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Affective processing guides behavior and emotions
communicate feelings: Towards a guideline for the
NeuroIS community
Peter Walla1,2,3,*
1 CanBeLab, Department of Psychology, Webster Vienna Private University, Praterstrasse 23,
1020 Vienna, Austria
peter.walla@webster.ac.at
2 School of Psychology, Newcastle University, Newcastle, Callaghan, Australia
3 Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Abstract. Like most researchers from other disciplines the NeuroIS community
too faces the problem of interchangeable terminology regarding emotion-related
aspects of their work. This article aims at solving this issue by clearly distin-
guishing between emotion, feeling and affective processing and by offering
clear definitions. Numerous prior attempts to agree on only an emotion defini-
tion alone have failed, even in the emotion research community itself. A further
still widely neglected problem is that language as a cognitive cortical mecha-
nism has no access to subcortical affective processing, which forms the basis
for both feelings and emotions. Thus, any survey question about something
emotional cannot be answered properly. This is why it is particularly important
to complement self-report data with objective measures whenever emotion-
related processes are of interest.
While highlighting that cognitive processing (e.g. language) is separate from af-
fective processing, the present paper proposes a brain function model as a basis
to understand that subcortical affective processing (i.e. neural activity) guides
human behavior, while feelings are consciously felt bodily responses that can
arise from suprathreshold affective processing and that are communicated to
others via emotions (behavioral output). To provide an exemplary consequence,
according to this model fear is not an emotion, but a feeling. The respective
emotion is a scared face plus other behavioral responses that show an observer
that one feels fear as a result of affective processing.
A growing body of literature within and outside the NeuroIS community reveals
that cognitive, explicit responses (self-report) to emotion stimuli often deviate
from implicit affective neural activity that can only be accessed via objective
technology. This paper has the potential to facilitate future NeuroIS research.
Keywords: emotion • feeling • affective processing • conscious • non-conscious
• behavior • emotion model • subjective • objective • implicit versus explicit
* Corresponding author
2
1 The problem
1.1 Introduction
If you ever felt angry about a person you deeply love you know what love/hate is.
How can one have two emotions at the same time? A quick answer is that love and
hate are no emotions, they are feelings. A more elaborate answer is that given the
current confusion in emotion research it is difficult to find a clear answer and only the
use of a more sophisticated and accurate vocabulary and a clear understanding of
human brain function can help.
Driven by the problematic and interchangeable use of the terms "affective", "emotion"
and "feeling" this article makes an effort to suggest a very concrete understanding of
those words' meanings with the purpose of proposing a distinct emotion model or
better a brain function model including affective processing that is the basis for emo-
tions. It is true, but unacceptable that most scholarly work in the field of emotion
research mentions the problem of missing proper definitions without offering a solu-
tion. Within Information Systems (IS) the NeuroIS community, established since
2007, is strongly focusing on emotional aspects related to information technology (IT)
and IS [e.g. 1-6] and suffers from an absent agreement on how to define emotion.
Most often feeling and emotion are used interchangeably. The herewith proposed
model and terminology is meant to help the NeuroIS community to more efficiently
disseminate its research outcome and to better communicate their results at confer-
ences. Ideally, it leads to a consistent view and use of those terms. In the best case this
effort also leads to a novel understanding of anything around emotion in principle.
The title "affective processing guides behavior and emotions communicate feelings"
already brings it to the point, but to fully understand this short and sharp statement
one must go into some further detail, which starts with a good understanding of the
overall function of the entire brain in the first place. Further below, a respective con-
cept is explained and elaborated on including its neurobiological roots. Whether or
not the science community will accept this solution depends on various factors and
might be a matter of time and solid evaluation, but it is definitely about time to make
some progress. Continuous interchangeable use of terms describing emotion-related
phenomena is hindering further developments and should thus become history.
