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Government and Political Regimes in Southeast Asia: An Introduction
Abstract
Southeast Asia as a region varies widely in its cultures, history, and political institutions. Due to this variety of regime types and the large variance of theoretically relevant explanatory factors, Southeast Asia presents political scientists with a “natural laboratory.” Levels of socioeconomic modernization, paths to state and nation-building, ethnic heterogeneity, colonial heritage, the structure of governing coalitions and elite formations, the shape and extent of interest and civil society organizations, as well as institutional factors like type of government or electoral system all differ widely. This chapter provides an overview of Southeast Asia’s demographic, cultural, and religious characteristics; outlines its precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial political development; and argues that the region’s eleven countries fall into three broad regime categories: Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, and—most recently—Myanmar are examples of “electoral authoritarianism.” Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand after 2014 are closed autocracies that lack multiparty elections. Finally, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste make up the region’s defective democracies, all stable but suffering from different constellations of problems, including intermittent mass mobilization, corruption, and incomplete stateness.
... In Southeast Asia, the diversity of different types of political regimes is much greater than in other regions such as post-communist Europe, the post-Soviet space or Latin America. As of late 2017 the eleven countries in the region could be organized into three regime clusters (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018) (Table 1). (1947-1973, 1977-1981, 1992, 2007, 2014-2019), Electoral (multi-party) authoritarianism (1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988), multi-party democracy (1975, 1988-1991, 1992-2006, 2008-2014) Timor leste Multiparty democracy (since 2002) ...
... The case of Myanmar is somewhat special: In 2015, the National League for Democracy led by Aung Sang Suu Kyi won a sweeping victory in the national elections, taking more than eighty percent of the contested seats in the bicameral parliament and formed the national government. However, the Burmese armed forces (Tatmadaw) still controls key aspects of the political process (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018). Finally, Malaysia used to be known as one of the longest-serving multiparty autocracies worldwide but is the most recent democracy in the region. ...
... In most countries, the historical origins of political parties date back to the interwar period and the years immediately following the end of World War II. Like elsewhere, political parties emerged as organizational manifestations of social conflicts and interests resulting from socio-economic change at the beginning of the twentieth century (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018). Often, however, political circumstances prevented continuous party development. ...
It is a long-standing belief in democracy studies that configurations of well-institutionalized and both moderately polarized and fractionalized party systems promote the effectiveness and efficiency of democratic institutions and thereby contribute to the functioning and legitimacy of the democratic system at large. At the same time, scholars frequently reassert the difficulty of consolidating democracy if political parties and party systems fail to establish a strong institutional linkage with society. The chapter analyses these issues in the context of Southeast Asia.
... The consensus among scholars, practitioners, and international organizations like the United Nations (2019) is that Southeast Asia includes the 11 countries of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste (commonly referred to as East Timor), and Vietnam. The consideration of Southeast Asia as a quasi-unified region dates back to academic writing in the 1920s (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018) and then in more general use in the 1940s as a convenient wartime grouping (Beng, 2014). The term Southeast Asia later became reinforced with the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 (Emmerson, 1984). ...
... It should be noted, however, that data on religious affiliation in Southeast Asia often does not account for the syncretism of belief systems, local practices, and folk religions that can skew statistics. For example, Swearer (2010) shows how Buddhism in Croissant and Lorenz (2018), and Wikipedia (n.d.) Note According to its constitution, Brunei is a hereditary constitutional monarchy; however, given the Sultan's absolute sovereignty and separation from the government, it is more accurately described as an absolute monarchy (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018) Southeast Asia has melded with local folk traditions over time. ...
... For example, Swearer (2010) shows how Buddhism in Croissant and Lorenz (2018), and Wikipedia (n.d.) Note According to its constitution, Brunei is a hereditary constitutional monarchy; however, given the Sultan's absolute sovereignty and separation from the government, it is more accurately described as an absolute monarchy (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018) Southeast Asia has melded with local folk traditions over time. In terms of language, no two Southeast Asian countries share the same official language except for the Philippines and Singapore where English is one of the multiple official languages. ...
