Netzwerke des Marktes: Ordoliberalismus als Politische Ökonomie
Abstract
Im Zentrum dieses Buches steht der Ordoliberalismus Deutschlands. Entgegen der Annahme, bei diesem handele sich es um eine begrenzte und relativ einflusslose Gruppe von Ökonomen mit vorrangig ordnungspolitischen Auffassungen, wird auf Basis einer konzeptionellen sowie empirischen Erhebung die Wirkmächtigkeit der deutschen Ökonomen ab 1945 als konsequente Marktbefürworter nachgezeichnet. Die Entstehung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, die Rekrutierungsmuster zentraler Akteure, wirkungsmächtige Lehrer-Schüler-Beziehungen, institutionelle Verdichtungen in Gremien und Think Tanks, internationale Verflechtungen sowie der Einfluss auf die Wirtschaftspolitik werden eingehend untersucht.
Der Inhalt
• Grundlegungen.
• Der „performative Fußabdruck“ der deutschen ÖkonomInnen (1954-1994).
• Das Konzept „des Marktes“.
• Ordoliberale Netzwerke.
• Die kurze Keynesianische Epoche.
• Die marktfundamentale Wende.
Die Zielgruppen
Lehrende und Studierende der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften
ÖkonomInnen
Die Autoren
Prof. Dr. Walter Otto Ötsch bestellt die Professur für Ökonomie und Kulturgeschichte an der Cusanus-Hochschule in Bernkastel-Kues.
Dr. Stephan Pühringer ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für die Gesamtanalyse der Wirtschaft (ICAE), Universität Linz.
Dr. Katrin Hirte ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für die Gesamtanalyse der Wirtschaft (ICAE), Universität Linz.
Supplementary resources (3)
Data
November 2017
... First, the production of economics knowledge is studied by economic historians and cultural sociologists (Coats, 1993;Morgan, 1990). In particular, different paradigms, hegemonic theories and marginalised forms of knowledge were analysed in order to understand how power relations influence the production of economic truths (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2009;Mirowski, 1991;Ötsch et al., 2017). In addition to this production-oriented research, the influence of economic expert knowledge on society became a major research field. ...
... 1 Second, economic advisors, mainly from the ordoliberal or German neoliberal school of economic thought, 2 were directly involved in the foundation of the German Federal Republic (e.g. the currency reform of 1949). Third, a network of ordoliberal economists in close collaboration with employers' associations served as promoter of the formative vision of "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" (social market economy) in the years of the "German economic miracle" (Ötsch, Pühringer, & Hirte, 2017;Ptak, 2004). Against this backdrop, many scholars stress the formative impact of ordoliberalism on German and partly also European economic policy-making (Biebricher, 2018;Campbell & Pedersen, 2014;Lechevalier, 2015). ...
... (Joseph E. Stiglitz, cited in: Phillips, 2016) In a similar vein, several scholars stressed idiosyncrasies of "German economics" such as (i) a traditional conservative approach concerning economic policy-making (Münchau, 2014;Phillips, 2016), (ii) the central role of institutionalized economic policy advice (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014;Pühringer & Griesser, 2020) as well as (iii) the existence of an ordoliberal power structure organized around think tanks supported by German employer associations (Flickenschild & Afonso, 2018;Ötsch et al., 2017). In the course of the debate on German economics induced by criticism mainly from U.S. and U.K. economists, for instance Burda, then president of the Verein für Socialpolitik (German Economic Association), defended German economists and in particular the members of the German Council of Economic Experts, the main economic policy advice body in Germany, publicly also referred to as "economic wise men". ...
Economists occupy leading positions in many different sectors including central and private banks, multinational corporations, the state and the media, as well as serving as policy consultants on everything from health to the environment and security. Power and Influence of Economists explores the interconnected relationship between power, knowledge and influence which has led economics to be both a source and beneficiary of widespread power and influence.
The contributors to this book explore the complex and diverse methods and channels that economists have used to exert and expand their influence from different disciplinary and national perspectives. Four different analytical views on the role of power and economics are taken: first, the role of economic expert discourses as power devices for the formation of influential expertise; second, the logics and modalities of governmentality that produce power/knowledge apparatuses between science and society; third, economists as involved in networks between academia, politics and the media; and forth, economics considered as a social field, including questions of legitimacy and unequal relations between economists based on the detention of various capitals. The volume includes case studies on a variety of national configurations of economics, such as the US, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, Mexico and Brazil, as well as international spaces and organisations such as the IMF.
This book provides innovative research perspectives for students and scholars of heterodox economics, cultural political economy, sociology of professions, network studies, and the social studies of power, discourse and knowledge.
... 1 Second, economic advisors, mainly from the ordoliberal or German neoliberal school of economic thought, 2 were directly involved in the foundation of the German Federal Republic (e.g. the currency reform of 1949). Third, a network of ordoliberal economists in close collaboration with employers' associations served as promoter of the formative vision of "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" (social market economy) in the years of the "German economic miracle" (Ötsch, Pühringer, & Hirte, 2017;Ptak, 2004). Against this backdrop, many scholars stress the formative impact of ordoliberalism on German and partly also European economic policy-making (Biebricher, 2018;Campbell & Pedersen, 2014;Lechevalier, 2015). ...
... (Joseph E. Stiglitz, cited in: Phillips, 2016) In a similar vein, several scholars stressed idiosyncrasies of "German economics" such as (i) a traditional conservative approach concerning economic policy-making (Münchau, 2014;Phillips, 2016), (ii) the central role of institutionalized economic policy advice (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014;Pühringer & Griesser, 2020) as well as (iii) the existence of an ordoliberal power structure organized around think tanks supported by German employer associations (Flickenschild & Afonso, 2018;Ötsch et al., 2017). In the course of the debate on German economics induced by criticism mainly from U.S. and U.K. economists, for instance Burda, then president of the Verein für Socialpolitik (German Economic Association), defended German economists and in particular the members of the German Council of Economic Experts, the main economic policy advice body in Germany, publicly also referred to as "economic wise men". ...
