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The Cardinal Difficulty for Naturalism C.S. Lewis’ Argument Reconsidered in Light of Peter van Inwagen’s Critique

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Peter van Inwagen maintains that C.S. Lewis’ argument against naturalism in Miracles fails, since Lewis has not shown that ‘Naturalism is inconsistent with ... the thesis that some of our beliefs are based on or grounded in reasoning’. In this article, Marcel Sarot shows that C.S. Lewis could not possibly have intended to argue for the inconsistency van Inwagen seems to exact, because that would amount to ‘Bulverism’, a position Lewis opposes. Furthermore, Sarot argues that Lewis did show that naturalism makes the thesis that our beliefs are based on or grounded in reasoning less likely. This, Sarot argues, is enough to make Lewis’ argument against naturalism valid.
Preprint of: Marcel Sarot, The Cardinal Difficulty for Naturalism: C.S. Lewis Argument Reconsidered in Light of Peter van
Inwagen's Critique, Journal of Inklings Studies, 1/2 (2011), 41-53. 1
The Cardinal Difficulty for Naturalism
C.S. Lewis’ Argument Reconsidered in Light of Peter van Inwagen’s Critique
Marcel Sarot
1
Abstract
Peter van Inwagen has recently argued that C.S. Lewis' argument against naturalism in
Miracles fails, since Lewis has not shown that 'Naturalism is inconsistent with ... the thesis
that some of our beliefs are based on or grounded in reasoning.' In this article, Marcel Sarot
shows that C.S. Lewis could not possibly have intended to argue for the inconsistency Van
Inwagen seems to exact, because that would amount to 'Bulverism,' a position Lewis opposes.
After that, Sarot argues that Lewis did show that naturalism makes the thesis that some of our
beliefs are based on or grounded in reasoning less likely. This, Sarot argues, is enough to
make Lewis' argument against naturalism valid.
Introduction
Academically speaking, we live in the age of naturalism. As the North-American National
Science Teachers Association has it: ‘Science, by definition, is limited to naturalistic methods
and, as such, is precluded from using supernatural elements in the production of scientific
knowledge.’
2
Naturalism, however, makes it impossible to acknowledge miracles. John
Macquarrie explains this neatly:
‘The traditional conception of miracle is irreconcilable with our understanding of ...
science... Science proceeds on the assumption that whatever events occur in the world
can be accounted for in terms of other events that also belong within the world; and if
on some occasions we are unable to give a complete account of some happening ... the
scientific conviction is that further research will bring to light further factors in the
situation, but factors that turn out to be just as immanent and this-worldly as those
already known.’
3
In recent years, naturalism has been promoted by influential thinkers like Stephen W.
Hawking, Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins, but it was the dominant view already when
C.S. Lewis wrote his book on miracles. C.S. Lewis was aware of the growing dominance of
naturalism in his time and also saw clearly that naturalism is incompatible with belief in
miracles: ‘if Naturalism is true, then we do know in advance that miracles are impossible:
nothing can come into Nature from the outside because there is nothing outside to come in,
Nature being everything.
4
It does not come as a surprise, then, that a refutation of naturalism
takes centre stage in Miracles and is, indeed, essential to its argument. When Peter van
Inwagen, therefore, in a recent article argued that C.S. Lewis argument against naturalism in
the third chapter of the revised edition of his book Miracles fails,
5
this was not the exposition
of a minor error in Lewis argument, but an attack on the very heart of it. Lewis’ argument in
Miracles stands or falls with his refutation of naturalism. And since naturalism has gained
1
Marcel Sarot is Research Professor for the History and Philosophy of Religious Studies and Theology at
Utrecht University, the Netherlands.
2
Natural Science Teachers Association, ‘The Nature of Science,’ NSTA Postion Statement adopted by the
NSTA Board of Directors, July 2000, http://www.nsta.org/about/positions/natureofscience.aspx, visited 18
August 2011.
3
John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (London: SCM Press, revd. ed. 1977), 248
4
C.S. Lewis, Miracles: A Preliminary Study (Glasgow: Collins 81982), 14.
5
Peter van Inwagen, ‘C.S. Lewis’ Argument against Naturalism,’ The Chronicle of the Oxford University C.S.
Lewis Society 7/1 (January 2010), 212.
