we are opposed to
formal education coming from the West…which is
not true, the second affirms our belief in the
supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for
culture is broader, it includes education but not
determined by Western Education” (Onuoha
2012, p. 2). However, members of this
organization themselves use the Arabic
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designation ‘Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah
wa'l-Jihād’ which means in English translation
“Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and
Jihad”. In 2015, this organization changed its
name to ‘Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah’ (in English
translation Islamic State West Africa Province,
ISWAP) which suggests its attachment to Islamic
State. The main objective of this organization is
to “replace the secular Nigerian state with
a regime adhering to strict Islamic sharia law,
applicable throughout the entire country”
(Onuoha 2014, p. 3).
Concerning organization of Boko Haram
movement, until 2009 it was led by Mohammed
Yusuf, who was killed during the uprising and
sectarian violence in June of that year. After his
death he was replaced by Abubakar Shekau, who
served until then as a deputy leader of the
movement. Yusuf and nowadays Shekau have
served as the commanders in chief (Amir ul-Aam)
of the entire movement. They have had two
deputies (Na´ib Amir ul-Aam I & II). Moreover,
each state where Boko Haram operates have had
its own commander or leader (amir) (Agbiboa
2013a, p. 72). Members of this movement
include university lecturers, political elites,
unemployed graduates and also foreign recruits.
They are mostly drawn from Kanuri tribe
concentrated in north eastern Nigerian states
including Bauchi and Borno, and the Hausa-Fulani
tribe which is prominent ethnic group in northern
part of the Country (Agbiboa 2013a, p. 72).
According to the analysis of CLEEN Foundation,
the main motivation for recruitment of young
Nigerians into this movement include “ignorance
of religious teaching opposed to violence”,
unemployment and poverty, difficult upbringings,
law level of literacy and widespread corruption
(Onuoha 2014; CLEEN foundation 2014).
Ideology of the movement is inspired by deeply
traditional Islamism and it is based on the
rejection of all Western and anti-Islamic
influences, as mentioned above. It may be
illustrated, e.g. by the statement of Boko Haram’s
leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009: “Our land was
an Islamic state before the colonial masters
turned it to a kafir (infidel) land. The current
system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs” (cit. in
Agbiboa 2013a, p. 73). Therefore, the idea of
establishment of Islamic caliphate in the region is
an important part of Boko Haram’s ideology.
However, it is important to stress, that Boko
Haram may not be perceived and understood as
a monolithic organization with unified aims and
ideology. In fact, it consists of many separate
factions, each of them has different strategies
and objectives, from time to time competing
between each other (Agbiboa 2013a, p. 75). As
James Forest (2012, p. 3) suggests, there may
have been a split of Boko Haram into three
territorially and ethnically based factions: Kogi
Boko Haram, Kanuri Boko Haram, and Hausa
Fulani Boko Haram.
Currently, Boko Haram is well organized by the
number of fluid cells and has developed an
organized structure. It is led by about 30-
members advisory council (Shura) and its
members are divided into specialized
departments. The tactics of the movement
includes suicide bombings, kidnappings,
intelligence gathering, target selection and
surveillance. Specialized departments also
construct explosive devices, plant explosives at
target sites, steal cars for use in attacks, engage
security forces and recruit and train new
members (Stratfor 2014).
As it comes from the Fig. 2, the Boko Haram’s
violent activity is concentrated mainly in the
northern part of Nigeria, especially in the states
of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. However, in 2014
the attacks were carried out in a large extent also
in the Kano State.
The movement’s actions are based on donations
from its members and from abroad. It is
interlinked with other Islamist groups operating
in the region, such as al-Qaeda in Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), from which Boko Haram
acquires ideological as well as material and
financial support. Its links to other terrorist
organization, oriented to al-Qaeda, enables Boko
Haram to get support from groups in Saudi Arabia
and the UK as well as from Islamic organizations
such as Al Muntada Trust Fund and the Islamic
World Society. Moreover, in 2011, a spokes-
person of the movement, Abul Qaqa admitted
the direct links to al-Qaeda: “It is true that we
have links with Al-Qaeda. They assist us and we
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assist them” (Vanguard 2011). However, in this
respect, it is not clear whether the connection
between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda is based on
a practical basis, or if it is simply only rhetorical
expression of support. The activities of Boko
Haram are financially supported also by officials
from northern Nigerian states such as governors
of Kano and Bauchi States. Besides that, Boko
Haram members are involved in illegal activities
in the region, e.g. bank robberies or weapon
trafficking from which they get materials as well
as finances for movement’s operations (Agbiboa
2013a, p. 74).
Fig. 2 − Evolution of Boko Haram Small Arms Violence
(source: Stratfor 2014)
4. Boko Haram in a wider regional perspective
In 2009, Boko Haram became well-known for
Western media when it staged an anti-
government campaign which ended with terrorist
attacks that killed more than eight hundred
civilians and security personnel. The uprising
ended with the arrest of Boko Haram’s leader,
Mohammed Yusuf in June 2009. Another widely
publicized incident connected to this movement
is kidnapping of more than two hundred school
girls in Chibok in north-east Nigeria in 2014
(Onuoha 2014, p. 2). However, nowadays, the
movement is able to conduct terrorist attacks not
only within the territory of Nigeria, but also
neighbouring countries, for example, attacks in
south eastern Niger in February 2015, suicide
bombings in Chadian capital N´Djamena in July
2015, or increasing number of suicide bombings
in Cameroon at the beginning of 2016.
