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Title:
All equal in death? Fighting inequality in the contemporary funeral industry
Submission to the Special Issue:
Inequality, Institutions, and Organizations
Authors:
Luc K. Audebrand, PhD
Associate Professor
Department of Management
Faculty of Business Administration (FSA ULaval)
Pavillon Palasis-Prince, Office #1628
2325, rue de la Terrasse
Québec City (QC), Canada, G1V 0A6
Phone: 418-656-2131 ext. 6050
luc.audebrand@fsa.ulaval.ca
Marcos Barros, PhD
Associate Professor
Department People, Organizations and Society
Grenoble École de Management
12 Rue Pierre Sémard,
38000 Grenoble, France
Office: F302
Phone: +33 4 56 80 68 61
marcos.barros@grenoble-em.com
Introduction
Inequality has an important history in social and institutional analysis (Blau, 1977; Mair, Martí,
& Ventresca, 2012). Social inequality occurs when resources and opportunities – e.g. wealth,
housing, food, healthcare and education – are distributed unevenly in a given society (Wilkinson
& Pickett, 2010). According to Fraser (2005, p. 73), the most general meaning of social equality
is parity of participation: inequality occurs when social arrangements prevent a specific group
from participating as peers in social life. Examples of social inequality include direct or indirect
ostracism of groups on the basis of gender (Belliveau, 2012; Phillips, 2005), race (Carton &
Rosette, 2011), socio-economic status (Leana, Mittal, & Stiehl, 2012) or sexual orientation
(Greenberg, 1990).
Institutions – commonly held beliefs, norms, values or practices – can exacerbate or
reduce social inequality (Earle, Spicer, & Peter, 2010; George, McGahan, & Prabhu, 2012).
Overcoming social inequality means ‘dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some
people from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction’ (Fraser, 2005,
p. 73). Scholars have examined how collective actors work to change institutional arrangements
that create or exacerbate social inequality. Central to this effort, social movement studies (Snow,
Soule, & Kriesi, 2008) have examined how social movements assemble resources, reframe issues
and exploit political opportunities to transform unequal social structures and institutional
frameworks (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008).
Amid these collective actors of institutional change, co-ops have received less attention,
despite the uniqueness of their foundational principles: member-ownership, member-control and
member-benefit (Dunn, 1988; International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), 2015; Schaars, 1973).
Co-ops operate in various economic sectors, including consumer/retail, banking, insurance,
health, utilities, agriculture and forestry (World Co-operative Monitor, 2016). While research has
shown how co-ops in these sectors profit from social movements to survive and grow (Develtere,
1992; Diamantopoulos, 2012a; Ketilson, Fulton, Fairbairn, & Bold, 1992; Schneiberg, 2002,
2013), scholars have yet to investigate if and how co-ops can fight alleged inequalities in an
institutional field without support from their traditional partners. Our research investigates how
co-ops can resist social inequality in an institutional context of corporate domination without
assistance from social movements.
To better understand co-op resistance to inequality, we analyse the history of funeral co-
ops in the Canadian province of Québec. There, the funeral industry has traditionally been
dominated by private organizations and was more recently invaded by multinational companies
(MNCs) threatening to control the whole sector (Smith, 2007; St-Onge, 2001; Tessier, 2008).
Here, we demonstrate that funeral co-ops fight inequality on two fronts: by resisting corporate
dominance in the funeral industry, and by diffusing and institutionalizing a model that helps
correct inequalities in the industry. Research has shown that deathcare services can be a source of
multiple inequalities (Sanders, 2009; Saunders, 1991), since the lack of knowledge and limited
information about such a large expense during a dramatic life experience (Bailey, 2010; Kopp &
Kemp, 2007) are frequently exploited by funeral businesses through abusive prices, particularly
affecting low-income clients (Drakeford, 1998). Despite these elements, insufficient attention has
been given to funerals as an inequality issue (Valentine & Woodthorpe, 2014), and to the role of
the co-op model in disrupting this inequality through resisting traditional corporate dominance
(Smith, 2007; St-Onge, 2001; Tessier, 2008).
To study this resistance, we used Fraser’s theory of justice (1995, 2005, 2009), which she
broadly defines as parity of participation and contextualizes in emancipatory social
transformation (Fraser, 2015). Fraser (2005) divides social justice into three domains that are
mutually irreducible, although practically intertwined: cultural, political and economic. Cultural
inequalities arise when hierarchical patterns of cultural value generate misrecognition or status
inequalities for particular social groups. Political inequalities exist when some individuals or
groups are not accorded equal voices in governance structures and decision-making procedures.
Economic inequalities occur when the structures of society generate class inequality for particular
social groups. Fraser (2005) also posits three crucial remedies: recognition, representation and
redistribution.
Our contribution to the literature on collective action is threefold. First, we show that
groups of co-ops, when united in a federation, can act similarly to social movements within an
established institutional framework, and thus effectively oppose local companies and MNCs,
even without a broader social movement. Our main focus is on the Fédération des coopératives
funéraires du Québec (FCFQ). As a secondary co-op supporting primary co-ops through
advocacy and knowledge-sharing, the FCFQ used a co-op model combined with a social
movement dimension to effect institutional change by drawing on local organizational and
institutional resources. Second, by applying Fraser’s (2005) theory of justice, we show how
groups of co-ops succeed by both tackling the three streams of inequalities and developing
dynamic positive interactions between remedies at different levels. Third, we extend Fraser’s
framework by showing that success for alternative economic organizations such as co-ops should
focus on the important and mutually constitutive relationship between local and institutional
inequality remedies.
Fighting inequality: Models and movements
The study of collective efforts against inequality has been dominated by literature on social
movements (Montgomery, Dacin, & Dacin, 2012; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008), defined by
joint action oriented towards social change (Snow et al., 2008). The question of formal structure
and temporal continuity separates the two main streams of the literature: social movements as
loose networks or formal organizations (Hensmans, 2003; Tarrow, 1998).
Social-movement organizations (SMOs) are formal groups that identify with a social
movement and attempt to implement that movement’s goals (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Most
scholars agree that SMOs are responsible for driving and coordinating social movement action
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977), and are thus essential for collective social change: they pool resources,
reframe issues and exploit political opportunities (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). At the
institutional level, SMOs ‘emerge from and exploit contradictions or multiple logics within fields
to mobilize support, forge new paths or produce change’ (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008, p.
650). There are no established structures or internal practices that characterize SMOs (Snow et
al., 2008), which take different organizational forms (including non-governmental organizations,
workers’ unions, environmental associations and advocacy groups) and whose existence is
determined only by capacity to influence social change (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008).
Social movements can also challenge institutional structures through promoting
alternative economic organizations, such as the co-op business model (Schneiberg, 2013).