This book provides readers with a comprehensive introduction to human resource development (HRD) in Southeast Asia and offers a holistic framework for the phenomenon of Regional HRD in Southeast Asia. It argues that viewing HRD in ASEAN as a complex adaptive system is the most effective way to understand the expansive and multifarious processes and activities involved in Regional HRD.
As a region, Southeast Asia continues to emerge as one of the most dynamic and compelling in the world with a need to develop its human resources to continue further its independence, economic prosperity, and sovereignty. By focusing on a regional perspective of HRD, this book establishes the missing link in the transition from the national HRD to the global HRD perspective. Offering a framework for understanding how HRD policy and practice function within a dynamic ecosystem, this book appeals to scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike, particularly those interested in ASEAN.
Oliver S. Crocco is Assistant Professor of Leadership and Human Resource Development at Louisiana State University, USA. His research focuses on HRD in Southeast Asia, enhancing cultural competence in university and work contexts, and adult development.
... The consensus among scholars, practitioners, and international organizations like the United Nations (2019) is that Southeast Asia includes the 11 countries of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste (commonly referred to as East Timor), and Vietnam. The consideration of Southeast Asia as a quasi-unified region dates back to academic writing in the 1920s (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018) and then in more general use in the 1940s as a convenient wartime grouping (Beng, 2014). The term Southeast Asia later became reinforced with the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 (Emmerson, 1984). ...
... It should be noted, however, that data on religious affiliation in Southeast Asia often does not account for the syncretism of belief systems, local practices, and folk religions that can skew statistics. For example, Swearer (2010) shows how Buddhism in Croissant and Lorenz (2018), and Wikipedia (n.d.) Note According to its constitution, Brunei is a hereditary constitutional monarchy; however, given the Sultan's absolute sovereignty and separation from the government, it is more accurately described as an absolute monarchy (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018) Southeast Asia has melded with local folk traditions over time. ...
... For example, Swearer (2010) shows how Buddhism in Croissant and Lorenz (2018), and Wikipedia (n.d.) Note According to its constitution, Brunei is a hereditary constitutional monarchy; however, given the Sultan's absolute sovereignty and separation from the government, it is more accurately described as an absolute monarchy (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018) Southeast Asia has melded with local folk traditions over time. In terms of language, no two Southeast Asian countries share the same official language except for the Philippines and Singapore where English is one of the multiple official languages. ...
Southeast Asia is one of the most dynamic regions in the world given its political, cultural, and economic diversity. Part of its emergence as a region is due to the role of its regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN’s guiding principle: the ASEAN Way. As the 11 countries of Southeast Asia (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam) have become increasingly interconnected economically and politically, the workforces of these countries have also become interconnected. A collective vision for human resource development (HRD) at the regional level (i.e., Regional HRD) is emerging with ASEAN playing a key role. Surrounding and influencing this vision is an evolving and sophisticated Regional HRD ecosystem made up of macro dimensional components such as government policy, meso dimensional components such as professional networks, and micro dimensional components such as individual workers. While these three dimensions make up the content dimensions of the ecosystem, there are also process dimensions that include emergence, convergence, divergence, and adaptation. This chapter introduces the region of Southeast Asia and ASEAN, discusses the concept of Regional HRD, and presents an ecosystems perspective of Regional HRD in Southeast Asia.
... According to Croissant & Lorenz, Southeast Asia as a region is an extraordinarily diverse collection of states, which vary widely in history, demographics, culture, economy, political systems, and the political challenges they face. Geographically, Southeast Asia is divided into an insular or maritime region, comprising Brunei, Indonesia, parts of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste, and a mainland or continental part, including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, the Malay Peninsula, and Vietnam (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018). Political and cultural synthesis can be seen in the way that Southeast Asian states have adapted to various external influences and internal challenges over time. ...
