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jalpp (print) issn 2040–3658
jalpp (online) issn 2040–3666
. @ –
©,
https://doi.org/10.1558/japl.?????
Journal of
Applied
Linguistics
and
Professional
Practice
Article
Bringing morals to life – Professionals’ use of
morals in German care planning conferences
Heinz Messmer
Abstract
eory and practice of social work are highly morally grounded. As a basically helping
profession, social work practice is closely linked to the idea that it will contribute to
improving the lives of its clients. Social work practice is grounded in the various values
of a societal order (social justice, individual rights, rights of religious freedom, human
dignity, etc.), which are transformed into ethical standards that are used to structure
normative expectations regarding the activities of professionals.
Empirically, however, moral issues in social work practice oen appear in a quite
dierent way. Based on a conversation analysis of audio-taped discussions between
professionals and clients in German care-planning conferences, this study emphasizes
how morals are established primarily in a practical sense. By regarding morals as a
sign of respect or disrespect, it is shown that professionals make use of morals to assess
a client’s behaviour in either a positive or a negative way. Furthermore, it is argued
that morals in social work practice primarily respond to the overall interactional asym-
metries of a client–professional encounter. In addition, they also reect the basically
decit-oriented case descriptions of the professionals to establish the case in a less
threatening way.
K: ; ; ;
;
Contact author
Heinz Messmer: University of Applied Sciences and Arts North-Western Switzerland, School of Social Work ,
Institute for Studies in Children and Youth Ser vices , Thiersteinerallee 57, CH- 4053 Basel, Switzerland
email: heinz.messmer@fhnw.ch
266
1 Social work as a moral enterprise
eory and practice of professional social work are highly morally grounded:
‘One hallmark of a profession is its promotion of moral conduct among the
practitioners and its willingness to establish ethical standards to guide prac-
titioners’ behaviour’ (Reamer 2012: 299; cf. Banks 1995; Clark 2006). As a
helping profession, social work practice is closely linked to the idea that it will
contribute to improving the lives of its clients. In doing so, social workers refer
to ethical values such as social justice, individual or religious rights, human
dignity, the protection of personal integrity and so on. In contrast to non-help,
the helping attitude of social work practice is therefore seen as an unques-
tioned value that does not need any further legitimation.
Currently, we are increasingly faced with normative standards dening
‘social work’s principal mission, values, and ethical principles’ (Reamer 2012:
306). e International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) for instance
states:
Ethical awareness is a fundamental part of the professional practice of social workers.
eir ability and commitment to act ethically is an essential aspect of the quality of
the service oered to those who use social work services. (cf. IFSW 2012: 1)
In a similar way, the Swiss ‘Code of Ethics of Social Work’ states the principles
of ethical conduct in a rather self-referential manner: ‘e practice of social
work is ethically justied if the action reects moral criteria and refers to the
principles of professional action’ (AvenirSocial 2010: 10, author’s translation).
Eventually, the mandate and legitimacy of professional practice become a
subject of legislation. For instance, the rst paragraph of the German Child
and Youth Welfare Act sets out the young person’s rights about support for his
or her development as a self-responsible and social person (§ 1, sec. 1 German
Child and Welfare Act). From this fundamental right we are able to draw far-
reaching conclusions regarding the standards and obligations of professional
social work – e.g. to eliminate social inequality and disadvantage, as well as
other threats to the wellbeing of young people.
Like every other profession, social work practice frequently deals with
clients who are to signicantly dependent on their services, to a greater or
lesser extent. In this respect, morals appear to serve as an alignment that aims
to counterbalance the clients’ dependency on the service provision. However,
in reconsidering the above quotes, it is striking that the concept of morals
– although important – remains largely undened. In principle, it seems to
substantiate the (good) objectives of social work practice as a professional
discipline. But how do morals come into eect practically? Who is making use
of morals, and in what ways are they used? And, nally, what are the intentions
behind the use of morals?
267
ese questions are central for the purposes of the present study. Below, a
brief outline is given of empirical research on morals in social work practice,
aer which a theoretically rigorous denition of morals is introduced ahead
of a detailed analysis of the professional activities with which this study is
concerned. Following a short description of the data, methods and objectives
underlying the present study, morals are demonstrated to be benecial for
mitigating and neutralizing the asymmetries of institutional action.
2 Research on morals in action
Contrary to the increasing attention paid to the ethical principles of social
work practice (for an overview see Banks 2008), research on morals beyond
the code and the textbook is somewhat rare. is may because questions of
responsibility and moral judgment largely depend on the contexts in which
a problem is posed and treated interactively. Furthermore, research on the
interactive and discursive use of morals also suggests co-production of the
framework conditions for moral judgments (cf. Cromdal and olander
2014). It is argued that the signicance and practical use of morals is primarily
established in a ‘particular arena of cultural intelligibility’ (Gergen 1994: 103).
Research on the interactive or discursive use of morals usually starts with
the assumption ‘that morality and interaction are deeply intertwined with
each other’ (Bergmann 1998: 279). Moral issues become manifest through
‘taking on and assigning obligations, entitlements, and responsibilities to self
and others’ (Linell and Rommetveit 1998: 446). Related research carried out
by Hall and colleagues (Hall et al. 1997, 2006; Hall et al. 2003; Hall et al. 2014)
has shown that the process of categorization in the course of ‘establishing cli-
enthood’ is both central and morally volatile. For instance, one study (Hall et
al. 1997: 270) makes clear that the construction of facts has to rely (at least to
a certain extent) on the decits of a client pursuing the question of his or her
responsibility.
