Article

Do Donors Reduce Bilateral Aid to Countries With Restrictive NGO Laws? A Panel Study, 1993-2012

Authors:
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the authors.

Abstract

Foreign aid contributes to about 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) of developing countries. To distribute aid in recipient countries, Western donors increasingly rely on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Yet, since the mid-1990s, 39 developing countries have adopted laws restricting the inflow of foreign aid to NGOs operating in their jurisdictions. In response to these restrictions, have bilateral donors reduced aid, either as a punishment or because they cannot find appropriate NGOs for aid delivery? We explore this question by examining a panel of 134 aid-receiving countries for the years 1993-2012. We find that all else equal, the adoption of a restrictive NGO finance law is associated with a 32% decline in bilateral aid inflows in subsequent years. These findings hold even after controlling for levels of democracy and civil liberties, which suggests that aid reduction responds to the removal of NGOs from aid delivery chains, and not to democracy recession.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.

... These NPOs compete for national and international grants, and the demand to access larger grants has reduced the output quality of NPOs (Nanda, 2000). Moreover, legal restrictions in India have restrained NPOs from receiving foreign contributions (Dupuy & Prakash, 2018). An Indian daily has reported that there are approximately 31 lakh NPOs (The Indian Express, 2018). ...
... Similar evidence was observed in other countries (Aldashev & Verdier, 2009Javeline & Lindemann-Komarova, 2010;Rohloff et al., 2011;Salim et al., 2011). The stringent legal framework of accessing foreign donations in India (Dupuy & Prakash, 2018) may have increased the aggressiveness of NPO competition. In 1992, Bush (1992) mentioned that some NPOs managed to compete appropriately, whereas others failed. ...
Article
Full-text available
This inductive study was conducted to understand the competitive dynamics of not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) in the Indian subcontinent. The analysis aimed to understand the dimensions, characteristics, causalities, influencers and consequences of not-for-profit competition. The narrative inquiry method was applied to understand the competitive dynamics of Indian not-for-profit organizations. Narrations were captured from 112 respondents. Data analysis was performed following the classical grounded theory approach. The study disassociated the cause and intervening condition of NPO competition. The characteristics of the competitive dynamics were captured through competitive aggressiveness. Long-term survival was the cause, while competitive advantages were the intervening conditions of NPO competition. There were three dimensions of NPO competition. The consequences of NPO competition were identified along with the NPOs’ survival strategies.
... Due to these laws, official foreign aid channeled through international NGOs (INGOs) has decreased in repressive countries (Brechenmacher, 2017;Chaudhry and Heiss, 2018;Dupuy and Prakash, 2018). However, philanthropy from private donors and foundations is not as adversely affected (McGill, 2018). ...
... While INGOs have not been passive in responding to the crackdown on civil society, they face increasing obstacles in acquiring funding. Closing civic space has resulted in net losses of income to INGOs, particularly in official bilateral and multilateral aid (Dupuy and Prakash, 2018). ...
Article
The phenomenon of closing civic space has adversely impacted international non‐governmental organization (INGO) funding. We argue that individual private donors can be important in sustaining the operations of INGOs working in repressive contexts. Individual donors do not use the same performance‐based metrics as official aid donors. Rather, trust can be an important component of individual donor support for nonprofits working towards difficult goals. How does trust in charitable organizations influence individuals' preferences to donate, especially when these groups face crackdown? Using a simulated market for philanthropic donations based on data from a nationally representative sample of individuals in the United States who regularly donate to charity, we find that trust in INGOs matters substantially in shaping donor preferences. Donor profiles with high levels of social trust are likely to donate to INGOs with friendly relationships with host governments. This support holds steady if INGOs face criticism or crackdown. In contrast, donor profiles with lower levels of social trust prefer to donate to organizations that do not face criticism or crackdown abroad. The global crackdown on NGOs may thus possibly sour NGOs' least trusting individual donors. Our findings have practical implications for INGOs raising funds from individuals amid closing civic space. Research on international giving by individuals, especially in the era of closing civic space, is not meant to find answers that can act as substitutes for strategic policy responses, especially by official aid donors and foundations. However, many INGOs are under immediate threat, and individual‐level philanthropy can help support these organizations.
... The perception that CSOs are at high risk of infiltration and exploitation by terrorist groups informed the embrace and deployment of counterterrorism measures (CTMs) that regulated CSOs' access to foreign aid in different political contexts (Howell & Lind, 2010a;Letts, 2018;Watson & Burles, 2018). However, the enforcement of the CTMs led to the securitization of foreign aid, which negatively affected the operationality of CSOs, closed civic spaces, and transformed voluntary associational life (Dupuy & Prakash, 2018;Fowler & Sen, 2010;Howell & Lind, 2010a;Sidel, 2010). In this article, securitization is understood as an articulated assemblage of practices where heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (sensations, thoughts) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reason for choices and act by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development. ...
... Hence, state actors established and enforced laws and policies that effectively securitized foreign funding for CSOs. The securitization of CSOs influenced the decisions of international development agencies to change their policies, thereby leading to declining support for CSOs and the redirection of assistance in a way that aligned with the agenda of their home governments' security objectives (Dupuy & Prakash, 2018). In the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Russia, studies have shown that CTMs had adverse effects on the operations of CSOs (Brechenmacher, 2017;Watson & Burles, 2018). ...
Article
Full-text available
While debates on the effects of the post-9/11 counterterrorism measures (CTMs) on civil society organizations (CSOs) exist, there is a paucity of data on how CTMs are shaping the spaces and actors of CSOs in Nigeria. Using a mixed-methods design, this article analyzes CSOs’ perceptions on the effects of counterterrorism financing measures, the countermeasures that CSOs are taking, and the government’s views on the security threat posed by CSOs. The findings show that although counterterrorism financing were not as constraining, it appears to increase the administrative cost of CSOs and disadvantaged the less prominent CSOs forcing them to close down or merge with more prominent CSOs. Besides, the result shows the state’s increasing interest in the activities of CSOs on the grounds of national security imperatives. Thus, I argue CTMs are evolving, and thus CSOs will experience increased financial regulations. Also, CTMs expansion will threaten CSOs’ sustainability and polarize them. Keywords Boko Haram, Islamic State of West African Province, foreign aid, de-risking policy, anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing, closing of civic space
... In this situation, NGOs are vulnerable. That vulnerability has been exposed with particular force in countries where authorities have curbed external funding and imposed other restrictions on non-profits; in those circumstances, most outside donors simply terminate the contracts, often with fatal consequences for NGOs, resulting in an overall reduction in NGO numbers (Dupuy & Prakash 2018). ...
Article
Full-text available
Restrictions on NGOs and others promoting civil liberties have caused alarm about «shrinking civic space» perpetrated by their domestic regimes. Yet because most camps in the world’s civil societies are left unmolested (indeed many are growing) and because non-domestic sources of constraint often play decisive roles, there are reasons to re-think the issues and ask how, and for whom, civil spaces are shaped. This exploratory article draws attention to forces set in motion from central, transnational levels that affect civic spaces: securitization; constraints on organized labour; marketization; transnational non-state actors; citizen disengagement driven by state retrenchment; and social media. As problematized in most policy, activist and scholarly writings, outside forces af-fecting civic space for emancipatory camps are often ignored, despite their being more susceptible to counteraction from outside than are repressive regimes. These issues await deeper investigation and discussion.
... Kendra Dupuy, James Ron and Aseem Prakash (2016) have shown that recent restrictions on foreign aid to NGOs in competitive political systems tend to relate to perceptions that they support the political opposition; such restrictions tend to be concentrated after multiparty elections. In related work, they also conclude that bilateral (official) aid flows tend to drop (by about 32 per cent) in the years after governments introduce new restrictions on NGO funds, but this relates more to donor preferences for funding favoured NGOs, rather than because of their disapproval of shrinking civic space (Dupuy and Prakash 2017). The decline in foreign aid to NGOs and CSOs is likely to have a direct effect on service delivery, as well as on the capacities of such organisations to hold governments to account over development policy processes and outcomes. ...
