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Journal of Asian Pacic Communication : (), 233–247. ./japc...wie
– / - – © John Benjamins Publishing Company
Nationalism, public opinion,
and dispute resolution
e Dokdo/Takeshima dispute
Krista E. Wiegand and Ajin Choi
University of Tennessee / Yonsei University, Korea
For several decades South Koreans have rallied around the Dokdo/Takeshima
islets, small rocky outcroppings in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. ere have been
signicant mobilization eorts by the Korean government, opposition parties,
media, and civic groups that stir up a strong level of nationalism in South Korea.
Why is public opinion about Dokdo, as the islets are named by Koreans, so erce
in South Korea despite the fact that South Korea has maintained eective control
of the islets for over 50 years? How can public opinion and territorial national-
ism aect dispute resolution? In this research project, we argue that domestic
mobilization, stalwart public opinion, and strong territorial nationalism exist
primarily because the islets symbolize other salient issues disputed with Japan
and such issue linkage makes the territorial dispute dicult to resolve.
Keywords: nationalism, territorial dispute, rhetoric, mobilization, public
opinion, Korea, Japan
In March 2005, the Shimane Prefecture government in Japan declared a “Takeshima
Day” to recognize Japan’s claim to the islands known in Korea as Dokdo and
Takeshima in Japan.1 Even though this action was pursued by a local government
and not at the national level in Japan, the outrage in South Korea was strong. At
the top level of government, South Korea withdrew its support for Japan’s inclu-
sion as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and started
a campaign to block Japan’s access to any permanent seat, and made Dokdo and
related disputed issues the dominant themes discussed at summits in June and
1. e Dokdo/Takeshima islets are relatively small rocky islets in the East Sea/Sea of Japan that
are fairly equidistant to the Japanese and Korean mainland. Known as the Liancourt Rocks in
English, the islets are called Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese.
234 Krista E. Wiegand and Ajin Choi
November 2005 (Moon & Suh, 2008). Mass protests were held in Korea, every lo-
cal government cut o exchange programs, the central government demanding the
ordinance to be dissolved, and at the most extreme, a mother and son each cut o
one of their ngers, while another demonstrator set himself on re (Onishi, 2005).
A year later, in April 2006, the Japanese Coast Guard announced plans to dispatch
maritime survey ships to the waters around the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islets
in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. In response, South Korea strongly protested the move,
claiming that Japan would be breaching Korean waters, and issued stern warnings
about following through with the plans, which Japan did anyway when it deployed
two Japanese ships to the area. e South Korean government then dispatched
20 naval and coast guard vessels and surveillance planes to monitor the area,
threatening to use force and seize any Japanese ships in the vicinity of the islands.
is move came in response to announced plans by the Japanese Coast Guard to
dispatch maritime survey ships to the waters around the islets. Despite a strong
protest and the dispatching of the Korean navy, coast guard, and air force, Japan
continued to pursue its plans to dispatch the maritime survey ships. Eventually,
during talks to end the crisis, Japan agreed to call o the maritime survey ships in
exchange for Korea agreeing to postpone submission of Korean names of the islets
and surrounding areas to an international oceanographic conference.
In South Korea, the responses to these incidents were overwhelming. e
Korean populace responded to Japan’s move with an outpouring of strong nation-
alism about the disputed islets, with sales of t-shirts and other paraphernalia say-
ing “I Love Dokdo” and “I am Dokdo,” mass participation in online commentaries
and postings, and deposits into bank accounts aliated with Dokdo (Lee, 2006).
e Korean Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology issued orders that
public schools include a minimum of 10 hours of curriculum about Korea’s own-
ership of Dokdo. is incident is one of many cases in which the Korean public,
government, opposition parties, media, and civic groups have rallied around the
disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islets.
In most territorial disputes, it is rare for the defending state– the state that
is targeted with a claim by another state– to mobilize the public and have such
high levels of nationalism about the claimed territory (Wiegand, 2011). Historic
evidence of Korea’s occupation and eective control of the islets dates back to 512
AD, though the Japanese government claims terra nullis– lack of occupation–
since 1905, when the Japanese government incorporated them into Shimane
Prefecture and began eective control of the islets (Van Dyke, 2007).2 Following
a series of treaties, Japan ocially annexed Korea in 1910 and exercised colonial
2. e Japanese position also states that Japan had established sovereignty of the islets by the
middle of the 17th century (Ministry of Foreign Aairs of Japan, 2012).
