The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience
Abstract
This classic book, first published in 1991, was one of the first to propose the “embodied cognition” approach in cognitive science. It pioneered the connections between phenomenology and science and between Buddhist practices and science-claims that have since become highly influential. Through this cross-fertilization of disparate fields of study, The Embodied Mind introduced a new form of cognitive science called “enaction," in which both the environment and first person experience are aspects of embodiment. However, enactive embodiment is not the grasping of an independent, outside world by a brain, a mind, or a self; rather it is the bringing forth of an interdependent world in and through embodied action. Although enacted cognition lacks an absolute foundation, the book shows how that does not lead to either experiential or philosophical nihilism. Above all, the book’s arguments were powered by the conviction that the sciences of mind must encompass lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience. This revised edition includes substantive introductions by Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch that clarify central arguments of the work and discuss and evaluate subsequent research that has expanded on the themes of the book, including the renewed theoretical and practical interest in Buddhism and mindfulness. A preface by Jon Kabat-Zinn, the originator of the mindfulness-based stress reduction program, contextualizes the book and describes its influence on his life and work. © 1991, 2016 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved.
... The cognitive revolution of the 1950's was an intellectual movement that focused on an interdisciplinary study of the mind and its processes. New voices at the time (like Herbert Simon, Noam Chomsky, Marvin Minsky, John McCarthy), put forth ideas that would later serve as the main principles of modern cognitive science, linguistics, and the nascent field of artificial intelligence [25]. The main intuition behind it was that human intelligence resembles computation in its essential characteristics. ...
... Under such a scientific understanding of reality, the observer of the experience is "a disembodied eye, looking objectively at the play of phenomena" [25]. The fundamental assumption of this view is that we inhabit a pre-given world with particular properties (e.g., length, color, etc.) which we, as objective observers, represent internally as a set of symbols and manipulation operations on these symbols. ...
... Two of the major critiques of such a world view contend that symbol processing does not seem to be the right approach for representing experience and that operations on symbols can be specified using only their physical form, not their meaning -i.e., "[t]he symbolic level is not reducible to the physical level" [25]. However, it is clear that the capability of the symbols to represent objects/ideas does not depend on how they are referenced in the world (e.g., the word 'tree' -has nothing to to with the way we identify and refer to it in the physical world). ...
True human-centered Artificial Intelligence (AI) is impossible without addressing the inherent and diverse aspects of humanness. Deep learning models have achieved remarkable success in some tasks in vision and language processing, and few can deny it. However, as it moves forward, the field cannot continue to pretend it can do it all by itself, especially when we advertise it as ‘human-centered AI’. It has come the time to open up the stage for methodological pluralism in the interest of critical and democratic science, and for the benefit of society. In this paper, I want to draw particular attention to the aspect of lived (subjective) experience , one research area highly misunderstood and hugely neglected in AI, and especially in Natural Language Processing (NLP). Our intensions, selfhood, autonomy, emotions, feelings, sensory knowledge, cultural history are integral components of our intelligence. Thus, the future AI and NLP models will need to more closely align with the embodied component of human intelligence. As we push the limit of creativity and innovation in AI, we need to develop a new way of looking at human experience, with a better scientific understanding of intelligence and its own practices, at the intersection of many disciplinary fields.
... The understanding of embodied cognition as presented here revolves around the concept of embodiment, which is seen as an extended relational condition involving the body, mind, and environment. This perspective is in line with the ideas of Clark and Chalmers (1998), who view embodiment as ecologically situated, evolutionary, and autopoietic (Varela et al. 2017). With this foundation established, we can now delve into the relational aspects that define the "embodied self-world bond" (Varela et al. 2017), which forms the fundamental concept of phenomenological restorativeness. ...
... This perspective is in line with the ideas of Clark and Chalmers (1998), who view embodiment as ecologically situated, evolutionary, and autopoietic (Varela et al. 2017). With this foundation established, we can now delve into the relational aspects that define the "embodied self-world bond" (Varela et al. 2017), which forms the fundamental concept of phenomenological restorativeness. ...
... Interestingly, restorativeness has been studied based on paradigms that guided the collection of both behavioral and psychophysiological data. However, as the phenomenal experience of the environment is primarily affective, in agreement with both the embodied perspective (Varela et al. 2017) and the perspective of experimental phenomenology (Bozzi 1989), our view is that the relationship between individual and environment needs to be understood by starting with an examination of the dynamics underlying the subjective experience of a restorative environment. ...
This paper proposes an integration of embodied and phenomenological perspectives to understand the restorative capacity of natural environments. It emphasizes the role of embodied simulation mechanisms in evoking positive affects and cognitive functioning. Perceptual symbols play a crucial role in generating the restorative potential in environments, highlighting the significance of the encounter between the embodied individual and the environment. This study reviews Stress Reduction Theory (SRT) and Attention Restoration Theory (ART), finding commonalities in perceptual fluency and connectedness to nature. It also explores a potential model based on physiognomic perception, where the environment’s pervasive qualities elicit an affective response. Restorativeness arises from a direct encounter between the environment’s phenomenal structure and the embodied perceptual processes of individuals. Overall, this integrative approach sheds light on the intrinsic affective value of environmental elements and their influence on human well-being.
... In mathematics education the term enaction was introduced by Bruner (1953), inspired by Dewey's (1910) 'learning by doing'. Bruner's enaction, is however far less radical than Varela's enaction (Varela et al. 1991), in that it does not challenge the notion of a given reality 'out there' which we perceive or represent more or less successfully. An unfolding metaphor for enaction in the sense of Varela (1987Varela ( , 1999 is Antonio Machado's famous poem (Machado 1988, p. 142;Thompson 2007): 'Caminante, son tus huellas el camino, y nada más; caminante, no hay camino, se hace camino al andar' ['Wanderer, your footsteps are the path, nothing else; there is no path, you lay down a path in walking']. ...
... An unfolding metaphor for enaction in the sense of Varela (1987Varela ( , 1999 is Antonio Machado's famous poem (Machado 1988, p. 142;Thompson 2007): 'Caminante, son tus huellas el camino, y nada más; caminante, no hay camino, se hace camino al andar' ['Wanderer, your footsteps are the path, nothing else; there is no path, you lay down a path in walking']. Varela (1987) himself cited Machado when he introduced his enactive program 2 in cognitive science (Varela et al. 1991), claiming that cognition is enaction, since enaction connotes bringing forth a world by concrete handling (Varela 1999, p. 8). Notice that the enactivist 'laying a path in walking' metaphor counters the traditional and "second nature" metaphors for learning like following a well-marked path given in advance, as in the "learning trajectories" of Wittmann (2012Wittmann ( , 2013 or as climbing a staircase (NAEYC, 2015;National Research Council, 2009). ...
