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Everything all right at the internal EU borders? The ambivalent effects of
cross-border integration and the rise of Euroscepticism
To cite this article: Frédéric Durand, Antoine Decoville & Robert Knippschild (2017):
Everything All
Right at the Internal EU Borders? The Ambivalent E*ects of Cross-Border Integration and
the Rise
of Euroscepticism, Geopolitics, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2017.1382475
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1382475
INTRODUCTION
A number of reports or articles apprehend the notion of cross-border integration through
purely quantitative measures, such as the number of cross-border commuters1, assuming that
these indicators can somehow estimate the level of Europeanisation achieved within the
different European border areas2. However, these measurement tools cannot embrace the
complexity, the diversity and the paradoxes that the opening of borders generates with respect
to border practices and perceptions. In border regions, more than elsewhere, the political
construct of Europe concretely affects daily life either in a positive or a negative way. As
Kuhn says, “in contrast to people living in core regions, for whom European integration might
be still a more abstract and remote process, residents of border regions experience European
integration on a daily basis”3. Observing the cross-border areas that constitute both margins
and interfaces and which embody the ideals of the European project (as well as its
weaknesses) allows to shed light on the ambivalent effects of cross-border integration on
space and society. Indeed, while the normative discourse supported by the European
institutions for the last 25 years has mostly emphasised the supposed benefits of the cross-
border integration process4, it has also ignored some of its negative effects.
The objective of this article is to highlight the diversity of the consequences that European
integration can have on border regions, and to illustrate that the effects of the cross-border
integration process are complex, sometimes unexpected, and should therefore be apprehended
in a less normative way than is usually the case in EU rhetoric. McLaren has shown that “for
some Europeans – particularly the elites of society – the integration project may present
countless opportunities to draw upon one’s skills and finances. For the vast majority of
Europeans, however, contemplating the specific benefits – or costs – of integration is likely to
be difficult, […] non-elite groups do indeed fail to detect any personal benefits or costs of
integrating Europe”5. This comment is especially relevant in cross-border areas, where the
increase in interactions resulting from the cross-border integration process engenders an
interdependence between the border areas, which is usually perceived as a source of
opportunity, but which can be seen as a source of vulnerability as well. As already highlighted
by the academic community in border studies, borders have different effects, they have
different meanings for different people and serve different purposes. Consequently, cross-
border integration and its impacts sometimes reinforce Eurosceptic views in border regions
for certain inhabitants who have the feeling of suffering from it. This contradicts the classical
and normative discourse according to which “living in a border region might affect
transnationalism, which in itself leads to less Euroscepticism”6. If this vulnerability is largely
absent from the normative discourses on cross-border integration, recent events (terrorist
attacks in Europe, migrant crisis, ‘Brexit’) have suddenly shown that cross-border interactions
depend on a high degree of openness and, conversely, how vulnerable they are to sudden re-
closures of borders.
This article proposes a conceptual opening in the academic literature on border studies by
addressing in an iconoclastic but necessary way the issue of the risks associated with cross-
border integration. Here, risk refers to the probability that an event occurs that might greatly
affect the functioning of cross-border territorial systems as promoted by the process of
European construction. The purpose is therefore not to feed an anti-integration discourse, but,
on the contrary, to highlight how some effects of the cross-border integration process can
negatively impact on living conditions and therefore create Euroscepticism within cross-
border areas. It is a first step towards the elaboration of more comprehensive policy responses
to the ambivalent effects of the cross-border integration process.
The first part will present the state of the art with respect to how Europeanisation has allowed
the fostering of cross-border integration but also how it has generated a Eurosceptic discourse.
In the second part, we will analyse by means of statistical indicators how spatial development
is impacted by the cross-border integration process in three cross-border metropolitan regions
that are considered to be the most functionally integrated ones in Europe with regard to cross-
border working flows7: Luxembourg, Geneva and Basel. In the third part, which draws on the
results of a large-scale survey realised in border regions, Eurobarometer 422, we will
highlight the divergent perceptions of the population living in border regions regarding the
national border. Finally, in a last part, we will show that the uncertainties and vulnerabilities
associated with cross-border integration put forward some new challenges.