Article
Full-text available
What does closing civic space mean for development? Aid donors are concerned about the implications of restrictions on civil society for their partners and programmes, but to date there has been little clarity about what this means for development. This paper summarises the findings of a literature review in support of research on this issue. It concludes that: (a) civic space has changed more than shrunk, although new restrictions affect aid-supported groups disproportionately; (b) new regulations are not all unwelcome, but nonetheless shift power from civic to political actors; (c) how that power shift shapes development outcomes depends on how political elites deploy that power, and in whose interests; (d) while there are instances where civil society has been curtailed to advance ‘developmentalist’ agendas, it more often enables land and natural resource grabbing, or the abuse of labour or other rights of marginalised and disempowered groups; (e) while short term economic growth is unlikely to be adversely affected, economic crises are more likely in settings where civic space is closed, and it is highly improbable that development has any chance of producing equitable, sustainable, or inclusive outcomes under conditions where civic space is restricted or closing.
... While NGOs are important development actors, increasingly in developing country contexts, they face accountability pressures and other challenges in their operating environments. Tough government discourse targets NGOs, in many contexts publicly asserting that NGOs are corrupt, incite public unrest and represent international interests (ICNL 2015); and restrictive policies toward NGOs are becoming more prevalent (CIVICUS 2016;Dupuy et al. 2016;Dupuy and Prakash 2018). Much of the attention on these shifts tends to focus on implications for larger, international NGOs. ...
Article
Full-text available
This research comparatively examines grassroots international NGOs (GINGOs), a growing subset of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) working in private development aid. GINGOs are small-scale, ongoing development initiatives through voluntary third sector organizations. How do GINGOs' founders and volunteers understand their role in private development aid? The article uses an interpretive framework to examine three in-depth comparative case studies of GINGOs based in the US and working in South Sudan, Nepal and Haiti. Its contribution is that it provides rich data to build further theory about the experiences, or multiple realities, in private development aid. It is found that GINGOs' founders and volunteers attach new meanings to private development aid to distinguish themselves from larger professio-nalized INGOs and emphasize personal connections.
... First, nonprofits have emerged as important policy actors (Gibelman and Gelman 2004). In addition to becoming important players in social policy in the domestic sphere (Smith and Lipsky 1993), about 10% of foreign aid is now funneled through nonprofits (Dupuy and Prakash 2018). Second, nonprofits are often regarded as principled and moral actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998) that are not corrupted by shareholder pressure (Hansmann 1980). ...
Article
We examine Twitter data to assess the impact of media exposes on the reputations of two international nonprofits, Oxfam and Save the Children (STC). Using a random sample of 6794 Tweets, we study the daily gap between positive and negative sentiments expressed towards these organizations. The “unweighted gap” and the “weighted gap” (weighted by the number of followers) of the Twitter handle follow broadly the same trajectory with high fluctuation in response to new negative or positive media stories. Twitter handles with large audiences amplify variability in weighted gap. While Oxfam’s reputation did not fully recover to pre-Haiti levels even 6 months after the scandal, STC’s reputation returned to pre-scandal levels in 8 days, although it fluctuated in response to new revelations. Overall, reputation recovery for both organizations was aided when they received celebrity endorsements and focused public attention on their positive activities, especially by linking to visible global events.
... In Ethiopia, a 2009 proclamation introduced a new classification of NGOs as well as monitoring mechanisms for those receiving foreign funds; by 2011, the number of registered international and local NGOs had fallen by 45% (Dupuy et al. 2015). And in a study of 134 developing countries, Dupuy & Prakash (2018) find that bilateral aid drops by 32% among countries that adopt more restrictive laws. ...
Article
Full-text available
The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented rise in government restrictions on foreign funding to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Often in the name of defending the nation from outside influences, over 60 countries have implemented laws limiting foreign funding to NGOs. We use event history analyses to evaluate domestic and global explanations for the adoption of these policies over the period 1994 to 2015. Prior work has argued that funding restrictions result from real or perceived threats to political regimes, especially in countries with competitive elections. We add to this story by situating it in a larger global and cultural context: new funding laws are part of a growing backlash against the liberal international order, which has long sponsored international and domestic NGOs devoted to issues such as human rights and the environment. In an era of increasing resistance towards globally-linked civil society groups-the primary carriers of liberal world society-NGO funding restrictions are now diffusing widely across the international system. We argue that restriction policies will be most common among countries that are linked to illiberal or anti-Western organizations and discourses in the international community. Moreover, adoption will accelerate as more countries do it, representing a growing "wave" or backlash against the liberal international order. Findings support the prior literature as well as our new arguments regarding illiberal international organizations and global backlash.
... In addressing civil society-government relations in this twenty-first century context, scholars have examined how authoritarian regimes in particular are approaching foreign aid funding and producing a 'shrinking space' for organized civil society, particularly for organizations working in human rights and democracy promotion (e. g. Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014;Dupuy, Prakash, and Ron 2016;Dupuy and Prakash 2018). More recent empirical work has shown that regulatory measures -whether populist or other -have changed the composition and size of organized civil society (see the Ethiopian case, Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015), and others propose that still further nuanced questions are warranted (e. g. ...
Article
Full-text available
This article examines how civil society organizations (CSOs) in Latin America cope with authoritarian populism. In particular, it outlines cases of coping and adaptive strategies by CSOs in Ecuador during the years of President Rafael Correa’s presidency (2007–2017). Ecuador provides an example of an authoritarian, leftist populist administration; thus situating our discussion in the general civil society-government relations literature, we link together trends of authoritarianism and populism and its implications on CSOs. Using a qualitative-interpretive approach with long-term fieldwork in Ecuador, we outline a selection of coping strategies used by organized civil society that include formal, semi-formal and informal organizational configurations.
... Dupuy et al. (2015) report that such restrictions have changed the population ecology of the NGO sector in law-adopting countries, leading to a significant decline in the number of NGOs, most notably in the numbers of groups promoting good governance, democracy, and human rights. These laws have also resulted in reduced foreign aid flows to law-adopting countries (Dupuy & Prakash, 2018). But we know little else about their domestic political effects in African states, including on citizens' political behavior. ...
Article
Full-text available
Laws that restrict foreign funding to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can depress voting through two mechanisms. First, they can signal a democracy recession. Consequently, citizens might fear rigged elections where their vote will not influence who forms the next government. Second, by denying funding to NGOs, these laws can undermine NGOs’ ability to generate social capital, which is crucial to mitigate collective action problems associated with voting. Since 1990, 13 of Africa’s 54 states have enacted laws restricting foreign funding for NGOs. Drawing on the 2016 Afrobarometer survey (36 countries, 53,936 respondents), we find support for the argument that restrictive NGO laws reduce citizens’ electoral participation in national elections probably by signaling democracy recession, and not by undermining social capital that foreign-funded NGOs are supposed to generate. In fully democratic countries, respondents are around 94% more likely to report having voted in a recent national election even after controlling for restrictive NGO laws
... NGOs provide assistance and rehabilitation support to the disaster-prone rural communities, like food and medical services, pure drinking water, dry clothes, temporary cyclone shelters, and credit for managing accommodations [33]. Due to lack of state capacity, donors making effective relief negotiations with NGOs bypassing the state institutions and disbursing relief through decentralized channels, like NGOs [107]. However, NGOs are moving far from speaking to grassroots, and the national and international organizations determine the needs of the victims without the community's concern [108]. ...
Article
Global indexes rank Bangladesh as the 5th most disaster-prone country in the world with immense loss of life and property. In this frightening narrative of death and damage, rural people are often the most vulnerable with limited access to infrastructure (e.g. information, governance, education, and clean water) leaving them unable to cope with the effects of a disaster. More than 2,500 registered Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) are delivering numerous community level programs in Bangladesh. However, a majority of these NGOs are non-Disaster Risk Reduction (non-DRR) in their core business lacking the expertise and resources to implement programs that directly impact DRR. This paper seeks to propose a practice issues for NGOs in Bangladesh looking to strengthen their community-based DRR mainstreaming initiatives. The researchers conducted a comprehensive review of published documents around the principles that guide international disaster risk reduction globally alongside a review of international best practices for NGO’s in mainstreaming disaster risk reduction. The findings of the study reveal a need for a multi-stakeholders’ involvement in line with global best practices aimed at reducing disaster risk. The International Decade for Disaster Risk Reduction (1990-1999), Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015), and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) emphasized the active involvement of all necessary parties from Non-government organizations (NGOs) to government agencies and community groups in coming together to achieve mainstream disaster risk reduction. Furthermore, NGOs have the opportunity to build up the communities more resilient by including DRR principles and practices within their regular relief and development programs.