Preprint of: Marcel Sarot, The Cardinal Difficulty for Naturalism: C.S. Lewis Argument Reconsidered in Light of Peter van
Inwagen's Critique, Journal of Inklings Studies, 1/2 (2011), 41-53. 2
rather than lost popularity since Lewis’ attempt at refutation, this attempt has lost nothing of
its importance. Therefore I have read Van Inwagen’s counter-argument with great interest,
and when I found it on rereading Lewis flawed, I wrote a brief article to show that and
how Van Inwagen misread Lewis.
6
It is this argument that is resumed in the present
contribution.
Let me begin by providing a very brief summary of Van Inwagen’s reconstruction of
Lewis’ argument. Naturalism is the position that nature (the cosmos, the physical universe) is
all there is. If that is indeed the case, everything is governed by the laws of nature (since there
is nothing outside of the physical universe). This also applies to our thoughts and beliefs. Our
beliefs, then, are events that are caused. Therefore they cannot be based on reasoning.
Conclusion: on naturalism, our beliefs are not rational but non-rational.
7
This undermines
naturalism, since the belief in naturalism itself cannot be a rational belief if naturalism is true.
Van Inwagen’s argument against Lewis may be summarised as follows. It is
conceivable that a belief is both caused and held for reasons. Therefore, a belief being caused
and the same belief being rational are not incompatible. If a belief being physically caused
does not preclude that belief being rational, however, the fact that all beliefs are physically
caused (as implied by naturalism) does not imply that all our thoughts are non-rational. Van
Inwagen subsequently concedes that he has not proven that ‘Naturalism is consistent with
(some of) our beliefs being grounded in reasoning’ (11),
8
but claims that he need not do so.
Since he merely aims to prove that ‘Lewis has not shown that has not even given us any
reason to believe that Naturalism is inconsistent with … the thesis that some of our beliefs
are based on or grounded in reasoning’ (10, italics PvI’s), he need not himself prove the
compatibility of naturalism with this thesis.
Insofar as Vanwagen renders Lewis’ position correct, his criticism of Lewis is valid. I
will argue, however, that Van Inwagen’s rendering of Lewis fails by ignoring some essential
elements of Lewis’ argument. Moreover, once these elements have been put back in place,
Van Inwagen’s refutation can be seen to fail. In order to show this, I must first fill in some of
the details of Lewis’ argument and Van Inwagen’s counter-argument that I left out in the
above summary.
Lewis’ Argument and Van Inwagen’s Counter-Argument
As Van Inwagen points out, Lewis’ own statement of his argument against naturalism rests on
his distinction between the cause-effect because and the ground-consequent because.
Lewis introduces this distinction by pointing out the different uses of ‘because’ in the
following two sentences:
(1) Grandfather is ill to-day because he ate lobster yesterday.
6
Marcel Sarot, ‘Lewis on Naturalism: A Reply to Peter van Inwagen,’ The Chronicle of the Oxford University
C.S. Lewis Society 7/3 (October 2010), 2127.
7
As Arend Smilde shows in his contribution to this special issue, one of the main changes Lewis introduced into
the revised 1960 edition of Miracles is the substitution of ‘non-rational’ for ‘irrational.’ In order to behave
irrationally, one needs cognitive skills. Events have no cognitive skills and do not fall into the category of things
that can be either rational or irrational. They are non-rational. That Lewis’ use of ‘irrational’ in the original
edition of Miracles was flawed, was pointed out to him in 1948 by Elisabeth Anscombe, ‘A Reply to Mr C. S.
Lewis’s Argument that “Naturalism” is Self-Refuting,’ The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 224232, esp. 224226. That Lewis indeed intended this to be the major
improvement in the revised edition of Miracles is also shown by his letter to Kenneth R.W. Brewer of 9 May
1962, included in vol. 3 of Lewis Collected Letters edited by Hooper. I am grateful to Mr. Smilde for drawing
my attention to Van Inwagen’s article and for various helpful discussions on Miracles.
8
The figures between brackets in the text refer to Van Inwagen, ‘C.S. Lewis’ Argument.’
Preprint of: Marcel Sarot, The Cardinal Difficulty for Naturalism: C.S. Lewis Argument Reconsidered in Light of Peter van
Inwagen's Critique, Journal of Inklings Studies, 1/2 (2011), 41-53. 3
(2) Grandfather must be ill to-day because he hasn’t got up yet (and we know he is an
invariably early riser when he is well.)’