Transnational nature of this movement may be
illustrated by the successful attraction of foreign
nationals from neighbouring countries, mainly
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, caused by the
charismatic teaching of Mohammed Yusuf in the
early stages of its existence (Onuoha 2014, p. 3).
Neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon served
as a safe haven for Boko Haram’s fighters after its
defeat and death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009.
Movement had enough space and time to
reorganize and to recruit more members and to
prepare for its return to Nigeria (Maiangwa 2013,
p. 2). The recruitment of foreigners continued
even in the later stages of the existence of this
movement, for example, in 2012 it recruited
number of youths in Diffa in Niger. Generally, the
neighbouring states are themselves vulnerable to
the terrorist attacks, since they are fragile and
poor, characteristic by the low values of the
Human Development Index and scarcity of
economic opportunities for the young
generation. Areas of these states bordering with
Nigeria are part of the Lake Chad Basin and
therefore exhibit very similar environmental
characteristics. In this respect, environmental
factors may contribute to the growth of Boko
Haram not only in northern Nigeria, but also in
border areas of Niger, Cameroon and Chad.
Besides, Boko Haram casts Nigerien President
Issoufou and Chadian President Deby as apostate
Muslims and criticize them for their cooperation
with the West. Therefore, the operation and
existence of Boko Haram may not be perceived as
solely Nigerian problem, but it is a serious
regional issue. Because of that fact, Nigerian
President Buhari, who won the 2015 election, is
trying to cooperate on some anti-terrorist
operations with neighbouring countries. In order
to fight Boko Haram effectively in the whole
region, he appointed a Nigerian-led Multi-
National Joint Task Force which is planned to
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comprise of 8700 troops from Nigeria, Niger,
Chad, Cameroon, and Benin (Thurston 2016, p.
22−23).
Transnationality of this movement may be
illustrated also by its links to other radical
regional and global organizations. As it has been
mentioned in the previous part of this paper,
Boko Haram joined Islamic State for strategic and
ideological reasons in 2015. Both movements
share similar ideas and have personal links to
each other. As Alex Thurston (2016, p. 24) points,
Boko Haram announced its affiliation to Islamic
State as a response to a larger military and
territorial losses. By its connection to Islamic
State it then tries to prove its legitimacy and
therefore, this announcement may be
understood as a part of movement’s propaganda.
However, the affiliation is rather rhetorical then
material, since it would be extremely difficult for
these organizations to support each other
materially due to large distance from Nigeria to
Syria and Iraq.
More likely, it is possible to seek connection and
similarities between Boko Haram in Nigeria and
the crisis in Mali. After the coup against Malian
President Amadou Toumani Toure, radical Islamic
movements, namely National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Islamist
Fighters of Ansar Dine, and the Movement for
Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) with
support from al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb gained
control over significant part of Malian territory.
Their common goal is the establishment of
Islamic caliphate in the whole territory of Mali
and introduction of ruling system based on
radical interpretation of Islamic law sharia
(Maiangwa 2013, p. 2). In this respect, Benjamin
Maiangwa (2013) warns, that there is a con-
siderable danger that these movements may
possibly try to unite in order to fight for their
gains together. This possible strong alliance of
radical Islamic movements would mean
worsening of not only security but also human
security situation in the whole region of West
Africa which has to deal with environmental
issues connected with the effect of climate
change (Roudier et al. 2011).
5. Conclusion
As it comes from the presented case study, the
environmental changes may harm human
security in various respects. In Nigeria, the
desiccation of Lake Chad led to worsening of
living conditions of local population which
became more vulnerable to practices of various
Islamic radical movements. Climate change and
desiccation of Lake Chad itself may not be
understood as a source of conflict in the area.
However, worsening of living conditions,
vulnerability and limited capacity of local
population to adapt to new conditions create
suitable environment for armed movements to
emerge, since unemployed youth became more
reluctant to be recruited by this organization in
order to improve their living standards.
Therefore, this case study supports argument
that climate change itself does not produce
conflict, but the lack of effective governments
which are not able to deal with environmental
issues may lead to conflict (e.g., Barnett & Adger
2007; Salehyan 2008; Cook & Bakker 2012). Boko
Haram has used radical interpretation of Islam
which echoed among the majority Muslim
population in northern Nigeria. However, at the
same time it became violent and started to
terrorize local population which resulted in series
of attacks and even armed uprising in 2009. Since
the defeat and the death of movement’s leader
Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram has changed its
strategy and focused more on the practices such
as kidnapping and suicidal bombings. Nowadays,
it has transnational links to similar Islamic
movement in the region as well as global Islamic
organizations such as al-Qaeda. However these
links should be understood more in the rhetorical
level. Nevertheless, Boko Haram, despite large
governmental campaign, has become the most
powerful Islamic radical movement in the region
and is able to carry out attacks even in
neighbouring countries which face the similar
environmental problems in the bordering areas
with Nigeria. Therefore, in order to fight it
successfully, it will be necessary for Nigerian as
well as for engaged international organizations to
adopt a holistic strategy, including empowerment
of moderate Islamic leaders and improvement of
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socio-economic and related environmental
conditions in northern part of Nigeria.
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