According to Croissant & Lorenz, Southeast Asia as a region is an extraordinarily diverse collection of states, which vary widely in history, demographics, culture, economy, political systems, and the political challenges they face. Geographically, Southeast Asia is divided into an insular or maritime region, comprising Brunei, Indonesia, parts of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste, and a mainland or continental part, including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, the Malay Peninsula, and Vietnam (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018). Political and cultural synthesis can be seen in the way that Southeast Asian states have adapted to various external influences and internal challenges over time. Political and cultural synthesis can also be seen in the way that Southeast Asian societies have developed their forms of nationalism, identity, and civil society that reflect their diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic backgrounds. The paper argues that political and cultural synthesis is a key feature and process of Southeast Asia, which is the result of the historical interactions and influences among different religions, cultures, and regions within and outside Asia. The paper analyzes various examples of cultural synthesis in Southeast Asian literature and cinema, and how they reflect and contribute to the diversity and complexity of the region. The text argues that this is a key feature and process of Southeast Asia, which is the result of the historical interactions and influences among different religions, cultures, and regions within and outside Asia. The text analyzes various examples of cultural synthesis in Southeast Asian literature and cinema, and how they reflect and contribute to the diversity and complexity of the region. Southeast Asia is divided into an insular or maritime region, comprising Brunei, Indonesia, parts of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste, and a mainland or continental part, including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, the Malay Peninsula, and Vietnam.
... While the institution of the ministerial adviser is not relevant in these countries, at times ruling parties have appointed part-time advisers with various social and experiential backgrounds from outside the state bureaucracy to formal institutions like the multi-level People's Political Consultative Conferences (PPCCs) and expert advisory committees (Croissant and Lorenz 2018;Li 2021). The ruling Communist Party in China also solicits political and professional advice from state-sponsored mass organisations, voluntary organisations in various sectors and regions, and international inter-governmental organisations such as the World Health Organization (Li 2019; . ...
This chapter establishes that traditions of political-administrative dichotomy and the institution of ministerial advisers are found in some Asian countries and areas but not others. Nevertheless, political control over the civil service through alternate structures can be found in places where the tradition of political-administrative dichotomy is not institutionalised. Unlike some non-Asian contexts, political control over the civil service in Asia does not always concern adding a defensive mechanism such as the ministerial adviser (which is the case made in Chapter 18 and by those who consider advisers to be a form of ‘counter-bureaucracy), but often relates to political leaders’ struggle for reforming and modernising the public sector, and developing the economy sustainably. In this chapter, therefore, while the primary emphasis is not (and cannot be) on the institution of the ministerial adviser as defined in Chapter 1, nonetheless a focus on political-administrative relations does illuminate the central theme of the Handbook: the relationship between politics and administration.
... Longer-term rights and responsibilities were suppressed by the focus on short-term transfer of roles and responsibilities, such as financially supported forest management and protection activities, as well as alternative livelihood schemes. While in this chapter we do not enter the debate on the Laotian one-party political system, it is an inevitable conclusion that the authoritarian and highly secretive political atmosphere (Creak & Barney, 2018;Croissant & Lorenz, 2018) diminishes any window of opportunity for an open and meaningful engagement between villagers and governmental agencies. ...
We analyse how the concept and practices of village forestry evolved in Laos through various donor driven forestry interventions since the early 1990s. We start our analyses with the Forest Management and Conservation Programme (FOMACOP) and conclude with village forestry interventions undertaken in the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) programme. We find that over time, using participation as a central donor requirement, villagers’ role has shifted from being village forest managers to being village forest participants and labour, fulfilling externally defined forest management tasks. In the frame of the REDD+ process, village forestry is used as a platform for piloting REDD+ activities in the villages, accompanied by a set of existing and additional tools and strategies. Such tools include village forest management plans, land-use planning and allocation, and alternative livelihoods, as well as environmental discursive practices, where local forest-based livelihood activities, especially shifting cultivation, are framed as a source of CO2 emissions. We conclude that the underlying reason for various bottlenecks in village forestry relates to a power imbalance, lack of trust, and lack of political will to establish a deliberative decision-making process and to devolve decision-making power, forest management, and tenure rights to villagers.
... The Polit Bureau and the Party influence and control political life and the major economic sectors, including forestry and agriculture (Stuart-Fox 2007;Creak and Barney 2018). In the international arena of REDD?, the country is represented by the Government of Laos (GoL) which, however, is tightly linked to the Party (Croissant and Lorenz 2018). ...