Although local variations exist among co-ops due to practical adaptations to specific socio-
economic/political contexts or co-operators’ varying aspirations (Webster, Shaw, Stewart,
Walton, & Brown, 2012), three central features characterize most co-ops (Dunn, 1988; Schaars,
1973). First, they are member-owned – i.e. owned by those who use their products and services,
not by distant investors – and based on capital collectivization (Gray, 2004) serving members’
individual and communal needs. Second, co-ops are member-controlled. In contrast with the
owners of capitalist enterprises, all co-op members have equal voting rights in the general
assembly, despite possible disparities in their economic participation or level of involvement.
Further, the board of directors comprises members elected by the general assembly. Third, co-ops
are member-benefiting enterprises. As business ventures, they are allowed to make profits
(Hansmann, 1999; Nilsson, 2001) but are limited in how they can distribute their surpluses: part
of the excess can be returned to members, with the remaining excess reinvested in the co-op. Any
distribution is proportionate to each member’s use of the co-op’s services, and is not based on
financial investment.
Co-ops, like SMOs, ‘seek to mobilize a diverse range of resources including material and
human, as well as moral, cultural, and social organizational’ (McCarthy, 2013, p. 1). However,
we suggest that SMOs and co-ops possess contrasting characteristics that both enable and limit
their resistance to inequality (see Table 1). By definition, SMOs are flexible (being able to adopt
different organizational structures) and expansive (adapting their organizational structure to better
pursue the social movement’s goals). Unlike SMOs, co-ops are fixed (having to follow country-
specific rules and regulations typical of their business model) and circumscribed (having limited
scope and reach due to the focus on their members).
----- Insert Table 1 here -----
Unlike SMOs, most co-ops focus internally – towards and among members – rather than
externally. Co-ops can thus be seen as a stronghold against the ‘entrenched hegemony of the
investor-owned firm model’ (Diamantopoulos, 2012b, p. 43) because they respond to members’
interests by creating an alternative economic organization that, through democratic citizenship,
incorporates equality into the firm’s internal functioning (Diamantopoulos, 2012a). They help
preserve ‘free spaces’ away from the logic of the market (Tarrow & Tollefson, 1994, p. 136).
Moreover, through adhering to a specific model (i.e. member-ownership, member-control and
member-benefit), co-ops promote internal equality. They ‘shift the purposes and masters served
by the firm from profit maximization and shareholder value to provision and the substantive
interests of consumers and producers’ (Schneiberg, 2010, p. 1422).
While co-ops impact the local communities in which they are embedded (Birchall, 2013;
World Co-operative Monitor, 2016), they are generally not viewed as structures that can (or wish
to) impact social structures and institutional frameworks. Unlike their SMO counterparts, co-op
members do not automatically participate in actions aimed at social transformation. Many
scholars argue that co-ops instead depend on social movements to effect changes to their
institutional contexts (Develtere, 1992; Diamantopoulos, 2012a; Ketilson et al., 1992).
Schneiberg (2002, 2010, 2013) has repeatedly demonstrated how co-ops have benefitted from
anti-corporate protest movements, which have ‘served as a bridge and an amplifier for mutualism
and diffusion for these contested innovations’ (2013, p. 673).
In sum, the literature on both social movements and co-ops suggests that co-ops cannot
change an allegedly unfair institutional framework without the support of a broader social
movement. However, the success of Québec’s funeral co-ops in fighting MNCs’ domination
invites us to reconsider this assertion. Thus, we believe that studying how co-ops can
independently extend their reach and impact their institutional framework is worthwhile, and may
provide valuable information on the potential for collective social action by alternative economic
organizations. We aim to extend the theory of collective social action (Montgomery et al., 2012)
with Nancy Fraser’s tridimensional theory of justice (Fraser, 2005) by exploring the strategies
used by funeral co-ops to disrupt inequalities in the industry, diffuse their organizational model
and resist MNCs. Fraser’s theory of justice (1995; 2005) is particularly useful for our analysis
through providing a heuristic model of inequality types and their respective potential remedies
that explores issues of parity at the heart of SMOs’ action and the co-op model.
Nancy Fraser’s tridimensional theory of justice
Fraser (2005) equates justice with parity of participation, arguing that inequality occurs when
social arrangements prevent a specific group from participating as full partners in social life. We
chose Fraser’s framework since it provides a comprehensive model describing cultural, political
and economic inequality, and suggesting specific remedies for each (Fraser, 2005); proposes
balanced criteria of inequality, without emphasizing any one isolated aspect of inequality (e.g.
politics of identity: Lawson, 2008), in contrast to most research on institutional change fostered
by social movements (Montgomery et al., 2012; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008); and
acknowledges the potentially complementary or contradictory interrelationships between
inequality types.
The cultural dimension of social justice corresponds to status order in society. Cultural
inequality can be conceptualized as resulting from norms and ideologies that classify some
groups of people as less worthy of respect than others. People suffer from recognition-related
inequality – or misrecognition – when they are ‘prevented from interacting on terms of parity by
institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing’ (Fraser, 2005,
p. 73). Forms of cultural inequality include cultural domination (being subjected to patterns of
interpretation and communication associated with another culture and alien/hostile to one’s own),
non-recognition (being rendered invisible through authoritative representational, communicative
and interpretative practices) and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic
public cultural representations and/or everyday situations). According to Fraser (2003),
alleviating cultural inequality demands substantial symbolic changes, such as re-evaluating
disrespected groups, promoting diversity, and transforming dominant patterns of representation.
The political dimension of social justice corresponds to the political constitution of
society; centred on membership, it problematizes governance structures and decision-making
procedures (Fraser, Dahl, Stoltz, & Willig, 2004). Political inequality is expressed in the
demography of the political arenas where major decisions are taken and political participation is
often limited to a few dominant actors. In recent years, this privileged club has become
increasingly dominated by MNCs (Fraser, 2009). People suffer from representation-related
inequality – or misrepresentation – when ‘political boundaries and/or decision rules function to
deny some people, wrongly, the possibility of participating on a par with others in social
interaction – including, but not only, in political arenas’ (Fraser, 2005, p. 76). Forms of political
inequality include ordinary-political misrepresentation (barriers to equal political participation
relating to ‘intra-frame representation’ and debates over the relative merits of alternative electoral
systems: Fraser, 2005, p. 76); misframing (‘polity’s boundaries [that] are drawn in such a way as
to wrongly deny some people the chance to participate at all in its authorized contests over
justice’: Fraser, 2005, p. 76); and meta-political misrepresentation (when ‘elites monopolize the
activity of frame-setting, denying voice to those who may be harmed in the process, and blocking
creation of democratic arenas where the latter’s claims can be vetted and redressed’: Fraser,
2005, p. 85).