Categorization work is frequently based on detailed descriptions of decits
and risks in the conduct of clients, and as such it constantly produces face-
threatening facts. Bergmann considers categorization as a ‘major resource for
the construction of moral actors’ (Bergmann 1998: 287). He argues that cat-
egorization can easily be recognized as blaming and thus has to be expressed
in mitigated, covert and neutralized terms. is is reected in the caution
and remarkable reluctance with which professionals dene and describe
their clients in distinct and unambiguous categories. A good example is the
description of a neglectful mother in neutralized and morally acceptable
terms – ‘caring but not coping’ (cf. Slembrouck and Hall 2003) – indicating the
mother’s willingness while avoiding suggestions of blameworthiness. Consid-
268
ering the face-threatening and conict-inducing content that categorizations
may have for the client, ‘establishing clienthood’ seems to be a rather delicate
mission as not only defensive but also oensive counter-reactions are usually
involved. is linkage is also in line with Buttny’s ‘self-defence rule’: ‘upon
receiving a blame, make a response […] lest no response be heard by others as
an admission to the blame’ Buttny’s (1993: 38).
Correspondingly, professionals have to reason and legitimate their assess-
ments carefully. ey are obliged to justify that there are serious deviations,
negligence or risks in the conduct of the potential client that substantiate the
conclusion to ‘establish clienthood’ as a matter of fact. Accordingly, accounts
are the ‘bedrock for categorization’ (Hall et al. 2006: 22; see also Matarese and
Caswell 2014). However, they do not only justify the categorization of the
individual client, but also aim for a positive client–professional relationship
necessary for subsequent interventions. Similar strategies can be observed
in activation (cf. Solberg 2011), risk assessment (cf. Stanford 2011) and the
decision-making procedures (cf. Kedell 2011, 2012) of social work practice.
Meanwhile, clients are asked to position themselves to the processes of
‘establishing clienthood’ (cf. Mäkitalo 2014). In situations in which clients
refuse to accept this institutionally attributed identity, implicit moral judge-
ments become explicit rather quickly. ‘Bad clients’ (in contrast to ‘good clients’)
are typically those who do not behave ‘like a “good” client should’ (Juhila 2003:
86; for similar analyses see Juhila 2004; Urek 2005; Mäkitalo 2006; Juhila,
Caswell and Raitakari 2014). Correspondingly, becoming a ‘good’ client is
closely linked to activity-tied obligations (e.g. co-operating or accepting the
perspective of the professionals) while its rejection, misalignment or disali-
ation typically falls back on the client, giving rise to explicit blaming and/or
accusations. us, according to Hall and colleagues (e.g. Hall et al. 2006: 30),
professional social work is mainly ‘character work’. Similarly, Hydén (1994)
equates social work professionals with ‘moral workers’, while White (2003)
uses the term ‘moral judge’.
Morals in social work interventions – although constantly present – mostly
remain hidden to avoid unconcealed conict and clients’ resistance. Further-
more, morals do not only rely on implicit or explicit judgements, but become
particularly eective as a substructure concerning the participants’ principal
ways of talking themselves into being. Bergmann (1998: 283) calls this the
‘proto-morality’ of communication, as it reects the quality of a situated social
relationship in line with the principles of politeness, awareness and reciprocity
(cf. Brown and Levinson 1987). ‘Individuals’, as Juhila and colleagues phrase it,
‘expect each other to behave in anticipated and jointly acceptable ways, which
create the basis for moral order’ (Juhila, Mäkitalo and Noordegraaf 2014: 11)
– including following basic principles such as authentic talk, the avoidance
269
of interruptions and monologues, and reection on the other’s perspective.
Proto-morality, one might say, denotes the elementary forms of an acceptable
social encounter, indicating that the interaction takes place in a symmetrical,
understanding and equitable manner.
Morality – as we have seen – is constantly present in social work interactions:
It ranges from premoral and proto-moral forms to explicit moralization, from
authentic expression to tactful respect for integrity, from embodied feelings of a
social-interactional origin to socioculturally sedimented norms and values oriented
to in human dialogue and interaction. Morality remains both a prerequisite and a
product of the engagement in dialogue. (Linell and Rommetveit 1998: 472)
However, although morality is an intuitively comprehensible and tangible
category, a clear and distinct denition of morals is not apparent. is is con-
ceivably due to the fact that morals become recognizable mainly when profes-
sionals avoid making explicit use of them. Additionally, interweaving morality
with a broad range of practical actions also prevents the detection of a clear
and common ground.
3 Dening morals
Although there is a consensus on the use of morals in social work practice, it
would be helpful to be equipped with a more concise understanding of morals
that allows us to reveal its traces in a somewhat more detailed fashion. A simple
but precise denition of morals related to Niklas Luhmann’s conception of a
societal order. Luhmann (1978) denes morals rst of all as a sign of respect
(Achtungserweis). As he explains this, a sign of respect typically responds to
communications that are used to turn the dierent perspectives of the par-
ticipants into a coherent and cooperative scheme. A sign of respect leads to
an appreciation that ‘others accord with the expectations one believes must be
assumed to continue a social relationship’ (Luhmann 1995: 235). Consequently,
Luhmann characterises the sum of the factual conditions to communicate
mutual respect or disrespect as the moral base of a societal order.
is notion of morals has the advantage that it must not rely on an idealized
understanding of what is considered as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. In juxtaposition to an
ontological reasoning of the ‘objectivity of the “ought”’ (cf. Jaspers 1973: 344,
author’s translation), it asks primarily for an empirical and procedural under-
standing of the ‘de facto practices of mutual respect or disrespect’ (Luhmann
1978: 51, italics in original; author’s translation), referring to the empirical
breakpoints of morals.