... Second, economic advisors, mainly from the ordoliberal or German neoliberal school of economic thought 2 , were directly involved in the foundation of the German Federal Republic (e.g. the currency reform of 1949). Third, a network of ordoliberal economists in close collaboration with employers' associations served as promoter of the formative vision of "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" (Social Market Economy) in the years of the "German economic miracle" 5 (Ötsch, Pühringer, & Hirte, 2017;Ptak, 2004). Against this backdrop, many scholars stress the formative impact of ordoliberalism on German and partly also European economic policymaking (Biebricher, 2018;Campbell & Pedersen, 2014;Lechevalier, 2015). ...
... They still believe in austerity even though the IMF, which is not a left-wing organization, has said austerity doesn't work" (Joseph E. Stiglitz, cited in: Phillips, 2016). In a similar vein, several scholars stressed idiosyncrasies of "German economics" such as (i) a traditional conservative approach concerning economic policy-making (Münchau, 2014;Phillips, 2016), (ii) the central role of institutionalized economic policy advice (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014;Pühringer & Griesser, 2020) as well as (iii) the existence of an ordoliberal power structure organized around think tanks supported by German employer associations (Flickenschild & Afonso, 2018;Ötsch et al., 2017). In the course of the debate on German economics induced by criticism mainly from U.S. and U.K. economists, for instance Burda, then president of the Verein für Socialpolitik (German Economic Association), defended German economists and in particular the members of the German Council of Economic Experts, the main economic policy advice body in Germany, publicly also referred to as "economic wise men". ...
Building on recent work on the political and societal impact of economics and distinct economists, respectively, this chapter aims to examine individual, research and institutional characteristics as well as existing professional networks of what are considered to be "influential economists" in Germany. For the purpose of identifying the most influential economists, we make use of the popular impact ranking of the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) entitled "The economists, Germany listens to" ("Auf diese Ökonomen hört das Land"), which distinguishes research, media and political impact. Through biographical research and the application of social network analysis we show that most influential economists are involved in co-authorship and/or institutional networks and that there are substantial connections to different levels of public governance. We find a tremendous gender bias within the sample as well as some hints for internationalization and division of labor. Our analysis moreover indicates a much less hierarchical structure of the German-speaking economics profession when compared to the U.S. A breakdown also reveals some considerable differences between the different impact rankings. We find that while a striking majority of media and policy advice economists have connections to (inter)national public governance bodies, only a minority of research economists have. Furthermore, the ordoliberal bias, which is a crucial feature of the German economics profession, is mainly restricted to media and policy advice economists. Finally, our analysis indicates the central role of (partly also geographically organized) research hubs among influential research economists.
... In other words, the dominant economics chessboard is populated by a limited set of pawns, the moves of which are restricted to a degree that render 'the human factor' in economic matters barely recognisable and, most importantly, reluctant to far-and deep-reaching transformation. Now, out of its partial marriage with the political project of neoliberalism (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009;Ötsch, Pühringer, and Hirte 2018), standardeconomic imaginaries not only limited the possibilities of thinking about 'the economy' but actually translated into the real-world streamlining of all sorts of social and cultural environments -a development dubbed the 'economisation of the social' (Çalışkan and Callon 2009;Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2011;Schimank and Volkmann 2012;Wenzlaf 2019). As John B. Davis (2017:525) states, economics since the 1980s "constructs the world in its own image, rather than seeks to provide accurate descriptions of it" (cf. ...
... This is the only reason why we still have to talk about it at all. Having said this, it goes without saying that the "intellectual monoculture" (Graupe, 2015) in economics as documented in bibliometric (Glötzl and Aigner, 2019) or network analyses (Ötsch, Pühringer, and Hirte, 2018) is not a matter of intellectual superiority (Fourcade, Ollion and Algan, 2015), but one of institutional power (Maeße et al., 2021). And this is one of the most important points, where neoliberalism firmly intersects with the discipline of economics. ...
“Beyond indifference”: this is not a signpost proposing to replace indifference curves with behavioral experiments. It is an invitation to rearrange the relationships of economics and economists with society and nature. An economics of the future will not retreat into loges, commanding the workings on the frontstage with a presumed knowledge about a presumed backstage. It will not get trapped again in timeless conceptions, methodologies, and theorems. Rather, it will humbly and out of an open epistemic engagement with economic realities contribute to a public debate about how to interpret and transform economic practices and institutions. It will set out to understand the manifold differences and ambiguities that make up our economic lifeworld. It will not emit last words again, but always invite and
provoke debate and alteration. The sentence “I don’t know” will not be a sign of weakness, but a commonplace of scientific honesty and a denominator of public reliability. For economics will have learned from its very own past that last words running astray may have grave impact. Crucially, it will place institutional safeguards that do not undermine but enable the discipline’s own, never-ending re-assessment and transformation, for instance, by anchoring the training of historical as well as philosophical capabilities at its study programmes’ core. In this vein, the self-critical reflection of its uncritical participation in a political project disguised in a discursive glow of unpoliticalness will mark the starting point.
Taking all these aspects together, economics ceases to resemble a paradigmatic, normal or textbook science in the Kuhnian sense. It will become an art of pluralist economic sensemaking in relation to lived reality providing for future-fit economies to emerge out of democratic debate and decision-making.
History has shown that economics can be a powerful science. Let us now subsume this potential under the quests to understand and care for Planet A.
