The effectiveness of governance mechanisms in scenarios of water scarcity: the cases of Southern Africa Hydropolitical Complex and the Jordan Basin Hydropolitical Security Complex

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The effectiveness of governance mechanisms in scenarios of water scarcity: the cases of
Southern Africa Hydropolitical Complex and the Jordan Basin Hydropolitical Security
Complex
Fábio Albergaria de Queiroz (Catholic University of Brasília/Brazil)
James Augusto Pires Tiburcio (Azim Premji University/India)
Thais de Castro de Barros (Catholic University of Brasília/Brazil)
Abstract: In many regions of the world, the multiple uses of transboundary fresh water have
been a critically important component for regional stability. This situation explains why, in
many cases, water management has commonly become linked to national security concerns.
But, in what intensity? In search for answers, we analyze the cases of Southern Africa and the
Jordan River Basin due to their prevailing condition of hydrological stress. To verify the role
played by governance mechanisms in accommodating the interests of riparian states, the
Hydropolitical Complexes model was applied in a comparative perspective. Thus, inferences
demonstrate a trend towards cooperation in Southern Africa due to the successful
institutionalization of management mechanisms capable of minimizing potential conflicts. On
the other hand, in the Jordan Basin the struggle for control of water resources has been a
paramount feature in the maintenance of a tense and resilient non-cooperative framework
among riparian countries.
Keywords: Jordan River Basin; Southern Africa; Hydrological Interdependence;
Hydropolitical Complexes; Water Governance.
Fábio Albergaria de Queiroz, PhD (corresponding author)
CAPES (Brazilian Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Level Personnel) Research Fellow at
the Institute of International Relations of the University of Brasilia/Brazil.
fabioaq@hotmail.com
ISA's 58th Annual Convention
February 22nd - 25th, 2017, Baltimore, Maryland
Panel SA68: Fighting about Resources

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1 - Introduction
The planet has approximately 1.4 billion cubic kilometers of water. However, almost
all this immensity, about 97.5 percent, is salty water. Of the 2.5 percent of the fresh water
technically available, an infinitesimal quantity is accessible for human usage (around a third
of this total), and still, unequally distributed through lakes, rivers, humid zones, aquifers that,
in many cases, ignore national borders, condition that, by establishing an undeniable relation
of interdependency, makes water resources an important reference in the relations of those
that share them (Clarke and King, 2005: 20; UNITAR, 2015; p.5).
More specifically, data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), entity responsible for the World Water Assessment Program
(WWAP), account for the existence of 263 transboundary water basins, of which, thirteen are
shared by five or more countries (UNESCO, 2003: 303). This noteworthy condition is also
observed in relation to aquifers that for nearly a quarter of the world population represent the
only source of drinking water (Clarke and King, 2005: 26, UNITAR, 2015).1
Given this complex scenario, empirical evidence has shown that water tends to act as a
powerful connective element proportional to the degree of dependency each agent involved
enjoys towards the shared water systems utilized to meet their multiple demands: from
drinking water to energy production, from irrigation to industrial consumption. Consequently,
the quality and availability of these communal resources are directly impacted by the way
these are managed and eventual resulting externalities controlled2 (Le Prestre, 2000: 440-443;
UNITAR, 2015:9).
Besides the complexity of the relationships, there are estimates that by 2050 almost
half the planet's population will live in chronic water scarcity areas (less than 500 cubic
meters per year per person) or in regions where the water system will be extremely imperiled
by factors such as climate change and disorderly population growth (UNITAR, 2015; p.5).3 In
this regard, Elhance (1999:20) warns us that:
"in a situation of growing water scarcity, the highly complex and multidimensional
interdependences created by transboundary water resources constrain states from asserting
their sovereignty and unilaterally pursuing the goals of national security, economic
development and social welfare."

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This prospective framework has implications in most of the fundamental themes in the
contemporary international agenda such as natural resources sovereignty, regional security,
water access and utilization, environmental protection and sustainable development. Chapter
18 of Agenda 21 (“Protection of the Quality and Supply of Freshwater Resources:
Application of Integrated Approaches to the Development, Management and Use of Water
Resources”) warns humanity against a world of generalized scarcity where constant and
gradual pollution of the world’s water resources in most regions of the world is coupled with
the progressive implementation of incompatible activities. Concomitantly, it calls for greater
cooperation among states in what concerns transboundary water resources.4
In the same fashion, signatory states of the United Nations Millennium Declaration
commit themselves in paragraph 23 “to stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources
by developing water management strategies at the regional, national and local levels, which
promote both equitable access and adequate supplies.”5
A review of these preliminary issues surrounding the scenarios of the scope of the so-
called Hydropolitics – term henceforth used to designate the multi-sector dynamics,
cooperative and/ or conflictive, originating from the relations of interdependence that are
established among actors that, to a certain extent, impact and/or are impacted by the usage of
international water resources (Queiroz, 2012:39) – reveal important aspects that demand
further considerations.
As water quality degrades or the quantity available has to meet rising demands over
time, a fierce competition among water uses and users may exponentially intensify. This
situation is worrisome, particularly in those regions that concentrate the most acute points of
water stress (per capita availability of water between 1.000 and 1.600 cubic meters/year) or
absolute water scarcity (less than 500 cubic meters/year), as are the cases of the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. In this regard, there is a consensus among experts
that international watercourse agreements need to be more incisive in setting out measures to
incorporate effective conflict resolution mechanisms in case disputes erupt.6
An analysis that takes into consideration the relation water/population, shows that
distributive inequalities are further accentuated, obviously, in densely populated regions. Such
is the case of Asia in general, where 36 percent of the world’s available water resources are to
be found whereas it concentrates 60 percent of the planet’s human population. This context of
unequal sharing of water resources defined as water interdependence (Elhance, 1999:13),
gives rise to highly complex, potentially conflictive interstate relations. Complementarily,
vulnerability - the capacity of reaction of a state, considering the availability and costs of the