Nationalism, public opinion, and dispute resolution 235
rule until the end of World War II. South Korea has maintained eective control
of the islets since the government placed coast guard forces there in 1954 aer
the Korean War. e current ocial position of the South Korean government is
that “no territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo and Dokdo is not a matter to
be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement” (Ministry of
Foreign Aairs and Trade (Korea), 2012). South Korea has eectively controlled
the islets for more than half a century and Japan has made no overt attempts to
claim the islets except for rhetorically. e likelihood of an armed invasion by
Japan is deemed to be extremely unlikely given the status of democracy in both
states, pressure by the U.S., and need for mutual security cooperation. Yet, the
Korean government works hard to “defend” Korea’s sovereign rights to the islets.
Why is there such strong emphasis in South Korea on these two rocky out-
croppings in the East Sea/Sea of Japan? By examining the role of the Dokdo dis-
pute in Korean politics, we can see that this dispute is intricately linked to historic
and current tensions with Japan and the Dokdo islets are interlinked with these
issues. erefore, as long as these bilateral tensions continue, the Dokdo islets will
continue to serve as a mobilizing symbol. e purpose of this research project is
to examine how erce public opinion and resulting strong levels of nationalism
about Dokdo, as the islets are named by Koreans, in South Korea aect dispute
resolution. In this project, to explain strong public opinion and territorial nation-
alism, we contend that mobilization by the Korean government and civic groups
has led to issue linkage, the deliberate linking of multiple disputed issues separate
from the territorial dispute. ese multiple disputed issues include the historic
narratives used in Japan about Korea, the issue of comfort women, and high levels
of nationalism in Japan. Such issue linkage plays an escalatory role in the territo-
rial dispute and makes it dicult to resolve.
Public opinion and territorial nationalism
It is an understatement to say that the Dokdo islets matter a lot in South Korea;
mobilization eorts have worked well. ere is little doubt that nationalism “is
especially critical to the Korean reaction, constituting the main exacerbating force
behind its position towards the dispute” (Emmers, 2010, p. 3). Public opinion polls
about Japan, Dokdo, and the Korean government’s policies with regard to Japan
and overall are quite indicative of the eect of mobilization eorts of both the gov-
ernment and civic groups. Shortly aer the declaration by Shimane Prefecture of
Takeshima Day, in April 2005, only eight percent of respondents in a public opin-
ion poll said they had a positive view of Japan, compared to 63 percent that had
a negative view of Japan (Moon & Suh, 2008). In 2007, while 64 percent of South
236 Krista E. Wiegand and Ajin Choi
Koreans perceived North Korean nuclear weapons as a potential threat, 90 percent
believed that if Japan were to access nuclear weapons, this would pose a threat to
South Korea (Kang, 2010a).
A 2010 public opinion poll continued to show that 73 percent viewed relations
with Japan as bad or very bad (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2010), suggesting there is a cost
to the dispute. During this period, though there were major concerns about North
Korea and the poor economy in South Korea, relations with Japan and the Dokdo
dispute were quite salient as well. In another 2010 poll, a striking 97 percent of the
Korean public thought that Japan should support South Korean claims to Dokdo
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 2010). According to a 2011 public opinion poll, just over 60
percent of the Korean population viewed Dokdo as the most signicant obstacle
in the development of Korean-Japanese relations, compared to 30 percent view-
ing Japanese textbooks and 10 percent viewing the issue of comfort women as
obstacles (Kim, Friedho, & Kang, 2011).
Only a few weeks aer the South Korean public renounced the government’s
plans to sign a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
with Japan and a few days before Liberation Day, President Lee visited Dokdo, the
rst time a Korean leader had visited. is surprising visit raised diplomatic ten-
sions with Japan. e Korean response to Lee’s visit to Dokdo was strong, with ap-
proval ratings reaching 84 percent (Kim & Friedho 2012; Kim, Friedho, & Kang
2012). e public opinion survey also showed that 65.4 percent of the public sup-
ported Lee’s visit “as a way to push Japan to acknowledge its colonization of Korea
and wartime atrocities” (Kim, Friedho, & Kang 2012). To top it all o, Lee had
also called for the Japanese Emperor to issue an apology about Japanese atrocities
committed during the colonial occupation of Korea, which incentivized strong
public opinion against Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda criticized
Lee’s visit to Dokdo saying that it was unacceptable and “extremely regrettable.”