... Traditionally, problem solving involves problems given beforehand, lying 'out there' in the world, waiting to be solved, independently of us. In the enactivist perspective, because of our structural coupling with the world (Varela 1996, Varela et al. 1991), we bring forth emergent problematic situations instead. This perspective is implemented in our courses, by not giving the students tasks to carry out, but instead, just presenting situations to them (cf. ...
In this theoretical paper providing illustrative examples, we discuss our didactic approach to emergency remote teaching (ERT) at the University of Chile. Intending to transpose to ERT our enactivist approach to mathematics teaching, which emphasises metaphorising and student random group work, we noticed that virtual tools like breakout rooms and shared whiteboards, opened up unexpected new avenues for student participation. To these avenues, which aim at a collective lesson creation, we refer as black swans in our title. In contrast, white swans embody the mainstream options to implement ERT in our universities. We argue then that student participation and collaborative work may also be enhanced, instead of thwarted, in ERT. The illustrative examples we discuss, concern two courses given by us at our university before and during the pandemic, one to prospective mathematics and physics teachers, prospective mathematicians, and the other to social sciences and humanities first year students.
... From the outset, Biology of Cognition posits that the nervous system is not a computer or a machine processing information but rather it is an infinite spiral of P erception ⟲ Action elementary acts where the main problem is deciding the next action. Thus, at its core, every living system is an unending stream of recursive Perception⟲Action loops and not a device that interprets, using the immutable laws of logic, an objective external world [11,12]. ...
... Structural Coupling, as first proposed by Maturana [11] and later refined by Varela [12] as Enaction, is the phenomenon by which living systems, as they undergo the never-ending perception⟲action spiral, create the "objects" 2 they encounter, thus creating their ecological niche ( Figure 3). "Objects" are an unavoidable side effect of the Perception⟲Action loop when embodied by an autopoietic system. ...
The most accepted paradigm of brain function sustaining mathematical thinking is the “Brain as Computer” metaphor. Since the early 1970s, however, a new viewpoint based on the Biology of Cognition, created by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, has slowly positioned itself as a challenger to the computer metaphor. Here, we interpret the notion of metaphorising in mathematics in the context of Biology of Cognition. Specifically, we introduce the fundamental concept of Structural Coupling, which is the mechanism by which living systems create the “objects” populating their niche by exploiting correlations in the never-ending Perception ⟲ Action loop. Furthermore, we show that how a living system decides which action to perform is the outcome of a Bayesian Inference mechanism; therefore, randomness is fundamental to living systems and not just a consequence of the mere lack of sufficient information to compute the next action. Additionally, in Bayesian inference, the underlying conditional probability distribution P ( action|perception ) changes by the very execution of every Perception ⟲ Action loop, performing a biased random walk according to a Hebbian-like rule. With this rich set of concepts derived from cutting-edge biology, we show that Biology of Cognition is a good fit to understand mathematical metaphorisation.
... The concept of an embodiment of the mind has long been one of the critical themes in the field of cognitive philosophy [1]. The interplay and inter-responses between cognition (brain), body, and the environment are crucial to generate an adaptive and flexible fit to the given circumstances. ...
... Thus, for the robots to manage well with any level of contingency, their autonomous judgement and adaptative movement to the given situation will be required. 1 A Japanese philosopher, Shūzō Kuki (九鬼周造, 1888-1941), worked on the notion of the level of contingency by examining the notion of necessity. According to Kuki, there lie different levels between IOP Publishing doi:10.1088/1757-899X/1292/1/012023 ...
How to deal with a contingency? A contingent situation plays a vital role in challenges with uncertainty and unpredictability. This is because contingency requires the subject to be adaptive and flexible in the given condition. Regarding the development of robotics, soft robotics is highly anticipated to be more adaptable and flexible to contingency with its bodily inputs. In contrast, material-wise, conventional hard robotics may fit more for fixed, stable, static, or predictable situations. The latest development in new materials has opened a window for more usable and useful artificial body parts as advanced tools. This short article first highlights the types of artificial body parts and summarises the role of contingency in robotics development. In addition, it analyses the various phases of the concept of the embodied mind in link with contingency. Additionally, for further discussion, it questions ethical, moral, and legal aspects regarding the future development of artificial body parts.
... An embodied perspective, therefore, moves us away from an anthropocentric, mentalistic view of cognition and extends it beyond 'skin and skull' to the body and the world (Clark 1997), with the aim of understanding how cognitive processes are rooted in bodily experience and interwoven with bodily action and interaction with other individuals (Merleau-Ponty 1962Varela et al. 1991;Damasio 1994;Clark 1997;Lakoff & Johnson 1999;Anderson 2003;Garbarini & Adenzato 2004;Barrett & Henzi 2005). It is therefore an approach that has much in common with the research strategy that Shettleworth (1998) characterizes as ecological; here the assumption is that evolution has selected for the behaviours and mechanisms that enable animals to cope with life in particular ecological niches. ...
... Tying this to work demonstrating the embodied and distributed nature of cognition in humans (e.g. Varela et al. 1991;Vygotsky 1978;Fogel 1993;Gallagher 2005) may then enable us to identify true commonalities across species, rather than anthropocentric chimera. ...
Why are humans so clever? The ‘Social intelligence’ hypothesis explores the idea that this cleverness has evolved through the increasing complexity of social groups. Our ability to understand and control nature is a by-product of our ability to understand the mental states of others and to use this knowledge to co-operate or deceive. These abilities have not emerged out of the blue. They can be found in many social animals that co-operate and compete with one another, birds as well as mammals. This book brings together contributions from an impressive list of authorities in the field, appropriately concluding with a chapter by Nick Humphrey (one of the pioneers in this field). This volume examines social intelligence in many different animal species and explores its development, evolution and the brain systems upon which it depends. Better understanding and further development of social intelligence is critical for the future of the human race and the world that we inhabit. Our problems will not be solved by mere cleverness, but by increased social co-operation.