BETWEEN EUROPEANISATION AND EUROSCEPTICISM: THE CROSS-
BORDER INTEGRATION PROCESS CALLED INTO QUESTION
Borders, which can be considered as constantly in motion, influence regional development in
a manner that has strongly varied through time8. If we apply a long-term perspective, border
regions were declining during the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. “The majority of
border regions were long considered to be peripheral areas, marginalized from an economic
and a social point of view in line with the classical theories of localization9”. The first decades
of European integration allowed a de-bordering process that generated new opportunities for
border residents and thus new development possibilities for the cross-border areas. However,
the recent re-bordering tendencies show how sensitive to external context these areas are.
Border regions are privileged spaces for “taking the pulse” of the level of European
integration and of the Europeanisation process.
Europeanisation is a contested concept with no st able meaning since it encompasses
different phenomena and processes of change, all referred to by this term10. In this article, we
refer to the broad but quite complete definition given by Radaelli. Europeanisation is a
“process of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures
and public policies”11. Consequently, Europeanisation redirects the content of national
policies, which “become increasingly subject to European policy-making”12. The process of
Europeanisation has implied a partial redefinition of the role of national borders by state
actors and has promoted a supranational understanding of the European political, social and
cultural space13. Different political agreements such as the European Outline Convention on
Transfrontier Co-operation (called Madrid Convention) launched in 1980, or the Schengen
Agreement signed on 14 June 1985, combined with the ideals of European integration, have
helped to increase exchanges between border territories, particularly regarding the labour
market and commercial activities, thus engendering a complex process of cross-border
integration at the regional level.
In response to this unifying process, oppositional forces have gradually denounced the top-
down influence on national policies. First appearing in the 1980s in England, the term
‘Euroscepticism’ refers to an opposition to the powers of the EU and to the idea of a European
integration14. Euroscepticism was seen as a marginal position until the speech of the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, in Bruges in 198815, which strongly
questioned the functioning of the EU and inflected a number of its principles, particularly
economic matters. Since then, Euroscepticism has become a persistent and growing response
to EU policies16. Through the term "Euroscepticism", we refer to hostile feelings in general
towards the European Union and its achievements. The campaigns and the results of the
referenda on the ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty that took place in France
and the Netherlands in 2005 showed that Euroscepticism reached a higher level to become a
truly mainstream phenomenon17. In order to explain the rise of Euroscepticism in Europe,
Hooghe and Marks have put forward the hypothesis that “individuals with exclusive
nationalist identities are predisposed to Euroscepticism if they are cued to believe that love of
their country and its institution is incompatible with European integration”18. They argue that
the populist right, which pretends to defend the national interest, or at the opposite end of the
spectrum, that the radical left parties, which are opposed to the capitalist paradigms that they
perceive as leading the EU integration process, might be closer to the pulse of public opinion
than mainstream parties.
The study of attitudes towards the EU enables to understand voting behaviours in relation to
European politics. Previous literature has shown that people living in border regions are less
prone to Euroscepticism than people living in central regions19, out of practical considerations
or differences in collective identities. However, perceptions and behaviours vary on each side
of a border within a single cross-border region20, and we cannot therefore consider the people
living in a cross-border region as constituting a single community sharing the same ideas
about, or representation of, matters of importance to it. The distinction proposed by Kuhn
between the utilitarian and the identitarian arguments to explain the positive attitudes of
people living in border regions towards European integration constitutes an interesting prism
for unravelling the sources of Euroscepticism in cross-border regions.
According to the utilitarian argument, people assess the gains of the Europeanisation process
through a cost-benefit analysis. If cross-border integration increases the quality of life of
residents in border regions, or if it maximises their working or consumption opportunities, it
is likely that people living there will be less Eurosceptic than people living in central regions.
However, this argument could also be used in an opposite way. Indeed, Euroscepticism may
potentially increase if the effects of cross-border integration are associated with a fear of
being exposed to more constraints, competition, nuisances or insecurity. In that case, the
‘added value’ of cross-border integration in collective representations can be negatively
compensated by the perceived disadvantages. As De Voogd wrote, “in addition to distinctions
between rich and poor, or religious and secular, a gap has emerged between the highly-
educated, embracing individualistic and cosmopolitan values, and profiting from open borders
on the one hand, and on the other hand, the less educated, more nationalist, community-
oriented, and nostalgic, who all feel threatened by globalization and immigration”21.
