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Federico, C. & Golec de Zavala, A. (in press). Collective narcissism in the 2016 Presidential election. Public Opinion Quarterly

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Explaining support for Donald Trump's presidential candidacy has become a key social-science challenge. An emerging literature highlights several important individual-level precursors of Trump support, including racial attitudes, sexism, and authoritarianism. In this report, we provide evidence for the role of a novel psychological factor: collective narcissism, an inflated, unrealistic view of the national ingroup's greatness contingent on external recognition. Using data from a recent national survey, we demonstrate that collective narcissism is a powerful predictor of 2016 presidential votes and evaluations of Trump, even after controlling for other variables known to predict candidate preferences in general and Trump support in particular. Word Count: 2,844
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Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 1
Collective Narcissism and the 2016 United States Presidential Vote
Christopher M. Federico
Departments of Psychology and Political Science
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455
federico@umn.edu
Agnieszka Golec de Zavala
Department of Psychology
Goldsmiths, University of London
London SE14 6NW
United Kingdom
a.golec@gold.ac.uk
Abstract:
Explaining support for Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy has become a key social-
science challenge. An emerging literature highlights several important individual-level
precursors of Trump support, including racial attitudes, sexism, and authoritarianism. In this
report, we provide evidence for the role of a novel psychological factor: collective narcissism, an
inflated, unrealistic view of the national ingroup’s greatness contingent on external recognition.
Using data from a recent national survey, we demonstrate that collective narcissism is a powerful
predictor of 2016 presidential votes and evaluations of Trump, even after controlling for other
variables known to predict candidate preferences in general and Trump support in particular.
Word Count: 2,844
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 2
Donald Trump’s candidacy and election defied the expectations of social scientists,
leading to a scramble for explanations (Sides and Farrell 2016). Some are structural: a toxic
combination of “weak parties and strong partisanship” makes it harder for elites to stop Trump-
like insurgents while guaranteeing that they receive support once nominated (Azari 2016).
Otherswhich we focus on heredeal with individual-level factors that attracted voters to
Trump’s candidacy. Explanations of this sort center on economic dissatisfaction,
authoritarianism, sexism, and racial resentment (Gest 2016; MacWilliams 2016; Schaffner,
MacWilliams, and Nteta 2017; Tesler 2016; Wayne, Valentino and Oceno 2016).
In the present study, we examine a factor that has not received much attention but
provides a powerful explanation of the psychology behind mass support for Trump’s candidacy:
collective narcissism, an individual-difference variable reflecting an exaggerated belief in an in-
group’s greatness that requires constant external validation (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka,
Eidelson, and Jayawickreme 2009; Golec de Zavala 2017). The Trump campaign emphasized an
alleged loss of national greatness and called for its restoration. Since collective narcissism
provides a unique motivation to support leaders who promise to restore national greatness, we
argue that it should predict electoral support for Donald Trump net of other variables known to
predict vote choice in general and Trump support in particular. Data from a recent national
survey provide strong support for these predictions.
Collective Narcissism
Collective narcissism (CN) is analogous to classical self-referential narcissism in that it
involves emotional dependence on admiration by others (Morf and Rodhewalt 2001). Individuals
high in CN seek admiration for their groups rather than themselves directly. They invest in
exaggerated in-group greatness to compensate for self-weakness (e.g., low personal control, as
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 3
measured or manipulated; Cichocka et al. 2017; Golec de Zavala et al. 2009, 2017). While self-
referential narcissists abandon groups that fail to boost their self-image (Bizumic and Duckitt
2008), collective narcissists aggressively seek to bolster the in-group’s reputation. Collective
narcissists constantly monitor their environment for validation and are hypersensitive to threats
to the in-group’s image (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka and Iskra-Golec 2013a; Golec de Zavala,
Pekker, Guerra and Baran 2016). Moreover, experimental studies indicate that those high in CN
respond with retaliatory aggression and rejoice in the out-group misfortune when the in-group is
criticized or insufficiently recognized (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009, 2013a, 2016).