(Jiji, 2012).
An August 2013 poll by the Asan Institute showed that Korean favorability
toward Japan had reached a low of 2.64 on a scale of 1–10, with 10 being the most
favorable, while 70 percent of those polled viewed Korean relations with Japan as
competitive (Kim & Friedho, 2013). is is not surprising given that Japanese
Prime Minister Abe had returned to oce in December 2012, and President Park
had met with President Barak Obama and President Xi Jinping, but not with
Prime Minister Abe.
More recently, according to a 2015 Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion
Poll, 61 percent of South Korean respondents answered that they have an unfavor-
able impression of Japan. With respect to reasons for this negative impression, his-
torical and territorial issues are on the top: 76 percent of South Koreans responded
that their negative impression of Japan is related to Japan’s lack of remorse for its
Nationalism, public opinion, and dispute resolution 237
historical invasion of Korea, while 70 percent of respondents listed the territo-
rial dispute as the top issue (Genron NPO & EAI, 2016, p. 4–6).3 Another recent
survey similarly shows that 67 percent of South Koreans express that their na-
tional sentiment toward Japan as “undesirable” and “concerning” (Genron NPO &
EAI, 2016, p. 7). erefore, these public opinion survey results suggest that South
Koreans have had consistent negative sentiments toward Japan as a product of the
ongoing territorial dispute and historical issues.
Furthermore, tens of thousands of Korean “netizens” have disseminated in-
formation about Dokdo and expressed their strong position against Japanese
claims. ey have used countless websites, Facebook community pages, hun-
dreds of Twitter feeds about Dokdo every day, video game applications about de-
fending Dokdo from Japanese invasion, and attempts to paralyze or take down
Japanese sites related to Japanese claims (Dong-A Ilbo, 2010). For example, in
2004, even before the Shimane Prefecture declared Takeshima Day, 2.2 million
sheets of stamps printed with pictures of Dokdo were sold out within three hours
(Emmers, 2010). ere was even a “Dokdo Gangnam style” ash dance in Seoul
in late 2012, attended by thousands. Among private citizens, 2,051 Korean citi-
zens have registered permanent residence on Dokdo, despite the fact that they
do not have physical presence on the islets (Division of Dokdo Policy, 2013). In
2009, 1,886 South Korean citizens led a claim against the Japanese newspaper
Yomiuri/Shimbun about claimed misrepresentations about Dokdo/Takeshima re-
garding then President Lee’s alleged lack of protest to Japanese textbook inclusion
of Dokdo as Japanese territory (Kang, 2010b). ere are also multiple songs about
Dokdo, art exhibits about Dokdo, and even songwriters, actors, and other celebri-
ties have adopted the cause of defending Dokdo. Videos on Youtube are abundant;
one video, describes Dokdo as a “temporary resting place for any birds ying by,”
and a “place where shermen stop by when fatigued by their daily work (Dokdo
Arirang, 2015).” When it comes to describing how Japan is “continuously creating
disputes about Dokdo,” the background graphic is a shark swimming around, then
essentially devouring Dokdo (Dokdo Arirang, 2015).
For civic groups and much of the Korean domestic populace, “Dokdo is not
simply an easternmost island. It is a Korean national symbol and a reminder of
Japan’s past aggression” (Choi, 2005). Because of strong domestic mobilization
by the government and civic groups, the islets have gained signicant national-
ist value among the Korean domestic populace. e level of territorial national-
ism in South Korea is particularly high because Japan already occupied and ruled
Korea for several decades, including the symbolic Dokdo islets. Not only did Japan
3. In the latter question regarding the reasons, each respondent was asked to choose two an-
swers.
238 Krista E. Wiegand and Ajin Choi
dominate Korea territorially, but it did so politically, economically, and socially.
us, for Koreans, Dokdo symbolizes a relationship that has yet to move beyond
the diculties of the past. Dokdo’s place in Korean society is directly in the con-
text of South Korea’s self-identity– one of militant and hostile Japan bullying
modest Korea.