... According to the theory of social organizing (Secchi, Gahrn-Andersen, & Cowley, 2022) cognition in organizations is a function of the nested sets of interactions, projections, anticipations, and coordination that can be observed among individuals, resources, ideas, and actions. This is not entirely new, since deep subjectivity was already central for proponents of embodied cognition (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). However, the emphasis has always been on unanimated artifacts and the way in which cognition operates on the basis of coordination (Hutchins, 1995;Steffensen, 2013). ...
... In groups where social interconnections are not as wide (r ≤ 8) then the use of aids (tools) starts to play a role as the interpretation gap grows. This speaks specifically to the EDEC perspectives (Hutchins, 2014;Clark & Chalmers, 1998;Varela et al., 1991) because it indicates when external material cognitive resources such as artifacts, for example, become essential. In fact, it seems that artifacts become relevant only when social cognitive resources are relatively scarce, or they do not work at their full extent. ...
... Прикладом міжгалузевого підходу до визначення медитації можуть бути дослідження Франциско Варели [15] і Евана Томпсона [14], яких вважають засновниками нейрофеноменології. Йдеться насамперед про спробу поєднати наукові дослідження медитації у нейронауках, аналітичну філософію і феноменологію, ґрунтуючись на медитативних практиках як експериментальній лабораторії. ...
Однією із сильних сторін наукового світогляду є здатність створювати дослідницькі середовища, які постійно між собою взаємодіють, належачи навіть до різних галузей знання. Поняття медитації – це приклад того, як увага дослідників з різних наукових дисциплін фокусується на одній темі, на одному предметі, але підходи зумовлюють різні визначення. У статті розглянуто основні існуючі підходи до поняття медитації і виокремлено основні: нейронауковий, інклюзивний (партисипативний), галузевий (наприклад, психологічний) і міжгалузевий. Здійснено попередню систематизацію підходів до визначення поняття медитації з огляду на труднощі, які пов’язані з контекстами, інтепретаціями і запитами сучасного світу до контемплятивних практик. У випадку з медитацією наука демонструє водночас проблему спеціалізації, схильність редукувати досліджуваний феномен згідно з власними методологіями, пояснювати локальні культурні середовища крізь призму постколоніального спадку. Особливу роль у цій дискусії відіграють саме гуманітарні науки (філософія, релігієзнавство, психологія), методологія яких більше орієнтована на людину, людські практики і значущість суб’єктивного знання.
... As part of an ontological perspective on border studies, we assume that borders emerge in the embodied creation of social space and that they serve as a means to interpret the environment and stabilise ways of knowing the wider world (Malpas, 2012;Scott, 2021;Scott & Sohn, 2018). This is also suggested by Rosch's (2017) elaborations on participatory sense-making which support the idea that borders (for example, within society and cities) emerge in the interaction between imagined and experienced space. Along similar lines, we can interpret urban borders as a nexus between everyday practices of differentiating social space, instrumental place-making, for example, as a project of urban development, and the ontological need for a sense of rootedness in place. ...
Place is of central significance to urban planning processes that specifically target community involvement and co-ownership of development decisions. Consequently, the intriguing but often daunting task of understanding how a sense of place emerges, develops, and evolves has been a subject of interdisciplinary study that links the social sciences, humanities, and more recently, cognitive sciences. Since Kevin Lynch’s classic study of urban images and mental maps, borders within cities have either directly or indirectly featured as vital meaning-making elements of place identities. However, despite some remarkable precedents, analysis of political and socio-cultural borders has only begun to link place-making and bordering processes in ways that resonate with urban planning studies. In this article, we will suggest that borders emerge in the embodied creation of social space as a means to interpret the environment and stabilise ways of knowing the wider world. Building on our own previous research on participatory place-making initiatives in Berlin, we will indicate how border stories (i.e., the social communication of neighbourhood distinction, relationality, and transformation) represent vital knowledges of place. These knowledges reflect embodied experiences of place as well as contestations and tensions that characterise place development processes. Perhaps most importantly in terms of planning, the salience of urban borders lies in broadening understanding of how and why places function—or fail to function—as communities.
... La référence à l'expérience, notamment corporelle et sensorielle, était présente dès les débuts de la notion de Soi en psychologie, quand James [10], en 1890, avait évoqué la dynamique d'un « je » transcendantal capable d'expérimenter un moi empirique matériel et corporel, social, subjectif et spirituel. Plus près de nous, dans la perspective de la cognition incarnée [4,28] et des théories sensori-motrices de la perception [6], la notion de Soi apparait émerger à partir des rapports entre organisme et environnement où les processus sensori-moteurs tiennent un rôle prépondérant. ...
Résumé: Nous abordons dans cet article la dimension émergente du Soi telle qu’elle peut être vécue et structurée dans la dynamique de la présence thérapeutique. Dans l’immédiat de la rencontre avec le patient, la présence du psychothérapeute aux différentes nuances de son expérience favorise une extension du champ du contact à des dimensions aussi actuelles que virtuelles, possibles ou potentielles de la relation. Le praticien peut explorer ces dimensions et ramener dans le contexte de l’interaction, de façon implicite ou explicite, un certain matériau utile au processus thérapeutique. Toutefois, l’expérience immédiate présente un caractère ambigu qui brouille les frontières de soi et met en tension le rapport à soi, à autrui et au monde. La rencontre mobilise nécessairement une dimension émergente du Soi qui se structure via des points de repère entre actualité et virtualité, des anchors dont la fonction incarnante permet l’utilisation saine du matériau émergent de la relation tout en permettant au praticien de revenir dans les contours stables de son Soi.
Mots-clés : incarnation, présence thérapeutique, psychothérapie, Soi.
... Thus, living beings do not just seek to obtain an equilibrium with regard to the situation they are actually in. Instead, they are disposed toward obtaining an equilibrium with regard to situations which are not yet actualized (see Thompson, 2007, 74): Living beings flee dangerous situations in order to get to safety; they leave austere environments in order to find richer vegetations; they modify their surroundings in order to make them more hospitable; etc. 4 Merleau-Ponty's ideas were taken up and unfolded in the autopoietic theories of living beings that Staubmann refers to in his discussion of Luhmann (Staubmann, 2022, 42; see also Maturana & Varela, 1980;Varela et al., 1992). Thus, Thompson, who is probably the main contemporary proponent of these theories, writes: "Something acquires meaning for an organism to the extent that it relates (either positively or negatively) to the norm of the maintenance of the organism's integrity. ...
The body is one of the main themes in Staubmann’s Sociology in a New Key : Staubmann wants to establish a sociology that is grounded in the body and that does justice to the bodily dimension of sociality. In what follows, I will examine Staubmann’s theory of the body from a philosophical viewpoint. I will discuss his main claims and relate them to recent developments in philosophy.