People can be collectively narcissistic about various groups, including national, ethnic,
and even mundane student or worker groups (Galvin, et al. 2015; Golec de Zavala et al. 2013a,
Golec de Zavala, Cichocka & Bilewicz 2013b). In the present study, we focus on CN with
respect to national identity. National CN has been differentiated from other forms of national
affinity. National CN predicts hypersensitivity to intergroup threat and retaliatory hostility even
after controlling for centrality of national identity to the self and how positively the national
group is evaluated (Cameron 2004; Leach et al. 2008), blind patriotism (uncritical admiration of
a nation; Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999), and nationalism (belief in national supremacy;
Kosterman and Feshbach 1999). After their links with CN are controlled, other variables
pertaining to national attitudes cease to explain out-group rejection in the context of intergroup
threat (Golec de Zavala et al. 2013b, 2016), and experimental studies show that national CN
uniquely predicts hostile retaliation to in-group criticism (Golec de Zavala et al. 2013a).
Moreover, once national CN is accounted for, positive evaluations of the national ingroup do not
predict hostility toward outgroups or hypersensitivity to intergroup threats (Golec de Zavala et al.
2016).
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 4
CN is also distinct from other predictors of intergroup and political attitudes, including
right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. CN uniquely predicts intergroup
hostility even after these variables are controlled for (Golec de Zavala, Guerra and Símão 2017).
These variables predict outgroup hostility for different reasons. Those high in CN show bias
when other groups undermine their ingroup’s image. In contrast, authoritarians reject outgroups
that threaten valued traditions, whereas those high in social dominance orientation are hostile
towards outgroups with whom they compete for status (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009).
Collective Narcissism and the Trump Candidacy
With this background in mind, the relevance of collective narcissism to the 2016 election
is clear. Donald Trump’s campaign dwelled extensively on concerns expressed by collective
narcissists. Consider Trump’s revival of classic slogans like “America First” and “Make America
Great Again.” They suggest that America’s greatness has been threatened and needs to be
restored. Those high in national CN are likely to be mobilized by calls to restore the in-group’s
greatness because they fear that others do not recognize itand because they may doubt its
greatness themselves (Golec de Zavala, et al. 2009). Collective narcissists are also likely to have
been attracted to Donald Trump’s promises of aggressive action against targeted out-groups
(e.g., Muslims), given that CN predicts hostility towards minorities (Golec de Zavala et al.
2013b).
Results from other national contexts confirm that collective narcissists support political
initiatives ostensibly aimed at countering threats from disliked out-groups. This has been evident
in the context of the recent global resurgence of nationalist populism. For example, Britons high
in national CN were more likely to vote in favor of leaving the European Union, a relationship
that was mediated by perceptions of threat from foreign immigration (Golec de Zavala et al.
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 5
2017). These findings suggest that CN may also predict support for Donald Trump’s candidacy.
Nevertheless, research has not examined the role of CN in support for Trump or
nationalist/populist political figures more generally. Thus, the present study represents an
opportunity to look beyond CN as a predictor of intergroup attitudes and explore its relevance to
candidate preferences.
Hypotheses
We have two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: National collective narcissism should predict respondents’ votes in the
2016 election, with those high in CN being more likely to prefer Trump.
Hypothesis 2: National collective narcissism should predict respondents’ evaluations of
Trump, with those high in CN evaluating Trump more positively and attributing more positive
traits to Trump.
We examine these hypotheses using a large national survey conducted over the course of
the 2016 presidential campaign, controlling for several other explanations for Trump support.
Data and Methods
Our data came from a national four-wave internet panel study fielded by the University of
Minnesota’s Center for the Study of Political Psychology. The data were collected through
Survey Sampling International. We use data from Waves 1 (July 2016), 3 (October 2016), and 4
(November 2016, post-election) of the survey, N=1,730. The sample is representative when
weighted. Details about the sample and measures can be found in the online appendix.