The identitarian argument is based on the idea that the interconnections fostered by the spatial
proximity between border populations decrease prejudices and support the emergence of
cross-border collective identities22. But this argument can also be reversed, especially in a
context characterised by political tensions and economic disparities. Indeed, strong
inequalities or disagreements in important political questions, such as the refugee policy, can
also emphasize differences between two sides of a border and hamper the development of
collective cross-border affinities, thus leading to Euroscepticism.
Euroscepticism appears as “an expression of reactive identities towards European
integration”23. It finds a fertile ground in the current context of the European construction,
which is “under stress”24 and even more since the referendum on the United Kingdom’s
withdrawal from the EU (‘Brexit’) in June 2016. This stress can be especially felt in the
regions that are at the interface of different domestic territorial systems, and which experience
concretely the impacts and tensions caused by European integration. This process, which is
difficult to define because of its “multifaceted forms”25, impacts on border territories and on
the populations living there to varying degrees, at different scales and temporalities, and
generates cross-border territorial systems26. Four main dimensions can be defined in order to
capture the sometimes contradictory impacts of cross-border integration in border areas27.
The first and probably the most obvious and well-studied dimension of the cross-border
integration process is the functional one. It relates to the concrete exchanges that link border
regions together. This dimension has been analysed by border scholars who have “focused on
the impact of borders on the flow of economic activities, modelling the impact of borders as
though it increased the physical distance”28. The gradual opening of borders fosters individual
or collective spatial practices to take advantage of the existing differentials (e.g. prices or
wages) on both sides of borders. Cross-border shopping, the use of services across the border,
cross-border work or residential mobility to the other side of the border, all of them due to
costs differentials, are phenomena that have frequently been observed at different spatial
scales29. Indeed, cross-border differentials generate opportunities30 for those who have the
requisites to exploit them, thus leading some authors to consider them as a ‘resource’31.
However, what appears as a resource for some people can also be perceived as a constraint or
as a limit for others. Indeed, the differentials can offer a benefit for a specific population of a
border region that can sometimes be at the expense of another specific population in the
neighbouring border region32. Not all individuals have the means – e.g. physical or labour
mobility – to use these differentials to their advantage. This is why the functional dimension
of cross-border integration should not be idealised; it should rather be perceived as an
equivocal phenomenon, even though studies and reports tend to present an important number
of border interactions as a positive thing, whatever the nature and the impacts of these
interactions.
The second dimension of cross-border integration, which can be defined as the structural one,
highlights the dynamics of convergence of the border territories with respect to socio-
economic characteristics. An integrated cross-border region from a structural point of view
would therefore present a low level of inequality in terms of development on either side of a
border33. However, the increase of cross-border interactions does not necessarily imply a
reduction of inequalities34, and such findings might contradict the European postulate
proclaiming that territorial cooperation is one of the premises for more territorial cohesion35.
The third dimension of cross-border integration, the institutional one, is related to the
networking of public and private actors with the aim of supporting cross-border initiatives,
and tends to institutionalise a shared cooperation area on both sides of the border as well as
the building of cross-border regions36. Nevertheless, cross-border areas are still institutionally
fragmented by the co-presence of several territorial systems marked by different practices,
regulations and planning cultures37. These gaps create challenges related to institutional
mismatches38. Under the influence of EU policy on cross-border governance39, numerous
socially constructed and ‘invented’ spaces of cooperation have emerged40 that attempt to
articulate horizontal and vertical networks of decision-making41. Consequently, these new
institutional arrangements call into question the exclusive gatekeeper role that national
executives held during most of the twentieth century42 even if the political decisions are still
dominated by national governments43. In addition, and beyond the positive and normative
discourse on cross-border cooperation, a certain ‘cooperation fatigue’ has appeared among the
actors 44. Even when the need for cooperation is obvious and the willingness to realise it is
shared, certain barriers to cross-border cooperation remain. These are linked to the lack of
substantial experience, competencies, knowledge of cross-border cooperation and
communication, as well as to a lack of common interests and consensus on crucial and
strategic issues45.