Quite similar to Luhmann’s concept of morals, scholars working in the
tradition of conversation analysis (CA) also consider morals as a device to
secure alignment and aliation of the encounter: While ‘aligning responses
270
cooperate by facilitating the proposed activity’, aliative responses in contrast
‘are maximally pro-social when they match the prior speaker’s evaluative
stance, display empathy and/or cooperate with the preference of prior the
action’ (Stivers et al. 2011: 21). Hence, seen from a CA perspective, morals
are likewise considered to support the basic preconditions to continue a social
relationship. us, although Luhmann’s concept of morals mainly refers to a
macro-level of a societal order, it nevertheless displays a considerable overlap
with micro-level analyses of the interactions involved.
With regard to social work practice, Luhmann’s concept gives way to an
analytical understanding of morals that is not only suitable but also feasible
in a strict empirical sense. It is suitable as far as a sign of respect or disrespect
points to the general ethical norms and obligations of social work practice
(e.g. appreciation, attentiveness, protection of human dignity, anti-oppressive
practice, etc.); and it is feasible, as it ts with the idea of the embeddedness
of morals in real communications creating the base for any institutional
activities. Hence, if morality is really ubiquitous, as some theorists (Simmel
1892–1893, among others) claim, the interactions in social work must also
reveal empirical traces of its existence.
4 Data, method and aim of the study
e data for this study derived from a conversation analytical investigation
into negotiations between professionals and clients in the context of German
Child Care Planning Conferences (CPC). Since a CPC is designed to ensure
exible adjustments of the services to the needs of the clients, it is viewed as a
key process of the German child welfare system. Clients’ ability to participate
actively in CPCs has a major inuence on the ways professionals interact and
communicate with them. us, for instance, the professionals have to consider
the clients’ capacities, participation and face-saving needs in the course of the
decision-making procedures (cf. Messmer and Hitzler 2008). With respect to
the following analyses, the 14 CPCs in our sample relate to the beginning, con-
tinuation or termination of residential care for a child; further characteristics
and idiosyncrasies of the empirical data will be described where relevant.
Care-planning conferences are established through communications
between dierent actors with dierent backgrounds to negotiate a common
understanding about the issues at stake. To reach a consensus about how to
begin, to continue or to end residential care eectively, it is vital to achieve a
mutual understanding regarding the dierent perspectives and needs of the
participants. us, every utterance made in the CPC setting can be said to be
‘context-shaped’ as well as ‘context-renewing’; that is, to foreshadow meaning
to come by drawing from meaning inferred (Heritage 1984).
271
In analytical terms, CA exploits the basic assumption that social reality is
situated, rule-bound and orderly (Sacks 1992). Believing that interactions serve
as joint attempts to produce and reproduce an understandable social order
which is accessible to any competent member of a speech community – that is,
participants and researchers alike – it concludes that participants themselves
have to observe and analyse their ongoing activities and make these analyses
interactively accessible to each other. Using each other’s turns as context for the
turns to follow, participants ensure a mutual understanding and perpetuate the
ow of the ongoing interaction, self-reexively knitting a tight net of interac-
tional meaning.
5 Forms and functions of morals
e analyses below aim to disclose pivotal features of morals in social work
practice in a detailed and strict empirical sense. e dierent moral phenom-
ena focus on: (1) the ubiquity of morals; (2) the avoidance of moralizations
(for reasons of morals); (3) the conict sensitivity of moral expressions; and
(4) the morals of helping. According to our data, the highlighted issues are
both typical and generalizable regarding the activities in a CPC, as will be
discussed in the nal section of this paper.
Moral phenomena are illustrated and analysed via conversational data
from the CPC arranged for Janine. Janine is a 13-year-old girl who evades the
control of her mother, staying out overnight and being picked up by the police
repeatedly in the company of adult males. Referring to a singular case has the
advantage that the analytical context remains widely the same, thus facilitating
the traceability of the analysed data – especially with respect to the veiled mean-
ings of moral functioning. Although this study does not claim completeness,
whether in an analytical or in a systematic sense, it aims to provide the grounds
for an understanding of morals overarching the heterogeneities in professional
social work.
5.1 Morality as a ubiquitous interaction device: Balancing the interac-
tional asymmetries
Analysing the CPC conversations along the question of how participants
design their moment-to-moment relationship will reveal a complex and com-
prehensive universe of morally-driven features – so, for instance, whether par-
ticipants are willing to display reciprocal understanding and attention (or not);
whether they listen carefully and avoid interruption (or not); or whether they
are ready to design their turns in line with the other’s expectations and needs
(or not). Each such choice will aect the nature and quality of their encounter.
is is particularly relevant in larger groups in which the participants may
272
not know each other, and where they hold hierarchical role-positions or are
equipped with dierent competencies. Correspondingly, the data disclose
numerous eorts to calibrate the unequal conditions for participating in insti-
tutional activities. With this in mind, Extract 1 represents the beginning of the
recorded talk, where the participants of Janine’s CPC introduce themselves
to each other, before the head of the pedagogical unit, Mr Hermann (HS),
proceeds to the particular issues of the CPC (an overview of speaker identiers
and transcript notations can be found in the Appendix).1
Extract 1
26 HS: I think all of you know Misses Hirschberg, right?
ich denk Frau Hirschberg kennen alle ne?