The economic dimension of social justice corresponds to the class structure of society and
is associated with the (re)distribution or sharing of material resources and economic power
among groups. People suffer from redistribution-related inequality – or maldistribution – when
they are ‘impeded from full participation by economic structures that deny them the resources
they need in order to interact with others as peers’ (Fraser, 2005, p. 73). Concrete examples of
maldistribution include income inequality, capitalist exploitation and substandard living
conditions arising from inadequate material resources. Forms of economic inequality include
exploitation (having the fruits of one’s labour appropriated for the benefit of others), economic
marginalization (being confined to undesirable, poorly paid work, or having no access to work)
and deprivation (being denied an adequate material standard of living). A transformative solution
to this inequality demands a restructuring of the whole economy, implicating ‘redistributing
income and/or wealth, reorganizing the division of labor, changing the structure of property
ownership, democratizing the procedures by which investment decisions are made, or
transforming other basic economic structures’ (Fraser, 2003, p. 17).
In essence, the success of the FCFQ belies traditional theories of collective action that
posit the essential role of SMOs in battling institutionalized structures of inequality. Fraser’s
theory of cultural, political and economic inequalities and remedies helps us understand this
counter-intuitive phenomenon by providing a framework for analysing each FCFQ action.
Further, our historical data allows us to explore the FCFQ’s dynamic over time by identifying
patterns that explain this actor’s success in changing the institutional inequality of the Québec
funeral industry.
Case study: Funeral co-ops in Québec
Research context
The modern funeral industry in North America started in the late 19th century (Parsons, 1999),
opening the path for today’s ‘widespread acceptance of the business side of deathcare
management’ (Fernandez, 2013, p. 350). North Americans now fuel a multibillion-dollar industry
that has transformed the dead into highly profitable revenue streams (Clark & Szmigin, 2003).
However, contemporary deathcare’s high profits come from increased expenses for the grieving
(Fan & Zick, 2004). Consumers are encouraged to spend more on funerals to demonstrate their
love for the deceased (Saunders, 1991), and funerals – augmented by increasingly ostentatious
high-priced services (Lynch, 1999; 2007) – are now among the most expensive purchases many
consumers will ever make (Kopp & Kemp, 2007). With time, funerals have become capitalist
endeavours giving ‘the appearance of the exploitation of someone’s loss and subsequent grief’
(Sanders, 2009, p. 448). The progressively rationalized role of the funeral industry reflects ‘the
ongoing colonization of capital into human emotion’ (Sanders, 2012, p. 263).
Like elsewhere in North America, Québec’s funeral market is characterized primarily by
steady growth as the number of deaths increases slightly every year (Rotermann, 2001; Smith,
2007; St-Onge, 2001). The industry is characterized by low-level risk, with only 4.9% of funeral
providers closing between 1989 and 1997 (compared to 14.9% for the whole economy). Unlike in
other countries, such as France (Trompette, 2007, 2013), there is no enduring public-system
influence on the funeral market, which remains open to ‘free’ competition. Consequently,
Québec’s funeral market attracted large financial groups on the lookout for safe long-term
investments (FCFQ, 2010). In the early 1990s, the market began to change as MNCs arrived (St-
Onge, 2001; Tessier, 2008), with artisanal funeral businesses becoming their prey (Bousquet &
Marengo, 1998); Service Corporation International purchased 15 family-owned funeral homes in
Québec in 1993 alone. Typically, when an MNC buys a funeral home, it avoids visible change by
keeping the original name and management (Sanders, 2012). This practice focuses consumer
attention on the traditional and familiar, projecting an erroneous impression that the funeral home
is still a local ‘mom-and-pop’ operation (Smith, 2007; Whittaker, 2005). In sum, while MNCs’
arrival did not start corporate domination of the funeral market, it did deepen structural
inequalities, which kindled funeral co-ops’ response through the FCFQ.
Data collection
We opted for a qualitative approach based on a historical analysis to delineate the remedies to
inequalities used by funeral co-ops. Our main focus was the FCFQ, being connected to most
events in our historical analysis. Following our review of the academic and specialized literature,
we suggest that this is a unique case (Yin, 2013) of alternative economic organizations
successfully empowering an actor both in resisting market dominance by local companies and
MNCs and in expanding its alternative business model.
We collected historical information from all Québec funeral co-ops to contextualize the
FCFQ’s actions, primarily examining documents from 1942 to 2016. First, we studied primary
documents produced and distributed by the FCFQ and by the 12 funeral co-ops we visited (e.g.
Lafleur, 2012; Tessier, 2008). Second, we drew on publicly available books, scientific works and
governmental publications about Québec funeral co-ops (e.g. Colin, 2000; Ministère de
l’industrie, du commerce et de la technologie (MICT), 1998; St-Onge, 2001). Third, we
examined newspaper and general print-media articles from 1942 onwards. Finally, we used
personal communications with Alain Leclerc, the FCFQ’s general manager since 1993, to better
describe the emergence of the FCFQ and to more accurately assess the state of the contemporary
market.
Alongside these historical sources, we relied on interviews with general managers from
funeral co-ops across the province, drawn from the FCFQ’s public list of members. During data
collection in 2013–2014, the province of Québec was home to 30 funeral co-ops, 23 of which
were formal FCFQ members. We conducted on-site, semi-structured interviews with 12 general
managers, asking about their co-ops, their business environment, the funeral industry as a whole,
and their interactions with the FCFQ. We aimed to understand general managers’ views on the
role and impact of individual co-ops, the co-op movement, and the FCFQ in the funeral industry
(Bluhm, Harman, Lee, & Mitchell, 2011). Interviews lasted 45-110 minutes, and were recorded
and transcribed with permission.
Data analysis
We describe three stages that systematically move from raw data to theoretical interpretations
(Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Although we delineate stages, the process was iterative –
meaning we used feedback between theory and data – to improve insights and relevance
(Langley, 1999; Locke, Golden-Biddle, & Feldman, 2008). In the first stage of analysis, we
organized the data in an NVivo database, allowing us to efficiently index, search, code and
theorize data. We then developed an overall chronology of Québec funeral co-ops, with the goal
of establishing a form of ‘temporal bracketing’ (Langley, 1999). We determined two distinct
periods – ‘bottom-up co-operatization’ and ‘top-down co-operatization’1 – with an interlude,
during which the model’s limits were felt by individual funeral co-ops but collective actions were
not yet underway. This timeframe enabled us to better determine the context, actors and actions
taken during each period.
In the second stage of analysis, each author independently coded the dataset according to
Fraser’s tridimensional theory of social justice, using the dimensions of cultural, political and
economic inequalities to analyse the FCFQ’s actions. While most instances were easily assigned
to one dimension, we debated a few that did not fit neatly into Fraser’s categories, and agreed a
common analysis of social inequalities. Then, we identified what seemed to be remedies (Fraser,
1995) to these inequalities, i.e. actions by individual co-ops and the FCFQ to correct what they
believed were inequitable conditions. Our goal was to improve coding reliability by comparing
and discussing different interpretations, thus achieving more robust results.