Correlations between all variables but the demographics are shown in Table 1.
Dependent Variables
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 6
We examined three dependent variables. Self-reported vote choice was assessed in Wave
4. Respondents who voted for Trump were given a score of 1; all others who cast a presidential
vote were given a score of 0. We also obtained two evaluations of Donald Trump in Wave 3. A
Trump thermometer rating was assessed using a standard 101-point scale. A composite Trump
trait evaluation was constructed from responses to five items asking respondents how
“competent,” “honest,” “reckless,” “insincere,” and “warm” Donald Trump was. After reversing
responses to “reckless” and “insincere,” all items were averaged (α=0.90). Both variables were
recoded to run from 0-1; higher scores indicate more positive evaluations (M=0.41, SD=0.38, for
the thermometer; M=0.38, SD=0.32, for the traits). The final N for the analyses using these
variables was smaller due to reduced overlap between the subsets of respondents who completed
Waves 1, 3, and 4 (N=862).
Independent Variables
Collective narcissism. CN was measured in Wave 4 using a five-item version of the
Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009, 2013b). The items were: “If the United
States had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place,” “The United States
deserves special treatment,” “It really makes me angry when others criticize the United States,”
“Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of the United States,” and “I will
never be satisfied until the United States gets the recognition it deserves.” All items used a
seven-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Responses were
rescaled to run 0-1 and averaged; higher scores indicate greater CN (α=0.83, M=0.56, SD=0.20).
In the online appendix, we provide additional information regarding CN’s properties.
Controls. We include several controls, measured in Wave 1 and rescaled to run from 0 to
1. First, several demographics were included: age (in its original metric), income (rescaled from
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 7
0 to 1), gender (0=female, 1=male), education (seven ordered categories), and race (0=nonwhite,
1=white). Second, following other research on CN (Golec de Zavala 2017), a control for basic
in-group attachment was included: American identification. This was assessed using one item: “I
generally consider myself to be (1) like most other Americans or (0) different than most other
Americans. We also controlled for two political predispositions: seven-point measures of
ideology (M=0.53, SD=0.28) and partisanship (M=0.46, SD=0.38). Higher scores indicated
greater conservatism and GOP identification. The remaining predictors were variables identified
as predictors of support for Trump and other populist figures: Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) racial
resentment scale (Tesler 2016; α=0.84, M=0.58, SD=0.27), a version of Glick and Fiske’s (1996)
hostile sexism scale (Schaffner et al. 2017; α=0.85, M=0.41, SD=0.25), Stenner’s (2005)
authoritarianism scale (MacWilliams 2016; α=0.60, M=0.55, SD=0.32), one economic
dissatisfaction item focused on personal finances over the previous four years (Schaffner et al.
2017; M=0.51, SD=0.23), and a measure of trust in institutions, leaders, and other people
(α=0.75, M=0.45, SD=0.16). Higher scores indicate greater levels of each construct.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Results
Collective Narcissism Among Different Voter Groups
We first compared the average CN scores of individuals who voted for Trump (n=668)
with those who voted for other candidates (n=869) and those who abstained (n=171). Survey
weights were used. Consistent with expectations, Trump voters scored higher in CN (M=0.64)
than those who voted for other candidates (M=0.52), t(1707)=6.34, p<0.001; and those who
abstained (M=0.51), t(1707)=4.75 p<0.001. Those who voted for candidates other than Trump
and abstainers did not differ in CN, t(1707)=0.39, p>0.250.