The fourth dimension of cross-border integration, associated with individual and collective
representations, reveals the impressions and opinions that the people living on one side of a
border have of their neighbours and which result from historical legacies as well as from the
actual and evolving social practices within the border regions46. This ideational dimension
emphasizes the importance of perceptions and imaginaries47 and their influences on the socio-
spatial practices of individuals48 and on their political choices49.
These four dimensions shows that cross-border integration cannot be reduced to a process
supposed to have a unique causal effect. It is rather driven both by symmetries and similarities
as well as by asymmetries and differentials between border regions50. Moreover, cross-border
integration is strongly related to the bordering dynamics, which can be defined as an ongoing
process of construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of borders through political
discourse and decision-making, as well as individual and collective representations51. A de-
bordering dynamic tends to promote a gradual phasing out of the border, while a re-bordering
dynamic reinforces the physical or mental presence of the border or re-activates its effects. In
addition, the process of cross-border integration has a stronger impact in the immediate border
area than in the hinterland. Indeed, the spatial proximity to the border has, for instance, certain
cost advantages in terms of trade due to market access considerations52. Nonetheless, the EU
continues to offer a single discourse on the process of cross-border integration and still
actively supports it in that direction, especially through its main instrument of cross-border
cooperation, the Interreg A programmes. Meanwhile, some contestations have been
formulated by certain national actors who have criticised the Schengen Agreement, mostly in
response to crises which have nothing to do with local and regional integration but which
nevertheless have a strong impact on border crossing issues. For instance, during the
campaign for the 2012 French presidential elections, the President Nicolas Sarkozy, called for
the re-introduction of border controls within the Schengen Area53. In a more abrupt manner,
Hungary’s and Austria’s governments have recently closed their borders with wire fences and
restored customs controls to limit the flows of refugees from the Middle East, thus de facto
suspending the application of the Schengen rules. As Dürrschmidt argues, border regions can
be “seedbeds of cosmopolitanism, sites of political closure, and often both simultaneously”54.
In this paper, we proceed to substantiate these theoretical reflections by focusing our analysis,
firstly on the dynamics of spatial distribution of employment and population in the three
above-mentioned European cross-border areas, and secondly on the results of a European
Public Opinion Analysis (EuroBarometer 422). The goal is to demonstrate that cross-border
integration impacts in an ambivalent manner on border areas, i.e. by strengthening the links
across borders as well as by generating asymmetries that can potentially harm the perceptions
of the European project.
CROSS-BORDER INTEGRATION WITHOUT CONVERGENCE
The three cross-border metropolitan regions of Basel, Geneva and Luxembourg (see Map 1)
have been chosen because they can be considered as the most integrated regions of Europe
with regard to cross-border work55. Indeed, recent studies revealed that in 2012 some 53,517
cross-border workers were commuting daily to the Basel metropolitan region (53% of them
from Germany and 47% from France), 63,386 to the Geneva Canton from France and 166,021
to Luxembourg from France (50%), Germany (25%) and Belgium (25%)56. As such, one can
expect that they constitute relevant cases for apprehending how the cross-border integration
process influences the dynamics of development on both sides of a border and how, in
response, the border regions’ residents perceive these influences. Taking into consideration
Switzerland, which is a non-EU country, can at first sight be perceived as outside of the scope
of this article, but this country is the one which receives the most important number of cross-
border commuters from the EU. Moreover, the increasingly dense network of agreements that
has been developed between Switzerland and the EU57 and its accession to the Schengen area
in 2008 tend to prove that despite it does not legally belong to the European Union, it can be
considered as having a ’functional membership’58.
Map 1. Location of case studies
The indicators in Table 1 show selected figures related to the number of jobs and residents in
each of the border regions of the three case studies between 2007 and 201259. These data
allow for unravelling some interesting elements, which relate to the constitution and the
functioning of cross-border territorial systems. Indeed, different development trajectories can
be observed between the different regions of each case study, but all in all the three different
cases show the same trend towards a functional specialisation of space on each side of the
border.