Throughout data analysis, we retained analytical freedom regarding the remedies
described by Fraser, thus not forcing data into our previously established analytical categories
and leaving space for alternative interpretations. Typically, the specific elements linked to the co-
op business model, especially at local level, did not fit perfectly into Fraser’s categories: this
brought a new perspective to her proposed remedies. While Fraser primarily describes macro-
remedies, we also found micro-remedies and meso-remedies in our data. At the end of this
second stage of analysis, specific remedies surfaced around identity-building, identity-changing
and identity-maintaining.
Findings from the first and second rounds of analysis informed a third stage. By
combining the temporally bracketed timeline with the coding of collective social actions, we
perceived two distinct trajectories for the remedies undertaken by funeral co-ops through the
FCFQ. Those remedies pioneered by the FCFQ followed an outward trajectory linked to the
geographical expansion of the co-op business model, and an upward trajectory in challenging
institutional inequalities. These trajectories mirror recent studies on social innovation that
identify the ‘scaling-out’ and ‘scaling-up’ movements of social entrepreneurs in their quests
(respectively) to expand the range of their innovation geographically and to legitimate it
institutionally (Westley, Antadze, Riddell, Robinson, & Geobey, 2014). Further, while
determining whether remedial actions were micro, meso or macro, we noticed that these actions
were not isolated but complementary, both on different levels and in different dimensions. Our
results therefore expand on the scaling-out and scaling-up model (Westley et al., 2014), as we
include not only the outward and upward trajectories but also the connections between distinct
remedies at the different levels driving those movements.
Findings
From our data analysis, we identified three distinct phases in the history of funeral co-ops in
Québec. First, ‘bottom-up co-operatization’ took place from 1942 to 1975 and was characterized
by small, localized impacts on inequality primarily through establishing funeral co-ops in a few
rural communities. The second phase, which we label as an interlude, included a rapid increase in
the number of funeral co-ops as well as the first unsuccessful attempts to create a fully-fledged
association between funeral co-ops. The third phase – ‘top-down co-operatization’ – began in
1994 and is ongoing. This period is characterized by the central role of the FCFQ, which fights
inequality by promoting the geographical expansion of the co-op model and by upholding it
institutionally. From 1994 on, funeral co-ops transcended their model nature and began to work
collectively like a movement.
Bottom-up co-operatization: An alternative model for fighting inequalities (1942–1974)
Québec funeral co-ops originally emerged from the initiative of citizens who, wanting an
alternative to expensive private funeral services, created self-managed organizations as protective
shields against capitalist practices that disregarded their basic needs (Tessier, 2008). The first
funeral co-op was founded in 1942 in Château-Richer (a small town near Québec City),
sponsored by Father Louis-Philippe Gravel, who wished to stop his fellow citizens experiencing
the debt cycle after expensive burial of a loved one: elaborate funeral rites and a lack of
competition often required people to go into debt to afford burial (Tessier, 2008).
Cultural inequalities and remedies. As elsewhere in North America, deathcare in Québec
began as a community endeavour (Parsons, 1999). In the early 20th century, it became a
commercial activity and the family of the dead went from being community members to being
consumers: a major cultural switch that brought feelings of misrecognition in many communities.
In some places, funeral-home owners closed or relocated without notice, thus forcing some
people to travel long distances for funeral services. Elsewhere, citizens felt disrespected because
there were no French-speaking services (Tessier, 2008). This misrecognition was engendered by
the dominant profit-maximization culture that guided decision-making by local private funeral
homes (FCFQ, 2010). This culture tends to oust the community as a rightful and qualified
participant in the organization of deathcare, thus limiting its access to organizational political
spaces. This ousting also enables prohibitive costs.
The first funeral co-ops were organized as consumer co-ops, in which patrons collectively
owned their funeral home. People were proud to pay their share and identify as owners of the
funeral co-op; for most, it was the only thing they owned aside from their house. In the Château-
Richer funeral co-op’s first year of operation, more than 250 of the 400 families in the parish paid
the CAD$10 share, granting member status.2 People were also proud to bring deathcare back to
the community: the strong ties between founders and their communities facilitated the first
funeral co-ops. Several co-ops set up their first showrooms in church basements or presbyteries,
and accessed many volunteers during funeral processes (Tessier, 2008).
Political inequalities and remedies. Around when the first co-ops were created, people
commonly accepted that decision-making was monopolized by the elite. At municipal, provincial
and federal levels, misrepresentation was the norm. Democracy was not yet universal in Québec,3
and corruption was endemic.4 In both small and large economic organizations, power was held by
a few Americans or English-speaking Canadians. As citizens, consumers and employees, people
rarely had a voice in the decisions that impacted their lives from cradle to grave.
Including co-op members in the decision-making process gave a voice to the community’s
needs and aspirations; members could vote in the general assembly, elect the board of directors,
sit on the board, and voice their opinions on strategic and operational issues. For example, the
newly elected board of the Château-Richer funeral co-op was mandated by the general assembly
to borrow CAD$2500 from the local credit union to purchase a hearse, funerary ornaments,
caskets and other equipment (Tessier, 2008). This democratic governance does not necessarily
mean that all members actually participate in every decision, but instead that they have the right
to do so. For many, membership of a funeral co-op represented a rare opportunity to have a voice
on community matters.
Economic inequalities and remedies. The primary reason for creating a funeral co-op was
to prevent community members from experiencing the cycle of debt that awaited them after the
expensive burial of a loved one. In some communities, the cost of a funeral was the equivalent of
more than a year’s wages (Tessier, 2008). Moreover, in most communities, privately owned
funeral homes were protected from competition: starting new funeral homes is risky, because
people are most likely to use one previously known to their family. Even where competition
existed, funeral homes did not compete on price (MICT, 1998).
Funeral co-ops immediately created local impacts on redistribution through lower funeral
fees for members (MICT, 1991). In the Château-Richer funeral co-op’s first year, the price of
first-class services was about one-third of that charged by a local private company, and for mid-
and low-end funerals approximately one-half (Tessier, 2008). The co-op alternative also forced
private companies to reduce the price of mortuary supplies. In 1972, the average cost of a funeral
in Québec was 19% higher than the Canadian average; by 1989, it was 8.9% lower (St-Onge,
2001).
Interlude: Limits to the model and creation of the FCFQ (1975–1993)
In the 30 years following the creation of the first funeral co-op, only five co-ops were started in
Québec (Tessier, 2008). Despite their commendable impacts on the cultural, political and
economic dimensions of inequalities, funeral co-ops had a difficult beginning. First, they were
isolated from each other and located mostly in rural regions, making communication between co-
ops hard. Second, most founding members and funeral directors lacked proper business
experience and could not access the latest business tools and practices. Some funeral co-ops thus
felt the need to join forces, although had difficulty agreeing on the nature of the union. The
Provisional Committee was first formed in 1975, and in 1981 became the Coordination
Committee, tasked with helping create a fully-fledged federation (Tessier, 2008). In 1987, the
FCFQ was founded, but almost went bankrupt in 1993.