27 if I-
wenn ich das so-
28 ( )
[( )
29 SW: [we have (-) got to know each other uhm today
[wir haben uns jetzt äh heute (-) kennen gelernt
30 HS: ah ((laughs)) ((somebody else laughs with him))
ach so ((lacht)) ((jemand anders lacht mit))
31 otherwise, as substitute of uhm Misses ( ).hhhh
ansonsten in Vertretung von äh Frau ( ) da .hhhh
32 my name is Matthias Hermann-
mein Name ist Matthias Hermann-
33 I am the head of the pedagogical institution,
ich bin der pädagogische Leiter Einrichtung,
34 (4.0)
35 TR: I am Claudia Mescher,=
ich bin Claudia Mescher,=
36 =and I am doing my internship
=und ich mach jetzt mein Anerkennungsjahr
<<soft voice>> in the ASD( )>
<<leise>> beim ASD ( )>
37 (2.0)
38 CA: <<soft voice>> hm. yes.
<<leise>> hm. ja.
39 Thomas (Reiser),
Thomas (Reiser),
40 I::=uhm- am working
ich::=ähm- arbeite
41 as I said-
wie gesagt-
42 as pedagogical colleague in the group;=.hh
als pädagogischer Mitarbeiter in der Gruppe;=.hh
273
43 where Janine is placed.>
wo Janine ist.>
44 (2.0)
45 HS: you are Janine.
du bist Janine.
46 [Hi.
[Tach.
47 CH: [yes.
[ja.
48 HS: hm. ((laughs with soft voice))
hm. ((lacht vor sich hin))
49 .hhh ok.
.hhh ok.
50 MO: <<loud>> I am Misses Simon?=
<<laut>> ich bin die Frau Simon?=
51 =and I am Janine’s mum.>
=und ich bin die Mama von Janine.>
52 HS: good.
gut.
53 cordially welcome. (1.0)
herzlich willkommen. (1.0)
CPC Janine
5.1.1 Inclusion by shared interaction
In the course of the introductions at the beginning of Janine’s CPC the partici-
pants display a remarkable degree of uniformity in making themselves known
to each other. All of them, except Janine (and the agency social worker, Mrs
Hirschberg, wrongly assumed here as known), introduce themselves with their
names and role-identities, pointing to their position within the CPC setting.
Correspondingly, the principle of equality is formally met. Not only do the
members of the group share the same information about their identity, they are
also equally recognized as a legitimate member, entitled to participate in the
CPC.
Furthermore, the talk reveals signicant moral features providing the par-
ticipants with similar participation opportunities – for instance, in the form
of longer pauses in lines 34, 37 and 44 as well as by HS’s support regarding
Janine’s introduction (lines 45–49). e strikingly restrained and so voices
(lines 36 and 38) also point to the cautious position a speaker may claim.
Finally, the closing phrase expressed by HS (‘good’, line 52) explicitly appreci-
ates the participants’ contributions. Based on the communicative features up
to this point, it becomes clear that the participants are willing to stick to those
expectations and norms that might be taken as a sign of respect regarding the
legitimate position of the relevant other. Correspondingly, they contribute to
274
formally equal rights of an interactional order that is able to acknowledge and
consider the dierent positions of each participant.
5.1.2 Inclusion by shared information
A similar situation is clear in Extract 2, which immediately follows and in
which HS explains the purpose and conditions of the subsequent procedure.
Extract 2
53 cordially welcome. (1.0)
herzlich willkommen. (1.0)
54 .hh good there was a prior conversation already,
.hh gut es hat ein erstes Gespräch schon gegeben,
55 where I did not take part,
an dem ich nicht teilgenommen habe,
56 I think it was about -=
da ging es glaube ich-=
57 if I understood you correctly Misses Hirschberg
wenn ich Sie richtig verstanden habe Frau Hirschberg
58 ROUghly about uhm THAT the measure takes place?
im GROben darum ähm DASS die Maßnahme stattndet?
59 SW: <<soft voice>> yes.>
<<leise> ja.>
60 HS: an:d (-)TOday we are sitting together-
un:d (-) wir sitzen HEUte zusammen-
61 in order to: make an agreement-
um: miteinander abzusprechen-
62 what (now) will happen EXCAtly.
was (nun) geNAU passiert.
63 we want to (-) clarify which mandate; (--)
wir wollen (-) klären welchen Auftrag; (--)
64 we have. (1.5)
wir haben. (1.5)
65 .h and (-) I think we have-
.h und (-) ich denke da haben wir-
66 possibly quite dierent, (1.5)
vielleicht ganz unterschiedliche, (1.5)
67 VIEws what is the mandate for,=
ANsichten zu was denn der Auftrag ist,=
68 =and therer-,
=und deswitzen-,
69 therefore we all sit at the TABLE;=
deswegen sitzen wir alle am TISCH;=
70 =so we can bring that together.
=damit wir das zusammenführen.
275
71 so that this becomes CLEAR to everybody.
damit das auch allen KLAR ist.
