Article
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the authors.

Abstract

The study of warfare is one of the oldest and most important dynamics of interest for students of politics. This area of research is predominantly − but not exclusively − undertaken within the sub-field of international relations (IR). IR theorists argue that war is the contingent outcome of the interaction among variables operating at three “levels of analysis”: the international level, the domestic level, and the individual level. The international level explores variables that operate exclusively “above” states such as anarchy and the distribution of power. The domestic level explores variables that operate exclusively within states, such as regime type and bureaucratic design. The individual level explores the ways in which individual psychology (i.e. beliefs, culture, personality) contributes to the outbreak of war. We also offer a discussion of new puzzles and challenges in the study of warfare, such as the decline of war hypothesis and the growing prevalence of civil war, insurgency and non-state violence.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.

... Boddewyn (2016) considered that the evaluation of strategic alliance performance could be measured the profi tability of the company as well as the satisfaction of interested parties and the quality of company transformation. Lopez & Johnson (2017) took subjective performance indicators of strategic alliance goal achievement and strategic alliance satisfaction as well as objective performance indicators of sales growth rate, net income growth rate, earnings per share growth rate, and revenue growth rate of a company as the research bases. Moghaddam, Bosse, & Provance (2016) measured with subjective measures of anticipated reward in strategic alliance, harmony and mutual trust, and perceived management capability and alliance sustainability. ...
Article
Applying Data Envelopment Analysis to evaluate efficiency in this study, representative enterprises, in major Medical devices industry production areas of Kaohsiung city, with cooperation with institutional consumers are studied. The research results are summarized as below. according to DEA, 1 DMU presents strong Medical devices industry strategic alliance efficiency, 4 DMUs show the Medical devices industry strategic alliance efficiency between 0.9 and 1, and 5 DMUs reveal the Medical devices industry strategic alliance efficiency lower than 0.9. 2. Sensitivity analysis is utilized for analyzing and finding out key factors in Medical devices industry strategic alliance, and the sensitivity to efficiency is understood by gradually removing inputs and outputs for DEA. According to the results to propose suggestions, it is expected to provide actual assistance for Medical devices industry strategic alliance and reinforce the cooperation between corporate groups and institutional consumers through intra-industry alliance and horizontal alliance.
... He explained that when a country becomes the dominant player on the international stage or ascends to the global hegemonic position, it eventually gets challenged by a rising and dissatisfied powerful nation. As proven by history, in most instances, the quest for world leadership between the declining hegemon and the emerging power usually lead to armed confrontation (Dunn 2010, Lopez andJohnson 2017). ...
Article
Full-text available
The apparent eroding in the hegemonic power of the United States and the sustained growth of China has triggered a debate as to whether the rise of China will be peaceful or conflictual. Structural realism posits that the world is characterised by the anarchic ordering principle in which there is no central authority sitting above the states. Therefore, the absence of a “leviathan” on the international system automatically makes every state equal on the system which created an atmosphere of competition for the maximisation of power for survival. On a similar line of reasoning, the Power Transition theory as a variant theory within realism postulates that when the international system is structured based on the principle of hierarchy, peace will reign. It means that when international relations are regulated and influenced by a dominant power, the international system becomes stable. But the emergence of a dissatisfied powerful nation to challenge the hegemon usually ends up in war. Based on this assumption, Power Transition theorists argued that the rise of China to rival the dominance of the United States could not be peaceful. The Power Transition theory has influenced many academics to have the belief that the two nations will end up in “Thucydides’ Trap”.. The inclusion of the current variables into the Theory will make it applicable and adequately fit in the discourse of international relations and global politics of the 21st-century international system.
... When nation states are the targets of violence, the source may be a terrorist network or a nation state engaging in "hybrid warfare" in which states bring to bear a motley range of tools, such as propaganda, cyber instruments and targeted assassinations, in order to effect outcomes short of war (Hoffman 2007). Lastly, the most common form of political violence is now civil war and insurgency (Lopez and Johnson 2017), which again, often bears the ancestral hallmarks of many raiding dynamics (Boot 2013). In short, the raid, having fallen from prominence over two thousand years ago, is now returning to center stage in our species' long evolution of warfare. ...
Chapter
Full-text available
The scientific study of the evolution of human coalitional aggression has exploded over the last three decades. In four parts, I explore and integrate many of the useful frameworks that have emerged to describe and explain the human practice of intergroup violence. First, we have a clearer understanding of the general conditions required for the evolution of adaptations for coalitional aggression. Second, given an understanding of these conditions, we can more usefully examine the historic and prehistoric record for evidence of the existence of these conditions. Third, I explore and integrate current lab and field evidence for psychological adaptations for coalitional aggression. This section reveals a core dynamic underlying all forms of coalitional aggression: the form of intergroup engagement is functionally linked with the emergent patterns of intragroup dynamics. In other words, how we fight "abroad" determines how we cooperate "at home," and vice versa. Here I examine five areas of inquiry that suggest special design for coalitional aggression. These are: the collective action problem of coordinated violence; parochial altruism; attacker-defender asymmetries; leader-follower dynamics; sex differences in the costs and benefits of violence. Fourth, and to conclude, I offer speculation on the historical emergence of modern human warfare. I do not use "coalitional aggression" and "warfare" interchangeably; rather, evolved psychological adaptations for small-scale coalitional aggression are what make the historical emergence of large-scale human warfare possible.
... Ludzkość w niczym nie wykazała większej inwencji niż w badaniu i doskonaleniu form wojny [1][2][3][4] i narzędzi do zabijania [5,6]. Szczytowym osiągnięciem w tej dziedzinie stała się broń masowego rażenia [7,8]. ...