Balancing agendas for climate mitigation and environmental justice continues to be one of the key challenges in climate change governance mechanisms, such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+). In this paper we apply the three-dimensional environmental justice framework as a lens to examine the REDD+ process in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos) and the REDD+ social safeguards. We focus particularly on challenges to justice faced by marginalized communities living in forest frontier areas under an authoritarian regime. Drawing on policy analysis and open-ended interviews across different policy levels, we explore procedural, distributional, and recognitional justice across the REDD+ policy levels in Laos. We find that REDD+ social safeguards have been applied by both donors and state actors in ways that facilitate external control. We underscore how authoritarian regime control over civil society and ethnic minority groups thwarts justice. We also highlight how this political culture and lack of inclusiveness are used by donors and project managers to implement their projects with little political debate. Further obstacles to justice relate to limitations inherent in the REDD+ instrument, including tight schedules for dealing with highly sensitive socio-political issues under social safeguards. These findings echo other research but go further in questioning the adequacy of safeguards to promote justice under a nationally driven REDD+. We highlight the importance of recognition and political context, including aspects such as power relations, self-determination and self-governance of traditional or customary structures, in shaping justice outcomes.
The study of civil-military relations considers the institutional and power relations between a country’s decision-making political elite and the military leadership responsible for conducting combat and strategic operations, as well as a plethora of related issue areas capturing diverse political, societal, and military interactions. The Russian wartime experience since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022 has been defined by significant and dynamic tensions between the political and military leadership. These tensions have ultimately led to strains on the public legitimacy of Russia’s military leadership, notable political intervention into military decision-making, disruptive elite personnel changes, and a brief breakdown in political order due to the armed rebellion of PMC Wagner and its leader, Evgeny Prigozhin. This report provides a conceptual framework for dimensions of control, authority, hierarchy, institutionalization, and autonomy within Russia’s shifting wartime civil-military relationship. It presents an overarching analytic narrative identifying changes and continuities in Russian civil-military relations since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as detailed case studies on shifts in military elite leadership and the Prigozhin Rebellion.
Political scientists have crafted intricate taxonomies to classify nations beyond liberal democracy, positioning these societies along an authoritarian continuum. Despite the pivotal role of journalists in accelerating political dynamics, there exists a lack of comparative research on media governance in these regimes. Consequently, this study scrutinizes the media governance ecosystems in Vietnam and Singapore. Vietnam is a one-party authoritarian state, whereas Singapore represents a hybrid political system. However, both countries exhibit a stable and uninterrupted rule by the respective ruling party. Our research uncovers the nuances of Singapore’s media regulation, which embeds trusted stakeholders with financial interests in key press roles to reinforce the implicit political norms. Conversely, Vietnam employs a more direct, coercive, and state-centric approach. Media actors in both nations occasionally test the boundaries of acceptable discourses, with each government’s responses being shaped by specific contexts and broader history. Reforms in Vietnam, embracing privatization and commercialization, mirror Singapore’s integration of capitalism, public ownership, and commercial interests when governing media. These findings highlight diverse yet effective authoritarian media governance strategies, unique features, and commonalities in both systems. Overall, media structures in these Southeast Asian countries have undergone profound evolutions towards more sophisticated regulatory tools to manage societal and political transformations.
I argue that Christopher Ryan Maboloc’s deployment of Chantal Mouffe’s radical democratic framework to characterize Rodrigo Duterte’s politics is a misappropriation. First, I provide an exposition of Mouffe’s radical democracy, emphasizing its two crucial features: (1) the objective of the radical reformation of the institutions of liberal democracy so that its ideals—liberty and equality for all—become effective; and (2) the provision of the space to struggle for liberty and equality, espousing the embrace of agonistic conflict (a non-violent struggle between legitimate adversaries) as opposed to antagonism (a violent conflict). Next, I present Maboloc’s interpretation of radical democracy and how his application of it to Duterte includes an anti-liberal dimension and the embrace of antagonistic practices, such as violence. Finally, I conclude that Maboloc’s mislabeling of Duterte as a radical politician can be traced to a misinterpretation of the two features of radical democracy. I show that Maboloc, contrary to Mouffe, views “radical” as a “radical break” from liberal democracy, while the embrace of conflict means an embrace of antagonistic practices. These misinterpretations are the reasons why Maboloc sees Duterte’s anti-liberal and antagonistic actions—despite their obvious incompatibility with Mouffe’s radical democracy—as indications of Duterte’s radicality.