Even with eective control, the Korean government, as well as civic groups,
attempts to mobilize and rally the domestic populace, mainly pointing out that
the Japanese claim is considered a breach of Korean sovereignty. For example,
every few years the Japanese government issues an ocial protest and claim for
the islets, and celebrates Takeshima Day in Shimane Prefecture every February. A
few years ago, in August 2012, Japan called for adjudication of the dispute by the
International Court of Justice; South Korea’s response was at out rejection that
a dispute even exists. In response to Japanese actions such as the celebration of
Takeshima Day in Japan each February, there are large protests involving all dier-
ent groups in Korean society. e Korean government has had to respond to these
challenges in a strong manner as well, and in doing so, has eectively rallied the
domestic populace to love Dokdo. Any potential perceived threat from Japan is
grounds for signicant mobilization in Korea.
Government mobilization
Governments oen mobilize domestic support by rallying around a nationalist is-
sue territory that is claimed– and therefore threatened– by another state is a per-
fect nationalist issue for such mobilization (Downs & Saunders, 1996; Wiegand,
2005). What drives nationalism in cases like the Dokdo dispute is the idea of losing
territory to another state, and as we will argue later, the linkages of the dispute
with other disputed issues rooted in perceptions of history. Because attachment
to nationalist territory like Dokdo can be highly emotional and therefore a high-
ly mobilizing issue for the public, this provides an opportunity for governments
and civic groups to rally support for themselves and their issues, particularly with
regard to issues related to Japan. Such government mobilization is frequently
used to mobilize support of government or those campaigning for election (Koo,
2006). Government mobilization in Korea is fairly easy because it is not needed as
much as it is in other territorial disputes where the people may not care as much
about the disputed territory as Koreans care about Dokdo. Nevertheless, govern-
ment mobilization has played an important role in synthesizing and encourag-
ing public opinion about Dokdo so that it is consistent with the government’s
position on Dokdo.
Nationalism, public opinion, and dispute resolution 239
Governments involved in territorial disputes with nationalist or symbolic
value are generally conscious of their ability to mobilize domestically and lead-
ers will oen take advantage of this sentiment by promising to defend territorial
sovereignty or to right an injustice that will result in a shi of territorial owner-
ship (Downs & Saunders, 1996; James, Park & Choi, 2006; Wiegand, 2011; Cho
& Choi, 2016). Governments worldwide have attempted and achieved domestic
mobilization around territorial disputes through the use of historic narratives, na-
tionalist rhetoric, and mobilization, a method commonly used with international
crises. Historical narratives in particular reect “the choices of certain individuals
or groups seeking to describe history as more than just a collection of facts from
the past” (Kimura, 2011), and the Korean government’s mobilization eorts have
been indicative of this action.4
Since the 1990s, the Korean government has eectively mobilized the public
by emphasizing the idealized perception of Dokdo and the Korean narrative about
history. e debates going on today about Japanese-Korean relations are not nec-
essarily about the historic events, but how to perceive them (Kimura, 2011). As
Kang (2010b, p. 42) notes:
While some dispute is actually about historical facts, much is not about historical
fact, but rather about the meaning of those facts. at is, historical disputes have
arisen from the changing, and unresolved, identities and political relationships in
the region, and the manner in which national narratives have dealt with history.
e debate is over how history is remembered, and characterized in the present,
and is merely the most obvious indicator for how Japan and its neighbors view
each other, themselves, and their roles in the region.
e public is generally eager to accept nationalist rhetoric about defending or
claiming nationalist territory if it is in the interest of the public (Hensel, 2001;
Kimura & Welch, 1998). is is particularly the case when territory is threatened,
even through claims such as Japan’s 2012 attempt to bring the Dokdo/Takeshima
dispute to the International Court of Justice. In such circumstances, governments
and civic groups rally the public to support the leadership against a potential
threat by an adversary by stirring strong nationalist sentiments and defense of
“the homeland.” is is particularly the case because claims on a state’s territory
“strike at the heart of a country’s national narrative about itself and its place in the
world” (Kang, 2010a).
e nationalist attachment that Koreans have for Dokdo is not inherent in
their long history as Korea or in their territorial understanding of their nation.
4. e Japanese government also has its own narrative about historic events regarding its claim
to Dokdo.