Article
Full-text available
The publication contains a synthesis of knowledge about chemical weapon and its use during the First World War and in the period after that war, until the nerve agent discovery. It describes chemical warfare agents (CWAs) that were discovered, produced, and used on the battlefield at that time. They are referred to as the first and second CWAs generation. Keywords: chemical weapon, chemical warfare agents, World War I, interwar period
... Scholars who study group-based violence among a range of pre-state people (i.e. forager, huntergatherer, farmer, etc.) tend to define war more broadly than scholars of international relations, which should come as no surprise (Lopez and Johnson, 2017). Yet, unlike scholars of modern international war, in which there is some consensus on measuring war (Gleditsch et al., 2002;Sarkees and Wayman, 2010;Maoz et al., 2019), the study of simple or "primitive" war is fraught with raucous disagreement on definitions and core concepts. ...
Preprint
Full-text available
Introduction: The evolution and history of warfare has been investigated by philosophers, historians, practitioners, social scientists and life scientists. Common questions in this endeavour are: How far back into human evolution and history do we find evidence of warfare? How frequent was warfare in any given historical period? How lethal was warfare? In short, scholarship on the evolution and history of warfare has focused on questions of origins, frequency, and intensity. Despite the fact that scientific interest in these questions is perhaps broader and more methodologically sophisticated than ever, consensus on these questions remains elusive for at least two reasons. First, the archaeological record of warfare is incomplete. Second, we do not agree on what warfare is or how to unambiguously distinguish it from other forms of violence. Beyond an agreement that warfare is something more than violence between two individuals, there is little consensus on the proper scope of our main unit of analysis. Given these hurdles, it would seem that an investigation into the evolutionary origins of human warfare is destined merely to perpetuate academic stalemates, in which old arguments are continuously repackaged with each new discovery of a mass grave or 'peaceful' society. Although this is a rather pessimistic view, I establish it at the forefront of this chapter since my argument will be that these hurdles (e.g. knowledge of ancestral phenomena and consensus on definitions) are not insurmountable. Entire disciplines thrive on their ability to successfully infer and model the unobserved past based on imperfect historical, geological and archaeological evidence. And the question of definitions must be placed in its proper scope-as a methodological, rather than ontological, consideration. One of the core dynamics of the evolutionary process is natural selection, which is the only force known to organise biological design-that is; natural selection builds adaptations. Given that biological adaptations are solutions to recurrent and reproductively significant problems in an organism's environment, these adaptations themselves convey some information about the environment in which they evolved. In other words, the form and function of adaptations contains information about the (socio)ecology in which they were built. Therefore, if there is an argument to be made about the ancestral frequency and intensity of warfare, we should expect that the form and function of our evolved psychology should reflect the ancestral existence of such challenges. This is a way of saying that if warfare was evolutionarily recurrent and reproductively significant for our ancestors, evidence of this fact lies in our very brains.
... Coppin (1994) deals with the determinants of international reserves in Barbados over the period 1972 to 1987. Using OLS estimation, he finds that while openness and real output do positively impact on real reserves, fiscal deficit and interest rate have a negative bearing on real reserves. ...
Conference Paper
The paper seeks to determine to what extent the progressive deterioration in the external current accounts in Barbados especially over the ten-year period of 2008 may be considered a monetary phenomenon, as argued by the advocates of the monetary approach to the balance of payments. A simple model that links the external current account to domestic credit, along with some standard control variables is postulated and estimated, using the auto regressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration, developed by Peseran et al (2001). The data for the analysis spans the period 1970 to 2008. The paper finds evidence that domestic credit creation plays an important role in the determination of the external current account in Barbados. This lends credence to the view that balance of payments issues do indeed reflect monetary developments in the country.
Article
This article examines the evolutionary stability of other-regarding preferences in a group contest for a prize, which is endogenously determined. In a destructive contest, such as war, contest efforts of all groups decrease the value of the prize. In contrast, in a productive contest, such as a patent race, contest efforts of all groups increase the value of the prize. The indirect evolutionary approach allows to endogenize players’ preferences, that is, the utility weights given by a group member, in her subjective utility function, to the material payoffs of in-group and out-group members. After characterizing the set of evolutionarily stable preference types, I show that the evolutionarily stable degree of in-group altruism is always stronger when the group contest is destructive than when it is productive. Moreover, when the group contest is strongly productive, preference evolution leads to in-group spite. However, a smaller group size and a larger number of competing groups makes this outcome less likely.
Thesis
Full-text available
Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWeap) are robots that can independently identify, and terminate targets without human oversight. They are potential weapons of mass destruction that generate many ethical and legal concerns. Despite numerous attempts brokered by the United Nations, they have not been banned by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is important to ascertain the public opinion on the use of LAWeap as outlined by the Martens Clause, as it can guide societal decision-makers. To determine the prevailing sentiment on LAWeap, and if their application for attack versus protection held different regard, an online survey and meta-analysis of the literature was performed. It was found that the majority of the public oppose these weapons, with less resistance to armaments used for defence versus offence. The identification of countries at highest risk to use LAWeap can direct diplomacy and regulations to limit the autonomy of weapons, promoting peace and conflict prevention. Within this context a linear regression formula hypothesizing which nations are most likely to deploy LAWeap was formulated using the predictors of a country’s: use of military drones, military budget per capita, compliance with the UN CCW ban, cyber insecurity, and the global peace index. The survey also polled for the relative importance of each predictor, calibrating the coefficients of the prediction formula. The latter suggests that Israel, USA, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Russia, France, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Niger, Iraq, Jordan, Singapore, Italy, China, North Korea and Turkey are the States most inclined to exploit LAWeap.
Article
Full-text available
The special issue aims to bring together different perspectives on conflict and war from different disciplines, including economics, psychology, evolutionary biology, anthropology, political science, and management. By collecting these distinct, but overlapping perspectives in a single issue, we hope to encourage interdisciplinary work on conflict and war.
Article
Full-text available
Linear and non-linear long-run association between tourism and economic growth is examined using the autoregressive distributed lag procedure with Sri Lanka as a reference country over the sample period 1978–2014. Linear estimation results indicate that a 1% increase in tourism receipts result in an increase in the output per worker by 0.10% in the long run. The net effect in the short run is marginally negative and generally mixed. Non-linear relationship explains the effectiveness of the tourism industry depends strongly on public infrastructure which is subject to congestion like the public transport, airports, road system or telecommunications. A long-run U-shape relationship is detected with the minimum necessary tourism receipts of 1.26% of GDP. The causality results indicate that higher tourism receipts causes growth. The method applied here can be used to examine other countries in the similar domain.