First, I will outline Staubmann’s position. Then, I will explore the similarities between this position and the interaction theory of social cognition, as developed by Gallagher, De Jaegher, Fuchs, and other philosophers. My main focus, however, will be on the relation between Staubmann’s theory of the body and that of Thompson and Merleau-Ponty: I will point out the differences between their approaches but also highlight their similarities. In the end, I will make a plea for a non-reductive conception of life, which, I believe, is very much in line with Staubmann’s Sociology in a New Key .
... Since technology concerns action and involves cognitive issues, anthropology's technological analysis consequently demands a cognitive proposal. Cognitive features could be associated with the idea of methods and mediation, insofar as it encompasses corporeal procedures anthropologists take on within their fieldwork (Hutchins, 1995;Menary, 2010;Varela et al., 1991). At the same time, corporeal procedures become techniques of the body (sensu Mauss, 1973), reflecting a loop between the material engagement of people with artifacts (production, use, and performance) and anthropological methods themselves. ...
We address the version of an ontological turn as a methodological imprint of the coproduction of knowledge. Although this perspective carries on a methodological effort to shed new light on object study through recursiveness, it neglects the importance of technical action. The present article aims to deepen the methodological venues offered by the ontological turn to address the notion of co-production related to techniques. Departing from the analyses of ethnographic contexts, we discuss whether experimentation as axes of co-production resonates with other methodological devices provided by the anthropology of technology. We argue that philistinism, inflection, and possibilism of material affordances colligate with experimentation reflected in different practices, overcoming representational bias and posthumanist excesses.
... Its articulation with these other constructs in an ascending and descending sense reinforces its validity, in accordance with Bunge (1974). For the rest, its components are linked to the material object of the current psychology of the mind: schemes of the self -personal identity (Metzinger, 2009); mental states -self-awareness (Noë, 2009); personal project -intentionality (Dennett, 1989); and feedback loop -mental causation (Varela et al., 2016). ...
Conceptualizing self-esteem as the result of the comparation between two schemas of the self, model-self and perceived-self (self-concept), a systemic, integrated, and analytic model is proposed to explain how that construct is updated and maintained in real time. Its theoretical structure includes elements of two types: components -situational antecedents, representations and mental states-, and cognitive processes -deduction, interpretation, and attribution. Within its operation stand out the self-esteem occasions -situational triggers-, the role plaid by the model-self as a principle to derive various blocks of information, the final experiences produced by self-esteem, and processes of feedback to correct inputs to the system. The model is based on research results in this field and is consistent whit other various psychological theories and constructs. Its clinical applications in psychopathology and psychotherapy are outlined, especially the possibility of developing its own therapy.
... The physical is characterized by our sensory and perceptual interactions with our concrete body and environment. The latter may not seem to be entirely novel since there is a whole series of 4E cognition scientific approaches to consciousness from Varela and colleagues [58] that emphasize that the physical is characterized as an integral component of the enactive cognitive system. In this school of thought-whose origins can be traced back to Merleau-Ponty [59]-the body is not seen as a separate entity but as an extension of the mind, and the mind is thought to arise from this bodily engagement with the environment in a continuous and reciprocal interaction between an organism's sensory perception and its motor actions. ...
The German word destruktion is used here in the sense that philosophy should destroy some ontological concepts and the everyday meanings of certain words. Tradition allows the transmission of knowledge, but it can perpetuate certain prejudices. According to Heidegger, tradition transmits, but it also conceals. Tradition induces self-evidence and prevents us from accessing the origin of concepts. It makes us believe that we do not need to return to that origin. Making tradition transparent dissolves the concealments it has provoked. Here, I apply this idea to the mind–body problem, which has inherited occultations that are born from Descartes himself. As a result, a new philosophical framework for research on consciousness emerges: that, as an individual cognitive being, I cannot avoid splitting reality into what I am and what I am not, extending then the individual duality to a collective error transmitted culturally.
... The latest research on neuroscience and consciousness [20,33] points to the importance of whole-person immersion in learning. One of the most effective paths to develop ecosystem awareness is for team members to experience the team as an organic whole. ...
... The attributes "perceptual" and "non-verbal" (associated with System 1) and "reflective" and "language-driven" (associated with System 2) seem the closest reference to the debate over representationalism, but it is perfectly possible for representations and content to be perceptual and non-verbal, and conversely for language and reflection not to involve representations.10 Bargh & Chartrand (1999, p. 463) are aware that representationalism is not the only game in town as in footnote 1 they mention the alternative assumptions on cognition ofVarela et al. (1991).Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved. ...
The “scaling-up” problem concerns radical embodied cognition’s (REC) supposed inability to extend its explanatory reach beyond simple cognitive phenomena. This paper questions the problem’s main assumption, that is, the possibility of sorting phenomena according to their inherent cognitive complexity or representation-hunger. To do so, I focus on a class of phenomena whose degree of representation-hunger has been much debated: social phenomena (and their cognitive correlates). Some, like Clark and Toribio (1994), consider social phenomena the absolute top of representation-hunger, while others, like radical enactivists, conceive of sociality as a non-representational resource; two opposite views which demonstrate how hard it is to place sociality somewhere in a representational hierarchy. An exploration into two social disciplines provides reasons to question the tenability of the scaling-up problem in the case of social phenomena and hence in general. The long debate in social psychology over dual-process models of cognition suggests distinguishing between the complexity of a task and its putative cognitive requirements, therefore rejecting that form of cognitive-task essentialism inherent in the idea of representation-hunger. The recent encounter of radical enactivism with social theory provides, on the other hand, a non-representational explanation of institutional phenomena. In the end, the paper suggests that one of the following must hold: either the scaling-up problem is untenable in its traditional (hierarchical) understanding or radical enactivism has already scaled up to social phenomena, understood as the pinnacle of representation-hunger.
... According to their theory: 1) Cognition is dependent on experiences that come from having a particular body design (and differences in design among animals); 2) Experiences of the body are embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context. Specifically, Varela et al. (1991) write: "The perceiver, with its body and sensory and motor systems, will determine what is available to that organism, such that as an organism moves through the world, its motion will produce opportunities for new perceptions and new perception will reveal opportunities for new actions!" (p. ...
This paper briefly traces how both Computer Science and Psychology grew-in tandem-to share similar notions of Embodied Cognition. It concludes an analysis of how the two fields are uniting in their work on Embodied Artificial Intelligence, and future challenges for the field.