72 (2.0)
73 HS: good.
gut.
74 (2.0)
75 HS: okay.
okay.
CPC Janine
As the above extract shows, HS apparently aims to establish a joint conversa-
tional framework connecting the past (‘.hh good there was a prior conversation
already’, line 54) with actual and future activities (‘we want to (-) clarify what
mandate; (--) we have’, lines 63–64). Moral phenomena are based on the fact that
the participants are formally provided with equal participation opportunities.
As HS designates the take-o for further decisions (‘THAT the measure takes
place?, line 58), denes the procedure as a joint venture (‘we are sitting together
TOday-’, line 60) while accepting dierent standpoints (‘I think we have- pos-
sibly quite dierent, (1.5) VIEws what is the mandate actually for,=’, lines 65–66)
and eventually claims procedural transparency (‘so that this becomes CLEAR
to everybody’, line 67), he strongly supports the alignment and aliation of all
group members to provide the ground for further consensual action.
However, despite HS’s emphasis on treating the CPC as a joint venture, he
actually denes the course of the proceedings in what is to a greater or lesser
extent a one-sided way. Hence, he makes use of a ‘conventional ascription of
warrantable rights or entitlements over the possession and use of certain kinds
of knowledge’ (Drew 1991: 45) as he explains what has to be done for the near
future. On the other hand, he also seems to be fully aware of this asymmetry,
as he constantly signals his willingness to treat his suggestions as a subject for
change. So, for instance, regarding the starting point of the proceedings (‘THAT
the measure takes place?’) he acknowledges that he himself did not participate
in earlier conversations (‘where I did not take part’, line 55), thus admitting the
questionable reliability of his knowledge (‘I think it was about-=’, line 56) as
indicated by a disclaimer. In addition, he points to the fact that misunderstand-
ings cannot be excluded (‘=if I understood you correctly Misses Hirschberg-’, line
57), and displays his willingness to respect the interests and needs of the other
participants in various ways: besides his impression, that there are ‘possibly quite
dierent, (1.5) VIEws’ about the mandate of the service provider, he also con-
cedes that the result of the CPC meeting remains undetermined (‘=so we can
bring that together’, line 70). Finally, pauses in between (line 64) and at the end
of his turn (lines 72 and 74) signal various turn-taking opportunities providing
the others with the prospect of taking a correcting or contradictory position.
276
Although HS’s statement up to this point does not include an explicit moral
judgment, it nevertheless displays various signs of respect that may aect the
position of the participants on dierent levels. Similarly, as he creates formally
equal chances to recognize the others’ interests and needs, he establishes a
situation apt to balance existing status asymmetries of the participants. A sign
of respect, one might conclude, becomes relevant as it encourages cooperative
and pro-social action in a basically asymmetric structured relationship.
5.2 Moralizing dispreferred: Balancing decit construction and stigma
avoidance
In Extract 3, a phenomenon of moral communication comes into view that is
striking as it attempts to deect the attention of the group. is highly wide-
spread form of moral reasoning refers to the categorization of the client and
thus might be heard as a subject of blame.
Extract 3
76 SW: well in advance there was the care planning
ja vorausgeschickt war ja das Hilfeplan
77 conversation in our oce? (1.0
gespräch bei uns im Amt? (1.0)
78 right?=
ne?=
79 =where among others uhm: .hhh uhm - (---)
=wo auch ähm: .hhh ähm - (---)
80 the mother, (--)
die Mutter, (--)
81 Janine;
Janine;
82 as well as professionals from the oce,
als auch Fachkräfte vom Dienst,
83 participated-
teilgenommen haben-
84 .hh and toGETHer the decision was taken-
.hh und geMEINsam wurde die Entscheidung getroen-
85 together also with Dschanien-
zusammen auch mit Dschanien-
86 and and uhm-
und und äh-
87 Janine and the mother .hh that uhm:- (-)
Janine und der Mutter .hh dass ähm:- (-)
88 uhm- (1.5)
ähm- (1.5)
277
89 for NOW a separation between both should take place?
VORerst eine Trennung zwischen beiden erfolgen soll?
90 .hh uhm::-
.hh ähm::-
91 BECAUSE Janine (-)
WEIL halt Janine- (-)
92 has been spending a lot of time OUTside her home;
sehr viel AUSserhäusig war;
93 and bunked.=right?
und abgehauen war.=ne?
94 one has to look at it this way,
das muss man ja so sehen,
95 and .hh you have been on the road and we f-
und .hh warst unterwegs und wir f-
96 .hhh our estimation as EXperts had been;
.hhh als FACHleute hatten die Einschätzung getroen;
97 uhm (-) that thereby you endanger yourself.
äh (-) dass du dich darüber gefährdest.
98 (1.0)
99 right?
nem?
CPC Janine
Here the social worker (SW) provides an account to justify the implemented
measures taken so far by referring to Janine’s staying out of home overnight and
her consequent risk of harm. It is quite noticeable here that the phrases used
circumscribe Janine’s behaviour with utmost caution and delicacy, as SW pref-
erably makes use of neutral descriptions while reporting the case (‘OUTside’,
line 92; ‘bunked’; ‘have been on the road’, line 95). What remains unspoken
here (but becomes topical later) are the professional’s worries about Janine’s
promiscuity. us, a sign of respect is based on the absence, or restraint of,
overt disrespect. Avoiding face-threatening terms and phrases in situations in
which blaming would be an expected option thus equates to considering the
face-saving needs of the client.