Article
n this article, we explore the much debated nexus between remittances and economic growth in Bangladesh. Drawing on an annual data from 1979 to 2012 and using the augmented Solow framework with the autoregressive distributed lag bounds procedure, we examine the cointegration relationship, the short-run and long-run effects and the causality nexus between remittances per worker, capital per worker and the output per worker. The results show that remittances have a mixed effect in the short-run, however, a momentous positive effect in the long-run (0.11 %), on the output per worker. From the Granger causality assessment, we find inter alia, a bidirectional causality between remittances and output (in per worker terms) and a unidirectional causation from capital to remittances (in per worker terms). Our results therefore support remittance led growth hypothesis in Bangladesh.
Article
Full-text available
The use of evolutionary theory for explaining human warfare is an expanding area of inquiry, but it remains obstructed by two important hurdles. One is that there is ambiguity about how to build an evolutionary theory of human warfare. The second is that there is ambiguity about how to interpret existing evidence relating to the evolution of warfare. This paper addresses these problems, first by outlining an evolutionary theory of human warfare, and second by investigating the veracity of four common claims made against the use of evolutionary theory for explaining warfare. These claims are: (1) ancestral warfare was not frequent or intense enough to have selected for psychological adaptations in humans for warfare; (2) the existence of peaceful societies falsifies the claim that humans possess adaptations for fighting; (3) if psychological adaptations for warfare exist, then war is an inevitable and universal component of the human condition; (4) modern warfare and international politics is so qualitatively different from ancestral politics that any adaptations for the latter are inoperative or irrelevant today. By outlining an evolutionary theory of war and clarifying key misunderstandings regarding this approach, international relations scholars are better positioned to understand, engage, and contribute to emerging scholarship on human warfare across the social and evolutionary sciences.
Article
Full-text available
The question of what causes war has concerned statesmen since the time of Thucydides. The Steps to War utilizes new data on militarized interstate disputes from 1816 to 2001 to identify the factors that increase the probability that a crisis will escalate to war. In this book, Paul Senese and John Vasquez test one of the major behavioral explanations of war--the steps to war--by identifying the various factors that put two states at risk for war. Focusing on the era of classic international politics from 1816 to 1945, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War period, they look at the roles of territorial disputes, alliances, rivalry, and arms races and show how the likelihood of war increases significantly as these risk factors are combined. Senese and Vasquez argue that war is more likely in the presence of these factors because they increase threat perception and put both sides into a security dilemma. The Steps to War calls into question certain prevailing realist beliefs, like peace through strength, demonstrating how threatening to use force and engaging in power politics is more likely to lead to war than to peace.
Article
Full-text available
Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable. Its core propositions about balancing strategies and the absence of sustained hegemonies apply to the European system and perhaps to some other autonomous continental systems but not to the global maritime system. Sea powers are more interested in access to markets than in territorial aggrandizement against other great powers. Consequently, patterns of coalition formation have been different in the European system and in the global maritime system during the last five centuries. An empirical analysis demonstrates that counterhegemonic balancing is frequent in Europe but much less frequent in the global system. Higher concentrations of power in the global system lead to fewer and smaller rather than more frequent and larger balancing coalitions, as well as to more frequent and larger alliances with the leading sea power than against it.
Article
Full-text available
Democratic states are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as nondemocracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict unfeasible. Using different data sets of international conflict and a multiplicity of indicators, we find that (1) democracy, in and of itself, has a consistent and robust negative effect on the likelihood of conflict or escalation in a dyad; (2) both the normative and structural models are supported by the data; and (3) support for the normative model is more robust and consistent.
Article
Political psychology in international relations (IR) has undergone a dramatic transformation in the past two decades, mirroring the broader changes occurring in IR itself. This review examines the current state of the field.Webegin by offering a data-driven snapshot analyzing four years of manuscript classifications at a major IR journal to characterize the questions that IR scholars engaged in psychological research are and are not investigating. We then emphasize six developments in particular, both present-day growth areas (an increased interest in emotions and hot cognition, the rise of more psychologically informed work on public opinion, a nascent research tradition we call the first image reversed, and the rise of neurobiological and evolutionary approaches) and calls for additional scholarship (better integration of the study of mass and elite political behavior and more psychological work in international political economy). Together, these developments constitute some of the directions in which we see the next generation of scholarship heading. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Political Science Volume 21 is May 11, 2018. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Article
The Cuban missile crisis is a seminal event. For thirteen days of October 1962, there was a higher probability that more human lives would end suddenly than ever before in history. Had the worst occurred, the death of 100 million Americans, over 100 million Russians, and millions of Europeans as well would make previous natural calamities and inhumanities appear insignificant. Given the probability of disaster—which President Kennedy estimated as “between 1 out of 3 and even”—our escape seems awesome. This event symbolizes a central, if only partially thinkable, fact about our existence. That such consequences could follow from the choices and actions of national governments obliges students of government as well as participants in governance to think hard about these problems. Improved understanding of this crisis depends in part on more information and more probing analyses of available evidence. To contribute to these efforts is part of the purpose of this study. But here the missile crisis serves primarily as grist for a more general investigation. This study proceeds from the premise that marked improvement in our understanding of such events depends critically on more self-consciousness about what observers bring to the analysis. What each analyst sees and judges to be important is a function not only of the evidence about what happened but also of the “conceptual lenses” through which he looks at the evidence. The principal purpose of this essay is to explore some of the fundamental assumptions and categories employed by analysts in thinking about problems of governmental behavior, especially in foreign and military affairs.