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alternatives that the agents involved perceive to have (Keohane and Nye, 1989:12) - is a
central element in the relations of states commanding the use and management of shared
water resources. Le Prestre (2000: 442), argues that fresh water has the potential to exacerbate
tensions contingent on the following circumstances:
1. Degree of vulnerability and dependence of each country in relation to its water needs;
2. Number of actors that claim access to the shared water source;
3. Power resources available to riparian actors;
4. Existence of substitute products (in what concerns water, none is presently available);
and even,
5. Political, cultural and identity symbolism socially attached to sovereign control of
water resources.
Given these considerations, and per the holistic and multi-sectorial nature of
Hydropolitics, to verify the effectiveness of water scarcity resources management instruments,
this investigative proposal makes use of an ampler and more inclusive governance perspective
(i.e., as a process of accommodation of consensus and, also, of conflicts and divergences)
considering it, therefore, as being:
"a multi-layered, multi-scale and multi-sector ensemble characterized by a combination of
hierarchical structures, participatory dynamics, associative action and market mechanisms
based on a culture of dialogue, negotiation, active citizenship, subsidiarity and institutional
strengthening " (CASTRO, 2007; p.103).7
Thus, considering the undeniable importance of governance for managing a common
and scarce resource – water – these are the issues that this article seeks to answer: to what
extent the various uses of water resources interrelate with the multi-sectorial dynamics of
those actors who share them? And, in favouring conflicting aspects and/or cooperative
arrangements between riparian stakeholders, how do the ramifications resulting from these
interactions affect the construction process of governance mechanisms?
2- Methodology, level and unities of analysis
Although levels of analysis, in their most general sense, serve more as ontological
references for where events happen, rather than sources of explanation in themselves (Buzan

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et al., 1998, pp. 5-6), it is important to highlight their widely recognized epistemological
relevance as they provide analytical consistency to the investigation, especially when the
investigative method used is the comparative one.
In this regard, to maximize the efficient instrumentalization of the method, and
concomitantly, the validation of the expected results, it is necessary to follow some implicit
steps in this process of identifying the elements common to the different cases and/or those
that are singular: 1) the selection of the phenomena to be observed, and 2) the definition of the
elements to be compared.
We consider territorial contiguity as our control variable,8 and the regional subsystem
as our level of analysis. For that, the conceptual model of Hydropolitical Complexes is our
reference unit as it is ontologically comparable, that is, geographically contiguous areas where
hydrological interdependence among the actors taking part in them is a sufficiently strong
factor to be considered. Thus, to maintain the same comparative coherence, some of the main
watersheds within the selected Hydropolitical Complexes will be analyzed as subunits.
In turn, the necessary connection between the methodology and the theoretical
framework strengthens the choice of the comparative method for this study, as comparisons
allow us to discover regularities, displacements and transformations, similarities and
differences in the search for generalizable explanations from the analysis of the cases
previously selected, an effort in which we are going to focus on in the next pages.
To accomplish this task, we use a combination of comparative techniques labeled by
Skocpol and Somers (1980) as investigative cycle, which basically consists of using multiple
strategies of approach, in this case: 1) the systematic study of co-variations identified in the
case studies; 2) the parallel demonstration in which the researcher applies a concept, set of
concepts and/or a concrete model - in our case the descriptive model of Hydropolitical
Complexes – in the universe of analysis, thus evidencing its explanatory validity; and last but
not least, 3) the contrast of contexts through which we seek to highlight the existing reciprocal
differences between the selected cases.
Still on the epistemological scope of our units of analysis, Schulz (1995) formulated
the concept of Hydropolitical Security Complex (HSC), an analytical tool that is used in this
article in trying to assess possible answers to the questions previously posited. The concept
was designed to help in the analysis of possible connections between Hydropolitics dynamics
originating in the specific context of the basin of the rivers Tigre and Euphrates and the
security agenda of Iraq, Turkey and Syria (Schulz, 1995).

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The idea of a descriptive concept applicable to cases in which water-related issues are
a relevant variable for the understanding of regional political dynamics was conceived from
observations of externalities generated by the construction of dams, control of water flows
and the generation of hydroelectric power. By doing so, Schulz (1995:97) conceived the
concept to describe regions where, “a set of states that are geographically part owners and
technically users of shared rivers start to consider, consequently, this water body to be a major
national security issue.”
Despite its importance, the Hydropolitical Security Complex analytical tool had
relevant limitations, among them, mostly taking into consideration only conflict events. That
restricted its explanatory capabilities when applied, for example, to contexts in which
cooperative arrangements prevailed. Moreover, the model was developed based on the sharing
of superficial waters.
Taking into consideration these limitations, Allan (2001) and Turton (2003),
developed Schulz’s (1995) model further, incorporating other dimensions, to equip it with a
higher explanatory capability. The authors introduced as independent variable the patterns of
amity/enmity among riparian states. Also, they assigned more weight to the sharing of
groundwater systems, thus achieving a more realistic model in regions such as Western Africa,
Southern Africa and the Middle East.
Thus, the empirically based analysis of Allan (2001, 2002) and successively, Turton
(2003, 2008), supported the existence of what they labeled Hydropolitical Complexes in
regions that the dependence on shared surface and groundwater systems is strategically
pivotal to the extent that it has a politically relevant directional role. That is, it drives inter-
state relations in an observable fashion towards potential cooperation (amity) or towards
damaging competition (enmity) (Turton, 2008:188).
Subsequently, Allan (2001) and Turton (2003) theorized that – as part of broader,
more complex circumstantial and structural contexts – whenever the relational dynamics
between riparian states (the most common, but not exclusive actor of hydropolitics)gravitates
towards cooperation and stronger friendship ties, a stable Hydropolitical Complex (HC) is the
most likely resulting outcome involving the concerned actors. On the other hand, whenever
the opposite occurs, a Hydropolitical Security Complex (HSC) is formed. In this theoretical
setting, an HSC is a tool that aids in mapping situations of heightened tension due to disputes
relating to shared water resources.
Once defined the methodology and the level of analysis and determined the conceptual
model of Hydropolitical Complexes as our theoretical framework, from its application we will