... According to their theory: 1) Cognition is dependent on experiences that come from having a particular body design (and differences in design among animals); 2) Experiences of the body are embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context. Specifically, Varela et al. (1991) write: "The perceiver, with its body and sensory and motor systems, will determine what is available to that organism, such that as an organism moves through the world, its motion will produce opportunities for new perceptions and new perception will reveal opportunities for new actions!" (p. ...
This paper briefly traces how both Computer Science and Psychology grew-in tandem-to share similar notions of Embodied Cognition. It concludes an analysis of how the two fields are uniting in their work on Embodied Artificial Intelligence, and future challenges for the field.
... As Johnson and Schulkin note, however, these kinds of language-centered accounts tended to lack a recognition of the significance of "the living, breathing, moving, copulating, making, dancing, sculpting, emoting, valuing body" (2023, 157; our emphasis) for human life and experience. Over the last decades, approaches that emphasize the significance of embodiment have become increasingly influential within the fields of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, with the movement known as the enactive approach as one of the key players (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991;Thompson, 2007;Di Paolo, Buhrmann & Barandiaran, 2017). In response to worries that the validity of such theories is limited in scope to "basic" aspects of the mind, such as the practice-oriented "ground-level" of perception, and that it will struggle to account for "sophisticated" aspects like language and symbolic thought, recent enactivist works have taken what could be called a second linguistic turn, suggesting novel, fine-grained conceptions of linguistic life with the enactive body as a constitutive and regulative starting point. ...
This article takes its point of departure from the second (embodied) linguistic turn represented by the enactivist notion of humans as linguistic bodies, using resources from Hans Georg Gadamer in order to propose a view of the relation between art and everyday experience as one of symbolic transformation. Conceiving art as a form of linguistic phenomenon wherein one can engage in original situations of communication, this view rejects both autonomist and direct continuity views of the art-everyday relation. We start by situating the idea of linguistic bodies within the enactive approach, spelling out relevant aspects concerning the significance of language for human life and perception (Sect. 2). Then we embark on a discussion of aspects of Shaun Gallagher's and Alva Noë's enactivist perspectives on art experience, highlighting places where their views align with and depart from ours (Sect. 3). The last two sections aim to lay out the transformative view in more detail, proposing a pluralistic understanding of art media and a view of art and art experience as modes of ideational, embodied thought (Sects. 4 and 5).
... they result from an ongoing investigation of the world by an active agent who is part of that world. This notion stands at the very heart of the enactive approach to perception (Gibson, 1979;Merleau-Ponty, 2002;Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). ...
institute of science, Rehovot, israel; b Tel-hai college, Kiryat shemoneh, israel; c The open University of israel, Ra'anana, israel ABSTRACT The sense of helplessness stands at the very core of the traumatic experience. This paper suggests that a sense of helplessness arises when, despite the functioning of the cognitive system and awareness of circumstances and feelings, an individual is unable to access practical knowledge. As a result, the subject becomes a victim of one's own inability to perform, or act, in the real world.
... The embodiment of mental processes has been a recurrent theme in cognitive science and neural biology during the latest decade and paradoxically even in robotics (Lakoff 1987;Varela et al. 1991;Damasio 1994;Deacon 1997;Lakoff and Johnson 1999;Hendriks-Jansen 1996;Clark 260 Jesper Hoffmeyer, Kalevi Kull 1997). But the coin has two sides, and while the naturalization of human intelligence has attracted much attention, the other side of the coin, the inherent intelligence of nature, has not drawn such attention. ...
The role of genetic inheritance dominates current evolutionary theory. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, several evolutionary theorists independently speculated that learned behaviors could also affect the direction and rate of evolutionary change. This notion was called the Baldwin effect, after the psychologist James Mark Baldwin. In recent years, philosophers and theorists of a variety of ontological and epistemological backgrounds have begun to employ the Baldwin effect in their accounts of the evolutionary emergence of mind and of how mind, through behavior, might affect evolution.
The essays in this book discuss the originally proposed Baldwin effect, how it was modified over time, and its possible contribution to contemporary empirical and theoretical evolutionary studies. The topics include the effect of the modern evolutionary synthesis on the notion of the Baldwin effect, the nature and role of niche construction in contemporary evolutionary theory, the Baldwin effect in the context of developmental systems theory, the possible role of the Baldwin effect in computational cognitive science biosemiotics, and the emergence of consciousness and language.
Bradford Books imprint
... Such models include Husserl's (1977) phenomenology, which argues for the "aboutness" of knowledge, Merleau-ponty's (1945) emphasis on lived experiences, and Santayana's (1904) writing on perceptual "essences" as the foundations for mental life. Models in cognitive neuroscience adapted the perspective of Varela et al. (2016) on cognition as geared to solve daily problems and discussed how cognitive faculties are molded by the specific problems individuals encounter in their physical and social ecology. These authors grounded mental life in the contextual and local, refuted schools of thoughts that emphasized abstract or metaphysical "ideas" (e.g., Plato, Descartes), and argued that human knowledge is eclipsed by the human body and its affordances and limitations. ...
To initiate discussion on women in science, we begin with Gerald Edelman’s definition: “Science is imagination in the service of the verifiable truth,” which underscores “verifiability,” truth reached by evidence, as the pathway science charts to Truth. “Verifiability” is named after the Roman Goddess Veritas, the daughter of Cronos and the mother of Virtus, suggesting that mythology viewed science as embodied by a female, embedded in its historical time, and aimed to breed values. We contemplate three perspectives on the topic and discuss their potential risks. The Veracity (Veritas) Perspective holds that science is impartial to the gender, race, political camp, or religious affiliation of its practitioner and from this perspective “women in sciences” is an oxymoron; science is, essentially, genderless. We argue that this perspective is misleading. Becoming a scientist requires education, resources, encouragement, training, role models, time, and funding, and the lack of such provisions banned women from the gates of Truth. The Harsh Reality perspective brings data presenting a grim picture. From 1902 to 2022 only 3.6% of Nobel Prizes in sciences were awarded to women and percentages of women in top academic positions are a third or lower across the US and Europe despite earning about 50% of PhDs in sciences. We contemplate internal and external reasons for this reality. Finally, the Potential Advantage position asks whether women may have unique sensitivities in the road to cumulative knowledge. We base our discussion on 20th century philosophical models that call to move from the metaphysical and abstract to the daily and contextual in the acquisition of knowledge and on research describing the distinct neural pathways to motherhood and fatherhood. We conclude by highlighting our unique historical time and the emergence of novel topics in neuroscience through the work of female and male scientists; interaction synchrony, inter-brain communication, and social and affiliative neuroscience.