240 Krista E. Wiegand and Ajin Choi
Territory by itself does not hold intangible value, but “territory takes on signi-
cance for the nationalist meaning ascribed it,” personalizing the dispute (Emmers,
2010, p. 3). Nationalist attachment to Dokdo is therefore a result of active mo-
bilization led by the Korean government and civic groups, particularly since the
1990s, to push the Dokdo agenda into the common consciousness of the Korean
populace.5 Active Korean government campaign eorts to increase nationalist at-
tachment are signicant and include:
– attractive color booklets and pamphlets citing the government’s position and
including photos, maps, and reprints of historic evidence of Korean ownership
of the islets, translated into nine languages in addition to Korean (Ministry of
Foreign Aairs and Trade (Korea), 2012)
– an ocial government website about the geography of Dokdo
– renaming the peaks on Dokdo to symbolically indicate Korean historic occu-
pation
– a recent decision to mandate 10 hours of classes about Dokdo in Korean pri-
mary and secondary schools
– a recent decision to name the Dokdo islets as part of a national geopark for
visitors to enjoy
– former president Lee Myung-Bak’s August 2012 visit to Dokdo– the rst time
a Korean president had visited the islets
– visits by lawmakers from the National Assembly
– funding of conferences and books about Dokdo
– public relations campaigns involving foreign journalists being own to Dokdo,
and
– an increased government defense budget specically earmarked for the de-
fense of Dokdo.
– naming Korea’s rst large amphibious ship in the Navy Dokdo in 2007
(Emmers, 2010)
A specic example, in March 2012, the Korean government announced a $1 billion
nancial commitment to improve infrastructure on Dokdo (Miller, 2012). Most
signicant is that there is a Division of Territory and Oceans in the International
Legal Aairs Bureau, based in MOFAT, which deals with advocating the govern-
ment position on Dokdo. e language used in the government campaign about
Dokdo is colorful, positive sounding, and nationalist. For example, on the govern-
ment website about Dokdo’s geography, the seasons on Dokdo are described as
such: “Spring in Dokdo, season of blooming; Summer in Dokdo, everything is
5. e South Korean government has been actively promoting Korea’s national brand overall
as well (Kang, 2010a).
Nationalism, public opinion, and dispute resolution 241
green; Autumn in Dokdo, treasuring clear blue sky; Winter in Dokdo, covered in
blanket of snow” (Dokdo Jirinet, 2016).
Mobilization by civic groups
Civic minded individuals and groups were mobilizing support for Dokdo to in-
crease nationalist attachment, particularly with the composition of the famous
song “Dokdo is Our Land” in 1982. Starting in the mid-1990s, civil society groups
started to form with the intention of lobbying and supporting the government’s
position on Dokdo (Choi, 2005). Such civil society groups came about around
the same time as groups seeking recognition and retribution by Japan for Korean
forced laborers and comfort women. ere are also ocial interest groups who
lobby the National Assembly regarding Dokdo, regularly pressuring lawmakers to
take a certain stance on bilateral relations with Japan. ere are two Dokdo muse-
ums, one on Ulleungdo and one in Seoul, funded by Samsung and the Northeast
Asian History Foundation respectively (Dokdo Museum Seoul, 2015).
In the past two decades, several civic groups focused on Dokdo have formed,
including Dokdo Sarang Hoe (Association of Love for Dokdo) (Ku, 2015), National
Headquarters for Defending Dokdo, the Party for Tokdo Protection, the Korea
Dokdo Research and Preservation Association, the Council for Dokdo Residents,
and the Headquarters for Making Dokdo an Inhabited Island (Choi, 2005). ese
civic groups have been quite active in mobilization attempts not only domestically,
but also internationally, such as running full page advertisements about how the
waters around Dokdo should be referred to as the East Sea, and not the Sea of
Japan (Kang, 2010a). Government response to activities of civic groups has been
primarily positive. Not only does the government condone or even organize pro-
tests or demonstrations, something Emmers (2010) calls pragmatic nationalism,
but lawmakers themselves have actively participated in mobilization, such as the
Dokdo Love Society, comprised of 29 lawmakers (Choi, 2005). Korean adminis-
trations have had to pay attention to nationalist civic groups invested in the Dokdo
issue to avoid potential domestic backlash.
