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Alliance theory and alliance ‘Shelter’: the complexities of small state alliance behaviour
Abstract
This study critiques traditional alliance theory because it fails to capture the nuanced alliance motivation and needs of small states. We argue that the concept of alliance “shelter” better explains small state alignment. The theory of alliance shelter has been developed to explain the alliance choices of Western small states, including Iceland, and serves as an important addition to alliance theory. Shelter is the diplomatic, economic, societal, and political alignment response of structurally weak states. Alliance shelter theory differs from traditional alliance theories for the following reasons. First, it regards small states as fundamentally different political, economic, and social units than large states. Second, their alliance shelter relationships are distinctly shaped by domestic as much as international factors. Third, small states benefit disproportionately from international cooperation, including institutional membership, compared with large states. Fourth, shelter theory claims that small states/entities need political, economic, and societal shelter (as well as strategic protection) in order to thrive. Fifth, the social and cultural relationships of the small states with the outside world are elements that have been neglected by alliance theory. Sixth, shelter may also come at a significant cost for the small state/entity. We conduct a plausibility probe of our argument against three contemporary non-Western cases: Armenia, Cuba, and Singapore. We find that the concept of alliance shelter explains their alliance behavior better than traditional alliance theory.
... According to Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016), the purpose of shelter theory is to interpret the behavior of Western small states regarding their coalition preferences. It is about the combination of strategies that small states follow to mitigate the vulnerabilities resulting from being small. ...
... Shelter theorists believe in the significance of their concept for the development of alliance theory for a few reasons. Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) argue that, although traditional alliance theory helps to make sense of international coalitions, there are many areas that it does not cover effectively, including the actions of small states. In Bailes and Thorhallsson's (2016) view, small states are peculiar actors in the international system, hence the use of nuanced theoretical frameworks is essential for their acts to be understood. ...
... Bailes and Thorhallsson (2016) argue that, although traditional alliance theory helps to make sense of international coalitions, there are many areas that it does not cover effectively, including the actions of small states. In Bailes and Thorhallsson's (2016) view, small states are peculiar actors in the international system, hence the use of nuanced theoretical frameworks is essential for their acts to be understood. But traditional theories focus mostly on the behavior of great powers, rather than those of small nations. ...
Apart from NATO membership, Greece and the U.S.A. enjoy a long-standing bilateral defense partnership which has benefited both countries. Greece’s highly geostrategic location and stabilizing strategic culture are appreciated by the U.S.A., which seeks dependable and honest allies in the boiling-hot region of the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, American military and political power, combined with its advanced defense industry and its influence on revisionist NATO allies, make the U.S.A. Greece’s main protector at times of great peril. This study examines this bilateral partnership from the aspect of shelter theory, highlighting how important these two allies are to each other.
... Small states are now being challenged more than ever within the currently prevailing multifocal world order and the 'polycrisis' -a cluster of related global risks with compounding effects (Torkington, 2023) on climate, energy, health and, thereby, at an economic and political level. Constituting the majority of the European Union (EU) 1 member states, small states are increasingly finding 'shelter' Bailes et al., 2016) within the EU framework, which offers them opportunities to promote their defensive and offensive economic interests at national, regional and global levels. On the one hand, internationally small states can stretch their economic presence globally as part of the EU and sheathed with the EU's international might, while being parallelly in the position to influence the EU's overarching policies to reflect their interests. ...
... Except for Kavvadia et al. (2018), who analyzed the vectors of Luxembourg's economic diplomacy and confirmed their efficiency and effectiveness, scholarly works argue that the country's success is partly due to different factors, including Luxemburg's capacity in international affairs (Hey, 2003), 'size-overcompensation' within the European institutions (Bailie, 2005;Majerus, 2008;, multilateral policy orientation of a 'multiplier of power' (Bourbaki, 2016), contribution in significant policy development (Hirsch, 2016;Frentz, 2010;, diplomatic style as an 'honest broker' (Hirsch, 2016;Frentz, 2010; and networking and lobbying capacity (Croisé-Schirtz, 1996;Hirsch, 2016;Frentz, 2010;. Academic works on Luxembourg frequently use the country as a case study to understand small states, from a foreign policy angle (Chong and Maass, 2010), Frentz, 2010) and especially from a security perspective (Archer, 2016; Bailes et al., 2016;Enrikson, 2001;Mastanduno, 1998;Baker Fox, 1969), as part of the increased research interest on small states. ...
... The small states in the international system, 1919 Journal 24(4): 751-764. Bailes, A.J.K., Thayer, B.A. and Thorhallsson, B. (2016). Alliance theory and alliance 'Shelter': The complexities of small state alliance behaviour. ...
... In some cases, small states wage more active foreign policy while in other cases very passive. Few scholars of small state foreign policy claim that small states can benefit disproportionally from international cooperation than large states (Hey, 2002;Bailes, Thayer, & Thorhallsson, 2016). Considering their small market and limited capabilities of being a small society, by aligning to bigger states and international organizations, the small state can limit the effects of their inner economic and political vulnerabilities (Bailes et al., 2016). ...
... Few scholars of small state foreign policy claim that small states can benefit disproportionally from international cooperation than large states (Hey, 2002;Bailes, Thayer, & Thorhallsson, 2016). Considering their small market and limited capabilities of being a small society, by aligning to bigger states and international organizations, the small state can limit the effects of their inner economic and political vulnerabilities (Bailes et al., 2016). ...
... However, scholars (Hey, 2002;Scheldrup, 2014) warn that, aside from benefits, eventual mistakes made by small states' active role in foreign policy are often unrepaired compared to larger states. This because small states are more vulnerable than larger states to an external threat (Hey, 2002;Scheldrup, 2014;Bailes et al., 2016). The best way for the small state to be a respectable player in international politics is to manage the economy well, have good administration, and have political unity (Scheldrup, 2014;Thorhallsson, 2016). ...
Considering the complex and dynamic developments of modern international politics in the modern world, small states’ foreign policy makers have to analyze and weigh foreign policy decisions. Besides being a small state, Kosova also is in the state-building process. Kosova is a new state, which declared independence in 2008. Out of the 193 UN members, 116 recognized Kosova’s independence. Therefore, Kosova still is not a UN member. On the other hand, Serbia is engaged persistently to undermine Kosova’s subjectivity on the international stage through the derecognition campaign and against Kosova’s membership in the international multilateral organizations. In its endeavor to strengthen its international subjectivity, Kosova’s strategic allies’ support is crucial. In November 2018, Kosova imposed a 100% tariff on all Serbian origin imports that lasted until April 2020. Kosova’s strategic allies opposed the measure. This qualitative case study approach was used to explore Kosova’s foreign policy consequences due to 100% tariff on Serbian origin imports considering allies’ opposition about this measure. This qualitative study interviewed 11 participants purposefully selected, consisted of foreign diplomats in Kosova and local foreign policy professionals dealing with Kosova and Serbia relations. Secondary data sources from documents review, journals, audiovisual materials, experts’ written analysis supported the emerged themes of interview transcripts. Findings demonstrate that the 100% tariff had some positive foreign policy effects but only during the initial period of a maximum of three months. Other findings demonstrated the negative effects that the 100% tariff had on Kosova’s foreign policy. This study does not pretend generalizability. However, this study’s specific context may serve as guidance for other Kosova's similar cases in the future.
... Just like alliance theory, shelter theory therefore commences from an assumption that small size produces inherent disadvantages (such as the monopoly of services and a dependency on imports and exports) (Baldacchino 2012), the solution to which may be found by seeking external shelter through an alliance with a large state or joining international organizations (Choi 1995). Where Bailes, Thayer, and Thorhallsson (2016) distinguish this theory from traditional alliance theory is on the grounds that alliance theorists are explaining the actions of great powers, whereas the behavior of small states may stem from more complex considerations and more "nuanced alliance motivation and needs," meaning that the concept of alliance "shelter" is more accurate in explaining small state alignment (Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2018, 1). Small states are fundamentally different social units than large states (thereby operating distinctly), and domestic factors (predominantly innate structural weaknesses) influence their choices in alignment as much as international factors. ...