... First, the production of economics knowledge is studied by economic historians and cultural sociologists (Coats, 1993;Morgan, 1990). In particular, different paradigms, hegemonic theories and marginalised forms of knowledge were analysed in order to understand how power relations influence the production of economic truths (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2009;Mirowski, 1991;Ötsch et al., 2017). In addition to this production-oriented research, the influence of economic expert knowledge on society became a major research field. ...
Economists occupy leading positions in many different sectors including central and private banks, multinational corporations, the state and the media, as well as serving as policy consultants on everything from health to the environment and security. Power and Influence of Economists explores the interconnected relationship between power, knowledge and influence which has led economics to be both a source and beneficiary of widespread power and influence.
The contributors to this book explore the complex and diverse methods and channels that economists have used to exert and expand their influence from different disciplinary and national perspectives. Four different analytical views on the role of power and economics are taken: first, the role of economic expert discourses as power devices for the formation of influential expertise; second, the logics and modalities of governmentality that produce power/knowledge apparatuses between science and society; third, economists as involved in networks between academia, politics and the media; and forth, economics considered as a social field, including questions of legitimacy and unequal relations between economists based on the detention of various capitals. The volume includes case studies on a variety of national configurations of economics, such as the US, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, Mexico and Brazil, as well as international spaces and organisations such as the IMF.
This book provides innovative research perspectives for students and scholars of heterodox economics, cultural political economy, sociology of professions, network studies, and the social studies of power, discourse and knowledge.
... First, the production of economics knowledge is studied by economic historians and cultural sociologists (Coats, 1993;Morgan, 1990). In particular, different paradigms, hegemonic theories and marginalised forms of knowledge were analysed in order to understand how power relations influence the production of economic truths (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2009;Mirowski, 1991;Ötsch et al., 2017). In addition to this production-oriented research, the influence of economic expert knowledge on society became a major research field. ...
There are three parts to this paper. The first part presents a discussion on ordoliberalism as a discursive structure. In doing so, it also analyzes how a certain set of ideas acquires hegemony and the specific significance of the indication “ideas matter”. The second, central part of the paper emphasizes the contradiction relating to the application of ordoliberalism within the European Union. This contradiction is sharpened with the tension between “rules” and “discretion”-based government. At the same time, ordoliberalism, which is woven into the German tradition, is presented as an expression of this contradiction. This section also sheds light on the COVID 19 pandemic from the perspective of ordoliberalism and points to the continuity of the pandemic with pre-existing crises. In the third part, starting from the relationship between ordoliberalism and capitalism, we talk about the connection of this orientation with the German export strategy, which is a sign of strong continuity of German politics. Ordoliberalism is an expression of Germany’s position in the EU and the world, and similarly, if we can talk about „ordoliberalization“ of European capitalism, we can expect its presence on a European scale.
Müller, Markus H.-P., 2019: Neo-Ordoliberalismus: ein Zukunftsmodell für die Soziale Marktwirtschaft, Wiesbaden: Springer. Ötsch, Walter Otto / Pühringer, Stephan / Hirte, Katrin, 2018: Netzwerke des Marktes: Ordoliberalismus als Politische Ökonomie, Wiesbaden: Springer. Scherer, Jakob F., 2018: Das Verhältnis von Staat und Ökonomie: Walter Euckens Ordoliberalismus im Angesicht der Schwächung des nationalstaatlichen Regulierungsmonopols, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Der Beitrag beschreibt die Entstehung sowie die zentralen Inhalte eines in den 1980er Jahren entwickelten neoliberalen Reformmodells für einen marktwirtschaftlichen Umbau des deutschen Gesundheitswesens und zeigt die Umsetzung des Reformmodells am Beispiel der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung.
Ordoliberalismus ist die Bezeichnung a) für eine wissenschaftliche Richtung in Feldern wie der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsphilosophie, der Volkswirtschaftslehre, den Rechtswissenschaften oder der Soziologie, b) für eine Gemeinschaft von Personen (auch aus der Politik und den Medien), die in ihrem politischen und gesellschaftlichen Handeln auf ordoliberale Konzepte Bezug nehmen und c) für Denkweisen in Zusammenhang damit. Der Ordoliberalismus insgesamt ist eine heterogene Strömung, deren VertreterInnen dennoch meist den Sammelbegriff Ordoliberalismus für sich reklamieren. In der Gesamtheit dieser Bedeutungsfülle von inhaltlichen und sozialen Aspekten kann auch von einem Denkkollektiv nach Ludwig (auch: Ludwik) Fleck oder nach Karl Mannheim gesprochen werden.
This was my master thesis at the Goethe University in Frankfurt, supervised by Prof.Dr.Bertram Schefold.
Die Einführung informiert über die Intention des Buches: einen Aspekt des wirtschaftenden Menschen in den Vordergrund zu stellen, der in der zeitgemäßen Ökonomik wenig untersucht wird – nämlich seine Fähigkeit Bilder wahrzunehmen, zu deuten, zu produzieren und zu teilen und darauf seine sozialen Wahrnehmungen und sein soziales Handeln zu begründen. Genau dieser Aspekt ist bei Adam Smith in der Theory of Moral Sentiments zu finden, wurde in der Geschichte der ökonomischen Theorie bald vergessen, in der Neoklassik geleugnet und bleibt im Wissenskonzept von Hayek nur einer selbst ernannten Elite von original thinkers vorbehalten.
Der Beitrag beschreibt die lange Geschichte der Metapher von der Maschine in der Philosophie (seit der Antike) und in der Ökonomik (seit dem 18. Jahrhundert), letztere reicht von den Physiokraten über Adam Smith, Robert Malthus, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Stanley Jevons und Léon Walras sowie Gérald Debreu bis zu Hayeks Konzept einer erweiterten Ordnung. Dabei wird der Mensch immer mehr auf rein maschinenhafte Aspekte reduziert. Es wird gezeigt, dass in der Neoklassik heute zwei sich widersprechenden Metaphern von der Maschine enthalten sind.