Cultural inequalities and remedies. Culturally, the expansion of the movement began with
the favourable context for social economy brought by the Quiet Revolution, the quest for
emancipation by Québec’s francophone majority (Colin, 2000; St-Onge, 2001). However, there
was no direct link between funeral co-ops and the broader social movement nurtured by this
revolution, which was mostly fuelled by people younger than those in funeral co-ops’ general
assemblies. More importantly, our data show no direct link between funeral co-ops and the
growing consumer movements in both Québec and Canada more widely.
Striking during that period is the lack of understanding of the benefits of a formal union
between funeral co-ops. For example, many early participants in the Provisional Committee
quickly left, believing that the existing co-ops were too different (e.g. in problems faced and
management values) to allow a fully-fledged federation. Although funeral co-ops wanted to
combine forces, they wished to retain autonomy. During this period, the membership fee was
much discussed; some considered the contributions too high for the services received (Tessier,
2008).
The Committee continued to work to nurture common values among – and change public
attitudes to – funeral co-ops. In 1978, it published the first issue of the newsletter Le Lien to
facilitate information exchange between funeral directors and nurture their commonalities. In
1983, the Committee asked the Ministry of Education for subsidies to finance public-education
projects. The money received was distributed to co-ops for awareness-raising activities on myths
surrounding death, and on funeral co-ops (Tessier, 2008).
Political inequalities and remedies. Without a common purpose, funeral co-ops struggled
to create and participate in a unified governance structure. During the interlude, attendance at
annual general meetings was low and only a few managers and directors fully participated in
maintaining some association between co-ops. However, the Committee was attempting to fight
misrepresentation in the political arena. In 1977, it began lobbying the Ministry of Education to
provide thanatological training in a public institution rather than in the private institutions
overseen by the Corporation des thanatologues du Québec (CTQ). In 1980, the government
agreed, and a pre-university college in Montréal became the only institution in Québec allowed to
offer a thanatology programme, with the previous private training programmes no longer
authorized.
Economic inequalities and remedies. The establishment of 19 funeral co-ops in the 1970s
undermined private funeral companies in several regions of Québec, breaking monopolies that
had lasted for generations (MICT, 1998). While this could be considered a victory against
maldistribution in the funeral industry, it was a consequence not of funeral co-ops joining forces
but of their individual work. Meanwhile, such co-ops were still marginalized by suppliers of
caskets and pharmaceutical products (Tessier, 2008). Funeral co-ops also felt the Committee was
asking too much of them: for example, in 1983, it requested a contribution of CAD$1 per funeral
from funeral co-ops. This amount was used to print Le Lien, organize the annual general meeting,
and pay the Committee’s expenses. Co-ops’ primary complaint was that to be sustainable, any
type of union between funeral co-ops should not rely solely on membership dues and other such
fees.
A primary reason for funeral co-ops to join forces was the possibility of cost-sharing. In
the mid-1970s, the Committee proposed various services but few co-ops were interested, so only
one such service was developed then. In 1983, the Committee signed an agreement with an
insurance company and created a specific life-insurance programme for co-op members, who
could subscribe by registering their funeral co-op as a beneficiary; the co-op would then receive
money for the funeral service. In addition, the insurance company gave the Committee a small
dividend from each insurance policy sold.
Top-down co-operatization: The FCFQ as a social movement (1994 to present)
In late 1993, Leclerc, general manager of a funeral co-op in the Eastern Townships, proposed a
revival of the FCFQ, which had been moribund for almost a year. Motivated essentially by the
arrival of foreign MNCs in Canada (Tessier, 2008), the rebirth and empowerment of the FCFQ
signalled a second movement where a greater expansion of the co-op model was accompanied by
a growing influence on its institutional framework (MICT, 1991). Among co-ops, there seemed
an increasing perception that expanding their model’s economic remedies would depend on
institutional recognition and structural representation. For that task, the FCFQ resolutely adopted
movement-like qualities. In September 1994, the FCFQ held a summit bringing together most of
the province’s funeral co-ops, after which participants voted to stop the ‘invasion’ of the foreign
funeral-service providers in Québec, ensure a consistent image of the movement with external
stakeholders, promote the flow of information among co-ops, create buying groups, and support
the creation of new funeral co-ops (Tessier, 2008). These five objectives represented some
remedies to cultural, political and economic inequalities.
Cultural inequalities and remedies. Recognition-related difficulties are common to co-ops
in many industries, and the co-op alternative is still marginalized within the capitalist economic
system (Webster et al., 2012). In the funeral industry, co-ops were often considered inferior
alternatives to traditional private funeral homes. Therefore, the revived FCFQ worked on alerting
the general public to the current situation in the funeral industry, educating the public about death
and deathcare, providing a new and professional image of co-ops, and changing the culture
within the funeral-co-op movement itself.
The FCFQ first attempted to alert the public to the current state of the funeral industry.
For Leclerc (2013), grouping co-ops around the revived FCFQ was intended to constitute a
political, economic and social force against foreign MNCs. The FCFQ collected information on
competitors and organized an awareness-raising campaign about foreign MNCs’ actions. At a
time when MNCs held around 40% of the market, the FCFQ wrote an exposé of the Québec
funeral industry, sending it to all major economic journalists. Facing what it depicted as a foreign
threat, the FCFQ portrayed itself as the primary defender of the local funeral industry’s interests
(Colin, 2000).
The FCFQ’s second remedy was to educate the public about death and deathcare, after
observing that domination by foreign MNCs was underpinned by a specific form of cultural
inequality expressed by an interpretation, by both businesses and customers, of death as taboo
and of deathcare as an untouchable activity that should be left to corporations (St-Onge, 2001).
One co-op general manager believes ‘that the exploitation comes from the fact that people don’t
want to talk about death – [MNCs] exploit a person’s vulnerability in order to sell products and
services that they don’t necessarily need. They play on people’s guilt and emotions.’ Another co-
op manager described MNCs as ‘really aggressive: they employ salespeople rather than
counsellors; they execute big promotion and marketing efforts; and they try to sell a lot of
superfluous things to their clients.’ In the contemporary funeral industry, consumers are
encouraged to spend more money on funeral services and products to demonstrate their love for
the deceased. ‘There seems to be no shortage of means for profiting from the death of human
beings,’ stated the same manager. In contrast to the elaborate-funeral culture, co-ops advocate
simple and sober funerals to pay tribute to the deceased:
Marketing, in the funeral industry, plays too much on emotion. […] In co-ops, we try not
to do that. Our marketing is focused around the diffusion of information, and we are
trying to introduce, as much as possible, neutral information. Beside the educational
materials, such as the publication of a magazine for members and free documentation
available in co-ops’ waiting rooms, the federation organizes symposia on various topics
related to death. Funeral co-ops want to bring members to reflect on their own funeral
arrangements, and raise awareness of the ostentatious abuses encouraged by some
private businesses. (Leclerc, 2013)
The funeral-co-op movement tried to distinguish itself from other types of businesses in
its marketing approach, including sending the monthly magazine Profil to all members. Each
issue dealt with questions regarding death, healthy ways of coping with grief, the importance of
counselling and family testimonials, etc.. According to Leclerc (2013), Profil aimed to demystify
and factually analyse death-related topics for co-op members to prepare them to make more
rational decisions when burying their loved ones.