1.2 Emotion in IS and NeuroIS
Since 2009 the link between information systems (IS) and the neurosciences (Neu-
roIS) is discussed in the frame of the Gmunden Retreat (Austria) that became a yearly
event with a rapidly increasing number of participants [7].
After all, it is the brain that produces behavior, perceives and appreciates design,
accepts or rejects technology, thinks, makes decisions and communicates and it con-
sists of neurons. Obviously, it makes sense to take neurosciences into account. The
3
NeuroIS community acknowledges that and thus forms an important and very promis-
ing group of scholars as part of the large IS community.
During the early days of NeuroIS Dimoka et al. [8] concluded that there is great po-
tential for drawing upon cognitive neuroscience theories and using brain imaging
tools in IS research to enhance its own theories. In their highly valuable commentary
[8] they were asking “how can the cognitive neuroscience literature inform IS re-
search?” and “how can IS researchers use brain imaging tools to complement their
existing sources of data?” While the answers to those questions will indeed provide
useful further insight into IT and IS related research it would also be beneficial to
invite neuroscientists more frequently to co-author respective written output in order
to help implementing neuroscience theories and interpreting collected data. The Neu-
roIS community already made enormous progress within IS by recognizing that ob-
jective and unbiased measures of cognitive and affective processes are important to
complement traditional data sources and by actually recording and analyzing those
objective measures for their research [9].
Importantly, it has been emphasized that pure behavior research is potentially biased
due to its reliance on self-report (i.e. explicit responses) [10]. Within the context of
technostress the relationship between physiological (objective) and self-reported (sub-
jective) data were investigated [11] and the authors argue that both kinds of data tap
into different aspects of technostress and that only the combination of both can pro-
vide the most complete understanding of technostress impact. This means an enor-
mous step forward. Respective empirical results show that a physiological measure
explains performance on the computer-based task over and above explicit responses,
which certainly reflects that the brain knows more than it admits to consciousness.
Neurophysiological methods such as electroencephalography (EEG) [12, 13], skin
conductance (SC) and facial electromyography (fEMG) were used in the frame of
NeuroIS investigations [14] and only recently also startle reflex modulation (SRM)
has been introduced (see below).
The use of objective technologies is an important first step, however one also wants to
understand why objective measures are often better than subjective measures and the
answer to that question is, because affective processing content is not directly acces-
sible to language. Some scholars already noticed a limited self-monitoring capacity
particularly related to emotionally driven decisions [15]. From a neurobiological per-
spective it is clear that self-report cannot properly reflect raw affective responses due
to language being a cortical function, while affective processing happens deeply sub-
cortical. In contrast, self-report can of course easily reflect cognitive responses, which
are mainly cortical themselves. The fact that words cannot easily reflect what’s going
on deep inside the brain has been shown in several studies about discrepancies occur-
ring between explicit responses to affective stimulation and objective measures [16-
36].
Besides those discrepancies also the way Gregor et al. [37] wrote about emotion in IS
research underlines the problem of respective interchangeable terminology use. In
their work, the authors speak of three interacting emotion systems, language, physiol-
ogy and behavior. Remarkably, they used a multiple measurement approach (i.e. pa-
4
per-based self-report measures, qualitative comments as well as EEG measures) and
highlighted the multiple aspect nature of emotion. This paper already points in a very
innovative direction regarding the understanding of emotion, but instead of using
distinct vocabulary the authors labeled all three emotion systems by borrowing names
related to other functions (language, physiology and behavior). Below, the solution
begins with first explaining the brain’s function from a neurobiological perspective
and then by defining affective processing, feeling and emotion.
2 The solution
2.1 The brain’s function
The heart pumps blood to deliver chemical substances as well as entire cells to dis-
tinct body parts. The lung extracts oxygen from the air to provide energy for the
whole organism and the brain processes information to produce adapted behaviour
(besides maintaining homeostasis). Every organ has its function that it operates via a
specific mechanism. The information the brain processes is the result of sensory in-
put. There are no sounds, pictures, odours nor any other actual physical or chemical
environmental stimuli in our brains, there are only neural signals triggered by sensory
neurons and sent toward the central nervous system, which consists of the brain and
the spinal cord. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching as well as all proprio-
ceptive signals from inside the body such as from organs and muscles inform the
brain continuously about ongoing changes in the external and internal world [38].