Table 1. Employment and inhabitants in the three cross-border areas of Basel, Geneva and
Luxembourg60
First, a strong employment growth can be observed in each of the metropolitan centres (the
cities of Basel, Geneva and Luxembourg). This employment growth benefits the local
residents, but also, and in a very impressive way, the cross-border commuters. The openness
of borders to the flows of workers obviously constitutes a huge opportunity for the regions
located in France, Belgium and Germany, for the Luxembourg case-study; in France and
Germany for the Basel case-study; and in France for the Geneva case-study. For some of
these regions the dynamic of employment growth related to the metropolitan central areas has
even allowed to compensate for serious unemployment and demographic shrinkage, such as in
the Lorraine Region61 and in the western fringe of Rhineland Palatinate62 for the Luxembourg
case-study, or in the French “Département” of Haute-Savoie for the case-study of Geneva63.
Second, it can be assumed that the non-metropolitan border regions are attractive from a
residential point of view, since a growth in population can be observed in each of them
whereas the number of jobs, proportionally, remains quite steady or even decreases.
The analysis of these three cross-border areas reveals significant disparities in the spatial
distribution of jobs and residential locations. Indeed, individuals exploit the differences
existing between both sides of a border to maximise their utility, as businesses do to maximise
their profits, in accordance with neoclassical economic assumptions. Cross-border exchanges
and flows, in return, create interdependency between the border regions.
The centralisation of economic activities in Basel, Geneva and Luxembourg and the
attractiveness that they exert on the regions located on the other side of the border lead to a
strong functional specialisation of space on both sides of the border. The different territories
tend to be more and more specialised according to their comparative advantages. The
metropolitan cores are dynamic economic centres with a skilled workforce and attractive tax
environments for businesses while the peripheral regions located on the other sides of the
borders can be considered as residential suburban extensions, notably because land is cheaper
and more readily available64. As a consequence, numerous employees of these metropolitan
cores choose to live in the territories located abroad in order to reduce their housing costs,
thereby contributing to the increase in the average home-work travel distance65. Conversely,
space-consuming activities such as recreational areas, golf courses, large shopping areas and
storage areas are massively developed in the regions located on the “peripheral” side of the
border, where land prices are lower, than near the metropolitan centre. Obviously, the
catchment areas of these large infrastructures largely overlap on both sides of the border.
Cross-border integration fluctuates and depends on various factors such as political decisions
that are taken at various levels of the administrative hierarchies. Therefore, cross-border
integration remains a perpetual and complex construction66, but also an unpredictable one
since it can vary along a gradient from weak to strong but also from strong to weaker.
Although the normative discourse of the EU highlights the virtues of cross-border integration,
this process can also potentially generate challenges with regard to the uncertain future of the
European construction. The functional specialisation of space seems to be fed by and also to
feed the socio-economic inequalities that tend to increase over time between border regions67,
meaning that the territorial dynamics are not converging within these three cross-border areas.
This result confirms the evidences highlighted by Hudson68 that economic integration does not
reduce socio-spatial inequalities within the EU.
PERCEPTIONS THAT DIVERGE WITHIN CROSS-BORDER AREAS
How do these mechanisms impact the perceptions of individuals? How do the people who live
in border regions today perceive the open borders that the Europeanisation process has put in
place? The Eurobarometer Survey 422, commissioned by the European Commission,
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy and co-ordinated by Directorate-General
for Communication, offers precious insights to better understand the perceptions of citizens
about the pros and cons of living near a border. This survey was conducted in 54 different
cross-border cooperation areas eligible for Interreg IV A programs and gathering 123 border
regions. It includes border regions in Norway and Switzerland. Realised in June 2015, 40,619
people were contacted by telephone and responded to it. More information about the regions
of investigation and the methodology can be found in the report written by the European
Commission69. This survey is the most extensive source of information ever collected about
the representations and practices of individuals living in European border regions. All the data
can be downloaded from the official website of the European Union70. So far, the results of
this study are mostly descriptive, and the potential of this rich database has not been used to
understand Eurosceptic trends and behaviours. In this paper, we will focus only on question 5,
related to the perception of the border (as an opportunity / an obstacle/ has no impact) by the
inhabitants of border regions (see Table 2).
Two ways can be used to analyse the results of this specific point of the Eurobarometer: either
at the level of the Interreg cross-border cooperation programme areas as a whole, or at the
level of the border areas which are part of a cross-border cooperation area.