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search for evidences demonstrating the degree of vulnerability of those that share water
resources in scenarios of high water-based dependence and, thereafter, the role played by
these agents in a continuum of hydrological interdependence driven by cooperation and/or
conflict. For such, we chose two sub regions markedly characterized by prevailing situation of
water stress: the Hydropolitical Complexes of Southern Africa and Jordan River Basin.
Fig. 1: Universe of analysis – Southern Africa (left) and the Jordan River Basin (right)
Hydropolitical Complexes
Sources: Relief Web (2009) and McKinney (2003)
To accomplish the proposed objectives, we present a sample of the main structural and
conjunctural defining dynamics within such sub-systemic spaces to, then, analyze the
effectiveness of governance mechanisms vis-à-vis the externalities stemming from the
hydrological interdependence existing amongst some of the main actors of both
Hydropolitical Complexes.
3 - Southern Africa Hydropolitical Complex (SAHC)
Southern Africa comprises Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. Particularly relevant to the subject matter is the influence played by colonialism,
followed by the Cold War and the Apartheid regime which dominated in an overlapping

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fashion at least the last three centuries of the regions’ shared history. In the beginning of the
21st century, some endemic political dynamics based on a common past took over the sub-
regional security agenda, visibly gaining greater autonomy in relation to the global agenda
(TURTON, 2015).
Among the issues that have stood out since then is transboundary water sharing on
which much of the social-political stability and economic development of the region hinges
on (KANIARU, 2010). Due in part to its artificial and arbitrary borders and changing climatic
regimen, transboundary water management is one of the crucial pillars for sustainable
economic development and political stability in Southern Africa. A remarkable feature of
Southern Africa's hydropolitics over this period was the fact that of the seventeen most
threatened watersheds in the world, six of them were to be found in this region's domains,
namely, the Incomati, Kunene, Limpopo, Okavango, Orange and Zambezi river basins (Wolf
et al., 2003: 29; 52), a situation that no longer persists as we shall see.9
Exclusive of the Mauritius and Madagascar, both island countries, all Southern Africa
countries are part of the same set of interlinked Hydropolitical complexes and are subject to
differing degrees of water stress (Turton 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006). Intrinsically coupled to that
is the projection that Africa in general “is the only region in the world where the population is
projected to keep increasing throughout the 21st century. Currently there are 1.2 billion people
in Africa, more than five times the population in 1950. By 2050, Africa's population will
double, to 2.4 billion, eventually reaching 4.2 billion by the end of the century- just about the
entire world population in 1977.” (UNICEF, 2014: online).
Current water stress and population growth are a potentially volatile combination
capable of elevating the management of water resources to a national security and survival
priority status, particularly in those situations in which riparian countries compete over access
to water. This association is what Ohlsson (1995: 4) called the “the ultimate limit” to
development and “an imminent threat to development”. The availability and the access to
water and potable water form the basis to sustainable economic development, being one of the
primary components of the physical base of the state, “particularly under conditions of aridity”
(Turton, 2003:31).
Thus, Hydropolitics assumes distinct contours in this type of scenario in which water
scarcity emerges as a limiting factor to economic growth and social development, mainly in
the most advanced economies in the region. That ensures that water remains and increasingly
becomes more prominent in the Southern Africa’s political agenda. And, although the
possibility of conflict over water resources is potentially growing, scarcity has also the

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potential of evoking and promoting cooperation opportunities and alternative means of
settling disputes (Gleditsch et al, 2005; Bernauer and Boehmelt, 2013).
In Southern Africa's case, mainly over the post-decolonization period, interactions of
riparian countries concerning water related issues have been fundamentally peaceful, leading
to politization and institutionalization of the theme rather than securitization10. Cementing the
normalcy of water relations in the region, regulatory norms and management procedures have
been successfully incorporated to the political processes supporting this cooperative setting
(Turton, 2003: 31; 2006: 8; 2009:6; 2015).
The 1986 South Africa-Lesotho treaty, ‘Lesotho Highlands Water Project’ (LHWP),
exemplifies the nature and achievements of water cooperation in Southern Africa. Essentially,
the LHWP is a cooperative international water supply project with a hydropower component,
that over a period of more than thirty years has facilitated water supply to South Africa in
exchange for electric power supply to Lesotho; the last construction projects are expected to
be delivered by 2020. The final stage of the project will allow for up to seventy cubic meters
of water per second (70 m3/s) to be transferred from the Senqu River in Lesotho to the Vaal
River in South Africa. It has included the damming of sizable areas, a hydropower plant,
transfer tunnels and canals and, considerable social and environmental impacts.11
South Africa is Lesotho’s main partner in practically every area mostly since it is
entirely landlocked by South Africa. Two thirds of Lesotho’s workforce find employment in
the neighboring country, especially in the mining sector and is responsible for at least a third
of the country’s gross national product. Apart from the supply of electricity, South Africa
pays around US$60 million in royalties for the use of Lesotho's water resources and transfers
back electric power generated in the scheme. (IIED, 2015: 2). There is, therefore, a working
Hydropolitical Complex in this two-riparian-country basin.
We call this "Hydropolitical symbiosis". Drawing openly and directly from the
biological sciences, we define it as a mutually advantageous relationship between two or more
states, which actively and voluntarily act in conjunction, for mutual gain (Queiroz, 2012:140).
In the example, the hydropolitically symbiotic relationship between these two riparian states
has been satisfactorily fruitful to both to date (IIED, 2015).12
This emblematic case is a demonstration that a situation of extreme power disparity is
not an insurmountable impediment to viable agreements over shared water resources with
mutually beneficial economic incentives (Wolf and Newton, 2008:1). And, although the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), comprising 15 countries, is also an
emblematic case of extreme power disparity in a regional level, that does not constitute a

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hindrance to cooperation. South Africa has a country share in SADC regional GDP of 55.5%,
while the second largest share, Angola, stands at 13.6% (World Bank, 2013). Nonetheless,
even considering that this is a localized case between only two countries in the region, it does
indicate a progressive and consistent movement away from potential conflict, towards a time
of greater fulfillment of the potential of cooperation (Kaniaru, 2015).
In second place, water tends to be of such importance to riparian states that rather than
fight over it, it leads to long term agreements that withstand even antagonistic and belligerent
actions in other areas (Turton, 2015). This trend, identified by Anthony Turton more than a
decade ago, and currently consolidated by cooperative arrangements resulting from it, is
because water resources were, and still are, perceived as:
“so important for each riparian state. Too important to fight over, to the extent that water
agreements are significant enough to be considered as drivers of international relations in their
own right, leading to the conclusion that a Hydropolitical Complex exists in Southern Africa”
(TURTON, 2005, p.37).
So, in this specific case, the dominating behavior is clearly molded by cooperation.
Conflicts, that eventually arise, are dealt with through peaceful means. Pursuant to this
Fig. 2: Lesotho and South Africa: a case of hydropolitical symbiosis
Source: https://www.dwa.gov.za/orange/images/rm207t6.gif