Was lernen Studierende im Unterricht über die Wirtschaft? Wie setzen Studierende der Ökonomie ihr Studium um? Wie geht es Ihnen dabei? Was erleben sie? Was macht das Studium mit ihnen? Welche Wirkungen werden damit erzielt? Wie stehen ihre Erfahrungen und die Inhalte ihres Studiums im Verhältnis zu ihren Motivationen Ökonomie zu studieren?
So far, the Euro crisis has been analysed using the ‘varieties of capitalism’ concept, the growth model framework or ideational accounts. These approaches have generally been applied in isolation or in opposition to one another. There has been little cross‐fertilization, due to the different epistemological points of departure that emphasize either institutional rational efficiency, material driving forces or ideational motives for the political economies during the crisis. This article instead applies the concept of cultural political economy to today's socioeconomic tensions between northern and southern member states. Cultural political economy offers a historical evolutionary perspective showing how institutional, material and ideational motivations have co‐evolved in European member states since the 1950s, contributing to the discrepancies that we witness today between the northern and southern EU countries. The article exemplifies the cultural political economy approach against the background of the German–Italian irritations that have sparked through the crisis.
Zeiten großer gesellschaftlicher Umbrüche in Richtung ethischen Fortschritts – etwa bei der Abschaffung des Sklavenhandels, der Apartheid oder der Einführung des Umweltschutzes – sind geprägt von einer Diskrepanz zwischen ethischer Deutung und rechtlicher Würdigung ein- und desselben Sachverhalts. Diese Phasen werden begleitet von gesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzungen und Konflikten, die im Idealfall und in einer Demokratie friedlich ausgetragen werden. Ein solcher Umbruch vollzieht sich zurzeit in Bezug auf den Stellenwert von Steuern, Steuergerechtigkeit und Finanztransparenz. Im Ergebnis werden Steuern anstatt als ausschließlicher Kostenfaktor, den es zu minimieren gilt, zunehmend als Dividende an die Gesellschaft begriffen, deren Zahlungen und Umfang nicht in Bilanzen geschönt oder versteckt, sondern offensiv als essenzieller Bestandteil und Aushängeschild unternehmerischer Verantwortung eines ehrbaren Kaufmanns verstanden und entsprechend detailliert und länderspezifisch veröffentlicht werden. Diese und ähnliche Daten werden am Ende auch dazu dienen, internationale und nationale Reformen durchzusetzen, welche die Kohärenz zwischen fiskalischen, entwicklungs- und außenpolitischen Zielen vorausschauend stärken. Der Weg führt in Richtung unternehmerischer (und staatlicher) sozialer Verantwortung 4.0.
The paper compares neoliberal market-fundamentalism and right-wing populism on the basis of its core patterns of thinking and reasoning. Hence we offer an analysis of the work of important founders of market-fundamental economic thinking (particularly von Mises) and an established definition of populism (demonstrated by the example of arguments brought forward by leading populists, like Trump). In doing so, we highlight conceptual resemblances of these two approaches: Both assume a dually divided world that is split into only two countervailing parts. Right-wing populism shows a society split into two groups, fighting against each other. In a similar vein, neoliberal market-fundamentalists argue that there are only two possible countervailing economic and societal orders. We argue that the categorical analogies between neoliberal market-fundamentalism and right-wing populism could provide the basis for a new form of authoritarian neoliberalism.
This article challenges the widespread view that neoliberalism had become hegemonic in the late 20th century by zooming into a less well-known variant of neoliberalism, German ordoliberalism, whose political ascendency dates back to the 1940s and 1950s. Through the lens of post-WWII housing policies—a central field of political intervention after 1945—this article focuses on the remaking of social policies as neoliberal policies in West Germany, a remake that rendered the market economy a key source of political legitimacy of the newly emerging, liberal democracy.
Die Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise ab 2007 kann als Krise der ökonomischen Theorie verstanden werden. Der fast vollständige Zusammenbruch des Interbankenmarktes und vieler Finanzmärkte und dann der tiefe Einbruch der globalen Realwirtschaft kollidiert mit der immer noch vorherrschenden Sichtweise, Märkte (und die gesamte Wirtschaft) würden sich im Prinzip selbst stabilisieren und Krisen seien demnach als „außergewöhnliche Ereignisse“ (Pühringer und Hirte 2015) zu interpretieren, die nichts an der grundsätzlichen Verfasstheit des Wirtschaftssystems ändern würden. Dies gab Anlass, die Beziehungen von ökonomischen Theorien zur Wirtschaft, zur Politik und zur Gesellschaft (u. a. zu den Medien) neu zu hinterfragen.
Die Verankerung des Konzepts der „Sozialen Marktwirtschaft“ im kollektiven Gedächtnis der Bevölkerung förderte die Tendenz, die hohen Wachstumsraten ab 1951 ursächlich der von Erhard und seinem Staatsekretär Müller-Armack betriebenen Politik zuzuschreiben. (Müller-Armack wurde 1952 Leiter der Grundsatzabteilung im Wirtschaftsministerium, von 1958 bis 1963 war er Staatsekretär für Europäische Angelegenheiten.)
There has been much talk about ordoliberalism recently. Scholars and the press identify it as the dominant economic instruction sheet for Germany's European crisis politics. However, by analyzing ordoliberalism only as an economic theory, the debate downplays that ordoliberalism is also an ethical theory, with strong roots in Protestant social thought. It is this rooting in Protestant social thought that makes Ordoliberalism incompatible with the socioeconomic ethics of most of the European crisis countries, whose ethics originate in Catholic and Orthodox social thought. This divergence is the source of a crisis of understanding between European nations and hinders a collective response to the Euro crisis.