... Three existing studies on the relationship between NGO restrictions and foreign aid (Christensen and Weinstein 2013;Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016) provide valuable clues as to the trade-offs governments may make in relation to such restrictions; it is a balancing act between the domestic desirability of curtailing potentially oppositional civil-society voices in order to stay in power and the international reputational and economic costs of such restrictions. Both Christensen and Weinstein (2013) and Dupuy and Prakash (2018) find that NGO restrictions do indeed come at a cost: they are associated with subsequent drops in bilateral aid. Discussing under what circumstances states might nonetheless choose to adopt such restrictions, Christensen and Weinstein (2013, 79) posit that "vulnerable governments restrict civil society in hopes of weakening groups that might mobilize opposition. ...
Article
Full-text available
Recent decades have witnessed a global cascade of restrictive and repressive measures against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). We theorize that state learning from observing the regional environment, rather than NGO growth per se or domestic unrest, explains this rapid diffusion of restrictions. We develop and test two hypotheses: (1) states adopt NGO restrictions in response to nonarmed bottom-up threats in their regional environment (“learning from threats”); (2) states adopt NGO restrictions through imitation of the legislative behavior of other states in their regional environment (“learning from examples”). Using an original dataset on NGO restrictions in ninety-six countries over a period of twenty-five years (1992–2016), we test these hypotheses by means of negative binomial regression and survival analyses, using spatially weighted techniques. We find very limited evidence for learning from threats, but consistent evidence for learning from examples. We corroborate this finding through close textual comparison of laws adopted in the Middle East and Africa, showing legal provisions being taken over almost verbatim from one law into another. In our conclusion, we spell out the implications for the quality of democracy and for theories of transition to a postliberal order, as well as for policy-makers, lawyers, and civil-society practitioners.
... The 1980s and early 1990s were termed the age of associational revolutions (Salamon and Toepler 2015), due to Western states' use of CSOs to institutionalise liberal norms and democratic principles in the global South and communist states (Dupuy and Prakash 2018). However, the late 1990s heralded a decline in CSOs' growth, as there was a push back by governments of these regions who resisted Western influence through CSOs (Rutzen 2015). ...
Article
Full-text available
Although there have been attempts to theorise state-Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) relations in the Counter-Terrorism (CT) context , including the "co-option and containment" and "duality of coercion" perspectives, these two-way articulations have failed to account for the range of strategic options open to the state in regulating CSOs. This study presents the framework of Strategic Exclusion, Co-option and Containment (SECC) to underscore the general patterns of state engagement of CSOs in the context of CT. It mapped secondary evidence in 19 countries and used three illustrative case studies (Australia, Uganda and Russia) to examine the elements of SECC, namely, states' exclusion of CSOs in law and policymaking on CT, the use of strategic ambiguity in enacting and interpreting CT laws, delegitimizing or criminalising advocacy and influencing the transformation of CSOs into state adjutants. This pattern of engagement with CSOs is transforming voluntary and associational life in precarious ways. The article advances the Copenhagen School and rational-actor model of global strategic decision-making, and contributes to discourses on the closing of civic spaces, democratic recession and the resurgence of authoritarianism. It lays a foundation for generalisable theory and future empirical research on state behaviour towards CSOs in the context of violence, conflict, and security.
... Preliminary evidence suggests that the repressive attack on NGO funding and activities is upending traditional development aid delivery models, forcing thousands of NGOs to shut their doors and driving donors to reduce overall foreign aid-disbursements to countries repressing civil society (Dupuy and Prakash, 2017;Dupuy et al., 2014;Hossain, 2018). Case studies in Ethiopia, Egypt and Russia furthermore report that domestic NGOs see foreign funding reduced and find themselves forced to organize more informally or move to service-oriented activities (Brechenmacher, 2017;Dupuy et al., 2014;Toepler et al., 2020aToepler et al., , 2020b. ...
Article
Full-text available
This paper examines through qualitative study the effect of government regulatory restriction and repression on non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) engaging in transnational advocacy. The focus is on NGO’s advocacy activities, in the realm of human rights, environment, labor and development in particular, using illustrations from Bangladesh and Zambia. It finds that next to some NGOs disbanding and moving towards service activities, many NGOs shift in terms of substantive advocacy and form of organizational collaboration. To continue cross‐border interactions with their foreign partners, many NGOs adjust to circumvent or compensate for restrictions and repression. Because of this, transnational advocacy can be said to continue, but repression and restrictions have significant substantive and organizational effects for the collaborations studied, and cross‐border NGO collaborations in our sample are increasingly fragile and their advocacy more tempered. Our research found that most of the time, non‐governmental organization representatives themselves planned and enacted changes in their transnational collaborations as a response to pressures. Donors involved in sponsoring activities mostly accommodated these changes, and exercised flexibility.
... If the aim of foreign funding restrictions is to reduce such inflows, then CSO-restricting governments have been granted their wish. The increase in legal constraints on foreign funding of civil society has negatively impacted on donor funds to civil society; Dupuy and Prakash (2017) find that countries with foreign fund restrictions in place experience a 32% decline in bilateral aid flows in the years after enacting such a measure. In an unpublished paper, Chaudhry and Heiss (2018) find an even greater impact on aid flows, with 45% less foreign aid channeled towards countries that restrict CSOs' ability to engage in advocacy. ...
... Restrictions on civic space may impact on development in several ways, including through curbing the ability of NGOs to provide services to people facing poverty and hunger. A study of 134 countries showed that bilateral (official) aid flows dropped by around one-third in the years after aid-recipient governments introduced new restrictions on NGOs, mainly because donors could no longer fund preferred NGOs (Dupuy and Prakash, 2017). Since many NGOs implement social protection and antipoverty programs, declines in foreign aid have meant cuts to services for the poor and hungry (Van der Borgh and Terwindt, 2014). ...
Article
Full-text available
Concerns about closing civic space have focused on human rights, and little to date has been known of the impacts on development. This article traces impacts of closing civic space on civil society and social movements addressing poverty and hunger in Brazil, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Countries that clamped down on civil society and social movements have not all fared badly in terms of poverty and hunger, as the ‘developmental states’ of China and Vietnam demonstrate. This article proposes that how closures of civic space affect development outcomes will depend on the role civil society plays in development, and specifically on the ‘fit’ between civil society and the state with respect to development policy and programming. Despite diversity in political and economic context, restrictions on civic space commonly prevent broad civic engagement in policy processes, in particular critique or scrutiny of government policy and practice, and hamper non‐governmental organizations’ service delivery. Because civic engagement matters most for marginalized and disempowered people, their exclusion from policy processes and services will deepen. Reversals or stagnation in progress towards addressing poverty and hunger indicate that as civic space narrows, the most marginalized and disempowered groups face a growing risk of being left behind.
... Eine Regulierung in Bezug auf ausländische Finanzierung kann sich darüber hinaus aber auch auf andere staatliche Funktionen auswirken. Sind doch in Bereichen wie Bildung, Gesundheit oder lokale Entwicklung zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen aktiv, die im Auftrag oder an Stelle des Staates eine Grundversorgung bereitstellen oder andere essenzielle Dienstleistungen erbringen und dafür vorwiegend auf ausländische Finanzmittel angewiesen sind (Dupuy et al. 2015;Amnesty International 2016;Dupuy und Prakash 2018). ...