... These Roadmaps will support the partner countries in identifying new sources of capital to mitigate the adverse impact of COVID-19. This reinforces and reflects the argument made by Bailes et al. that, when seeking to reduce the impact of the economic shock, small states seek the economic "shelter" afforded by international organizations to offset inbuilt structural weaknesses with external assistance (Bailes, Thayer, and Thorhallsson 2016). By collaborating across the public and private sectors, the Roadmaps initiative will support the building of more resilient socioeconomic structures and will help to offset some of the limitations in capacity for small developing and low-income states in particular (Chastanet, Déau, and Toyota 2020). ...
This article tests one of the core theses in the burgeoning literature on small states, which asserts that small states must seek shelter within larger organizations or in partnership with large states in order to mitigate their inherent vulnerabilities and build resilience against externally originating shocks. This article tests this theory by conducting comparative case study analysis to investigate how small states have navigated the COVID-19 pandemic. It examines the extent to which small states have been seeking shelter that is economic, political, and societal from existing multilateral frameworks, as well as the conditions under which they are developing new work-arounds when the existing multilateral arrangements have not functioned as intended. These ad hoc multilateral and minilateral arrangements, necessitated by the crisis, have filled the gap when the expected benefits of collective security have not been forthcoming from long-standing frameworks, yet they also reveal how a more unified and proactive approach to remedying the failings of existing, credible multilateral frameworks would serve to maximize and spread the benefits more widely, rather than fragmenting efforts and unevenly distributing the gains. Consequently, while the conclusion acknowledges small state successes in coalition building, innovation, flexibility, and proactivity in harnessing multilateralism or developing sovereign initiatives to respond to this crisis in the short term, it also highlights several emergent problems that will require shoring up and remedying the failings of existing regional and international multilateral mechanisms in the long term. The article closes by offering several recommendations, including the critical necessity of commitment from large counterparts to overhaul international financial mechanisms to ensure that no small states get left behind in the pandemic recovery.
... As with most SIDS, Mauritius' economy is threatened by climate change, with severe coastal erosion since the 1960s (Allen 1999). The Government of Mauritius (GOM) has budgeted funds towards several sectors within Blue Economy, such as the development of aquaculture, and fisheries (Bailes et al. 2016). The COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted the Mauritian economy, especially the tourism industry. ...
... Nonetheless, with the development of the international system, the need for diplomacy within IR of SIDS has increased significantly, with state interactions needing mediation. Bailes et al. (2016) explains that there are at least three definitions of 'diplomacy': the representation of one's nation in "international negotiations"; it involves the "external policies of a nation or its government"; and diplomacy is considered a "branch of political science" related to international relations. With the emergence of Blue Economy, there has been a shift in the view of oceans and seas in international politics, and many scholars have brought forward the cruciality of diplomacy for Blue Economy success (Baldacchino 2022). ...
Does Blue Ocean become the perfect mantra for reaching desired developmental goals? Blue Economy is an essential sustainable development framework for coastal and island states who rely on the ocean and marine resources as a source of livelihood. The concept of a Blue Economy merges economic development and conservation for coastal and island states. The Seychelles and Mauritius are two Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the Western Indian Ocean, faced with economic development and conservation dilemmas. Identifying and understanding the challenges and limitations of Blue Economy for SIDS are required to understand the vulnerability of those nations, which is essential to the future outcomes of sustainable development in the Seychelles and Mauritius. Adopting library research methods and online focus group conversations with different stakeholders in both countries, and over two years, during pre-and post-Covid lockdown periods, provide this paper with fascinating findings. Further identification and understanding of vulnerability, overcoming challenge and paradox of Blue Economic ideals in these two cases of SDIS refine the authors’ scepticism upon the myth of the SDG. The authors’ preliminary findings explain the difficulty of the Covid-19 pandemic in allowing both states to realise their SDG targets.
... The theory plays well with empirics only in some aspects, such as the importance of FN's contribution to an HN's ability to defend and increase security. However, Latvia, in particular, is not seeking to promote its domestic interests to the international community, nor is it hampering agreed activities as it would be if it followed the scholars' (Bailes et al., 2016;Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017;Urbelis, 2015) thoughts. There is no evidence suggesting that Latvia is being restrained by Canada, as per the alliance theory; even more, Canada incurs the financial and political cost in short-and mid-term in return for diplomatic recognition and wider political acceptance (Leuprecht and Sokolsky, 2017, p. 22). ...
Following the events in Ukraine in 2014, North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to strengthen its presence in three Baltic States (3B) by establishing an enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Estonia, led by the United Kingdom; Latvia, led by Canada; and Lithuania, led by Germany. This study examines the nexus between host nations (HNs) and the eFP framework nations (FNs) while referencing small state theories. The case study considered theoretical and analytical approaches, including classical realism, neorealism, constructivism, liberal theory, neoliberal theory, shelter theory, alliance theory, alliance shelter theory, theory of the free-riding concept of bandwagoning, strategic hedging, and the concept of neutrality to indicate small states’ behaviour and attitude towards bigger states. The more intensive nexus between FNs and HNs was evident in the 3B; however, it varied when analysing activities in military and economic fields. Empirical evidence related to the FN–HN states’ pair led to different theoretical considerations. The study’s outcome suggests that an individual bespoke approach towards the 3B’s is required. The alliance and alliance shelter theories should be regarded as the most appropriate, albeit not explicitly corresponding with first-hand findings.
... The strategy of tight military and security cooperation with India and the US was adopted by the previous Solih government, but under the current Muizzi government, the Maldives has demonstrated a distinct change. It seems that the current government has picked its side, and this "alliance of shelter" (Bailes et al., 2016) with Beijing is considered more fruitful compared with the gains accrued from bonding with New Delhi. The soft power tools of India to keep a working cordial relationship with the Maldives government has been overrun by the hard power tactics of the Chinese state. ...
The relations between India and Maldives are deeply rooted in historical and geographical proximity and are concretized through soft power assets. India's soft power diplomacy with the Maldives has been multifaceted, including Cultural diplomacy, educational assistance, development aid, healthcare support, capacity-building, tourism, and diplomatic and strategic engagement. Despite these successes, India's soft power diplomacy in the Maldives faces significant challenges due to geopolitical strains, the shifting foreign policy of Maldives, and the growing competition in the Indian Ocean Region. However, the recent election of Maldivian President Mohammad Muizzu, known for his anti-India rhetoric and China stance, has challenged the once stable and cooperative relationship. This study explores how India's soft power has evolved as a strategic tool to maintain influence in the Maldives amid rising geopolitical challenges. Through this lens, India's soft power diplomacy becomes not just an avenue for cultural exchange but a dynamic force in shaping the trajectory of strategic relations amid evolving regional dynamics. The main objective is to analyze India's soft power assets, which have helped to strengthen India-Maldives relations. Secondly, it examines the role and impact of India's soft power in fostering bilateral relations and navigating the geopolitical strain between India and Maldives.
... This article builds on the literature of small states which are found to be difficult to define as discussed in Alesina and Spolaore (2005); Briguglio et al. (2006); Bailes Alyson et al. (2016); and Butler and Morris (2017). However, they do generally share the following characteristics: a low level of participation in international affairs, limited scope on foreign policy issues, the main focus on the immediate neighbourhood, and a disinterest in utilisation of hard power measures (Hey, 2003: 5). ...
From the Summit of South American–Arab Countries (ASPA) created in 2005, UAE–South American relations have continued to develop based on a combination of pragmatism, threat perception, political support and expanding economic interests. We argue that the strength of UAE engagement in this region is consistent with its attempts to build, deploy and benefit from soft power globally through economic statecraft in a mutually reinforcing series of bilateral and multilateral relationships. These include forums such as the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the expanding BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The article draws on primary and secondary data in English, Portuguese and Spanish, focusing mainly on UAE relations with Brazil and Venezuela. We find that through a myriad of growing investment relations and first‐mover advantage on arms and industrial cooperation, the UAE is well positioned vis‐à‐vis other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to benefit from the economic, diplomatic and security ties that could boost its relational autonomy in a competitive and uncertain regional and international environment.
