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POLITICAL ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS EXCLUSION IN TURKEY
Türkay Salim Nefes
Department of Sociology and Brasenose College, University of Oxford
This is an original version of the manuscript of an article published by Oxford
University Press in Parliamentary Affairs, available at:
https://academic.oup.com/pa/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/pa/gsx038/4601746
Please use the Parliamentary Affairs version for citing the paper.
Do perceived political threats lead to religious exclusion? This study explores the political
rationale of the exclusionary attitude towards non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. It relies on a
qualitative content analysis of the discussions on the Armenian, Greek and Jewish foundations
in the Turkish parliament in the 2000s. While doing so, the research brings together the
academic literatures on the perception of religious minorities in Turkey with the group threat
perspective. The findings show that the exclusionary statements about the non-Muslim
minorities are often justified by suspecting them as potential plotters of the dismemberment of
the country. The paper concludes that to achieve an inclusive political culture in Turkey, it is
imperative to understand the perceived national security threats. In so doing, it underlines that
the parliamentary debates constitute an ideal and systematic resource for research, which
deserves a greater attention from mainstream political science.
Keywords: Political Exclusion, Religious Minorities, Group Threat Theory, the Sevres
Syndrome, Non-Muslim Communities in Turkey, Parliamentary Proceedings
Turkish national anthem, the Independence March, begins with an assurance that the nation
will exist forever: ‘Fear not! For the crimson banner that proudly ripples in this glorious dawn,
shall not fade’. This apprehensive emphasis on the future existence is fathomable within the
historical context: the Turkish Republic is a successor of the Ottoman Empire, which collapsed
due to the wars against foreign powers and independence movements of its various minorities.
This historical background generated an ontological insecurity in Turkish politics, about a
threat of dismemberment, called the Sevres syndrome, which manifests itself with distrust to
the Western powers and internal minorities (Göçek, 2011; Nefes, 2012). This study scrutinises
the significance of the Sevres syndrome on the perception of non-Muslim minorities, namely
Armenians, Jews and Greeks, in contemporary Turkish politics. It explores to what extent the
ontological insecurities pave way to exclusionary politics about non-Muslims in Turkey. The
paper proposes that the exclusionary attitude is largely a function of the perceived threats about
the dismemberment of the country.
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The focus of the analysis is on the discussions about the non-Muslim charity foundations in the
Turkish parliamentary proceedings between 2002 and 2008. In particular, the debate
concerning the property ownership rights of the non-Muslim foundations of Armenians, Greeks
and Jews. It is an ideal case to understand the relationship between exclusionary attitude
towards non-Muslims and the Sevres syndrome for three reasons. First, it concerns all major
non-Muslim minorities in the country together and therefore presents an excellent opportunity
to examine the political perception of these groups from a holistic perspective. Second, it is a
very significant and persistent discussion in the 2000s that clearly reflects the political attitudes
towards these minorities. Third, thematically, the debate is relevant to the ontological
insecurities about dismemberment, as it prompts both exclusionary and inclusionary political
views about the land ownership of the non-Muslim minorities.
In various ways, the research develops the relevant scholarships. To start with, it is one of the
first studies that use the Turkish parliamentary proceedings, a rich source of systematic data
from mainstream politics, to explore the perception of the non-Muslim minorities. It delineates
the political rationale of the exclusion and inclusion of the religious minorities in depth by a
qualitative content analysis.
The author(s) rightly point out the centrality of parliamentary debates in Turkey and suggest
ways parliamentary debates could assume a much greater attention from mainstream political
science (a tendency that could be further supported in the future by the digitization efforts and
online easy access in various countries such as Turkey): The article could build on this broader
argument and support further the importance of parliamentary debates and why those should
not be overlooked by mainstream political science. A much broader memorable argument will
improve the article’s impact in the discipline.
In addition, it provides a theoretically novel perspective by bringing together the threat
perspective (e.g. Blumer, 1958) with the academic literature on the Turkish perception of non-
Muslims (e.g. Bali, 1998, 2001). Third, it develops the group threat perspective by bringing
evidence from an underexplored context, Turkish politics at macro-level. Below, the paper
begins with a brief historical background of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and the laws
about the property rights of the non-Muslim foundations. Subsequently, it delineates the
relevant scholarships and the methods used. Last, the paper discusses the implications of the
findings.