The movement also sought to demystify the deathcare process itself. Closed and
concealed procedures, according to some general managers we interviewed, helped reinforce an
aura of taboo and even ‘dirty work’ around the funeral industry, with one manager commenting:
‘We sell death, and nobody really wants to hear about it.’ This in turn kept families outside the
process and created further dependency on traditional providers. The movement thus created an
‘open-door’ practice, where members, with the general public, were invited to visit funeral co-
ops to learn about their work. The goal was to change the symbolic perception of funeral
practices by portraying these practices as normal and simple, and so to empower people to avoid
exploitation when making deathcare decisions.
The FCFQ’s third remedy was to advertise the unique nature of funeral co-ops. In 1991, a
provincial-government publication reported that funeral co-ops, unlike their competitors, did little
marketing to publicize their services – resulting in a general lack of awareness of the benefits
offered by such co-ops (MICT, 1991). Funeral co-ops were often seen as a less valuable, ‘cheap’
alternative to private funeral homes. Several general managers we interviewed mentioned that
they had to fight this negative perception, for example:
There was this woman who was not yet a member of our co-op, but who wanted to do
business with us. When she died, her sister didn’t come to visit us because we are a co-
op. For her, it was out of the question that she’d do business with a co-op, because we
were ‘cheap’.
While funeral co-ops’ lower prices achieved economic remedies, they were also mistakenly
linked to a perception by potential members and customers of low-quality products and services:
In the early 1990s, people believed that co-ops were cheap: they were in the basements
of churches and organized by volunteers. Through communication tools, we tried to
upgrade our standards and demonstrate in our marketing that co-ops are classy and offer
high-quality products and services. (Leclerc, 2013)
In 1994, the FCFQ suggested that its members standardized their advertising to promote a
consistent image of the movement. It designed a logo to promote a more professional image, now
used by most co-ops in the network. Through a joint and uniform strategy, a media campaign was
launched to change this image of ‘cheap’ services, and to show that funeral co-ops provided top-
quality services that valued their members’ cultural diversity. According to Leclerc (2013), this
campaign countered the negative image of co-ops among Québec’s public.
In addition to improving the media image of funeral co-ops, consolidating their
advertising had further implications for the movement’s identity: ‘Entrusting us with the
production of the advertising material ensured that the discourse was uniform. Therefore our
marketing approach as well as the values that we defended quietly diffused within the entire
network’ Leclerc (2013).
Accordingly, the FCFQ’s fourth remedy was to promote a culture of professionalization
across the movement, a task that demanded the introduction of standardized procedures. While
the first funeral co-ops were established by and worked with a unique collaboration of volunteers,
professional employees were now needed. Since the Quiet Revolution, the general population
was less religious and churches were increasingly deserted. The quest for meaning in death
remained but had become more complex. Funeral co-ops thus needed to adapt how their
employees dealt with death and grieving families. The FCFQ implemented a staff-training
programme, Symphony (promoting the importance of meaning, and of involving the mourners in
the funeral), provided self-help groups for members to facilitate mourning, and offered the
services of psychologists and other bereavement experts (Tessier, 2008).
Political inequalities and remedies. Inequalities faced by funeral co-ops include
misrepresentation in the political arena. This was explicit in the ‘open-door’ government policy
that granted MNCs the ability to buy family-owned funeral homes under duress and to impose
their market logic on those who resisted (MICT, 1998). There was a general perception among
funeral co-ops that the political discussion on deathcare was limited to a small elite of state
officials and MNCs, which precluded participation by non-traditional representatives such as
funeral co-ops (Smith, 2007; St-Onge, 2001). Consequently, market-centred discourses and
solutions were privileged, while the co-op solution was never presented as a credible alternative
(Leclerc, 2013).
The first remedy used by funeral co-ops to achieve greater political equality was the
empowerment of the FCFQ as a political force – a provincial structure of representation – against
what it depicted as the ‘American invasion’. This new stance clearly differed from the apolitical
position held by most funeral co-ops before MNCs’ arrival. As soon as Leclerc became the
FCFQ’s new general manager, he commissioned a comprehensive study on Québec funeral co-
ops to plan the construction of the FCFQ’s political representation in various provincial
networks, focusing on the Americans’ arrival. As Leclerc (2013) put it, the FCFQ ‘insisted on
talking about the American invasion of the funeral industry, and we depicted the co-ops as a
shield against this state of affairs’. Following this study, the newly elected Leclerc met with
municipal and provincial politicians from various regions around the province; funeral co-ops
were no longer left outside the political arena.
The second remedy against misrepresentation was to emancipate the funeral-co-op
movement from the Québec funeral industry’s primary political actor, the CTQ. Until 1996,
relations between funeral co-ops and the CTQ were quite good. The FCFQ systematically
encouraged co-ops to join the CTQ to improve their relationships with private entrepreneurs in
their region. The FCFQ hoped its members would receive information on the funeral industry and
be better able to defend their rights. CTQ membership also gave co-ops additional credibility. At
the time, the CTQ was welcoming MNC representatives to its board of directors, and the FCFQ
wanted co-ops to have a place there too. In 1998, the general manager of a funeral co-op was
elected as president of a local branch of the CTQ, and so could sit on the CTQ’s board of
directors. The FCFQ believed that this election had established a bridge with the CTQ, allowing
them to work together on projects. However, the presence of a co-op representative on the CTQ’s
board of directors sent a shockwave through private entrepreneurs, with some private funeral
homes contesting the legality of the election. The following year, the annual meeting of that local
branch of the CTQ attracted a record number of participants from private companies, and the
mandate of the general manager was not renewed: co-ops were again excluded from the CTQ’s
board.
In the spring of 2004, a second event definitively undermined funeral co-ops’ relationship
with the CTQ. Several co-ops received a severe censure from the CTQ, having claimed in an
advertisement that they could offer cheaper funeral services than could private businesses:
according to CTQ rules, funeral homes were prohibited from advertising on the basis of price.
After negotiations with the CTQ failed, the FCFQ – with 18 co-ops – decided not to renew
membership. In 2006, the CTQ unsuccessfully invited the FCFQ to reverse its decision (Tessier,
2008).