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consolidated pattern of action, the recognition of such practices results in a plus-sum agenda
based on communicative trust, in which the benefits of cooperation are evident, and, in their
turn, influence directly the way riparian states perceive each other (Queiroz, 2012; Warner et
al, 2013; Kaniaru, 2015).
In this aspect, it is worth highlighting that the first protocol signed by SADC
signatories was the Protocol on Shared Watercourses Systems of August 1995. It testifies to
the strategic importance of water resources to sub regional development and its priority status
in commanding political will for the institutionalization of a cooperative regime - mostly as
hydrographic basins commissions - as a feasible option in conflict management in the region.
Moreover, some provisions contained in the 1992 SADC Treaty and its Protocols
require its parties to solve any disputes amicably, negotiations being the first resort. In case of
failure, the issue may be brought before the SADC Tribunal, created to ensure "adherence to
and the proper interpretation of the provisions of the treaty and the subsidiary instruments,
and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it".13 (UNITAR, 2015: 42).
Aligned to these efforts, the Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM) was
created in September 1994, bringing together Namibia, Angola and Botswana under the motto,
"three countries, one river". It was established to promote the coordinated and sustainable
development of shared water resources and the surrounding environment, concomitantly fairly
accommodating the legitimate demands of each riparian state.
Angola, an upstream riparian and in a privileged position in terms of the water
resources of the Okavango, presented a long-term post-conflict reconstruction agenda for the
south of the country. Namibia, on the other hand, upstream in relation to Botswana,
downstream in relation to Angola, faces multiple limitations to develop the rural northeast,
mostly due to a general scarcity of resources that plagues the region.
Lastly, Botswana, of the three, is the one that presents the best socio-economic
indicators. Nonetheless, the country is the most vulnerable to changes in the Okavango water
regime. Its downstream location and low availability of natural resources in general,
compound the situation.
Each country appoints two commissioners to be representatives at the Permanent
Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM), headquartered in Maun, the fifth
largest town in Botswana, its tourism capital, at the Okavango delta. The Okavango Basin
Steering Committee (OBSC), with three to five permanent and non-permanent members from
each of the three countries supports the OKACOM as a specialized discussion forum, directed
to technical issues in the general agenda and is instrumental in the implementation of the

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OKACOM decisions domestically. The Committee works through three technical task forces:
the Institutional Task Force, the Biodiversity Task Force and the Hydrology Task Force
(OKACOM, 2015).
Among their challenges, the LHWP and the OKACOM have the mission of
implementing large regional water transfer schemes in contexts of severe economic
limitations, worsened by endemic water scarcity. For that, they depend largely on effective
cooperation, particularly in the top tiers of government, among decision-makers, to keep the
agreements relevant and to make expensive and large infrastructural projects such as the
inversion of the normal seasonal flow pattern leave drawers and become reality.
Large projects, such as a proposed abstraction of water from the Zambezi River to the
Okavango and Cunene rivers, a canal linking the Limpopo and Zambezi basins, or a deviation
of 1% of the Okavango flow to the Namibian capital city, Windhoek, have been considered
(Mbaiwa & Mmopelwa, 2009). Nonetheless, potential negative environmental impacts
associated with such projects have allowed for their postponement.
Southern Africa’s hydropolitical complex developed around some of the most
dynamic economies in the region: South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe.
Concomitantly, these are also the countries that face the biggest water stress challenges in the
same region as they are all close to reaching the limit of exploration of available resources in
their territories, water being therefore a limiting factor for social and economic development
(Speed et al, 2013).
These four countries fall into the category of “pivotal states”: riparian states with a
high level of economic development that also have a high degree of reliance on shared river
basins for strategic sources of water supply, with the real prospect of water scarcity posing a
limitation to future economic growth and development.
The southern Africa's pivotal states - Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe
- are, by and large, interlinked by two of the main water basins of the region, the so-called
pivotal basis: water systems that face closure, and which are also strategically important to
any one (or all) of the Pivotal States by virtue of the range and magnitude of economic
activity that they support. In southern Africa, two basins fall into this category: Orange and
Limpopo.” (Turton, 2005:16). Besides the Orange and Limpopo, they also share seven other
smaller water systems - Pungué, Buzi, Save, Incomati, Umbeluzi, Maputo and Thukela – with
the other co-riparian states, forming a multifaceted, complex network of water
interdependence, known as the Southern African Hydropolitical Complex (SAHC), illustrated
below.

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Fig.3: Southern African Hydropolitical Complex (SAHC)
Source: Adapted from Turton (2005:4)
4 - Jordan Basin Hydropolitical Security Complex (JHSC)
The Middle East North Africa region (MENA) is dominated by a territorially
projected hydropolitical structure that encapsulates the magnitude that disputes involving
transboundary water basins can assume in a scenario of scarcity and profound water resources
interdependence, as is the case of the Middle East. The Jordan Basin Hydropolitical Security
Complex (JHSC), which ground and surface water are the main water suppliers for Israel,
Jordan and the Palestinian territories is source and setting of some of the most enduring
conflicts in contemporary times. To a lesser extent, Syria and Lebanon are also part of the
same system, even though the Euphrates, the Orontes and Tiger rivers supply practically all
their water needs (Le Prestre, 2000: 446).