... In security and defence matters, member states traditionally dominate policy-making, and their contribution towards the outcome is generally proportional to their relative resources (Pedi, 2021;Wivel et al., 2014). Despite their supposedly limited role, the attention on small states in security cooperation has grown, regularly evidencing that small states are not always impotent (Arter, 2000;Bailes et al., 2016;Jakobsen, 2009;Weiss, 2017). This raises the question as to what extent exerting influence on security policy-making in the EU has become a way of dealing with the integration dilemma. ...
Small states often have little influence on the outcome of negotiations over security cooperation. They face take-it-or-leave-it situations, so-called ‘integration dilemmas.’ Yet, in European Union (EU) security and defence matters, small states may not always be so powerless, which raises the question as to what extent exerting influence on security policy-making via the EU has become a way for small states to mitigate integration dilemmas. To approach this question, this chapter focuses on security-related reforms in two EU policy areas: defence and border control. In the 2017 launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the 2019 reform of European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) traditional state competences were at stake. In both cases, small states sought to exert some influence over final outcomes, especially when they had clear preferences. Coalition building with other member states and EU institutions occurred but did not prove sufficient to alter decision-making significantly. The EU attenuated the dilemma for small states, not by giving them increased influence but by allowing them to better knit EU policies into existing national strategies and narratives, thus facilitating the communication of the reforms to national audiences.
... Historically, the alternative to hiding is shelter-seeking, i.e., to seek refuge from the great power politics of international anarchy by allying with one or more strong states able and willing to shelter the small state from external threats (Bailes, Thayer, and Thorhallsson 2016;Vital 1967). Shelter-seeking involves a more or less tacit contract or a tradeoff with the great power(s) providing shelter (Morrow 1991). ...
Grand Strategy is a state’s “theory of victory,” explaining how the state will utilize its diverse means to advance and achieve national ends. A clearly articulated, well-defined, and relatively stable grand strategy is supposed to allow the ship of state to steer a steady course through the roiling seas of global politics. However, the obstacles to formulating and implementing grand strategy are, by all accounts, imposing. The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy addresses the conceptual and historical foundations, production, evolution, and future of grand strategy from a wide range of standpoints. It seven constituent sections present and critically examine the history of grand strategy, including beyond the West; six distinct theoretical approaches to the subject; the sources of grand strategy, ranging from geography and technology to domestic politics to individual psychology and culture; the instruments of grand strategy’s implementation, from military to economic to covert action; political actors’, including non-state actors’, grand strategic choices; the debatable merits of grand strategy, relative to alternatives; and the future of grand strategy, in light of challenges ranging from political polarization to technological change to aging populations. The result is a field-defining, interdisciplinary, and comparative text that will be a key resource for years to come.
... Arguably, smaller countries cannot aspire to self-sufficiency and well-rounded security. In the spirit of self-preservation, they tend to become security consumers beholden to more powerful countries and preoccupied with the formation and consolidation of alliances with these nations (Baker Fox, 1969;Mastanduno, 1998), mainly as shelter-seekers (Bailes et al., 2016;Thorhallsson, 2011). Their "bandwagoning" implies their "rent-paying" contribution to common security in terms of both material and intangible, as well as financial, means. ...
This chapter focuses on a small-state case, that of Luxembourg. Thirty years since the end of the Cold War, important developments in the European Union (EU) and the international system include radical changes in the security context with new threats, capabilities, “battlefields” and players. Against this intricate backdrop, and constituting the majority of EU member states, where do the European small states stand? Do they continue bandwagoning as security consumers following larger member states, or do they become security contributors? Academic interest has been increasing on both space militarization and small states. The nexus of the two realms remains under-exposed and under-researched. This chapter instead examines the role of small European states in the militarization of space, looking at Luxembourg, as a case study. Despite its size, Luxembourg has been a frontrunner in space development. Its enabling environment includes a regulating framework, as well as vibrant technological, financial, and academic ecosystems. Building on the dual use of space capabilities, Luxembourg has been expanding into space militarization applications. Using a structural realist and constructivist perspective, the chapter posits that Luxembourg has been pursuing space militarization as a window of opportunity for increasing its influence and clout in Europe, as well as in the anarchic structure of the international order.
... Shelter theory is acknowledged as a leading analytical tool within the field of small-state studies (Wivel, 2021); the theory has become useful in systematically deconstructing and understanding small-state foreign policies and has thereupon been utilized in a variety of case studies and other academic work (e.g., Bailes et al., 2016;Jokela, 2022;Pedersen, 2023;Thorhallsson & Bailes, 2017). ...
This article offers a challenge, in the form of an illustrative case study, to the notion that Finland's NATO membership is a radical reversal in security policy. With the use of shelter theory, it examines how Finland (as a small state), beginning in the Cold War, has actively sought to achieve political, economic and societal shelter from Western organizations. However, due to geopolitical restraints, the country has at various times been unable to fully adopt preferred shelter arrangements, especially within the military security sphere. The analysis indicates that the institutionalisation of Finland's shelter strategy has often been a tedious, diplomatic quest to integrate with the West, contingent upon opportunistically taking advantage of external ‘critical junctures’ to solidify its own interests. The article posits that Finland's pursuit of Western economic and societal shelter during the Cold War transformed into further Western political shelter‐seeking in its aftermath and, finally, membership of NATO in 2023. The case of Finland indicates that shelter theory captures the foreign policy strategy of a small neutral/nonaligned state. Nevertheless, our specific case also indicates that the theory ought to take a closer look at four features regarding relations between small and large states, that is how an agressive neighbour can restrict a small state's foreign policy choices, how economic and societal shelter relations may precede political shelter relations (or vice versa), the role of critical junctures within shelter theory, and, finally, how a history of cooperation may be transitioned into full‐fledged shelter.
... For example, Bailes et al. argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the alliance behaviour of small states is shaped in terms of their internal and external liabilities. Thus, small states seek a 'shelter' in order to redress these liabilities (Bailes et al. 2016). In a similar manner, the asymmetric and non-asymmetric distinction is of paramount importance in alliance maintenance and duration. ...
Russia has been conventionally portrayed in the area studies literature as a close ally of Armenia, although the latter is a subordinate rather than an equal partner. More recent scholarship has focused on Armenia’s dilemma as to whether to align itself with the liberal West or to enhance ties with its former patron. The Armenian foreign policy establishment has demonstrated in political action and discourse a marked preference for Europe’s institutions and political vision. Russia’s neutrality in the recent escalation of tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite bilateral security arrangements with Armenia, showed the inherent fragilities of this asymmetric alliance. Drawing on asymmetric alliance literature, this article seeks to explain Russia’s reluctance to involve itself in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in favour of Armenia and identifies how Russia rewards or punishes its ally, based on its assessment of whether the ‘side payments’ attached to the alliance have been honoured.
... Borrowing power can be attained through a shelter method. Shelter is an alliance relationship where the regional states compensate their structural vulnerabilities by partnering with powerful nations or joining the latter in specific like-minded coalitions within international institutions (Bailes, Thayer, & Thorhallsson, 2016). For instance, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates banded with Saudi Arabia to manage the power interplay between Iran and Iraq. ...
Economic statecraft (ES) has been playing an increased role in affecting the international relations. While armed conflicts decline, states have been weaponising trade, investment, and other economic ties to gain leverage over their counterparts. In the contemporary world, ES is not only used to galvanise countries’ influence in specific issue areas but also part of their grand strategy to achieve broad power-maximisation goals. Despite a proliferation of ES literatures in recent years, extant research tended to focus on great powers’ ES, leaving small states’ ES under-examined. Also, previous studies usually looked into how countries unilaterally employ ES. Hence, insufficient attention has been paid to how regional states work together to collectively alter multilateral frameworks to advance their ES. Against this backdrop, this paper investigates small nations’ roles in the development of multilateral cooperative frameworks. Using the ES lens, it explores how these countries leverage these schemes to push forward their collective ES. The main argument is that regional states worked together to craft the terms of multilateral economic agreements to galvanise their clout over certain governance areas. I validate this argument by using the case of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This study makes contributions to the research pertaining to ES, small states’ strategies, and economic regionalism. It also yields practical implications for policymakers involved in fostering international economic governance.