The study of electoral system reform is often focused on consolidated democracies. This special issue on electoral reforms in the Mediterranean region selects both consolidated democracies and moderate authoritarian systems. It analyses reforms under the aspects of how they deal with the dilemma between improving ‘governability’ by majoritarian instruments versus increasing proportionality of representation. While governability also depends on other factors, public debates are frequently structured along this dichotomy, which also affects the outcome of the reform process. The Mediterranean focus reflects the higher degree of reform activities in this policy area (for instance compared to the Nordic countries), which helps to focus on drivers, scope, direction, and vested interests of electoral reforms.
In this article we challenge the conventional wisdom that COVID-19 and related legal restrictions invariably reinforce a global trend of shrinking civic space. We argue that the legal guarantee (or restriction) of civil society rights is not the sole factor configuring civic space. Instead, we reconceptualize civic space by broadening its determinants to also include needs-induced space and civil society activism. Investigating five countries with flawed democracic or competitive autocracic regimes in Southeast Asia, we propose a three-pronged mechanism of how these determinants interact in the context of COVID-19. First, legal restrictions on civil society rights intertwine with the space created by health and economic needs to create new opportunities for civil society activism. Second, these new opportunity structures lead to the cross-fertilization between service delivery and advocacy activism by civil society. Third, this new trajectory of civil society activism works to sustain civic space.
This article analyzes the political‐institutional determinants of bureaucracy quality among a group of newly industrialized countries in Latin America and East Asia democratized in the Third Wave. Four causal conditions are examined for the occurrence of higher levels of bureaucratic “weberianess” in the selected cases: historical sequence, political parties' institutionalization, electoral competition, and ethnic politics. The study employs the fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis to explore the expectation that each of these conditions' implications depends on other conditions' presence or absence. The findings disconfirm claims about the critical role of party system institutionalization for Weberian bureaucracies in new democracies. Besides, the analysis did not declare a professional public administration's prior existence before democratization as a necessary or sufficient condition for the outcome of interest. Finally, although the electoral competition was declared necessary for the outcome occurrence, it does not imply the same result if combined with ethnic politics.
The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Timor-Leste in 2020 was great, and the ripple effects may be felt for years. Paradoxically, it was not that the population was directly impacted—indeed, the small half-island nation stands out with only a score or so of cases, and no deaths—but that the oil-dependent economy and the status of financial reserves took a major hit with the collapse of oil and stock prices. In the interest of managing the pandemic, the incumbent prime minister declared a state of emergency, withdrawing his earlier resignation and thus averting a political crisis. Still, as the new economic realities surrounding oil-related mega-infrastructure projects hit home, we see churn among the concerned ministers and technocrats, amid a major rethink of the way ahead, and with many of the choices invidious in the challenging new economic environment.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) currently faces a series of major, historically unprecedented, challenges. Perhaps the most consequential of these new threats is the intensifying strategic, economic, and even institutional competition between the United States and China. ASEAN's rather predictable response to this geopolitical contest has been to “hedge” and avoid choosing between the two great powers. While this strategy may be understandable, it threatens to undermine ASEAN's much vaunted “centrality” and the geopolitical and diplomatic relevance of the organization as a whole. This article explores the background to these developments and Southeast Asia's relationship with both the United States and China. I argue that the limited impact of ASEAN-style multilateralism helps to explain why great powers are creating alternative forums or simply paying lip service to the notion of ASEAN centrality.