1. Historical background of the non-Muslims in Turkey: from an imperial subject
to a modern citizen
To understand the non-Muslim communities’ perception in the Turkish Republic, we should
mention their position in the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923). Between the fifteenth and the
nineteenth centuries, the prominent non-Muslim communities, namely the Greek-Orthodox,
Armenian-Gregorian and Jewish communities, lived under the millet (meaning religious
community in Turkish) system. These minorities had a freedom to manage their internal
religious, educational, juridical and fiscal affairs (Barkey, 2008; Barkey and Gavrilis, 2016;
Bedlek, 2016). They were organised around their religious authorities. For example, the
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Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople (Patrick) was the head of the Greek Orthodox
community. While the millet system recognised the autonomy of the non-Muslim
communities, they were in a subordinate position to the Ottoman ruler. They paid extra taxes
and were not allowed to serve as state officers, unless they converted to Islam (Içduygu et al.,
2008). The millet system gradually weakened during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923
meant the abolishment of the millet system.
Before going into the non-Muslim communities’ transition from the Ottoman millet system to
the modern citizenship in the Turkish Republic, we should briefly outline the negative impacts
of the downfall of the empire on the perception of the religious minorities. This period saw
ethnic minority independence movements and wars with foreign powers that costed a rapid and
heavy land loss to the empire. In order to avoid the impending collapse, the Ottomans attempted
to modernise. They sent students to Europe to learn the latest technologies and employed
foreign experts to modernise their institutions. Political reforms also accompanied this process:
the Tanzimat reforms gave more minority rights to all minorities in 1839. However, these were
not enough to solve the weighty problems, and the coming collapse created a negative view of
the minorities. It produced a suspicion about their loyalty to the empire, as many rebelled and
established their independent states. This was manifest in the evolution of the ideological
directions to save the empire, which quickly lost hope to include non-Muslims as citizens.
Initially, the Ottomanism attempted and failed to unite all ethnic and religious subjects of the
empire under the Ottoman identity. Subsequently, the non-Muslims were dropped of the
imagined unity, as the Islamist ideology imagined a Muslim nation regardless of the ethnic
differences, and Turkism aimed to create an Ottoman nation ruled by ethnic Turks. These
alternating ideological attempts seem to show the beginnings of the exclusionary view about
the non-Muslim communities in modern Turkey.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was complete at the end of the First World War. It was
secured by the signature of the Sevres Treaty with the Allied Powers. The treaty was a heavy
agreement for the Turkish side, which led them to wage the Turkish Independence War (1919-
1923). Subsequently, they established the Turkish Republic after signing the Lausanne Peace
Treaty in 1923. The Ottoman collapse period and the Sevres Treaty left a traumatic perception
of the non-Muslim minorities among the Turkish political elite. They saw minorities as a
potential fifth column, who could act in the interests of foreign powers once the opportunity
arises. This suspicion about the conspiracies of external enemies and internal minorities to
weaken and dismember the Turkish Republic is called the Sevres syndrome in the scholarship
(Göçek, 2011).
Turkish political elite’s wary view about the minorities was reflected in their approach to the
Lausanne Peace Treaty. The agreement initially promised the continuity of the millet system
and secured the autonomous rights of the non-Muslim communities (Bali, 1998). Given the
Ottoman past, the Turkish state was not willing to give much autonomy and intended to create
a homogenous society (Toktaş, 2005). Hence, they pressured the non-Muslim communities to
renounce these rights of autonomy. First the Jewish community and then the Armenians and
Greeks renounced them to avoid state hostility (Aviv, 2017). The Lausanne Treaty meant a
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transition of their legal status to modern citizenship. On the positive side, it promised them an
equal position as the citizens of Turkey. On the negative side, they lost the autonomy that they
enjoyed in the Ottoman period. In addition, the proposed equality in law did not match their de
facto treatment (Nefes, 2015b). For example, although he Capital Levy of 1942 intended to tax
the citizens who made fortunes from the wartime economy (Neyzi, 2002), it was heavy-handed
on non-Muslim minorities. They were forced to pay very high taxes, and the ones who could
not afford them were sent to ‘work camps’ in Eastern Anatolia to labour in difficult conditions
(Mango, 2006).