Lewis explains: In the first sentence because indicates the relation of Cause and Effect: The
eating made him ill. In the second, it indicates the relation of what logicians call Ground and
Consequent. The old man's late rising is not the cause of his disorder but the reason why we
believe him to be disordered.
9
In argumentation, each step is connected with the previous
step by a ground-consequent relation. Only if this relation holds, can our conclusions be
trusted. In nature, events are connected with previous events by a cause-effect relation.
Naturalism holds that thoughts and beliefs are natural events that are connected by a cause-
effect relation. Now we are only one step removed from the conclusion that thought and
beliefs cannot be rational, and that step, Van Inwagen assumes, is the following:
(3) If a thought is caused in the way a natural event is caused it cannot simultaneously be
grounded in the way the conclusion of an argument is grounded.
The question then becomes: On what grounds does Lewis accept (3)? On no grounds
whatsoever, according to Van Inwagen. Lewis does not argue the incompatibility of being
grounded and being caused, but assumes it: ‘The central premise of Lewis’ argument is that
an explanation of a belief fact
10
in terms of “the Cause-Effect ‘because’” precludes any
explanation of that fact in terms of “the Ground-Consequent ‘because’” (6; italics mine
MS).Van Inwagen does not attempt to argue for his view that Lewis holds the incompatibility
of being grounded and being caused as a premise. He merely claims it.
11
Let me comment here that it is this assumption that Lewis holds (3) as a premise that
makes it relatively easy for Van Inwagen to refute Lewis’ argument. If a claim is the
conclusion of an argument, one has to show that the argument fails in order to undermine the
claim. If a claim is the premise of an argument, one can show the whole argument to be shaky
merely by throwing doubt on that claim. Van Inwagen throws doubt on (3) by means of a
counter-example. He compares two possible answers to the question ‘Why do you think the
earth is round?’
(A) Because the edge of the shadow of the earth on the moon during a partial lunar eclipse
is always an arc of a circle no matter where the moon is in the sky. And only a ball
casts a circular shadow from every angle.
(B) Because the way the universe was in the remote past and the laws of physics made it
inevitable that I should now have that belief. (67)
The question is: is (A) (which is an explanation in terms of grounds) incompatible with (B)
(which is an explanation in terms of causes)? In Van Inwagen’s own words: ‘Does the
existence of a ‘Cause-effect “because”’ explanation of a belief fact in every case preclude
there being a ‘Ground-consequent “because”’ explanation of that belief fact?’ (8; italics PvI’s)
It is important to note here the ‘in every case’: Van Inwagen needs only one plausible counter-
example to refute (3). The problem is, that he cannot prove the existence of any counter-
example, because naturalism cannot be proven and as a result type-B claims (claims like that
9
C.S. Lewis, Miracles: A Preliminary Study (Glasgow: Collins 81982), 19.
10
Van Inwagen stipulates the following definition of ‘belief fact’: If a person has a certain belief, let us call the
fact that that person has that belief a “belief fact”. For example, the fact that I believe that Lewis was a
Cambridge professor is a belief fact.Van Inwagen, ‘C.S. Lewis’ Argument,’5–6.
11
He adds a note, but that note does not refer to Lewis but comments on the precise way in which Van Inwagen
understands ‘explanation.’
Preprint of: Marcel Sarot, The Cardinal Difficulty for Naturalism: C.S. Lewis Argument Reconsidered in Light of Peter van
Inwagen's Critique, Journal of Inklings Studies, 1/2 (2011), 41-53. 4
made in (B) above) cannot be proven. He ends up by making a weaker claim concerning his
counter-example: ‘We have no reason to suppose that if a certain belief fact is caused by
various other belief facts (with the same subject), its being so caused precludes its having a
type A explanation”’ (5). In short, Van Inwagen does not prove Lewis’ alleged premise to be
untrue; he merely shows that one can think of counter-examples that, if they obtained in
reality, would be incompatible with (3). And since, according to Van Inwagen, Lewis does
nothing to show that they do not obtain, his argument rests on a shaky premise (3) and his
conclusion is shaky as well. Lewis failed to show that naturalism is incompatible with
rationality.