Because of a perceived (and real) risk of repressive action, some survey questions are sensitive in more autocratic countries while less so in more democratic countries. Yet, survey data on potentially sensitive topics are frequently used in comparative research despite concerns about comparability. To examine the comparability of politically sensitive questions, I employ a multilevel analysis with more than 228,000 respondents in 37 African countries to test for systematic bias when the survey respondents believe (fear) that the government, rather than an independent research institute, has commissioned the survey. The findings indicate that fear of the government induces a substantial and significant bias on questions regarding trust, approval and corruption perceptions in more autocratic countries, but not in more democratic countries. In contrast, innocuous, apolitical questions are not systematically influenced by regime type.
This chapter outlines the experience of populism in democratic Southeast Asia. It outlines an understanding of populism as a political strategy in which leaders seek to directly mobilize the people through mass communication. This approach is especially useful in explaining the trajectory of populism in a region where political parties have been historically weak. The chapter briefly summarizes this historical experience, with a special focus on The Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, the states with the most extended democratic records in the region. The chapter concludes with some suggestions on how this approach to conceptualizing populism may also facilitate theorizing about populism's causes in the region. Keywords Strategic approach; mass communication 1 I would like to thank Oliver Friedmann and Nur Azizah for research assistance. 2
This chapter documents the role of the King's Privy Council and notably the cooperation it fosters between legal and military elites in bringing about and sustaining Thailand's illiberal constitutionalism.
East Timor, also known as Timor-Leste, comprises the eastern half of the island of Timor, located at the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago. East Timor was among the last of colonial territories to become independent, and it actually had to be liberated twice. First, after more than four centuries of Portuguese colonial rule, it achieved independence in 1975 only to be invaded and occupied by Indonesia. After a blood-soaked occupation of 24 years and following intense international pressure, the Jakarta-regime only grudgingly allowed East Timor to form a nation of its own in 1999. Since then, the new state has faced further armed clashes and is only now able to seriously engage in nation-building. Historical Dictionary of East Timor relates the turbulent history of this country through a chronology, an introductory essay, an expansive bibliography, and over 200 cross-referenced dictionary entries on significant persons, events, places, organizations, and other aspects of East Timor history from the earliest times to the present.
This book is, in essence, about incentives: the incentives for competing societal interest groups to cooperate with each other to benefit from a growing economic pie, rather than fighting over a bigger share of a smaller one. This is the conundrum of economic development. If elite interest groups have both incentive and ability to allocate resources toward themselves, and if such rent seeking causes a decline in economic inefficiency, how can economies ever grow? The book illuminates the mechanisms by which in one of the world’s recent economic success stories— Vietnam’s rapid industrialization and passage into the middle-income category—the interest in cooperating to grow the economy overrode the elites’ instinct to allocate resources through the use of political power. The book shows how the need to provide positive conditions for international investment altered pay-off structures and pushed the all-powerful Communist Party of Vietnam to engage in bargaining with provincial officials; provincial officials with international investors; and finally all coercive elites even with the working classes. It describes the emergence of a harmony of interest among societal groups in which each group benefits from a growing economy, and no one group can monopolize the benefits of growth without hurting itself. The Vietnam case validates Nobel-Prize winning economist Mancur Olson’s proposition that elite predation can only be kept in check when the elite itself suffers from the economic decline it causes at least as much as it gains from the rents it collects.
Baumgartner, Kada, and thier contributors examine presidential impeachment in such varied settings as the United States, Russia, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, the Philippines, and Madagascar. In all of these countries there has been a serious impeachment attempt within the past decade or so. The results of each impeachment attempt vary, from unnsuccessful attempts to those which were successful; in the latter case, some resulted in presidents remaining in office, others in removal of the president, and, in one case, the forced resignation of a president.
The common framework of each analysis includes a discussion of the historical and constitional bases of the presidency, the institutional balance of power, provisions for impeachment, and the structure of party politics in each country; in addition, the role that public opinion plays in the process is discussed. While broad, the framework permits comparison between the cases and some general conclusions about all phases of the impeachment process and executive accountability can be drawn. One of the most important conclusions is that contrary to popular wisdom, impeachment is most definitively not a strictly legal process, but rather one that is highly political from start to finish. As the volume makes clear, it is most useful to view impeachment by way of examining the intersection of executive-legislative relations, partisan political conflict, and public opinion.