The legal changes about the property ownership rights of the minorities present an ideal case
about the unmet promises of the modern Turkish citizenship of the non-Muslims. The Turkish
state required the non-Muslim foundations to provide an inventory of their belongings in 1936.
These foundations were allowed to buy and sell properties and accept donations until 1974,
when the Turkish state declared the acquired property of the foundations after 1936 as illegal,
because foreigners were not allowed to gain asset in Turkey (Varol, 2005). This led to returning
of the foundations’ properties, acquired after 1936, to their donors. Varol (2005) underlines
that this meant their loss of property to the Treasury of the Turkish Republic, as not many of
the original donors, who mostly had left the country, could have been found. Varol (2005) adds
that this has had important economic repercussions for the foundations, as their primary source
of income was coming from rents. The AKP government passed legal changes in 2003 that
allowed the foundations to acquire properties and to demand their confiscated properties from
the past. Nevertheless, the Turkish courts often did not grant the applications from the
foundations, and the AKP government attempted to pass another law to ensure that they will
be returned without seeking court permission. The President of the period, Ahmet Necdet Sezer
returned the legal changes passed in the parliament in 2006, defending the decision in 1974.
Finally, the succeeding president, Mr Abdullah Gül, approved the legal changes in 2011.
2. Perceptions of threat and non-Muslim minorities
One of the prominent lines of the academic literature on ethnic and religious prejudice is group
threat theory. This perspective assumes that prejudice arises from dominant group members’
perception of outgroups as a threat to their prerogatives (e.g. Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1983, 1999;
Olzak, 1992; Semyonov et al., 2006). The theoretical approach frames inter-group perceptions
similar to a zero-sum game mentality, where a subordinate group’s gain is perceived to be
taking place at the expense of the dominant group. The central arguments of the group threat
theory are as follows: (a) dominant group members see themselves entitled to certain rights
and privileges; (b) any perception of threat to these prerogatives would incline members of the
dominant group members towards negative prejudices about subordinate groups. In other
words, group threat theory links social position to dominant group members’ perception of
others. Blumer (1958) argued that four types of feelings shape prejudiced attitude: (1) dominant
group’s superiority; (2) the essential difference of the subordinate groups; (3) dominant group’s
proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage; (4) fear about other groups’
designs on their privileges. He prioritised the third feeling, as he saw prejudice as a defensive
reaction. That is to say, prejudice is a protective device, historically and collectively developed
to defend social positions (Blumer, 1958).
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Using the group threat perspective, studies demonstrate that the negative perception of
subordinate groups would increase with a growth of their population and worsening economic
conditions in the developed world (e.g. Blalock, 1956; Dixon, 2010; Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989;
Meuleman et al., 2009; Schneider, 2008). These valuable researches tend to focus on public
members’ perception of threat in the developed world. This micro-level emphasis sets a
limitation, because it does not adequately examine the macro-level historical and political
influences on prejudice. Quillian (1995, 1996) underlined the importance of the historical and
cultural components of the relationship between dominant societies and outgroups and
admitted that precise measures of these factors are not available. The academic literature can
benefit from studies on less developed countries and looking into macro-level factors of
prejudice. Indeed, this study contributes to the group threat perspective by focusing on macro-
level politics of an under-explored context, Turkey.
One of the most significant sources of the perceived threats in Turkish politics is the Sevres
syndrome (Guida, 1998). Accordingly, it is not farfetched to argue that the Sevres syndrome
would have implications on the apprehensive political perception of the ethnic/religious
minorities. Indeed, Gol (2005) claims that the Turkish state’s exclusionary practice towards the
Armenian minority was because of its threat perception of the Armenian claims on the Turkish
territory. In his analysis of the parliamentary debates about the Kurdish question in the 1990s,
Loizides (2009) finds that the Sevres syndrome predominantly shaped most of the political
parties’ perspectives. Nefes (2012, 2013, 2015a) demonstrates that the anti-Semitic
conspiratorial rhetoric among the public and political parties often underlined the perceived
threat of dismemberment. This seems to resonate with the argument that Turkish nationalism
sees Islam as the indispensable component of the Turkish identity and excludes the non-
Muslims from the definition of the nation (Yildiz, 2001). One of the formulators of the Turkish
state ideology, Ziya Gokalp, did not include non-Muslims in his definition of the new nation.
