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The Yazidi—Religion, Culture and Trauma

Authors:
  • Cooperative State University Baden-Württemberg
Advances in Anthropology, 2017, 7, 333-339
http://www.scirp.org/journal/aa
ISSN Online: 2163-9361
ISSN Print: 2163-9353
DOI:
10.4236/aa.2017.74019 Nov. 15, 2017 333 Advances in Anthropology
The YazidiReligion, Culture and Trauma
Jan Ilhan Kizilhan1,2
1Baden-Württemberg Cooperative State University, Stuttgart, Germany
2Institute for Psychotherapy and Psychotraumatology, University of Duhok, Dohuk, Iraq
Abstract
The Yazidi are Kurdish speakers who have lived for centuries as farmers and
cattle breeders, scattered about in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and the
former Soviet
Union. They shared the same fate as the Kurds when the areas were Islamized
in the 7th
century. Most of the Kurds were forced to convert to Islam. The
Yazidi live predominantly in present day northern Iraq. Their number worl
d-
wide is estimated to be in the region of 800,000 to 1,000,000 (Cetorelli et al.
,
2017). The troops of the self-
proclaimed “Islamic State” conquered 2014 the
areas of northern Iraq and turned on the long-
established religious minorities
in the area wi
th tremendous brutality, especially towards the Yazidi. Huge
numbers of men were executed; thousands upon thousands of women and
children were abducted and wilfully subjected to sexual violence. The religious
minority was to be eliminated and the will of the victims broken.
The future
of Yazidism is unclear, but it will certainly never be the same again.
Keywords
Yazidi, Religion, Trauma, Terror, Minority
1. Introduction
The word “Yazidi” “Yezidi”, “Izîdî” or “Ezdayi”, “Êzîdî”, as it is pronounced by
the members of the religious community, comes from Kurdish and means “the
one who created me”, that is, the Creator and God (Kreyenbroek & Rasho,
2005). I shall continue to use the term “Yazidi” in this text since it has been used
for several centuries and because it is the one the general public is most familiar
with. Yazidism is the belief in one Entity and in one God, in other words, a
monotheistic faith (Omarkhali, 2016). The Yazidi call God “Xweda” (Khuda),
which means “the one who created himself” (Grant, 1915).
The seven archangels follow God; they are also mentioned in Judaism, Chris-
tianity and in Islam. These angels are included in the Yazidi daily prayers. The
How to cite this paper:
Kizilhan, J. I.
(201
7). The Yazidi
Religion, Culture and
Trauma
.
Advances in Anthropology, 7
,
333
-339.
https:
//doi.org/10.4236/aa.2017.74019
Received:
October 14, 2017
Accepted:
November 12, 2017
Published:
November 15, 2017
Copyright © 201
7 by author and
Scientific
Research Publishing Inc.
This work is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution International
License (CC BY
4.0).
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Open Access
J. I. Kizilhan
DOI:
10.4236/aa.2017.74019 334 Advances in Anthropology
chief of the seven angels is Tausi Melek, the Peacock Angel, commissioned by
God with the surveillance of the world and in particular with the protection of
the Yazidi (Allison, 2016).
Each Yazidi is obliged to fast on three days per year, in December, as a sign of
gratitude for the creation of the earth and in remembrance of God and the
Yazidi faith. Each Yazidi must also visit the holy temple “Lalish” in northern
Iraq once during his or her lifetime. The Yazidi have a system of beliefs with
universal principles on ethics and morals, right and wrong, justice, truth, loyalty,
mercy and love (Guest, 1993).