Article
Full-text available
Gesetzliche Maßnahmen im Bereich der Auslandsfinanzierung von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen werden inzwischen als zentraler Bestandteil von schrumpfenden zivilgesellschaftlichen Räumen angesehen. Allerdings existiert in der Literatur bisher kein Konsens über die Angemessenheit eines expliziten staatlichen Eingriffs in diesem Bereich. Der Artikel entwickelt deswegen einen konzeptionellen Rahmen, um den einschränkenden Charakter von staatlichen Eingriffen empirisch präziser als bisher bestimmen zu können. Wir plausibilisieren unser konzeptionelles Argument anhand von sechs kurzen Fallstudien zu Deutschland, Österreich, der Türkei, Ungarn, Uruguay und Venezuela. Damit tragen wir in dreifacher Art und Weise zur Debatte über schrumpfende zivilgesellschaftliche Räume bei. Wir zeigen erstens, dass gesetzliche Maßnahmen in Bezug auf die ausländische Finanzierung von Zivilgesellschaft nicht zwangsläufig als Teil eines weltweiten repressiven Trends anzusehen sind. Zweitens schlagen wir eine neue analytische Einordnung vor, die über das bisher dominante binäre Verständnis hinausgeht, welches gerade im Global Süden jeglicher Anpassung gesetzlicher Maßnahmen in diesem Bereich repressive Tendenzen unterstellt. Drittens versuchen wir eine Sicht der internationalen Menschenrechte zur Vereinigungsfreiheit mit einer auf nationalen verfassungsrechtlichen Normen fokussierten Perspektive in Verbindung zu bringen, um damit empirisch-analytisch präziser auf die in vielen Ländern existierenden rechtsnormativen Unterschiede zwischen diesen beiden Ebenen aufmerksam zu machen.
... Although international assistance might help protect civic space, the resistance to the restrictions in civic space can most effectively be handled by NGOs and activists themselves, for several different reasons. First, due to unfavourable conditions, foreign donors have been cutting down their funding or have ceased it altogether (Dupuy and Prakash 2018). Second, the hostile political rhetoric towards foreign-funded NGOs has undermined their role in society (Buyse 2018). ...
... The few scholars who have examined the closing space phenomenon not only confirm the rise in restrictive CSO laws around the globe but also their negative, and in some cases devastating, consequences (K. Dupuy and Prakash 2017;Chaudhry 2016). A variety of reports suggest that the percentage of states that have adopted restrictive CSO laws, notably including laws that restrict CSOs' ability to access foreign funding, has risen sharply since 2013 (Laufer 2017;Schuman 2017;Rutzen 2015), and a mounting body of evidence suggests the dire consequences they are having on CSOs, which in some contexts is leading to the collapse of entire sectors of civil society (Chick 2017;K. ...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Why and to what extent are democratic states, including long-standing, consolidated democratic states, adopting legislation that restricts the ability of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to operate autonomous from government control? This phenomenon is common and expected in authoritarian countries, but surprising in the context of democracies, which have historically championed and funded an independent civil society. This paper maps the full scope and spread of the so-called'closing space phenomenon'within the world's strongest democratic states. This phenomenon has been extensively mapped in the context of non-democracies but, until now, not in democracies, which alters the conventional wisdom about why this global trend has gained traction and momentum since the turn of the twenty-first century.
Article
Foundations are often criticized as organizations of elite power facing little accountability within their own countries. Simultaneously, foundations are transnational actors that send money to, and exert influence on, foreign countries. We argue that critiques of foundation power should expand to include considerations of national sovereignty. Recently, countries across the globe have introduced efforts to restrict foreign aid, wary of the foreign influences that accompany it. However, it is unknown whether these restrictions impact foundation activity. With data on all grants from US-based foundations to NGOs based in foreign countries between 2000 and 2012, we use a difference-in-difference statistical design to assess whether restrictive laws decrease foundation activity. Our results suggest that restrictive laws rarely have a significant negative effect on the number of grants, dollars, funders, and human rights funding to a country. These results call for attention to considerations of foundation accountability in a transnational context.
Article
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are a core component of a robust civil society and operate in a wide variety of sectors, ranging from service delivery to political advocacy. However, research has yet to systematically investigate whether the impact of government repression varies across NGO activities. We hypothesize that advocacy NGOs are more affected by repression than those in service delivery. Surveying 176 employees from 106 NGOs in Cambodia, we employ a conjoint experiment to examine how the level of repression affects a task crucial to NGOs’ survival: obtaining funding via grant applications. We find that while increases in the severity of repression appear to have a stronger deterrent effect for advocacy NGOs, repression has a large deterrent effect on service NGOs as well. Interviews and text analysis of open-ended questions suggest that local officials target both advocacy and service delivery NGOs, but for different reasons. Our findings speak to the spread of authoritarianism and the challenges NGOs face in countries with closing civic spaces.
Article
State restrictions on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly pervasive across the globe. Although this crackdown has been shown to have a negative impact on public funding flows, we know little about how it affects private philanthropy. How does information about crackdown abroad, as well as organizational attributes of nonprofits, affect individual donors’ willingness to donate internationally? Using a survey experiment, we find that learning about repressive NGO environments increases generosity in that already-likely donors are willing to donate substantially more to legally besieged nonprofits. This generosity persists when mediated by two organizational-level heuristics: NGO issue areas and main funding sources. We discuss the implications of our results on how nonprofits can use different framing appeals to increase fundraising at a time when traditional public donor funding to such organizations is decreasing.
Article
Full-text available
This article examines the factors that influence the Nigerian government’s constraints of NGOs in counter-terrorism context, analysing whether NGO type, nature, areas of operation and size were determinant factors. Drawing from mixed-methods design, it argues that NGOs’ political advocacy, reporting of human rights abuses and monitoring the use of security funds were key factors that attract government restrictions. Women, youth, children, and faith-based NGOs experienced more government constraints than human rights NGOs. Advocacy and international NGOs also suffered more restrictions. The findings contribute to generalisable knowledge by demonstrating the link between counter-terrorism and NGOs in Nigeria.
Article
Recent assessments of relations between states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) claim a global wave of state crackdowns, raising questions about the continued authority and influence of NGOs. The works reviewed here challenge the idea of a pattern of global conflict, demonstrating a range of ways in which states work with, through, and alongside NGOs. They also demonstrate that the diversity of NGO–state relations can make it difficult to generalize about these interactions across national contexts. One way to reconceptualize these relationships may be to focus on the normative commitments that states and NGOs do or do not share. Conflictual and cooperative NGO–state dynamics emerge from the many and sometimes contradictory liberal values that enabled the rise of NGOs. NGOs can embody three liberal values: visions of civil society can emphasize political freedoms, market-based visions of private action, or universalism. States may embrace some of these values while rejecting others. Thus, while the era of the unimpeded rise of NGOs may have come to an end, the shifting political spaces for NGOs do not spell an end to their influence.
Article
Climate action has two pillars: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation faces collective action issues because its costs are focused on specific locations/actors but benefits are global and nonexcludable. Adaptation, in contrast, creates local benefits, and therefore should face fewer collective action issues. However, governance units vary in the types of adaptation policies they adopt. To explain this variation, we suggest conceptualizing adaptation-aspolitics because adaptation speaks to the issues of power, conflicting policy preferences, resource allocation, and administrative tensions. In examining who develops and implements adaptation, we explore whether adaptation is the old wine of disaster management in the new bottle of climate policy, and the tensions between national and local policy making. In exploring what adaptation policies are adopted, we discuss maladaptation and the distinction between hard and soft infrastructure. Finally, we examine why politicians favor visible, hard adaptation over soft adaptation, and how international influences shape local policy. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Environment and Resources Volume 43 is October 17, 2018. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Article
Full-text available
Scholarship and practitioners interested in civil society organizations (CSOs) around the world have drawn attention to the growing set of laws—both restrictive and permissive—governing CSO activities. To date, however, there have been limited efforts to typologize these regulations which hinders the ability to analyze their emergence and effects. This article seeks to move scholarship toward a coherent framework by first, introducing a broad typology of governance, formation, operations , and resources provisions that allows for a systematic study of CSO laws and policies across contexts; and second, proposing four ideal-types of regulatory regimes, rigid-conservatism, bureaucratic-illiberalism, permissionless-association , and legitimized-pluralism . These regulatory regimes are political institutions that consist of multiple laws and constitutional protections that govern and protect civil society. The article theorizes the effect of each ideal-type regulatory regime on CSOs’ organizational ecology. To provide a concrete example, I apply the typology to the case of Kenya to show how its regulatory regime has changed incrementally over time. Methodologically, the article uses an iterative, inductive review and analysis of academic articles, book chapters, and practitioner reports contributing to our understanding of the laws and policies that regulate CSOs, or what I call CSO regulatory regimes .