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 8
Collective Narcissism and the 2016 Presidential Vote
We examined Hypothesis 1 using a binary-probit regression model in which vote choice
was regressed on the demographics, other controls, and CN (Table 2). Survey weights were
applied. Table 2. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, those high in CN were significantly more likely
to vote for Trump (b=1.52, p<0.001). Multiplying the probability change in the “ΔPr” column by
100, this indicates that going from the lowest to the highest CN level is associated with a 30%
increase in the probability of voting for Trump. Men, whites, conservatives, Republicans, those
higher in racial resentment, and economically-dissatisfied respondents were also more likely to
vote for Trump (ps<0.05). However, the only predictor with a stronger effect than CN was
partisanship. Going from the most Democratic to the most Republican partisanship was
associated with a 41% increase in the probability of a Trump vote. For illustration, Figure 1 plots
Trump vote probability as a function of CN and seven other key vote predictors.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Collective Narcissism and Evaluations of Donald Trump
We examined Hypothesis 2 using two ordinary least-squares regression models: one for
the Trump thermometer rating and one for the Trump trait evaluation (Table 3). These models
used the same specification as above, except for the different estimator. Survey weights were
applied. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, there was a significant relationship between CN and
Trump ratings (b=0.27, p=0.001). Given the 0-1 variable codings (recall that the variable was
rescaled from its original 0-100 degree-based metric), this indicates that going from the lowest to
the highest CN level was associated with a 27% increase in positivity toward Donald Trump.
Partisanship was the only other predictor that reached significanceand the only one that had a
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 9
stronger relationship with Trump ratings (b=0.54, p<0.001); going from the most Democratic to
the most Republican position was associated with a 54% increase in positivity toward Trump.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 plots thermometer ratings as a function of CN and seven other
key predictors.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
In turn, CN was again related to trait evaluations of Trump (b=0.22, p=0.001),
corresponding to a 22% increase in positive trait attributions as one goes from the lowest to the
highest level of CN. Less-educated respondents, conservatives, Republicans, and hostile sexists
also attributed more positive traits to Trump (ps<0.05). Again, partisanship was the only variable
whose predictive power was stronger than CN’s (b=0.37, p<0.001). Compared to the most
Democratic respondents, the most Republican respondents are 37% more positive in their
attribution of positive traits to Trump. To illustrate these relationships, Figure 3 plots trait
evaluations as a function of CN and seven other key predictors.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Robustness Checks
In the online appendix, we provide several robustness checks: (1) a replication of the
thermometer and trait-rating results using residualized versions of the variables that account for
Clinton support; (2) analyses entering education as a series of dummy variables; and (3) analyses
correcting for measurement error in core predictors. Results were similar in all cases.
Discussion
Research has offered several explanations for the appeal of Donald Trump’s candidacy.
In the present article, we argue for the role of a factor broadly implicated in intergroup hostility:
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 10
collective narcissism. Consistent with our hypotheses, our data revealed that collective
narcissists were more likely to vote for and positively evaluate Donald Trump, net of other
relevant predictors. In fact, CN was more strongly related to our dependent variables than almost
all controls.
One limitation of our study is that it does not allow us to firm conclusions about
directionality of the relationship between CN and candidate preferences. We follow previous
work in positing that CN is prior to judgments about specific figures, groups, and issues, but it
also possible that individuals gravitated toward Trump first and then followed him in adopting
beliefs characteristic of CN (Zaller 1992). We doubt this alternative explanation for several
reasons. First, research typically suggests that group-related individual differences (such as
authoritarianism and CN) constrain specific attitudes and actions, such as candidate evaluations
and voting (rather than vice versa; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, and Kielmann 2005; Duckitt 2006;
de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Second, CN is conceptualized as a relatively-stable individual
difference. Consistent with this, longitudinal studies indicate that CN is a stable construct (with
raw test-retest correlations from r=.59 to r=.73; see Cichocka et al. 2017; Golec de Zavala, et al.
2017; see the online appendix for further detail), and CN in earlier time periods constrains
specific out-group attitudes in later time periods (Cichocka et al. 2017).