Territorial dispute and issue linkage
We argue that the value placed on Dokdo in South Korea is directly related to the
nationalist narrative that the government and civic groups have pursued, speci-
cally the linkage of other issues disputed with Japan. Issue linkage occurs when a
state links one issue to other foreign policy issues, making the explicit or implicit
242 Krista E. Wiegand and Ajin Choi
claim that resolving one issue will aect or be aected by the resolution of another
disputed issue (Wiegand, 2011). e idea of issue linkage rests on the assumption
that there are multiple interstate issue areas that states agree and disagree about,
and that issue areas such as territorial disputes, trade disputes, human rights, or
economic aid can and should each be treated as a separate unit of analysis, and
that dierent issues will aect decisions and outcomes about interstate relations
in diverse ways. To claim that two or more issues are linked “implies that some-
how, decisions, values, or norms in one area or regime will inuence the other”
(Leeborn, 2002, p. 16). Sometimes states can link issues substantively, so that is-
sues such as trade and workers’ rights logically link together. States can also use
issue linkage strategically, with no obvious connection of issue areas. A state is able
to take advantage of the endurance of a territorial dispute and use it as bargaining
leverage to persuade shis in the foreign policies of its adversary regarding other
disputed issues that it otherwise would not be able to inuence (Wiegand, 2011).
e Dokdo islets serve as a strong nationalist symbol of the strong degree of
frustration with what is perceived as Japan’s lack of sucient recognition of its
poor treatment of Korea in the twentieth century. Dokdo has become a rallying
point for the domestic populace in Korea and as a result, Korean governments
and civic groups have been able to mobilize domestic support by focusing on the
threat of Japan’s claim for the islets. is claim, even when issued by the local
Japanese Shimane Prefecture government, is “perceived by Koreans as denying
Korea’s identity as a sovereign state as well as the return of an expansionist impe-
rial Japan” (Ku, 2015, p. 13). Since Dokdo holds a tremendous amount of sym-
bolic value as a form of territorial nationalism in Korea, and because Koreans have
perceived Japan’s attitude toward its historic treatment of Korea as irresponsible,
governments and civic groups in Korea continue to link these issues together and
mobilize accordingly. Essentially, history has become a foreign policy tool for the
Korean government in is relationship with Japan (Ku, 2015).
Numerous issues strain the relationship between these two states: the debate
about whether Japan has suciently apologized to South Korea for its atrocities
during Japanese occupation and colonization of the Korean peninsula, the unre-
solved issue of Korean “comfort women” during the same time period, Japanese
politicians’ unwillingness to halt visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine,
Japanese textbooks that gloss over or avoid historic treatment of Korea, and most
visibly and arguably most salient, the Japanese territorial claim for the Dokdo/
Takeshima islets. is dispute and the related historic animosities between South
Korea and Japan are wrapped up together, making it dicult to treat them as in-
dependent issues to resolve. is set of issues, symbolized most tangibly by the
Dokdo/Takeshima islets dispute, has strained bilateral relations for a couple of
decades, impeding mutual security interests.
Nationalism, public opinion, and dispute resolution 243
e islets act as a tangible symbol of Japan’s former occupation of Korea, with
the island dispute serving as a reminder of consistent resentment from the 36 year
occupation period (Bong, 2013; Emmers, 2010), and the related issues still un-
resolved between Japan and Korea. e linkage is made evident by the Korean
governments and civic groups who oen hold events or rallies about Dokdo spe-
cically on dates that commemorate Korea’s resistance and independence from
Japanese colonization. Similarly, in a study of news reports about Korean-Japanese
relations, Dokdo, and historic animosities, Kimura (2011) nds that that, although
there has been a consistent focus on Dokdo since the end of World War II, focus
on the Yasakuni Shrine, Japanese textbook portrayals of history only really began
in the 1980s, and the issue of comfort women did not really gain traction until the
1990s. is is a strong indication that these issues were not discussed with such
fervor prior to the 1980s and some degree of mobilization and emphasis by gov-
ernment, civic groups, or the media had to occur rst.