This comprehensive guide to the Pacific and South Asia provides detailed and enlightening information about the many ethnic groups of this increasingly important region of the world.
Ideally suited for high school and undergraduate students studying subjects such as anthropology, geography, and social studies, Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia provides clear, detailed, and up-to-date information on each major group in South Asian and Pacific Island countries, including India, Nepal, Indonesia, Pakistan, Singapore, Australia, Tonga, Samoa, and the Solomon Islands.
Organized alphabetically by ethnic group, each entry provides an introduction followed by accessible descriptions of the origins, early history, cultural life, political life, and modern history of the ethnicity. Alternate names, major population centers, primary languages and religions, and other important characteristics of each group are also covered. Beyond being a valuable resource for student research, this book will be enlightening and entertaining for general readers interested in South Asia and the Pacific.
This volume contains a selection of essays drawn from a major scholarly project undertaken by the American Council of Learned Societies. The ACLS hosted symposia around the world in order to broaden and stimulate the field of comparative constitutionalism. That effort brought together scholars and political actors from many countries and every region of the world to discuss the experiences of constitutionalism. Twenty-five papers were selected to represent the range and depth of possibility for serious constitutional analysis. With the staggering changes in Eastern Europe and much of the rest of the world, constitutionalism has become one of the most important phenomena in the modern world. The essays in this book represent the very best work being done throughout the world on that important topic.
China, like many authoritarian regimes, struggles with the tension between the need to foster economic development by empowering local officials and the regime's imperative to control them politically. Landry explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages local officials in order to meet these goals and perpetuate an unusually decentralized authoritarian regime. Using unique data collected at the municipal, county, and village level, Landry examines in detail how the promotion mechanisms for local cadres have allowed the CCP to reward officials for the development of their localities without weakening political control. His research shows that the CCP's personnel management system is a key factor in explaining China's enduring authoritarianism and proves convincingly that decentralization and authoritarianism can work hand in hand.
This book is a unique analysis of the struggle to build a rule of law in one of the world's most dynamic and vibrant nations - a socialist state that is seeking to build a market economy while struggling to pursue an ethos of social equality and opportunity. It addresses constitutional change, the assertion of constitutional claims by citizens, the formation of a strong civil society and non-profit sector, the emergence of economic law and the battles over who is benefited by the economic regulation, labor law and the protection of migrant and export labor, the rise of lawyers and public interest law, and other key topics. Alongside other countries, comparisons are made to parallel developments in another transforming socialist state, the People's Republic of China.
Why have some states in the developing world been more successful at facilitating industrialization than others? Challenging theories that privilege industrial policy and colonial legacies, this book focuses on state structure and the politics of state formation, arguing that a cohesive state structure is as important to developmental success as effective industrial policy. Based on a comparison of six Asian cases, including both capitalist and socialist states with varying structural cohesion, Tuong Vu proves that it is state formation politics rather than colonial legacies that have had decisive and lasting impacts on the structures of emerging states. His cross-national comparison of South Korea, Vietnam, Republican and Maoist China, and Sukarno's and Suharto's Indonesia, which is augmented by in-depth analyses of state formation processes in Vietnam and Indonesia, is an important contribution to understanding the dynamics of state formation and economic development in Asia.
This dissertation analyzes the effect of civilian control over the military amid the defense transformation agenda in Indonesia’s nascent democracy. Studies on civil-military relations and democratization has reached a consensus that civilian control of the military positively influences the democratic consolidation process. Well-institutionalized civilian control contributes to the entrenchment of democratically-elected civilians as the ultimate decision-makers in democratic regime. Nevertheless, systematic analysis on the relationship between the degree of civilian control of the military and policy change in the defense sector remains an understudied topic. In order to fill this lacuna, the author offers an integrative framework that is primarily derived from the institutional change theory approach. Accordingly, the scope of policy change in the defense sector is perceived as a function of two factors: the veto player configuration in the political decision-making arena; and the level of policy discretion in the national defense institution. This dissertation finds that the civilian government in post-Reformasi Indonesia was able to initiate limited change on promoting military jointness within the future orientation of national defense. Under the condition of multiple veto players and military domination in the defense institution, civilian government established new foundations of military warfighting integration. However, the civilian government was unable to replace the status quo of the total people defense doctrine that is heavily influenced by the army-strategic way of thinking. Ultimately, the Army domination in the defense institution influences the scope of policy change that could be afforded by the civilians.