Lewis’ Argument Restated and Vindicated
I will now show that
(4) There is no reason to hold that Lewis accepts (3)
(5) There is reason to hold that he accepts a mitigated version of (3), (3’)
(6) (3’), contrary to (3), is not undermined by Van Inwagen’s argument
(7) (3’) is not a premise of Lewis’ argument, since he supports it by reasons.
For me, these reasons are compelling. The aim of this article, therefore, is not merely to
defend one of the great Christian apologists of the recent past against a misdirected
counterargument, but also to support his arguments against naturalism as still worth
considering in the present.
Since Lewis nowhere explicitly states or defends (3), then, can we find out whether he
supports it or not? I would like to argue that we can. Lewis states with respect to explanation
in terms of a natural cause and explanation in terms of grounds that ‘we behave in disputation
as if they were mutually exclusive.’
The mere existence of causes for a belief is popularly treated as raising a presumption
that it is groundless, and the most popular way of discrediting a person’s opinions is to
explain them causally You say that because (Cause and Effect) you are a capitalist,
or a hypochondriac, or a mere man, or only a woman.”
12
Lewis claims here that when we know that a view is caused, e.g., by undergoing hypnosis,
drinking too much, or taking antidepressants, this counts against taking this view as a view
grounded in arguments. He does not claim that that explanation in terms of a natural cause is
incompatible with explanation in terms of grounds. Why not? Because he did not believe so.
That this is indeed the case, can easily be seen from his opposition against Bulverism, the
logical fallacy one commits by explaining why one’s opponent holds a certain position and
assuming that this explanation suffices to show him or her wrong. In Lewis’ own words:
You must show that a man is wrong before you start explaining why he is wrong. The
modern method is to assume without discussion that he is wrong and then distract his
attention from this (the only real issue) by busily explaining how he became so silly.
In the course of the last fifteen years I have found this vice so common that I have had
to invent a name for it. I call it Bulverism. Some day I am going to write the biography
of its imaginary inventor, Ezekiel Bulver, whose destiny was determined at the age of
five when he heard his mother say to his father who had been maintaining that two
12
Lewis, Miracles, 20.
Preprint of: Marcel Sarot, The Cardinal Difficulty for Naturalism: C.S. Lewis Argument Reconsidered in Light of Peter van
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sides of a triangle were together greater than the third Oh, you say that because you
are a man.’ ‘At that moment,E. Bulver assures us, there flashed across my opening
mind the great truth that refutation is no necessary part of argument. Assume that your
opponent is wrong, and then explain his error, and the world will be at your feet.
Attempt to prove that he is wrong or (worse still) try to find out whether he is wrong
or right, and the national dynamism of our age will thrust you to the wall.’ That is how
Bulver became one of the makers of the Twentieth Century.
13
C.S. Lewis could only accept (3) at the price of giving up his opposition against Bulverism;
there is no indication that he ever did so, however.
We understand by now why Lewis did not claim that explanation in terms of a natural
cause and explanation in terms of grounds are mutually exclusive. He phrases his position
cautiously: we behave in disputation as if they were mutually exclusive. This counterfactual
formulation suggests that instead of (3), Lewis supports
(3’) If a thought is caused in the way a natural event is caused, it is not likely to be
grounded in the way the conclusion of an argument is grounded.
(3’) has the following advantages over (3). Firstly, by claiming incompatibility Lewis would
make himself very vulnerable to counterexamples. Alcohol does not sit well with rational
argumentation, but that does not mean that no one under the influence of alcohol will ever
have good reasons for some particular view. Exit incompatibility. Lewis would have expected
that people like Van Inwagen would have come up with counter-examples. And secondly, and
not unimportantly for Lewis, (3’) is compatible with his critique of Bulverism in that it still
allows him to claim that a position cannot be rejected on the mere ground that its adoption can
be causally explained. As Victor Reppert has argued, ‘One can criticize Bulverism without
committing oneself to Anscombe’s implausible thesis that how a belief is formed is irrelevant
to how the belief is justified.
14
Moreover, (3’) suffices to support Lewis’ argument against naturalism. All Lewis
needs in order to show that naturalism undermines rationalism is the claim that if a thought is
caused, it is not likely to be grounded. As soon as we accept this claim, naturalism through its
claim that all our thoughts are caused will lead to a distrust of our own thoughts. By way of
support for (3), Lewis merely needs to show that there is nothing in causation that makes it
verific, in other words that the process of causation is such that it is unlikely to yield grounded
knowledge. This is exactly what he does by arguing that ‘the two systems (that of ground-
consequence and cause-effect MS) are wholly distinct.’