Interpreting Emile Durkheim’s sociological approach in the Turkish context, he explained that
the origin of Turkish culture is rooted in Sunni Hanafi Islam. Moreover, the population
exchange with Greece, which meant expelling 1.2 million Orthodox Christians to Greece and
in return receiving four hundred thousand Muslims, exemplifies the nature of Turkish state
nationalism and its preference for Muslim subjects. In parallel, various studies underline that
Turkish-Jews are seen as a foreign group in Turkey (Bali 2001; Brink-Danan, 2012). All in all,
the study brings together the literature on group threat and perception of minorities in Turkey
and claims that the exclusionary attitude towards the non-Muslim minorities is a function of
the perceived threats about the dismemberment of the country.
3. Method
This paper examines the Turkish parliamentary proceedings between 2002 and 2008 to
understand the political roots of religious exclusion in Turkey. The proceedings are an ideal
source, as they contain systematic and representative evidence with regards to the political
parties’ positions on the debates related to the minorities (Loizides, 2009). Moreover, they
include the non-verbal reactions of the Turkish politicians, such as clapping or booing, which
provide further depth to the analysis. Various studies already demonstrate excellent evidence
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on different aspects of mainstream Turkish politics through looking at the parliamentary
proceedings (e.g. Doganay, 2007; Loizides 2009). This inquiry relies on a qualitative content
analysis of the parliamentary proceedings. This unobtrusive, flexible and transparent method
helps to afford an in-depth understanding of the text by enabling to consider both manifest and
latent content (Cabrera and Reiner, 2016; Sandelowski 2000; Wolff 2007). Qualitative content
analysis helps to interrogate the data be able to identify categories that highlight the key content
(Drisko and Maschi, 2015: 88). Indeed, these are imperative requirements for the current study,
as it focuses on the Turkish political jargon in the parliament, where politicians often use
symbolic metaphors.
To do that, I reached the parliamentary proceedings at the digital archives of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly (https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/td_v2.sorgu_ekrani). First, I
searched the archive by using relevant keywords, such as Armenian, Jew and Greek. After an
exploratory analysis of the debates on the non-Muslim minorities in the 1990s and 2000s, I
found that the discussions on the land ownership rights were one of the most significant and
foundational debates that often refers back the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Thus, I
focused the main inquiry to the parliamentary debates on this topic in the 2000s.
4. The debates and actors at the parliament
This research brings together three parliamentary debates concerning the property rights of the
non-Muslim Foundations in 2002, 2006 and 2008. The first was about a change in the law that
removed the legal terms against the foundations’ right to own property. This was suggested by
the AKP government and the passed in the parliament. Subsequently, along with the legal
changes that were brought by the European Union (EU) candidacy, the AKP government
proposed further changes in the legal terms about the property rights of the foundations in 2006.
This led to a longer debate but the changes were approved by the majority of the parliament.
The third debate took place in 2008, as the President Sezer did not approve all the legal changes
of the law that passed in 2006 and returned some of the clauses to be further discussed in the
parliament.
As it can be seen in table 1 below, political parties from the right-wing to the left have
contributed to the debate. Members of 10 political parties and an independent MP made 113
speeches on the issue. The political parties that contributed to the debate are as follows: the
governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) and several opposition parties, namely The
Motherland Party, (ANAP), Great Unity Party (BBP), Republican People’s Party (CHP),
Democratic Left Party (DSP), True Path Party (DYP), People’s Democratic Party (HDP),
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Felicity Party (SP), and New Turkey Party (YTP). Overall,
41 speeches were in favour of the changes, while 69 contributions were against. In addition,
three speeches on the topic did not address the discussions directly and therefore are excluded
from the analysis.