... Small states seek shelter in bi-and multilateral relations to reduce vulnerabilities to external shocks and crisis. Shocks may be military, economic or societal (Bailes et al., 2016;Graeger, 2019;Sarapuu et al., 2021;Thorhallsson, 2019). Yet sheltering comes with a price. ...
After three decades of US unipolarity, the international system may be on the brink of transformation. Although the combined capabilities of the United States remain stronger than those of any other state in the international system and the United States remains unrivalled in defence spending and research and development, the American superpower no longer has the same ability to set agendas and impose preferences as in the immediate post-Cold War era. This chapter provides an overview of existing knowledge of links between different types of polarity and the challenges and opportunities of small states. We use this overview of existing knowledge as starting point for a comparative discussion of small state strategy under continued (weakened) unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity and non-polarity. We argue that in a world dominated by US- and China-led bounded orders, small states must choose their battles wisely, prioritize their resources and build networks with like-minded small states.
... rección de reuniones y comisiones, la participación en el establecimiento de la agenda, y el aprovechamiento de su imagen como neutrales, pacíficos y hasta de "intermediarios honestos" (Nye, 1990;Hey, 1993;Thorhallsson, 2000Thorhallsson, , 2012Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006;Björkdahl 2008;Jakobsen 2009;Panke, 2010Panke, , 2011Panke, y 2012Grøn y Wivel 2011, Bailes, et. al., 2016Smed y Wivel, 2017;Thorhallsson y Steinsson, 2017;). Asimismo, parte importante de la literatura sobre integración, como Laurent Goetschel (1998;, Olav Knudsen (2002), Roderick Pace (2002), Lee Moosung (2004), Magnette y Nikolaidis (2005) y Archer y Nugent (2006) se ha centrado en las estrategias utilizadas por algunos países de la Unión ...
En el presente artículo se indaga teóricamente sobre el poder de los Estados más débiles en lo que respecta a las relaciones jerárquicas del sistema internacional. Esta cuestión se aborda primeramente a partir de una revisión de la literatura existente sobre los conceptos de autonomía y valor estratégico. Se advierte que, mientras que el primero ha sido ampliamente discutido en diversos círculos académicos, principalmente en América Latina; el segundo carece de reflexiones profundas a pesar de la íntima vinculación entre ambos y de su mención pasajera por parte de diversos autores. En función de esta vacancia temática, en el último apartado del artículo se reflexiona teóricamente sobre este concepto, su operacionalización mediante la identificación de sus distintos componentes, sus características y su relevancia. El mismo se aborda desde el marco teórico general del Realismo Periférico de Carlos Escudé. Se argumenta que el valor estratégico percibido de los países periféricos por parte de las grandes potencias resulta una variable condicional esencial para comprender estas relaciones asimétricas, siendo fundamental su incorporación en posteriores análisis empíricos que avancen sobre las mismas.
... Fox (1959), Vital (1967), and Bailes et.al. (2016), on the other hand, argue that small states should pursue neutral or non-alignment if the state wants to maintain their political maneuverability, self-determination, and integrity (Bailes et al., 2016;Fox, 1959;Vital, 1967). When these alliances can prove as a great tool for small states to compensate for their relative weakness, it is not without risk that states enter into them. ...
Scandinavian Cybersecurity is currently facing significant challenges as a result of the countries small state status. The Scandinavian countries have historically built great international cooperation and taken much part in the international community. Furthermore, the Scandinavian countries are some of the most digitalized countries in the world, but are they safe? This thesis aims to analyze if the Scandinavian countries successfully make use of international alliances, institutions, and norms to compensate for their relative weakness as small states in cyberspace. To test this, the thesis has analyzed how the countries have utilized NATO, EU, and international norm building as their main platforms for international cooperation, and if these corporations have helped Denmark, Norway, and Sweden increase their cybersecurity.
... Small countries tend to be dependent on their bigger neighbours, and the networks they belong to, for trade, food, medical supplies as well as policies [35,36] . This proved to be a challenge from the very start of the pandemic way back in February 2020, particularly in the decision for border closure. ...
The aim of this paper is to compare the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on four small countries in the southern half of Europe with similar public health systems: San Marino, Montenegro, Malta and Cyprus, the latter two being island states. There are advantages and disadvantages in being a small nation amidst this crisis. The centralized public health administration means that small countries are faster at adapting as they learn and evolve on a weekly basis. However, small countries tend to be dependent on their bigger neighbours, and the networks they belong to, for trade, food, medical supplies as well as policies. The risk threshold taken by a small country for the transition strategy has to be less than that taken by a bigger country because if things go wrong in a border region, there is less resilience in a small country, with immediate impact on the whole country. The blow to the tourism industry, which plays a main role especially in small countries, negatively impacted the economy, and it has been a feat to reach a balance between allowing the flow of inbound tourists and keeping the local infection rates under control.
... In many respects, there is evidence of cognitive dissonance in relation to a new world order where in fact the majority of states could be classified as small and in many respects have become increasingly powerful. As a conglomeration, they also presented challenges to alliance formation and international norms of cooperation like never before (Bailes et al 2016). ...
The Gulf is increasingly recognized as one of the most dynamic and unstable regions in the international system. Within the region, the survival of small states can no longer be taken for granted and power relations are conflictual. The hegemonic ambitions of larger regional state actors draw small states into a contested orbit and emphasize the fluidity of pre-existing notions of the balance of power. This has led to forms of fragmentation. Small states can no longer sit comfortably under the shelter of regional and even external super-powers. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on small states like Kuwait and Qatar is a useful prism to examine the ways in which such small states attempt to project power and sovereignty through their diplomatic responses. Our argument, here, is that such discourse is framed as part of an ideational and material construct for state resilience within a regional and international system that is perceived as predatory. Yet pandemic politics reveals both the opportunities and limits of such approaches.
... Academic literature also suggests that small states are fundamentally different political, economic, and social units, as compared to large states. Authors put forward the argument that smaller states are more inclined for building shelter relationships, namely that they need political, economic, and societal shelter (as well as strategic protection) in order to thrive (Bailes, Thayer and Thorhallsson, 2016). This has another implication: small states benefit disproportionately from international cooperation, compared with large states. ...
The geopolitical interpretation of political processes taking place in the South Caucasus region ignores the possibility of an independent external policy of the smaller states that do not possess considerable military or economic power. Nevertheless, small states build their relations with Russia, the EU and other actors in accordance with the national political discourse that does not often correspond to the realist paradigm of international relations. The case of Armenia exemplifies membership in integration projects often described in academic literature as competing ones. As a consequence, the importance of closer research of internal political processes and factors that influence the decision to join one or another regional project increases. Cooperation with the EU, which has been strongly connected to partners’ commitment to democratic norms, human rights reforms and rule of law, was considered as an important part of their external policy by all the three South Caucasus countries. For the moment, the Eurasian Economic Union does not designate the normative component of cooperation with member countries. In this sense, the Eurasian project has still to define itself.
... Alliance shelter theory has significant explanatory power to explain this "cooperative turn" and represents a suitable tool to examine the strategic rationale behind the Swedish Armed Forces decision to revise its joint doctrine in recent years. Bailes et al. (2016) formulated this theory with the aim of providing a more nuanced tool than traditional alliance theory (see e.g. Waltz 2010 [1979];Walt 1987) to explain small state alignment behaviour, since the latter assigns priority to explaining great power behaviour. ...
In the 21st century, small countries continue to face a distinct set of challenges that shape their security strategies. Despite ongoing constraints in military resources, the lack of strategic depth, and vulnerabilities due to their geographic location, new global trends post-2020 have added complexity to their security dynamics. These challenges include the rise of cyber warfare, shifts in the geopolitical balance of power, the global spread of pandemics, increasing international economic interdependence, and strategic competition between major powers, particularly in regions such as the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe.