2. The History of the Yazidi
The Yazidi themselves claim to be members of one of the oldest world religions
and make reference to Mithraism and its relationship to Yarsan and Zarathrustra
(Kreyenbroek & Rashow, 2005). The Yazidi have reported massacres since the
Arab invasion of the Near and Middle East in 637 A.D. and the enforced
Islamisation and these continue to the present day. They were, and still are, con-
sidered by radical Muslims as “Devil Worshippers” and are not regarded as
“Followers of the Book”. As a result of the pressure of being forced to convert to
Islam, the eretreated to the hills and had only limited contact to the other
groups. Their religion was passed on orally by the priests. Therefore, the history
of the Yazidi is an “Oral History” (Kizilhan, 2014). There are very few written
documents by the Yazidi about the Yazidi and this has only changed in the last
50 years (Furlani, 1936; Omarkhali, 2017).
The Yazidi generally assume that their origins are in the Mithraic religion, up
to the 14th century B.C. Up to the 7th century A.D. there is no mention in his-
torical sources of the term “Yazidi”. Around the turn of the century Moslem
clerics and historians started using the term “Yazidi” (Al-Damalgi, 1949).
In the 10th century the Arabian historian Al-Samani (ca. 1166) in his book
“Al-Ansab” (The Genealogies) describes the Yazidi as a group of Aztecs living in
the Helwan hills (nowadays Northern Iraq/Kurdistan Region). In his book he
also mentions that the Yazidi are loyal to Yazid Ibn Muawiya, the second Om-
mayid Caliph (Al-Samani, 1912). In some communities in Kurdish regions this
false assertion is still held today and has often been used as an argument and jus-
tification for plundering and enslaving the Yazidi. Since that time, and even to-
day, some Shiites and Alevites believe that the Yazidi, as followers of Yazid Ibn
Muawiya, killed the prophet Ali’s sons Hasan and Hüssein, who were to be Mo-
hammed’s successors. Only in the last forty years has there been any real contact
between the Yazidi and the Alevites and they are nowadays engaged in dialogue
(Encyclopaedia Iranica, 2014). When the Osman Empire collapsed, many Yazidi
fled, along with the Armenians, to present-day Armenia and lived there in the
Caucasus regions of the former Soviet Union. At the end of the First World War
and the foundation of Turkey in 1923 the Yazidi homeland was partitioned.
Since then, the Yazidi have been living in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and the former So-
viet Union.
J. I. Kizilhan
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10.4236/aa.2017.74019 335 Advances in Anthropology
2.1. Sheikh Adi and the Founding of a New System of Religion
In recent years the last Yazidi reformer has again and again been the subject of
countless discussions within the Yazidi community. Since the Yazidi are forbid-
den from having a relationship and marrying persons of a different religion,
Yazidi are very critical of Islam. In the past they have suffered countless repri-
sals, persecution and have fled from the Moslems on many occasions. Sheikh
Adi himself is supposed to have been a Moslem. Many Yazidi reject such a claim,
since a person can only be Yazidi by birth. There were no Yazidi missionaries as
there were in the case of Christians or Moslems.
Countless documents confirm, however, that Sheikh Adi, son of Musafir, was
born in the village of Bait al-Far (nowadays known as Khirbet Qanfar) in the
Baalbak region of Lebanon around 1050 or 1075. He is a descendant of the Ibra-
him family, son of Abdul Malik, son of Mervan Ibn Al-Hakam (Al-Jazri, 1966).
Sheikh Adi died aged ninety. The Yazidi regard Sheikh Adi as the incarnation of
Tausi Melek, the Peacock Angel. The Tal Lalish became Sheikh Adis headquar-
ters and since that time has been regarded as holy. It has become a place of pil-
grimage for all Yazidi (Kreyenbroek & Rashow, 2005).
At that time the Yazidi assumed that Sheikh Adi had received his mental and
spiritual power from Tausi Melek (the Peacock Angel). This tradition also says
that Sheikh Adi was sent by Tausi Melek to be the leader of the Yazidi
(Kreyenbroek & Rashow, 2005). After settling among the Yazidi, he introduced a
new religious doctrine called “Sad u Had”, “Rights and Duties” (Kizilhan, 1997).