Article
Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale liberal-realist debate, Economic Interdependence and War lays out a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of conflict between nations. Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the Napoleonic and Crimean wars to the more recent Cold War crises, Dale Copeland demonstrates that when leaders have positive expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance long-term power. When, however, these expectations turn negative, leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and markets, giving them more incentive to initiate crises to protect their commercial interests. The theory of trade expectations holds important implications for the understanding of Sino-American relations since 1985 and for the direction these relations will likely take over the next two decades. Economic Interdependence and War offers sweeping new insights into historical and contemporary global politics and the actual nature of democratic versus economic peace.
Article
Cyber attackers rely on deception to exploit vulnerabilities and obfuscate their identity, which makes many pessimistic about cyber deterrence. The attribution problem appears to make retaliatory punishment, contrasted with defensive denial, particularly ineffective. Yet observable deterrence failures against targets of lower value tell us little about the ability to deter attacks against higher value targets, where defenders may be more willing and able to pay the costs of attribution and punishment. Counterintuitively, costs of attribution and response may decline with scale. Reliance on deception is a double-edged sword that provides some advantages to the attacker but undermines offensive coercion and creates risks for ambitious intruders. Many of the properties of cybersecurity assumed to be determined by technology, such as the advantage of offense over defense, the difficulty of attribution, and the inefficacy of deterrence, are in fact consequences of political factors like the value of the target and the scale-dependent costs of exploitation and retaliation. Assumptions about attribution can be incorporated into traditional international relations concepts of uncertainty and credibility, even as attribution involves uncertainty about the identity of the opponent, not just interests and capabilities. This article uses a formal model to explain why there are many low-value anonymous attacks but few high-value ones, showing how different assumptions about the scaling of exploitation and retaliation costs lead to different degrees of coverage and effectiveness for deterrence by denial and punishment. Deterrence works where it is needed most, yet it usually fails everywhere else.
Article
Neurobiological advances appear critical for explicating individual differences in attitudes, values, behaviors, cognition and evaluation, but only recently has the neurobiological tool kit been applied to questions of interest in international relations. In this review, we first provide an overview of historical approaches from two domains of enduring interest to the field: leadership and political violence. We then explicate the ways that the neurobiological revolution has so far furthered our understanding of these domains.
Article
How does a president's leadership style influence the nature of his advisory system? This paper examines how the president's work habits, the ways he likes to receive information, the people he prefers around him, and how he makes up his mind are all key to understanding the manner in which the White House is organized. A survey of the literature linking leadership style to advisory systems revealed five characteristics that seem important to shaping what kinds of advisers are selected and how they are constituted. Building on these five characteristics, we develop a typology indicating how presidents prefer to coordinate policy and the degree of control they need over the policy-making process. Recent presidents are classified and discussed using this typology.
Article
I imagine an IR that (1) begins with conquest and the colonial experience, instead of Westphalia, (2) focuses attention on thinking and feeling IR; and (3) sees contemporary neo–neo debates as trapped within fractures in the enlightenment vision that we need to move beyond.
Article
How do Americans decide whether their country should use military force abroad? We argue they combine dispositional preferences and ideas about the geopolitical situation. This article reports the results of a representative national survey that incorporated five experiments. Findings include the following: (1) Respondent dispositions, especially isolationism versus internationalism and assertiveness versus accommodativeness, consistently constrained policy preferences, whereas liberalism-conservatism did not; (2) features of the geopolitical context-the presence of U.S. interests, relative power, the images of the adversary's motivations, and judgments about cultural status-also influenced support for military intervention; and (3) systematic interactions emerged between dispositions and geopolitical context that shed light on when and why ideological disagreements about the use of force are likely to be amplified and attenuated by situational factors. Our results are consistent with a cognitive-interactionist perspective, in which people adapt broad predispositions in relatively thoughtful ways to specific foreign policy problems.
Article
This study examines various attempts to define the concept of the offensive/defensive balance of military technology, to trace the theoretical consequences of an offensive or defensive advantage, and to measure or classify the balance for the last eight centuries. It is concluded that the last two tasks are flawed because of the ambiguity of the concept of the offensive/defensive balance. There are multiple definitions and multiple hypotheses, but these are not interchangeable, particularly between the pre-nuclear and nuclear eras, where the concept means something fundamentally different. Hypotheses appropriate for one definition may be implausible or tautological for another. It is concluded that the notion of the offensive/defensive balance is too vague and encompassing to be useful in theoretical or historical analysis, but that some of the individual variables that have been incorporated under this broader concept may themselves be useful. Much more analysis is needed, however, to demonstrate that these concepts have important theoretical consequences.
Article
This article questions the prevalent argument that civil wars have fundamentally changed since the end of the cold war. According to this argument, "new" civil wars are different from "old" civil wars along at least three related dimensions--they are caused and motivated by private predation rather than collective grievances and ideological concerns; the parties to these conflicts lack popular support and must rely on coercion; and gratuitous, barbaric violence is dispensed against civilian populations. Recent civil wars, therefore, are distinguished as criminal rather than political phenomena. This article traces the origins of this distinction and argues that it is based on an uncritical adoption of categories and labels, combined with deficient information on "new" civil wars and neglect of recent historical research on "old" civil wars. Perceived differences between post­cold war conflicts and previous civil wars may be attributable more to the demise of readily available conceptual categories caused by the end of the cold war than to the end of the cold war per se.
Article
The study of personality and politics is possible and desirable, but systematic intellectual progress is possible only if there is careful attention to problems of evidence, inference, and conceptualization. This essay reviews such problems, setting forth a conceptualization that takes account of, and builds on, many of the recurring reservations that are advanced about the utility of studying the personalities of political actors. In doing do, it takes selective account of the classical literature on political psychology and more recent developments in the field.
Article
This paper will explore the ambivalence or conflict in the literature about the extent to which leaders matter in international politics, commonly linked to the level-of-analysis question. One the one hand, national leaders are often larger than life figures with strong preferences and distinctive personalities who seem to leave their stamp on events. On the other hand, most ir scholars place great stress on the incentives and constraints posed by the environment, be it domestic or international. I will proceed in four sections. The first discusses the essential claims at stake, the kinds of evidence that could be adduced to support one position or the other, and the pathways by which individual differences can make themselves felt. The second section examines the implications for morality, responsibility, and democratic theory. This discussion too will point to relevant methods, including ones that are contested. I will then turn to post-Cold War American foreign policy, skeptically examine the claim that individual presidents, even George W. Bush, mattered as much as is generally believed and close by discussing the implications for democratic accountability and control.