The state of civil-military relations in Thailand in 2021-2022
This paper investigates the Singapore state’s varied responses toward dissent and explores the modes of control employed by the state towards varied dissent. We argue that any attempt to understand the politics of control in Singapore is incomplete without understanding how the state calibrates liberalisation as a third primary strategy. This study contributes to a more nuanced comprehension of how hybrid regimes can expand their modes of control. It offers a new framework to understand how tools of dominance are calibrated to adapt to a shifting socio-political landscape and calls for viewing liberalisation as a method of extending control.
Presidential term limits have been a crucial institutional feature of the third wave of democratization. They are meant to safeguard democracy by promoting alternation in office and preventing the personalization of power. However, since the 1990s term limits have been subject to frequent contestation by incumbents. This process has often been considered a sign of autocratization because it involves the weakening of other constitutional constraints, such as courts and legislatures. Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa are focal points of these trends, despite their different histories of presidentialism and diverging types of term-limit rules. Term-limit contestations have attracted the attention of scholars working with a global perspective as well as with a regional or country-specific one too. In this article, we argue that bringing together the regional scholarship on Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa can generate new both empirical and theoretical insights. We further present our findings on institutionalization, the power of precedence, incumbent-centred strategies and approaches to protect presidential term limits. We also show that despite frequent reforms, term-limit rules have persisted until today in the majority of constitutions found in the two regions.
The 2008 Constitution of the Union of Myanmar establishes the framework for a ‘discipline-flourishing’ constitutional democracy in which the Tatmadaw , the Burmese military, retains a significant degree of power. Under this Constitution, the Union Election Commission (UEC) is vested with significant authority to supervise elections, regulate political parties and electoral campaigns, register voters, suspend elections, and to make conclusive determinations in electoral disputes. Between 2010 and 2020, the UEC oversaw three consecutive general elections and three by-elections. Following a term under the former military leadership, the country's major democratic opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won a resounding victory in the 2015 elections. In the years that followed, civilian-military relations were a source of tension, as the NLD attempted to reform the executive and legislative roles for the military guaranteed by the Constitution. These tensions became in particular tangible during the 2020 elections, which the NLD again won in a landslide victory. The military alleged the election was marred by fraud while the UEC rejected this allegation. On 1 February 2021, hours before the new parliament was to convene, the Tatmadaw staged a coup d’état . This article reviews the UEC in its constitutional and political context. It identifies its institutional features, significant points in its brief history, and the impact of UEC leadership as a contributing factor in fostering confidence in the electoral process.
The National League for Democracy secured an astonishing electoral victory in Myanmar’s 2015 general elections after nearly three decades of repression of the party. Despite this victory, there are conflicting accounts on whether the NLD was a strong or a weak party leading into these elections. Appealing to data from an original survey and extensive qualitative field research, this article measures the NLD’s strength in 2015 and explores the mechanisms behind it. When operationalized as reported contact with voters, the NLD appears to have been a very strong party, but this strength can be explained by the same widespread enthusiasm for change, for democracy, and for Aung San Suu Kyi that existing scholarship appeals to in explaining the party’s victory in general. This finding has important implications for the NLD in the 2020 and future elections, as well as for our understanding of the dynamics of party strength in transitional regimes and new democracies more generally. Most importantly, the strategies parties have employed in transitions are unlikely to be successful in subsequent elections, as widespread enthusiasm and momentum gives way to everyday politics, but newly governing parties are likely to keep appealing to them precisely because they were so successful.
The chapter looks into the decentralisation efforts of Southeast Asian governments and assesses their ability to deepen democracy