2.2. The Caste System
Sheikh Adi’s arrival amongst the Yazidi community in the 12th century did not
only have religious significance. Setting up the caste system changed the whole
structure of the community. The relationship of the groups to each other was
re-defined. There were the
Sheikhs
(teachers) on the one hand and the
Murids
(lay people, the people) on the other. This structure can also be found among the
Sufis. The existing group of priests (
Pirs
) lost their position as the main instruc-
tors in the Yazidi religion. They were so strongly anchored in the Yazidi com-
munity however, that they continued to play an important religious role, albeit a
role subordinate to that of the Sheikhs (Lescot, 1938; Kizilhan, 2009).
The Yazidi tribes were divided among the Sheikhs and Pirs. Each Sheikh and
Pir who was responsible for a tribe had to have a connection to the instructor of
the other tribe (Kreyenbroek & Rashow, 2005).
Marriage between Pir and Sheikh (castes) is forbidden. Within the Sheikh
caste only descendants of the one group are allowed to marry one another. In the
Pir caste it is taboo for persons descending from Pir Hasan to marry Mamans.
The Pirs can, however, marry among their own people. It is strictly forbidden for
Murids to marry Sheikhs or Pirs (Jindy, 1998; Omerkhali, 2007).
From an ethical point of view the marriage prohibitions of the castes among
each other make for clear relationships (Al-Jadan, 1960). It is only possible to be
a member of a group by birth. It is not possible to change groups. Such a clear
J. I. Kizilhan
DOI:
10.4236/aa.2017.74019 336 Advances in Anthropology
division and the fact that it is impossible to change to a different caste prevents
any power struggle between the castes. Each individual is aware of his or her so-
cial status and has no chance to change this. Marrying a person from a different
religious community is also not possible.
Many of these rules have been destroyed as a result of the terror carried out by
the “Islamic State” 2014 and the rape of thousands of women, young girls and
children. Sexual contact with non-Yazidi also led to the community rejecting its
own daughters and wives since they were no longer Yazidi. At the same time, in
addition to destroying the infrastructure, IS terror is systematically trying to de-
stroy a complete community, which is why the UN speaks of genocide (UN Re-
port on Genocide against the Yazidi
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20113
&LangID=E, 14.09.2017).
3. Collective Trauma and Terror
The Islamisation of the Kurdish areas in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey brought
with it an odyssey of persecution. The Kurds, and with them the Yazidi, were
forced to convert to Islam. This happened not with the onset of IS terror but
with the overall Islamisation of the Middle East. We must assume that 74 geno-
cides against the Yazidi have been carried out in the past 800 years by Islamised
groups and states. To date, according to conservative estimates, some 1.8 million
Yazidi have had to convert and some 1.2 million Yazidi have been killed
(Kizilhan, 2016; Gerdau et al., 2017). Numerous fatwas have “legitimised” their
killing, looting, abduction and, since their religion was not recognised, their
forcible conversion to Islam. IS also uses such spurious arguments to carry out
genocide against the Yazidi (Kizilhan & Othman, 2012).
Minority religions such as Yazidi, oriental Christians, Mandaeans, Shabaks,
Feylis and other groups have often been the target of persecution and annihila-
tion by radical Islamised groups in the Middle East (Gerdau et al., 2017).
After the end of the Saddam Hussein era in 2003, and particularly since 2007,
hundreds of Yazidi in Iraq have been murdered by the terrorist group Al-Qaida
(Kizilhan & Othman, 2012). Even today they are ostracised and have to suffer
reprisals from the Muslim majority. Since the attack by Islamic State (IS) at the
beginning of August 2014 more than 7000 Yazidi have been killed, thousands of
families held hostage in their villages and, if they did not convert to Islam, mur-
dered. Over 5800 young girls have been abducted, raped and sold on Arab mar-
kets, enslaved and killed. Over 20,000 Yazidi have fled to Syria, 30,000 to Turkey
and over 360,000 to the Kurdish region. The Yazidi have been, and are still be-
ing, systematically persecuted and murdered (Tekin et al., 2016).