According to the first method, the cross-border regions which mainly consider the border as
an opportunity and therefore received the highest scores are cross-border areas composed of
older member countries of the EU such as the Germany-Denmark, Spain-Portugal or the
Upper Rhine (France-Germany-Switzerland) cross-border areas. In contrast, the lowest scores
were obtained in the cross-border cooperation areas, including new members’ states only,
such as the cross-border regions of Lithuania-Poland, Latvia-Lithuania, Czech Republic-
Poland, Hungary-Romania, and Hungary-Croatia.
The second method is rather useful for highlighting the divergences existing on both sides of a
border within a cross-border cooperation program area. Indeed, the results of question 5 of the
Eurobarometer 422 show clear differences in people’s perception of a cross-border area, and
especially between both sides of a border, thus confirming Kuhn’s point that perceptions and
behaviours vary across borders. Concretely, the regions which tend most to consider the
border as an opportunity are usually the ones which are economically less favoured in a cross-
border cooperation programme set up between a wealthy and older member state, and a more
recent and less wealthy member state, such as in the Austrian - Hungarian programme
INTERREG V A (only 25% of the Austrians consider the border as an opportunity whereas
77% in the Hungarian border region of the programme consider it as an opportunity), or in the
Austrian - Slovenian INTERREG V A programme (where 67% of the interviewed Slovenians
consider the border as an opportunity).
Two of the three case studies treated in this paper rank among the European cross-border
programmes in which the gaps in perception are the highest, namely the Luxembourg and the
Geneva case-studies, whereas the gap appears lower in the Basel case-study. The population
of the French borderlands, where most of the workers come from, tends to consider the
presence of the foreign border region as an opportunity (see table 2) whereas the population of
the regions hosting these migration flows (the core cities of Basel and Geneva and the Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg) consider the foreign border region as having no impact. These
contrasting results highlight the asymmetries in collective perceptions, which might impede
an ongoing cross-border integration process.
Table 2. Results of Eurobarometer 422 on perceptions concerning the presence of a border
THE CROSS-BORDER INTEGRATION PROCESS AND ITS CHALLENGES IN
AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
The settlement of cross-border workers in the regions located across the border from the main
metropolitan centres, who often have a greater purchasing power than the ‘local’ residents,
leads to an increase in land and property prices71 which in turn creates negative social
externalities for the domestic inhabitants. The latter can have the feeling that they are less
privileged and suffer more than they benefit from the cross-border integration process. To
take up the analytical grid proposed in the first part, it appears that these border regions,
which are functionally among the most integrated in Europe in terms of flows, seem to be
much less ideationally integrated, since perceptions differ strongly on both sides of the border.
And this lack of integration in terms of perception is probably to be linked with the important
imbalances in terms of levels of development, that is to say, to an insufficiency in structural
cross-border integration. Despite all the benefits that cross-border integration has engendered
for the metropolitan core areas of Luxembourg, Geneva and Basel, and for the regions located
on the other side of the border, the lack of territorial convergence concerning the various
levels of socio-economic development is a potential topic of resentment, rivalry and social
dissent both between and within border regions, and thus constitutes a first challenge. These
regions offer a fertile ground for tensions between those who benefit from European
integration and the others who do not.
The North of Lorraine is a typical example of such a phenomenon, which finds its expression
through a process of spatial fragmentation. The most obvious forms this takes are the
development of new housing estates, located outside the cities and aimed particularly at cross-
border commuters, while the less privileged part of the population is concentrated in the older
urban fabric, inherited from an industrial past72. It should also be added that local authorities
are strongly differentiated in terms of economic resources as well, since taxes on business are
collected mainly on one side of the border, i.e. where the companies are located73. These
trends of socio-spatial fragmentation, visible at different scales, constitute a major challenge
for territorial cohesion and feed Eurosceptic feelings, especially for those who consider
themselves excluded from the benefits generated by cross-border integration. The results of
the French presidential election in May 2017 show that the inhabitants of the northern part of
the Lorraine Region have massively supported Marine Le Pen, who proposes an anti-EU
policy and who is largely in favour of reinstalling border controls (in the “Département” of
Moselle, Le Pen has obtained 28.35% of the votes in the first round (the first position among
the candidates) and 42.34% in the second round, which is far above the national average of
33.90%). This result was achieved despite the numerous cross-border workers who live in this
region and who have everything to lose with the reestablishment of border controls. In order
to face the market-driven development at the cross-border scale, which increases the
differences between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ of the integration process, certain
stakeholders have proposed to put in place tax compensation mechanisms in favour of the less
dynamic side of the border74, successfully in the past for the Belgian region, but not so for the
French side.