Though we cannot rule out the reverse pattern, we believe that our finding of a strong net
relationship between CN and Trump support is significant in and of itself, regardless of whether
CN motivated Trump support or vice versa. Either way, our result sheds light on the broader
network of beliefs surrounding Trump support in the mass public by demonstrating the centrality
of CN to that belief system even after other factors are accounted for. Indeed, the presence of an
influential group of citizens motivated by CNwith a strong attachment to a particular leader
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 11
may have serious consequences for intergroup relations at home and abroad. Decision makers
and citizens motivated by collective narcissism may make unrealistic demands on other countries
and support war more readily (Golec de Zavala et al 2013a). Moreover, the alliances they form
may be short-lived and abandoned when inconvenient. Moreover, given the inclination to
conspiratorial ideation among those high in CN, conspiracy theories may become a more
prominent part of political discourse as collective narcissism becomes more pronounced among
elites (Cichocka et al. 2016). In domestic affairs, leaders high in CN may be especially likely to
aggravate intergroup tensions, since collective narcissists rely on a narrow definition of what
constitutes a nation. In particular, minorities are likely to become the targets of greater hostility
and derogation (Golec de Zavala et al. 2013; Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012). In short,
leadership marked by CN carries with it higher risk that invidious distinctions between “true”
members of the national in-group and various outsiders may be legitimized. Of course, none of
these consequences of CN are unique to the incipient Trump era. Nevertheless, given the strong
relationship between CN and Trump support, attention to the implications of collective
narcissism for contemporary mass politics in the United States seems well-advised.
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 12
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Table 1. Intercorrelations for Key Variables
1
2
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1. Trump vote
2. Trump thermometer
3. Trump traits
4. American identification
5. Ideology
6. Partisanship
7. Racial resentment
8. Hostile sexism
9. Authoritarianism
10. Economic dissatisfaction
11. Trust
12. Collective narcissism
1.00
0.82***
0.79***
0.10***
0.53***
0.66***
0.47***
0.15***
0.20***
0.23***
-0.12***
0.28***
1.00
0.91***
0.04
0.53***
0.64***
0.42***
0.28***
0.18***
0.21**
-0.20***
0.29***
1.00
0.12***
0.13***
0.16***
-0.12***
0.08***
0.01
0.15***
0.13***
1.00
0.58***
0.42***
0.22***
0.23***
0.19***
-0.07**
0.27***
1.00
0.41***
0.13***
0.16***
0.15***
-0.05*
0.16***
1.00
0.17***
0.18***
0.14***
-0.04
0.26***
1.00
0.22***
0.10***
-0.07**
0.33***
1.00
0.09***
-0.06*
0.29***
1.00
-0.25***
0.12***
1.00
0.12***
Note. Entries are point-biserial correlations for all pairs involving the Trump-vote variable and Pearson correlations in all other cases.
*p<0.05. **p<0.01. ***p<0.001.
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 17
Table 2. Trump Vote as a Function of Collective Narcissism (2016 CSPP)
Trump Vote
Predictor
b
95% CI
ΔPr
p
Age
Income
Gender (1 = male)
Education
Race (1 = white)
American identification
Ideology
Partisanship
Racial resentment
Hostile sexism
Authoritarianism
Economic dissatisfaction
Trust
Collective narcissism
Intercept
0.16
-0.07
0.40
0.06
0.40
-0.03
0.77
2.19
1.40
0.12
0.04
0.72
-0.68
1.52
-4.04
(-0.49, 0.80)
(-0.78, 0.64)
(0.11, 0.68)
(-0.51, 0.64)
(-0.001, 0.80)
(-0.39, 0.32)
(0.07, 1.47)
(1.70, 2.67)
(0.80, 2.00)
(-0.53, 0.76)
(-0.45, 0.52)
(0.06, 1.37)
(-1.57, 0.21)
(0.79, 2.26)
(-5.10, -2.98)
0.03
-0.01
0.08
0.01
0.08
-0.01
0.16
0.41
0.28
0.02
0.01
0.15
-0.13
0.30
>0.250
>0.250
0.007
>0.250
0.050
>0.250
0.031
<0.001
<0.001
>0.250
>0.250
0.032
0.132
<0.001
<0.001
F (df)
N
19.22 (14, 1445), p<0.001
1,459
Note. Entries are binary probit regression coefficients. Survey weights are applied. “ΔPr
indicates the change in the probability of a Trump vote associated with (1) going from the
minimum to the maximum value of the predictor for continuous predictors; and (2) going from
the group coded “0” to the group coded “1” for categorical predictors.