4. Systematic Destruction of the Yazidi Community
From 3rd August 2014 onwards, IS began terrorising Yazidi villages and soon
gained control of the area. The Iraqi army and the Kurdish Peshmerga retreated
J. I. Kizilhan
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10.4236/aa.2017.74019 337 Advances in Anthropology
and the people were helpless, at the mercy of Islamic State terror. People were
herded into buildings such as schools and town halls and their jewellery and
valuables confiscated. IS then separated the men from the women. Many men
were executed immediately. More than 150 women who I interviewed reported
that in the village of Kocho, for example, more than 413 men were executed on
15th August 2015. After that, the older women, women with children, married
women without children, young boys and girls between eight and 14 years had
to form groups and were taken to various locations. Older women and women
with children were interned in mass accommodation or in villages, near Tel Afar
or Mosul for instance, where the Shiites had previously lived. They were guarded
by IS fighters, humiliated, beaten, raped. Every evening not only IS fighters but
also male civilians from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Tunisia and other
countries turned up because they wanted to buy the women and take them away
with them (Cetorelli et al., 2017).
Women are being forced to convert to Islam and to pray in Arabic every day,
even though they only speak Kurdish. Children are being drilled and exploited,
similar to African child-soldiers. They are being brought up to be brutal, even to-
wards their own families. In camps they are trained to beat other children, to cru-
cify them, or to bury them alive if they do not adhere to IS demands. Those who
are not sent to fight serve as the emirs’ lackeys or as guards or spies in the villages
or camps where Yazidi or other religious minorities are held captive (Kizilhan,
2017).
Since the Yazidi do not see any hope of a peaceful life in Iraq, they are trying
to leave the country, above all they want to come to Germany because the Yazidi
in Turkey have been migrating to Germany since the 1960s.
Flight and Migration
For more than 50 years the Yazidi have been living in Germany as migrants who
have left their homeland for economic and political reasons. Of some 40,000
Yazidi in Turkey there are, according to some estimates, around 38,000 living in
Germany today (Kizilhan, 2014). According to the Turkish interior ministry
there are no more than 470 Yazidi living in the whole of Turkey. On account of
their small number, the Yazidi are no longer in a position to live effectively as a
group in Turkey or to revitalise their community. Most of the 470 Yazidi are
over 60 years old and the majority of the following generation live in Europe.
In recent years, increasing numbers of Yazidi have fled to Germany from
Syria, Iraq and the former Soviet Union. Since the IS invasion in 2014 ca. 40,000
Yazidi from Iraq alone have fled to Germany. There are some 120,000 Yazidi in
Germany and some further 40,000 in the other European countriesand the
trend is upward (Kizilhan, 2016). Around 12,000 Yazidi are now living in the
USA, 5000 in Canada and 2000 in Australia.
Since Europe is completely strange to the Yazidi, they are exposed to many
social, political and cultural burdens. The way of life is different and is com-
pletely foreign for the new, severely-traumatised Yazidi.
J. I. Kizilhan
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10.4236/aa.2017.74019 338 Advances in Anthropology
The Yazidi refugee children and adolescents do not just suffer from PTSD but
from various other problems (Tekin et al. 2017). As a result, any problems which
the survivors of torture have need to be defined far more broadly than by mere
PTSD symptoms and recognition must be given to the contextual influences of
being a torture survivor, including as an asylum seeker or refugeeor belong-
ing to special ethnic group, and to psychological and social health factors
(Kizilhan, 2016). In addition to mental disorders like PTSD, long-term studies
indicate a change in the social, culture and religion structure in the migration
after the IS. The Yazidi community has been changed fundamentally and it is
not clear whether they will survive as group or not. They can learn from the ca-
tastrophe of trauma and can grow as a group by adapting new rules in the wake
of migration such as the rules relating to marriage to a non-Yazidi, changing the
cast system, and trying to overcome the collective and individual trauma.