With the continued emergence of hybrid threats—ranging from cyberattacks to disinformation campaigns—small nations are adapting by strengthening their cyber capabilities, developing robust civil defense systems, and enhancing multilateral cooperation within international organizations. Furthermore, these countries are seeking strategic alliances to offset their military disadvantages, leveraging economic partnerships and adopting technological advancements to bolster resilience.
This article examines how small countries are adjusting their security strategies to navigate these contemporary global shifts. By balancing military, political, and economic resources, these nations are adopting a more nuanced approach to their national security, increasingly focused on flexibility, adaptability, and regional cooperation. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has further highlighted the importance of global health security and the role of small nations in international governance, underscoring the interconnectedness of modern security concerns.
The Eastern Mediterranean has emerged as a significant geopolitical region in the 21st century, influenced by both intra-regional dynamics and the strategic interests of international powers. The Republic of Cyprus (RoC)-a small State within this region-has endeavoured to adapt to the evolving international landscape and promote its own strategic interests. This paper examines the RoC's foreign policy in the Eastern Medi-terranean, particularly its involvement in regional cooperation and the formation of quasi-alliances. The primary focus is twofold: situating the RoC's foreign policy within the international-regional nexus (particularly US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and US-RoC relations), and assessing its strategic objectives and priorities. The analysis revisits the formation of quasi-alliances, such as the Israel-Cyprus-Greece and Egypt-Cyprus-Greece partnerships, and regional networks of cooperation. The key questions addressed include the success of RoC policy since the early 2010s, the positives and negatives of its approach, and the preconditions for a more effective foreign policy. The paper concludes that, despite notable progress, the RoC's foreign policy suffers from a lack of vision, strategic planning, and institutional capacities, making it vulnerable to domestic politics, populist rhetoric, and geopolitical shifts.
This article examines the position of Serbia as a small state in the context of external pressures, largely reflecting an ambition to balance the East and the West. While clearly interested in offers and benefits from collaboration with both geostrategic realms, Serbia’s authorities have always left space for possible alternatives—a trend that is expected to serve power preservation or to inform external players to what extent Serbia is keen on balancing and juxtaposing great powers in the region. While analyzing the limited case of the Covid-19 pandemic and the never-ending case of Kosovo, additionally actualized by the Russo-Ukrainian war, the present study suggests that Serbia is at the crossroads between growing ambitions and the real limitations of what its smallness can achieve. The paper concludes that Serbian foreign policy contains all the prerogatives of movement without a goal, a search for strategic partnerships, but without a coherent political vision—an approach that generates suspicion of being labelled as distracted and unreliable.
Indonesia and Australia are two neighboring countries with dynamic bilateral relations. In 2018, both countries agreed to enhance the partnership through the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (IA-CSP). Through the IA-CSP, both countries are committed to increasing cooperation in strategic sectors and maintaining the security stability of each country and the Indo-Pacific. However, in 2021 Australia formed a defense alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom under the name AUKUS. The main objective of the AUKUS defense alliance is to increase Australia’s military capabilities by procuring nuclear-powered submarines. This condition is contrary to the IA-CSP’s pillars, especially the third and fifth pillar. By using a qualitative approach and interviews and literature studies as data collection methods, this article was written to analyze the implementation of IA-CSP after the formation of the AUKUS defense alliance. To understand and explain that issue, the authors use strategic partnership theory, defense alliance concept, and collective security concept. Based on this study, the authors found that the existence of this alliance did not directly hinder the implementation of the IA-CSP because both countries tend to be able to lower their respective egos in various situations and conditions to keep working together on strategic issues.
This paper posits that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Sweden’s decision to join NATO and end its official policy of ‘non-alignment’ is neither very surprising nor quick in nature. Utilising the shelter theory framework, we examine the Swedish case to shed a new light on the economic, societal, and political shelter-seeking policy choices that led to Stockholm’s NATO application in May of 2022. The analysis finds that Sweden’s established strategy of seeking shelter from Western powers eventually induced and facilitated close military cooperation with NATO – ultimately leading to accession on March 7th, 2024. The decision to join the Alliance should therefore be understood as a culmination, building on a historically flexible approach to neutrality and previously established shelter arrangements that were deemed in 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent developments in Finland, to be no longer sufficient in deterring or responding to new threat dynamics. The case indicates that shelter theory accurately captures the foreign policy strategy of a small neutral and later non-aligned state. However, analysing Sweden’s move towards NATO within the given framework also presents an opportunity for theory development; specifically, the theory ought to more meticulously examine three small state shelter-seeking features, namely, how societal and economic shelter relations may precede and therefore affect political shelter strategies (or vice versa), the role of ‘critical junctures’ in the theory; and finally, how small states may be affected by each other’s shelter seeking strategies.
One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
The core aim of this book is to test the common assumptions of the small states literature that all small states are similar units and behave in the same manner in the international system. It will examine the cases of Iceland and Portugal and their relations with larger states and membership in regional organisations from the mid-twentieth century until today.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China has heightened since COVID-19. Secondary states face increasing difficulties maintaining a 'hedging' strategy between the United States and China. This Element introduces a preference-for-change model to explain the policy variations of states during the order transition. It suggests that policymakers will perceive a potential change in the international order through a cost–benefit prism. The interplays between the perceived costs and the perception of benefits from the order transition will shape states' policy choices among four strategic options: (1) hedging to bet on uncertainties; (2) bandwagoning with rising powers to support changes; (3) balancing against rising powers to resist changes; and (4) buck-passing to ignore changes. Four case studies (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand) are conducted to explore the policy choices of regional powers during the international order transition. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This paper analyses how Maldives’ close ties with Saudi Arabia have affected its relations with other countries from Middle East Asia. Following the footsteps of Saudi Arabia, Maldives severed its diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016 and with Qatar in 2017. The paper discusses the economic investments Riyadh has made to develop civic infrastructure in the island nation. However, more than diplomatic ties and economic investments, close relations between Malé and Riyadh have affected the Island state’s society. There is a spread of religious obstructionism in Maldivian society, for which several outside scholars and Maldivians blame Saudi Arabia. Finally, the paper briefly discusses Maldives’ ties with Middle East countries other than Saudi Arabia.
Shelter theory has emerged as a promising but unrealized alternative to existing theories of bandwagon and hiding in the literature. It describes how small states can utilize the structural power of great powers to achieve political aims through the formation of asymmetric alliances. At present it is not clear exactly what shelter diplomacy aims to achieve, what type of costs it protects small states against and to what degree asymmetric shelters are useful when the preferences between the small state and the shelter partner widen. The article addresses these gaps. It develops a realist inspired model of shelter diplomacy that specifies when, how and with what effects small states can utilize the structural powers of great powers. It demonstrates how shelter diplomacy can help small states balance the costs of abandonment and entrapment in the alliance dilemma through construction of both asymmetric and symmetric shelters. The main contributions are to bring shelter diplomacy into the International Relations mainstream literature and develop a new theoretical middle position between the more well-described bandwagon and hiding strategies. The model is applied to a Danish case that demonstrates how small states have utilized and adopted dynamic shelter strategies in the European integration process.
This paper examines the nature of the foreign policy positioning of the Republic of Albania as a small state towards the United States of America as a big power in international relations by analysing their bilateral relations from 2013 to 2022. The paper finds that Albania’s positioning is based on the need to secure an alliance shelter with the United States. The urges to realise the aforementioned alliance stem from Albania’s weaknesses at the international and state domestic levels. The protection that Albania enjoys from the US has a political, military, and economic-social character on an external and internal state basis. The implications of such bilateral relations for Albania include diverse foreign policy loyalties towards the United States. In addition, the consequences of enjoying such protection include substantial penetration and transformative intra-state effects in accordance with the intentions of its protector state.