With tremendous nationalist value, the Dokdo islets play a critical role in
Korean-Japanese relations. Not only do the Dokdo islets symbolize Korean terri-
tory, but also Korea’s continued discontent regarding the lack of sucient recogni-
tion, apology, and compensation for colonial and wartime atrocities by Japan. It is
no secret that the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan is strained
due to past hostilities. In addition to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, several issues
complicate bilateral relations: whether Japan has suciently apologized to Korea
for its atrocities during Japanese occupation and colonization of the Korean pen-
insula from 1905 to 1945, the disputed issue of Korean comfort women during the
same time period, Korean protests about the unwillingness of Japanese politicians
to halt visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo (where war criminals
are enshrined), and the use of Japanese school textbooks that gloss over or avoid
historic treatment of Korea.6
All of these issues are directly linked to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, with
Dokdo perceived by Koreans as a symbol of Japan’s continued disrespect of Korea
and attempt to avoid righting past wrongs. is set of issues, symbolized most
tangibly by the Dokdo/Takeshima islets dispute, has strained bilateral relations for
decades, impeding mutual security interests. Such issues “are more than simply
isolated squabbles in the larger context of the relationship” (Kang, 2010a, p. 555).
Dokdo is arguably the most salient of this disputes, though they are oen all linked
together as one big issue in the narratives of mobilization eorts. e Korean gov-
ernment and civic groups eager to gain support for their position are easily able to
6. e Korean and Japanese governments announced that they bilaterally settled over the com-
fort women issue on December 28, 2015, yet this issue continues to remain part of the narrative
about negative views toward Japan.
244 Krista E. Wiegand and Ajin Choi
rally around Dokdo, knowing that all of these issues are inherently linked together
for the Korean populace. As Emmers (2010, p. 11) notes, “the fact that the dispute
over the islets remains an issue is an indication to many Koreans that Japan is not
fully remorseful for its past,” and that the “emotional signicance of the islands to
the Korean psyche is largely tied to that of anti-Japanese nationalism.”
e symbolism associated with Dokdo is particularly powerful because the
islets were the rst of Korean territory Japan annexed in 1905 during the Russo-
Japanese War, or from another perspective, the rst Korean territory taken by
Japan. With tremendous nationalist value, the Dokdo islets play a critical role in
Korean-Japanese relations. An analysis of the dispute sums up the situation very
well: “to try to understand South-Korea-Japan relations by focusing on the dy-
namics of the contemporary relationship is to get things upside-down…from the
South Korean perspective, the dispute over these rocky outcrops is the big picture”
(Park & Chubb, 2011, n.p.). Korean governments defend their ownership of the
islets voraciously and regularly promise the domestic populace that they would
never consider compromise, dropping the claim, or oering any territorial conces-
sions to Japan.
Conclusions
Why is there so strong emphasis in South Korea on Dokdo islets? We argue that
the Dokdo dispute is intricately linked to historic and current tensions with Japan,
which triggers a strong nationalist sentiment among South Koreans. As Dokdo
has become a rallying point for the domestic populace in Korea, both govern-
ments and civic groups have been able to mobilize domestic support based on
this dispute. By promoting a highly nationalist narrative about Dokdo, the South
Korean government, civic groups, and the media have set an agenda that makes
it very dicult to de-link Dokdo from disputed issues based on historic relations
between Japan and Korea. Public opinion polls consistently demonstrate that mo-
bilization eorts are successful, with the dispute over ownership of Dokdo and
historic relations regularly at the top of the agenda and intricately linked together.
As a result of such eective mobilization eorts, it is highly unlikely that Korea
would consider any type of compromise or concessions with Japan regarding the
disputed islets. Rather, we should expect to see Korean ocials and civic groups
continuing to use the Dokdo islets to press Japan on related issues, mainly Japanese
textbooks, the lack of apology for the service of Korean comfort women, and the
lack of sucient apology about and compensation for Japan’s atrocities in Korea
during colonialism. South Korea and Japan may have mutual security interests
in the face of the development of North Korean nuclear weapons and the rise of
Nationalism, public opinion, and dispute resolution 245
China’s military power (Wiegand, 2015), but these shared interests are limited by
tensions resulting from nationalist rhetoric.
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Nationalism, public opinion, and dispute resolution 247
Authors’ addresses
Krista E. Wiegand
Department of Political Science
Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy
University of Tennessee
1640 Cumberland Ave.
Knoxville, TN 37996
kwiegand@utk.edu
Ajin Choi
e Graduate School of International Studies
Yonsei University
50 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu
Seoul, 120–749
Korea
choiajin@yonsei.ac.kr