15
He continues: ‘To be caused is not
to be proved. Wishful thinkings, prejudices, and the delusions of madness, are all caused, but
they are ungrounded.’
16
Moreover, Lewis argues as we have seen above we generally take
being caused as a sign of not being well-grounded.
A little bit further on, Lewis provides still another argument. There he asks what
makes belief into knowledge and subsequently argues that this knowledge-generating attribute
is absent from the process of causation. What, according to Lewis, is the difference between
believing something and knowing something? Beliefs generally ‘are “about something other
13
C.S. Lewis, ‘Bulverism,’ originally published in Socratic Digest no. 2 (1944) and republished in the essay
collections God in the Dock, First and Second Things and Compelling Reason. On internet: http://www.barking-
moonbat.com/God_in_the_Dock.html (visited 19 August 2011).
14
Victor Reppert, ‘Bulverism and the Argument from Reason,’
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2006/03/bulverism-and-afr.html, visited 19 August 2011. Reppert refers to G.
Anscombe, ‘Reply.’
15
Lewis, Miracles, 20.
16
Lewis, Miracles, 20.
Preprint of: Marcel Sarot, The Cardinal Difficulty for Naturalism: C.S. Lewis Argument Reconsidered in Light of Peter van
Inwagen's Critique, Journal of Inklings Studies, 1/2 (2011), 41-53. 6
than themselves.
17
If a belief is to count as knowledge, it must be determined … solely by
what is known,
18
by what it is about. My belief that my wife is at home can count as
knowledge if it is caused by (seeing, hearing etc. that) my wife is at home, and not if it is
caused by something else (e.g., alcohol, or the novel I currently read). So it is the fact that
beliefs are about something (philosophers would be inclined to say: that they are
intentional),
19
that makes it possible for beliefs to be true. This does not apply to events in
general: ‘Events in general are not about anything and therefore ‘cannot be true or false.’
20
It has by now become clear that Lewis does support (3’) by argument, and does not
merely assert it as a premise. The final question we need to ask is: To what extent is (3’)
undermined by counterexamples like that of Van Inwagen? If (3’) is true, counterexamples
are to be expected. The number of counterexamples depends upon the degree to which it is
unlikely that a thought that is caused like a natural event is caused, is also grounded in the
way the conclusion of an argument is grounded. I do not want to quibble about this, and I am
willing to admit as I think Lewis would have admitted that this is not very unlikely. There
will be counterexamples, then, even though as a general rule, one would not expect a thought
that is caused in the way a natural event is caused to be grounded in the way the conclusion of
an argument is grounded. Since counter-examples are to be expected, Van Inwagen’s counter-
examples do not succeed in undermining (3’). In order to do that, we would need a refutation
of Lewis’ arguments in support of (3’).
Conclusion
In light of the above, Lewis’ argument can be restated in a way that is both closer to Lewis
than Van Inwagen’s restatement, and invulnerable to his objections: Naturalism is the position
that nature (the cosmos, the physical universe) is all there is. If that is indeed the case,
everything is governed by the laws of nature (since there is nothing outside of the physical
universe). This also applies to our thoughts and beliefs. Our beliefs, then, are events that are
caused. If a thought is caused in the way an event is caused, however, it is unlikely to be
grounded in the way a conclusion from an argument is grounded. Therefore naturalism
undermines belief in the rationality of our thoughts, and since naturalism itself belongs to our
world of thoughts, naturalism undermines itself. According to Lewis, this is the ‘cardinal
difficulty’ for naturalism.
21
It is not the only difficulty, and in the remainder of Miracles, he
notes more difficulties for naturalism.
Though in Miracles, Lewis’ cardinal difficulty functions in the context of a longer and
quite complex argument, I have discussed it as an independent argument. I feel justified in
doing so by the role this argument has played in the subsequent discussion on naturalism. As I
noted in the introduction, Lewis’ argument has lost nothing of its importance. It is not only
still relevant, but it is also still referred to in the contemporary discussion.
22
Alvin Plantinga,
who is often considered as the most important living champion of the argument, shows
17
Lewis, Miracles, 21.
18
Lewis, Miracles, 2122.