... As previously mentioned, embodied cognition in its various forms has been a major component of our prior research, writing, higher education instruction, and scientific workshops [3,4]. Embodied cognition can be described as whole body cognition [110], which in our holobiont understanding of whole body would include the microbiome. Embodied cognition encompasses any manner in which information can be accessed by utilizing any part of the body as the source and/or conduit. ...
... (1) Enactivism is a comprehensive, multidisciplinary research program that has grown in popularity since the 1980s, drawing on and developing sciences as diverse as cell biology, complex dynamical systems theory, robotics, linguistics, ecological psychology, cognitive ethnography, phenomenology, and pragmatism (DiPaolo et al., 2017;Newen et al., 2018;Thompson, 2007;Varela et al., 1991). Over the last 10 years it has been applied to the study of musicking as well as to fields such as for instance education, psychotherapy and psychiatry. 1 Taken together, these developments ought to be able to translate to, and enrich music therapy research. ...
... The obvious difference, however, between the norms of health and rule-guided behavior is that we are never fully conscious of the norms that guide our interactions with our environment. Rather, to borrow a term from Varela (1992Varela ( , 2016 in its original meaning, we enact -in the strict sense of "bringing forth" -the norms that govern our health. ...
... The perspective I wish to explore instead, however, is one informed by complex theories of cognition (Davis, Sumara & Luce-Kapler, 2000;Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991;Johnson, 2001), one that intertwines readings and concepts I have juxtaposed alongside the vignette of Tara's reading/mis-reading experience. Such an examination of this event necessitates, in addition to the other analyses, the inclusion of a layer of historical and hermeneutic interpretation, both for Tara as an individual child, and for Tara as someone who is participating in a larger initiation into literacy culture and practices. ...
... The emphasis on outcomes neglects the emotional aspects of learning, in particular, that cognition and emotion are inextricably linked (Colombetti, 2013;Maturana & Varela, 1987;Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). Towers, Takeuchi and Martin (2018) found that "student's relationships with mathematics are fragile, volatile, subject to contextual influences, and constantly in process" (p. ...
In this paper, I argue that a lack of play and joy in classrooms could be due to our North American standardized education system, which emphasizes achievement outcomes. I argue that this system does not benefit the majority of students, nor the field of mathematics. Many students are negatively affected—both emotionally and academically—by a focus on results. Rather than outcome-driven pedagogy, a focus on learning to enjoy doing mathematics might change the conversation. A kinder, process-driven approach through mathematical play may spark enjoyable teaching and learning. Play (Gadamer, 1960/1989; Huizinga, 1944/1949) has the potential to absorb learners as they seek answers to fun yet challenging mathematics problems. The experience of flow is similar to that of play (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000); when playing, learners get a chance to practice and elaborate on their existing skills in manners that suspend notions of time. When the play releases them from its grasp, learners experience the joy from solving problems. Dewey (1916) considered play to be purposeful activity that sponsors a child’s growth. Teachers could capitalize on this for growth in learning. Learning to bring mathematical play into the classroom requires intention, an inviting attitude, knowledge of the types of problems that invoke play, and knowledge of how to connect playful problems to mathematical concepts and curriculum. Such engaging experiences with mathematics could sponsor joyful engagement in mathematics and an intrinsic desire to learn more.
... In both cases, the body of the musician can generate immediate adjustments that could re-orient the musical trajectory being developed. Indeed, musicians can get an optimal grip on the performance by selectively responding to available affordances (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014;Bruineberg et al., 2018) and transforming in turn the relationships between various musical factors via perceptually guided actions (Varela et al., 1991). ...
The present contribution introduces a theoretical framework to explore music performance from a perspective inspired by the conceptual resources of two orientations known as Dynamical System Theory and Embodied Cognitive Science. We discursively elaborate on how music performance might be conceived of as a complex, multi-component system that deals with evolving patterns of stability and instability, and examine how a combination of cognitive, motor, and affective skills stands at the heart of the performer’s capacity to optimize their performance. In doing so, we consider how musicians often generate different interpretative “hypotheses” with little or no pre-planning and use their body to selectively navigate the range of possibilities such hypotheses entail. In conclusion, the relevance of this perspective is discussed in relation to current research in music performance and music education to outline continuities and differences between the two domains.
This chapter aims to deepen Donald Schön's insight about jazz playing as an example of what he calls "reflection-in-action" (RiA) by situating this notion within the enactive view of humans as linguistic bodies. Our main claim is that the knowledge or skills displayed by expert jazz musicians must be understood as aural and communicative in nature. After presenting the notions of RiA and linguistic bodies, we develop our view through a critical discussion of four statements from Schön's passage on jazz musicianship, before wrapping up and clarifying the position we are advocating. This way, we suggest a revised version of Schön's concept, which we call "reflection in communicative jazz action."
In the interpretation of the body in the twentieth century, philosophy placed less emphasis than before on its natural composition and sought to integrate value judgements from different perspectives. The philosophy of the body addresses the deepest essential problems of human society and culture, it generates a uniquely detailed analysis of human nature and its various roles and performances in social operations, and it reveals contemporary society’s operating mechanisms and deep internal contradictions. Accordingly, philosophy no longer gives the mind any priority or superiority in terms of cognition, and the focus of research has moved away from pure consciousness and towards the body. Contemporary philosophical exploration of the body covers both the concept of belongingness and the feasibility of bodily freedom. It not only foregrounds the impossibility of viewing the body and the mind as separate entities but also leads us to examine the connections between humans and the world, taking meaning, reason and the body as their basis. This chapter explores the connections between body and thought in modern philosophy, traces the development of philosophy’s increasing concern with the body, elucidates the main contributions of representative figures in the field of philosophy of the body, and analyses the methodological significance and influence of the philosophy of the body as a contemporary philosophical trend.
Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin’s radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept of intentionality. I show that whereas enactivists endorse the idea that intentionality is a base-level property of cognition, pragmatism offer(ed) us some reasons not to proceed this way. It is therefore doubtful to hold that pragmatists and enactivists would converge in the defence of a common, non-representational conception of intentionality.