The article explores the foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus. Belarus declared a multi-vector policy at the doctrinal level, and neutrality — at the constitutional level. The analysis of the foreign policy course confirms the dominance of the Eastern (Russian) vector. The author aims to explain this choice of official Minsk. In his search for the answer, the author makes use of the concept of a small state. To defend national security, a small state can use one of the options of strategy-balancing, banqueting, strategic hedging and neutrality policy. The author concludes that none of these practices can explain the dominance of the Russian direction in the foreign policy of Belarus. The article argues that these strategies are suitable for large or medium-sized powers, but not for small states like Belarus. The author refers to the theory of “refuge” (“shelter”), which was developed by Baldur Thorhallson, Alison Baileys, Sverrir Staynsson, etc. Much attention is paid to the main structural components of this theory (military-political, economic and social). Applying the theory of shelter to Belarus, the author consistently studies the role of Russia in solving the difficulties of Minsk caused by the small size of the state. Some political analysts argue that the CSTO provides and supports military sovereignty, and economic assistance to Belarus through the provision of loans that goes along the lines of the Eurasian Fund for stabilization and development, as well as on a bilateral basis. In conclusion, the author states that the prevalence of the Eastern vector in Minsk’s foreign policy is due to some difficulties that Russia, not Brussels or Washington, helps it overcome.
The Anthropocene is an emerging concept that defines the challenges for international relations due to human activity altering the Earth on a planetary scale. The debates around the Anthropocene as a study of international relations are in infancy without a comprehensive theory to articulate its ramifications on the foreign and security policies of nation-states. This study aims to examine the challenges and opportunities posed for Taiwan in the Anthropocene. The research concludes that the Taiwanese foreign and security policy in the Anthropocene can find opportunities by seeking new social, economic, and political alliances as proposed by the Shelter Theory. These opportunities could help mitigate the dangers of this new phenomenon and allow Taiwan to reach its economic and foreign policy aims without exposing itself to future shocks.
This article examines and compares the foreign policy preferences of three small states in Central Asia, namely Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, in the post-independence era. Although the three countries share similar features, such as a common Soviet legacy, landlocked position, and population size, the foreign policy behavior differs in Turkmenistan. While Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan align with Russia, Turkmenistan embraces permanent neutrality. This study argues that natural resource endowment, coupled with fewer internal threats and geographical constraints compared to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, helped Turkmenistan to pursue a neutral and more independent foreign policy. Yet, over-reliance on China as the major buyer of Turkmen natural gas may make it difficult to sustain permanent neutrality.
Finland has been concerned about the political and security policy implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, not to mention the negative economic impact. The departure of the EU’s third-largest member state with its significant diplomatic and military assets has been described as a loss for EU foreign and security policy and as a rupture of European political cohesion. Drawing on the theoretical literature on small states and Europeanisation, this article investigates how Finland has responded to these challenges and the related risks. It is suggested that the post-Brexit political consolidation of the EU was a priority for Finnish government(s) as the increasingly turbulent global and regional environment yet again highlights the security-policy benefits of Finland’s EU membership. The analysis also points towards the further Europeanisation of Finnish foreign and security policy as a Brexit-related hedging strategy. Finland also sought to hedge against some of the perceived risks embedded in the changing political dynamics of the EU and, relatedly, the loss of a powerful northern political ally in major EU economic matters.
The study of the foreign policies of small states started from basic assumptions developed by the realist school revolving around the inability of these international units to protect
This book examines security cooperation between Western states.
Security cooperation occurs between Western (i.e. European and North American) states as a coping mechanism, as an imperfect substitute for integration. The book investigates the reasons for cooperation, what Aristotle called the ‘final cause’, as well as the material, formal, and efficient causes of cooperation. Such a causal explanation is based on a Critical Realist philosophy of social science. The book is also based on an embedded multiple-case study; the states studied are the United States, France, and Luxembourg. Within each state, the embedded subcases are three types of state security organizations: the armed forces, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, which have rarely been compared in this way. Comparing different types of states and different types of state security organizations has allowed temporal, spatial, national, and functional variation in cooperation to be identified and theorized. The empirical evidence studied includes participant observations at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and documents such as state policy documents, annual reports by organizations, reports by parliaments and non-governmental organizations, autobiographies, books by investigative journalists, and articles by newspapers and magazines. The book is also based on a score of elite interviews with ambassadors, diplomatic liaisons, ministerial advisors, foreign ministry officials, and military commanders.
This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, intelligence studies, military studies and International Relations in general.
This volume, largely written by a community of graduate students, includes the thoughts of Dr. Abdullah Baabood who traces the origins of the GCC, its ebbs and flows, and its prospects going forward as the opening chapter of the book. Contributors then explore in some detail the policies and priorities of GCC states, the tensions within and across the organization, and behavioral traits of its key actors. Several papers also pay close attention to the GCC’s interactions with the wider region and in particular such countries as Iran and Turkey. Finally, the debates of the day were brought together in a thought-provoking roundtable, which explored a wide variety of factors and actors in the life of the GCC.
Հոդվածում վերլուծվում և ըստ վերջնարդյունքի՝ պետության անվտանգության և ինքնուրույնության վրա ազդեցության, խմբավորվում են մեծ տերությունների նկատմամբ փոքր պետությունների անվտանգության մի շարք ռազմավարություններ։ Առաջարկվում է փոքր պետությունների արտաքին անվտանգության բոլոր ռազմավարությունները բաժանել չորս խմբի՝ համադրման, հակադրման, ինքնաբացառման և կցորդման։ Մասնավորապես,
քննվում են առաջին երկու խմբերում դասվող ռազմավարությունների շարքերն ու դրանց հիմնական բնութագրիչները, վեր են հանվում այդ ռազմավարությունների կիրառման հիմնապայմանները։ Եզրակացության մեջ ներկայացվում են այդ երկու խումբ ռազմավարությունների հիմնական տարբերություններն ու ընդհանրությունները։
How do IR scholars 'write' the Arab Gulf? In attempting to address this question, the focus is twofold: first, the 'small state' as a construct and second, its application to the study of Gulf small states. The article tries to grapple with issues inherent in such an enterprise by providing a critical assessment of recent scholarship on the topic, with special reference to Qatar and the UAE. The problematic comes to the fore in a context of these two countries' increasing regional and international visibility, as well as what seems to be renewed scholarly interest in small states, more generally. Specifically, this analysis primarily seeks to relativize the small state within the Arab Gulf sub-region, drawing attention to ontological and epistemologi-cal issues. In so doing, the article offers some heuristics for the writing of small states in the Arab Gulf. One suggestion put forward in the article is more scrutiny of the regional context; what is called here the 'hydrocarbon semi-periphery'; and misgivings (conceptual and empirical) concerning, respectively, the treatment of 'soft power,' mediation, and intervention. One parting idea to derive from this line of inquiry is its cautionary note against inflating the utility or the explanatory power of a catch-all 'small state' construct when it comes to non-Western settings.
This article makes a novel contribution to the literature on Bhutan’s International Relations (IR) by shifting the focus away from an exclusively India–China framing. First, it points out how small states are increasingly salient but under-studied in IR and how non-European non-island states like Bhutan are even more so, and why we gain by addressing this. Second, it shows how the conventional study of Bhutan has solely focused on its friendship with India and the threat to it/this from China, and why it is important that these conventional narratives be critically examined. In doing so, we perceive the endogenous drivers of Bhutan’s foreign policies, for instance via Bhutan’s stance on the Doklam issue. Third, going beyond the three typical determinants (economic factors, bilateral relations with India, and threats from China), the article provides two additional axes of understanding Bhutan’s foreign policies – bridging of attributional distances and learning from experience.
The goal of this article lies in examination of the topical issues of modern security strategy implemented by small states. For achieving the set goal, the author solves the following tasks: 1) define a “small country” as a concept of modern political science; 2) outline the current needs and problems of small states; 3) analyze the existing and possible security strategies of small states. Analysis is conducted on the security strategies used by small states, as well as the policy of small states in the current complicated international situation that threatens the security of all mankind. The Modern small states face a range of problems related to security, which determine their foreign policy behavior and security strategies. Small states are much more vulnerable than major powers, and thus are limited in their domestic and foreign policy. In order to enhance their security and sustainability, as well as have greater influence and meet their own economic and political needs, the small states either seek partners and allies to fulfill their goals or remain neutral. The security strategies of small states are aimed at improving their chances to stay the course and conduct their independent policy in the modern conditions of civilizational clash and escalating confrontation. Depending on their geography, historical fate, and existing limitations from the perspective of economic, political, and territorial capabilities, the small states choose different behavioral models in their foreign policy.