The third remedy related to representation used by the FCFQ in developing strategic
alliances to strengthen its political position. According to Leclerc (2013), it was imperative for
the FCFQ to join forces with other actors in the co-op movement, both locally and globally.
Although the funeral co-op movement had been using the services of the Conseil québécois de la
cooperation et de la mutualité (CQCM) – the democratic body owned and operated by Québec
co-ops and mutual societies – since the 1970s, their relationship intensified with the renewal of
the FCFQ, especially when the latter decided to join the CQCM’s board (Leclerc, 2013).
In 2006, some Canadian funeral co-ops outside Québec considered creating a Canadian
association, but eventually decided they should instead join the FCFQ. The following year, the
FCFQ began to translate its materials into English, led the organization of a second meeting of
Canadian funeral co-ops in Moncton (New Brunswick), and provided technical support for the
start-up of co-ops in Ottawa (Ontario) and Regina (Saskatchewan). In partnership with the
Société de coopération pour le développement international (SOCODEVI)5, the FCFQ also
helped create Funerales ServiPerú, the first funeral co-op in Peru.
The next step for the FCFQ was on the global level. In 2012, as part of the United
Nations’ International Year of Co-operatives, the FCFQ issued a worldwide invitation to funeral
co-ops and mutual enterprises to attend the first International Summit of Funeral Co-operatives.
For the first time, co-ops, mutual societies and other democratic organizations working in the
funeral industry around the world met. More than 85 representatives from 30 organizations in six
countries discussed their shared issues and challenges, and adopted the first Declaration of
Funeral Co-operatives and Mutual Enterprises (Lafleur, 2012; Leclerc, 2013).
Economic inequalities and remedies. These efforts granted cultural recognition and
political representation to the funeral co-op movement, both in Québec and more broadly. The
FCFQ convinced government officials of the benefits of supporting the co-op alternative in the
funeral market, and the Ministry for Industry and Trade published a report in 1998 about funeral
co-ops, praising their market-regulation role. Most importantly, agreements were reached with
public-investment agencies to finance the FCFQ’s growth strategy. Thus, the FCFQ’s political
action brought economic benefits as it received funds both to purchase private funeral homes in
financial trouble and to develop new co-ops by supporting interested local communities.
The FCFQ’s first remedy for economic inequality encouraged funeral co-ops to produce
surpluses. To promote this change in mentality, Leclerc wrote and published (in Le Lien in 1998)
a provocative article entitled ‘Profits? Why?’, explaining to FCFQ members that profits could
shield against foreign MNCs. He argued further that the era of merely breaking even was over,
stressing the importance of competing with foreign MNCs. While some co-ops were already
operating with surpluses, others resisted this change of philosophy (Colin, 2000). Leclerc (2013)
explained the adoption of this change:
When I arrived in the network in the 1980s, most co-ops had no interest in making
surpluses. As soon as there was a bit of profit, the co-ops’ managers reduced prices, so at
that time there was no financial reserve created in co-ops. The FCFQ succeeded in
convincing our members that if they wanted to grow, they must create some financial
reserve. That would allow, for instance, buying a new building or renovating an old one.
With this new mindset within funeral co-ops, the management team would calculate
their prices at cost and then add a margin to get a small surplus that would be reinvested.
This was a new mindset in the network.
A second remedy for economic inequality was developing inter-co-operation (i.e. co-
operation within the movement) for economic – not just political – purposes (Leclerc, 2013).
Purchasing groups ensured that all co-ops, regardless of size and financial health, could access
important services and products. According to a 1994 FCFQ survey, 60% of co-ops had
experienced suppliers refusing their attempts to purchase caskets, and the same percentage
wanted to join a casket purchasing group. In a context where MNCs controlled 40% of the market
and could thus put huge pressure on suppliers, the FCFQ believed that purchasing groups could
be enormously important for co-ops; it was counting on these groups to lower costs, improve
supply, and contribute to co-ops’ financing needs. The casket purchasing group was launched in
1996, and 18 co-ops joined in the first year. The following year, a casket-transport purchasing
group was established to help co-ops in remote areas that had difficulty accessing caskets from
distant suppliers.
Third, the FCFQ focused intently on the growth of the funeral co-op movement. In 1997,
the FCFQ, government of Québec and Desjardins Credit Union created a CAD$15m
development fund to finance the purchase of family-owned funeral homes. This fund had two
goals: to keep the ownership of funeral enterprises in Québec and to strengthen the position of
existing funeral co-ops (MICT, 1998). These funds were part of the larger growth strategy
envisioned by the FCFQ to expand the co-op business model throughout Québec. Thus, the
FCFQ combined bottom-up and top-down models in order to respond quickly to foreign MNCs
(Colin, 2000).
The larger growth strategy developed by the FCFQ was threefold, to adapt to different
situations. In the first situation, an existing funeral co-op would indicate its readiness to expand,
and enquire about any funeral homes for sale; the FCFQ then assisted. In the second situation, the
initiative would come from a group outside the funeral industry; this traditional model occurred
when a community group, gathered around a common need, told the FCFQ they wished to form a
co-op. As long as the founding group could mobilize sufficient community actors, the FCFQ
helped finance the co-op, find local support for business-planning, and inform potential members
how co-ops work. During this start-up phase, the FCFQ demanded no fees, to avoid stifling the
initiative (Colin, 2000). In the third situation, the owners of a funeral home would express a
desire to sell; after being approached by foreign companies, they would contact the FCFQ to see
whether it could make an offer. The FCFQ also sought out such opportunities. In this type of
acquisition, the FCFQ proceeded just as with community-generated demand: it mobilized key
community actors, such as the local Desjardins Credit Union and community-development
corporation, into gathering sufficient people to constitute the founding assembly and to take
charge of the co-op. If requested, the FCFQ then provided further assistance. The FCFQ could
help appoint a general manager, and an FCFQ representative would attend board meetings during
the co-op’s first year to ensure a smooth transition.
Discussion
The literature on collective action explains how the presence of supportive communities,
processes of network formation, ability to federate, and diffusion of that federation are ways for
alternative economic organizations to survive after founding movements fade (Ingram & Simons,
2000; Schneiberg, 2013; Simmons & Birchall, 2008). The puzzle is how such organizations can
survive and thrive – despite growing domination by local companies and MNCs – without
beginning as or with social movements. In this paper, we answer this question by showing how
co-ops can thrive by drawing on local organizational and institutional resources to organize
themselves and act like social movements, addressing all three of Fraser’s (2005) inequality
dimensions.