Article
Stephen Biddle's Military Power deserves serious attention from military historians. Military Power makes a powerful argument that has redefined thinking within political science and policy circles on why armies win battles. Biddle argues that the outcome of battles revolves around force employment, meaning "the doctrine and tactics by which armies use their material in the field" (p. 2). The modern system of force employment was born in the First World War. It is based upon reducing exposure to firepower and applying combined arms tactics. Armies that have failed to adopt the modern system of force employment stand to lose battles against armies that do. This argument directly contradicts popular strands of thought that hold that material/numerical or technological superiority drive victory. The book's argument has been at the center of debates between Biddle and other scholars (including Lawrence Freedman, Martin van Creveld, and Eliot Cohen), most notably in the Journal of Strategic Studies and International Security. Biddle uses multiple approaches to prove his point—historical case studies, large-n statistical analysis, computer simulation, and formal mathematical modeling. Fortunately, Biddle is a sufficiently able writer that the quantitative aspects of the work can be easily understood. The case studies are Operation Michael, Operation Goodwood, and Operation Desert Storm. They are solidly written and convincingly show that force employment rather than material/numerical or technological superiority led to success. Biddle fully reviewed the historical literature and backed it with archival research. My only mild comment is that he might have cited David French's Raising Churchill's Army, the definitive work on British Army doctrine in the Second World War, in dealing with Operation Goodwood. Certainly, Military Power presents numerous points that scholars will contest. How can the development of tanks and airplanes not be considered central to the modern system of force employment? Is force employment the best explanation for German defeat in the 1918 Spring Offensives and the Battle of Normandy? Is the Battle of 73 Easting representative of the causes of Iraqi defeat in Operation Desert Storm? Does the outcome of battles matter today when terrorism and insurgencies seem to have overtaken conventional battles in significance? Yet none of these points detract from the fact that Biddle's work is innovative, thought-provoking, and well-researched. The key point to remember when reading Military Power is that Biddle is discussing the outcome of battles, not wars. Biddle explicitly states as much in his title and the first line of the book: "What causes victory and defeat in battle?" (p. 1). Though of less scholarly interest than the outcome of wars, one can hardly argue that the outcome of battles such as France in 1940, Stalingrad, or the 1950 Chinese offensive over the Yalu do not have a great impact on politics and society. In conclusion, Biddle has produced an outstanding work that addresses a question central to historians, political scientists, and policy-makers. Undergraduate and graduate students, as well as military officers, should become familiar with this book.
Article
One of the most striking findings in political science is the democratic peace: the absence of war between democracies. Some authors attempt to explain this phenomenon by highlighting the role of public opinion. They observe that democratic leaders are beholden to voters and argue that voters oppose war because of its human and financial costs. This logic predicts that democracies should behave peacefully in general, but history shows that democracies avoid war primarily in their relations with other democracies. In this article we investigate not whether democratic publics are averse to war in general, but whether they are especially reluctant to fight other democracies. We embedded experiments in public opinion polls in the United States and the United Kingdom and found that individuals are substantially less supportive of military strikes against democracies than against otherwise identical autocracies. Moreover, our experiments suggest that shared democracy pacifies the public primarily by changing perceptions of threat and morality, not by raising expectations of costs or failure. These findings shed light on a debate of enduring importance to scholars and policy makers.
Article
Contemporary research on civil war has largely dismissed the role of political and economic grievances, focusing instead on opportunities for conflict. However, these strong claims rest on questionable theoretical and empirical grounds. Whereas scholars have examined primarily the relationship between individual inequality and conflict, we argue that horizontal inequalities between politically relevant ethnic groups and states at large can promote ethnonationalist conflict. Extending the empirical scope to the entire world, this article introduces a new spatial method that combines our newly geocoded data on ethnic groups’ settlement areas with spatial wealth estimates. Based on these methodological advances, we find that, in highly unequal societies, both rich and poor groups fight more often than those groups whose wealth lies closer to the country average. Our results remain robust to a number of alternative sample definitions and specifications.
Article
Peace and regime type can be examined at the dyadic, nation, and system levels. At the dyadic level, it is well established that democracies rarely if ever fight each other. At the national level, the broad consensus is that there is no significant relationship between democracy and war participation, but this conclusion remains controversial. At the system level, there has been little research; most scholars have taken for granted that the answer can be inferred from the findings at the dyadic or national levels. The authors show that, if the conventional wisdom holds at the dyadic and national levels, the probability of war in a politically mixed dyad must be higher than the probability of war between two nondemocracies, and the relationship between democracy and war at the system level must be parabolic. Thus increasing democratization initially produces more war, and the reduction of war starts only at a higher level of democratization.
Article
Kenneth Waltz opted to reject the rational actor assumption in developing his theory of international politics. That choice, I argue in this article, creates three problems for his theory. First, it means that it is unsuited for explaining state behavior, which means it is of limited utility for explaining the workings of the international system. Second, Waltz's claim that his theory is well suited to explaining international outcomes — as opposed to state behavior — is unconvincing. Those outcomes are heavily influenced by the actions of the great powers, but if his theory cannot predict their behavior, it is unlikely to reliably predict the outcomes of their behavior. Third, Waltz's assumption that states often behave recklessly leads to a more competitive world than described in his theory. I conclude with the suggestion that the theory's greatest virtue is its normative value — its ability to explain how the world should work, not how it works.
Article
During the Tet holiday of 1968, North Vietnamese troops launched massive attacks on a large number of South Vietnamese cities. Why?