19
Since, as Arend Smilde shows elsewhere in this issue, Lewis introduces the notion of aboutness only in the
revised edition of Miracles, and since the revision was primarily prompted by Anscombe’s critique, it seems not
unlikely that this notion was inspired by Anscombe’s Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957). I suggest that it is a
way in which Lewis bows his respect to Anscombe.
20
Lewis, Miracles, 21.
21
The title of the revised chapter 3 of Miracles is: ‘The Main Difficulty of Naturalism’ (italics mine – MS);
Elisabeth Anscombe adds a ‘[sic]’ tot that title (‘Introduction, Collected Philosophical Papers, ix). The original
title was ‘The Self-Contradiction of the Naturalist.’
22
Victor Reppert, C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: A Philosophical Defense of Lewis’s Argument from Reason
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 46.
Preprint of: Marcel Sarot, The Cardinal Difficulty for Naturalism: C.S. Lewis Argument Reconsidered in Light of Peter van
Inwagen's Critique, Journal of Inklings Studies, 1/2 (2011), 41-53. 7
awareness of the fact that his argument ‘bears a good bit of similarity to’ C.S. Lewis’s.
23
Plantinga has developed a new version of the argument, in which he inquires how probable it
is that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and given the fact that our
cognitive faculties are the result of an evolutionary process. Evolutionary processes, Plantinga
argues, are supposed to lead to survival, not to truth. If our cognitive faculties have developed
through an evolutionary process, then, they are geared towards survival. Does this mean they
are geared towards truth as well? That depends on how they are connected with behaviour. It
is conceivable that cognitions hardly influence behaviour; in that case, there is no reason
whatsoever to suppose that our cognitive faculties have developed to become truth-producing
faculties. Even if our cognitive faculties contribute to the genesis of behaviour, Plantinga
shows, it is conceivable that false beliefs produce adaptive behaviour, and he produces
counterintuitive but possible examples like that of Paul: ‘Perhaps Paul very much likes the
idea of being eaten, but whenever he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect
because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees will eat him.’
24
This is a much simplified summary of Plantinga’s version of the argument; an
adequate summary and discussion obviously goes beyond the limits of this article.
25
It
suffices, however, to draw attention to two weaknesses in Plantinga’s argument, that do not in
a similar way affect Lewis’ argument. Firstly, Plantinga’s argument does not focus on
naturalism as such, but on naturalism combined with a specific theory, the theory of
evolution. This means that (a) its scope is smaller, (b) the justification of Plantinga’s
argument requires a discussion of all the intricacies of the theory of evolution and (c) if
Plantinga’s argument succeeds, it is not naturalism that is defeated, but naturalism-cum-
evolution theory. And, secondly, prima facie it is probable that beliefs lead to behaviour (I
take my umbrella with me only when I expect rain), and that true beliefs heighten the
probability of survival, and Plantinga needs quite a number of counterintuitive examples to
‘strengthen’ his case. Altogether, Lewis’ argument is simpler, more elegant and more
convincing, and has besides the advantage of targeting naturalism as such and leaving specific
scientific theories out of consideration. Therefore, a defence of Lewis’s form of the argument
has more than an archaeological interest; it is an argument that deserves to be taken seriously
in the contemporary debate, more so perhaps than some of its current successors.
Marcel Sarot (*1961) is Research Professor for the History and Philosophy of Religious Studies and
Theology at the Faculty of Humanities of Utrecht University, and permanent deacon of the
Archdiocese of Utrecht.
23
Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 237.
24
Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 225.
25
For detailed discussion of Plantinga’s argument, see James K. Beilby (ed), Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on
Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Thaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2002).
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Smilde shows elsewhere in this issue, Lewis introduces the notion of aboutness only in the revised edition of Miracles, and since the revision was primarily prompted by Anscombe's critique, it seems not unlikely that this notion was inspired by Anscombe's Intention
  • Since
  • Arend
Since, as Arend Smilde shows elsewhere in this issue, Lewis introduces the notion of aboutness only in the revised edition of Miracles, and since the revision was primarily prompted by Anscombe's critique, it seems not unlikely that this notion was inspired by Anscombe's Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957). I suggest that it is a way in which Lewis bows his respect to Anscombe.
Lewis's Dangerous Idea: A Philosophical Defense of Lewis's Argument from Reason
  • C S Victor Reppert
Victor Reppert, C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: A Philosophical Defense of Lewis's Argument from Reason (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 46.