Networks of Appreciation, Intentional Not-Knowing, and Historio-graphy. The article deals with the tradition of a special academic field, agricul-tural economics and policies during the 20th century. Agricultural economics had become a prominent field of science during the Naziperiod in Germany. Persisting networks after 1945 allowed for the field to re-establish itself by emphasizing mutual appreciation, negating and denying the Nazipast of the academic field and its actors. Among other sources a specialized journal (Agrarwirtschaft) became an empirical focus of the article.
The Economic and Monetary Union was constructed on poor foundations which sought to impose inappropriate macroeconomic policies. This construction did not pay heed to the differences between countries with regard to their economic position and interests nor to the institutional and historical differences. The EMU was faltering before the financial crisis which highlighted and added to the problems of EMU. The neo- and ordo-liberal constraints on policy and policy reform are indicated. The outline of a policy agenda for prosperity in EMU is given.
The global economic crisis and the crisis in the euro zone exposed the deep differences of opinion between German economists and scientists from Anglo-Saxon countries. The German approach conceptually differs in the views on the strategies and tools of anti-crisis policy, especially fiscal stimulus in the Keynesian-style, quantitative easing monetary policy of the ECB, the question of financial assistance to Greece and restructuring its debt. The other areas of difference are the approach to the rules in macroeconomic policy, fiscal consolidation, and interpretation of current account surplus. Given the size and performance of the German economy it is important to understand the reasons for these opposites, which constitute the research goal of this article. Considerations are based on the thesis that ordoliberal thought still has a strong impact on the practice of macroeconomic policy in Germany and also at the European level. The analysis is built on the short overview of ideological foundations of the German social market economy and its most important postulates, which then will be applied for interpretation of intellectual distinctions between economists from
Germany and other countries in the theoretical and practical dimensions of the economic policy observed in Europe. The methodology includes the critical literature studies and the comparative analysis of macroeconomic policy through the prism of economic thought.
Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to offer an explanation of the predominance of austerity policies in Europe based on distinct crisis narratives and their underlying market metaphors in public speeches and addresses of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to a broader audience of economic decision-makers.
Design/methodology/approach
– The author uses discourse and metaphor analysis of speeches and addresses of Angela Merkel in the aftermath of the crisis applying cognitive metaphor theory in combination with a corpus linguistic approach.
Findings
– Dominant conceptual metaphors in Merkel’s crisis narrative subordinate policy-making to superior “market mechanisms”, which are attributed with human and natural characteristics. Moral focus of crisis narrative of “living-beyond-ones-means” forces austerity policies.
Research limitations/implications
– The analysis is restricted to public speeches of Merkel, whereas the impact on public discourses was not analyzed.
Social implications
– The paper offers an explanation for the prevalence of neoliberal policies in the Eurozone and the uneven balances of political power in public economic discourses.
Originality/value
– Study of the role of “market metaphors” in crisis narratives of influential political leaders as well as an analysis of the impact of discursive manifestations and conceptual market metaphors for economic crisis policies.
Hirsch’s h-index cannot be used to compare academics that work in different disciplines or are at different career stages. Therefore, a metric that corrects for these differences would provide information that the h-index and its many current refinements cannot deliver. This article introduces such a metric, namely the hI,annual (or hIa for short). The hIa-index represents the average annual increase in the individual h-index. Using a sample of 146 academics working in five major disciplines and representing a wide variety of career lengths, we demonstrate that this metric attenuates h-index differences attributable to disciplinary background and career length. It is also easy to calculate with readily available data from all major bibliometric databases, such as Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge, Scopus and Google Scholar. Finally, as the metric represents the average number of single-author-equivalent “impactful” articles that an academic has published per year, it also allows an intuitive interpretation. Although just like any other metric, the hIa-index should never be used as the sole criterion to evaluate academics, we argue that it provides a more reliable comparison between academics than currently available metrics.
While the current financial crisis had an overwhelming impact on the global economy, its effect on economics as an academic discipline has been negligible. This paper explores the relationship between the financial crisis, mainstream economic theory and the education of economists. In a nutshell it shows that (a) current economic education leaves students illiterate with respect to events like the financial crisis, (b) mainstream economic theory is unable to systemically explain the financial crisis and (c) this situation will be unaffected by the recent events. On the contrary economic education will stay pretty much the same, since it incorporates a set of ideas, perceived as influential, well-established and important by the economic community.
Despite the frequency with which the concept of neoliberalism is employed within academic literature, its complex and multifaceted nature makes it difficult to define and describe. Indeed, data reported in this article suggest that there is a tendency in educational research to make extensive use of the word ‘neoliberalism’ (or its variants neoliberal, neo-liberal and neo-liberalism) as a catch-all for something negative but without offering a definition or explanation. The article highlights a number of key risks associated with this approach and draws on the Bourdieuian concept of illusio to suggest the possibility that when as educational researchers we use the word ‘neoliberalism’ in this way, rather than interrupting the implementation of neoliberal policies and practices, we may, in fact, be further entrenching the neoliberal doxa. That is to say, we are both playing the neoliberal game and inadvertently demonstrating our belief that it is a game worth being played. In so doing, this article seeks to extend understandings of what illusio means within the context of educational research.