5. Conclusion
To what extent, trauma management is possible also depends on the way a soci-
ety deals with the topic of sexuality, violence, and transgenerational stress. The
women have been raped and abused and this is known publicly. In this context,
the women experience considerable insecurity, sometimes refusing to talk about
it (a complete taboo). High moral conceptions and limitations along with inter-
nalised attitudes relating to “honour and the violation of honour” lead to con-
siderable worry and the fear of collective exclusion. In this respect, feelings of
shame play a particular part. This is because, in a “shame culture”, it is not so
much the incident itself and the perpetration of a possible violation of the norm
which plays a part but rather how one can save one’s face in front of the others.
Thus, for instance, the rape of a young woman can be evaluated by the collective
as disgraceful and the victim can be ostracised.
The feeling of loss and the shift of balance on all sides triggers various
re-defining and cultural assertion tendencies, and these need a long time to take
hold. On the other hand the individual who is freed from his old rites and rules
will have difficulties to feel at ease in his new “religious homeland”. This new
homeland, however, can mean a real chance of survival for the following genera-
tion. Renewals, reforms and changes must not necessarily be negative or prob-
lematical experiences. It is conceivable that the increasing cosmopolitan nature,
migration, and becoming acquainted with other cultures can be experienced as
an enrichment and can therefore facilitate the renewal process.
Re-orientation and transformation are necessary, but are only possible once
the historical and individual trauma has been processed.
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ID=E
... This, however, apparently does not affect the willingness of Zoroastrians in the KRI to accept new converts, and both Awat Tayib and Pir Luqman indicated that thousands had joined Zoroastrianism over the past few years (Awat Tayib, Besides internal theological differences, it is important to examine to what extent the predominantly Muslim society in the KRI is willing to accept conversion. While the religious landscape in the KRI is diverse, some non-Muslim groups like the Yezidis simply do not accept conversion at all (Kizilhan, 2017: 2), while others, like the various Christian groups that in theory can proselityse, do not do so, at least not publicly. The public acceptance of conversion by Zoroastrians is therefore unsurprisingly attracting criticism and animosity from some Muslims in the KRI. ...
... This, however, apparently does not affect the willingness of Zoroastrians in the KRI to accept new converts, and both Awat Tayib and Pir Luqman indicated that thousands had joined Zoroastrianism over the past few years (Awat Tayib, Besides internal theological differences, it is important to examine to what extent the predominantly Muslim society in the KRI is willing to accept conversion. While the religious landscape in the KRI is diverse, some non-Muslim groups like the Yezidis simply do not accept conversion at all (Kizilhan, 2017: 2), while others, like the various Christian groups that in theory can proselityse, do not do so, at least not publicly. The public acceptance of conversion by Zoroastrians is therefore unsurprisingly attracting criticism and animosity from some Muslims in the KRI. ...
... This, however, apparently does not affect the willingness of Zoroastrians in the KRI to accept new converts, and both Awat Tayib and Pir Luqman indicated that thousands had joined Zoroastrianism over the past few years (Awat Tayib, Besides internal theological differences, it is important to examine to what extent the predominantly Muslim society in the KRI is willing to accept conversion. While the religious landscape in the KRI is diverse, some non-Muslim groups like the Yezidis simply do not accept conversion at all (Kizilhan, 2017: 2), while others, like the various Christian groups that in theory can proselityse, do not do so, at least not publicly. The public acceptance of conversion by Zoroastrians is therefore unsurprisingly attracting criticism and animosity from some Muslims in the KRI. ...
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... This, however, apparently does not affect the willingness of Zoroastrians in the KRI to accept new converts, and both Awat Tayib and Pir Luqman indicated that thousands had joined Zoroastrianism over the past few years (Awat Tayib, Besides internal theological differences, it is important to examine to what extent the predominantly Muslim society in the KRI is willing to accept conversion. While the religious landscape in the KRI is diverse, some non-Muslim groups like the Yezidis simply do not accept conversion at all (Kizilhan, 2017: 2), while others, like the various Christian groups that in theory can proselityse, do not do so, at least not publicly. The public acceptance of conversion by Zoroastrians is therefore unsurprisingly attracting criticism and animosity from some Muslims in the KRI. ...
