Content uploaded by Jérôme Creel
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Jérôme Creel on Dec 20, 2017
Content may be subject to copyright.
A preview of the PDF is not available
Repair the roof when the sun is shining
Preprints and early-stage research may not have been peer reviewed yet.
Figures
Figures - uploaded by Jérôme Creel
Author content
All figure content in this area was uploaded by Jérôme Creel
Content may be subject to copyright.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
We quantify government spending multipliers in US data using Bayesian prior and posterior analysis of a monetary model with fiscal details and two distinct monetary-fiscal policy regimes. The combination of model specification, observable data, and relatively diffuse priors for some parameters lands posterior estimates in regions of the parameter space that yield fresh perspectives on the transmission mechanisms that underlie government spending multipliers. Short-run output multipliers are comparable across regimes-posterior means around 1.3 on impact-but much larger after 10 years under passive money/active fiscal than under active money/passive fiscal-90 percent credible sets of [1.5, 1.9] versus [0.1, 0.4 ] in present value, when estimated from 1955 to 2016.
The optimal currency areas (OCA) theory has been influential in pushing eurozone countries towards structural reforms to make product and labour markets more flexible. The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for structural reform is that asymmetric shocks are permanent. However, when shocks are temporary it does not follow that more flexibility is the answer. When shocks are the result of business cycle movements, the way to deal with them is by stabilisation efforts. We provide empirical evidence that suggests that the biggest shocks in the eurozone were the result of business cycle movements. These were relatively well synchronised, except for their amplitude. We argue that efforts to stabilise the business cycles should be strengthened relative to the efforts that have been made to impose structural reforms, and consider the implications for the governance of the eurozone.
L’introduction d’un salaire minimum légal interprofessionnel de 8,5 euros par heure est l’aboutissement d’une longue campagne initiée au milieu des années 2000, qui a peu à peu fédéré toutes les forces syndicales, et amené l’ensemble des forces politiques lors des dernières élections législatives d’octobre 2013 à inscrire dans leur programme la nécessité de renforcer les normes salariales « minimales ».
There is no need for Europe to replicate the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) can provide the backstop for sovereigns, even without a financial contribution from the IMF. In this sense, the ESM already constitutes to a large extent a ‘European Monetary Fund’. Other IMF activities, such as surveillance and policy coordination should remain with the European Commission, the Eurogroup and other existing bodies. The financial resources of the ESM will be required as a backstop only intermittently, in times of great financial market instability. The need for this will evolve as a function of the nature of financial markets and their cross-border integration. It is not possible to forecast with any precision when the next financial crisis might break out and what form it will take. Any evolution of the ESM should thus aim at enhancing flexibility in its instruments while clarifying its overall mandate (financial stability), rather than changing the details of the rescue mechanism or its institutional structure. The financial stability function of the ESM should be extended to the central institutions of the Banking Union, with an ultimate backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). Moreover, the ESM should be viewed as the natural instrument for unifying the euro area’s representation in the IMF.
Using microdata from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), this study examines the role of inheritance, income and welfare state policies in explaining differences in household net wealth within and between euro area countries. First, about one-third of the households in the 13 European countries we study report having received an inheritance, and these households have considerably higher net wealth than those which did not inherit. Second, regression analyses on households' relative wealth position show that, on average, having received an inheritance lifts a household by about 14 net wealth percentiles. At the same time, each additional percentile in the income distribution is associated with about 0.4 net wealth percentiles. These results are consistent across countries. Third, multilevel cross-country regressions show that the degree of welfare state spending across countries is negatively correlated with household net wealth. These findings suggest that social services provided by the state are substitutes for private wealth accumulation and partly explain observed differences in levels of household net wealth across European countries. In particular, the effect of substitution relative to net wealth decreases with growing wealth levels. This implies that an increase in welfare state spending goes along with an increase—rather than a decrease—of observed wealth inequality.
The euro crisis was fuelled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk, coupled with cross-border flight-to-safety capital flows. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a euro area-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show that ESBies with a subordination level of 30% would be as safe as German bunds and would increase safe asset supply. Second, a model shows how, when and why the two features of ESBies - diversification and seniority - can weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose how to create ESBies, starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.
The paper examines the role of labor market institutions in the rise of income inequality in advanced economies, alongside other determinants. The evidence strongly indicates that de-unionization is associated with rising top earners’ income shares and less redistribution, while eroding minimum wages are related to increases in overall income inequality. The results, however, also suggest that a lack of representativeness of unions may be associated with higher inequality. These findings do not necessarily constitute a blanket recommendation for higher unionization and minimum wages, as country-specific circumstances and potential trade-offs with other policy objectives need to be considered. Addressing inequality also requires a multipronged approach, which should include taxation reform and curbing excesses associated with financial deregulation.
The GDP collapse phase of the economic crisis has less affected female employment than male employment, whereas the austerity phase was particularly harsh for women. This gendered impact of the different stages of the crisis is described in the literature as follows: “from he-cession to sh(e)austerity”. This article aims to analyse the gendered trends in labour market for eight European countries. The quarterly evolution of the participation of women and men and the employment at the sectorial level are decomposed. The “he-cession to sh(e)austerity” scenario does not apply to all the selected countries. The other channels through which austerity policies can jeopardize gender equality and women's rights are identified by referring to a typology of these policies.