In this essay, we analyze the dominant position of economics within the network of the social sciences in the United States. We begin by documenting the relative insularity of economics, using bibliometric data. Next we analyze the tight management of the field from the top down, which gives economics its characteristic hierarchical structure. Economists also distinguish themselves from other social scientists through their much better material situation (many teach in business schools, have external consulting activities), their more individualist worldviews, and their confidence in their discipline’s ability to fix the world’s problems. Taken together, these traits constitute what we call the superiority of economists, where economists’ objective supremacy is intimately linked with their subjective sense of authority and entitlement. While this superiority has certainly fueled economists’ practical involvement and their considerable influence over the economy, it has also exposed them more to conflicts of interests, political critique, even derision. © 2015, Russian Presidental Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. All rights reserved.
Die wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung mit Ideenagenturen und Think Tanks ist eine spannende Angelegenheit. Nicht nur, weil die Beschäftigung mit Forschern und ihren Ideen für sich schon aufregend genug ist, sondern auch deshalb, weil so wenig über diese Institutionen bekannt ist. Und das, was bekannt ist, stellt sich bei näherem Hinsehen oft als Mischung aus geschickter Propaganda und subjektiver Einschätzung dar. Intensive empirische Forschung war daher nötig, um mehr über die Institute zu erfahren, als in den üblicherweise verfügbaren Quellen zu finden ist. Es ist daher denjenigen Institutionen bzw. ihren Vertretern zu danken, die Auskunft gaben, sowie den Bundestagsabgeordneten, die ihren Fragebogen ausfüllten. Es bleibt zu hoffen, daß die unter Mühen gewonnenen Erkenntnisse den hohen zeitlichen und finanziellen Aufwand rechtfertigen. Viele Institutionen, Kollegen und Freunde haben dazu beigetragen, daß die Arbeit nun der Öffentlichkeit vorgelegt werden kann. Es handelt sich im wesent lichen um den Text, der im Sommer 1994 an der Universität Trier als Habili tationsschrift angenommen wurde. Von den sieben Gutachtern, denen für ihre sachverständigen Urteile und Anmerkungen gedankt sei, möchte ich Erwin Faul und den zwischenzeitlich leider verstorbenen Peter Haungs hervorheben. Erwin Faul hat meine Arbeit wie immer wohlwollend und kritisch beurteilt, ihm ver danke ich im übrigen auch den Begriff der 'Ideenagentur' . Peter Haungs hat sich trotz seiner schweren Erkrankung noch die Mühe gemacht, den Text zu lesen und zu kommentieren.
German policy during the Eurozone crisis supposedly follows an ordoliberal tradition. In this paper, we discuss to what extent this contention holds and to what extent Germany pragmatically responded to different crisis phenomena. A proper analysis of ordoliberal thinking reveals that European Monetary Union can be justified on ordoliberal grounds as an economic constitution for Europe in which several pillars supposedly aim at ensuring sound money in the Eurozone. The policies the German government pushed during the Eurozone crisis have been informed by the ordoliberal tradition. In particular, this tradition may explain why the German government has been hesitant to support the call for Eurobonds and has only reluctantly established the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). However, the decisions on the ESM and the acceptance of unconventional monetary policy in Europe show that German economic policy largely responded pragmatically to the challenges offered by the crisis. JEL-Classification: B25, B26, B31, D78, E61, E63 Keywords: Ordoliberalism, Eurozone Crisis, Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Why do so many people who should know better argue that Neoliberalism 'does not exist'? In this paper I examine the disinclination to treat the Neoliberal political project as a serious intellectual project motivating a series of successes in the public sphere. Economists seem especially remiss in this regard.
Based on ideas of David Hume, Adam Smith, the founder of modern economics, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments developed the idea of a moral person. Morality in his conception is obtained in a continuous process of imagination about oneself and the others as well. Smith's idea of man has many implications for economic theory. However, in economics it was soon forgotten. Therefore, the history of economic thought beginning with Adam Smith can be understood as the constant loss of imagery and the implications of imaginations for economic activities. At the end, this article provides a short overview of some major implications of this development for economic thought.
This paper deals with the complex relationship between academic advice given to policy makers, economics as a science, and economic policy. It is seen from the viewpoint of a university teacher who serves (or did so formerly) as an adviser in the advisory council of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Council of Economic Experts. The paper addresses the trade-off between doing research work and economic advising, as well as the extent to which economics as a science is established sufficiently enough to advise seriously. Moreover, the reputation of economic advisers and the successful influence of economic advising on economic policy makers is discussed.
The latest financial and economic crisis has undoubtedly reawakened public and academic interest for the scholarly discourse on economics of the 1930s. Large think tanks foster a reenactment of John Maynard Keynes or Friedrich August von Hayek with various methods and intentions, while scholars invite their audience to rediscuss economic ideas of the Great Depression and its subsequent period. One of these scholars is James M. Buchanan, who has highlighted the importance of the “Old Chicago” School (and sharply contrasted it from the “New Chicago” School’s tenets); another is Viktor Vanberg, who has highlighted the importance of the Freiburg School of Economics. The Chicago School and the Freiburg School have remarkably influenced the design of post-war economic orders as well as scholarly discourse in economics in the United States and Germany.
http://www.metropolis-verlag.de/Demokratie!-Welche-Demokratie%3F/970/book.do
In the German federal elections on September 22, 2013, for the first time after 64 years, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) was not elected to the German federal parliament, the Bundestag, anymore. Less surprising than this fact is the malice of its political opponents with which this landslide defeat was accompanied. In this paper, it is argued that the hostility towards the Free Democrats originates from its turn to the Christian Democrats in 1982 with the so called Manifesto for the Market Economy written by Otto Graf Lambsdorff, then Federal Minister of the Economy. The Manifesto argued for a consolidation of public finance and tax reductions, for reforms in the labor market and the social security systems, and for a liberalization and privatization policy. While the Free Democrats did not achieve much of that agenda during the coalition with the Christian Democrats, it influenced the Agenda 2010 by Chancellor Schröder. The paper concludes with a proposal for a renewal of supply side policies in Germany and a renewal of the reform agenda.