In the canton of Geneva, the “Genevan citizen Movement” (MCG), which is an anti-cross-
border political movement set up in 2005, shows evidence of emerging tensions between
border populations in a context of growing cross-border interaction75. The MCG advocates
that priority be given to Genevans for recruitment and criticises policies that favour cross-
border workers. In the local elections in 2015, the MCG scored 13.4%, and was the subject of
much criticism, notably for its campaign in favour of a “zero cross-border commuter” label
for the municipalities. Certain concrete actions have also been taken at the cantonal level,
such as a framework directive instituting a cantonal preference for hiring new workers in
2014, which increased the perception of cross-border workers from France of being
unwanted. These campaigns, which are driven by nationalist discourses, have come up in
reaction to the perceived negative effects associated with cross-border integration. Some
people have the feeling of being left behind by economic prosperity and are therefore subject
to resentment towards the incoming cross-border commuters, who are accused of taking jobs
away from the local labour force76.
By contrast, the cross-border metropolitan region of Basel does not seem to be confronted
with the same problems of tension between border populations. It must be said that the cross-
border agglomeration does not encounter some of the issues faced in the ones in Luxembourg
and Geneva, especially in terms of road congestion, thanks to an efficient cross-border public
transport system that has benefited from several decades of close institutional cooperation.
Indeed, the cross-border region of Basel “is widely regarded as an example of cross-border
cooperation in Europe, particularly as far as transport is concerned. Public transport has long
been recognized as a top priority and is the starting point for the agglomeration program
subsidized by the Swiss Confederation Agglomeration Policy77“. In addition, the differences
in socio-economic situation between the inhabitants of the Swiss, German and French border
regions is not as important as in the cases of Luxembourg or Geneva78. Baden-Wurttemberg is
one of the wealthiest German Länder, and so is the Alsace region, in France, even though the
unemployment rate is much higher in the latter than in Basel (14.1% in the “Département” of
Haut-Rhin in 2014, and 3.5% in the Canton of Basel and 2.8 for Basel-Land in 201779).
The comparison of these three case-studies highlights the fact that divergences appear
between the logic promoted by the EU with regard to cross-border integration, which aims at
eliminating differences in development levels, and the mechanisms at work, driven by the
behaviours of various individuals who exploit border differentials, thus leading to more social
and spatial differentiation both at the cross-border scale and within each border region80. The
EU has already mentioned its willingness to tackle the problem of uneven development, for
instance considering tax convergence when taking fiscal policy decisions81. Taxation,
especially of companies, influences the strategic choice of the location of a business and also
the scope of job creation, and as such contributes to accentuating the disparities between
territories, notably at the cross-border scale. However, the EU has limited room for
manoeuvre since most of the competencies which would be required to support more
convergence between border regions remain at national or regional level.
A second challenge concerns the perceptions of border residents, and the rise of
Euroscepticism. Some border residents wonder what the real benefits that result from
European integration actually are. They have the impression that their national/regional
identity is “overshadowed by the EU”82. Therefore, in such a context of uncertainty, different
attitudes and sentiments tend to combine into major driving forces of Euroscepticism. They
range from the feeling that the necessary political efficiency of the EU is missing to answer
their needs or fears. Even if different expressions of Euroscepticism coexist in Europe83, they
highlight the will to preserve national or regional identity, and question the added value of
being an EU member or being part to the EU area. These populations call into question the
way the European construction is set up. The important scores obtained by nationalist or
sovereignist parties in many border regions in Europe84 – which defend Eurosceptic positions
– tend to show that a part of the population living in border regions has a low level of trust
and support for EU institutions and EU policies. However, it must be said that it is
problematic to isolate the weight of the Eurosceptic discourse in the rationale that pushes
people to vote for these parties. Furthermore, border residents can adopt contradictory
behaviours, for instance by profiting from the open-border regime while voting for anti-
European parties. These reservations should prevent us from establishing simplistic and
unique causal relations.