Through the analysis of this case study the book illustrates how even in works which are more directed by narrative or thematic aspects, the emotional import can still be correlated with the perceptual properties of the work. A link is proposed between the idea of tension, the physical sense of tension, the shared rhythm of all the perceptual properties analysed, and the powerful poignancy that emerges through the work. The chapter discusses notions of embodied cognition, enactive perception, the social construction of perception, and embodied concepts, and presents a summarised view of embodiment, enaction, and emotion.
Our world has always been changing, sometimes rather gradually, at other times more radically. In today’s world, we see both tremendous challenges and potential to shape it in a new and desirable direction. In almost every domain of our lives we are challenged by high levels of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguousness (“VUCA world”). In this context of profound technological, digital, social, and political changes and transformations, we have to ask ourselves: what is it that makes us humans human? What does a meaningful and joyful relationship between humans, technology, and the future look like? How do we meet the challenges of increasingly blurred borders between humans and technology in a more human(e) manner? Which skills and mindsets do we need to deal with our uncertain and unpredictable future in order to co-shape it in a purposeful and thriving manner? In this chapter, we will explore the challenges of a VUCA world and take a closer look at what their implications are for our educational systems. We will develop a future-oriented perspective on learning that is based on the concept of learning as co-becoming with the world. We will discuss that this requires futures literacies, such as sense-making capabilities, a constructivist epistemology, systems thinking, designerly ways of thinking and making, and most importantly, a capacity to identify and make use of future potentials. We will both discuss theoretical foundations (e.g., from cognitive science/enactive cognition approaches, systems thinking, etc.) and practical implications, skills, mindsets, and a concrete case study illustrating these concepts.
At this time of considerable technological development, interdisciplinarity assumes a key role in the advancement of research and the design of virtual reality and immersive environments. In this chapter, I will start by reporting some significant examples of technologies designed to generate new creative and therapeutic spaces that use the user’s movements, such as CARE HERE, e-mocomu and Sentire, and I will then describe the design prototyping of BehCreative. At the basis of these technologies are a few common features, including a sense of control, a multimodal design, and sensor-free performative movement. I will also address music therapy and rehabilitation, empowerment and Creative Empowerment based on the embodied cognition paradigm—a concept already present in the research of other authors yet never studied in depth or connected with Extended Digital Musical Instruments (EDMIs).
Bu çalışmada, tarafsızlık ve nötr olmak anlamına gelen, bütünselleştirici geleneksel nesnellik, bedensel perspektifi ve bilginin konumluluğunu reddetmesi bakımından eleştirilmiş ve bunun yerine Donna Haraway tarafından önerilen konumlu bilginin nesnelliği, kavram sistemlerinin metaforik doğasına dayandırılarak açıklanmıştır. Bu amaçla, birinci bölümde, bütünselleştirici nesnellik miti ele alınmış, Thomas Nagel’in nesnelliğe ulaşma sürecini anlatan üç aşamalı formülü örnek çerçeve olarak kullanılmıştır. İkinci bölümde, George Lakoff ve Mark Johnson’ın kavramsal metaforlar görüşü, bedenlenmiş, konumlu bir nesnellik olanağını sunması bakımından önerilmiştir. Bu amaçla, imge-şemaları aracılığıyla kavramsal sistemlerin nasıl oluştuğu, bu oluşum sürecinin beyinde nasıl gerçekleştiği, dile nasıl yansıdığı örneklerle desteklenerek gösterilmiştir. Son bölümde, Haraway’in konumlu nesnellik görüşü tanıtılarak, kavramsal metafor fikriyle ilişkisi kurulmuştur. Buna göre, kavramsal metaforlar, anlamı doğuran kavramsal sistemlerin bedenin perspektifinden yoksun bir nesnellikle değil, bedenin konumlanmışlığı bağlamında kurulduğunu ve bilme pratiklerinin de bu bağlamın ürünü olan bir nesnellik içerdiğini gösterirler.
Enactive görüş, klasik zihin anlayışına karşı alternatif bir zihin görüşü ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir. Buna göre insanın bilişsel nitelikleri ne tamamen indirgemeci bir şekilde somut ilişkilerle ne de sadece nesnesinden bağımsız soyut bir süreç olarak açıklanabilir. Aksine bilişsellik bedenli bir öznenin somut olarak içinde bulunduğu dünyada nesnelerle kurduğu yönelimsel ilişkiler olarak anlaşılmalıdır. Bu hedef doğrultusunda Merleau-Ponty’nin fenomenolojik analizlerini ve bedene yönelik düşüncelerini kendilerine rehber edinirler. Ancak söz konusu çalışma iki açıdan yetersiz kalmaktadır. İlki enactive görüşün yararlandığı bilimsel veriler nedeniyle fenomenolojinin doğalcılık eleştirilerine muhatap olacak bir doğal tavır içerisine girmesidir. İkincisi ise alternatif bir yol arayışı için rehberlik edinen Merleau-Ponty analizlerinin mevcut haliyle söz konusu hedefi geliştirmede yetersiz kalmasıdır. Bu nedenle TEM’in enactive görüşün bedenlenmiş bilinç yaklaşımını gerçek bir alternatif çözüm olarak sunması için söz konusu eleştirileri aşması gerekmektedir.
The article explores the theme of environment in Valeriy Podoroga’s analytical anthropology, offering an enactivist reading of his “The Metaphysics of Landscape”. The analytical strategy of “The Metaphysics of Landscape” is contrasted with that of later works such as “Mimesis” and “Anthropograms”. Whereas in the later works the analytical techniques are set by a variety of optical concepts, metaphors and images, thus representing a strategy of “exclusionary observation”, in “The Metaphysics of Landscape” the analysis follows rather the movement of observer’s body included in the environment and aims at the reconstruction of an integrated, sensorimotor, yet imaginary experience. Three fragments of Podoroga’s text, reconstructing imaginary bodies and landscapes embedded in the works of Kirkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, are interpreted as three different ways of coupling body and environment, generating three different models of bodily-environmental experience. Finding the correspondence of the fragments of the description of this experience to some key points of enactivist epistemology and aesthetics, the author shows that the enactivist approach makes it possible to formalize those techniques of analysis that allow us to discover the rules of dependence between some implicit modus of writing and the bodily experience of reading.
