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The Essence-Existence Distinction: Four Elements of the Post-Avicennian Metaphysical Dispute (11–13th Centuries)
Abstract
The essence-existence distinction was a central issue in metaphysical disputes among post-Avicennian thinkers in the Islamic world. One group argued that what a thing is is different from that it is only conceptually. A rival view would have it that the distinction between essence and existence is real. The purpose of this article is to analyze the philosophical core of the dispute, by isolating the main arguments and their metaphysical foundations. I will study four central issues of the essence-existence debate: (1) the argument that existence is distinct from essence because one can conceive of an essence without knowing whether it exists; (2) the argument that if existence were really distinct from essence, existence would itself have to exist, leading to an infinite regress; (3) the question of whether God is responsible for the existence of essences only or also for their essential content (this relates to the problem of the ontological status of the non-existent); (4) the problem of whether essences are prior to existence.
The Avicennian distinction between quiddity and existence opens the way to several derivative issues concerning the quiddity of existence (what existence is) and the ontological status of existence (whether and how existence is). This paper presents a fine-grained account of the positions and arguments developed by post-Avicennian authors on these matters, showing how the debates on states ( aḥwāl ) and grounding ( taʿlīl ) feed into the picture. The discussions on the quiddity of existence revolve around the features of its knowability and its connection to a ground ( ʿilla ), or lack thereof. As for the ontological status of existence, the standard idea of a clash between realism (existence is an extramental existent) and conceptualism (existence is a purely mental existent) calls for further refinement. First, realism itself encompasses two distinct positions when it comes to the relation between the second-order existence of existence and existence itself (sameness, additionality). Second, the tradition presents other doctrines not easily classifiable within the realism-conceptualism framework (the existential non-assertability of existence, the non-existence of existence).
This paper engages critically with Dimitri Gutas’ recent characterization of post-classical Islamic philosophy and theology as a form of paraphilosophy or intellectual activity that merely simulates philosophy. I argue that this view arises from a misguided understanding of the concept of philosophy that should provide the standard for its historiography. In order to avoid a number of problematic consequences, such as gaps in historical continuity or a disconnection from what we understand by philosophy today, we must take our cue from a sufficiently uncontroversial contemporary concept of philosophy instead of any particular historical concept, such as the Peripatetic amalgam of metaphysics, theory of science, and the empirical sciences. Such a strategy provides a sound basis for the inclusion of post-classical thinkers, as well as many classical thinkers who are not falāsifa, in the history of Islamic philosophy without vicious circularity or loss of a normative concept of philosophy
Bu makale, Dimitri Gutas’ın, post-klasik İslam felsefesi ve teolojisini, “felsefemsi” bir form veya felsefeye öykünen entelektüel bir faaliyet olarak nitelemesine eleştirel bir şekilde yaklaşır. Bu görüşün, felsefe tarih- yazımı için standart sağlaması gereken felsefe kavramının yanlış anlaşılmasından kaynaklandığını iddia ediyorum. Tarihsel süreklilikte boşluklara neden olma veya günümüzde felsefeden anladığımız şeyden kopuk olma gibi birtakım problemli sonuçları önlemek için, metafizik, bilim teorisi veya ampirik bilimlerin Meşşâî birleşimi gibi herhangi belirli bir tarihsel kavram yerine, pek tartışmalı olmayan bir çağdaş felsefe kavramından yola çıkmalıyız. Böyle bir strateji, felâsifeden olmayan pek çok klasik düşünürün yanı sıra post- klasik düşünürlerin, herhangi bir kısırdöngüye girilmeksizin veya normatif felsefe kavramı kaybedilmeksizin İslam felsefesi tarihine dâhil edilmesi için sağlam bir temel sunar.
The onto-epistemological status of mental representations can be seen among the most controversial problems of Post-Avicennan philosophy. The problem has its roots in Ibn Sīnā’s attempt to get a predicational unity between the layers of being on one hand and in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s criticisms of mental existence and universality of mental exemplars on the other. Al-Rāzī’s criticisms led the prominent followers of Ibn Sīnā to reconsider the Avicennan principle of the preservation of essences in multi-layered being and Ibn Sīnā’s conception of knowledge as an immaterial representation of nature. Against al-Rāzī’s criticism, al- Ṭūsī tried to narrow the ontological extension of essences and to redefine universal predication. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s involvement in the discussion took the restrictive efforts to the next level. In addition to al-Ṭūsī‘s restricting the ontological extensions of essences by only giving them an epistemological role, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī downgraded their epistemological roles as well and counted them just as individual exemplars (mithāl) in the individual’s mind. In addition to al-Ṭūsī’s hesitant rejection of universal natures in external world, he also clearly rejected the existence of universal natures in the external world. His first position led him to redefine the notion of correspondence and universality, and his second position led him to propose a non- explanatory interpretation of Ibn Sīnā’s hylomorphic substances. In this paper, I will discuss the continuities and discontinuities of his interpretations with respect to Ibn Sīnā’s strong metaphysical realism and his philosophical project’s aim to construct the unity of essences in a multi-layered being.