A third challenge concerns the vulnerability of border regions to a potential re-bordering
process. The durability of interdependencies between the border areas depends on the
continuity of a high degree of permeability of borders. The current political disagreement
between European policy-makers over the management of the refugee crisis, combined with
an increase in nationalist and protectionist opinions in the public debate, show that national
borders are more and more associated with “protective shields” in the current discourse of
several states. These tendencies, which go against ideational cross-border integration,
constitute an immediate threat to cross-border interactions, especially if they result in
measures which degrade border-crossing facilities. Obstacles to cross-border flows can have
huge economic consequences, as shown in France with the temporary re-establishment of
border controls after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 201585. Indeed, the
reintroduction of French border controls has had significant effects on the efficiency of daily
trips to the employment centres of Basel, Geneva and Luxembourg, which are already quite
slow in normal times. More frequent or even permanent reintroduction of these controls
would result in the collapse of road traffic with strong consequences on economic activities.
Some studies have even tried to quantify the effects of a permanent reintroduction of border
controls, both in terms of economic impact and transport time86. Such a situation can be
harmful for cross-border regions which have developed strong interdependencies based on a
pure exploitation of rent differentials, as in the case studies described above. Of course, the
EU cannot be held accountable for re-bordering tendencies, but its incapacity to ensure that its
internal borders stay open can also be grounds for criticisms of the EU for people living in
border regions given the complexity of transnational and cross-border governance.
CONCLUSION: GOING BEYOND THE NORMATIVE DISCOURSE ON CROSS-
BORDER INTEGRATION
Border regions are considered as laboratories of the process of Europeanisation87, and as such
they constitute a major point of interest for the EU policy-makers. The study of the three
cross-border metropolitan regions of Basel, Geneva and Luxembourg shows that several
decades of cross-border integration policy have led to a functional specialisation of space
between the metropolitan cores and the neighbouring peripheral regions. It also shows that
from a more ideational perspective, asymmetries in the perceptions of the “neighbour” on
both sides of the border still exist. The analysis of the three cases also confirms the purposes
of Rumford who wrote in 2012 (i) that the borders can be interpreted differently from
different perspectives, and (ii) that “ordinary people (citizens, non-citizens) are increasingly
active in constructing, shifting, or even erasing borders”88. In a Eurosceptic perspective, they
try to activate certain functions of the border to delimit, to distinguish and to reject other
people from their territory.
These key findings put forward a certain fragility of the territorial systems put in place at the
cross-border scale. Indeed, the intensification of cross-border exchanges produces
interrelations and interdependencies between border areas while also emphasising the
differences and communication problems, thus sometimes creating tensions. In the case-
studies described above, which are among the most functionally integrated in Europe, the
cross-border integration process has led to reinforcing or to creating negative ecological and
social effects, such as residential segregation, urban sprawl and long-distance commuting. In
more economically peripheral areas, cross-border integration can also contribute to the
destabilising of local economies that are already affected by high unemployment rates, by
encouraging people to work abroad. Frustration with, and mistrust of, the “neighbours”, or
even xenophobia, can more frequently be found in these border regions nowadays.
The “multiperspectival89” approach to the border leads to apprehend the bordering process in
an intermingling way90 and to better understand the co-existence of both de- and re-bordering
trends. Therefore, we conclude that it is crucial to go beyond the normative discourse of EU
regional policy, which only emphasises the positive aspects of cross-border integration,
observing it through a ‘functional’ lens without paying enough attention to its structural and
ideational outcomes (the growth in inequalities and the lack of shared values and perceptions
at the cross-border scales). While some scholars mention the possible disintegration of the
EU91, it seems indeed necessary to acquire some critical distance with respect to European
territorial cooperation policy and to consider as well the risks of regional imbalances, social
fragmentation, economic dependencies and ecological impacts contained in this process.
Today, the ideal of European integration is confronted with new challenges, such as migration
flows, inner security or general Euroscepticism and border regions are the most sensitive focal
points of this landscape in which challenges can change over time.
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