Using Virtual Environments to Improve Real World Performance in Combat Identification

Abstract

There is an increased understanding that training in virtual environments will play a key role in future force development (Department of Defense, 2010)-but there is still a need to better understand the interaction between classroom-based learning, virtual exercises to reinforce those skills and force-on-force field training. There is now a widening body of research on virtual environment performance as an effective preparation for force-on-force field training (Roman & Brown, 2009; De Leo, Sechrist, Radici, & Mastaglio, 2010). The question remains how to best use virtual environments to bridge classroom-based learning and the application of classroom acquired knowledge during tactical military execution. An opportunity to explore virtual infantry training transfer came during Bold Quest 2011 (BQ11), a coalition combat identification event. Four infantry squads received five days of instructor-led Advanced Situational Awareness Training (ASAT) that focused on increasing their situational awareness and improving decision making; a fifth squad did not. Three of the squads who underwent ASAT training and the one squad that did not then conducted two days of virtual environment scenarios focused on training situational awareness and decision making skills in a combat identification environment. All five squads then performed two different, measured and observed force-on-force field scenarios. Our hypothesis was that initial practice in a virtual environment prior to the force on force scenarios would greatly enhance squad exhibition of the knowledge, skills and attitudes (KSAs) associated with the instructor-led ASAT class, as compared to those trainees who did not conduct the virtual missions. This paper is a follow on to Reitz and Reist, 2010, providing the results of the then proposed experiment. It will discuss squad performance throughout the BQ11 training event; provide the results of an analysis of the training transfer between classroom, virtual and field training environments; and propose broad requirements to improve the effectiveness of the virtual environment to support combat identification training.

Full text

Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2012
2012 Paper No. 12136 Page 1 of 9
Using Virtual Environments to Improve Real World Performance in Combat
Identification
Emilie A. Reitz,
Kevin P. Seavey
General Dynamics Information Technology
Alion Science and Technology
Suffolk, VA
Suffolk, VA
emilie.a.reitz.ctr@mail.mil
kseavey@alionscience.com
ABSTRACT
There is an increased understanding that training in virtual environments will play a key role in future force development
(Department of Defense, 2010) – but there is still a need to better understand the interaction between classroom-based
learning, virtual exercises to reinforce those skills and force-on-force field training. There is now a widening body of research
on virtual environment performance as an effective preparation for force-on-force field training (Roman & Brown, 2009; De
Leo, Sechrist, Radici, & Mastaglio, 2010). The question remains how to best use virtual environments to bridge classroom-
based learning and the application of classroom acquired knowledge during tactical military execution.
An opportunity to explore virtual infantry training transfer came during Bold Quest 2011 (BQ11), a coalition combat
identification event. Four infantry squads received five days of instructor-led Advanced Situational Awareness Training
(ASAT) that focused on increasing their situational awareness and improving decision making; a fifth squad did not. Three of
the squads who underwent ASAT training and the one squad that did not then conducted two days of virtual environment
scenarios focused on training situational awareness and decision making skills in a combat identification environment. All
five squads then performed two different, measured and observed force-on-force field scenarios. Our hypothesis was that
initial practice in a virtual environment prior to the force on force scenarios would greatly enhance squad exhibition of the
knowledge, skills and attitudes (KSAs) associated with the instructor-led ASAT class, as compared to those trainees who did
not conduct the virtual missions. This paper is a follow on to Reitz and Reist, 2010, providing the results of the then proposed
experiment. It will discuss squad performance throughout the BQ11 training event; provide the results of an analysis of the
training transfer between classroom, virtual and field training environments; and propose broad requirements to improve the
effectiveness of the virtual environment to support combat identification training.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Emilie A. Reitz is a Research Analyst at General Dynamics Information Technology. She is currently supporting the Joint
Fires Division of Joint Staff J6, Deputy Director for Command and Control Integration (C2I). Her research focuses on
integrating joint capabilities into modeling, simulation, and training. She was the research lead for the JCW immersive
technology initiative during BQ11, and acted as a research assistant for the NTSA award-winning Border Hunter initiative.
Emilie holds a Master’s Degree in international studies.
Kevin P. Seavey is a Senior Systems Engineer at Alion Science and Technology. He is currently supporting the Environment
Development Division of Joint Staff J7, Deputy Director for Joint and Coalition Warfighting (JCW) in Suffolk, VA. In this
capacity he provides support for the development of joint Live, Virtual and Constructive (LVC) training capabilities, to
include application of gaming technology to joint training and advanced simulation capabilities to improve human decision
making and effectiveness. He was the technical lead for the JCW immersive technology initiative during BQ11.

Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2012
2012 Paper No. 12136 Page 2 of 9
Using Virtual Environments to Improve Real World Performance in Combat
Identification
Emilie A. Reitz,
Kevin P. Seavey
General Dynamics Information Technology
Alion Science and Technology
Suffolk, VA
Suffolk, VA
emilie.a.reitz.ctr@mail.mil
kseavey@alionscience.com
INTRODUCTION
There is now an established body of research on virtual
environment performance as effective preparation for
live military execution (Roman & Brown, 2009; De
Leo, Sechrist, Radici, & Mastaglio, 2010). However,
there are still significant areas for research on using a
virtual environment as an effective bridge between
classroom-based learning and live force-on-force
training. An opportunity to explore virtual infantry
training transfer came during Bold Quest 2011 (BQ11),
a coalition combat identification event sponsored by
the Joint Staff J8’s Joint Fires Division. Combat
identification is an area of military operations that
relies heavily on both technical and non-technical
situational awareness. It is possible that human failures
in combat identification can be mitigated by thorough
and intense simulation training targeted at the faults
that cause the incidents in the first place –
communication, cognitive biases, stress, and more
(Shrader, 1982; National Audit Office [NAO], 2006;
Kulsrud, 2003; Office of Technology Assessment
[OTA], 1993).
Our hypothesis during the BQ11 event was that
practicing combat identification-related decision
making in a virtual environment prior to the live force-
on-force scenarios would improve squad exhibition of
the knowledge, skills and attitudes (KSAs) associated
with instructor-led situational awareness training, as
compared to those trainees who did not receive the
virtual training and those trainees who received only
the virtual training but were excluded from classroom
training. This paper is a follow on to Reitz and Reist,
2010, providing the results of the then proposed
experiment. It will discuss squad performance
throughout the BQ11 training event; provide the results
of an analysis of the behavioral training transfer
between classroom, virtual and field training
environments; and propose broad requirements to
improve the effectiveness of the virtual environment to
support combat identification training.
COMBAT IDENTIFICATION
Combat identification is the action of determining
whether an individual on the battlefield is friendly,
enemy, neutral or non-combatant. The U.S.
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms (Department of Defense, 2012)
defines combat identification as “the process of
attaining an accurate characterization of detected
objects in the operational environment sufficient to
support an engagement decision.” The U.K Ministry
of Defence takes this a step further, defining combat
identification as “the process of combining situational
awareness, target identification and specific tactics,
techniques and procedures to increase operational
effectiveness of weapons systems and reduce the
incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire” (NAO,
2006). In this construct, combat identification is
achieved through increased situational awareness and
accurate target identification.
Situational awareness is an understanding of the
location of units, both friend and foe, and the meaning
of actions occurring in the environment over time.
Target identification is the accurate characterization of
an entity or object sufficient to support an engagement
decision.
Combat identification is accomplished through a
mixture of human and technology solutions, with the
current emphasis placed on technology. (Gadsden &
Outteridge, 2006; Shrader, 1982). While combat
identification systems can be highly accurate, human
operators must typically be relied on to both activate
the technology and then accurately interpret the system
output. An error in either stage of the combat
identification process can yield fatal results.
Accuracy in combat identification, especially for
dismounted infantry, is challenging in all combat
situations, but the complexity greatly increases when
multiple Services from different nations operate in the
same environment, each with potentially different
weapons, communications methods, rules of

Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2012
2012 Paper No. 12136 Page 3 of 9
engagement, and tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTP) for conducting combat identification.
Human Factors
Combat identification technologies have failed to
sufficiently afford effective, error-free operation, as
they have outpaced the training sophistication of the
operators (Shrader, 1992; OTA, 1993; House of
Commons, 2007). Because the soldier is the end point
in the process of combat identification, there is
increased interest in how humans can better utilize
combat identification technologies (National Audit
Office, 2006). Each source in the literature highlights
factors related to humans as the predominant causes for
failures in combat identification. Issues include
communication failures, poor situational awareness,
insufficient training, cognitive factors, misapplication
of TTP, misidentification and poor leadership
(Gadsden & Outteridge, 2006; Shrader, 1982; Wilson
et al., 2007).
While technology has changed quickly, the types of
fratricide themselves have not, which is indicative to
some researchers that reduction of those incidents will
depend on trained skills (OTA, 1993; Greitzer &
Andrews, 2010). Instead of focusing on materiel
solutions, this research emphasized the importance of
training as a method to enhance the application of
combat identification. While unseasoned personnel
cannot become highly experienced veterans overnight,
realistic and demanding situational awareness focused
training can alleviate the need to learn all lessons on
the ground in the heat of battle. To create true
situational awareness, information shared must be rich
in important details. Training personnel to quickly
recognize what is happening around them and generate
that richness of information has been shown to
anecdotally enhance combat effectiveness in units
which have deployed in recent operations (Spiker &
Williams, 2010).
BQ11
BQ11 was a Joint Staff Deputy Director J8-sponsored
event focused on improving coalition combat
identification. It was conducted at Camp Atterbury
Joint Maneuver Training Center (CAJMTC) and
Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC) in
Indiana from 6 to 23 September 2011. While past Bold
Quest events have been focused on developing and
testing material solutions to improve combat
identification, Joint Staff Deputy Director J7 for Joint
and Coalition Warfighting (JCW) supported an
initiative during BQ11 to apply non-material human-
effectiveness solutions to improve combat
identification. This effort employed a sequence of
mutually supportive training initiatives to create
enhanced situational awareness and provide a basis for
improved decision making (Reitz & Reist, 2011).
Leveraging previous research on the improvements to
warfighter performance afforded by programs such as
Combat Hunter, Border Hunter, and advanced
situational awareness training (Schatz, Reitz,
Nicholson, & Fautua, 2010), and the body of work
associated with the Future Immersive Training
Environment Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (FITE JCTD) (Muller, 2010), a suite of
training enablers were offered.
TRAINING CAPABILITIES
The literature on training to close the gaps for combat
identification emphasizes the need to create stress and
realism. Greitzer and Andrews (2010) suggested that a
phased style of training could enhance combat
identification by increasing stress steadily through the
duration of the training. This stress would, in theory,
not cause a decline in performance, as the time-phased
structure of the training would inculcate defenses to
stress and cognitive biases in the trainees.
The training capabilities presented during BQ11 were a
first attempt at identifying a phased sequence of
training that could enhance situational awareness and
increase combat identification proficiency, as well as
overall combat effectiveness.
ASAT
A foundational element of this training was the
Advanced Situational Awareness Training (ASAT)
course, that focused on building small unit combat
observation, profiling and decision making skills.
ASAT is a training course similar to the U.S. Marine
Corps’ Combat Hunter course. Both ASAT and
Combat Hunter focus on teaching trainees how to read
and react appropriately to changes in the baseline of
their environments, in multiple domains, to include
human behavior (Spiker & Williams, 2010; Spiker,
Johnston, Williams & Lethin, 2010). The version of
ASAT conducted during BQ11 consisted of three days
of classroom training and two days of observational
range practice at MUTC.
Virtual Training
After participating in ASAT training, specific units
moved to an immersive virtual training environment
prior to live events at MUTC. The virtual technology
solution for BQ11 consisted of the same system that
had been used during Spiral 1 of the FITE JCTD: the
ExpeditionDI wearable virtual system and the game
engine software, VBS2. Expedition DI is a man worn
immersive system, developed by Quantum3D, Inc. The

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2012 Paper No. 12136 Page 4 of 9
system is made up of: a wearable computer, a head
mounted display system, a motion tracking system, a
weapon system, and simulated audio and radio
capabilities. The configuration in figure 3 shows two
fire teams and a squad leader as they navigated the
virtual marketplace training area.
Rather than being a stand-alone demonstration of the
state-of-the-art for virtual infantry training, as was
done during the FITE JCTD (Muller, 2010), virtual
training during BQ11 was part of a focused and
integrated effort to demonstrate how human
performance in combat identification can be improved
by educating and training the participating units
through a sequence of mutually supportive human-
centric training initiatives. This included utilizing the
same terrain for both the virtual and live training.
Figure 1. MUTC Live Marketplace Training Area
2 below provide a comparative look at the live and
virtual MUTC terrain. The level of fidelity greatly
Deputy Director Joint Staff J8 sponsored JCW’s
development of a very high fidelity VBS2 terrain
database of the central portion of the MUTC site.
MUTC is an extremely complex urban training
environment and, therefore, the virtual environment
had to be comparably rich and complex. Figures 1 and
increased the units’ sense of “presence” as they
operated in the virtual environment. That additional
fidelity was expected to facilitate the transfer of KSAs
between the virtual and live events.
BQ11 introduced a phased transition from virtual
training to live training environments, to include a
sequence of increasingly complex combat
identification scenarios as the units moved from virtual
Figure 2. MUTC Virtual Marketplace Training Area
(running in VBS2).
Figure 3. Guardsmen from 2nd Battalion, 151st Infantry Regiment train in the Virtual Marketplace Training Area at Camp
Atterbury Joint Maneuver Training Center, Sept. 12. (Courtesy of U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Matthew Scotten, 2010)

Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2012
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to live. The scenarios all focused on counter-
insurgency operations from today’s theater of
operations. The initial virtual scenario allowed the
squads an opportunity to establish the pattern of life
norms in a rural village environment and interact with
the civilian population. The second scenario involved
a squad movement-to-contact to seize an insurgent
leader. The two live scenarios conducted at MUTC
involved progressively more complex and kinetic
operations to exercise combat identification skills
under increasing levels of stress. All scenarios, both
virtual and live, included specific events and
opportunities designed to stimulate the squads to use
knowledge gained during the ASAT course.
To improve the transition between virtual and live
scenarios, and to increase the potential for training
transfer between the two environments, some elements
of the exercise control staff played a role in both
events. Additionally, background intelligence reports,
human terrain in the village and rules of engagement
were identical across both domains.
BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES
During BQ11, one U.S. Army squad from 4-17IN,
1/1AD (SBCT) and four squads from the Indiana
National Guard made up the training audience. The
entire study group had an average of nearly 6 years of
military service, with the army participant group
(n=13) having an average age of 26.38; an average of
6.23 years in service; and an average of 1.45
deployments during their career. The National Guard
group (n=34) had an average age of 24.68; an average
of 5.53 years in service, and an average of 1.04
deployments. Table 1 shows the demographics by
treatment group, which includes participants from the
larger Bold Quest exercise. The variances between
treatment groups were not statistically significant.
Table 1 Demographics of Experimental Plan Participants,
by Treatment Group
Four infantry squads received five days of ASAT; a
fifth squad did not. Three of the squads who underwent
ASAT training and the one squad that did not then
conducted two days of virtual environment scenarios
focused on training situational awareness and decision
making skills in a combat identification environment.
All five squads then performed two different, measured
and observed force-on-force field scenarios.
To trace the development of changes in behavior
through the training cycle, behavioral observation
checklists were used to capture exhibition of the
behaviors that were taught in the classroom portion of
the training curriculum. This tool was particularly
useful in assessing performance while executing the
ASAT range days, each squad’s time in the immersive
environments, and during the force-on-force scenarios.
Despite a lack of inter-rater reliability due to the widely
spread raters, there was a wealth of solid data recorded
for evaluating performance, collected through
placement of audio recorders; video recordings of the
force-on-force scenarios; and time space positional
information (TSPI) provided through the trainees’
Integrated Tactical Engagement Simulation System
(ITESS) vests. The data collected was excellent for
displaying trends in training developments as trainees
progressed through the different stages of the training
and began to assimilate portions of the training into
their usual behavior patterns without being specifically
instructed to do so.
KSAs
There are 33 KSAs currently associated with ASAT
training. The ASAT KSAs are further organized into
six objective areas, which had been observed during
previous administration of the training (Spiker &
Johnston, 2010a; Fautua, et al, 2010; Gideons et al,
2008).
■ Use of enhanced observation techniques
■ Identification of critical event indicators
■ Interpretation of human behavior cues
■ Synthesis of ambiguous information
■ Proactive analysis and dynamic decision making
■ Employment of cognitive discipline
The KSAs are considered key to improving intelligence
flow, and allowing soldiers to act before a threat signal
turns into an actual threat.
Methods
Behavioral observation checklists are a technique
utilized for collecting information during field
observations on individual and team performance
(Spiker & Johnston, 2010b). The behavioral
observation checklist employed was previously utilized
at Border Hunter (Fautua, et al, 2010), focusing on the
Treatment
Avg
Age
Avg Yrs
in Service
Avg. No. of
Deployments
All Training (n
=29)
25.38
5.93
1.26
No Virtual (n=9)
24.89
6.11
1
No ASAT (n =9)
24.67
4.67
1
No Training (n
=33)
26.52
5.85
1.21

Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2012
2012 Paper No. 12136 Page 6 of 9
Table 2 Trainee utilization of ASAT KSAs in scenarios, by treatment group
*Note: FE,V1, V2, F1 and F2 FE stands for the ASAT final exercise; V1 is virtual scenario 1; V2 is virtual scenario
2; F1 is the Afghan village force-on-force scenario; F2 is the layered house fight force-on-force scenario. Each
number is the mean of observed instances of a particular KSA type, within each treatment group.
human terrain profiling knowledge skills and attitudes
drawn out of that research, as first portrayed in Spiker
and Johnston, 2010a.
The data associated to the observed scenarios was
scored twice, weeks apart and under different
conditions. Trainees participated in 7 ASAT scenarios,
a final exercise, two virtual immersive environment
scenarios utilizing the individually worn virtual
systems, and two live scenarios, one of which was
cleanly linked to the operational world created for
virtual environment scenarios. Through the first seven
ASAT scenarios, scoring was only available on Indiana
National Guard Squad 2, the No Virtual training
treatment group, during which data was collected by
two independent observers. The scope of those two
observers expanded to include squad 3 during the
ASAT final exercise; observations on squads 1 and the
Army squad during the final exercise were backfilled
through the collected radio network traffic.
Observations of the virtual and live scenarios were
performed during execution of each scenario, and
supported through the collected audio and video
recordings of each squad’s run through the scenarios.
Results
As exhibited in Table 2, the layered house fight did not
provide opportunity for trainees to identify indicators
of critical events, synthesize ambiguous information, or
to exhibit proactive analysis at this point in the trainee
integration of the ASAT KSAs into their normal
tactical procedures. Unlike the village scenario, which
was grounded very tightly to the virtual environment
scenario, the layered house fight was a very kinetic
scenario, focused on quick shoot-don’t shoot decision
Enhanced
observation
techniques
ID of critical event
indicators
Interpreting human
behavior cues
Synthesis of
ambiguous
information
Proactive analysis
and dynamic
decision making
Cognitive
discipline
Treatment Gro up
FE
V1
V2
F1
F2
FE
V1
V2
F1
F2
FE
V1
V2
F1
F2
FE
V1
V2
F1
F2
FE
V1
V2
F1
F2
FE
V1
V2
F1
F2
All Training (n=27)
10.3
6
4.7
6.7
7
7.6
9.3
10
12.7
3. 7
8.67
9. 3
10. 7
11. 3
7.3
14.7
12
12
12.5
2. 7
10
13.3
11
16.2
7. 7
5.3
8.33
10.3
10.3
6.67
No Virtual (n=9 )
8
6
6
5.5
11
10
9
7
11
8
6
2
No ASAT (n=9)
6
5
4
6
2
0
2
1
3
4
5
1
0
0
0
3
6
2
4
3
3
5
7
4
*Note: Error bars represent one standard deviation.
Figure 4 Observed Exhibition of ASAT Skill Groups, through Four Selected Scenarios, by Treatment Group