Zihnî temsillerin onto-epistemolojik statüsü İbn Sînâ sonrası felsefenin en tartışmalı problemleri arasında görülebilir. Problemin kökenleri bir yandan İbn Sînâ’nın farklı varlık düzlemleri arasında yüklemsel birlik elde etme teşebbüsünde, diğer yandan Fahreddin er-Râzî’nin zihnî varlık ve zihnî misallerin tümelliği eleştirisinde bulunur. Fahreddin er-Râzî’nin eleştirileri İbn Sînâ’nın önde gelen takipçilerini, İbn Sînâ’nın mahiyetlerin farklı varlık seviyelerinde korunumu ilkesini ve onun bilgiyi doğanın gayrimaddi temsili olarak tanımlamasını yeniden düşünmeye sevk etmiştir. Fahreddin er-Râzî’nin eleştirilerine karşı Nasîrüddin et-Tûsî mahiyetlerin ontolojik kapsamını daraltmış ve tümel yüklemlemeyi yeniden tanımlamıştır. Kutbüddin er-Râzî’nin tartışmaya dâhil olması daraltma çabalarını daha ileri bir seviyeye taşımıştır. Tûsî’nin mahiyetlere sadece epistemolojik bir rol vererek onların ontolojik kapsamında yaptığı daraltmaya ilaveten Kutbüddin er- Râzî mahiyetlerin epistemolojik kapsamında da daraltmaya gitmiş ve İbn Sînâ’nın aklî suretlerini, hiçbir şekilde tümel olması mümkün olmayan, tikel bir zihindeki tikel suretler olarak değerlendirmiştir. Ayrıca Tûsî’yle birlikte, kendinde mahiyetlerin hariçteki fertler arasında müşterek varlığını reddeden Kutbüddin er-Râzî, bu iki adımdan yola çıkarak mutabakat ve tümellik tasavvurlarını yeniden tanımlamış, İbn Sînâ’nın hilomorfik cevher teorisi için mereolojik olmayan bir yorum geliştirmiştir. Bu makale İbn Sînâcı felsefede on üçüncü yüzyıldan itibaren ortaya çıkan bu adımları, İbn Sînâ’ya özgü gerçekçiliğin dönüşümü olarak okumakta ve bu dönüşüme giderek artan zihinselci bir eğilimin eşlik ettiğini öne sürmektedir.
Islamic Philosophy should be observed as the worth treasure that manifested during the history of Islamic Intellectual Tradition. Quite different from the Philosophical traditions breed in Western Civilization, Islamic Philosophy affirmed its construction based on Revelation, Intuition, and demonstration. This paper will enquire several arguments reconsidering an influential position of Philosophy in Islamic Intellectual Tradition; ranged from an elaboration regarding the unity of Reason (Ratio-Intellectus), unity of existence, and the unity or relation between the Knower and the known object. Consequently, there are at least five significances of Islamic Philosophy to be studied by present-day Muslims by order: Islamic Philosophy acquired the whole competencies to seek the truth and wisdom; it is required as a systematic thought to face challenges confronted by Western Civilization; especially their destructive ideas; Islamic Philosophy also encourage mankind to find an answer an eternal question concerning the nature of their world; and finally, Islamic Philosophy counteracts the bias framework of Orientalists.