When the global financial crisis hit in 2007, many commentators thought it heralded the end of neoliberalism. Several years later, neoliberalism continues to dominate policy making. This book sets out why such commentators got it so wrong, and why neoliberalism remains so durable in the face of crisis.
Jahrhundertelang verstand man unter Wissen bewiesenes Wissen-bewiesen entweder durch die Kraft der Vernunft oder durch die Evidenz der Sinne. Es galt als ein Gebot der Weisheit und der intellektuellen Redlichkeit, sich unbewiesener Behauptungen zu enthalten und die Kluft zwischen bloßer Spekulation und begründetem Wissen, sogar im Denken, auf ein Mindestmaß zu beschränken. Wohl wurde die beweisende Kraft des Verstandes und der Sinne schon vor mehr als zwei Jahrtausenden von den Skeptikern in Frage gestellt, aber sie wurden durch den Triumphzug der Newtonschen Physik mit Verwirrung geschlagen. Einsteins Ergebnisse haben die Situation dann wieder auf den Kopf gestellt, und heute gibt es nur noch wenig Philosophen und Wissenschaftler, die der Ansicht wären, wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis sei oder könnte bewiesenes Wissen sein. Aber fast niemand sieht ein, daß damit auch das ganze klassische Gebäude intellektueller Werte zusammenbricht und durch etwas Neues ersetzt werden muß: Man kann das Ideal bewiesener Wahrheit nicht einfach verdünnen -etwa zum Ideal ‘wahrscheinlicher Wahrheit’2), wie es einige logische Empiristen tun, oder zur ‘Wahrheit aufgrund [wechselnder] Übereinstimmung’3), die wir bei einigen Wissenssoziologen finden.
While unification has undoubtedly had major effects on Germany's political economy, the pattern of current policy-making preferences was established at an earlier stage, in particular, at the beginning of the 'Kohl-era' in 1982. This essentially neo-liberal pattern can be seen to have dominated the modalities chosen to guide Germany through the process of unifi cation and was mirrored in developments in other OECD countries and in particular within the EU. This book demonstrates that the three policy imperatives (neo-liberal structural reform, European monetary integration, and unification) produced a policy-mix which, together with other structural economic and demographic factors, has had disappointing results in all three areas and hampered Germany's overall economic development.
This article traces the evolution of Milton Friedman's ideological views over the course of his adult life. It finds the evolution to be from a moderate liberalism to a definite classical liberalism and then, during the last 50 years of his life, to an increasingly robust libertarianism. Friedman explicitly acknowledged a change in his views on a number of policy issues; also, sometimes even if his opinion on an issue did not change, the strength with which he held and promoted it did. A significant point in Friedman's life was his retirement and relocation to San Francisco in 1976. There he became almost exclusively a public policy advocate, and his mode of discourse shifted significantly away from empirical demonstration and toward invoking and applying what he considered to be the broad verities and maxims of the outlook he had established for himself.
La guerre froide a serieusement altere le developpement national des Etats-Unis et des Etats Sovietiques. Dans cet article, l'A. analyse leur developpement scientifique et technologique en etudiant l'histoire et la production de la recherche
The Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit public policy organizations constituted by section 501c3 of the U.S. Tax Code ("think tanks", TTs or "tanks") monitor and adjust governance norms and networks by using research, analysis, and advocacy to structure discourse about social problems and solutions among multiple elites and in the popular imagination. Through conversation, public communication, participation in government commissions and committees, and other methods, tanks strive to keep certain ideas alive (or at bay) until a particular policy idea becomes politically feasible and persuasive. Thirty-four case studies illustrate TT roles in constructing two basic policy regimes in 20th century America, corporate liberalism and neoliberalism. The two policy regimes are contingent discursive achievements, reflected in the adaptations in the modalities and rhetoric of think tanks in relation to dynamic processes of capitalist development, crisis, realignment, and consolidation. The cases show that while TTs generally function to contain and co-opt radical political economic ideas and social impulses, they are are not able to stitch interests seamlessly into state policy. Rather, social and economic crises, the changing demands and forms of the economy and the state, the actions of other actors, and other forces function to constrain the appeal of a given discourse or institution, so much so that individual tanks can drift from one ideological pole to another over time in reaction to these forces. These forces can also enable think tanks to exert discourse as an autonomous power that transcends the material constraints of the organizations themselves.
Economists and Societiesis the first book to systematically compare the profession of economics in the United States, Britain, and France, and to explain why economics, far from being a uniform science, differs in important ways among these three countries. Drawing on in-depth interviews with economists, institutional analysis, and a wealth of scholarly evidence, Marion Fourcade traces the history of economics in each country from the late nineteenth century to the present, demonstrating how each political, cultural, and institutional context gave rise to a distinct professional and disciplinary configuration. She argues that because the substance of political life varied from country to country, people's experience and understanding of the economy, and their political and intellectual battles over it, crystallized in different ways--through scientific and mercantile professionalism in the United States, public-minded elitism in Britain, and statist divisions in France. Fourcade moves past old debates about the relationship between culture and institutions in the production of expert knowledge to show that scientific and practical claims over the economy in these three societies arose from different elites with different intellectual orientations, institutional entanglements, and social purposes.Much more than a history of the economics profession,Economists and Societiesis a revealing exploration of American, French, and British society and culture as seen through the lens of their respective economic institutions and the distinctive character of their economic experts.
The predictive power of the h-index has been shown to depend for a long time
on citations to rather old publications. This has raised doubts about its
usefulness for predicting future scientific achievements. Here I investigate a
variant which considers only the recent publications and is therefore more
useful in academic hiring processes and for the allocation of research
resources. It is simply defined in analogy to the usual h-index, but taking
into account only the publications from recent years, and it can easily be
determined from the ISI Web of Knowledge.