The goal of this article lies in examination of the topical issues of modern security strategy implemented by small states. For achieving the set goal, the author solves the following tasks: 1) define a “small country” as a concept of modern political science; 2) outline the current needs and problems of small states; 3) analyze the existing and possible security strategies of small states. Analysis is conducted on the security strategies used by small states, as well as the policy of small states in the current complicated international situation that threatens the security of all mankind. The Modern small states face a range of problems related to security, which determine their foreign policy behavior and security strategies. Small states are much more vulnerable than major powers, and thus are limited in their domestic and foreign policy. In order to enhance their security and sustainability, as well as have greater influence and meet their own economic and political needs, the small states either seek partners and allies to fulfill their goals or remain neutral. The security strategies of small states are aimed at improving their chances to stay the course and conduct their independent policy in the modern conditions of civilizational clash and escalating confrontation. Depending on their geography, historical fate, and existing limitations from the perspective of economic, political, and territorial capabilities, the small states choose different behavioral models in their foreign policy.
The paper argues that there is not necessarily a correlation between political, economic and societal shelter. Iceland received considerable societal and political shelter from Denmark in the period under study, but Denmark failed to provide its remote island with economic cover. Firstly, and most importantly, it provided substantial and highly valuable societal shelter. Copenhagen was the main channel by which new knowledge and technology could enter Iceland. The islanders benefited from educational, health-care and social policies of the crown and it played an invaluable role in preserving Iceland’s cultural heritage. Secondly, Denmark provided partial protection of Icelandic waters and land though Iceland’s peripheral position continued to be its main protection from outside attacks. However, at the end of our period, the Danish kingdom was in decline and unable to provide political cover. Nevertheless, increased centralization, initiated from Denmark, provided internal order and political stability and citizens became more equal before the law. Thirdly, Icelanders paid a heavy price for the Danish trade monopoly though Icelanders continued to receive partial economic and societal shelter from foreign merchants and fishermen. The crown’s policies towards Iceland can largely be explained by current ideological trends at any given time. By being in constant contact with the European continent through Denmark, Icelandic society was part of the societal, political and economic evolution in Europe and managed to avoid isolation despite its geographical remoteness.
This book examines small states' security conceptually, theoretically and empirically.
Of all the violent disputes that have flared across the former Soviet Union since the late 1980s, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is the only one to pose a genuine threat to peace and security throughout Eurasia. By right of its strategic location and oil resources, the Transcaucasus has been and will continue to be a source of interest for external powers competing to advance their geopolitical influence in the region. Under such conditions, the possibility will remain for the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict to reignite and expand to include other powers.
The ten-year conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been one of the bloodiest and most intractable disputes to emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union. Animosity that developed between the Armenians and Azeris under czarist Russian rule was fueled by the rise of a dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region for which both peoples feel an intense nationalistic affinity. The attachment of the region to Azerbaijan by Stalin in 1923 became a source of deep resentment for the Armenians, and during the rule of Gorbachev, a campaign was begun to achieve the peaceful unification of Armenia and Karabakh. Azerbaijan resisted the move as a threat to its territorial integrity, and clashes that broke out soon escalated into a full-scale war that outlived the USSR itself.
Although a cease-fire has been observed since May, 1994, a peaceful settlement to the conflict has been elusive. Meanwhile, by right of both the strategic location and resources and the unique security characteristics of the Transcaucasus, major external powers—Russia, Turkey, and Iran—have sought to influence the dispute according to their geopolitical interests. With the growth of interest in the oil riches of the Caspian Sea and the increasing engagement of Western countries, including the United States, the risks and implications of renewed violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan will grow. This major study will be of interest to students, scholars, and policymakers involved with international relations, military affairs, and the Transcaucasus.
In a challenge to visions of perpetual hostility—beyond plots involving overt invasion, covert destabilization, psychological operations, trade embargos, poison cigars, exploding seashells, and a grinding economic embargo—this book chronicles a new way to view the real history of US-Cuban relations through the nations' continuing bilateral efforts at dialogue, rapprochement, and reconciliation. Since 1959, Washington's approach to Havana has been characterized by US efforts to roll back the Cuban revolution, and the story of US-Cuban relations has focused on the obvious conflict and confrontation. This book, however, presents a far less known, but increasingly more relevant, side to the story. From John F. Kennedy's offering of an olive branch to Fidel Castro after the Bay of Pigs invasion to Barack Obama's promise of a “new approach” to US-Cuban relations, the book uncovers a fifty-year record of negotiations, both secret and open. This book shows how, given the political radioactivity surrounding any hint of better relations with Havana, negotiations have typically been conducted through secret, back-channel diplomacy. Concluding with ten lessons for U.S. negotiators today, the book argues that this new story is especially important now, when both Barack Obama and Raúl Castro have publicly declared their desire to move beyond the legacy of hostility.
Though the term “alliance” has often been used loosely to mean simply “friendship” or “working partnership,”1 jurists and theorists have long insisted on a narrower definition, according to which an alliance is a treaty binding two or more independent states to come to each other’s aid with armed force under circumstances specified in the casus foederis article of the treaty. Whether offensive or defensive, limited or unlimited, equal or unequal, bilateral or multilateral, alliances must involve some measure of commitment to use force to achieve a common goal.2
Was there an international society in East Asian history during China's long imperial age (221 BC–AD 1911)? What were the rules, norms, and institutions of such an international society? Classic English School scholars, chiefly Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, seemed to think that because of ‘Chinese suzerainty’, this was a ‘suzerain-state system’ rather than an ‘international states system’. Both, however, readily identified China during the Warring States period (403–221 BC) as an international society, apparently because the seven competing states during the time appeared to possess ‘sovereign equality’ analogous to that of modern European states, which was seen as a basic condition for the existence of international society (Wight 1977: 23–4, 33; Bull 1977: 11). East Asia during the era of the Chinese empire, spanning most of the region's history, therefore does not fit within the traditional English School understanding of international society. In any case, this period was treated as an anomaly and largely neglected (X. Zhang 2011). Even Adam Watson (1992), in his celebrated analysis of the evolution of international society, fails to follow on his account of China's Warring States' system by considering East Asia's imperial age. This early bias and neglect are now being addressed by a new generation of English School scholars. Barry Buzan and Richard Little have long pointed out the problem of Eurocentrism inherent in Western international relations (IR) theorizing (Buzan and Little 2000: 7, 20; Buzan 2004: 169). Legal sovereignty is a profound institutional innovation in modern European international relations. Whether or not it can serve as a justification for denying the existence of international society in East Asian history is far less clear. Buzan and Little have also noted the hierarchical nature of traditional East Asian international relations in their comparison of international systems in world history (Buzan and Little 2000: 232). Yongjin Zhang (2001), in what appears to be the first systematic English School treatment of the subject, sees the so-called tribute system as the fundamental institution of the historical East Asian order. Building on this argument, Zhang and Buzan (2012) have recently articulated the constitutional structure of the tribute system as an international society in East Asian history.
East Asia has increased its formal institutional linkages in both the economic and security arenas. This article addresses three questions concerning this expansion. First, why has the number of institutions increased? Second, why is there so little overlap in the purposes and memberships of these many new bodies? Third, why have most regional institutions achieved such limited policy successes? The article demonstrates that the bulk of the new
economic
institutions represent collective responses to generalized pressures from globalized finance, whereas the new
security
bodies deal with regionally endogenous problems of a highly particularistic character. Furthermore, most regional bodies in East Asia still reflect the preeminence of individual state strategies rather than any collective predisposition toward multilateralism per se. East Asian regionalism thus represents a complex “ecosystem” of institutions whose future is likely to see the enhancement of some and the diminution of others through a process referred to here as “institutional Darwinism.”