Article
This paper employs Oliver Williamson's transaction cost approach to assess contracting. We find that donor contracting with global non-profit chains is conducive to NPO opportunism due to the asset specificity of the contracts, infrequent contracting, and the uncertainty of outcomes. These risks are further exacerbated by the weak enforcement mechanisms available in many developing countries. Williamson's framework predicts that these risks would tempt donors to resort to the muscular approach, where they would exercise maximum control over the non-profit chain. Although competition would be a safeguard against the muscular approach, the donor landscape suffers from collusion and is monopsonistic. Our analysis suggests that while the current contracting and oversight arrangements might serve the donor procedural objective to exercise control in a sector marked by information asymmetries, these arrangements can undermine the primary objective of donors, namely responsiveness to beneficiaries, and ultimately, improved beneficiary welfare. We illustrate our conceptual analysis with short case studies of three Ugandan NPOs.
Article
Climate action has two pillars: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation faces collective action issues because its costs are focused on specific locations/ actors but benefits are global and nonexcludable. Adaptation, in contrast, creates local benefits, and therefore should face fewer collective action issues. However, governance units vary in the types of adaptation policies they adopt. To explain this variation, we suggest conceptualizing adaptation-as-politics because adaptation speaks to the issues of power, conflicting policy preferences, resource allocation, and administrative tensions. In examining who develops and implements adaptation, we explore whether adaptation is the old wine of disaster management in the new bottle of climate policy, and the tensions between national and local policy making. In exploring what adaptation policies are adopted, we discuss maladaptation and the distinction between hard and soft infrastructure. Finally, we examine why politicians favor visible, hard adaptation over soft adaptation, and how international influences shape local policy. 2.1
Article
Full-text available
Serious questions remain about the ability of NGOs to meet long-term transformative goals in their work for development and social justice. We investigate how, given their weak roots in civil society and the rising tide of technocracy that has swept through the world of foreign aid, most NGOs remain poorly placed to influence the real drivers of social change. However we also argue that NGOs can take advantage of their traditional strengths to build bridges between grassroots organizations and local and national-level structures and processes, applying their knowledge of local contexts to strengthen their roles in empowerment and social transformation.
Article
Full-text available
Objective. This study investigates the trends in the distribution of environmental aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. foundations, and a multilateral donor, the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), to determine whether aid is driven by donor interests or recipient need. Methods. Data from USAID, the Foundation Center, GEF, and other secondary sources are analyzed using logistic and OLS regressions. Results. Traditional donor interests (politics, economics, and security) and donors’ environmental interests (those favoring “global” environmental concerns over local ones) explain which nations receive environmental aid and which do not and how much nations receive. In general, the allocation of environmental aid differs from that of official development assistance. The United States does not demonstrate a middle–income bias; multilateral aid is not more “humanitarian” than bilateral aid. Foundations’ allocation patterns favor traditional donors interests. Conclusions. Environmental aid does not target the nations that are most in need of abating local pollution. Instead, environmental aid donors favor nations with whom they have had prior relations (economic and security), nations that are democratic, and nations with unexploited natural resources. In short, donor interests outweigh recipient need.
Article
Full-text available
Recent military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have sparked controversy by using humanitarian aid to further military goals. In 1999, NATO forces set up refugee camps for fleeing Kosovars, even as NATO fighter pilots attacked Yugoslavia. US planes dropped both cluster bombs and food packets in Afghanistan in 2001. As the US military finalized plans for invading Iraq, the US Agency for International Development recruited nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to work in the war zone. Despite the heated rhetoric concerning militarized charity, military and humanitarian actors offer little examination of its effects. My analysis of recent military and NGO interaction reveals three types of interaction, which I term humanitarian soldiers, aid workers as government agents, and the humanitarian placebo. I find that in the absence of adequate security, "humanitarian soldiers" cannot create stability or meet local humanitarian needs. Additionally, aid organizations face the reality of non-neutrality, and may be considered as de facto government agents, if they operate in close proximity to Western intervention forces.
Article
Full-text available
We examine some issues in the estimation of time-series cross-section models, calling into question the conclusions of many published studies, particularly in the field of comparative political economy. We show that the generalized least squares approach of Parks produces standard errors that lead to extreme overconfidence, often underestimating variability by 50% or more. We also provide an alternative estimator of the standard errors that is correct when the error structures show complications found in this type of model. Monte Carlo analysis shows that these “panel-corrected standard errors” perform well. The utility of our approach is demonstrated via a reanalysis of one “social democratic corporatist” model.
Article
Full-text available
This study explores the donor side of debates revolving around the proper role of foreign assistance as a foreign policy tool, by empirically testing for the aid determinants of four industrial democracies: France, Japan, Sweden, and the United States. A pooled cross-sectional time-series design is employed to assess the impacts of six sets of variables on aid flows to thirty-six African states during the 1980s. Three sets of these variables--humanitarian need, strategic importance, and economic potential--are constructed using data traditionally employed in empirical foreign aid studies. Three additional sets of variables--cultural similarity, ideological stance, and region--are constructed from data that regional specialists consider to be important in the foreign aid equation. Although no two cases are alike, one can nevertheless draw some tentative conclusions about the nature of the foreign aid regime of the final cold war decade of the 1980s on the basis of several cross-national patterns. In short, the results (1) contradict rhetorical statements of northern policymakers who claim that foreign aid serves as an altruistic foreign policy tool designed to relieve humanitarian suffering; (2) confirm the expected importance of strategic and ideological factors in a foreign aid regime heavily influenced by the cold war; and (3) underscore the importance of economic, particularly trade, interests in northern aid calculations.
Article
Full-text available
Does foreign aid prop up recipient governments? Although many people argue that it does, there is little systematic evidence to support this claim. We argue that aid's effects on government survival depend on both the recipient's regime type and the analyst's time horizons. In the long run, continued aid helps autocrats more than democrats because the former can stockpile this aid for use against future negative shocks. However, because large stocks of aid reduce the marginal impact of current aid, current aid helps democrats more than autocrats. We test and find support for our argument with a survival analysis of 621 leaders in 123 countries from 1960 to 1999. Our results imply that donors should make both the nature of aid and the use of aid conditionality contingent on the domestic regime type of aid recipients.
Article
Full-text available
This article examines states' decisions to commit to human rights treaties. It argues that the effect of a treaty on a state - and hence the state's willingness to commit to it - is largely determined by the domestic enforcement of the treaty and the treaty's collateral consequences. These broad claims give rise to several specific predictions. For example, states with less democratic institutions will be no less likely to commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records, because there is little prospect that the treaties will be enforced. Conversely, states with more democratic institutions will be less likely to commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records - precisely because the treaties are likely to lead to changes in behavior. These predictions are tested by examining the practices of more than 160 countries over several decades.
Book
Full-text available
What's wrong with development aid? It is argued that much of aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid delivery system, and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. The theoretical insights of the new institutional economics are applied to several settings. First, the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, is investigated to analyze how that aid agency's institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired outcomes, contrary to the desires of its own staff. Second, cases from India, a country with low aid dependence, and Zambia, a country with high aid dependence, are used to explore how institutions on the ground in recipient countries might also mediate the effectiveness of aid. Suggestions are offered on how to improve aid's effectiveness. These include how to structure evaluations in order to improve outcomes, how to employ agency staff to gain from their on-the-ground experience, and how to engage stakeholders as 'owners' in the design, resource mobilization, learning, and evaluation process of development assistance programs. © C. Gibson, K. Andersson, E. Ostrom, and S. Shivakumar, 2005. All rights reserved.