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Water is one of the most contentious issues in the MENA region, and consequently a
fundamental component of the ideal and physical structure of that region’s nation-states
(Buzan, 1991:65, 91; Messerschmid and Selby, 2015, p. 258). Following the Arab-Israeli
War of 1948 (1948-49), latent tensions were further accentuated when Israel initiated in 1952
a project to use the waters of the Jordan to irrigate the Negev Desert. Soon after, in 1953, the
Israelis started the construction of an intake for a diversion for their National Water Carrier at
the Daughters of Jacob Jordan Bridge, north of the Sea of Galilee, in the demilitarized zone
bordering Syria (Priscoli and Wolf, 2010). The construction was soon threatened by a veto by
Russia at the United Nations Security Council and de fato stopped when the United States
threatened Israel with sanctions, though Israel eventually completed the National Water
Carrier in 1964 (Zeitoun, 2008).
When Gamal Abdel Nasser first came to power in Egypt (1954-56) with an ambitious
nationalist project, backed by a discourse of linguistic and religious unity of the Arab world –
Pan-Arabism, and in the context of the Cold War, under Moscow’s military support, the
regional Hydropolitics became further entangled in the general international relations of the
Middle East. One of Nasser’s most daring measures in this period was to block the Straits of
Tiran, where the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba meet, where the exit of the strategic Israeli
harbor of Eilat is found.
The stalemate was one of the ingredients for the second Arab-Israeli war: the Suez
War that broke out on October 29, 1956. From then onwards, the Middle East would attain
the condition as one of the main theaters of the dispute for influence between the two Cold
War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in the context of proxy
confrontation of a then bipolar world. While the United States endorsed and supported Israel’s
political and military actions, the Soviet Union, financed and gave military support and
guidance to Egyptians and Syrians (Bickerton and Klausner, 2014; Kinsella, 1994).
In that period, the riparian states of the Jordan basin could not reach any agreement
that would make feasible an effective and efficient project for shared management of water
resources. Dwight Eisenhower, the then president of the United States, with the United
Nations’ support, appointed Eric Johnston a special representative of the president of the
United States to negotiate the water conflict between Israel, Jordan, and Syria in 1953.
Eisenhower was trying to resolve the regional water issues and diminish the belligerent
tensions by incentivizing cooperation among foes (Shapland, 1997; Queiroz, 2012).

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Fig.4: The Johnston Plan
Source: Elmusa, 1998: 301
The Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan, commonly known as the "Johnston Plan",
formulated in the two ensuing years, received formal approval from the technical committees
of the Arab League and Israel but remained officially unratified (Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).
The would be Arab signatories feared that “their agreement would imply indirect recognition
[…] of Israel.” (Shuval, 2000:44). And, in fact, it did mean that, as a proposal of cooperation
of that magnitude would demand, consequently, the Arab League to recognize Israel as a
legitimate state and, also as a user, de facto and de jure of scarce regional water resources.
Such uncompromising stance further cornered Israel into an aggressive defensive position,

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heightening an insecurity perception that became incorporated in the political discourse and
strategies of the Jewish state (Turton, 2003; Abukhater, 2013).
The years between 1964-67 strengthened the hypothesis of the existence of a
correlation between Arab-Israeli conflict and regional Hydropolitics. It was in that period that
Israel’s neighbors decided to attempt to divert two of the three sources of the headwaters of
the Jordan River – the Headwater Diversion Plan – to make National Water Carrier, initiated
in 1955, unviable (Wolf, 1995).
The Israeli response came through the launching of an intensive airstrike in Syrian
territory against the diversion works in April of 1967 which resulted in the immediate
interruption of the Arab efforts but also in a series of reprisal military actions led by Egypt.
The mounting tension around water related issues and resulting hostility, played a
considerable role in politically justifying the June 1967 Six-Day War. The preemptive attacks
by Israel that initiated the war were, in part, a response to the Jordanian and Syrian led
attempt to divert the Jordan headwaters (Clarke and King, 2005). Lindholm (1995) argues that
if water was not the main cause for the outbreak of the conflict, it certainly was one of its
driving forces, contributing to exacerbating the escalation of aggression between Arabs and
Israelis in the period 1965-1967.
The outcome of the hostilities was a crushing Israeli victory and thus, a new political
geography arrangement as the victors expanded their de facto borders, simultaneously taking
control of close to fifty percent of the region’s water resources. Such view seems to be
supported by the declarations of Ariel Sharon, then Head of the Northern Command Staff of
the Israel Defense Force (IDF) by stating that:
"We could have sat there much longer just watching the [Arab] canal make headway. Exactly
when the government would have moved against the Syrians, or in what context they could
have done so, I do not know. But with their assault in November, Syria started off a round of
fighting that gave us the opportunity to put an end to their project. People generally regard 5
June 1967 as the day the Six-Day War began. This is the official date. But in reality the Six-
Day War started two and a half years earlier, on the day Israel decided to act against the
diversion (initiated by upstream Arab stages) of the Jordan." (Bulloch and Darwish, 1993:50).
In the following years, inspired by the words of David Ben-Gurion, one of the
founding fathers and prime minister (1948-1953 and 1955-1963), "it's necessary that the water
sources, upon which the future of the Land depends, should not be outside the borders of the

17
future Jewish homeland [...] the Land needs this water" (Lindholm, 1995:61), Israel continued
to place Hydropolitics close to the center of its geopolitical concerns, by persistently pursuing
a policy of internalizing its sources of water, on which the development of the country
depended on.
In this manner, the occupation of the Golan Heights plateau and, particularly, of the
Cisjordan or West Bank, from where forty percent of the potable water consumed in Israel
derives, guaranteed not only access to the spring heads of the Jordan River, but also control of
twenty percent of the north banks of the Yarmouk River, its largest tributary (Awartani, 1981).
Also, the water sources in the east bank of Lake Tiberias (Kinneret), Banias and the shared
West Bank Aquifer (in the occupied territories) are in many ways fundamental to Israel's
agriculture viability and even that of the State itself (Le Prestre, 2000; Queiroz, 2012).
On one side, water as a general security issue in Israeli-Syrian relations has been
prominent since before the 1967 war when there were problems in Israel's point of view as
Syria deviated the waters from the spring heads in Golan. Israel wanted to make sure that
Syria would not be able to do that again (Chesnot, 1994; 1992). It is worth highlighting that
the occupation of the Golan Heights allows Israel 770 million cubic meters of water a year,
corresponding to a third of Israel's annual water consumption.
Therefore, any rearrangements in legal or illegal occupation would entail significant
consequences in the geopolitics of Israel and its riparian neighbors. The regional war
epicentered in Syria has profoundly disrupted the tenuous pre-war balance and Israel probably
has never been further away from leaving its strategic water securing positions. A remote
possibility pre-Syria Regional War (March 2011 - ) was an Israeli withdrawal which would
allow Syria to recover its privileged position as the riparian agent in control of the upper
stream Jordan River. Such withdrawal would have resulted in profound rearrangements of
Middle East geopolitics, especially in hydropolitical terms, changing the regional power
positions.
On the other side, Palestinian access to water resources in the West Bank, a hydro-
strategically relevant territory, is extremely unfavorable (Wolf, 1996; Hass, 2014; Zeitoun and
Warner, 2006; United Nations, 2015). Israel sells water at full price to the Palestinians and
controls the amount of water to be sourced in the territory apart from maintenance of existing
water infrastructure and development of new facilities. Concurrently, as the number of Israeli
settlers grows in the occupied territories, the demand for water resources and the inequality in
its distribution have grown at a higher ratio (Tignino, 2014; United Nations, 2015).