We provide three main contributions to the overall literature on collective action against
inequality (Montgomery et al., 2012). First, we contribute specifically to the studies on
alternative economic organizations – here, co-ops – in the fight against market domination by
local companies and MNCs. Previous research, particularly by Schneiberg (2002, 2010, 2013),
has provided thorough examinations of how co-ops either survive through the support of social
movements or establish themselves over time by slowly creating a solidarity network (Simmons
& Birchall, 2008). Our study adds to this literature by examining how funeral co-ops thrive
through a third option: creating and empowering an actor – a secondary co-op – that can embody
both model and movement dimensions. With this dynamic, the FCFQ promoted the co-op model
institutionally while defending co-ops’ values and principles internally. We also highlighted the
complexities of the work done by the FCFQ to incorporate model and movement logics: as a
model, the FCFQ was intrinsically coherent; and as a movement, it was expansive. Thus, the
FCFQ succeeded by embodying both logics.
The work of the funeral co-op movement and its federation is best described as an upward
and outward trajectory, from the local inequality impacts of funeral co-ops to the FCFQ’s model
of expansion and promotion at the institutional level. A similar idea has been proposed in the
literature on social entrepreneurship, particularly through the concept of scaling-out and scaling-
up (Westley et al., 2014). Some authors suggest that social entrepreneurs should make the jump
to institutional entrepreneurship to make their innovations last (Westley et al., 2014), but they
only acknowledge potential contradictions. We add to this literature by providing an empirically
rich example of the dynamics, interactions and ambiguities involved in the process.
In a similar vein, we contribute to the literature on collective social action with an
empirical illustration of inter-co-operation, the main thrust of which is that in today’s globalized
markets, a co-op movement can rise to its full stature only if co-ops unreservedly support one
another (Diamantopoulos, 2012a, 2012b). While the aspiration to transform society is inherent in
the ICA’s sixth principle – that co-ops can effect greater change by working together than by
working individually – the idea of a co-op economy ‘is too often an intellectual concept without a
corresponding material reality, simply because of the lack of unity and cohesion between the
different branches of the movement’ (ICA, 2015: 72). Our findings show that co-ops can operate
and succeed alone, but that they impact their institutional framework only by working together.
All co-ops, in order to best serve the interests of their members and communities, should actively
co-operate in every practical way with other co-ops at local, national and international levels. Our
findings also show that the promise of a co-op economy requires coordination, co-operation and
collaboration among existing co-ops.
We also contribute to the scholarship on institutional inequality (Mair et al., 2012) by
applying Fraser’s framework (2005) to the model–movement dynamic. This framework
facilitates understanding of the interactions between various forms of inequalities and remedies,
central to the institutional recognition of funeral co-ops. With this analytical tool, our study could
uncover how different remedy types were mutually influential, complementing and reinforcing
each other in resisting cultural, political and economic inequalities. Fraser’s theorization, inspired
by social movement research and practice, crucially illuminated these institutional-level actions
and dynamics.
Our findings also suggest an addition to Fraser’s framework, based on the specific
features of funeral co-ops as alternative economic organizations where internal coherence is
essential and an equality source itself. Fraser (2015) is sceptical of the transforming potential of
such organizations set in an illusory independence from broader social questions and failing to
question the dominant system. It is essential, she argues, that alternative economic organizations
do not stay at the local level, instead connecting with social movements at all levels to resist the
globalized financial system. The transformative potential of these organizations depends on their
relationships with other political practices and the struggles that transcend them. These initiatives
must be part of an assemblage attacking the centres of power, as alternative economic
organizations can be promising only if they converge with forces sharing their radical intentions.
Our findings show, however, that by adopting movement-like qualities and focusing on
the three streams of inequalities and their remedies, alternative economic organizations can
impact their institutional context while preserving their own model. In fact, co-ops themselves
appear to embody ‘transformative’ remedies associated with ‘correcting inequitable outcomes
precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework’ (2005, p. 73). Therefore, in
contrast to SMOs, which are supposed to disappear when the inequality issue is resolved, co-ops
can spread their model indefinitely as a permanent measure against injustice. Our paper provides
some insights into the essential problem of how this micro-level solution to inequality can be
simultaneously diffused and institutionalized at the macro-level.
We did observe, however, that funeral co-ops’ intrinsic normative framework was
challenged during their own institutionalization. Therefore, throughout this process, the FCFQ
actively engaged in different approaches to building and maintaining the co-op identity in order
to preserve the organizations that legitimated the FCFQ’s own institutional actions. These actions
were essential to the institutionalization and diffusion of funeral co-ops, and maintained the
model central to their existence. With the help of their federation, funeral co-ops adapted their
institutional framework while maintaining their primary objective: responding to the needs
expressed by their local community members. This new perspective adds to the macro-remedies
of Fraser’s framework by including the micro- and meso-remedies important in maintaining the
intrinsic normative framework of the co-op business model.
Future research could expand on several aspects of our paper. We believe that the impact
of alternative economic organizations on inequality has been insufficiently examined, with the
literature generally focusing on social movements. More studies are needed to better understand
how such organizations can become institutional agents of change. Our study, while indicating
some general results about inequality-inspired collective action and social innovation, has
specific elements typical only of Québec, such as the important presence of co-ops and the
nationalist perspective favouring local solutions. We thus suggest analysing similar processes for
alternative economic organizations in other regions/contexts. Finally, our study showed the
usefulness of Fraser’s framework for understanding various dynamics fostering successful
resistance to institutional inequality; nevertheless, we believe that further research is needed to
explore more deeply other dynamics, e.g. the concepts of affirmative and transformative remedies
(Fraser, 2005), and how these interact.
Aknowledgement
We would like to thank Arnaud Desbiens and Vanessa Hebding for their participation in data
collection. We would also like to thank Myriam Michaud as well as the participants in the 2015
EGOS Colloquium (Sub-theme 34: Inequality, Institutions and Organizations) for their feedback
on earlier versions of this paper. Finally, we would like to express our deep gratitude to our three
anonymous reviewers and Guest Editorial Team for constructive and encouraging feedback that
greatly improved this paper. Any remaining errors are ours alone.
Notes
1. These two labels were originally coined by Colin (2000).
2. A CAD$10 share in 1942 is equivalent to CAD$150 in 2017, although the membership fee has
increased only slightly in that time: it is now CAD$20.
3. Women obtained the right to vote in 1917 at federal level, but only in 1944 at provincial level,
two years after the first funeral co-op was created.
4. The historical period between 1936 and 1959 was coined ‘La grande noirceur’ (‘The great
darkness’) because of the policies introduced by Québec premier Maurice Duplessis, in power
for most of this period.
5. SOCODEVI is a Canadian network of co-ops and mutual societies that share their technical
expertise and knowledge with partners in developing countries to create, protect and distribute
wealth (http://socodevi.org/en/).
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Table 1: Comparisons between model and movement
Internally
Externally
Model
Fixed:
Co-ops must follow specific rules and
regulations typical of their business
model
Circumscribed:
Co-ops’ organizational requirements focus on their
members, thus directing the scope and reach of their
action to both organizational and local levels
Movement
Flexible:
SMOs can and do portray different
organizational structures
Expansive:
SMOs can adapt their organizational arrangements,
expanding their actions to societal level