Islamic Philosophy should be observed as a valuable scientific treasure that particularly manifested in the history of Islamic intellectual tradition. Apart from multiple schools of traditions, Islamic Philosophy possesses prominent features compared with Western Philosophy, uniting elements of reason (Ratio-Intellectus), existence, and Knower-Known. Through 'Conceptual Analysis Method,' this article will reconsider the manifestation and significances of Islamic Philosophy as a part of Islamic intellectual tradition to be studied by present-day Muslims. Those significances are: Islamic Philosophy strives to fulfill virtuous and religious advancement needed by the Muslim community; harmonizes essential demand by regards to the Worldview of Islam opposing Western thought; deals with the ideas in the context of dialogue of civilization; answer eternal questions about the nature of reality; and finally, recognizes and readily accepts intellectual challenges confronted by Orientalists. Abstrak Filsafat Islam harus dipahami sebagai khazanah keilmuan berharga yang termanifestasikan dalam sejarah tradisi intelektual Islam. Terlepas dari sejumlah madzhab tradisi pemikiran yang ada, Filsafat Islam memiliki sejumlah karakter yang berbeda terutama dengan Filsafat Barat dengan menyatukan sejumlah elemen akali (Ratio-Intellectus), eksistensi, dan subjek mengetahui dengan objek yang diketahui. Melalui metode 'Conceptual Analyis', artikel ini akan mencoba menimbang kembali manifestasi dan pentingnya Filsafat Islam sebagai bagian dari tradisi intelektual Islam untuk dipelajari oleh Muslim yang hidup saat ini. Urgensi tersebut antara lain: Filsafat Islam berupaya ntuk memenuhi peningkatan moral dan religius yang dibutuhkan oleh Umat Islam; menyelaraskan tuntutan mendasar berdasarkan pandangan hidup Islam untuk menghadapi pemikiran Barat, bertanggung jawab atas dialog peradaban; menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan abadi tentang asal mula realitas; dan terakhir, memahami dan siap menghadapi tantangan yang dihadirkan oleh para Orientalis
This paper shall look briefly into the treatment of some topics related to scepticism in general in works by Barhebraeus, the famous Syrian Orthodox polymath and theologian (1226–1286). He addresses scepticism both directly by a discussion of sensory and intellectual fallacies or sceptical scenarios as well as indirectly by the definition of knowledge and the role of intuitive knowledge regarding primary notions and logical principles, which have an impact on establishing secure knowledge. Despite writing in Syriac, his dealing with the matter is heavily indebted to Arabic sources, primarily contemporary post‐Avicennan authors, and here especially Fakhr al‐Dīn al‐Rāzī (1149–1209) and Naṣīr al‐Dīn al‐Tūṣī (1201–1274) but also Avicenna (980–1037) himself, although Barhebraeus adds a decisively Christian note in some instances. The Syriac tradition, therefore, should not be neglected when dealing with medieval scepticism.
The theory of essential definitions is a fundamental anti‐sceptic element of the Aristotelian‐Avicennian epistemology. In this theory, when we distinguish the genus and the specific differentia of a given essence we thereby acquire a scientific understanding of it. The aim of this article is to analyse systematically the sceptical reasons, arguments and conclusions against real definitions of three major authorities of twelfth‐century Arabic philosophy: Faḫr al‐Dīn al‐Rāzī, Šihāb al‐Dīn al‐Suhrawardī and Abū l‐Barakāt al‐Baġdādī. I focus on showing how their refutation of our capacity to provide essential definitions of things is rooted in their semantic theory: we only know things under certain descriptions which are identical to the meanings of the words that we use to refer to them, yet these descriptions do not capture the essences of things in themselves. The best result one can achieve with Aristotelian‐Avicennian scientific definitions is a “nominal definition”. With this, Rāzī, Suhrawardī and Abū l‐Barakāt will put some serious epistemic limitations on our capacity to attain scientific knowledge of things, at least as Aristotle and Avicenna would have it.
Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) famously criticised the central concepts of Avicennian metaphysics as merely mind-dependent (or iʿtibārī ) notions. This paper aims to show that despite his critique, Suhrawardī held that these concepts are meaningful, indeed necessary for human cognition. By the same token, it is argued that their re-emergence in Suhrawardī’s ishrāqī metaphysics is not a matter of incoherence. Although the paper’s findings can be generalised to hold of all iʿtibārī concepts, mutatis mutandis , our focus is on the concept of substance, mainly because of the importance of the concept of ‘dusky substance’ in ishrāqī metaphysics.
Scholarship on medieval philosophy has rightfully acknowledged the historical and systematical merit of Avicenna’s (d. 1037) thought in all divisions of philosophy. Avicenna however did not provide a systematic theory of individuation: matter, existence, ‘individual intentions’, and other candidates equally appear in his works as candidates for the principle of individuation. This systematic gap was to be filled in post-Avicennian Islamic philosophy. In this paper, I will focus on two figures: Avicenna’s disciple Bahmanyār b. Marzbān (d. 1066) and Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191), the founder of what has come to be called Islamic Illuminationism. We will see that Bahmanyār, inspired by Avicenna’s Marginal Notes, connects individuation with matter, motion, time, and position. Suhrawardī in his turn will present a revolutionary attempt to break with the Aristotelian-Avicennian tradition of explaining individuation through spatiotemporally designated matter. His position, as I will show, comes close to what we nowadays call primitive individuation.
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