... This, however, apparently does not affect the willingness of Zoroastrians in the KRI to accept new converts, and both Awat Tayib and Pir Luqman indicated that thousands had joined Zoroastrianism over the past few years (Awat Tayib, Besides internal theological differences, it is important to examine to what extent the predominantly Muslim society in the KRI is willing to accept conversion. While the religious landscape in the KRI is diverse, some non-Muslim groups like the Yezidis simply do not accept conversion at all (Kizilhan, 2017: 2), while others, like the various Christian groups that in theory can proselityse, do not do so, at least not publicly. The public acceptance of conversion by Zoroastrians is therefore unsurprisingly attracting criticism and animosity from some Muslims in the KRI. ...
... This, however, apparently does not affect the willingness of Zoroastrians in the KRI to accept new converts, and both Awat Tayib and Pir Luqman indicated that thousands had joined Zoroastrianism over the past few years (Awat Tayib, Besides internal theological differences, it is important to examine to what extent the predominantly Muslim society in the KRI is willing to accept conversion. While the religious landscape in the KRI is diverse, some non-Muslim groups like the Yezidis simply do not accept conversion at all (Kizilhan, 2017: 2), while others, like the various Christian groups that in theory can proselityse, do not do so, at least not publicly. The public acceptance of conversion by Zoroastrians is therefore unsurprisingly attracting criticism and animosity from some Muslims in the KRI. ...
... Eine Erklärung könnte darin liegen, dass beide Gruppen nach religiösen Einschränkungen in den Herkunftsländern in Deutschland nunmehr umfassender von ihrer Religionsfreiheit Gebrauch machen (nachholende Intensivierung). Der Psychologe Jan Ilhan Kizilhan (2017) Privatisierung, also die Verlagerung des religiösen Lebens in den persönlichen Bereich. In einem früheren Beitrag habe ich argumentiert, dass die gleichen Mechanismen, die für religiöse Intensivierung angeführt werden, auch eine Relativierung oder Privatisierung der religiösen Lebensführung begründen könnten (Nagel, 2022): So können soziale Benachteiligungslagen dazu führen, dass für religiöse Betätigung im Alltag Zeit und Raum fehlen. ...
Article
Im Fokus dieses Beitrags steht die Frage, wie Geflüchtete traumatisierende Erfahrungen artikulieren und ggf. religiös adressieren. Dahinter steht die Annahme, dass es im Vorfeld oder im Verlauf der Flucht zu Traumatisierungen kommen kann, die im Aufnahmeland gedeutet und verarbeitet werden müssen. Auf der Basis von Interviews mit Geflüchteten, die teilweise auch von religiöser Verfolgung betroffen waren, werden die vielfältigen Erscheinungsformen solcher Traumata sowie verschiedene Coping-Strategien analysiert. Dabei zeigt sich, dass traumatische Erfahrungen auch im Kontext von Ankunft und Aufnahme autreten und der meritokratische Diskurs über Migration als volkswirtschaftliche Ressource für Geflüchtete eine implizite Norm des Vergessens und Verdrängens etabliert, um sich möglichst rasch in die gesellschaftlichen Funktionssysteme eingliedern zu können. Religion kommt in diesem Zusammenhang sowohl als Teil der Lösung als auch als Teil des Problems in den Blick.
... The name 'Yazidi', 'Izîdî', 'Ezdayi' or "zîdî," as it is pronounced by members of the religious community, originates in Kurdish and means "the one who creates me', that is, God (Kizilhan, 2017). They follow Yezidism, which is a monotheistic religion, following one god, and Malak-Tawus, the Peacock Angel, is the most important prophet in the Yazidi belief system, which is both divine and evil (Wilkinson et al., 2019). ...