After the translation of external and internal stimuli into the brain's language (i.e.
graded potentials and action potentials) actual information processing begins. Im-
portantly, two different information aspects are central, one cognitive and the other
affective. Cognitive information focusses on semantic features that lead to an under-
standing what something is, while affective information is evaluative leading to a
decision on how something is [29].
It makes sense to believe that affective processing evolved before cognitive pro-
cessing as a first mechanism to adapt behaviour on the basis of evaluative decisions
rather than semantic understanding. This idea is supported by the fact that affective
information is processed by older brain structures whereas cognitive information is
processed by much younger cortical neurons. Primitive non-human animals still make
their decisions solely based on affective processing and so is our own early childhood
primarily guided by affective processing. However, the brain evolved over time and at
some point cognitive processing established as a consequence of natural selection
[39]. But crucially, one must understand that even in us humans any behavior is ini-
tially triggered deep inside the brain by old structures that can still be found in primi-
tive vertebrates such as reptiles and that both affective and cognitive information
processing adjusts it on the way to its execution, again with affective processing being
the basis. The right part of the below figure reflects such motivated behavior.
To this point, you may have noticed that the term "emotion" has not been men-
tioned yet even though the function of the brain has been fully explained. This is so,
5
because emotion is here understood as behaviour and not information processing.
"Emotion" (from Latin "emovere" = to carry away, to remove or in other words to
move out or express) is here understood as behavioural output of affective processing
and because it is not processing itself, it does not directly contribute to behaviour
adaptation. See further details in the next paragraph and the left side of the below
figure that shows paths related to emotional behavior.
Affective processing can happen without even generating an emotion, which has
serious implications, because not all disordered affective processing might show up as
observable or measurable emotions (i.e. behavioural patterns). It is also of great inter-
est to the industry and of course the IS and NeuroIS community, because the emotions
a marketing expert plans to elicit or an IS scholar tries to measure might not always
match up with underlying affective processing, which might negatively influence the
interpretation and discussion of scientific results. These are just some of many more
examples that highlight this undoubtedly radical, but helpful approach to "emotion".
2.2 The proposed emotion model
As a matter of fact, some scholars understand emotions as neural activities, others see
them as felt affective phenomena and yet others as facial expressions. Independent
from an exact definition of emotion it is problematic to assume that observing
someone's facial expression elicits respective responses in the observers’ brain. Given
that in most cases the facial expressions were fake and that faces are often not neces-
sarily reflective of deep inner affective states this becomes even more problematic.
The herewith proposed model states that affective processing (i.e. neural activity)
represents actual information processing, while an emotion is not at all information
processing, it is produced behavior as the word “motion” in e-motion suggests. Criti-
cally, emotions are not directly reflective of affective processing, which means that
one should be more interested in affective processing and not emotions.
In the mammalian brain, any motivation-based behavior (i.e. muscle contraction caus-
ing movement) is triggered in the brain stem and on the way to its motoric execution
it is first affective information processing (i.e. affective decision making) that can
adapt it to environmental changes by evaluating stimuli (approach or withdraw). This
basic processing stage equals a judgment of external environmental as well as internal
own body stimuli regarding their pleasant/unpleasant aspects. It is automatic and
independent from cognitive processes. It evolved long before cognition and con-
sciousness and thus also before language came into existence.