18
The average daily Palestinian consumption in the West Bank is 71 litters per capita
while the average Israeli consumption is 350 litters, much superior to the World Health
Organization recommended daily quantity of 100 litters per capita (Clarke and King, 2005;
Carvalho, 2013). By 2012, the West Bank was already purchasing 60% of all municipal water
supply, of which 34% was directly from the national water company of Israel, Mekorot
(Palestinian Water Authority, 2013).
Water has become a major barrier to economic growth and further development in the
West Bank as since 1967, Israel has been limiting Palestinian usage and exploration, taking
control of all water resources. Military orders established Israeli control of all West Bank
aquifers, quotas on pumping, limitations on the depth of wells, limited maintenance and
prohibition of new wells without authorization of the Israeli military command (Le Prestre,
2000; Lindholm, 1995, Palestinian Water Authority, 2013; ESCWA, 2013). And since
October 2002, the Ministry of Infrastructure of Israel has banned Palestinians from drilling for
water and frozen the issuance of future permits. 14
The hydrogeological vulnerability of groundwater to pollution in the West Bank is
high as Israel is already using almost 80 percent of the annual safe yield of the groundwater
basins shared with the West Bank and the unmet demand encourages over-exploitation (Nazer,
2010). The severity of the situation has strengthened the prevalent view among Israeli
authorities that a fully recognized and functional Palestinian state in the West Bank would
seriously compromise the hydro security of the country. In the past, one of the arguments to
justify such fears was that excessive usage was leading to irreversible salinization of the entire
system, which would be "casus belli for Israel, because, in contrast to the situation elsewhere,
no substitutes can be offered to Israel in this matter” (Shapira, 1978, cited in Ohlsson,
1995:66).
Presently, the counterargument is that alternative solutions, such as desalinization
plants of brackish water and treated wastewater re-use are becoming more and more feasible
and offer potential long term solutions (Palestinian Water Authority, 2013). Tignino (2014,
p.395) and Messerschmid and Selby (2015) argue that the Israeli stance seems to give robust
evidence to the existence of a systematic policy of investment of one side and neglect on the
other, being used as an efficient instrument towards guaranteeing political and economic
hegemony of Israel in the West Bank, a dominative form of hydro hegemony that seems to be
common to the region.
The Middle-Eastern geopolitical scenario, including its hydropolitical dimension, has
taken a turn for the worse after at least a positive perspective following the paradigmatic Oslo

19
Agreements of 1993. Bill Clinton, Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995), and Yasir Arafat (1929-2004)
signed the agreement at the signing ceremony at the lawns of the White House in Washington,
DC, on September 13, 1993. The Agreement established the autonomy of the Palestinian in
Jericho, in the West Bank, in the Gaza Strip and in territories west of the Jordan River
occupied during the Six Day War under the Palestinian Authority that was presided by Yasir
Arafat.
The first Oslo Accords ratified the perception that a project that could bring substantial
peace between Israelis and Palestinians would necessarily include that of water sharing (Wolf,
1995). In dealing with the issue, the subsequent agreements of 1995 provisioned for the
creation of a water development program, formed by a regulatory agency overseeing the
hydrographic basin and a joint committee for cooperation – the Joint Water Committee which,
would both formulate proposals that would make possible equitable sharing and access to
water resources (Rouyer, 1999).
Nonetheless, the lack of concrete commitments, the ambiguous nature of the existing
legal mechanisms in relation to distribution and exploration of water resources and Israel’s
limited political will in recognizing a plan for an equitable partition constituted unsurpassable
impediments to reasonable advances in the negotiations (Le Preste, 2000; Handcock, 2004;
Clarke and King, 2005; Carvalho, 2013, Tignino, 2014; Messerschmid and Selby, 2015).
The scenario described points to the hypothesis that in a context of water scarcity and
interdependency, states that control water resources, regardless of the means used to obtain
and guarantee such control, generally are not predisposed to negotiate. Also, they do not find
obvious incentives to cooperate with those states that are incapable of negotiating in a
condition of parity. Therefore, states in a hydropolitical complex are observably in a situation
of vulnerability and dependency in relation to the decisions of the most dominant riparian and
its political will to cooperate or not – both cases made exemplified in the cases of South
Africa toward Lesotho and Israel toward Palestine, respectively.
Riparian states have three main options in such power imbalance scenarios: (1) sign
cooperation agreements, which is difficult, nonetheless not impossible; (2) restructure their
economies to leave them less dependent on shared water resources, a task that imposes many
difficulties, and; (3) militarize water disputes, an option for those that have resources and
necessary incentives available. Faced with limited and costly options, water seems to be set to
continually be an impediment in peace talk and subsequent negotiations regarding a
Palestinian state, as narrated in the next section (Le Prestre, 2000).

