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Improvement of Survivability of a Power Plant's Direct Current Auxiliary Power System under Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)

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High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is a challenging agent aimed to destroy the most critical types of electronic equipment in the most important components of national infrastructure. The article addresses the issue of improvement of a power plant’s direct current auxiliary power systems (DCAPS) survivability under HEMP impact, and suggests certain simple measures and affordable technical means that ensure significant improvement of DCAPS’s resistance to HEMP.
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[Gurevich *, Vol. 2(1): September, 2017] ISSN- 2456-8651
http://www.ijoest.com ©International Journal of Engineering Science Technologies [1]
IMPROVEMENT OF SURVIVABILITY OF A POWER PLANT’S DIRECT
CURRENT AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM UNDER
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (HEMP)
Vladimir Gurevich*1
*1Central Electric Laboratory, Israel Electric Corp
DOI: https://doi.org/10.29121/IJOEST.v2.i1.2017.01
ABSTRACT
High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is a challenging agent aimed to destroy the most
critical types of electronic equipment in the most important components of national
infrastructure. The article addresses the issue of improvement of a power plant’s direct current
auxiliary power systems (DCAPS) survivability under HEMP impact, and suggests certain
simple measures and affordable technical means that ensure significant improvement of
DCAPS’s resistance to HEMP.
Keywords: Power Plant; Electromagnetic Pulse; Hemp; Direct Current Auxiliary Power System.
Cite This Article: Vladimir Gurevich. (2017). IMPROVEMENT OF SURVIVABILITY OF A
POWER PLANT’S DIRECT CURRENT AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM UNDER
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (HEMP). International Journal of Engineering Science
Technologies, 2(1), 1-8. doi: 10.29121/IJOEST.v2.i1.2017.01
1. INTRODUCTION
HEMPs, as well as special high-power sources of pulse electromagnetic emission, are the most
up-to-date and effective means to destroy the electronics of power systems, communications,
water supply systems and other critical parts of national infrastructure facilities, without direct
damage to the population [1, 2]. Thus, this kind of weapon is deemed to be the most promising
and is in rapid evolution in all developed countries.
A direct current auxiliary power system (DCAPS) represents an important power plant’s system,
the lack of which makes it impossible for other systems to operate. A DCAPS of each power
plant’s block usually consists of two powerful high-capacity accumulator batteries, two powerful
battery chargers (BC), DC switchboards (or DC cabinets). The DC distribution system is very
branchy and contains many long non-shielded cables spread over a vast territory. In case of
HEMP impact, this cable system will act as a huge antenna that absorbs the energy from the vast
area and brings it directly to very sensitive digital systems of the power plant’s management,
control, protection, signaling and communication systems. However, those are not the only
devices that need to be protected from HEMP. The DCAPS itself, with its electronic BC, also
requires protection. Modern BC are equipped with micro-electronic and more often a
microprocessor-based system of control that is very sensitive to HEMP. Thus, they need to be
protected in the first turn.
Improvement of Survivability of A Power Plant’s Direct Current Auxiliary Power System Under
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
http://www.ijoest.com ©International Journal of Engineering Science Technologies [2]
2. IMPROVEMENT OF PROTECTING LEVEL OF A BC CABINET
Powerful BC, intended for currents of several hundreds of Amps, are designed as metal cabinets
consisting of 2-3 compartments that are usually located close to each other. Figure 1 shows three
BC for 300 A (one serves as a backup). Each of them is designed as a 2-compartment metal
cabinet. A well-designed metal cabinet provides good protection to internal electronic equipment
from HEMP. Do usual cabinets of usual BCs feature the same qualities? Definitely, they don’t!
Figure 1 shows “weaknesses” of these cabinets. These include: open top (1) intended to improve
ventilation and cooling; the panel of digital programming and measuring unit (2); ventilation grid
at the bottom of the cabinet’s door (3) and the open bottom of the cabinet (4). In addition to that,
attention should be paid to the rubber seals running along the doors’ perimeter and the lack of
closed flooring inside the cabinet, which is necessary for power and control cables entering.
Figure 1: Design of power plant's BC. The figures indicate the “weaknesses” of cabinets that
allow unobstructed access of HEMP inside the cabinet.
All these weaknesses allow unobstructed access of electromagnetic emission (including HEMP)
into the internal part of the BC cabinets. Thus, the measures intended to improve survivability of
DCAPS should first deal with improvement of the cabinets’ design.
The ventilation grid 2 should be substituted by a special panel of honeycomb structure, based on
“waveguides-below-cutoff” (Fig. 2) consisting of a set of small diameter metal pipes with the
pipe’s length to diameter ratio of 4:1.