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2012 Paper No. 12136 Page 7 of 9
making. There was little opportunity afforded to the
squads to approach the situation with a more thought
out response. Each squad performed twice in the
village scenario, confronted with structured variations
of a hostage recovery in the by then familiar village
from the virtual environment. All live force on force
performance was further complicated by the fact that
all participating squads were aligning their tactical
procedures together for the first time.
The results of changes of KSA exhibition over time in
relation to each treatment group was statistically
significant (Wilks’ Lambda .119, F(10, 16)= 3.047,
p=.023, Partial Eta Squared = .656). The between-
subjects effects of treatment in regards to the KSA
training objectives exhibited were also statistically
significant (F(2,12)=19.429, p=.000, Partial Eta
Squared=.764).
Throughout the training event, each squad not only
improved in their ability to utilize the KSAs associated
with the ASAT body of work, but employed those
KSAs differently according to the scenario they were
faced with. Compared pairwise, the Army squad
performed statistically better than Squad 2, which did
not participate in the virtual training, (p=.023), and
Squad 4, which did not receive any ASAT training
(p=004) in terms of exhibiting ASAT KSAs throughout
the scenarios. Performance by Squad 3 was also
statistically significant when compared to Squad 4
(p=001).
Scenarios that did not encourage an initial creation of a
baseline also did not tax trainees in areas associated
with deeper analysis. Yet the differences between
scenarios, at least in terms of observed outcomes, were
not statistically significant when viewed through a
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
The data on transitioning classroom taught KSAs to
live force on force training events through a virtual
environment indicates the utility of virtual
environments for reinforcing and sustaining the
situational awareness and decision making skillsets
taught in programs like Combat Hunter and ASAT.
Additionally, the data shows the utility of the virtual
environment providing a quick knowledge transfer to
those who have not experienced the training, through
the use of carefully crafted scenarios aligned with the
skillsets.
Recommendations
To increase the realism of the virtual training,
especially for more experienced units, several
initiatives are proposed for future events using virtual
environments to train combat identification skills.
First, participants in the virtual environment need to be
subjected to more sensory stimulation in order to
increase their cognitive load and improve their sense of
immersion. During BQ11 there was little audio and no
haptic stimulation available. We have already taken
steps to improve audio input by providing higher
quality, more realistic and relevant environmental
background noise integrated with the scenarios. We
are additionally looking at options for better area audio
generation, including vortex cannon technology, to
complement the individual audio inputs to the trainees
and induce more stress into the scenarios. During
BQ11, an industry partner demonstrated auditory
stimulation capabilities that can induce a significant
stress load in the trainees. These same capabilities
could augment the existing virtual training
environment and greatly improve its ability to create
the demanding training environment required to hone
combat identification skills. Additionally, we are
exploring improved haptic feedback devices to
improve realism and the ability of the virtual system to
induce a sense of lethal responsibility.
Second, the results also support what we suspected was
going to be a pitfall going into the research. In general
simulation systems today lack the ability to model
human behavior to the fidelity required to fully engage
the trainees on the same level they would be engaged
while working face to face with a real human. We
therefore had to have a live exercise controller drive all
interactions between trainees and virtual humans. For
the more skilled trainees, this meant that we were
unable to provide the realistic human interaction
challenges that exist in real world operations and that
are required to move past training sustainment and
allow trainees to progress in their learning.
Third, using the virtual environment to train combat
identification requires training cases that emphasize the
cultural environment to provide opportunities for cross-
cultural perspective taking. This is so that trainees can
start to recognize and correctly interpret cultural cues
that may indicate hostility or cooperation. For future
events we intend to put an increased focus on the
cultural environment, to include requiring the squad to
interact with village leaders, providing more realistic
human terrain built upon social network data available
in the intelligence background, and some exposure to
the local language. While greater emphasis on cultural
context will require more from the exercise control
team, it is nevertheless required to replicate the current
operational environment, where complex combat
identification dilemmas persist.

Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2012
2012 Paper No. 12136 Page 8 of 9
Finally, we see the need to expand the joint enabling
capabilities available to the squad in the virtual
environment. That is, specific capabilities that a squad
in today’s operational environment has access to, such
as remote sensor feeds, close air support and
MEDEVAC capabilities, were missing. We are well
along on plans to introduce other virtual and
constructive simulations to flesh out these missing
pieces, to include integrating a virtual Joint Terminal
Attack Controller (JTAC) simulator.
CONCLUSIONS
The mutually supportive training capabilities employed
during BQ11 provided an initial step towards
improving human performance of combat identification
by squad and individual-level dismounts. During the
period of execution, we were able to identify as many
positive outcomes of the training as we did lessons
learned – this is enough to warrant more structured
research in the future. Where trainees were provided
scenarios which were contextually rich and closely
mirrored reality – whether in a virtual environment, or
in field force-on-force events – the trainees
significantly exhibited the classroom-trained behaviors,
leading to increases in their ability to sort friends from
enemies, and neutral and non-combatant actors. There
are many developments which need to be made to
increase not just visual realism, but functional realism
of the central portions of the training. Despite the
previously outlined functional shortfalls, virtual
training can be an effective bridge between classroom
learning and live training in the development of combat
identification skills. Virtual training that is focused on
observation and sense-making skills, recognizing and
overcoming cognitive biases and developing the ability
to deal with stress in a lethal environment can enhance
situational awareness and improve decision making.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported in part by the U.S. Joint Staff
(Contract #N65236-09-D-3809). The views and
conclusions contained in this document are those of the
authors and should not be interpreted as representing
the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the
US Joint Staff or the US Government. The US
Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute
reprints for Government purposes.
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