20
Following Oslo I, an Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, also
known as Oslo II or Taba Agreement (Egypt) was signed in September 1995. Oslo II created
Areas A, B, C in the West Bank. Area “A”, for eight Palestinian cities and their surrounding
areas (Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho and 80 percent of
Hebron) under full civil and security control of the Palestinian Authority, without any Israeli
settlements and off-limits to Israeli citizens. It corresponds to 3 percent of the West Bank,
apart from East Jerusalem.
Area “B” is composed of almost 440 Palestinian villages and surrounding land, also
has no Israeli settlements, but the Palestinian Authority has only civil control, while security
is shared with the Israelis. Area “C” is an area under complete Israeli civil and security
control, where 60 percent of the Palestinian population live, occupying close to 70 percent of
the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley (the Emek HaYarden Regional Council). Israeli
control is obviously linked to security concerns over the water resources available in the area
even tough article 40, Appendix B of the Oslo II agreements expressively recognizes
Palestinian rights over the same (Clarke and King, 2005; Magnoli, 1996; Caubet, 2006).
Because of this framework, United Nations points out in a recent report that:
Before the occupation, agriculture was the main source of labour and
resources for Palestinians. Palestinian agriculture has, however, been
adversely affected by measures taken by Israel as the occupying
Power, in particular land seizures and restrictions on access to land
and water resources (A/68/513, para. 40). From 1965 to 1994,
cultivated areas shrank by 30 per cent from 1965 to 1994, and
Palestinian agricultural production was reduced, from 50 per cent in
1968 to 4.9 per cent of GDP in 2013. (United Nations 2015, p.10).
Therefore, while Palestinians – based on humanitarian and sovereignty grounds –
assert their right to a larger share of the water resources available in the West Bank, Israel
opposes any principle of equitable utilization. The Israelis do not accept any further revisions
of the present allocation status based on historical and acquired rights, a position that has been
further reinforced by the military and political quagmire in which the Middle East finds itself
drowning since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War (March 2011 - ) and the advent of the
so-called Islamic State.
It should be noted that at least a half dozen major cease-fire violations, especially
between 1951 and 1967, triggered by disputes over water resources, cemented the deadly
political and territorial rivalries among Israelis, Jordanians, Syrians and Lebanese. The issue
of sovereign rights over water resources in the region is set to remain a divisive and complex

21
one until there is political will and popular support for a workable hydropolitical symbiosis
(Tignino, 2010, p.669; United Nations, 2015).
5 - A word of caution
Water is often presented as the central theme in the most dramatic future scenarios due
to its scarcity and indispensability for the maintenance of life and exercise of vital daily
activities. It is frequently treated as a source of power and consequently, as a matter of
national security.
However, although the admonitions presented in relation to the theme are pertinent, it
is also equally pertinent to avoid extreme reductionism in water resource issues (Le Prestre,
2000). In situations in which the uses of water are object of dispute, it might always seem to
be possible to construct a causation path, direct or indirect, proximal or remote, between the
scenario of instability to be explained and understood and a hydropolitical variable and in so
doing, foresee because of this association, the harbinger of future instabilities.
What is suggested is caution when dealing with the binomial “water-security”. There
is a need for analytical tools that would allow us to gauge the real dimension of water
resources among a multiplicity of other variables that also present potential to aggravate a
given situation of instability. In this way, it seems more useful and viable to study
Hydropolitics as another element that generates supplementary tensions (Queiroz, 2012).
After all, it is extremely difficult to sustain a hypothesis advocating water as a
conflict-triggering variable as generally, once there are multiple causes motivating and
originating a conflict, and in the present state of political and international studies, it is
illusory to isolate a single factor as the main cause of a conflict situation.
6 - Conclusions
Empirical evidence is indispensable for determining the role of water in complex
hydropolitical scenarios. Nonetheless, a theoretical framework such as the one applied in this
paper is important for assessing situations such as the case studies presented. Water can thus
be appreciated as an important variable in the regional political dynamics and its impact on
the international relations better understood.
Guided by the comparative method and through the conceptual lenses of the
Hydropolitical Complex Theory, it was possible to infer that, in general, the propensity to

22
cooperate prevails in situations in which the identities among actors are mostly perceived as
positive, as it is in the Southern Africa case. On the other hand, a balance of power situation
stands out, at times with the use of extraordinary means, such as aggressive use of force, in
cases in which these identities are perceived as negative and/or existing mechanisms of
governance are insufficient to lower prevalent perceptions occasioned by lack of trust and
mutual fear of aggression, such observed in the Jordan basin context.
Regarding the two cases, the contrast of contexts technique has led us to hypothesize
that in the Southern Africa Hydropolitical Complex, disputes over water resources have been
mitigated through institutional arrangements strong enough to minimize potential conflict by
directly providing the institutionalization of conflict management mechanisms of water
resources through intergovernmental initiatives such as joint committees. Thus, even in a
prevailing context of first order scarcity (or of natural resources), conflicts arising from the
sharing of water resources have been satisfactorily maintained at the level of the usual
processes of bargaining and dispute of the political sphere, i.e., as a technical issue.
From this perspective, we have the synthesis of the rationale that defines the Southern
Africa Hydrological Complex (SAHC). Supported by the symbiotic nexuses established
between the elements that integrate the structure described, the resultant is a notable degree of
hydrological interdependency that inevitably connects them in a highly politicized multi-
sectorial scenario, that is in itself, the outcome of a context of prevalent cooperation in the
region.
In its turn, through an overview of Hydropolitics at the Jordan River basin, inferences
demonstrated that the intensification of tensions around water resources is not primarily
caused by the region’s deficit between water demand and supply. As seen, it involves other
historical, complex and multidimensional issues which have weightier impact in the general
geopolitical context of the region. In that case, conflicts are fundamentally arising from
physical and territorial integrity disputes, and from identity related underlying problems. They
indicate that physical and conceptual state structures represent the main domains in which
perceptions in terms of threat are formed and water is one more aggravating factor.
The hydropolitical situation in the Jordan basin, therefore, seems to be an additional
risk and threat element, supplementing and further complicating the regional security agenda
and concurrently reinforcing the process of construction of antagonistic identitarian
perceptions among regional actors. In this sense, we found that disputes over the control of
water resources seem to have continually been one of the determining factors in the
maintenance of a violence prone scenario, strong enough to trigger crises or for making it