[Gurevich *, Vol. 2(1): September, 2017] ISSN- 2456-8651
http://www.ijoest.com ©International Journal of Engineering Science Technologies [3]
Figure 2: Honeycomb ventilation panels protecting from electromagnetic emission.
A ventilation panel such as this will allow the air flow in, but will not allow the electromagnetic
emission inside the cabinet. These panels should cover other parts of the cabinet which are open
for ventilation purposes (1 and 4).
A metal frame, projecting height wise above the screen and keys of the unit 2, should be welded
around the open panel of the programming and measuring unit (2), located on the external
surface of the cabinet’s door. This frame should be equipped with a steel 3-4 mm thick or
aluminum (4-6 mm) small door. However, steel would be preferable. A seal designed as a
conductive rubber cord should be glued to the door’s edges contacting the frame.
Figure 3: Seals made of a conductive rubber cord to be installed on HEMPs protected cabinet
doors.
All other seals made of non-conductive rubber running along the perimeter of each cabinet’s
door should be replaced by the above mentioned seals (made of conductive rubber).
The floor surface, free of cables, should be covered with a conductive metalized fabric (Fig. 4)
laid on a supporting metal grid.
Improvement of Survivability of A Power Plant’s Direct Current Auxiliary Power System Under
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
http://www.ijoest.com ©International Journal of Engineering Science Technologies [4]
Figure 4: Conductive metalized fabric to cover open parts of the cabinet’s floor.
3. IMPROVEMENT OF DCAPS’s ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT
In order to improve DCAPS's resilience, some other elements were incorporated into it (Fig. 5),
i.e.:
varistor blocks with high energy dissipating capacity R1 - R7, installed on AC and DC
current bus bars;
varistor blocks with medium energy dissipating capacity R8 - R23, installed in BC
cabinets and accumulator batteries’ terminals to limit the voltage pulse amplitude applied
to DCAPS equipment;
Chokes L1 - L8 that limit the amplitude of current pulse, which can flow in DCAPS
equipment circuits under HEMP impact;
Special elements of the grounding system L9 L10, R24-R25, K1 K2.
Figure 5: General electric circuit diagram of HEMP protected DCAPS. 1 DC switchboard
(DC1, DC2); 2 AC switchboard; 3 accumulator batteries; 4 BC.
4. PROTECTION ELEMENTS FOR DCAPS
It is recommended to use high energy varistor blocs manufactured by EPCOS, Semi code, Dean
Technology, Inc., Dongguan Uchi Electronics Co., etc., built in standard enclosures with
[Gurevich *, Vol. 2(1): September, 2017] ISSN- 2456-8651
http://www.ijoest.com ©International Journal of Engineering Science Technologies [5]
maximum dimensions of 135mm х 118mm х 27mm, see Fig. 6. Such varistor blocks s are
capable of single current pulses of 8/20ms with amplitude up to 100 kA and dissipating energy of
2kJ 3kJ, or even up to 10kJ. Pulse response time is 15 ns 25 ns, according to the
manufacturer’s data (generally, real time response is more). Varistors of this type should be
outsized (by nominal voltage) as they are designed to ensure protection against HEMP high-
voltage pulse, rather than against surge transient overvoltage normally presented in the system.
For example, for DCAPS with nominal voltage of 250VDC, such varistors can have 420VDC
activation voltage (residual voltage or clamping voltage is 840V).
Figure 6: Varistor blocks with high dissipated energy and pulse currents Up to 100 kA.
Upon HEMP impact, a residual voltage of 840V does not damage the wire and power cables
insulation, as they are designed to withstand much higher pulse voltages of several kilovolts. On
the other hand, such a big safety factor ensures reliable and damage-free varistor operation
within the long period.
As medium dissipated energy varistors, it is also recommended to use varistor blocks made by
the above mentioned manufacturers or little fuse Company, see Fig. 7. Such varistors, designed
for installation inside the BC cabinet or directly on the battery block buses, are tolerable to single
pulse currents up to 30 kA 40 kA, have lower dissipated pulse energy (300J 500J), smaller
maximum size (usually, 60 mm x 55 mm x 14 mm), and lower redundant operating voltage, e.g.
320VDC (clamping voltage is 650V).
Figure 7: Varistor Blocks with medium energy dissipating capacity and pulse currents
Up to 40 kA.
High-power chokes L1 - L8 suitable for use in DCAPS as HEMP filters are manufactured by the
American company CWS, see Fig. 8, Table 1.