Article
How did human societies evolve from small groups, integrated by face-to-face cooperation, to huge anonymous societies of today, typically organized as states? Why is there so much variation in the ability of different human populations to construct viable states? Existing theories are usually formulated as verbal models and, as a result, do not yield sharply defined, quantitative predictions that could be unambiguously tested with data. Here we develop a cultural evolutionary model that predicts where and when the largest-scale complex societies arose in human history. The central premise of the model, which we test, is that costly institutions that enabled large human groups to function without splitting up evolved as a result of intense competition between societies-primarily warfare. Warfare intensity, in turn, depended on the spread of historically attested military technologies (e.g., chariots and cavalry) and on geographic factors (e.g., rugged landscape). The model was simulated within a realistic landscape of the Afroeurasian landmass and its predictions were tested against a large dataset documenting the spatiotemporal distribution of historical large-scale societies in Afroeurasia between 1,500 BCE and 1,500 CE. The model-predicted pattern of spread of large-scale societies was very similar to the observed one. Overall, the model explained 65% of variance in the data. An alternative model, omitting the effect of diffusing military technologies, explained only 16% of variance. Our results support theories that emphasize the role of institutions in state-building and suggest a possible explanation why a long history of statehood is positively correlated with political stability, institutional quality, and income per capita.
Article
This paper contributes to a growing literature on leaders in international politics by explaining why and how the background experiences of leaders influence nuclear proliferation. Given nuclear weapons' crucial role in world politics, examining the importance of leaders for nuclear proliferation represents a key development in research on leaders. We argue that leaders with a particular experience -- participation in an armed rebellion against the state -- are more likely than their non-rebel counterparts to pursue nuclear weapons. Former rebels are aware of the contingency of their rule and more likely to value weapons that could bolster national independence. Drawing on a new dataset on leader participation in rebel activities, we analyze 1,322 leaders in office from 1945 to 2000. The results strongly support our theory, even when accounting for leader selection. Our findings underscore the value in using leaders -- not just states -- as a unit of analysis in international relations research.
Article
Stephen Van Evera teaches international relations in the Political Science Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Thanks to Robert Art, Charles Glaser, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on this article. It is distilled from Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming 1999). 1. In this article "offense dominant" means that conquest is fairly easy; "defense dominant" means that conquest is very difficult. It is almost never easier to conquer than to defend, so I use "offense dominant" broadly, to denote that offense is easier than usual, although perhaps not actually easier than defense. I use "offense-defense balance" to denote the relative ease of aggression and defense against aggression. As noted below, this balance is shaped by both military and diplomatic/political factors. Two measures of the overall offense-defense balance work well: (1) the probability that a determined aggressor could conquer and subjugate a target state with comparable resources; or (2) the resource advantage that an aggressor requires to gain a given chance of conquering a target state. I use "offense" to refer to strategic offensive action—the taking and holding of territory—as opposed to tactical offensive action, which involves the attack but not the seizure and holding of territory. 2. I use "offense-defense theory" to label the hypothesis that war is more likely when conquest is easy, plus explanatory hypotheses that define how this causation operates. The classic work on the topic is Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214 at 169. An overview is Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691. The theory I frame here subsumes and elaborates on Jervis's theory. 3. Suggesting this hypothesis are Ivan S. Bloch, The Future of War, trans. R.C. Long, pref. W.T. Stead (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899), pp. xxx-xxxi, lxxix; also George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), p. 9. A corroborating test is John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983). 4. As Robert Jervis notes, "when the offense has the advantage over the defense, attacking is the best route to protecting what you have...and it will be hard for any state to maintain its size and influence without trying to increase them." Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 211; see also pp. 168-169, 173, 187-199. 5. It also seems possible that states should be more careful to avoid war when conquest is easy, because war then brings greater risk of total defeat. If so, offense dominance should cause more caution than belligerence among states, and should lower the risk of war. Advancing this argument is James Fearon, "The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648," paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 1995, pp. 18-24. Fearon's argument seems deductively sound, but history offers very few examples of policymakers who argued that offense dominance was a reason for caution. This is one of many cases where deduction and the historical record point in opposite directions. 6. The classic discussion of these dangers is Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 221-259. 7. For a discussion of the dangers of preventive war, see Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107. 8. On fait accompli strategies, see Alexander L. George, "Strategies for Crisis Management," in Alexander L. George, Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 377-394 at 382-383, also pp. 549-550, 553-554. Other discussions of faits accomplis include R.B. Mowat, Diplomacy and Peace (London: Williams and Norgate, 1935), chap. 10 (on "sudden diplomacy"); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 57-97 (on "brinkmanship"); and Thomas...
Article
V.P. Gagnon, Jr., is an SSRC-MacArthur Foundation post-doctoral fellow in Peace and Security in a Changing World in the Peace Studies Program, Cornell University. In the current academic year, he is a visiting scholar at Zagreb University in Croatia and Belgrade University in Serbia. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the September 1992 APSA meeting in Chicago. For helpful suggestions and criticisms, thanks to Dominique Caouette, Roger Petersen, Liz Wishnick, and Peter Katzenstein. Funding for revisions of this paper were provided by the Social Science Research Council-MacArthur Foundation Post-doctoral Fellowship in Peace and Security in a Changing World, and the Department of State Title VIII program in Russian and East European Studies, administered by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 1. See, for example, John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39; Jack Snyder, "The New Nationalism," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 179-200; Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). 2. The best English-language sources on the Yugoslav wars include Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Rabia Ali and Lawerence Lifshutz, eds., Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan War (Stony Creek, Conn.: Pamphleteers Press, 1993). 3. Examples include Greece-Turkey (1922), Ireland (1921), the Sudetenland (1938), India-Pakistan (1947), South African apartheid (1948), Palestine (1948), and Cyprus (1974). John Mearsheimer and Robert Pape, "The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia," The New Republic, June 14, 1993, pp. 22-28, argue for partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina as the best solution to the current conflict. 4. One of the shortcomings of the literature on ethnic and nationalist conflict is the lack of a precise conceptual definition. The term "nationalism" (or "hypernationalism") is commonly used, either implicitly or explicitly, to mean simultaneously (and confusingly) ethnic national sentiments or beliefs; political rhetoric that appeals to ethnic nationalist sentiment; and violent conflict that is described and justified in terms of ethnicity. To avoid this confusion, and to clarify the dependent variable (violent conflict, rather than ethnic sentiment) "ethnic nationalism" in this article refers to the rhetoric by which political actors describe, justify, and explain policies with reference to the interest of the "nation" defined in ethnic terms. It does not refer to sentiment or belief. This definition also makes clear that the root causes of a conflict that is described as ethnic may have little to do with ethnicity per se, and thereby points to the questions that must be answered to understand ethnic nationalist conflict: when do political elites resort to conflictual definitions of ethnic national interest? When and how do such definitions come to dominate the policies of the state? What are the goals of this conflictual behavior? 5. Examples of international relations works which look to ethnic sentiment as the key to understanding the link between nationalism and foreign policy include Alexis Heraclides, The Self Determination of Minorities in International Politics (Portland, Ore.: Cass, 1991); William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For those that look to external security concerns, see Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; and Barry Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124. The literature on ethnic conflict also tends to explain violent conflict as a response to external threats to or opportunities for the ethnic group vis-à-vis other groups. The most prominent such work is Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 6. One work that explores the domestic roots of conflictual nationalist policy is Snyder, "The New Nationalism." For a review of earlier works that look at domestic sources of international conflict, see Jack Levy, "The Diversionary...