New York/London: W.W. Norton & Co., 382pp., ISBN 978-0-393-07748-3 $28.95/£18.99 (hb) 2011 As the Luftwaffe targeted culturally-rich cities in 1942, two economists took their turn in fire-watching on the roof of King's College chapel. Thus opens an account of 'history's greatest economic duel'. With his journalist skill, Nicholas Wapshott gives a vivid account of a personal/professional relationship that underscores continuing debates over monetary and fiscal policy. Poignancy is gained as his narrative cites policies adopted across thirteen US Presidencies. His market is clear: a copyeditor is credited for turning 'English-English into American-English'. The author's adjudication of the clash between Keynes and Hayek is far from impartial. Readers are led from the outset. Keynes had 'a commonsense understanding', whereas Hayek's was 'intellectual rather than practical'. Keynes saw economics as 'a means of improving the lives of others', whereas Hayek was 'consumed by economic theory for its own sake'. Keynes confronted 'real-life dilemmas', whereas Hayek indulged in 'pure theory'. To a degree, this is as understandable as it is common. Few master either the depth of Hayek's work or the contrast between Keynes's General Theory and Keynesianism. Yet, each is essential to any worthwhile appraisal of 'the clash that defined modern economics'. The significance of eight weeks in Zurich (1919-1920) to Hayek's Sensory Order and the relevance of that paradigm to Hayek's analysis of a complex socio-economic order are missed. Instead, the trite categorisation of 'devotees of the free market' is reflected in multiple entries for 'laissez-faire', none of which cites Hayek on the emptiness of the term: 'nothing has done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of some liberals on ... the principle of laissez-faire'. Indeed, the 'laissez-faire' blunderbuss conflates policy directed towards managing real macroeconomic forces (abhorrent to Hayek) with policy to achieve monetary stability (which took Hayek's attention over many years).
In diesem Kapitel wird gezeigt, dass die Österreichische Schule der Nationalökonomie ein weitgehend heterogenes Generationenprojekt darstellt. Bereits im Wechsel von der ersten zur zweiten Generation tauchen wechselseitige Unverträglichkeiten der beiden Hauptlinien auf, die zum einen von Carl Menger über Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk und zum anderen von Carl Menger über Friedrich von Wieser gezogen werden können. Anfängliche Differenzen haben sich in der Folgezeit zu gravierenden Entfremdungserscheinungen und manifesten Feindseligkeiten zugespitzt, die sich schulenintern, aber auch in schulenübergreifenden Beziehungen zeigen. Sowohl Abgrenzungen zu alternativen theoretischen Ansätzen als auch intendierte Wahlverwandtschaften haben dazu geführt, dass die Schule in ihrer jüngsten Generation vollends in eine Dilemmasituation geraten ist. Da, wo sie eng in der Tradition verbleiben will, ist bereits eine Selektion vorgenommen worden, mit der nicht nur nebensächliche, sondern auch grundsätzliche Positionen der einstigen Hauptstränge der Schule ausgegrenzt werden. Hinzu kommt, dass Züge von Dogmatismus auftreten, die blinde Flecken gegenüber Unzulänglichkeiten und Fehlern der Väter des Austrianismus verraten. Da, wo sie sich von der Tradition löst, tut sie das in einem Ausmaß, das den trotz allem ständig beschworenen Schulzusammenhang nahezu komplett opfert und nur noch als mehr oder weniger starke Bastardierung wahrzunehmen ist, wenn plötzlich mit Argumenten hantiert wird, die eben nicht dem Erbe der Vorgänger entspringen.
We present the results of a survey among the members of the German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik) concerning the relevance and reputation of economic journals. Our results show that internationally oriented, English journals are rated as most relevant. German journals, however, receive a higher rating of relevance when compared to citation‐based methods. Moreover, while older economists favor policy‐oriented journals, younger economists largely prefer technically oriented ones. Internationally oriented journals also dominate the ranking of journals based on their reputation, whereas German journals fare rather poorly. While research‐oriented journals are perceived as more renowned than applied journals, we only find slight differences in the ratings across different age groups. Compared to our survey from the year 2000, all journals are rated as more relevant but less renowned. German journals are among the biggest losers, with an average loss of 30 ranks in the ranking of relevance and 16 ranks in the ranking of reputation.
This study represents one of the first attempts to use empirical analysis to estimate academic productivity complex and proves the thesis that academic productivity is a function of multidimensional combination of the work of academic researchers: the scientific work, education, and external relationships. Given the complexity of academic productivity, it is necessary to clarify that it is divided into scientific productivity of the first type (scientific publications); scientific productivity of the second type (awards and academic positions); productivity in terms of external relationships (or external advice); and educational productivity. This objective of this paper is achieved through a sample survey (2,738 academics responded) conducted by Italian researchers from the PIR research project. The results obtained, however (as a case of estimates obtained using the results of a sample survey), are the result of a working reality that Italian academics are flooded by a myriad of activities that are not always consistent with the primary aims of the work of a researcher with an organisational and environmental well-being at the limit of iper productivity (or hyper productivity). The overall productivity (academic productivity) is significantly correlated with the four dimensions: average annual scientific productivity of the first type, average annual scientific productivity of the second type, the productivity external advice and, lastly, teaching productivity. The estimate of the sizes for the four indicators of productivity are the result of a literature search of the primary techniques used to assess productivity in academia. By comparing the most significant indicators, we managed to select all of the technical aspects missing in the Italian system of evaluation. This process allowed for us to add additional variables characterising the various aspects of productivity and prove the validity of our theory about the multidimensionality of academic productivity.