Article
Full-text available
This article seeks to understand how the Indian state exercises control over transnational ties between foreign and domestic actors by examining the national legislative practices that determine receipt of foreign funds and the data on foreign funding flows to NGOs (a database of more than 18,000 associations). The article shows how legislative practices of democratic states serve to reduce foreign influence. Issue characteristics are also shown to determine state response to externalization, blocking transnational ties in "high politics" areas such as minority claims. Finally, within state imposed restrictions, religious rather than secular organizations remain dominant transnational actors in India. The study contributes evidence to suggest that contrary to the arguments of world polity theory and many transnational social movement scholars, states continue to remain powerful actors limiting transnationalization. © International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2008.
Article
Full-text available
The euphoria which emerged in the late 1980s with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the spread of democratic regimes has been replaced in recent years by a sombre backlash against civil society on many levels and fronts. This has particularly intensified following the attacks on September 11 and the ensuing global war on terror. This working paper examines the causes of the backlash against civil society within the context of the War, describes the overt and implicit manifestations of that backlash, and reflects upon the implications for the future. It considers how the growing prominence of security concerns and the concomitant expansion of counter-terrorist measures across the world threaten the spaces for civil society to flourish and act. It argues that while the manifestations of the backlash, such as the crackdown on NGOs in Russia or the taming of NGOs by bilateral and multilateral agencies, may appear to be disparate, unconnected phenomena, on closer inspection it is clear that they are intricately intertwined.
Article
After seeing its reach increase for decades, international support for democracy and human rights faces a serious challenge: more and more governments are erecting legal and logistical barriers to democracy and rights programmes, publicly vilifying international aid groups and their local partners, and harassing such groups or expelling them altogether. Despite the significant implications of the pushback, this phenomenon remains poorly understood and responses to it are often weak. This article examines the scope of the pushback phenomenon, its impact on funders and their partners, its causes, and the responses to date. The article finds that international responses remain relatively weak due to a number of divisions within the democracy and rights community, and structural features of the international political system.
Article
Many resource-strapped developing country governments seek international aid, but when that assistance is channeled through domestic civil society, it can threaten their political control. As a result, in the last two decades, 39 of the world’s 153 low- and middle-income countries have adopted laws restricting the inflow of foreign aid to domestically operating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Governments recognize that such laws harm their international reputations for supporting democracy and may invite donor punishment in terms of aid reductions. Yet, they perceive foreign aid to NGOs as supporting political opponents and threatening their grip on power. In the aftermath of competitive electoral victories, governments often take new legal steps to limit these groups’ funding. We test this argument on an original dataset of laws detailing the regulation of foreign aid inflows to domestically operating NGOs in 153 low- and middle-income countries for the period 1993–2012. Using an event history approach, we find that foreign aid flows are associated with an increased risk of restrictive law adoption; a log unit increase in foreign aid raises the probability of adoption by 6.7%. This risk is exacerbated after the holding of competitive elections: the interaction of foreign aid and competitive elections increases the probability of adoption by 11%.
Article
Around the globe, people are forming private, nonprofit and voluntary organizations to pursue public purposes once considered the exclusive domain of the state. Economically, environmentally and socially, where the state has failed, nonprofit groups are taking advantage of revolutions in communications and bourgeois values to fill these gaps for themselves. This "associational revolution" may be permanently altering relations between states and citizens and prove as important to the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the nineteenth.
Article
Since 1960, the French African Policy has been based on a military, economic, and cultural cooperation. Behind the official goal, that of development aid, lie the French geopolitical priorities. Since general de Gaulle, the French diplomacy is obsessed by the international place of France in the World. The influence of France in Africa is an integral part of this. Therefore the cooperation between France and Africa is clientelist : the economic and financial aid provided by France is exchanged with the French privilege of an economic and political influence within the African states, which includes military support in situations of border conflict and even domestic « disorder ». This conception of the relationship between France and Africa has not really changed with the French presidents who have followed general de Gaulle. Consequently, the French government institutions of cooperation with Africa have been in the same situation since the sixties. The result is such a complex, obsolete and inefficient labyrinth that the real execution of French African policy is carried out in non-official political and business networks. A radical reform of this policy is now necessary, due to the new international context : the end of the Cold War, the French involvment in the European process, and the increasing dependance of Africa on the Bretton Woods institutions.
Article
The state plays an important role in structuring and channeling civic activism in Russia. Rather than eliminating advocacy, it privileges the advocacy forms that it prefers. The larger challenge facing Russian NGOs is an apathetic public.
Article
Journal of Democracy 6.1 (1995) 65-78 As featured on National Public Radio, The New York Times, and in other major media, we offer this sold-out, much-discussed Journal of Democracy article by Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone." You can also find information at DemocracyNet about the Journal of Democracy and its sponsor, the National Endowment for Democracy. Many students of the new democracies that have emerged over the past decade and a half have emphasized the importance of a strong and active civil society to the consolidation of democracy. Especially with regard to the postcommunist countries, scholars and democratic activists alike have lamented the absence or obliteration of traditions of independent civic engagement and a widespread tendency toward passive reliance on the state. To those concerned with the weakness of civil societies in the developing or postcommunist world, the advanced Western democracies and above all the United States have typically been taken as models to be emulated. There is striking evidence, however, that the vibrancy of American civil society has notably declined over the past several decades. Ever since the publication of Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, the United States has played a central role in systematic studies of the links between democracy and civil society. Although this is in part because trends in American life are often regarded as harbingers of social modernization, it is also because America has traditionally been considered unusually "civic" (a reputation that, as we shall later see, has not been entirely unjustified). When Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830s, it was the Americans' propensity for civic association that most impressed him as the key to their unprecedented ability to make democracy work. "Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition," he observed, "are forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types -- religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute. . . . Nothing, in my view, deserves more attention than the intellectual and moral associations in America." Recently, American social scientists of a neo-Tocquevillean bent have unearthed a wide range of empirical evidence that the quality of public life and the performance of social institutions (and not only in America) are indeed powerfully influenced by norms and networks of civic engagement. Researchers in such fields as education, urban poverty, unemployment, the control of crime and drug abuse, and even health have discovered that successful outcomes are more likely in civically engaged communities. Similarly, research on the varying economic attainments of different ethnic groups in the United States has demonstrated the importance of social bonds within each group. These results are consistent with research in a wide range of settings that demonstrates the vital importance of social networks for job placement and many other economic outcomes. Meanwhile, a seemingly unrelated body of research on the sociology of economic development has also focused attention on the role of social networks. Some of this work is situated in the developing countries, and some of it elucidates the peculiarly successful "network capitalism" of East Asia. Even in less exotic Western economies, however, researchers have discovered highly efficient, highly flexible "industrial districts" based on networks of collaboration among workers and small entrepreneurs. Far from being paleoindustrial anachronisms, these dense interpersonal and interorganizational networks undergird ultramodern industries, from the high tech of Silicon Valley to the high fashion of Benetton. The norms and networks of civic engagement also powerfully affect the performance of representative government. That, at least, was the central conclusion of my own 20-year, quasi-experimental study of subnational governments in different regions of Italy. Although all these regional governments seemed identical on paper, their levels of effectiveness varied dramatically. Systematic inquiry showed that the quality of governance was determined by longstanding traditions of civic engagement (or its absence). Voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and football clubs -- these were the hallmarks of a successful region. In fact, historical analysis suggested that these networks of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity...
Book
Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions, including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at the international level than at the domestic level. Drawing on principal-agent theory, they explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.