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Table 1 Summary of the debate and the participants
Year
Political party
Ideological position
Political position
Speech
frequency
2002
AKP
Centre-right
In favour
1
ANAP
Centre-right
In favour
1
DSP
Centre-left
In favour
1
DYP
Centre-right
In favour
1
MHP
Right (Nationalist)
Against
2
SP
Right (Islamist)
In favour
1
YTP
Centre-left
In favour
1
2006
AKP
Centre-right
In favour
8
ANAP
Centre-right
Against
2
CHP
Centre-left
Against
25
2008
AKP
Centre-right
In favour
27
BBP
Right
Against
1
CHP
Centre-left
Against
19
DSP
Centre-left
Against
1
HDP
Left (pro-Kurdish)
In favour
4
MHP
Right
Against
19
Independent
Centre-left
Against
3
5. Rationale in favour of the legal changes
The political parties that welcomed the law changes are the AKP, HDP, SP, ANAP, DSP and
YTP. The ANAP and DSP only supported the changes in the discussions in 2002 and then took
an opposite direction in 2006 and 2008. Main rationales put forward to support the law can be
listed as follows: (1) Equality of all citizens of Turkey; (2) Responding to the needs of (a)
religious communities, (b) general society and (c) cultural heritage; (3) The changes will
eventually benefit the Turkish citizens living abroad; (4) Turkey loses court cases in the
European Court of Human Rights and pay fines with the existing practice.
To start with the first theme, all supporting political parties underlined that the non-Muslim
minority members are also Turkish citizens, who should have the same property rights as the
Muslim citizens. Left-wing HDP reminded about the equality principle among different groups
in the country. Hasip Kaplan expressed that as follows: ‘our constitution ensures equality
before law regardless of the lingual, racial, ethnic, political, religious and philosophical
differences… the Turkish Republic recognises law above everything. This is not a
tribal/primitive state’. In parallel, centre-left political parties, DSP and YTP, underlined that
providing equal rights to all citizens are a necessity of the modern times. Ahmet Tan (DSP)
stated that ‘…the Turkish Republic is a country of law... These changes will remove the
complications with regards to equality… They will help to reach the standards of the modern
civilization’. The ANAP and AKP agreed with this view. Nejat Erseven (ANAP) explained
that ‘according to the law about foundations, they should have the right to establish foundations
and to buy property’.
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Second, the AKP, DTP and SP talked about religious, social and cultural benefits of the
proposed legal changes. Cevat Ayhan (SP) claimed that the legal changes would serve the
needs of the religious minorities and added that there should also be improvements for the
Muslim community foundations: ‘If there is a religious community, its needs have to be
satisfied by the state’. Moreover, the AKP stated that the legal changes would benefit the
society in general. Ali Yuksel Kavustu expressed this as follows: ‘thanks to the new law, these
foundations will be able to serve the Turkish society in an effective way’. In parallel, the DTP
MP Akin Birdal pointed to the societal benefits by claiming that the law would bring an
improvement in terms of human rights: ‘As you know, human rights refer to freedoms
regardless of national, political, ethnic and gender identities. This law will help to protect these
human rights in the country’. Last, the AKP posited that the changes would be beneficial for
preserving the cultural heritage of minorities in Turkey. Yasar Karayel highlighted that need
in the following manner: ‘Looking after our cultural heritage does not only mean being proud
of the national soul and social institutions, but also taking care of it’.
Third, the AKP and ANAP suggested that the new laws about the religious minorities would
benefit the treatment of the Turkish citizens living outside Turkey. Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat
(AKP) explained that as follows: ‘…we should be open to synagogues and churches.
Otherwise, we endanger the minority rights of our four million people living abroad... The
world is watching us’. In parallel, Nejat Arseven (ANAP) stated that with this law ‘we will be
able to protect and develop the Turkish foundations abroad’. Fourth, the AKP and DTP
reminded that Turkey was losing court cases and pay fines in the European Human Rights
Court because of the existing inequalities with regards to the foundations right to own property.
Thus, the legal changes were indispensable to prevent these losses. Hayati Yazici (AKP)
highlighted that the minority foundations sued Turkey in the European Union Court and won
their cases, which forced Turkey to pay compensation. Hasip Kaplan (HDP) also reminded
about these losses and how they pointed to the need of legal changes.