Article
Stephen Van Evera is a Research Fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. I would like to thank Jack Snyder, Richard Ned Lebow, Barry Posen, Marc Trachtenberg, and Stephen Walt for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 1. Quoted in L.L. Farrar, Jr., "The Short War Illusion: The Syndrome of German Strategy, August-December 1914," Militaergeschictliche Mitteilungen, No. 2 (1972), p. 40. 2. On the origins of the cult of the offensive, see Jack Lewis Snyder, "Defending the Offensive: Biases in French, German, and Russian War Planning, 1870-1914" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1981), forthcoming as a book from Cornell University Press in 1984; Snyder's essay in this issue; and my "Causes of War" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984), chapter 7. On the failure of Europeans to learn defensive lessons from the wars of 1860-1914, see Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); and T.H.E. Travers, "Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900-1914," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51 (June 1979), pp. 264-286. Also relevant is Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 42-52. A related work which explores the sources of offensive and defensive doctrines before World War II is Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 47-51, 67-74, and passim. 3. Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth, trans. Andrew and Eva Wilson, with a Foreword by B.H. Liddell Hart (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958; reprint ed., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 100; and Friedrich von Bernhardi, How Germany Makes War (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1914), pp. 153, 155. 4. Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), p. 357; and Wallace Notestein and Elmer E. Stoll, eds., Conquest and Kultur: Aims of the Germans in Their Own Words (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917), p. 43. Similar ideas developed in the German navy; see Holger H. Herwig, Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1976), pp. 42-66. 5. B.H. Liddell Hart, Through the Fog of War (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 57. 6. In 1912, quoted in John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Pantheon, 1975), pp. 53-54. 7. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Dell, 1962), p. 51. 8. In 1912, quoted in John M. Cairns, "International Politics and the Military Mind: The Case of the French Republic, 1911-1914," The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 25, No. 3 (September 1953), p. 282. 9. On the offensive in French prewar thought, see B.H. Liddell Hart, "French Military Ideas before the First World War," in Martin Gilbert, ed., A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950 (London: Hamilton Hamish, 1966), pp. 135-148. 10. Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 81. Likewise, Joffre later explained that Plan XVII, his battle plan for 1914, was less a plan for battle than merely a plan of "concentration. . . . I adopted no preconceived idea, other than a full determination to take the offensive with all my forces assembled." Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, rev. ed. (New York: Collier, 1962), p. 229. 11. In 1913 and 1914, quoted in Travers, "Technology, Tactics, and Morale," p. 275. 12. In 1909, quoted in D.C.B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 113. 13. See Tuchman, Guns of August, pp. 127-131. 14. Marshall Joffre, Mémoires du Maréchel Joffre (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1932), p. 33. Joffre speaks of "le culte de l'offensive" and "d'une 'mystique de l'offensive'" of "le caractère un peu irraisonné." 15. Ropp, War in...
Article
The causes of war remain a strangely obscure subject in the discipline of International Relations. Although the subject is of cardinal significance, theories of International Relations address it only obliquely, and most scholars in the field recognize the lacuna only when their attention is drawn to it. While people have a good idea of the aims that may motivate states to go to war, an attempt at a strict definition of them is widely regarded as futile. This article seeks to show how the various causes of violence and war all come together and are explained within an integrated human motivational complex, shaped by evolution and natural selection. These interconnected causes of fighting — some of them confusedly singled out by various schools in IR theory, most notably within realism — include competition over resources and reproduction, the ensuing quest for dominance, the security dilemma and other prisoner’s dilemmas that emanate from the competition, kinship, identity, and ideas.
Article
This study investigates risky group decision making in Japan from a prospect theory perspective. Hypotheses concerning the effects of the reference point on risk preferences in group decision making were tested by content analyzing transcripts of Japanese leaders' deliberations prior to their 1941 decision for war and subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor. Consistent with prospect theory, the results show systematic associations between the reference point used and the riskiness of policy recommendations. The highly risky decision for war appears to have been influenced by the group's reference point, which framed the group's alternatives as a choice between losses. The decision for war thus appears to have been motivated by a desire to avoid what were otherwise perceived as certain losses.
Article
This article offers an interpretation of the current international situation from the perspective of power transition theory. Previous efforts to understand what the end of the Cold War means for international relations have provided only part of the picture. Optimistic views tend to deny the possibility of the emergence of new threats, while pessimistic arguments generally fail to recognize that the prospects for major war have been significantly reduced by the dramatic events of the last half decade. The interpretation offered here is potentially advantageous because it draws insights from a theory with a long record of empirical support. Power transition theory is consistent with the existence of a `Long Peace' since World War II, with the Cold War's peaceful end, and thus provides confidence to those who would use it to interpret the prospects for the future. The conclusion offered here is that while the end of the Cold War offers reason for celebration, there is also cause for concern.
