BookPDF Available

Altered Self and Altered Self Experience

Authors:

Abstract and Figures

From a theoretical point of view the experiences in which the feeling of self is temporarily or permanently altered, pose opportunities to apply, critically verify or even renew theories of the self. The altered self, from a human point of view, gains its most relevance when it is related to psychological sufferings, their comprehension, relief or treatment. For some, self-alterations are desired as in technically achieved, or drug induced suspensions of a “fixed”, „regular“, „normalized“ or „orthodox“ experience of self. Altered Self and Altered Self-Experience (ASASE) explores different conceptual and clinical notions of the altered Self and different modes of altered self-experience in order to clarify the notion of self. This book deals with questions on the self from an interdisciplinary point of view including decidedly divergent perspectives from different philosophical approaches to the Altered Self and Altered Self-Experience such as “neuro”-philosophies, philosophy of emotion, philosophy of psychiatry, phenomenology besides approaches from developmental psychology, mindfulness praxis, as well as religious studies, cinema and literature studies. ASASE is the result of a selection of research papers of the project “Cognitive Foundation of the Self” with contributions of international scholars who mainly presented and discussed their work at the international workshop "Altered Self and Altered Self Experience" organized by Alexander Gerner (CFCUL) and Jorge Gonçalves (IFILNOVA) held at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa (FCSH-UNL) at the institute of philosophy IFILNOVA on the 30th and 31st of May 2013 in Lisbon, Portugal. Authors of this volume include: Dina Mendonça, Amber Griffioen, Sara F. Bizzaro, Niccola Zippel, João Fonseca, Alexander Gerner, Michele Guerra, Iwona Janicka, Gabriel Levy, Bernardo Palmerim, Michaela Hulstyn, Vera Pereira, Jorge Gonçalves, Pablo López-Silva Pio Abreu, Georg Northoff, Inês Hipólito and Anna Ciaunica. Chapters include: Emotional Aspects of the self; Disembodiment of Self-experience: Out-of-Body Experience, Full-Body Illusion and Cinematic Experience; Altered Self-Experience in Religious Self-Experience, Intimacy, Self Reports of Drug-Experiments and Mindfulness Meditation; Gender and Altered Self-Experience; Acting Theories and the Self; Altered Self in Schizophrenia; Altered Social Selves: Autism and intersubjectivity
Content may be subject to copyright.
A preview of the PDF is not available
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Chapter
Full-text available
In this paper I take attention as a constitutive ground of the self. I crit- ically survey the claim of Metzinger that a subjective self, defined as the centre of awareness, is the possibility of being able to manipulate the focus of attention, thereby stabilizing subjective experience. Thus I propose an attentional self in which I will put Metzinger’s thesis of the “control of the focus of attention” and the resulting notion of the “atten- tional self ” critically into perspective by approximating the concept of the self by means of conceptual personae of the “impossible” attention- al self in Paul Valery’s dyadic conceptual personae “Monsieur Teste”/ “Émilie Teste” and the “heautoscopic” attentional self in Italo Calvino’s “Mister Palomar”.
Book
Psychopathology is the study of the signs and symptoms of psychiatric disorders - delusions, hallucinations, phobias, depression, for example. This book gives an account of the terms currently in use and attempts an in-depth analysis of the nature of each. The matter is examined both from a philosophical perspective and from the point of view of what is known about the function of the hemispheres of the brain.
Article
Deficits specific to the syndrome of infantile autism appear in imitation, emotion sharing, theory of mind, pragmatics of communication, and symbolic play. Current competing theories of Hobson and of Baron-Cohen, Frith, and associates account for some, but not all, of these specific deficits. The present article suggests that early social capacities involving imitation, emotion sharing, and theory of mind are primarily and specifically deficient in autism. Further, these three capacities involve forming and coordinating social representations of self and other at increasingly complex levels via representational processes that extract patterns of similarity between self and other. Stern's theory of interpersonal development is offered as a continuous model for understanding the development and deficits of the autistic child and as a means for integrating competing theories about the primary deficits in autism. Finally, the article suggests a neuropsychological model of interpersonal coordination involving prefrontal cortex and executive function capacities that is consistent with the social deficits observed in autism.
Book
Integrating the perspectives of a number of disciplines, this work examines social referencing in infants within the broader contexts of cognition, social relations, and human society as a whole.
Chapter
One of the principal tenets of contemporary cognitive psychology is that there are mental representations. In this paper I consider two critiques of that assumption by philosophers who are otherwise disposed to be friendly towards cognitive psychology. In other words, these are not radical critiques; each critic believes that, if understood in the right way, cognitive psychology is a worthy scientific endeavor. However, each also believes that it is an endeavor that could be and ought to be conducted without the notion of mental representation. The two critiques I will consider are by Stephen Stich and Stephen Horst. Although, as we will see, the arguments given in each case are quite different, they, ultimately turn on the same basic point: that the positing of mental representations, contrary to what most cognitive psychologists believe, does no real explanatory work. Stich believes this is the case because he thinks there is no explanatory work for which mental representations are needed. Horst seems willing to grant the existence of an appropriate explanandum but argues that, as currently conceived, mental representations cannot do the job.