6. Rationale against the legal changes and the response
The CHP, MHP, BBP, DYP, ANAP (in 2006), DSP (in 2008) MPs and the independent MP
Kamer Genc spoke against the legal changes. All of the opposition delineated the proposed
legal changes as a grave mistake that carve up of the Turkish Republic. The MHP provided the
most fervent speeches. Hasan Calis (MHP) claimed that ‘Armenian and Greek lobbies request
more rights by hiding behind the EU… you can see that they will not stop until they cleansing
the Anatolia from Turks’. The opposing MPs supported their cases by emphasizing legal,
political and security reasons: (1) dismemberment threat, (2) political futility of the changes,
and (3) legal complications of the proposed laws.
To begin with the most significant theme, all opposing political parties described the laws as
an existential threat imposed by foreign powers, reminiscent of the Sevres syndrome. First,
MHP, ANAP and CHP drew analogies between the legal changes and the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire. Mehmet Sandir (MHP) stated that ‘like the legal processes during the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, these laws stab Turkey in the back…’ Ibrahim Ozdogan
(ANAP) added that the Western powers try to reintroduce the Sevres Treaty that ensured the
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end of Ottoman Empire. Second, the MPs explained that this foreign conspiracy would take
place by giving excessive rights to ‘foreigners’. Mehmet Vedat Yucesan (CHP) argued that
‘these new laws will provide foreigners a right to establish foundations and own property…
these pose a very important threat with regards to national unity and security’. Osman Ertugrul
(MHP) warned about the potential missionary threat: ‘Non-Muslim foundations will become
ideal places for missionaries to convert their target populations. The proposed legal changes
will help them to achieve their goals’. In line with that, Muhsin Yazicioglu (BBP) accused that
the Soros Foundation would find a great opportunity to conspire against Turkey. Last, the DSP
framed these legal changes as a grave economic threat. Harun Ozturk declared that ‘… these
threaten our economic independence and therefore the political independence of the Turkish
Republic’.
Another argument was that the proposed changes were politically ineffective. This was
expressed in two main ways with regards to: (a) foreign relations and (b) the corruption. First,
The CHP, MHP and the independent MP Kamer Genc contended that these laws were products
of the AKP government’s inefficient foreign policy. They claimed that these changes were
unjustly imposed by the EU. Hasan Calis (MHP) stated that ‘Greece, Cyprus and Romania
have become EU members. Did they face any requirements to change their laws on religious
foundations? No!’ Accordingly, they portrayed the AKP government’s endeavour as a wrong
political strategy in the negotiations with the EU. Tuncay Ercenk (CHP) summarised this as
follows: ‘We pass all the laws and sign all the protocols imposed by the EU without hesitation.
We passively accept the United Nation’s Annan plan for Cyprus… However, we do not have
any progress in our EU membership candidate status. This submissive policy is not how we
can become an EU country’. In parallel, Genc (Independent) suggested that these laws should
be enacted once Turkey becomes an EU member. Second, centre-left CHP and DSP proposed
that the new changes would lead to political corruption. Harun Ozturk (DSP) stated that ‘with
these legal changes, the AKP government will only cooperate with the partisan foundations in
line with their political agenda’.
Third main argument the opposition underscored that the proposed changes contradict the
existing laws and the Lausanne Treaty. To start with the latter, the CHP, DSP, DYP and MHP
representatives all underlined that the proposed laws contradicted the main principles of the
Lausanne Treaty, which set the legal foundations of the Turkish Republic. Sevgi Esen (DYP)
stated that ‘the fourth clause of the new law contrasts the principles of the Lausanne Treaty.
These changes have to be amended’. In addition, Halil Unlutepe (CHP) proposed that ‘the
Lausanne Treat secures the existence of the Turkish Republic. The new laws will leave the
treaty dysfunctional… The new law looks a lot like the Sevres Treaty’. Second, the MPs from
the CHP, DYP and MHP also pointed that the law was not in line with the Turkish Constitution.