Improvement of Survivability of A Power Plant’s Direct Current Auxiliary Power System Under
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
http://www.ijoest.com ©International Journal of Engineering Science Technologies [6]
Figure 8: High power cored HCS series choke for currents up to 1,000 a manufactured by CWS
Company under special technology using special material.
Table 1: Key parameters of powerful HCS Series chokes with a core
Choke Type
Max.
Continuo
us
Current,
А
Inductance
at Current
300A, µH
Dimensions,
mm
DC,
m
1
MHz,
k
1
GHz,
МΩ
HCS-631M-450A
450
249
4.5
1.56
1.56
393 x 118 x 97
HCS-301M-1000A
1000
244
4.5
1.53
1.53
431 x 228 x
101
The chokes are connected into the cut of power DC cables exiting the BC through the open part
of the BC flooring. When arranging the chokes and varistor blocks in the BC cabinets, they
should be located on the cabinet’s floor so that they are covered with a conductive fabric
separating the protected area of the cabinet from external space. It is advisable to arrange a
special metal compartment on the BC floor to accommodate the chokes and varistor blocks.
Cables “free” from induced HEMP should enter the inner part of the cabinet.
Control cables of alarm and signal circuits that enter and exit the BC cabinets shall be protected
by detachable ferrite filters, Fig. 9. These filters should be located directly at the point of the
cables’ entry into the cabinet.
Figure 9: Ferrite HEMP filters installed on control cables without cutting them.
[Gurevich *, Vol. 2(1): September, 2017] ISSN- 2456-8651
http://www.ijoest.com ©International Journal of Engineering Science Technologies [7]
The features of ferrite filters, as well as recommendation on their use, are provided in [3].
Components of cabinet’s grounding system and internal “ground” of BC: L9 L10, R24-R25,
K1 K2 are intended to realize a so called “special floating ground”, the detailed description of
which is provided in [4].
5. SPARE MODULES
In order to improve survivability of DCAPS, it is very important to ensure availability of spare
elements, modules or spare BC (as shown in Fig. 1) in addition to the above mentioned measures
and technical facilities. Moreover, spare BC should have a well-protected (using the above
mentioned equipment) cabinet and should be completely disconnected from all external circuits
and external cables. The truth, however, is that it is rather expensive to have a powerful spare BC
on each unit of a power plant. Storing of spare electronic elements and electronic blocks (printed
circuit boards) of BC in a special closed container will be more affordable for mass use.
Additionally, the printed circuit boards should be placed into conductive plastic packages (Fig.
10), whereas the packages should be placed into aluminum containers with a close fitting cover
(Fig. 11). The containers, with spare electronic components, should be stored close to the BC,
rather than in a remote warehouse.
Figure 10: Protective conductive plastic packages to store spare printed circuit boards of BC.
Figure 11: Protective aluminum containers to store spare electronic elements and modules of BC.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The simple measures and affordable technical facilities described in the article result in
significant improvement of survivability of a very important power plant’s system – DCAPS
Improvement of Survivability of A Power Plant’s Direct Current Auxiliary Power System Under
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
http://www.ijoest.com ©International Journal of Engineering Science Technologies [8]
under HEMP impact, and reduce the risk of complete “loss” of a block or even a power plant in
the case of impact.
REFERENCES
[1] Gurevich, V., Protection of Substation Critical Equipment against Intentional Electromagnetic
Threats. Wiley, London, 2017, 240 p.
[2] Gurevich, V., Cyber and Electromagnetic Threats in Modern Relay Protection. Taylor &
Francis Group, Boca Raton, 2015, 205 p.
[3] Gurevich, V., The problem of correct choice of ferrite beads, Electrical Engineering & Electro
mechanics, 2016, No. 2, pp. 71-73.
[4] Gurevich, V., The Issues of Electronic Equipment Grounding at the Power Facilities,
International Journal of Research Studies in Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IJRSEEE),
2017, vol. 3, issue 1, pp. 11 19.
*Corresponding author.
E-mail address: vladimir.gurevich@ gmx.net
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Article
Full-text available
A ferrite bead is a passive electrical element used to suppress high-frequency noise in electric circuits. This is one of the simplest and the cheapest type of filters. Thus, such filters are widely used in electric and electronic apparatus for both domestic and industrial purposes. It would seem that such a wide application of these elements suggests that methods for their correct selection and use are well-defined. However, this is not quite true.
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The Issues of Electronic Equipment Grounding at the Power Facilities
  • V Gurevich
Gurevich, V., The Issues of Electronic Equipment Grounding at the Power Facilities, International Journal of Research Studies in Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IJRSEEE), 2017, vol. 3, issue 1, pp. 11 -19.