Article
Bauhr, Monika, Nicholas Charron, and Naghmeh Nasiritousi. (2013) Does Corruption Cause Aid Fatigue? Public Opinion and the Aid-Corruption Paradox. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12025 © 2013 International Studies Association Does perceived corruption in recipient countries reduce support for foreign aid in donor countries? This under-explored yet salient question is examined using the 2009 Eurobarometer survey for the 27 EU countries. We suggest that perceived corruption can cause aid fatigue but that this relationship is highly contextualized. The results show that perceptions about corruption in developing countries reduce overall support for aid among respondents in donor countries. However, this effect is mitigated by country and contextual-level effects and different understandings of what we call the “aid-corruption paradox,” namely that the need for foreign aid is often the greatest in corrupt environments. Three different dynamics of the aid-corruption paradox influence support for aid: moral, pragmatic, and strategic understandings. In EU-15 countries, the effect of perceived corruption in recipient states on aid fatigue can be substantially altered if aid is motivated by moral reasons for helping poor countries or if the purpose of aid is understood to improve governance. In new member states (NMS-12), the effect is reduced if respondents believe that the result of aid can serve national interests. The results provide new insights into the public opinion/development policy nexus, which suggest a number of salient policy recommendations and future areas for research.
Article
The conventional wisdom in the literature on aid allocation suggests that donors utilize bilateral aid as a tool to buy influence in the aid-receiving country. Those who conclude that aid is driven by donor self-interest focus on government-to-government aid transfers. However, this approach overlooks important variation in delivery tactics: Bilateral donors frequently provide aid to nonstate actors. This paper argues that donors resort to delivery tactics that increase the likelihood of aid achieving its intended outcome. In poorly governed recipient countries, donors bypass recipient governments and deliver more aid through nonstate actors, all else equal. In recipient countries with higher governance quality, donors engage the government and give more aid through the government-to-government channel. Using OLS and Probit regressions, I find empirical support for this argument. Understanding the determinants of donor delivery tactics has important implications for assessing aid effectiveness.
Article
“Trade, not aid” has long been a catchphrase in international development discourse. This paper evaluates whether the “trade, not aid” logic has driven bilateral aid allocations in practice. Using a dataset that covers development assistance from 22 donor countries to 187 aid recipients from 1980 to 2002, we find that donor countries have dispersed bilateral aid in ways that reinforce their extant bilateral commercial ties with recipient countries. Instead of “trade, not aid,” bilateral aid disbursement has followed the logic of “aid following trade.” The policy implication is that bilateral aid allocation patterns have reinforced the disadvantages of poor countries that have a limited ability to participate in international trade due to a variety of factors such as geography and a lack of tradable resources. Résumé. «Le commerce et non l'aide» est un slogan qui continue d'occuper une place importante dans le débat sur le développement international. L'article qui suit vise à évaluer la mise en pratique de ce principe dans les allocations de l'aide bilatérale. S'appuyant sur une base de données recouvrant l'aide distribuée par 22 pays donateurs à 187 pays récipiendaires entre 1980 et 2002, notre analyse révèle que l'aide a été allouée en fonction des liens commerciaux bilatéraux existants et les a renforcés. C'est donc le principe de «l'aide après le commerce» qui a prévalu. Les allocations d'aide bilatérale ont ainsi aggravé les désavantages des pays pauvres dont la capacité à bénéficier du commerce international est limitée en raison de divers facteurs, dont la situation géographique et le manque de ressources marchandes.
Article
Foreign Aid: “A Proposal” Re-examined - Volume 9 Issue 4 - Raymond Vernon
Article
Why do OECD countries vary in their regulatory approach towards non-governmental organizations (NGOs)? This paper introduces an index to assess NGO regulation regarding barriers to entry, NGOs’ political capacity, and economic activity. Our cross-section analysis of 28 OECD countries offers preliminary evidence of systematic differences in NGO regulation between corporatist and pluralist systems. We suggest corporatist systems have more restrictive regulations because NGOs risk upsetting the political order and managed social consensus. In pluralist countries, NGOs face fewer restrictions because governments view them as substitutes for formal communication channels. We present two cases, Japan (corporatist) and the United States (pluralist), to illustrate this argument. In sum, macro-institutional arrangements of political representation have a crucial bearing on national styles of NGO regulation. Future uses of this index include examining the effects of national context on international NGOs, explaining variations in organizational structures and strategies among NGOs, and tracking variations in NGO-state relations over time.
Article
How do public regulations shape the composition and behavior of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)? Because many NGOs advocate for liberal causes such as human rights, democracy, and gender equality, they upset the political status quo. At the same time, a large number of NGOs operating in the Global South rely on international funding. This sometimes disconnects from local publics and leads to the proliferation of sham or “briefcase” NGOs. Seeking to rein in the politically inconvenient NGO sector, governments exploit the role of international funding and make the case for restricting the influence of NGOs which serve as foreign agents. To pursue this objective, states worldwide are enacting laws to restrict NGOs’ access to foreign funding. We examine this regulatory offensive through an Ethiopian case study, where recent legislation prohibits foreign-funded NGOs from working on politically sensitive issues. We find that most briefcase NGOs and local human rights groups in Ethiopia have disappeared, while survivors have either “rebranded” or switched their work from proscribed areas. This research note highlights how government can and do shape the population ecology of the non-governmental sector. Because NGOs seek legitimacy via their claims of grassroots support, a reliance of external funding makes them politically vulnerable. Any study of the NGO sector must include governments as the key component of NGOs’ institutional environment.
Article
We model foreign-aid-for-policy deals, assuming that leaders want to maximize their time in office. Their actions are shaped by two political institutions, their selectorate and winning coalition. Leaders who depend on a large coalition, a relatively small selectorate, and who extract valuable policy concessions from prospective recipients are likely to give aid. Prospective recipients are likely to get aid if they have few resources, depend on a small coalition and a large selectorate, and the policy concession sought by the donor is not too politically costly. The amount of aid received, if any, increases as the recipient leader's coalition increases, the selectorate decreases, the issue's salience increases, and the domestic resources increase. The theory explains why many Third World people hate the United States and want to live there. Empirical tests using the U.S. Agency for International Development data for the post—World War II years support the model's predictions.
Article
Postconflict state reconstruction has become a priority of donors in Africa. Yet, externally sponsored reconstruction efforts have met with limited achievements in the region. This is partly due to three flawed assumptions on which reconstruction efforts are predicated. The first is that Western state institutions can be transferred to Africa. The poor record of past external efforts to construct and reshape African political and economic institutions casts doubts on the overly ambitious objectives of failed state reconstruction. The second flawed assumption is the mistaken belief in a shared understanding by donors and African leaders of failure and reconstruction. Donors typically misread the nature of African politics. For local elites, reconstruction is the continuation of war and competition for resources by new means. Thus their strategies are often inimical to the building of strong public institutions. The third flawed assumption is that donors are capable of rebuilding African states. Their ambitious goals are inconsistent with their financial, military, and symbolic means. Yet, African societies are capable of recovery, as Somaliland and Uganda illustrate. Encouraging indigenous state formation efforts and constructive bargaining between social forces and governments might prove a more fruitful approach for donors to the problem of Africa's failed states.
Article
Since the end of the Cold War the United States has led six major nation‐building operations – that is to say, the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin a transition to democracy. In Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and most recently Iraq, the US has renewed with varying success a form of activity upon which it had embarked in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War. Study of these past missions suggests a host of lessons applicable today in Iraq, and raises the question of why, in light of its substantial and recent experience, the US government's learning curve appears so flat.
Article
Well-governed countries are more likely to make use of foreign aid for the purposes of economic development and poverty alleviation. Therefore, if aid agencies are providing funds for the sake of development, these countries should receive more aid and categorically different types of aid as compared with poorly governed countries. In poorly governed countries aid should be given in forms that allow for less discretion. Using an original data set of all World Bank projects from 1996 to 2002, the author distinguishes programmatic projects from investment projects and national from subnational investment projects. If the World Bank allows more discretion in well-governed countries, then it will choose to provide programmatic and national aid for these recipients. The author presents evidence that the World Bank provides a larger proportion of national investment lending in better-governed countries. With regard to programmatic lending, he finds mixed evidence. Among counties eligible for International Development Association (IDA) aid, good governance surprisingly is associated with a lower proportion of programmatic aid, whereas for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) borrowers, good governance is associated with a higher proportion. The author subjects these results to a number of robustness checks. Although he confirms the existing result in the literature that the World Bank provides larger overall amounts of aid to better-governed countries, his examination of the disaggregated data leads to questioning whether both lending wings of the World Bank are designing aid programs in the most prodevelopment way possible.