Article
William C. Wohlforth is Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. I am indebted to Stephen G. Brooks, Charles A. Kupchan, Joseph Lepgold, Robert Lieber, and Kathleen R. McNamara, who read and commented on drafts of this article. 1. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 23-33. 2. Patrick Tyler, "The Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics," New York Times, March 10, 1992, p. A12. 3. For the most thorough and theoretically grounded criticism of this strategy, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124. 4. The phrase—commonly attributed to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright—is also a favorite of President Bill Clinton's. For example, see the account of his speech announcing the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Urges NATO Expansion in 1999," New York Times, October 23, 1996, p. A20. 5. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 915-916; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 44-98. Although I differ with Waltz on the stability of unipolarity, the title of this article and much of its contents reflect intellectual debts to his work on system structure and stability. See Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-901. 6. See Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79. Samuel P. Huntington maintained this position in Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 63-83, but he has since abandoned it. A more bullish assessment, although still more pessimistic than the analysis here, is Douglas Lemke, "Continuity of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 203-236. 7. As Glenn H. Snyder puts it, the international system "appears to be unipolar, though incipiently multipolar." Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 18. The quoted phrases in this sentence appear in Charles A. Kupchan, "Rethinking Europe," National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999); Kupchan, "After Pax Americana," p. 41; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment"; and Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 914. Although Charles Krauthammer coined the term "unipolar moment" in his article under that title, he argued that unipolarity had the potential to last a generation. 8. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999), p. 36. For similar views of the post-Cold War structure, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; and Josef Joffe, "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 94-117. 9. The assumption that realism predicts instability after the Cold War pervades the scholarly debate. See, for example, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace—An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); and David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For more varied perspectives on realism and unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Explanations for stability despite the balance of power fall roughly into three categories: (1) liberal arguments, including democratization, economic interdependence, and international institutions. For examples, see Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University...
Article
The author distinguishes between two types of costly signals that state leaders might employ in trying to credibly communicate their foreign policy interests to other states, whether in the realm of grand strategy or crisis diplomacy. Leaders might either (a) tie hands by creating audience costs that they will suffer ex post if they do not follow through on their threat or commitment (i.e., costs arising from the actions of domestic political audiences) or (b) sink costs by taking actions such as mobilizing troops that are financially costly ex ante. Analysis of a game model depicting the essentials of each case yields two principal results. First, in the games' equilibria, leaders never bluff with either type of signal; they do not incur or create costs and then fail to respond if challenged. Second, leaders do better on average by tying hands, despite the fact that the ability to do so creates a greater ex ante risk of war than does the use of sunk-cost signals. These results and the logic behind them may help explain some empirical features of international signaling, such as many crises' appearance as competitions in creating domestic political audience costs. They also generate empirical puzzles, such as why the seemingly plausible logic of inference that undermines bluffing in the model does not operate in all empirical cases.
Article
Economic models of rebellion usually treat it as a form of crime or banditry. However, the analogy is not developed. This article treats rebellion as a distinctive form of organized crime that differs from other crime in its objective, which is the predation of the rents on natural resource exports. Because such rents can be defended by government forces, rebel forces must be sufficiently large to defend themselves. This introduces a survival constraint that affects whether a rebellion is financially viable and how it reacts to increases in government forces and introduces an entry threshold. This threshold gives rise to a problem for the rebellion of attracting sufficient start-up finance. The predictions of the model are shown to be consistent with four stylized facts.
Article
1. Introduction Part I. Theory: 2. Information and signalling in international crises 3. Democratic politics in international crises 4. Domestic competition and signalling in international crises Part II. Empirical Analysis: 5. Selective threats, effective threats: the initiation and escalation of international crises 6. Credibility confirmed: the implications of domestic support 7. Credibility undermined: the implications of domestic dissent 8. Conclusions and implications Appendices Reference Index.
Article
International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Second, the security dilemma is ameliorated when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. These two variables, which can generate four possible security worlds, are influenced by geography and technology.
Article
The Cuban missile crisis is a seminal event. For thirteen days of October 1962, there was a higher probability that more human lives would end suddenly than ever before in history. Had the worst occurred, the death of 100 million Americans, over 100 million Russians, and millions of Europeans as well would make previous natural calamities and inhumanities appear insignificant. Given the probability of disaster—which President Kennedy estimated as “between 1 out of 3 and even”—our escape seems awesome. This event symbolizes a central, if only partially thinkable, fact about our existence. That such consequences could follow from the choices and actions of national governments obliges students of government as well as participants in governance to think hard about these problems. Improved understanding of this crisis depends in part on more information and more probing analyses of available evidence. To contribute to these efforts is part of the purpose of this study. But here the missile crisis serves primarily as grist for a more general investigation. This study proceeds from the premise that marked improvement in our understanding of such events depends critically on more self-consciousness about what observers bring to the analysis. What each analyst sees and judges to be important is a function not only of the evidence about what happened but also of the “conceptual lenses” through which he looks at the evidence. The principal purpose of this essay is to explore some of the fundamental assumptions and categories employed by analysts in thinking about problems of governmental behavior, especially in foreign and military affairs.
Article
When do leaders resort to deception to sell wars to their publics? Dan Reiter and Allan Stam have advanced a selection effects explanation for why democracies win the wars they initiate: leaders, because they must secure public consent first, select into those wars they expect to win handily. In some cases, however, the selection effect breaks down. In these cases, leaders, for realist reasons, are drawn toward wars where an easy victory is anything but assured. Leaders resort to deception in such cases to preempt what is sure to be a contentious debate over whether the use of force is justified by shifting blame for hostilities onto the adversary. The events surrounding the United States' entry into World War II is useful in assessing the plausibility of this argument. President Franklin Roosevelt welcomed U.S. entry into the war by the fall of 1941 and attempted to manufacture events accordingly. An important implication from this finding is that deception may sometimes be in the national interest.