According to the international relations literature, small countries need to form an alliance with larger neighbours in order to defend themselves and be economically sustainable. This paper applies the assumption that small states need economic and political shelter in order to prosper, economically and politically, to the case of Iceland, in an historical context. It analyses whether or not Iceland, as a small entity/country in the Middle Ages (from the Settlement in the 9th and 10th centuries until the late 14th century) enjoyed political and economic shelter provided by its neighbouring states. Admitting that societies were generally much more self-sufficient in the Middle Ages than in our times, the paper argues that Iceland enjoyed essential economic shelter from Norwegian sea power, particularly as regards its role in securing external market access. On the other hand, the transfer of formal political authority from Iceland to the Norwegian crown was the political price paid for this shelter, though the Icelandic domestic elite, at the time, may have regarded it as a political cover. The country’s peripheral location shielded it both from military attacks from outsiders and the king’s day-to-day interference in domestic affairs. That said, the island was not at all unexposed to political and social developments in the British Isles and on the European continent, e.g. as regards the conversion to Christianity and the formation of dynastic and larger states. This paper claims that the analysis of the need for shelter needs to take into account the political and economical costs that may be involved in a shield. Also, it needs to address how external actors may solve the problem of internal order. Moreover, an analysis from the point of view of the advantages of political or military shelter needs to address the importance of the extent of engagement of a small community, particularly a remote one, with the outside world. The level of engagement and the identity of the entity with which reciprocal transactions take place may have an important bearing on the community. This was the case in Iceland, i.e. communication with the outside world was of immense importance during the Middle Ages. Hence, the paper suggests that an analysis of the means by which shelter was secured must address the importance of communication according to the centre-periphery relations model.
A planned referendum in 2014 on Scottish independence gives cause to examine that scenario in the light of small state studies and recent European experience. One of the best-supported assumptions in small state literature is that small countries need to form alliances and seek protection from larger neighboring states and/or international institutions. Small European states have generally sought shelter from the European Union (EU) and NATO. This study confirms that an independent Scotland would need strategic, political, economic and societal shelter, and could look for the various elements within existing European institutions, from its closest southern and northern neightbours, and from the US. However, protection may come with a certain cost - just as union with another entity does at present.
The paper applies the assumption that small states/entities need economic and political shelter in order to prosper, to the case of Iceland in the period from 1400 to the Reformation in the mid-16th century. Also, it applies the findings from the first paper in this ‘hexalogy’ (a six-paper series) on Iceland’s external relations in a historical context, i.e. that Iceland enjoyed societal shelter in the Middle Ages, to this period. The aim is both to analyse whether or not Icelanders enjoyed economic, political and societal cover from their engagements with the Danes, English and Germans and to evaluate the validity of the ‘shelter theory’. The paper argues that Iceland enjoyed considerable economic and societal shelter from its encounters with English and German merchants and fishermen in a period in which Danish political cover was formally in place but was not effective in practice. Moreover, the paper claims that the shelter theory, and small-state studies in general, need to take notice of the importance of social communication with the outside world for a small entity/state. Also, the Danish political vacuum in our late Medieval Period provided the islanders with economic opportunities and social engagements with the wider world. This was at the cost of continued domestic clashes between the islanders themselves, on the one hand, and between them and ‘outsiders’ on the other. Our findings indicate that in the case of Iceland there might be a trade-off between the benefits of strict political cover by a single external actor, and the economic and societal opportunities accompanied by a lack of political affiliations.
This article argues that there are two broad categories of qualitative factors that determine the ability of small states to influence the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The first is the internal compe-tence of small states in areas such as knowledge, initiative, and diplomatic, coalition and leadership skills. The second is the image of the state in the international system with specific regard to its perceived neu-trality or reputation as a norm entrepreneur in particular policy fields. These qualitative features need to be combined with quantitative variables — such as population, territorial size, gross domestic product (GDP) and military capacity — that are normally used in International Relations (IR) in order to under-stand small states' ability to become active participants in the UNSC.
The article, written from a post-financial crisis vantage point, applies Katzenstein's democratic corporatist model to the case of Iceland, and asks if it overlooks an essential message from theory, namely that small states need an external protector in order to survive, economically and politically. The article claims that the model convincingly made the case for how small states can buffer from within but fails to grasp their need for external shelter to cope with risk. In a financialised world economy, small states need economic and political shelter in order to prevent risk from spiralling out of control and they need support in order to clean up after a crisis.
This paper argues that the 2008 economic crisis was particularly deep in Estonia and Iceland because non-corporatist neo-liberal political features were essential endogenous factors deepening it. A lack of corporatist features also formed the basis for responses to the crisis and the political aftermath in both cases. Furthermore, the paper argues that adding new institutionalist aspects to the corporatist model – in particular the juxtaposition of compound and simple polities – helps deepen our understanding of political dynamics in societies that lack clear-cut corporatist features. It makes a big difference whether or not a country enters the neo-liberal era with an already corporatist set of structures.
The article examines the claims of the small states literature on the importance of alliance formation. It applies it to the case of Ireland and Iceland and asks whether membership of the EU and euro in Ireland and the absence of these in Iceland had a say in their reduction of risk before the financial crisis, assistance in absorbing the shock of their crash and help in recovering after it. The article argues that the notion of shelter needs to take more account of domestic arrangements and the shelter's costs though the cases confirm the importance of alliance formation.
The paper argues for exploring the functionality of the EU in small states’ comprehensive security strategies. Institutions and states today frequently publish security ‘strategies’ defining their overarching aims and policy principles. For small states, membership of regional institutions can be a strategic aim—easing multiple security concerns—but itself tends to modify strategic agendas and discourse. The paper argues that the EU offers small European states soft security strategic options not previously available nor (currently) paralleled elsewhere; and that small states can and do make use of this broader ‘shelter’, albeit at a certain cost. It calls for an update of the small states literature by focusing on the importance of existential and ‘soft’ security benefits increasingly offered by multilateral institutions like the EU.
Recent developments in the European Union have created new opportunities and challenges for small member states, increasing the demand from policy-makers and diplomats for coherent and accessible analyses of the conditions and potential strategies of small states in the EU. Unfortunately, the academic literature on small states in the EU appears both diverse and fragmented: there is no agreement on how we should define a small state, what similarities we would expect to find in their foreign policies, or how they influence international relations. However, if we are to understand the challenges and possibilities currently faced by small EU member states, we need to systematise what we already know and to identify what we need to know. This article makes a modest contribution towards this goal by answering three simple questions: What is a small state in the European Union? How can we explain the behaviour of small EU member states? How do small states influence the European Union?
A link is made between definition and theory in considering the size of states and behaviour and influence within the European Union. Traditional variables in such definitions have held back theoretical understandings. The article offers a wider range of variables to understand the concept of size, and provides a conceptual framework that includes six categories referring to the size of state. Both the ‘action capacity’ and ‘vulnerability’ of states, internally and externally, help define the size of a state and its behaviour within the EU.
Unipolarity is a novel condition in world politics, and its effects on international alliances have yet to receive sustained theoretical attention. Tracing its impact requires a careful distinction between the purely structural features common to any unipolar system and the unique characteristics of the current unipole (the United States) or the policies undertaken by particular U.S. leaders (such as George W. Bush). In general, the unipole will enjoy greater freedom of action and be less dependent on allied support, enabling it to rely more readily on ad hoc "coalitions of the willing." Lesser powers will be concerned about the concentration of power held by the unipole, but they will also face larger barriers to concerted action to contain it. Hard balancing against the unipole will be unlikely-unless the unipole begins a major effort to expand-but lesser powers will engage in soft balancing to contain the latter's influence. Medium powers may pursue alliances with others in order to reduce dependence on the unipole, but weaker states are likely to ally with the unipole in order to use its power against local security challenges. Bandwagoning will remain rare even under unipolarity, but disputes over burden sharing and alliance leadership will continue. Weaker states will prefer multilateral arrangements that enhance their own influence, while the unipole will prefer bilateral or ad hoc coalitions of the willing that it can more readily dominate.
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