According to this, moralizations in reporting the case are typically disfa-
voured. Despite the highlighted phrases up to this point, SW’s descriptions
also comprise various delays and hesitation markers indicating her feelings
of unpleasantness. e need to establish and assess the case in accurate terms
seems to contradict SW’s desire to evade ascriptions and phrases that could be
heard as an expression of blame. As a consequence, the participants are faced
with relatively vague and undened descriptions that leave the separation
between mother and child in various respects unexplained.
278
5.3 Moralizing preferred: Balancing misalignment and compliance
Avoiding moralizing in a CPC may be not possible in every aspect of the
setting. Sometimes moralizing seems to be a rather desirable option – for
instance, if the alignment of the client falls behind the professionals’ expecta-
tions. Related activities that make their failure topical are identied to engen-
der insight and behavioural change. is is illustrated in Extract 4, when HL
refers to Janine’s rule-violating behaviour, blaming her for visiting the ‘at-
roofed building’ – which is not permitted for her as this is the place where the
boys are accommodated.
Extract 4
189 HS: well (-) the carer, [referring to the male ones]
also (-) die Betreuer,
190 and the carer [referring to the female ones]
und BetreuerINNEN,
191 sometimes they: write down some things,=
die schreiben ja: manchmal so n bisschen was auf,=
192 =what is happening in the group,
=was so passiert in der Gruppe,
193 and then;
und dann;
194 this t <<more rapidly>> this I get to read;=
das d <<schneller> das krieg ich dann zum Lesen;=
195 =so that I also know what’s happening there,
=damit ich auch weiß was da passiert,
196 because I am not working there,>
weil ich arbeite da ja nicht direkt,>
197 .hh and then sometimes it happened that they:-
.hh und dann war schon auch so manchmal dass sie:-
198 had to pick a little quarrel with you;=
sich n bisschen mit dir anlegen mussten;=
199 right?
=oder?
200 CH: hm.
hm.
201 HS: hmm.
hmm.
202 ((somebody breathing loudly))
((irgendjemand schnauft laut))
203 (3.5)
204 HS: that ya also are try:ing a little from behi:nd,
dass de auch so versu:chst so n bisschen hintenrum:,
205 (2.0)
279
206 HS: well (-) Tommi said somehow::- (--)
also (-) Tommi sagte irgendwie::- (--)
207 he had told you explicitly you SHOULDn’t go
er hätte dir deutlich gesagt du SOLLST nicht
to the at-roofed building?
in den Flachbau gehen?
208 CH: mhm.
mhm.
209 HS: <<smiling voice>> and then?=
<<schmunzelnd>> und dann?=
210 =he had to get you out of there;=right?>
=musst er dich da rausholen;=ne?>
211 so you’re actually trying a little;=
also versuchst das schon so n bisschen;=
CPC Janine
In order to safeguard the client’s alignment it seems necessary to make use
of moral judgments pointing to activity-tied obligations. Statements of this
type – to use a phrase of CA – are highly inference rich (Sacks 1992: 40–41)
and to a large extent vulnerable to conict escalation. However, as the above
excerpt shows, HS seems to be quite aware of this implication, as he deploys
various communicative strategies that are suitable to preventing Janine’s pro-
spective resistance. For instance, since the problem is raised by HS and not
by Janine’s carer Tommi (who, as the complaining party, is also present at the
CPC), HS establishes himself as a third party agency. As far as he acts as a mere
transmitter of a potentially face-threatening accusation, he positions himself
outside the trouble while, at the same time, establishing himself as the relevant
addressee. us, HL reduces the likelihood of personally driven rejections
contributing to the reication of potential conict.
Moreover, HS’s statement exposes numerous mitigating and diminutive
particles to defuse the weight of his blaming (e.g. ‘sometimes, a little bit’ line
191; ‘sometimes’, line 197; ‘a little quarrel’, line 198; ‘ya also are try:ing so a little’,
line 204; ‘Tommi said somehow::- (--)’, line 206; ‘so you’re actually trying like a
little;=’, line 211). By doing so, HL again proposes to decrease the risk of direct
counter-reactions to avoid subsequent and manifest denial.
According to CA research, however, blaming belongs to an adjacency-pair
part of the organization of everyday communication that is highly standard-
ized, in that if a speaker makes use of the rst part of the adjacency-pair (e.g. a
question, an invitation, a greeting, etc.), it is quite probable that the other will
react with the second pair part (e.g. an answer, acceptance of the invitation, to
greet back, etc.), responding to the speaker at the prior position (cf. Scheglo
2007). e same applies to an accusation or blame, thus activating Buttny’s
‘self-defence rule’ mentioned above. In Extract 5, although HS apparently does
280
not nish his blaming (marked by the equals sign in line 211) Janine disrupts
his statement immediately – accounting for her misalignment by criticizing
the rules of the institution:
Extract 5:
211 HS: so you’re actually trying a little;=
also versuchst das schon so n bisschen;=
212 CH: yes I nd it shit-=
ja ich nd das scheiss-=
213 =I am the youngest there;=
=ich bin die jüngste da;=
214 =and then (-) for instance- (-)
=und dann (-) zum Beispiel- (-)
215 .hh if I have to be inside in the evenings
.hh wenn ich dann abends
216 at half past eight already,=
schon um halb neun drin sein muss,=
217 =d’ring the week, (--)
=n der Woche, (--)
[continues]
CPC Janine
us, explicit moralizing comes into play if clients deviate from explicit or
implicit activity-tied obligations or show a lack of commitment in other
respects. According to our data, moralizing in the sense of displaying a sign of
disrespect is similar to highlighting the responsibilities of the client for future
commitment and behavioural change. If, however, the blaming is directly
addressed to the accused person, it is most likely that the accused person will
respond in a similar way.