Building on the landmark O’Regan and Noë (Behav Brain Sci 24:939–973, 2001) that introduced us to the sensorimotor theory of perception, Alva Noë has continued to develop and defend a highly influential enactivist account of perception. Said account takes perceptual experience to be mediated by sensorimotor knowledge (knowledge of the law-like relations that hold between bodily movements and sensory changes). In recent work, Noë has argued that we should construe sensorimotor knowledge as a kind of conceptual knowledge. One significant theoretical advantage of his account, he contends, is that it allows us to better characterize our embodied coping skills by way of showing how they are manifestations of a conceptual-and-yet-not-representational kind of understanding. He argues that both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of skill alike assume that conceptual understanding must be wedded to explicit judgement, and therefore have failed to correctly characterize the role of understanding in skilled performance. This paper argues against Noë’s contention that skilled action is always permeated with understanding. It argues additionally that Noë’s of unorthodox notion of conceptual understanding is unstable and, if it were adopted, would over-intellectualize the role of perception in action. The paper concludes by arguing that doing so frees us up to take more seriously the enactivist options for understanding skilled performance without introducing notions of conceptual understanding at all.
The scientific review presents current approaches in identifying the parameters of the situational analysis, which are demonstrating general trends in the study of both objective circumstances and their perception by the subject. The article presents modern theoretical views on the subject’s mediation of situational activity by the process of understanding the environment, the violations of the functioning of which can serve as a demarcation between adaptive and maladaptive behavior in certain circumstances. In order to objectify this process, a model of subject’s perception and sense-making of the situation are demonstrated as a field of affordances i.e. opportunity for the action. Axial (dimensional) analysis of this concept is considered as a way to study legally significant situations.
The Computational Theory of Mind says that the mind is a computing system. It has a long history going back to the idea that thought is a kind of computation. Its modern incarnation relies on analogies with contemporary computing technology and the use of computational models. It comes in many versions, some more plausible than others. This Element supports the theory primarily by its contribution to solving the mind-body problem, its ability to explain mental phenomena, and the success of computational modelling and artificial intelligence. To be turned into an adequate theory, it needs to be made compatible with the tractability of cognition, the situatedness and dynamical aspects of the mind, the way the brain works, intentionality, and consciousness.
Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die Grundlagen, die Geschichte und die Methoden der phänomenologischen Bildungsforschung im deutschsprachigem Raum. Im Mittelpunkt steht die phänomenologische Deskription und ihre verwandten Verfahren wie Anekdoten und Vignetten sowie die darauf aufbauenden responsiven Bild-und Videoforschungen als qualitative Methoden. Ausgangspunkt sind die phänomenologischen Theorien der Erfahrung und der Leiblichkeit, die in einem kurzen Überblick dargestellt werden. Danach folgt unter der Perspektive empirisch qualitativer Bildungsforschung eine Darstellung der phänomenologischen Erziehungswissenschaft von ihren Anfängen bis heute. Deskription, Reduktion und Validierung werden als Kernelemente phänomenologischer Methodologie vorgestellt und schließlich anhand von vier deskriptiven Zugänge genauer beschrieben.
The research paper argues that the challenges facing the world today require a wiser political-economic philosophy. A philosophy that can provide a 21st century paradigm that enables nations and markets more relevant ‘response-abilities’. Such a paradigm is not only possible, it is practical, and currently is, a purposefully-made invisible ground of our current economic orthodoxy.
The paper builds on the foundation of a Chartalist understanding of the nature of currency. Chartalist theorists argue that money is a token (e.g. an IOU). Chartalism is derived from the Latin word 'charta' meaning ticket or token. Neo-chartalists, argue that a key concern requires distinguishing between institutions of governance that can issue money versus money users. This distinction enables the democratic debates about the use of resources for public purposes. This theory of money has been further developed by recent work related to Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). MMT enables a more accurate description of currency creation and therefore provides a more realistic framework for policy imagination that expands the scale and scope of possible policy decisions and analysis.
Understanding a Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) approach invites us to revisit that concept of the factors in the economy. At minimum any democratic political economy that issues its own currency should ensure its citizens have the literacy and means of political participation to ensure that the collective power of citizens is properly enacted to fulfill the general will of citizens in shaping their political economy.
Technologies like Head Mounted Display (HMD)-based Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) have made HMD-based immersive museums possible. To investigate the user acceptance, medium and interaction experience for HMD-based immersive museums, an app entitled The Extended Journey has been designed, developed, and deployed on both VR headsets and AR headsets. Subsequently, a between-subjects design experiment with sixty-two participants was conducted to measure the user experience and learning outcome in HMD VR and HMD AR conditions. Quantitative results revealed that HMD VR museums had statistically significantly better immersion and empathy compared to HMD AR museums. Qualitative data indicated HMD-based immersive museums were embraced by most young participants while HMD VR had better user acceptance than HMD AR for immersive museums. The interview also demonstrated that the advantage of the HMD-based immersive museum over the traditional online museum is only the sensory immersion from the medium itself, but also the interactive narrative experience that the HMD medium facilitates, especially the natural interaction with the CG characters and the environment in the story.
In recent years, there has been a notable shift in the design field towards practice-led research, driven by the recognition of design practitioners as valuable contributors to knowledge production. However, the lack of well-defined methodologies for conducting practice-led research in academia has posed challenges to its progress and widespread adoption. This article aims to address this gap by providing examples of effective methodologies in practice-led research. The article emphasises the importance of robust frameworks that foster a symbiotic relationship between design practice and research, integrating theoretical inquiry and hands-on experimentation. It presents an innovative approach developed by the author during their PhD, which contributes to the ongoing discourses on practice-led research in design. The proposed methodology consists of four stages: the landscape, data gathering, reflection, and feedback. By engaging in iterative cycles of design exploration, critique, and reflection, the researcher gains a holistic understanding of design processes and their outcomes. This approach facilitates an in-depth exploration of the complex interplay between design concepts, materials, and the surrounding landscape. Ultimately, this article contributes to the discourse on practice-led research in the design field by introducing a methodology that embraces the practical, creative, and theoretical aspects of design inquiry. It responds to the increasing demand for examples of effective methodologies and provides a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners engaged in practice-led research at the PhD level.
In this chapter, I discuss the relationship between epistemic rationality, education, and bioethic governance. After briefly outlining a definition of bioethic governance, I locate the importance of normative standards for judging belief and the need to educate decision-makers to be guided by those standards. This leads to a discussion of the rationality of belief and, therefore, to aspects of epistemic rationality. I focus on the role of affectivity in the production of meaning, especially our affective and aesthetic sensibility to the world, as an essential aspect of epistemology. During the discussion, I raise some questions in the epistemology of education, especially the aims and curriculum content necessary to educate rational decision-makers in the promotion of good governance.
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