23
more difficult to reach a compromise on other disputed resources and issues in which enmity
relations are emphasized in a noticeable context of second order scarcity (i.e., lack of
willingness or capacity to deal with changes imposed by a scenario of water scarcity).
Hence, be it in a conflict or cooperation continuum, the satisfactory accommodation of
seemingly competing interests of riparian states is one of the greatest challenges facing
existing governance mechanisms. It gives evidence of the potential that hydrological
interdependence among those actors sharing fresh water has to affect regional political
stability, especially in scarcity-dominated water scenarios.
Therefore, these efforts in ordering demands and preferences that are seemingly
incompatible requires greater effectiveness of the intended actions and also the coordinated
adoption of polycentric and decentralized approaches (i.e., at various levels, with the active
participation of local, national and regional actors), aimed at providing shared management
tools with greater inclusiveness capacity, flexibility and adaptability to uncertainties and
complexities, that quite often come up in such circumstances.
Acknowledgements:
We are immensely grateful to Professors Aaron T. Wolf (Oregon State University); Michael T.
Klare (Hampshire College) and Andrea K. Gerlak (University of Arizona) for their comments
and suggestions on earlier versions of the manuscript that greatly improved it.
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Zeitoun, M., Warner, J. 2006. Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans-boundary
water conflicts. Water Policy 8, 435–460.
1 The Atlas of Transboundary Aquifers, an inventory published by UNESCO in 2008, points
to the existence of 273 aquifers shared by at least two countries, 68 in the Americas, 38 in
Africa, 65 in Eastern Europe, 90 in Western Europe and 12 in Asia (WHYMAP, 2015).
2 The so-called First Order Scarcity (or of natural resources) refers here to water availability.
From this perspective, it is possible to outline three main situations: 1) a pre-water stress
scenario when water availability per capita per year ranges between 1600 to 2000 m3; 2)
Water Shortage when this amount stands between 1.000 and 1.600 m3 per capita per year; 3)
Water scarcity, when the amount available is less than 500 m3 per capita per year. Intrinsically
linked to these scenarios there is also the so-called Second Order Scarcity (scarcity of social
resources) that, in general, refers to the lack of ability and/ or adaptive capacity of social
actors to deal with changes imposed by a scenario of ever increasing water scarcity.
3 A study published in March 2015 by UNESCO – (The UN World Water Development
Report 2015, Water for a Sustainable World (WWDR 2015) – warns that about 748 million
people lack access to clean water sources and 20% of the world aquifers are already being
excessively exploited, which can lead to serious consequences such as soil erosion and
saltwater intrusion in these reservoirs. The report also predicts that world water reserves may
shrink 40% by 2030 and that by 2050, agriculture and food industry will need to increase by
400% its demand for water. Adding to this pessimistic outlook, are estimates that with an
average increase in global temperature of around 2 degrees Celsius (this in a more optimistic
scenario assessed by the UN Panel on Climate Change), water scarcity would certainly triple
in highly vulnerable areas such as North Africa, Middle East and Central Asia. Densely
populated regions in developed countries that presently are already living with chronic
shortages, such as southeast Australia and the southwest of the United States, would also be
severely impacted.
4 United Nations. Agenda 21. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [on the report of
the second Committee (A/47/719). 22 December 1992.
5 United Nations. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [without reference to a Main
Committee (A/55/L.2)] 55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration. 8 September 2000.
6 The history of water treaties dates as far back as 2500 BC, when the two Sumerian city-
states of Lagash and Umma crafted an agreement ending a water dispute along the Tigris
River. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) more than 3,600 treaties
related to water resources have been drawn up since 805 AD, mostly to deal with navigation
and boundary demarcation. Nonetheless, the focus of negotiation and treaty-making in the last
century has shifted away from the aforementioned issues towards the use, development,

30
protection and conservation of water resources (Source:
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transboundary_waters.shtml.)
7 Labeled by the literature on water governance as collaborative or participatory water
management (Plummer et al., 2012; van Buuren, 2013), the polycentric nature of this
approach based on more stakeholder participation, more collaboration, and more interaction
encourages experimental efforts at various levels, which may lead to the development of
methods for assessing in a more accurate way the costs and benefits of specific strategies
adopted in certain situations, and thereafter the possibility of comparing them with results
obtained in other cases.
8 A variable that is held constant to assess or clarify the relationship between two other
variables, in that case, effectiveness of governance mechanisms (dependent variable) and
water scarcity (independent variable).
9 Commonly cited in lists of the most endangered basins, Southern Africa's watersheds are no
longer at risk and one of the reasons is precisely because institutions have been crafted to deal
with water related issues over time and have been successful as an useful conflict mitigating
factor. The SAHC is a very good example that in many situations, rather than causing open
conflict, the need for water sharing can generate unexpected cooperation.
10 Securitization may be understood as an extreme situation in which the securitizing actors
(those in a position of power that have the authority to declare something as being threatened)
facing a threatening situation tries to put the object to be protected (referent object) in a locus
of decision immune to the ordinary rules of the political scenario. Thus, they may use the
means they feel are necessary to solve the problem, including the force (Buzan et al. 1998: p.
23).
11 Source: http://www.lhda.org.ls/Phase1/
12 The hydropolitical symbiosis concept is not fully developed in this manuscript and further
considerations are needed to strengthen and improve it. An important reflection concerns the
role of power imbalances since hydropolitical symbioses are supposed to be based on
consensual rather than imposed concessions. A good starting point for the discussion is the
2006 Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner paper on "hydro-hegemony".
13 Art. 16 of the Declaration and Treaty of the SADC. And although the Court had been
originally assigned to mediate disputes between "States and between natural or legal persons
and States" and between "States and the Community" (Article 17-18 of the Protocol on Court
and Rules of Procedure), a resolution adopted during the SADC Summit, held in 2012,
restricted its activities exclusively to interstate disputes.
14 It is worth mentioning that Israel has capped agricultural uses and well drilling in the West
Bank for both Israelis and Palestinians. Nevertheless, there is a noticeable difference in the
treatment given to both. Military Order n. 158, issued shortly after the Six-Day War,
determined, among other provisions, that Palestinian wells could not exceed a depth of 140
meters, while Israelis were allowed to drill wells over 800 meters. LE PRESTRE (2000, p.
466) states that since 1967 no Palestinian has been authorized to drill a new well for
agricultural purposes or to repair a well in the vicinity of an Israeli one.