5.4 The morals of helping: Balancing institutional and clients‘ needs
A nal typical issue to be discussed here draws on the morals of helping. As
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, a ‘helping’ attitude can be seen as
an expression of morals, insofar as it refers to the needs of the client without
any claim to reciprocity. Extract 6 is an illustration of this in which SW tries
to explain the helping attitude of the professionals in response to Janine’s risky
behaviour:
Extract 6
286 SW: and that you are able to deal with certain things-
und dass du mit bestimmten Dingen-
287 =in a resPONsible way either,
281
=auch verANTwortlich umgehen kannst,
288 well that’s the other point right?
also das das ist ja so der andere Punkt ne?
289 .hhh when we have said -
.hhh wenn wir gesagt haben –
290 uhm?
ähm?
291 Janine within the cur- the care planning
Janine auch im Hef- im Hilfeplan
292 conversation in our oce already,=
gespräch bei uns im Amt,=
293 =you remember don‘t you?
=weißt ja noch ne?
294 .hh that we are worried-
.hh dass wir die Befürchtung haben-
295 that you if you: (--)
dass du wenn du:- (--)
296 uhm: (---) go on m=moving on that STREEt-
ähm: (---) so weiter d=dich auf dieser STRASse
bewegst-
297 as you moved in Holzwickede; [Janine’s home town]
wo du dich in Holzwickede bewegt hast;
298 well (-) bunking on the weekends, (-)
also (-) Wochenende abhauen, (-)
299 .hhh uhm with uhm:- (-)
.hhh ähm mit äh:- (-)
300 to hook up with those older GUYs and so on;=
diesen älteren TYpen da rum machst und so weiter;=
301 =then (-) this this is THEN already:-
=dann (-) das das ist DANN schon:-
302 .hh that we already there (-)
.hh dass wir da schon (-)
303 <<hum and haw>> af well n n>-
<<druckst herum> af also n n>-
304 well we have the FEAR,
ja die ANGST haben,
305 that you: will move in a certain DIrection.
dass du: in ne ganz bestimmte RICHtung gehst.
306 right?=
ne?=
307 we have explained to you how this COUld e::nd.
wir haben dir beschrieben wie das aus::gehen KÖNNte.
308 Not that it has to be this way,
Nicht dass es so ist,
282
309 but .hh that it MIght end in that way.
aber .hh dass es so ausgehen KÖNNte.
310 .hhhh and uhm: I am just thinking too uhm-
.hhhh und ähm: ich denke einfach auch äh-
311 Janine you are (-) HERE, uhm (-)
Janine du bist (-) HIER, äh (-)
312 that we can protect you a little bit for now.
damit wir dich ERSTmal ein Stückchen schützen.
313 (3.0)
CPC Janine
In this statement, the professionals’ concern for helping is due to being
‘worried’ (line 294) and because of ‘FEAR’ (line 304) – both suitable for jus-
tifying the professionals’ former and future interventions to protect the child
from risks. e social worker’s statement highlights distinct features of an
altruistic attitude concerning the client–professional relationship. Although
SW denotes Janine’s deviance much more clearly than ever before (‘moving on
that STREEt; bunking on the weekends; hook up with those older GUYs, lines
296–300), numerous particles of her speech (stretching of phonemes, delays,
pauses, word and sentence abortions, audible breathing, etc.) nevertheless
point to her reluctance to blame Janine for what she is doing to herself (line
‘that you: will turn in a certain Direction’, line 305). While in everyday con-
versations the used categories (‘bunking, to hook up with those older GUYs’)
would justify the conclusion that Janine is an immoral or promiscuous girl,
SW instead pursues an alternative track focusing on the issue-related objec-
tive of the CPC, knitting together institutional purposes with Janine’s concrete
needs: ‘Janine you are (-) HERE, uhm (-) that we can protect you a little bit’.
us, the morals of helping are designed to t the principal mission of the
agency with the personal needs of the client accounting for the subsequent
measures according to the decision-making agenda of the CPC setting.
6 Discussion
Starting from (and ending with) the notion of social work as a helping and
moral profession, this study has aimed to make moral phenomena palpable
where they are eective but dicult to access. While the relationship between
professionals and clients is regularly considered an asymmetric and imbal-
anced trade (cf. Hydén 1994, 1999), the CPC conversations mainly point to
the positive functions of morals. us, a sign of respect does not only refer to
the ethical principles of social work practice but also contributes to mitigating
inherent structural asymmetries of the client–professional encounter.