Orhan Eraslan (CHP) explained how the law contradict the constitution:
The Lausanne Treaty is approved by the Turkish Constitution (clause no. 90) and
therefore contradicting the treaty is breaching the constitution. In addition, the civil law
(101/4) states that ‘no one can establish a foundation to support a religious community,
ethnicity or a sect’, and therefore, when you breach this, you break the constitution’s
clause number 10.
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Last, the AKP responded to all these criticisms by reassuring that the changes did not constitute
a dismemberment threat in four ways: (a) the state will be closely inspecting the actions of
these foundations; (b) we have enough trust in the strength of the Turkish Republic to believe
that providing these freedoms will not diminish its power; (c) the non-Muslim foundations will
not be allowed to engage in international activities; and (d) the legal changes are in line with
the Turkish Constitution and the Lausanne Treaty. Moreover, the AKP members condemned
the opponents by claiming that they criticised because of their political interests not for the
welfare of the country. It should not go without saying that even though most of these claims
were from the AKP other MPs, such as Hasip Kaplan (DTP) and Nejat Arseven (ANAP), were
also critical of the opponents’ depiction of the legal changes as an existential threat to Turkey.
7. Discussion and conclusion
The parliamentary debate about the property ownership rights of the non-Muslim minority
foundations in Turkey lucidly shows that the exclusionary perspective about the Armenian,
Greek and Jewish communities tends to be justified through existential threats about the
dismemberment of the country, the Sevres syndrome. The findings point to three main reasons
that opponents posited to avoid modernizing the property ownership rights of the non-Muslim
foundations: (a) the dismemberment threat; (b) political futility, (c) legal complications. All
these themes involve a sense of existential threat. The first and the most significant one is a
direct expression of viewing religious minorities as a potential ally of foreign conspiracies that
aim to dismember the country. In parallel, the other themes build on the logic that perceives
providing rights to minorities as a potential security threat. The political futility reason presents
the proposed legal changes as losing grounds and possibly land to the European Union. Third,
the legal complications argument portrayed the proposed laws contradictory to the legal
foundations of the Turkish Republic by claiming that they are incongruous with the constitution
and the Lausanne Treaty. All in all, this paper reveals that to achieve an inclusive political
culture in Turkey, not only democratic reforms are needed but also existential threats should
be resolved.
This conclusion has important outcomes for the relevant scholarships. First and on a global
scale, the paper affords supporting evidence to the group threat perspective (Blumer, 1958;
Bobo, 1999; Olzak, 1992) by showing how they are used to justify exclusionary policies with
regards to religious minorities. In so doing, it develops the threat theory by focusing on an
underexplored context, Turkish politics, and by bringing evidence from macro-level politics,
while the academic literature tends to focus on micro-level perception of threat by individuals.
Second, the research contributes to the scholarship on Turkish politics by focusing on all non-
Muslim religious minorities together. In addition, it underlines with evidence that historically
formed existential threats are an important component justifying exclusionary politics towards
the religious minorities in the country. This perspective can help to explain the general public
perception of the non-Muslim minorities as outsiders (Nefes, 2015b). For example, the Turkish
ultranationalist group called the Alperen Hearths protested Israel’s restrictions on the access to
the Al-Aqsa compound in 2017 in front of the main synagogues in Istanbul (Hurriyet Daily
News, 2017). Choosing the worship places of Turkish Jews instead of the Israeli Embassy
clearly presents how they view both as the same, and see Turkish Jews as foreigners.
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The paper examines macro-level politics in Turkey. The scholarship could go beyond this
analysis by exploring the validity of its conclusions among the general public. It could explore
relevant online conversations and public opinion polls. Expanding on these areas would give a
more comprehensive picture about the perception of religious minorities at both macro and
micro levels in Turkey. Given that religious hostility decides the fate of the Middle East, it is
vital and urgent to explore the causes of the hostile politics towards religious minorities in
Turkey. Moreover, future research could look into the relevance of the findings in different
contexts by systematically analysing the parliamentary proceedings of other countries. For
example, a comparative study with Greece could look into the mention of the word Turk in the
parliament and provide a comparative analysis between the countries, which has not been done
yet. Indeed, widespread digitization of the parliamentary proceedings in different countries
enables such a task at very low costs. This would help us to understand and respond to the
political roots and impacts of ethnic and religious exclusion from an international perspective.
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