Since humans are mammals too it must be accepted that this automatic evaluative
process also forms the basis for any human behavior. In humans though, cognitive
processes can influence and overrule affective decision making, which is usually
referred to as emotion control, but should from now on be understood as affection
control. Nevertheless, getting back to affective processing one can say that if it cross-
es certain thresholds (supra-threshold neural activity) it leads to bodily responses
(hypothalamus, visceral, etc.) that can be perceived and thus lead to feelings. All
organisms capable of consciousness, which is a prerequisite of perception can have
feelings (basically all mammals). So, feelings are conscious phenomena, but they are
6
not cognitive, they are perceived bodily responses. To consciously experience (to
feel) a bodily response is like to consciously experience (to see) visual information.
Like in the previous paragraph, we haven’t heard anything yet about THE most often
used term, emotion. Gain, what is an emotion, the probably most inflationary word
that is in everybody’s mouth? According to the current model, emotions are possible
behavioral results of affective processing, they are separate to feelings. However,
there is a possible link between emotions and feelings in that emotions as behavioral
responses can communicate feelings. As stated in the abstract the feeling of fear can
be communicated by a respective facial expression. Perhaps, emotions evolved to let
conspecifics know how one feels. It is here suggested to call those emotions that are
genuine results of affective processing involuntary emotions. As mentioned above,
cognition can interfere and organisms that are capable of cognitive information pro-
cessing can intentionally modify emotions (e.g. facial expressions) and use them for
strategic nonverbal communication purposes. This is an evolutionary advantage and
such emotions are here referred to as voluntary emotions (e.g. fake facial expressions,
exaggerated expressions, etc.).
Fig. 1. Schematic model demonstrating that any behavior is initially triggered deep inside the
brain by old neural structures belonging to the brain stem. Crucially, before actual execution it
is adapted through affective and cognitive information processing that takes influence and thus
modify the way we behave (right side: motivation behavior). On the left, note the distinction
between involuntary and voluntary emotion behavior (emotions are behavioral output!).
7
Table 1: Summary of definitions
affective processing
neural activity coding for valence (“how” aspects)
feeling
felt bodily response arising from suprathreshold affective processing
emotion
behavioral output of affective processing communicating feelings
cognitive processing
neural activity coding for semantic information (“what” aspects)
To link this model to existing emotion theories it can be said that it contains aspects
of the well-known James-Lange-emotion theory, which also links bodily responses to
feelings. In his 1884 paper 40, “What is an emotion?” James wrote that “the emo-
tional brain-processes not only resemble the ordinary sensorial brain–processes, but in
very truth are nothing but such processes variously combined”. The crucial change in
terminology now is that those brain processes are here called “affective processing”,
while emotions are defined as their behavioral consequences, while feelings, like
James suggested, are felt bodily responses.
Charles Darwin 39, when writing about affections, mentioned changes in the func-
tioning of glands and muscles, which basically are the only effectors that get activated
as a consequence of prior information processing in the brain. The current idea to put
strong emphasis on behavioral output when talking about emotion resembles that
view. Fear is a feeling that arises when respective neural activity elicits respective
physiological bodily responses and the scared face is the emotion.
James also says that “the immense number of parts modified in each emotion is what
makes it so difficult for us to reproduce in cold blood the total and integral expression
of any one of them. We may catch the trick with the voluntary muscles, but fail with
the skin, glands, heart, and other viscera.” In terms of the current model this means
that voluntary emotions can never fully copy involuntary emotions.
3 Conclusions
This article covers two major topics of interest. First, due to explicit language func-
tions being cortical mechanisms self-report data cannot adequately reflect affective
brain responses that happen deeply subcortical. This inevitably leads to misleading
results whenever survey-based data alone are analyzed. Second, the interchangeable
terminology related to emotion can be solved by accepting that emotions are possible
behavioral responses to affective processing (e.g. facial expressions) and feelings are
felt bodily responses that arise as a consequence of strong (suprathreshold) affective
processing.
Affective processing equals neural activity representing the most basic decision mak-
ing quality that guides human behavior. An emotion has nothing to do with infor-
mation processing, it’s behavior. Indeed, it has to be emphasized that this model is
quite reductionist, but short and accurate explanations are better than long, confusing
and also no explanations.
8
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