Article
Background The Yazidi community is a Kurdish minority of the population that lives mainly in Iraq. In history, they suffered from many problems and disasters, including the most recent brutal invasion by ISIS, which significantly impacted their mental health. Aims Our objective is to examine the prevalence of psychiatric disorders among Yazidi people resulting from the invasion of ISIS in 2014. Methods A systematic review was performed using the PRISMA protocol. 252 publications were initially identified in PubMed, EMBASE, Scopus, and Google Scholar using relevant keywords. Finally, 23 full articles were included for data extraction. The inclusion criteria were English papers that investigated Yazidi's psychiatric problems, regardless of gender, or age. However, letters to editors, systematic reviews, and studies that examine general physical health were excluded. Results A total of 252 publications were identified; 217 were assessed for eligibility, of which 23 studies met eligibility criteria and were included in the present systematic review. According to the findings, the Yazidi people were severely affected by persecution, forced migration, massacres, and ISIS violence in the recent period and suffered from a variety of mental and psychiatric problems. The most prevalent mental disorders among Yazidi people of all ages and sexes are PTSD, depression, and anxiety disorders. Conclusion This study indicates that the Yazidi minority is a traumatized population. According to the results of the current systematic review, the Yazidi have suffered from a variety of mental and psychological disorders, most commonly PTSD, depression, and anxiety. Eventually, addressing these challenges should be prioritized to improve the quality of life of Yazidis through implications for intervention.
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Background: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) committed genocide of the Yazidis in Sinjar 2014, resulting in dispersion and enslavement. Research shows severe mental health problems, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among survivors, but less is known about their resources and strengths, conceptualized as posttraumatic growth (PTG). Aims: are to examine the balance between symptoms and strengths among Yazidi women caring for their infants by identifying groups differing in PTSD and PTG, and analyze how demographic, obstetric, and infant-related factors associate with the groups. Method: Participants were 283 Yazidi mothers with their 1-18-month-old infants displaced in Kurdish Region of North Iraq. PTSD symptoms were measured by Harvard Trauma Questionnaire and PTG by the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory. Results: identified four groups: "Severe symptoms and low growth" (39%), "Low symptoms and moderate growth" (38%), "Moderate symptoms and very high growth" (13%), and "Moderate symptoms and low growth" (10%). Low education, economic difficulties and obstetric problems related to the "Severe symptoms and low growth" group, whereas newborn and infant health problems did not have an impact. Conclusion: Effective help for genocide survivors should both alleviate suffering and encourage resources through tools of recreating a sense of cultural security and pride.
Book
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Public and academic interest in the Yezidis, their religion and culture, has increased greatly in recent years. The study of Yezidism has also made considerable progress in recent decades. Still, several lacunae in our knowledge remain, notably concerning many concrete aspects of the textual tradition. This book is a comprehensive study of the Yezidi religious textual tradition, containing descriptions of many hitherto unknown aspects of the oral transmission of Yezidi religious knowledge. It presents a detailed account of the ‘mechanisms’ underlying various aspects of the tradition. It shows how the religious textual tradition functioned – and to a certain degree still does – in its pre-modern way, and also describes the transformations it is currently undergoing, including the issues and processes involved in the increasing trend to commit religious knowledge to writing, and indeed to create a written Canon. The work contains several hitherto unpublished texts and the most comprehensive survey to date of the extant Yezidi sacred texts. It is accompanied by a CD with an extensive collection of recordings of texts. Omarkhali, Khanna. The Yezidi Religious Textual Tradition: From Oral to Written. Categories, Transmission, Scripturalisation and Canonisation of the Yezidi Oral Religious Texts, Studies in Oriental Religions 72, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2017, X, 625 p.