Using Luhmann’s notion of morals, we are able to analyse morally under-
pinned conversations in a somewhat dierent way. According to the empirical
283
ndings, the CPC conversations above all stress the omnipresence of moral
reections referring to an interactional order that positions the participants
of the setting in a basically disparate and hierarchical way. Correspondingly,
morals become particularly eective in a substantially proactive manner, pro-
viding the ground for equal rights and obligations to share the benets an action
may have for the participants in the setting. us, any communication seems
to rely on moral considerations indexing the form and quality of a situated
social relationship. As a consequence, participants are able to draw far-reaching
conclusions regarding their position and status taken as a collection of entitle-
ments and responsibilities at any moment in the particular setting (cf. Eneld
2011: 291). Firstly, this is in line with the writings of Hall and colleagues, as
morals were used along with various accounting and categorizing activities that
substantiate ‘character work’ and spell out its implicit meaning. Moreover, a
sign of respect also goes beyond this, as it points to the interactional needs of
dierently equipped participants in a client–professional encounter.
A second nding refers to the functions of morals. Morals (in the sense of a
sign of respect or disrespect) become potent as a precept for social inclusion
and equity. Seen from a wider perspective, morals seem to provide the ground
for a societal order which holds membership (cf. Luhmann 1997: 618) and
solidarity (cf. Parsons 1972: 306) as fundamental to bridging the gap between
individual and societal needs. One basic condition for social inclusion seems
to be the acknowledgement of the other as a legitimate member of the particu-
lar setting, provided with shared information and equal rights to participate.
Making use of morals as a sign of respect thus clearly refers to the prerequisites
of social inclusion, bridging the needs of the individual with the objectives of
the particular setting on an interactional level.
Referring to morals as a device of exclusion avoidance, however, the situation
appears slightly dierent. While there is a constant need to problematize cases
in a more or less explicit way to justify and legitimize the subsequent interven-
tion, this poses a certain dilemma as it implies the risk of characterizing the
client’s identity in a more or less stigmatizing and, therefore, face-threatening
way. As a result, professionals explicate the (negative) characteristics of the
client only as far as it seems to be necessary to gain a shared understand-
ing about the relevant topics. Correspondingly, professionals choose to use
neutral or non-judgmental descriptions to avoid conict and resistance and to
secure the clients’ alignment and aliation.
One might understand the data concerning the morals of helping in a
similar way. To the extent that institutional action is assessed primarily in
ethical terms, inclusion (and, respectively, the avoidance of exclusion) turns
out to be a signicant issue in the course of a client–professional relationship.
However, if clients fail to comply with the institutional expectations they are
284
increasingly portrayed as persons with clearly dened obligations and activ-
ity-tied responsibilities. As a consequence, clients were regularly held liable
for underpinning the helping attitude of the professionals, and will be blamed
if they fall behind their role expectations.
Finally, these ndings are particularly relevant insofar as institutions create
their own understanding of what is considered to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ regard-
ing the conduct of clients. e limits of positive morals thus show up when
institutional aims do not meet the needs of the client. is is highly probable
if residential care is terminated against the will of the client (Messmer and
Hitzler 2011), if decisions provoke the clients’ resistance (Hitzler and Messmer
2010) or if the promises of participation cannot be reconciled with the needs
of the clients (Hitzler and Messmer 2015).
Morality, then, seems to be an equally universal and exible tool to inuence
and govern the encounter in line with the needs of the agency (Jayyusi 1984).
It is both suitable to safeguard the client’s alignment as well as to discipline
his or her conduct in line with the objectives of the particular setting. Seen
from a wider perspective, morals in social work practice become especially
manifest within the mismatch of persisting ethical norms and the constraints
posed by the functions of an institutional and interactional order, respectively.
Professionals, who have to balance legal, nancial and political claims with the
necessity of establishing an eective working relationship, are only partially
able to act in a legitimate and transparent way. In a quite similar vein, Berg-
mann describes morality as a dysfunctional hybrid of modern, rationality-tied
institutions constantly producing the need to bridge the heterogeneities of an
interactional and societal order:
Although morality is ocially backgrounded in modern institutions and profes-
sions, the whole enterprise of people-processing in institutions rests on assessments
and decisions about people’s normality and moral accountability […] e mixture
between rational and moral frame in institutional settings produces a peculiar hybrid
context of interaction that is at least for the clients somewhat ‘nebulous’ […] e par-
adoxical situation is carried to extremes when an institution has to deal in a rational,
demoralized mode with morals issues. (Bergmann 1998: 291)
Appendix: Transcript notation
Speakers
CR Carer
CH Child/young person
HS Head of services
MO Mother
TR Trainee
SW Social worker
285
Other conventions
(.) Micro pause
(-) Pause (one dash approximately .25 seconds)
(1.0) Pause (in seconds)
( ) Unintelligible utterance
(yes) Uncertain utterance
((laughs)) Context remarks
<<loudly>> Remarks describing the utterance (including scope)
.h .hh Inbreath
: Stretching of phonemes
= No gap between utterances
WELL Capitals: emphasis
and [so
[okay Overlap
. Voice falls
; Voice falls slightly
- Voice unchanging
, Voice rises slightly
? Voice rises
Note
1. e English translations of the data extracts aim to maintain the gist of the
interactions rather than to sustain the syntactical and lexical form.
About the author
Heinz Messmer received his doctorate from Bielefeld University and in 2003 his
Habitation with a conversation analytical study on the emergence and systemic
reproduction of social conict. Since 2009 he has been Professor and Senior
Researcher at the School of Social Work (FHNW) at Basel, Switzerland in the eld
of child care organizations and child care practices. Address for Correspondence:
University for Applied Sciences and Arts, School of Social Work (FHNW), Insti-
tute for Studies in Children and Youth Services, iersteinerallee 57, CH-4053
Basel, Switzerland. Email: heinz.messmer @nw.ch
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