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 18
Table 3. Trump Thermometer Rating and Trump Trait Evaluation as a Function of Collective Narcissism (2016 CSPP)
Trump Thermometer Rating
Trump Trait Evaluation
Predictor
b
95% CI
p
b
95% CI
p
Age
Income
Gender (1 = male)
Education
Race (1 = white)
American identification
Ideology
Partisanship
Racial resentment
Hostile sexism
Authoritarianism
Economic dissatisfaction
Trust
Collective narcissism
Intercept
0.05
0.09
0.02
-0.13
0.004
-0.03
0.05
0.54
0.08
0.09
-0.01
0.05
-0.13
0.27
-0.08
(-0.13, 0.23)
(-0.05, 0.23)
(-0.05, 0.08)
(-0.26, 0.004)
(-0.08, 0.09)
(-0.10, 0.05)
(-0.09, 0.20)
(0.44, 0.64)
(-0.07, 0.23)
(-0.03, 0.22)
(-0.13, 0.10)
(-0.10, 0.19)
(-0.32, 0.05)
(0.11, 0.43)
(-0.25, 0.09)
>0.250
0.190
>0.250
0.057
>0.250
>0.250
>0.250
<0.001
>0.250
0.139
>0.250
>0.250
0.143
0.001
>0.250
0.01
0.04
0.05
-0.13
0.01
-0.02
0.15
0.37
0.02
0.12
-0.04
0.07
-0.14
0.22
0.01
(-0.16, 0.17)
(-0.08, 0.16)
(-0.004, 0.11)
(-0.25, -0.01)
(-0.06, 0.08)
(-0.08, 0.04)
(0.02, 0.29)
(0.28, 0.47)
(-0.12, 0.15)
(0.02, 0.23)
(-0.14, 0.06)
(-0.04, 0.18)
(-0.30, 0.003)
(0.09, 0.36)
(-0.15, 0.16)
>0.250
>0.250
0.069
0.031
>0.250
>0.250
0.026
<0.001
>0.250
0.023
>0.250
0.204
0.056
0.001
>0.250
R2
F (df)
N
0.515
41.72 (14, 787), p<0.001
801
0.497
34.38 (14, 792), p<0.001
806
Note. Entries are ordinary least-squares regression coefficients. Survey weights are applied.
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 19
Figure 1. Probability of self-reported vote for Donald Trump as a function of selected independent variables. Predicted probabilities
based on estimates from Table 2. Panels marked “ns” indicate a non-significant coefficient (p>0.05 or higher).
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 20
Figure 2. Thermometer rating of Donald Trump as a function of collective narcissism. Predicted values based on estimates from Table
3. Panels marked “ns” indicate a non-significant coefficient (p>0.05 or higher).
Collective narcissism and the 2016 vote 21
Figure 3. Trait evaluation of Donald Trump as a function of collective narcissism. Predicted values based on estimates from Table 3.
Panels marked “ns” indicate a non-significant coefficient (p>0.05 or higher).
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Weak Parties and Strong Partisanship Are a Bad Combination
  • Julia Azari
Azari, Julia. 2016. "Weak Parties and Strong Partisanship Are a Bad Combination." Mischiefs of Faction blog at Vox.
Entries are point-biserial correlations for all pairs involving the Trump-vote variable and Pearson correlations in all other cases
  • Note
Note. Entries are point-biserial correlations for all pairs involving the Trump-vote variable and Pearson correlations in all other cases.