Article
We examine some issues in the estimation of time-series cross-section models, calling into question the conclusions of many published studies, particularly in the field of comparative political economy. We show that the generalized least squares approach of Parks produces standard errors that lead to extreme overconfidence, often underestimating variability by 50% or more. We also provide an alternative estimator of the standard errors that is correct when the error structures show complications found in this type of model. Monte Carlo analysis shows that these "panel-corrected standard errors" perform well. The utility of our approach is demonstrated via a reanalysis of one "social democratic corporatist" model.
Article
Abstract The transfer of official bilateral economic aid has become an institutionalized dimension of the relationship between high- and low-income countries. There is, however, considerable confusion about the precise role and foreign policy implications of aid. The paper establishes two explicit models of aid allocation, the recipient need and the donor interest models, which provide different characterizations and explanations of the aid relationship. These models are tested against the distribution of US aid for each of the years 1960–70. Our results provide strong confirmation for the donor interest model, and in general indicate a US aid relationship compatible with the realist image of the international system.
Article
What are the connections between personal risk-management and governmental responsibility toward citizens? This paper argues that governments in neoliberal societies increasingly acknowledge a responsibility to help citizens make “informed choices” in order to reduce or avoid risk. A key feature within this framework is the issuing of official governmental advice to the citizens. But such advice does not merely carry information that citizens are free to accept or decline. Rather, it also consists of a conscious effort on part of governments to construct individuals as calculating, prudent, and rational persons that know how to manage risk (to “responsibilize” them). Below I examine the practice of governmental advice as an effort of responsibilization in the case of travel warnings issued by foreign offices to international travelers.
Article
Using an original dataset of all World Bank projects from 1996 to 2002, I distinguish between projects that are targeted sub-nationally from those that are nationwide. I also distinguish investment projects from programmatic aid. Then I look to see which national characteristics predict the use of programmatic aid and national project aid by the World Bank. The main hypothesis is that, if the World Bank acts strategically, then it will choose to use programmatic and national aid in countries with better governance. This is because untargeted aid is less likely to be subject to capture and corruption in well-governed countries. The evidence reveals that countries with better governance are more likely to receive national investment projects. I also confirm the finding that good governance increases the size of overall World Bank aid flows. However, I do not find evidence of an effect with regard to programmatic aid versus investment project aid. Urquiola for comments on previous drafts and to Alex Scacco and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro for useful conversations.
Article
This note provides background data and analysis on what has been happening to aid flows and the resulting change in aid architecture. It is based on data taken from the OECD/DAC and on a review of the literature. Key numbers on development assistance trends: * Net official development assistance (ODA) from the 22 DAC member countries has increased to over $100 billion over the last two years, with a promise of increases of 30 percent over the next three years. * Most ODA is for special purpose needs which do not translate into funds available for development projects and programs. Developing country governments are only receiving about $38 billion in net country programmable aid (CPA). * Sub-Saharan Africa is especially hard hit by this wedge between ODA and CPA. It only received $12.1 billion in CPA in 2005, showing almost no increase over the preceding two decades. * Non-DAC bilateral assistance (NDBA) is growing rapidly and amounts to more than $8 billion in ODA and $5 billion annually in CPA. * Private aid (PrA) from DAC member countries might already contribute between $58-68 billion per year, although aggregate data is sketchy. * Total aid flows to developing countries therefore currently amount to around $180 billion annually. Key trends in aid architecture: * Multilateral aid agencies (around 230) outnumber donors and recipients combined. * Multilaterals only disburse 12 percent of total aid (official plus private), and about one-quarter of total net CPA. * Multilaterals disburse more towards Africa than do bilaterals. * The average number of donors per country is growing, while average project size appears to be shrinking, implying growing fragmentation of aid. Key Issues: * Mechanisms for information sharing, coordination, planning and aid administration are increasingly costly and ineffective. * There is a growing need for efficient allocation rules for donors to fund the growing number of aid agencies, but assessments of aid agency effectiveness is in its infancy. * Scaling up, learning and innovation could advance as new players experiment with new methods, but would require more public and private sector exchanges.
Article
The authors analyze the nation-state as a worldwide institution constructed by worldwide cultural and associational processes, developing four main topics: (1) properties of nation-states that result from their exogenously driven construction, including isomorphism, decoupling, and expansive structuration; (2) processes by which rationalistic world culture affects national states; (3) characteristics of world society that enhance the impact of world culture on national states and societies, including conditions favoring the diffusion of world models, expansion of world-level associations, and rationalized scientific and professional authority; (4) dynamic features of world culture and society that generate expansion, conflict, and change, especially the statelessness of world society, legitimation of multiple levels of rationalized actors, and internal inconsistencies and contradictions.
Article
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), deservedly or not, have gained a reputation as the leading practitioners of rural development in Africa. African governments have responded ambiguously to the presence of these new agencies, on the one hand valuing the economic resources NGOs can raise, but resisting the political pluralization implied by popular development action. This article describes the growth of NGOs in Africa and proposes a framework for analyzing the dynamics of government-NGO relations. By means of examples drawn from Kenya and Zimbabwe, among other African countries, the article illustrates the strategies used by governments to exercise control, and by NGOs to assert autonomy. An argument is made that politics, rather than economics, best explain the contribution of NGOs to development, as well as the attitude of governments toward the burgeoning voluntary sector.
Article
This paper attempts to identify the underlying principles of aid allocation, and particularly the balance of motivations as between the needs of recipient countries and the interests of donor countries. Two alternative models are fitted by cross-country regressions to bilateral and multilateral aid flows to some 80 developing countries in 1969–1970 and 1978–1980. The first (recipient need) model assumes that all aid is given to compensate for shortfalls in domestic resources. This model provides a reasonable explanation for the distribution of multilateral aid, but it is clearly not applicable for bilateral aid flows. The second (donor interest) model assumes that all aid serves only donor interests, defined to cover political/security investment and trade interests. This model gives generally good explanations of bilateral aid, but is a poor fit for multilateral aid. The relative importance of the various donor interests differs sharply among donors. The paper ends with an analysis of the shift in the balance of aid over the 1970s towards the recipient need element, and with a reference to the sharp change in policy in the 1980s towards increasing emphasis on donor interest aid.
Article
Nongovermental organizations (NGOs) are frequently touted as important actors in democratization. Yet despite the proliferation of NGOs since the advent of political liberalization and democratization in Jordan, they remain circumscribed by the realities of continued state power. Because the political transition was informed by a desire to perpetuate regime survival in the midst of economic crisis, NGOs continue to experience political limits to their activities. The regime primarily relies upon three strategies to control the NGO community: (a) administrative repression and oversight; (b) civil society “infiltration” through royal nongovernmental organizations and other government NGOs; and (c) centralization through the General Union of Voluntary Societies.
Article
Practically all donor countries that give aid claim to do so on the basis on the recipient's good governance, but do these claims have a real impact on the allocation of aid? Are democratic, human rights-respecting, countries with low levels of corruption and military expenditures actually likely to receive more aid than other countries? Using econometric analysis, the author examines the factors that really determine the patterns of aid giving. The author analyses such examples as: Aggregate aid flows. Aid from multilateral organisations such as the EU and the UN. Aid from bilateral donors such as Germany, Japan, the US as well as Arab donors. This concise, well argued and well researched book will be a great read for students, academics and policy-makers involved in development studies, economics and international relations.
Article
Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. By Carol Lancaster. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007. 284p. $50.00 cloth, $20.00 paper. This book addresses an important issue—namely, why governments give aid—and offers a comparison of five countries since 1945: the United States, Japan, France, Germany, and Denmark. Each country occupies its own chapter, with systematic comparison being assisted by a common set of headings relating to the main domestic sources of influence: ideas, institutions, interests, and government organization. Two opening chapters set the stage and offer a brief history of aid's purposes. A rather short concluding chapter sums up the findings. No other book has the same agenda. Carol Lancaster's analysis benefits greatly from her position as an “insider” for 13 years on and off in the U.S. government, working on aid issues, and from the opportunity to interview around a hundred aid officials and expert commentators in the five countries during 2002–3.