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Background In August 2014, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacked the Yazidi religious minority living in the area of Mount Sinjar in Nineveh governorate, Iraq. We conducted a retrospective household survey to estimate the number and demographic profile of Yazidis killed and kidnapped. Methods and findings The survey covered the displaced Yazidi population from Sinjar residing in camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Fieldwork took place between 4 November and 25 December, 2015. A systematic random sample of 1,300 in-camp households were interviewed about the current household composition and any killings and kidnappings of household members by ISIS. Of the 1,300 interviewed households, 988 were Yazidi from Sinjar. Yazidi households contained 6,572 living residents at the time of the survey; 43 killings and 83 kidnappings of household members were reported. We calculated the probability of being killed and kidnapped by dividing the number of reported killings and kidnappings by the number of sampled Yazidis at risk, adjusting for sampling design. To obtain the overall toll of killings and kidnappings, those probabilities were multiplied by the total Yazidi population living in Sinjar at the time of the ISIS attack, estimated at roughly 400,000 by the United Nations and Kurdish officials. The demographic profile of those killed and kidnapped was examined, distinguishing between children and adults and females and males. We estimated that 2.5% of the Yazidi population was either killed or kidnapped over the course of a few days in August 2014, amounting to 9,900 (95% CI 7,000–13,900) people in total. An estimated 3,100 (95% CI 2,100–4,400) Yazidis were killed, with nearly half of them executed—either shot, beheaded, or burned alive—while the rest died on Mount Sinjar from starvation, dehydration, or injuries during the ISIS siege. The estimated number kidnapped is 6,800 (95% CI 4,200–10,800). Escapees recounted the abuses they had suffered, including forced religious conversion, torture, and sex slavery. Over one-third of those reported kidnapped were still missing at the time of the survey. All Yazidis were targeted regardless of age and sex, but children were disproportionately affected. They were as likely as adults to be executed but constituted 93.0% (95% CI 71.9–98.6) of those who died on Mount Sinjar. Moreover, children only accounted for 18.8% (95% CI 8.4–36.9) of those who managed to escape captivity. A sensitivity analysis suggests that the actual toll of killings and kidnappings may be underestimated in our data because of survival bias. The uncertainty associated with inference from a small sample of in-camp households and the reliance on a rough figure of 400,000 for extrapolation to the total Yazidi population of Sinjar at the time of the ISIS attack are the main limitations of this study. Conclusions Consistent with other existing evidence, our data provide a clear indication of the severity of the ISIS attack against the Yazidis in terms of both the number and demographic profile of those targeted.
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Background: Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression are common among populations displaced due to large-scale political conflicts and war. Objective: The aim of this study is to investigate the prevalence and gender-based differences in symptoms of PTSD and depression among Iraqi Yazidis displaced into Turkey. Method: The study was conducted on 238 individuals who were evaluated using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I) and the Stressful Life Events Screening Questionnaire. Results: Of the participants, 42.9% met the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for PTSD, 39.5% for major depression, and 26.4% for both disorders. More women than men suffered from PTSD and major depression. More women than men with PTSD or depression reported having experienced or witnessed the death of a spouse or child. Women with PTSD reported flashbacks, hypervigilance, and intense psychological distress due to reminders of trauma more frequently than men. Men with PTSD reported feelings of detachment or estrangement from others more frequently than women. More depressive women than men reported feelings of guilt or worthlessness. Conclusions: PTSD and major depression affected women more frequently than men. While women tended to respond to traumatic stress by undermodulation of emotions and low self-esteem, men tended to respond by overmodulation of emotions. Rather than being a derivative of sex differences, this complementary diversity in response types between genders seems to be shaped by social factors in consideration of survival under extreme threat.
Article
Antecedents Sheikh Adi and his order the Yezidi religion early encounters with the outside world prisoners on a sinking ship English-speaking missionaries and explorers Rassam and Layard the tribulations of Mir Hussein Beg Abdul Hamid and the Yezidis the publication of the sacred books brother and sister the epoch of Mayan Khatun the Yezidis in transcaucasia. Appendix: the Yezidi sacred books and Sheikh Adi's hymn texts of the Yezidi letters to the Grand Vizier and Sir Stratford Canning an interview with Yezidi religious leaders.
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